But again, resolving a bad case of Cartesian anxiety is probably not on anyone's agenda, philosophically -- if by "resolving" we mean actually finding certainty of the sort Descartes longed for. — J

There's a section of The Embodied Mind, Thompson et al, named after it. It's not a matter of resolving it in the sense of providing the longed-for certainty, but critiquing the conceptual and cognitive framework which gave rise to it.

There is no one obviously correct story. — J

No 'meta-narratives'. I get that. Although one little-known book I read about five years does a great job explicating it, Defragmenting Modernity, Paul Tyson.

Science relies for its practice on no particular metaphysical beliefs. — Janus

If you're familiar with philosophy of science, E A Burtt's Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, in particular, you will see that this is completely mistaken. The 'metaphysical belief' in question being early modern science's division of primary and secondary attributes, overlaid on the Cartesian separation of mind and matter. It's metaphysical through and through, but then 'metaphysics' is consigned to terra incognito, so the way in which it is metaphysical becomes one of the things we're enjoined to ignore.

Similarly, I think I know what you mean when you talk about the early-modern quest for certainty; there's no doubt that epistemological concerns have characterized much of philosophy since Descartes. — J

Ever come across the expression 'the Cartesian anxiety?'

Cartesian anxiety refers to the notion that, since René Descartes posited his influential form of body-mind dualism, Western civilization has suffered from a longing for ontological certainty, or feeling that scientific methods, and especially the study of the world as a thing separate from ourselves, should be able to lead us to a firm and unchanging knowledge of ourselves and the world around us. The term is named after Descartes because of his well-known emphasis on "mind" as different from "body", "self" as different from "other".

Richard J. Bernstein coined and used the term in his 1983 book Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis,

such talk is no longer philosophical discourse, in my understanding — J

For the greater part of Western cultural history, philosophy was woven into a fabric which included poetry, theology, fiction, art and drama. It's the 'fragmentation of being' which has given rise to the separation and specialisation charateristic of modern philosophy.

The person pursuing love/in love would fight you tooth-and-nail if you were to say that this was just an attachment. The surge of hormonal response to someone who has won at love, would rebel to such a degree, that your nothingness would be thrown aside for the sweet embrace of eros-turned-philia that a stable long-term relationship might take. — schopenhauer1

Consider early Buddhism - Gautama said to be of noble birth, who renounces home and family life in pursuit of liberation. (The meaning of the name of his son, Rāhula, who joined the sangha and was also considered arahant, was 'fetter'.) This is axial-age philosophy - similar in some respects to the contemporaneous Gnostic sects in the Middle East who likewise depict wisdom and liberation as being entirely other to wordly life.

But with the advent of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the meaning of liberation is altogether re-envisioned. One of the Mahāyāna texts is the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa, the subject of which is a wealthy silk-trader who's insight into śūnyatā is so profound that the other disciples are afraid to debate him! One of the revolutionary insights of Mahāyāna was the non-difference of Nirvāṇa and Saṃsāra, whereas for the earlier tradition these were utterly separate realms. (There is an aphorism associated with early Mahāyāna, 'Saṃsāra is Nirvāṇa grasped, Nirvāṇa is Saṃsāra released', although it is of course true that these are the kinds of teachings that Theravada Buddhists don't accept.)

Accordingly, the Bodhisattva ideal introduces a profoundly different dynamic:

There are two ways in which someone can take rebirth after death: rebirth under the sway of karma and destructive emotions and rebirth through the power of compassion and prayer. Regarding the first, due to ignorance, negative and positive karma are created and their imprints remain on the consciousness. These are reactivated through craving and grasping, propelling us into the next life. We then take rebirth involuntarily in higher or lower realms. This is the way ordinary beings circle incessantly through existence like the turning of a wheel*. Even under such circumstances ordinary beings can engage diligently with a positive aspiration in virtuous practices in their day-to-day lives. They familiarise themselves with virtue that at the time of death can be reactivated providing the means for them to take rebirth in a higher realm of existence. On the other hand, superior Bodhisattvas, who have attained the path of seeing, are not reborn through the force of their karma and destructive emotions, but due to the power of their compassion for sentient beings and based on their prayers to benefit others. They are able to choose their place and time of birth as well as their future parents. — H H The Dalai Lama

* That description loosely approximates Schopenhauer's diagnosis of 'world as will'.

