But rationality WAS decisive for both of us. Contrast our rational choices with IRRATIONAL means of making a choice: basing it on the alignment of the planets, consulting a Ouija board, or basing it on an inscription in a fortune cookie. — Relativist

I’ve been thinking about this and I’m not sure you’re right. I guess it depends on whether he didn’t take the bet because he really thought the odds were against him or because Hume said he shouldn’t.

He is not going to recommend that you abandon your science or your common sense. But he is going to ask you to abandon your arrogance and righteousness. — unenlightened

This seems like kind of an arrogant and righteous comment.

While for the last fifty years or so the news has been reporting many issues that threatens to effect our lives there has been one problem that hasn't been really talked about and that there is a problem that world population is not only not growing but it is actually deceasing world wide. In many of the industrial countries of the world there is talk that there isn't going to be even younger working age people to do enough work to support those that are retired. I wonder what the thoughts are of the members of this forum on this subject. — dclements

This is an issue that gets talked about all the time, including here on the forum. The current world population is about 8 billion. That’s expected to reach about 11 billion within 70 years I think. Then it’s supposed to shrink. I don’t think that takes into account the possible consequences of climate change.

This is a truly bizarre argument. I give up.

We rarely have enough information to prove something true beyond all doubt, so navigating through life entails making informed, rational predictions and decisions. Occasionally, wild guesses work out, but informed, rational decisions are more apt to do so. Example: for any given vaccine, it's possible it will do more harm than good, but we can look at studies (or trust those who've done so) to weight the good vs the bad. — Relativist

I would go a step further. It would be irrational not to do things the way you’ve described.

It seems to me there could be a scifi story in what you're saying. If we came up with a way of thinking about something that actually changed its behavior, and it never behaved that way before we came up with that way of thinking about it. That would be pretty amazing. — Patterner

Did you ever read the “Lathe of Heaven” by Ursula LeGuin? It’s not exactly what you described but it has a lot in common. Really good book. Pretty good movie.

I have already explained why it would not have been rational, viz. that your offering the bet in circumstances where you had expertise that I lacked, especially when you had been plying me with alcohol made me suspect a scam. Thus I had legitimate Wittgensteinian reasons for doubt in the particular circumstances. — unenlightened

This is why we pragmatists rule the world.

This is a point very specific to Peircean semiotics and hierarchy theory...

If you have black and white as two complementary extremes, you must also have all the shades of grey which a black and white mixes. And that makes for a triadic story of complexity. This is a simplistic example. But you can see how it makes threeness the irreducible basis of a world with complex relations. You’ve got to break possibility apart in a way it then can relate over all its scales of being — apokrisis

I can never figure out what you mean when you talk about Peircean triads. Is it the degrees of freedom below, the constraints above, and the resulting phenomena?

Well the crowd I mixed with were mainly ecologists and biologists. — apokrisis

Even as an engineer I was sometimes frustrated by the clunky, short-sighted approach, but those were the standards of practice.

How could you - as an ecologist - even argue with someone who only thinks as a mechanist. — apokrisis

Although I'm not a ecologist, that's what I'm trying to do here.

Because cause is what people are often interested in. And precisely because systems are often complex, describing it is too much, if possible at all. — hypericin

If you can't thoroughly describe a system, you can't express it in terms of causes either.

That A casually impinges on B is both of practical significance and is a metaphysical reality. — hypericin

My point in this discussion is to show that causality is only of practical significance in a limited number of mostly artificial cases. I'm not sure what you mean by "metaphysical reality."

That your history of smoking is a casual antecedent to your lung cancer, while brushing your teeth isn't, is an interesting and real feature of the world. But, as you point out, the way it is a casual antecedent is usually quite complex, in a way that the language of cause doesn't easily capture. The word "cause" seems to imply a billiard ball view, where the cause solely produced the effect, which confuses and obscuring the reality, especially of very complex events such as wars, elections, and ecologies. But this doesn't mean we should throw out casualty entirely. — hypericin

I agree with this. The bolded text in particular states my position well. I don't propose to throw out causality entirely, but I would limit it's use to specific cases where it is useful.

I'll just leave it there, and see if it appeals to anyone else. I think you didn't understand Hume's problem in the first place, so an argument that addresses it might like — unenlightened

You still haven’t answered my question. Would your decision to take the bet be rational?

