However, if we are talking about Kant, this is not what Kant meant by “a priori”. In this different context, the term “a priori” as used by Kant has a different meaning — RussellA

In case you’re interested, here’s a link to an article by Lorenz—“Kant's Doctrine Of The A Priori In The Light Of Contemporary Biology.”

https://archive.org/details/KantsDoctrineOfTheAPrioriInTheLightOfContemporaryBiologyKonradLorenz

From that if/then, follows necessarily that because noumena are not phenomena, noumena cannot be entities, insofar as phenomena are necessarily representational entities, within that metaphysics demanding that status of them. — Mww

Agreed.

But there isn’t talk of noumena other than the validity of it as a mere transcendental conception, having no prescriptive properties belonging to it. There is no possible talk whatsoever of any specific noumenal object, which relegates the general conception to representing a mere genus of those things the existence of which cannot be judged impossible but the appearance of which, to humans, is. — Mww

In the context of Taoism, I think of speaking the unspeakable as something of a joke, or at least a self-aware irony. Hey… What else are you gonna do?

As I wrote before: “Kant did not propose that we have knowledge prior to our sensibilities, which we then apply to our sensibilities. Kant proposed in Transcendental Idealism that a priori knowledge is that knowledge derived from our sensibilities that is necessary to make sense of these very same sensibilities.” — RussellA

Yes, this is the quote I responded to. Unless I’ve misunderstood you, this is not how I understand what Kant was saying.

As an analogy, suppose you fly over an island about which you have no previous knowledge. You observe stones on the beach in the form of the letters SOS. You may have the thought that these stones rolled into that position accidentally through the forces of nature, whether the wind or waves, but find such a thought almost impossible to believe. The only sensible explanation for your observation would be the existence of a human agency, even if you have no direct knowledge of such human agency. — RussellA

Again, this is not my understanding of what a priori means. As I wrote previously, I see it as knowledge we have as part of our human nature. It’s built into us.

I don't buy this mystical woo woo interpretation of most ancient philosophers. It amounts to cognitive & spiritual nihilism if taken seriously. — Sirius

Then we probably don’t have much to talk about.

Noumena is in the plural. If it's just that which is unknown or beyond naming, then why does it have a singular & plural form which Kant uses (knowingly) throughout his book ? — Sirius

As I mentioned in that post, the Taoist idea of the Tao is similar to Kant’s noumena, but there are differences. At the same time, I think they’re talking about the same unnameable… The Tao is not spoken of in the singular and plural. There is only the One.

I see this common misinterpretation of Kant a result of Schopenhauer's conscious reinterpretation of Kant gaining currency in the public imagination. Unfortunately, even this involves misunderstandings since Schopenhauer has no room for "thing in itself" in his philosophy — Sirius

The idea that reality is an unnamable One is not limited to Kant or Lao Tzu. It is common in many philosophies. There comes a point when you can’t count on what other people say and you have to just look for yourself.

It is obviously, clearly, not unintelligible to posit unintelligible objects. Its just pointless. It would be unintelligible (and its obviously, because this isn't possible - which is essentially what the term claims) to posit a specific unintelligible object. That is not what's being done in those sorts of theories. — AmadeusD

This is something I’ve struggled with, but I will say it is not obvious and clear.

Kant did not propose that we have knowledge prior to our sensibilities, which we then apply to our sensibilities. Kant proposed in Transcendental Idealism that a priori knowledge is that knowledge derived from our sensibilities that is necessary to make sense of these very same sensibilities. — RussellA

I am certainly not a Kant scholar, but it’s my understanding that he did see a priori knowledge as coming before any sensory input. It’s part of our human nature. Konrad Lorenz claims that that knowledge results from biological and neurological Darwinian evolution. That makes a lot of sense to me.

The proof: there is no such thing as a noumenal entity, for the human intelligence, which is to say Kant does not allow positing entities beyond intelligibility. To posit that which understanding cannot think, is impossible. — Mww

I think you’re right. If noumena aren’t phenomena, then they aren’t entities. In Taoism, the Tao, which cannot be spoken, is, as I understand it, not a thing at all. If it’s not a thing, then it doesn’t really exist at all. Taoists sometimes call it non-being. If it doesn’t exist, then it can’t be posited.

Of course, that leads to the irony that we’re here talking about what can’t be talked about. Eastern philosophies seem more comfortable accepting that than western philosophies do.