I'm not quoting this to evangalise belief but as an illustration of the way that Mahāyāna Buddhism reconciled the reality of life in the world with the higher truths of their religion. But for me, personally, it provides a satisfactory philosophical framework within which to accept the vicissitudes of existence.

Yes, that's right - no-thing-ness, not a thing, neither this nor that (neti neti). Basic to the terminology of Mahāyāna and Vedanta. Since the Renaissance, Western thought has been characterized by a focus on objectivity, substantiality, and the reification of "things." This emphasis was cemented by Cartesian dualism, which sharply divided subject and object, and later by the rise of scientific materialism, which framed reality as a collection of discrete, independently existing entities. In this framework, being was often equated with "being a thing," obscuring more dynamic and relational understandings of existence (which is, however, now starting to burst through all the seams, so to speak.)

There's a book I've been aware of for a long while, and Vervaeke frequently mentions in Awakening from the Meaning Crisis. It is Religion and Nothingness, by Kitaro Nishida. Nishida was a member of the Kyoto School which was a group of Japanese scholars who intensively studied Western philosophy and compared its insights with their native Zen tradition.

In Religion and Nothingness, Nishida critiques Nietzsche's nihilism as incomplete because it fails to fully realise the meaning of "absolute nothingness." Nishida appreciates Nietzsche's effort to reject metaphysical absolutes, such as God or the Platonic realm, and sees his proclamation of the "death of God" as a profound acknowledgment of the collapse of traditional values in Western culture. However, Nishida finds Nietzsche's response to this nihilism—embodied in the ideas of the Übermensch and the will to power—insufficient because it does not go beyond the duality of self-assertion and negation (or self-and-other).

For Nishida, Nietzsche’s nihilism remains trapped within the Western metaphysical framework of oppositional thinking, which understands nothingness as mere absence. In contrast, Nishida, drawing on Zen, sees "absolute nothingness" not as mere absence but as the ground of reality itself, 'the nothing which is everything'. This nothingness is dynamic and relational, allowing for the dissolution of dualities such as self and other, being and non-being. But realisation of emptiness involves a kind of death - 'dying to the known', as one teacher puts it - and the abandonment of self-concern.

It's not "useless" unless you feel there needs to be a "use", and that presupposes "something" about what you think philosophy must conclude, no? — schopenhauer1

Not useful in a utilitarian sense, but more in the sense of virtue being its own reward. Philosophy is love-wisdom - not the love of books about philosophy, although that's surely a part, but a state of love-wisdom, which I think is incompatible with the pessimism we're discussing. As you note, Schopenhauer himself was not ultimately pessimistic, although this seems to have escaped many of those who comment on him.

Why do you suppose it is important for you that there be a salvation of some sort? — schopenhauer1

Very flattering that you think I've invented the history of world religions.

"Nihilism" again, is a shifty label that itself is pointless. — schopenhauer1

But that is Zappfe's self-description, and you brought him up. Nihilism is variously the view that nothing matters, nothing is real, reality is empty appearance with nothing behind it, etc. In the Buddhist world, nihilism is the view that at death, the body returns to the elements and there are no consequences for actions taken in life.

Our capacity for self-awareness of existence, has enormous capacity to open up the Suffering entailed in existence. — schopenhauer1

':

Quote from wiki entry on Zappfe: "I am not a pessimist. I am a nihilist. Namely, not a pessimist in the sense that I have upsetting apprehensions, but a nihilist in a sense that is not moral".

Why bother with it? How is it philosophy? Nihilism is the negation of philosophy. Not interested in discussing him.

Of course these posters oppose the kind of radical pessimism and antinatalism I speak of.

That description could well apply to me, now a grandparent and effectively retired from the workforce. It's not that I'm 'opposed' to pessimism and nihilism, but that it is pointless, even by its own admission.