I won't take your bet, — unenlightened

Too late, you already took the bet. The question is was your decision rational? If you say no, it’s kind of hard to take your argument seriously.

imagine a world where the future is not always like the past. — unenlightened

I don’t have to imagine it, I live in the world where the future is not always like The past.

In other words, if the future fails to be connected to the past and related to it, it fails to be the future. The future is necessarily similar to the past, otherwise it is not the future. The timeline has to hold together, or else it is broken, and a broken timeline is not a timeline at all. — unenlightened

Sorry, I really don’t understand this argument

The problem is that it is not rational, in the sense that no amount of past evidence can constrain the future in any way, logically. And you just saying it seems rational does not make it so either. It goes something like this: — unenlightened

So let’s say you and I are sitting out on my front porch drinking whiskey sours. I live on a pretty busy road so cars are going by often. Let’s say every 30 seconds. We sit there for 10 minutes or so watching cars go by and keeping track. During that time 20 cars go by. Fifteen of them have Massachusetts plates, two have Rhode Island plates, and three have New Hampshire plates.

Then I say “I’ll bet you $50 the next car will have Rhode Island plates?“ You say “sure.” I’d say your decision to take that bet was rational.

But because my memory is sometimes unreliable does not mean that I can or should never rely on it, because even the interpretation of immediate sense data relies on memory, and thus there is nothing at all without it. — unenlightened

It seems to me the reliance on memory you are talking about is rational. So, what’s the problem?

ordinary usage intervenes. — bert1

I’m a big fan of ordinary usage, but it comes into conflict with philosopher’s desire to make up new definitions and new words.

I've been been considering whether the distinction between intentional cause and non intentional is sustainable. I think it may be, but the non intentional would be derived from the intentional. The only causes we actually know about are intentional. Other causes are often attributed to laws, which are descriptive and don't need the notion of cause to work, perhaps. Not sure. — bert1

Off the top of my head, this makes sense to me, but I haven’t spent a lot of time thinking about intentional cause. I specifically left it out of this thread because I didn’t want to complicate things.

You don't see the value of the distinction between rational and irrational? — unenlightened

Hume’s idea of legitimate belief is not irrational. If anything it’s non-rational. Very few of our beliefs are rational. Even fewer are irrational. The large majority are non-rational. Rational belief comes into play when a monkey wrench gets thrown in the machinery.

Or memory and imagination? — unenlightened

I don’t understand how this is relevant.

This is supposedly in line with what working class and lower middle class people do prefer, in comparison with the suggestions of OP, which is more in line with the ideas of progressive people of more prosperous beginnings. — Ansiktsburk

Good post. As a registered Democrat here in the US, what you’ve written is in line with my criticism of the party. We’ve lost contact with our purpose.

I hadn’t heard of Bourdieu. Sounds interesting. Any particular recommendation?

My initial interest was in how the idea of cause applies to historical events (which is terribly fraught, slightly different and more nebulous to the matters you have raised). — Tom Storm

Yes, the whole distinction between events that are intentional versus those that are not seems to complicate all of the discussions I’ve looked at. As I noted earlier, that’s why I avoided the whole subject of human causation. That doesn’t mean none of the issues discussed in this thread is relevant.

Quoting Freud is ironically more a disproof of your claim than anything else. He didn't recognize two different types, he guessed. Thankfully no one really buys that anymore. — Darkneos

None of this is true

Now how on Earth could anyone discover that, other than just guessing in a manner of which seems to offer no room for any argument to the contrary? — Outlander

It didn't say Freud discovered it. It said he recognized it. I also recognize it based on my own experience. I wouldn't have put it in my post otherwise.

But a philosopher pauses and asks about rational truth. Pausing seems like a suspension of everyday action and pragmatism, the things to be done. There is a relationship between the philosopher's contemplation (pausing) and not following inductive everyday life, if one can say such a thing. — JuanZu

I don't see the value in this kind of distinction. How do you see it?

But then, I find the same can be said of "what's responsible for what": what is responsible for my sink being clogged; what's responsible for my window not opening; and so forth. — javra

Again, I didn't say the idea of causality is never useful, only that it's usefulness is limited. I tried to give examples of what I was talking about in the OP.

However they may be thought to do it, non-human animals too operate by discernment of the same, both in terms of who and what as being responsible for what. We humans just term this issue one of causation. — javra

Causality is a human concept. Animals, at least the great majority of them, don't recognize causes. They just act in accordance with their nature given the conditions they encounter.

