I think the question that concludes the post operates on a faulty premise. To "deprive" the "machines" presupposes that the machines have the dignity that human persons have. But this is untrue.
Also the post assumes a sort of dualism: that there is a difference between the CM and the PM. But my understanding is that most scientists reject that view and think that the so-called CM is itself the functioning of the PM. Therefore since dualism is not accepted among scientists, the question whether we ought to pursue the fusion of CM and and machines does not even arise. Rather the question becomes whether scientific technology will reach the point where the brain can be artificially replicated in machines. But this is doubtful since the brain is unique and very complex — Brian A
↪SteveKlinko If there are no waves in your mind, then how is it that you can say "I'm thinking of waves."? Again, I'm not saying that there are actual waves in your head. I'm saying that whatever it is that you think takes the form of the qualia that you experience of the world. To say that you can think of anything is to say that your thoughts take some form for you to even be aware that you are thinking. What form do they take? — Harry Hindu
So, if these waves in your mind have a color, then if direct realism is true, then the waves out there have color and look like the waves in your mind too, right — Harry Hindu
It sounds like you're just presuming that some sort of separate entity exists apart from the brain and it's goings on which has something to do with human consciousness. I contend that the human brain contains the entirety of whatever human consciousness really is.
It's possible that some extra-dimensional plane contains the human consciousness, but we've not much reason to presume this is the case — VagabondSpectre
Relatively simple and small organisms can see, recall, so it should be fairly clear that the conscious awareness that is the seeing doesn't require "a big process in the Brain function".
Whatever is left to explain on how seeing arises from biochemistry is not the big explanatory gap that arises from assuming dualism or representational perception, because a direct realist does not make the latter assumptions. — jkop
How is there any explanatory gap at all, much less a big one, if neural activity IS the model? Again, all you see is a brain, or a model of the brain on a computer screen with different colors representing certain activity in the brain. Just as the model on the computer screen isn't the real brain, the brain you look at when a doctor opens up someone's head is just a visual model of someone's neural activity. — Harry Hindu
Isn't it possible that the Conscious Mind grows along with the Neurons in the Brain and is a separate thing from the Neurons? — SteveKlinko
Yes and no.
The brain is the seat of consciousness. If we meddle with the brain, the consciousness gets meddled with. If the brain gets destroyed, as far as we know the consciousness gets destroyed.
A good analogy here is the difference between computer software and computer hardware:
The hardware houses data and provides physical connect-ability between bits of data.
The software is data contained within the neurons, but more importantly it is the complex way in which individual bits of data connect together which produces a higher function.
The software is dependent upon the hardware (and constrained by it), but is much greater (more complex) than merely the sum of it's parts (it's hardware and also it's bits). There are 100 billion neurons in the human brain, but there are 1000 trillion connections between neurons in the human brain. It is these connections which seems to most plausibly represent the base unit of human cognition.
Like a dance (consciousness), it cannot be defined only by the nature of the dancers (the hardware of the brain), it must also be defined by their movements, including the spaces in-between them. — VagabondSpectre
It is called 'direct' because there is nothing by way of which the objects are seen, neither a process nor a mechanism, so there are no such things to explain.
The seeing, however, is a causation of biochemical processes in the brain, and that's the short explanation of how the capacity to see works. Its detailed explanation is the subject for empirical research. — jkop
No the hard problem has not been solved. Our best guess is that the consciousness is a kind of reflection/illusion produced by matter in the brain.
We cannot identify the neurons of consciousness because we're pretty sure that consciousness has something to do with the way neurons interact with each-other rather than a property of individual neurons.
Consciousness is like a dance in this sense. When the dancers (neurons) are motionless, there is no consciousness. It rises and falls with activity the between them. — VagabondSpectre
When the appearance that you see is the external object that you see there is no gap to explain — jkop
So it would seem like it is well within the jurisdiction of Physics to describe Consciousness some day . — SteveKlinko
But, it's a huge and unresolved argument. It's not as if physicists have agreed on what it means - they don't agree at all. The existence of 'the observer effect' is a great unresolved mystery. Here is an essay on it. — Wayfarer
It's time to start thinking in different ways. — SteveKlinko
Right, so why are you stuck in dualism?
Direct realism is a better assumption as defended by Searle, or Putnam.
Perception has no interface between the brain's causation of becoming aware of what you see, and the causal chain to what you become aware of; the latter sets the conditions for what you will perceive.