The philosophical point of such aphorisms is the sense in which classical philosophy gestures towards something beyond. The role of philosophy is to take you to the border, so to speak.

Plotinus wishes to speak of a thinking that is not discursive but intuitive, i.e. that it is knowing and what it is knowing are immediately evident to it. There is no gap then between thinking and what is thought--they come together in the same moment, which is no longer a moment among other consecutive moments, one following upon the other. Rather, the moment in which such a thinking takes place is immediately present and without difference from any other moment, i.e. its thought is no longer chronological but eternal. To even use names, words, to think about such a thinking is already to implicate oneself in a time of separated and consecutive moments (i.e. chronological) and to have already forgotten what it is one wishes to think, namely thinking and what is thought intuitively together. — Classroom Notes on Plotinus

The unity of thinking and being described by Plotinus challenges the prevailing view that knowledge is a sequential accumulation of information. Instead, it suggests that the highest form of knowledge is a direct, intuitive apprehension of reality—an eternal 'now' that escapes chronological fragmentation (per Eric Perl, Thinking Being: Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition.)

The obvious objection will be that we're dragging theology into the frame, but I would prefer to think of it in terms of philosophical spirituality (and bearing in mind the fact that whilst the term 'spirituality' carries some regrettable connotations, the current English lexicon lacks any obvious synonyms.) While the objection is understandable, it reflects a dichotomy that the ancients did not recognize. For Plotinus and his heirs, philosophy was itself a spiritual discipline aimed at the apprehension of ultimate principles—what we might call today 'philosophical spirituality.' This is not theology in the dogmatic sense but the pursuit of wisdom that necessarily transcends the empirical and the discursive (in the sense conveyed in Pierre Hadot's books). Nevertheless, modern culture, post 'death of God', deprecates such ideas - guilt by association, as it were. But in so doing it also vitiates any sense of the higher good which was essential to every form of pre-modern philosophy. Hence, the scare quotes around "Highest"!

Anything that's common must be good at existing in one way or another, or else it would not exist. So, since religion is common amongst humans, it must serve some beneficial purpose, or else people would either quit believing in it, or the believers would die out. — Brendan Golledge

This is an instrumental argument because it evaluates the existence of religion solely in terms of its utility or function, implying that its widespread presence must correlate with some beneficial or survival-enhancing purpose. This form of reasoning is described by Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of instrumental reason, which they say reduces all values and phenomena to their utility within systems of domination, survival, or material function (ref). By presuming that religion's existence is justified only by its pragmatic usefulness, the argument neglects the possibility of other dimensions, such as religion's intrinsic, cultural, or existential significance, and mirrors the instrumental rationality of secular culture.

As I estimate, Trump and the Trump yes-men will create a huge clusterfuck of government inability. Yes, the Trump voters just like that, but in the end nothing will happen. Trump will just have a temper tantrum because nothing has happened. He will fire people as long as there is loyal Trumpists willing to take the position. — ssu

I think the case can be made, not that anyone will listen to it, that Trump's major motivation is hatred and vengeance of those that prosecuted him - which is, basically, the Government! Trump hates the Government, he hates an independent judiciary and departmental secretaries who (as he sees it) ignore his wishes. So his major focus is on destroying the Government. Trump is 'the enemy within' that he kept ranting about pre-election. And he's been given a mandate to do it.

In another thread Socratic Philosophy I argued that because the Good is beyond being it cannot be known. — Fooloso4

The expression 'beyond being' is frequently encountered in axial-age philosophies of both East and West. I think what it means is 'beyond the vicissitudes of existence' i.e. not subject to birth and death and arising and perishing. So I think it should be expressed as 'beyond existence' rather than as 'beyond being', as I think the latter is unintelligible. And as to how what is 'beyond existence' can be known, that is the object of transcendental wisdom:

Plato (Republic, 509b):

"The Good is not being existence, but is beyond being existence, exceeding it in dignity and power."

Upanishads (Katha Upanishad, 2.2.13):

"That which is beyond all is not born, does not die; it is not from anywhere, nor has it become anything. Unborn, eternal, everlasting, and ancient, it is not slain when the body is slain."