The invitation in your OP was to consider how we use the word"cause", and you showed that causal chains and inferring probabilistic causes are quite different ways of speaking. — Banno

That's what I was trying to do. I don't think I've been very successful.

Unfortunately, what you are talking about may be clear in your own mind, but it's not clear to my simple mind. — Gnomon

Did you read all my posts? I'm guessing you didn't.

This is a great summary of the "blooming, buzzing confusion." Better than the one I've presented in the OP and my subsequent posts in this thread.

You feel the notion of causality is too simple to deal with the complexities of reality. Applying its simple rules quickly becomes defeated by the fact that reality is just too much to be boiled down into chains of cause and effect. Everything is too networked, too interdependent, too full of feedback and strange loops. Stuff emerges. Things are transformed. Growth and development leave linear tales of cause and effect fast behind. — apokrisis

Yes.

Which is all true. But that is only to say that Nature is not a machine. A machine is designed to have a mechanical logic, a cause and effect linearity. It can be described in terms of a blueprint and a system of differential equations. But Nature is irreducibly complex. Or at least that is the conclusion of the systems science tradition that has sought a better model of natural causality - the causality of a cosmos - since philosophy first started cranking up. — apokrisis

Maybe this is where our differences start. From what I've observed, most people don't recognize the irreducibly complex reality you describe. For them, causality means simple systems--billiard balls. That's the curse of reductionism. That's what I'm talking about. Your complex and nuanced understanding of causality is not how most people understand it. We civil engineers don't work with machinery, we go out into nature and treat it as machinery. We're not the only ones.

Massively large calculations could hope to do a reasonable approximation of the intricate patterns of connection that make up any natural system. One could simulate the weather, the internals of a proton, the boom and bust of fishing stocks or stock markets. Networks of feedback arranged into hierarchies of such networks over logarithmic scale. Throw in phase transition behaviour too. It’s all become standard causal modelling. — apokrisis

I was going to mention numerical monitoring in my OP, but I didn't think I could do it justice. I'm not a modeler, but I have worked with them. We used groundwater and river flow models often in my work. I was going to use modeling as an example of the kinds of efforts required to overcome a knee-jerk dependence on causal processes. In a model you break up reality into little cells and apply simple causal processes within and between those cells. That just brings us back to my original question. When you're dealing with such a complex system, why do you need the idea of causality? Of course reality can be described using the language of cause, but why do it?

Well the history of humanity seems to suggest no. The problem is more the lag between the partial reductionst models and the later arrival of the more holistic models. We are already running at one level of inquiry before having learnt to walk at the next. — apokrisis

This makes sense to me.

Nope, not how it works. — Darkneos

Yup, that’s how it works. From the web.

Freud recognized two different types of processes, the preconscious, which contains thoughts that can easily become conscious, and the unconscious proper, which holds repressed material that cannot be directly accessed.

In Hume, legitimate beliefs exist. They occur in a process of recurrent association. A belief is legitimate when it is associated with a vivid impression. For example, the belief that one object will move after another is based on past experience of their constant conjunction. Hume concluded that fundamental beliefs, such as the existence of an external world or the existence of the self, are not rationally justifiable but are legitimate because they are the result of experience and custom. — JuanZu

So, you can’t trust induction, so just act as if you can. After all, what else are you going to do? Seems kind of a cheat. It’s not rational, but it’s legitimate. What other use is there for rationality other than to help us figure out what to do?

How can you, or anyone else, uphold responsibility sans “the whole idea of causality”? — javra

I posted this earlier in this thread.

there are everyday, common sense situations where the chain of causality is simple--as you called them "brute force causes." I would have no problem with saying I hit the ball in the pocket. I caused the ball to go in the pocket. At human scale that kind of judgment is necessarily so I can be held accountable for my actions. — T Clark

That’s why I don’t claim the idea of causality is useless in all situations.

As with many, if not most, disagreements on this forum, the controversy hinges on the definition of key terms. — Gnomon

In the OP and subsequent posts, I think I’ve made it reasonably clear what I’m talking about when I say “causality.”

But scientists & philosophers tend to assume Universal Causation as an axiom, despite the rare exceptions. — Gnomon

This is not true. Many do not.