I don’t remember that at all. It doesn’t sound like something I would agree with. — T Clark

You’re right. This is the quote from three years ago that you linked.

A charitable interpretation of T Clark’s position is that he is not saying, for example, that in a discussion entitled “What is truth?” we have to agree on what truth is at the start to make any progress—that obviously couldn’t work—but that in a discussion about something else, some other concept, one that depends on the concept of truth, a way of directing the debate is to decide on the definitions of those dependencies, otherwise the wrangling over definitions never ends. — Jamal

I did agree with that then and I do agree with it now. It was misleading for me to call you out on that in my post to @Ludwig V.

which is that you don't begin a philosophical discussion with the definition of the concept you centrally want to discuss, but it can help, for the sake of argument, to define any supporting concepts. — Jamal

I don’t remember that at all. It doesn’t sound like something I would agree with.

He was banned 3 years ago. — Tom Storm

It still makes me sad, although those fucking Australians are always causing trouble.

But no definition (rule) can cater for all future possibilities - there can always be cases where interpretations of the rule differ. There's no reason why these can't be sorted out, but they can only be sorted out when they appear; they cannot be sorted out in advance. — Ludwig V

As I noted previously, this is why our discussions of metaphysics never get beneath the surface—why we repeat the same arguments over and over again.

It’s good to see @Streetlight’s byline back on the front page.

I understand where you are coming from. — Sirius

Well, I must admit I have no idea where you’re coming from. I learned a new word recently— incommensurable. That’s what your philosophy and mine are. That’s not a criticism, you really sound like you know what you’re talking about. It’s just that I see things really differently.

The possibility of metaphysics hinges on metaphysical naturalism & its adjacent views like materialism, empiricism (YES), nominalism, mechanism being flawed or incomplete. — Sirius

It is my understanding, which admittedly is not deep, that ancient philosophers were not materialists or empiricists. For them, the world was infused with spirit and human value.

This is an interesting idea. I have so many questions. But it seems better to read the book and then ask questions. It's 200 pages, so that will take time. It's a pity, but perhaps there will be an opportunity on another occasion. I have downloaded the book. — Ludwig V

For what it’s worth, the big ideas are upfront in the first few chapters. The rest of the book tracks the implications and gives some examples. And there will definitely be plenty of more opportunities to discuss. Metaphysics pops up at least a couple of times a month.

"Definitions first" is a recipe for stalling. "Definitions last" would be a lot more realistic. — Ludwig V

@Jamal and I have disagreed about this in the past. This thread provides good evidence that you need to put your money down on specific definitions or you’ll never be able to discuss beyond just the surface of metaphysics. If we come back in a month and have the same discussion, the same arguments will just get recycled over and over without ever having a resolution. If you want to go deeper, you have to commit.

With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion." — 180 Proof

More bigoted baloney.

I can't grasp what you are trying to say about the context. To differentiate between this object, as a brussels sprout and that object, as an eggplant, is to make a judgement. This is regardless of whether you are saying that you prefer one to the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

Seems to me by your standard just about any statement would be a judgment.

That is clearly an act of judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, not in the context we’re using here. It says nothing about brussels sprouts or eggplant. It only says something about me. I am not judging eggplant. If I said “eggplant is bad,” that would be a judgment about eggplant.

But isn't judging inherent within or nature? It's just what we do, we judge all sorts of things. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think valuing, choosing, and liking are inevitable, but those are not the same as judging. If I choose brussels sprouts over eggplant, that doesn’t say anything about eggplant except that I prefer brussels sprouts. It doesn’t mean that eggplant is bad, although it is, as a matter of fact, very very bad.

Ethics are necessary and functional, but not to civilize the evil out; rather, because mind/history has alienated us from our nature — ENOAH

This is from Gia-Fu Feng’s translation of Verse 57 of the Tao Te Ching.

The more laws and restrictions there are,
The poorer people become.
The sharper men's weapons,
The more trouble in the land.
The more ingenious and clever men are,
The more strange things happen.
The more rules and regulations,
The more thieves and robbers.

So, ethics, etc., albeit functional, yranscend our nature, creating a "fictional" domain in which only humans operate and experience. — ENOAH

This makes sense, although I don’t see it as a negative thing as much as you do.