Plotinus (Enneads, VI.9.3):

"The One is all things and yet no one of them. It is the source of all things but not itself one of the things that come from it."

Shankara (Vivekachudamani, 239):

"Brahman is without attributes and actions, eternal, without any desire and stain, without parts, without change, without form, ever-liberated, and of unimaginable glory."

We are talking about realism and antirealism. You brought in constructivism. — Banno

I think the term 'antirealism' can sometimes be misleading. The key point about so-called antirealism, as I see it, is that it challenges the tenet of mind-independence as the criterion for what is real—the idea that what is the case exists entirely irrespective of any perspective or knowledge of it.

I brought up constructivism because it incorporates aspects of idealism while stopping short of claiming that reality is mental or mind-like in nature. Constructivism emphasizes the role of human activity, interpretation, and social practices in constructing knowledge, reality, and meaning.

Realism, in contrast, seems grounded in an empirical attitude: the world is just so, and knowledge discloses its nature through continued discovery. Constructivism, ultimately, harks back to Kant and his Copernican Revolution in philosophy—the idea that things conform to thoughts, and not vice versa.

Let's take the knowability principle: ∀p(p → ◊Kp). — Michael

I appreciate the breakdown of the knowability principle and the use of modal logic to clarify these issues. Modal logic is a topic I’ve started to learn about through this forum, and I appreciate the rigor. That said, my interests lie more in the existential dimension—how the mind constructs and relates to reality in a lived, phenomenological sense. I see these questions as tied to insight and transformation, which may not be completely amenable to analysis through symbolic logic. Modal logic, by its nature, focuses on propositional structures, and I think that’s where the divergence in our perspectives lies.

Schopenhauer: Procreation perpetuates the "will to life" and endless striving. — schopenhauer1

Hence the association of celibacy with renunciate philosophies.

It’ll have to wait, but I will.

Constructivism is nonetheless a counterpoint to realism, is it not?

So what’s the full- strength version?

My comments about truth being a single-placed predicate are intended to show that there are uses for assigning truth to sentences outside of our attitudes towards them. I've highlighted these elsewhere -

Surprise
We are sometimes surprised by things that are unexpected. How is this possible if all that is true is already known to be true?

Agreement
Overwhelmingly, you and I agree as to what is true. How is that explainable if all there is to being true is attitudes? How to explain why we share the same attitude?

Error
We sometimes are wrong about how things are. How can this be possible if all that there is to a statement's being true is our attitude towards it? — Banno

But constructivism doesn’t entail that there are no facts outside our knowledge of them. I see the point about constructivism as being, not that there can’t be unknown facts, but that whatever facts we come to know are incorporated into the way we construe the totality of experience, our worldview. Or not, in which case we might have to change it. That we are not passive observers of an already-existing world but are active participants in it.

He will have to hitch hike to work, Shaye Moss has just taken possession of his Merc.

you simply regurgitate the unsupportable "witchhunt" claims of Trump and his propoganda machine. — Relativist

Never! Who would ever do such a thing?

Although that said I still favor constructivism which as a general approach is more characteristic of continental philosophy than Anglo.

Agree I’ve lead us off into the long grass

I haven’t grasped a form of qualitative value judgement, in keeping with an ethical discipline, in phenomenology, even if some sort of specialized perception for what is, is its objective. — Mww

Maybe not but isn’t existentialism generally concerned with ethical normativity post Death of God?

And what is the ‘third noble (aryan) truth?

My approach is based on facts; — Seeker25

Not at all. It's based on sentiment.

Awakening from the Meaning Crisis - Book One has been published.

WE LIVE TODAY in the aftermath of what philosopher Charles Taylor described as the “great dis-embedding.” While we once commonly understood our relationship to nature as being a part of the greater whole, we now find ourselves separate and isolated from its perpetual flow, desperately trying to inhabit an impossible Frankensteinian “view from nowhere.”

Some claim we’re above nature and capable of bending it to our will. Others diagnose our state as beneath nature, not worthy of participating in its cycles. They say we’re a scourge, and the planet would be better off without us.