The visual system does not produce a "result" that would be "looked" at by some inner homunculus. Instead it produces the looking-part of the experience, whereas the present features of the external object sets the conditions of what the object-part of the experience will appear like. For example, if a door is open, then it will be an open door that you see. Looking at some result of your own brain events would amount to blindness or hallucination — jkop
The implication of indirect realism is that what we experience is a model of the world, not the world as it is. This means that when we look at someone's brain, the brain we experience is a visual model, not the the way it really is. We too often think of it as the other way around - that what we see is real, and then we run into the problem of how the brain generates the model we experience. If we were to think of it in reverse - that what is real is "out there", and "in here" is the model, then we can understand the reason why we can't experience someone else's experiences - or mental activity. The brain that we see is a model of their mental activity that is happening "out there" in the way that it does whether or not someone is looking at it or not. You might say that the brain we experience visually is the model of all of their mental activity, including their conscious experience. — Harry Hindu
The Conscious Mind is definitely using the same Physical Signals as the Visual System. The Inner Light (Conscious Light) is correlated with these Signals. It still defies Physical explanation what the Conscious Light is. It can not be found in the Physical Mind (Brain) yet. We have been waiting too long for the Physical explanation of Consciousness. It's time to start thinking in different ways. The Conscious Space and the Conscious Mind concepts are primarily thought experiments to see if there might be some new way of approaching the problem.Regardless of whether we call it an organ or inner light, what signals does it use? If it is using the same signals as the visual system, then whence the addition of "inner light" that is supposedly "looking" at the alleged construction or "result" of the visual system? — jkop
The visual system uses Nerve signals from the Retina to construct the scene we are looking at with our own internal Conscious Light. — SteveKlinko
What organ is that? What signals would it use? — jkop
Certainly Quantum Physic has talked about the effect of Consciousness on results of certain experiments. So it would seem like it is well within the jurisdiction of Physics to describe Consciousness some day .All this means is that physics hasn't described consciousness — Harry Hindu
It's not in the business of trying to 'describe consciousness'. What it describes is the motion of objects. It's amazing the number of people who don't seem to get that — Wayfarer
Maybe I should have simply asked How do we See?, not What does it Mean to See?↪Wayfarer What about a life-form that isn't conscious, like a starfish, that has eyes, but no central nervous system with a brain?
But what does it really mean to See? — SteveKlinko
What it means to see is that you are using light as a source of information about the world. We know this is true because we don't have any information about the world when there is no light. Actually, the only information we have is that there is no light symbolized by our visual field covered in black. — Harry Hindu
First of all Conscious Life Forms like us are Physical Things. That's just a fact. I say First Of All with the implication that there is a Second of All at least here. I go on to talk about the Conscious aspect of the whole thing.But what does it really mean to See? A conscious life form is first of all a Physical Thing — SteveKlinko
Actually, that is not so. 'A conscious life-form ' is a subject, in our case - we assimilate the information from an object, but we also interpret it and integrate it into our already-existing knowledge. In other words, we judge its meaning. Physical things don't do that. The assertion simply assumes 'physicalism' is the case. — Wayfarer
The next sentence says It is now Nerve Impulses and Nerve Firings. That's the something else.As soon as the Physical Light hits the Retina it is turned into something else as it transmitted to the Cortex. It is now Nerve Impulses and Nerve Firings. — SteveKlinko
Sure, the light hits the retina and thereby starts a causal chain of biochemical reactions. But you say more: that the light would be turned into "something else", and "transmitted" to the cortex. :-} — jkop
Is it physically possible even for nerves and neurons to transmit "something..." (what?) ..as if the cortex would be a TV?
I don't think it is necessary for an observer's visual system to transmit anything when there is the presence of an object and light that reflects its present features. Only the latter are necessary for the visual system to see something. — jkop
I don't know if it's necessary or not but your visual system is doing that.I don't think it is necessary for an observer's visual system to transmit anything when there is the presence of an object and light that reflects its present features. Only the latter are necessary for the visual system to see something — jkop
The visual system uses Nerve signals from the Retina to construct the scene we are looking at with our own internal Conscious Light. The Light scene you see is correlated to the external scene when we are awake. The Light scene you see when you are Dreaming is made out of the same Conscious Light stuff as the Light scene when you are awake but it is not correlated to any external scene. How the Visual system creates the Conscious Light scene is the David Chalmers Hard Problem of Consciousness as described in The Conscious Mind. The lack of understanding of how the Conscious Experience occurs is the Explanatory Gap as proposed by Joseph Levine in Materialism and Qualia. Maybe you are more familiar with the term Qualia in which case when I say Conscious Light it is the same as the Light Qualia. The fact that we don't know how this works yet is the 800 pound Gorilla in the Consciousness room.If we only see our own internal lights, then how could they ever be correlated to something external that we supposedly don't see? It seems inconsistent. — jkop
If you see the colour directly, then there is no gap to explain. The colour experience is partly set by the optics, and partly by your background capacities and habits which enable you to see it. — jkop
I also find this thinking too reductionist. While I understand the inclination to seek such a hypothesis scientifically, it does nothing at all to resolve the actual problems of conceptuality, and so it actually does science a disservice. Personally I find the issue of individual consciousness itself turns into a solipsistic red herring. Most of the ideas I know are not my own, but other peoples', so by the same extrapolation you refer to, I don't feel that beliefs based upon them are my own beliefs either, but rather just inserted into me, like fake limbs, by other people. I have been led to understand that is a very rare experience, but that is how I feel about them, and I feel if all the things I had learned from other people did not exist, but I had some kind of 'self consciousness' regardless, it would probably be on the level of awareness of a pet cat. — ernestm