So completely that the latter has virtually displaced the former, alienating the human animal from our nature — ENOAH

When you get into larger groups of people, I think that's inevitable. When that happens, you need rules to keep the wheels of social discourse lubricated.

That bonding is the real source of our so called ethics. But our so called ethics are made up. — ENOAH

I think there is truth in this but I think it might hide the fact that, although what you call bonding may be the source of ethics, they are completely different things. Bonding, empathy, is something personal while ethics is social. Bonding deals with emotions while ethics deals with rules. Bonding is done without premeditation or expectation but ethics is done with the expectation of reward or punishment.

I was thinking about saying even a society without bonding would need social rules, ethics. But then I realized such a society might not even be possible.

How do we achieve or pursue metaphysical clarity? — Moliere

Geez, now you're going to make me put my money where my mouth is. I'll take a first swing at it. Here are some characteristics of metaphysically clear writing:

• Important terms are identified and defined.
• Underlying assumptions are explicitly identified.
• The scope of the discussion is laid out explicitly--what issues and questions, or at least what kinds of issues and questions, are being addressed.
• Describe the uses and consequences of the particular metaphysical positions being discussed.

As I noted, this is a first take. I don't like it much. Definitely needs work. Beyond what's on the list, just general good writing rules also apply.

I've been listening to William James recently. He writes wonderfully clearly about metaphysics. I'll think more about what I like about his work to tighten up my thoughts.

Long ago I remember reading a piece by Isaiah Berlin about philosophy (reference forgotten) that claimed that philosophy is about all the questions that nobody knows how to answer. That caught my attention and eventually sucked me into philosophy. It would explain the phenomena. — Ludwig V

After 3,000 years I would, and do, suspect there are no answers to the questions.

So it may be that truth or falsity isn't the issue. I've got time for the idea that metaphysics is about how to interpret - think about - the world and life and Grand Questions. Truth is beside the point or perhaps not the whole point. — Ludwig V

I think this is exactly right. It's at the heart of what metaphysics means to me. This is what I posted back on the first page of this thread:

Metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or group of persons, on this or that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking. — R.G. Collingwood - An Essay on Metaphysics

Here's what he says about absolute presuppositions:

Absolute presuppositions are not verifiable. This does not mean that we should like to verify them but are not able to; it means that the idea of verification is an idea which does not apply to them.... — R.G. Collingwood - An Essay on Metaphysics

Natural bonding has been displaced by narratives of good and evil, and those narratives trigger actions which, transcending our natures, are played out in the fictional theatre we construct and call history. — ENOAH

Can’t we say something similar about what happens in all human thought, not just that related to morality?

Metaphysics is about the nature of reality. It's pretty simple. — frank

Yea. It's about ultimate truth, which is why I brought up gothic cathedrals. Metaphysics is tinged with the idea that we're finding a hidden, but grand truth about what's right under our feet. — frank

I don’t get it. If it’s so simple why have people been arguing about it for thousands of years with no resolution in sight—just going around and around and around.

Materialism, realism, idealism, anti-realism, existentialism, stoicism, nihilism, empiricism, rationalism, utilitarianism, and all the other isms—do you really think one of those is right and all the rest are wrong?

It’s hard to define metaphysics, but you can know it by the value it brings. Metaphysics should be in the background of every philosophical discussion. Whether it’s discussed or not, it should at least be recognized. When the metaphysics is ignored or misunderstood, philosophy falls apart.

So true — frank

You left out the most important thing—the “agree with me” part.

Now what? — Moliere

If you’ve read many of my posts, you know the subject of metaphysics comes up all the time. A large portion of the fruitless arguments here on the forum result from lack of metaphysical clarity.

Now what?—Use it.

It's pretty simple. — frank

The contents of this thread, and all the other metaphysics threads, demonstrate it’s not simple at all, although it could be if everyone would just agree with me.

The most important thing I was trying to say was that you are unlikely to find a good definition of metaphysics and then go on to study it. The trick is to get involved in the discussions and let the definition take care of itself. The discussions are much more interesting anyway. — Ludwig V

That would probably be true if metaphysics was just something interesting to talk about as opposed to something really important and useful that has important consequences.

I have a .pdf of a very good, recent textbook on metaphysics. — Wayfarer

Your advice was very good on the Burtt book, so I’ll definitely give it a look.

I was thinking about this some more. The thing about metaphysics for me is that it’s the most useful idea I’ve ever come across. It colors all of my understandings about, not only philosophy, but everything conceptual and intellectual.