This paradoxical confusion about our species’ role in the Cosmos has a common denominator.

After unknown thousands of years of faith in the inherent meaning in and of life, since the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment, a dark wave of nihilism has washed across our global village. We’ve mistaken part of life’s complex experience, the problems, and waved away the greater emergent whole of their meaning.

How did this meaning crisis happen?

Awakening from the Meaning Crisis: Origins traces the history of what led to our contemporary malaise, offering scientific, spiritual, and philosophical interweaving threads that ground us in the troubling truth of our extraordinary evolution.

All that to express interest in a forthcoming (?) metaphysical heuristic predicated on abandonment of “the very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a representation of something mind-independent…”, at least with regards to empirical knowledge. — Mww

As I keep saying, there is need for a value judgement, a qualitative criterion of what is best. In Platonism it was the Idea of the Good, later subsumed into theology by the Church Fathers. In Indian philosophy (which is actually a misnomer, as those schools are called darsana. Unlike the term “philosophy,” which originates from the Greek word for “love~wisdom,” darsana emphasizes direct seeing or experiential realization. It is not merely speculative or discursive reasoning but involves an intimate and transformative understanding of the nature of being). Which is what, for example, Heidegger drew attention to with ‘forgetfulness of being’ and ‘alētheia’ or unconcealment.

In any case philosophy as now generally understood has lost sight of that qualitative dimension, on the whole, and with notable exceptions. But the import is that the acuity of perception to see ‘what is’, is an ethical discipline rather than an objective methodology, let’s say.

While Trump’s choice of Gaetz to lead the Justice Department is a clear sign that his second administration will be catastrophically chaotic, vengeful and corrupt, that should never have been in doubt. Trump made no secret during his campaign of his desire to persecute his political enemies. Anyone he chose as attorney general would share his interest in turning the justice system into the enforcement arm of the MAGA movement. The selection of Gaetz just rips the mask off. With it, Trump is trolling not just his defeated opponents but many of his craven establishment supporters. It’s like Caligula trying to make his horse a consul. — Michelle Goldberg

Although that's probably a little unfair to the horse.....

Boredom was very important to Schopenhauer, as it showed Will's negative (lacking that is) nature. — schopenhauer1

I've thought about this. Obviously something I suffer from, as do many. But I think from a Buddhist perspective, it is an aspect of Kleśa, 'defiled cognition'. It is a form of delusion, and possibly also craving, namely, craving for things to be other than what they are. Of course, realising such a state of inner poise such that one is not subject to boredom seems remote, but I thought I'd mention it. (I suppose in my own case, that being the one I'm most intimately familiar with, it manifests as restleness, general low-level cravings to eat or watch something, and a bodily feeing of slight unease.)

But we’ll survive it, and hopefully come back stronger and better organized. — Mikie

https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/

And into the china shop, walks the bull.

Yeah I must stop doom-scrolling and posting about Trump. I see no silver lining whatever, only a long series of f***ups and outrages, which have already commenced two months before the actual inauguration. God knows what will happen when he gets behind the Resolute Desk, but it's going to be awful, all the while the sycophants and suckers rationalising and gaslighting everyone. 'A republic, if you can keep it.'

Maybe we do need to distinguish between semantic realism and metaphysical realism. — Michael

I think that's close. I do notice that many discusses revolve around what might constitute a properly-worded proposition, what can be truly said. But then, that's in keeping with the overall tendency in Anglo analytical philosophy. Whereas I am trying to develop a metaphysical heuristic (and sorry if that sounds a tad pretentious.) I think you would agree that the latter approach is more in line with continental and phenomenological philosophy.

One thing I've noticed in many such debates, is the expression 'out there' as a criterion for 'what really exists' or 'what is real'. It is implicitly distinguished from what is 'in the mind'. But notice the implicitly realist mind-set in that terminology. Whereas in the heurestic I'm interested in the distinction is not nearly so clear-cut. One of the useful quotes I've picked up from this forum describes it thus:

Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned. — Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s Legacy

And, contrary to the opinion expressed in the OP, that it 'makes no difference' whether one is realist or not in this regard, I think it makes a world of difference.