But I’ve come to prefer a version of the so-called Transference theory of causation, where causation ought to be reduced to the transference of physical conserved quantities, like “momentum” or “energy”, from one object to another. Though I’m not sure I believe in “physical conserved quantities”, it is at least intuitive and empirical to say that one object hitting another caused the other to move. — NOS4A2

I’ve come to the same sort of conclusion you have— looking at cause, efficient cause, is a question of the transfer of energy. That doesn’t change the primary question in this thread, i.e. is the whole idea of causality useful in most situations? My answer is “no” or at least “maybe not”

That the reed hitting the black on the billiard table, causing it to move, is a different sort of explanation to that you went to the fridge because you wanted a beer, and different again to vaccinations causing the number of measles cases to decline. — Banno

I intentionally left out instances where a human motivation was involved because I wanted to avoid the complications associated with that. I think the difference between the billiard balls and the inoculations is the difference between a very simple instance where efficient cause probably does make sense and a more complicated one where it might not.

it's more a way of offering an explanation than some underlying universal mechanism. — Banno

I understand this, but I think it’s not a useful way of looking at things.

Don't be insulted. — apokrisis

I’m not insulted at all. I was just making an observation. I think this post confirms my observation is correct.

Well we can't really be aware of our internal mental processes since much of it happens unconsciously. — Darkneos

Sure we can. You’re right that you don’t have access to everything. But then again, the kinds of subjects that philosophy covers tend to be associated with conscious attention and intention. It’s also true that the more aware you become, the more of your unconscious mental activity becomes conscious.

Not sure if we even live on the same planet. — apokrisis

Even I'm not sure the US is on the same planet as everyone else these days.

There is indeed a reason for confusion. You have glimpses of fragments and they all seem to come from different puzzles. — apokrisis

It's clear from this thread I'm working on pulling my thoughts on this subject together. I don't think that's the same thing as glimpsing fragments from different puzzles.

This could take a while.... — apokrisis

Yes, I knew I was in trouble when you brought Peircian triads into the discussion.

And there will be those who just love such an answer.

But there is a reason why pragmatism describes it as the natural state of the newborn helpless babe when thrust kicking and screaming into the strange new world.

We start with the simple things so as to move on to the complicated things. Or in your case, its a shrug of the shoulders? Once you seem to be getting by, why should other folk still be working hard to get ahead? — apokrisis

A bit condescending.

I'm saying the reason the 8 ball moved is the physical impact of the cue ball, and the reason the cue moved is your decision to move it. Those seem very different to me. — Patterner

I see what you mean, but I tried to keep human intention out of the question. I can see I kind of slipped some in.

Wouldn't one response be, T Clark, that identifying a dichotomy also depends on were you look? That what constitutes a dichotomy is also a matter of convention, at least as much as a matter of fact? — Banno

To tell the truth, I'm not really sure what @apokrisis means by "dichotomy" in this context.

Nice OP! — hypericin

Thank you.

I feel you have demonstrated less that cause is not a useful concept, but that the concept needs a lot of refinement to generalize beyond toy cases. The problem is that people want to take the toy concept and apply it to everything. — hypericin

Do you consider the description of the salt marsh I discussed as a "toy case?" If so, I disagree.

In a family tree there is a orderly relationship between causes and effects, where every effect has two immediate causes, four nearest proximate causes, 8 second nearest, and so on. In reality there is no such order. any event may have any number of causes, arising from anywhere on the graph. Effects of a cause may even simultaneously serve as a cause of the cause, in the case of feedback loops. — hypericin

The question I've been asking is--if it is such a complex system of events, why bring the idea of causality into it at all. Why not just describe the system? To be clear, I acknowledge it is possible to express just about any situation in the language of causality, it's just that in many, most, cases it doesn't add anything to the discussion.

Peirce had his model of tychism or the probability of propensities. Popper recapitulated it. So the idea has been taken seriously. — apokrisis

I looked up "propensity probability" on Wikipedia and it said this:

Propensities are not relative frequencies, but purported causes of the observed stable relative frequencies. Propensities are invoked to explain why repeating a certain kind of experiment will generate a given outcome type at a persistent rate. Stable long-run frequencies are a manifestation of invariant single-case probabilities. — Wikipedia

That seems like a patch to me. A patch to cover the hole in the idea of causality related to what I called as probabilistic causality.

Something that interests me greatly is the singularity of the effect that cannot be reduced. — JuanZu

I'm not sure what you mean in this context. Previously I suggested just describing the conditions rather than attributing causality. Is that the same thing you are talking about.