So, that’s what I’d say to you, find a definition of metaphysics that you can use as a tool.

(i guess i should have tried to find older threads of a similar type before posting this, I suppose, even though what you have there is much longer method for defining it) — ProtagoranSocratist

It’s rare for someone to go back and look into old threads. The one I linked is four years old. There have been lots of threads on metaphysics in the interim. I wouldn’t have linked it except I thought the interactions among posters on that first page would be helpful to get an overview of how different people think about the subject. As you can see, I was sort of trying to do the same thing that you’re doing here.

Metaphysics is hard. Almost nobody agrees on what it actually means. That’s why I was pleased to find Collingwood. I found something that suits me and I can stick with it and don’t have to rethink it every time this subject comes up.

Metaphysics is my thing and my man is R.G. Collingwood. He wrote “An Essay on Metaphysics.” In it he wrote that metaphysics is the study of absolute presuppositions. Absolute presuppositions are the unspoken, perhaps unconscious, assumptions that underpin how we understand reality.

Metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or group of persons, on this or that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking. — R.G. Collingwood - An Essay on Metaphysics

Here's what he says about absolute presuppositions:

Absolute presuppositions are not verifiable. This does not mean that we should like to verify them but are not able to; it means that the idea of verification is an idea which does not apply to them.... — R.G. Collingwood - An Essay on Metaphysics

An understanding of what is meant by "absolute presupposition" is at the heart of this approach. As I understand it, its two most important aspects are 1) that its application can be limited, as Collingwood notes, to specific people, at a particular time, for a particular purpose. And 2) that it can be neither true nor false. The value that an absolute presupposition has is dependent on it's usefulness for a particular purpose, not its truth value.

There's obviously a lot more to say about this. I'll try to give an example of what this means in a clearer context. I've taken this from E.A. Burtt's "The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science." A great book. It's his summary of the changes that took place in scientific metaphysics during the 1600s with the work of Copernicus, Kepler, Descartes, Newton, and all those other guys.

We have observed that the heart of the new scientific metaphysics is to be found in the ascription of ultimate reality and causal efficacy to the world of mathematics, which world is identified with the realm of material bodies moving in space and time. Expressed somewhat more fully, three essential points are to be distinguished in the transformation which issued in the victory of this metaphysical view; there is a change in the prevailing conception (1) of reality, (2) of causality, and (3) of the human mind.

First, the real world in which man lives is no longer regarded as a world of substances possessed of as many ultimate qualities as can be experienced in them, but has become a world of atoms (now electrons), equipped with none but mathematical characteristics and moving according to laws fully statable in mathematical form.

Second, explanations in terms of forms and final causes of events, both in this world and in the less independent realm of mind, have been definitely set aside in favour of explanations in terms of their simplest elements, the latter related temporally as efficient causes, and being mechanically treatable motions of bodies wherever it is possible so to regard them. In connexion with this aspect of the change, God ceased to be regarded as a Supreme Final Cause, and, where still believed in, became the First Efficient Cause of the world. Man likewise lost the high place over against nature which had been his as a part of the earlier teleological hierarchy, and his mind came to be described as a combination of sensations (now reactions) instead of in terms of the scholastic faculties.

Third, the attempt by philosophers of science in the light of these two changes to re-describe the relation of the human mind to nature, expressed itself in the popular form of the Cartesian dualism, with its doctrine of primary and secondary qualities, its location of the mind in a corner of the brain, and its account of the mechanical genesis of sensation and idea. These changes have conditioned practically the whole of modern exact thinking. — E.A. Burtt - The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science

One more thing--If you want a quick overview of all the things "metaphysics" might mean, this is a link to an old discussion. In the OP I lay out a bunch of definitions then in the first few posts, others put in their own $0.02 worth.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12096/what-is-metaphysics-yet-again/p1

Well, if you say belief in God and solipsism are metaphysically equivalent, it sounds like you're saying they contain the same metaphysical outlook.

If you say they're epistemically equivalent, it would sound like you're saying the two are the same with regard to what the holder of the belief actually knows. — frank

Interesting. Maybe both. I’ll have to think about it more.

Metaphysically? or do you mean epistemically? — frank

Hmm… explain the difference in this case.

@frank

As I have followed along in this thread, it struck me that solipsism, the simulation argument, and belief in God are equivalent metaphysically.