Don't know whether to laugh or cry. But probably the latter.

As I see it, nearly all these debates are implicitly centred around the correspondence theory of truth, the way in which propositions do or do not correspond with actual states of affairs in the world. I think the poorly-named 'antirealist' attitude is nearer to constructivist theories of truth, that our judgements of what is the case are constructed on the basis of the combination of sensory and rational judgement. In other words, it calls into question the criterion of 'mind-independence', but not on the same grounds that correspondence theory appeals to it. It does so on the basis of another perspective. From this perspective, experience is not a direct reflection of an external reality, but rather constructed through processes of cognition, cultural context, and sensory experience. This view questions mind-independence by suggesting that what we take to be true is deeply conditioned by the structure of our conceptual frameworks and the limitations and particularities of perception.

While correspondence theory appeals to a straightforward, objective standard for evaluating truth (like Banno's kitchen utensils), constructivist or coherence theories call attention to the interpretative acts that shape judgment. This doesn't mean that anti-realists deny the existence or even the reality of an external world; rather, that the truth-value of our propositions depends on how we organize, interpret, and construct our experiences of it. So what it calls into question is the chimeric notion of 'mind-indepedence' (which is what Banno appeals to with respect of all the cups he cannot see).

Needless to say, the glaringly obvious facts that crimes were committed is proof positive that Smith's investigations and indictments were appropriate. — Relativist

Regardless, it's already obvious that one of DJT's major aims is to extract vengeance on the Department of Justice for prosecuting cases against him. There's an entire emerging counter-narrative that these prosecutions constituted 'weaponisation of the justice system', the premise being that they were unjust prosecutions brought for improper political purposes. But as always, Trump projects all of his most nefarious actions onto his opponents, and is intent on launching improper prosecutions against anyone he can, on no grounds other than vengeance Which is why he wants to appoint a completely unscrupulous lackey, Matt Gaetz, who's suitability is beyond ridiculous.

Oh, and news just in, he wants to make the ridiculous Robert Kennedy secretary for health. I mean, honestly, it's still two months out from inauguration, and already the whole debacle is becoming a s***show. And we've got four years of it to go. :fear:

And I implore everyone in this thread to stop feeding the MAGA troll. Only encourages it.

what I said.

I came of age in the 60's as I often mention and the way I used to view Jesus then was as a peripatetic teacher of spiritual enlightenment. The Kingdom of Heaven was the state of Self Realisation as described by Indian gurus such as Yogananda and Sri Ramana. The latter's teachings supported this view as Ramana had been educated briefly at Christian schools and would frequently quote Biblical aphorisms to illustrate convergence between his teaching and the Bible (typically, 'I AM THAT I AM' Ex 3:14 which Ramana said is the Self, the I AM of all beings.)

Of course this reading tends to infuriate doctrinal Christians as Hindu teachers are by definition not 'saved', not having 'kissed the ring', but there were always a few maverick Christians who managed to straddle both cultures. One was Venerable Bede Griffith who lived most of his adult life in a Christian~Hindu Ashram and whom I saw at one of his last public lectures, in Sydney in the early 1990's. One might also mention Somerset Maugham's The Razor's Edge which made quite an impression in the 1950's and which he wrote after a pilgrimage to Ramana's Southern Indian hermitage (subject of an atrocious film starring Bill Murray in 1984). Another influential book from that period was Alduous Huxley's The Perennial Philosophy.

Then there was the entire Zen-Christian subculture which was inaugurated by Thomas Merton (one of my mother's favourites, as his autobiography Seven Story Mountain was very popular in the 60's). There was thereafter an entire cadre of Catholic Zen teachers who blended elements of Zen Buddhist liturgy and practice with their own (Hugo Enomiya-Lassalle, Ama Samy, Reuben Habito, William Johnston among others.) Raimon Panikkar is another name worth knowing, a Jesuit of Spanish and Indian descent, who divided his time between India and Europe.

Salutations to all of these wisdom teachers. :pray:

In any case, the universalist theme always made perfect sense to me, as it situated Jesus in a broader context, as an epitome of a kind of higher consciousness which described in many cultures outside the Middle Eastern. It is of course open to all kinds of criticisms and I wouldn't die on a hill defending it, but it makes sense from an anthropological perspective, aside from anything else.
-----

(Perusing the Wikipedia on Panikkar 'He earned a third doctorate in theology at the Pontifical Lateran University in Rome in 1961, in which he compared St. Thomas Aquinas's philosophy with the 8th-century Hindu philosopher Ādi Śańkara's interpretation of the Brahma Sutras.[3] Just the kind of thing that interests me.)

Since the end of the Cold War, western governments (with the US at the helm) have dominated the information landscape and abused that position to influence their population in a way that can only aptly be described as 'brainwashing'. — Tzeentch

Rubbish. I could stand on a street corner in Washington DC and pass out flyers accusing the US Government of corruption and at worst be moved along by the DC police. I was a Russian citizen who expressed hostility to the war in Ukraine, I could be arrested and jailed without trial. There’s no moral equivalence there, and you should thank your stars you’re in a society which gives you the ability to express your dissident opinions, because it’s under threat.

'If there is one single point which underlies the entire illusion of modern scientific materialism, it is the idea of the mind-independent object'.

'Of course there are mind-independent objects!'

'Well, name one.'

:chin:

I don't buy the 'all sides are the same' argument at this point in history. In US politics, one particular important player is notoriously mendacious, self-interested and unfit for public office. But - who cares? The recent GOP Congress was notoriously dysfunctional, consumed by internicene disputes and pointless inquisitions. But they were returned anyway, with an increased majority. Meaning: the electorate doesn't know or care, they think it doesn't matter. Or, maybe that all sides are the same.

The problem is, all sources of authority have adopted 'post-truth'; governments, international institutions, media, science - it's all tainted.

It appears the only way forward is for the common people to completely reject traditional sources of information, and rebuild the truth from the bottom up. I suppose it's just a matter of time before the house of cards comes tumbling down and people will be forced to do so. — Tzeentch

Wouldn't that require complete abandonment of culture and society, medicine and technology? 'The bottom' you would need to start from would be like existence in a pre-agrarian society, a literal re-invention of the wheel (and fire, for that matter.)

I read Federico Faggin's 'Silicon' last year, and have started his 'Irreducible'. This last one is difficult material and there's a lot about it I don't understand, but there are some elements beginning to crystallise.

Thesis

The evolution of the Earth, over 4.6 billion years, has given rise to the laws and principles that regulate both the natural environment and our existence. Within these evolutionary trends, we can find the essence of the ethical principles and moral norms that humanity seeks to identify. Therefore, understanding the evolution of our planet can help us establish and explain the foundations for more harmonious and sustainable coexistence. — Seeker25

Firstly, well-written OP — kudos for presenting a cohesive argument. However, I wonder if the reliance on 'evolutionary principles' here may be leaning into an idealization. It seems to attribute a kind of intentional moral guidance to evolutionary trends, which could be seen as filling the gap left by traditional creation myths. If we look at your Practical Examples, 'evolution' could almost be replaced with 'God' or 'the Creator,' and the text would still resonate, for instance, 'God has endowed us with...'

I don’t mean to imply this as a criticism of personal belief, as I understand you’re presenting this as a secular framework. But I think it's worth questioning whether attributing ethical direction to natural processes risks an overly idealistic optimism. After all, evolutionary processes are not inherently moral; they produce life and diversity, but they also result in competition, predation, and extinction.

It’s a fresh perspective, and I hope these questions don’t come across as too cynical. I just think a pinch of skepticism might help refine this viewpoint and open up further discussion on how we align human ethics with, rather than simply model them on, natural processes.

I would recommend you need to expand your reading. There have been scientific proposals that explore ideas you might find compatible, such as Scientists Propose ‘Law of Nature’ Expanding on Evolution. But evolutionary biology is a very complex subject so don't look for easy answers.