He’s being a little sarcastic, in my reading, but his meaning is clear: If we continue to allow p to float somewhere in the World 3 of abstracta, without acknowledging its dependence on thought1, we are going to get a lot of things wrong.

Makes sense, for Big Heg, "the truth is the whole," and the process of knowing and the knower is not excluded from the Hegelian circle.

I seem to recall from past Rödel exposure that one of the crucial points he makes is that an understanding of action and actors is essential to understanding the world. We are involved in the world (a point going back to Aristotle), not passive recipients, as in many empiricist views. A notion of ends and aims, terminating ultimately in the Good and the True (unified in the Absolute Idea) is required to fully explain this. "All men by nature desire to know," and the first principle of science is wonder.

It's like Plotinus says, thinking and being are two sides of the same coin and, at the limit, in the One/Absolute, they are not two things.

But we can slide away from this into confusion and multiplicity, which is what excising any thinker from thoughts does.

If “the I think accompanies all our thoughts” has been rendered uncontroversial, is it now also uninteresting, unimportant? This is a further question, which I’m continuing to reflect on.

It seems very important in a context where propositions are often thought to stand in for or "represent" states of affairs (say, as physical ensembles) that bear nothing more than a contingent relation to thought.

One might think this should be more normative though: "P" should include "I think P." It seems clear that it fails to for some people (or is at least heavily obscured). Rödl might be in danger of, as Big Heg puts it, arguing that the "flower refutes the bud."

Judgment is a fundamental activity of thought — Wayfarer

Then it seems I was right; he only thinks in terms of assertions. He doesn't think of questions.

In asking what sort of tree that is, one is already supposing that there are trees of different sorts... is that the idea?

If so, where does the "I" come from? It's not just I who thinks there are different sorts of trees...

This gets to both the questions I ended my earlier post with:

If “the I think accompanies all our thoughts” has been rendered uncontroversial, is it now also uninteresting, unimportant? This is a further question, which I’m continuing to reflect on. — J

Another further question is, How to understand all this in terms of self-consciousness? — J

To be continued.

In the above summary, I'm trying to stick pretty closely to Rödl's arguments and terminology. I might try and answer those questions, but it won't be at all what he would say. (Psst....)

If “the I think accompanies all our thoughts” has been rendered uncontroversial, is it now also uninteresting, unimportant? This is a further question, which I’m continuing to reflect on. — J

It is unanticipated, but perhaps not unimportant. I have often critiqued that same tendency to reify propositions here on TPF. Aristotle's critique of Plato seems very similar to this critique of Frege.

It must be an error to suppose that thought, in order to be objective, must be of something other than itself — Sebastian Rödl

All that is objective, extended, active—that is to say, all that is material—is regarded by materialism as affording so solid a basis for its explanation, that a reduction of everything to this can leave nothing to be desired (especially if in ultimate analysis this reduction should resolve itself into action and reaction). But ...all this is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined, and is therefore merely a relatively present object, for it has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and active in time. — Arthur Schopenhauer

Take note of the summary of some of Rödl's introductory points on the previous page.

So the I think = thought1? Such that Rodl's claim is, "The temporal event of thinking accompanies all our [Fregian propositions]." — Leontiskos

Yes, that's my hypothesis.

If the I think means only a temporal event of thinking, then what does it have to do with self-consciousness? What does it have to do with the self-reflective "I think"? — Leontiskos

Right, that's the natural next question. This is where Rodl's idealism comes in. He believes there's a great deal more to be said about the structure of thought1, the "I think". I'm still working on finding a clear and concise way of articulating his ideas here. The key, I'm pretty sure, is the connection he wants to draw between self-consciousness and how thought can be also objective. But since that's the very title of the book, it's big, and I'm not going to pretend I've grasped it yet. To be continued.

My main distinction here (which I do think Popper would uphold) is between an event in time and the idea of a proposition’s being timeless, unspecific, “the same” no matter who thinks it, or when.
— J

Okay, but is this a real distinction or a mental distinction? — Leontiskos

I don't think I understand this question. Could you say more?

The important insight is that, when someone argues that “the I think accompanies all our thoughts,” they are using both senses in the same sentence. We should translate this sentence as “When I think p (thought2), I must also think: ‛p’ (thought1).” Put this way, it shouldn’t even be controversial. You can’t propose or entertain or contemplate a proposition without also thinking1 it.
— J

This seems to go back to <what I said to javra>. — Leontiskos

which was:

Thinking p requires thinking p. No one disputes this. The question of the OP is whether thinking p requires self-consciously thinking p; whether it requires thinking "I think p." — Leontiskos

I believe we can now see that there are subtleties and distinctions we need to make here. On the hypothesis of there being these two construals of "think/thought," the first quoted statement would be "Thinking2 p requires thinking1 p." But was your statement "No one disputes this" based on the observation that this is a pointless tautology, or were you aware of the different senses of "thinking p"? It reads to me like you were indeed making that distinction, and going on to raise the question of self-consciousness. But now what we must ask is, How would you divvy up the "thinks" in the next statement? The relevant bit is "whether thinking p requires self-consciously thinking p; whether it requires thinking "I think p". Rather than guessing, I'll just toss it to you. How would you disambiguate the various "thinking/thinks" here?

That is, the plural "thoughts" would capture two distinct Fregian propositions, but not the same Fregian proposition thought on two different days. — Leontiskos

Yes, that's right. Can you say more about why (with the necessary disambiguations) this is problematic? I may not be seeing your point.

Well, I hope my post above offers another possibility. Yes, to think is to have a thought, big deal. But if we distinguish the senses of think1 and think2, we're also saying that no proposition can appear out of mid-air, so to speak. It has to be thought1. So how do we bridge the gap between this apparently subjective/idealist genesis of p, and its claim to objectivity? This is a lot of what concerns Rodl.

These notes are terrific, thank you. I'm going to read them more carefully and see if I can anything to supplement. But it's great to have someone else doing a close reading.

I wasn't able to follow much of the differentiation between thinking p and thinking that p.

"Fregian proposition". What's that?

These notes are terrific, — J

Yep. , thanks.

"Fregian proposition". What's that? — Banno

In line with the comments on The Thought: a Logical Analysis, and also another paper I've mentioned, Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge. The basic drift is that formal ideas - arithmetical proofs for instance - are true regardless of being judged so by anybody. They are in the 'third realm' of timeless truths which exist just so, awaiting discovery. It is at the nub of the argument.

Now that I am reading Self-Consciousness and Objectivity, it would help if you cited where you are quoting from.

I read the Schopenhauer passage as not confirming the Rödl statement. Was that your understanding as well?

Now that I am reading Self-Consciousness and Objectivity, it would help if you cited where you are quoting from. — Paine

I did add page references in those notes.

I read the Schopenhauer passage as not confirming the Rödl statement. Was that your understanding as well? — Paine

Not at all. The key phrase of the Schopenhauer passage is the reference to 'the machinery and manufactory of the brain', and the way that this enables an object to be 'presented to us in space and time'. As is well known, Schopenhauer's philosophy is that the world appears to us as Idea. And that is at least suggestive of:

It must be an error to suppose that thought, in order to be objective, must be of something other than itself — Sebastian Rödl

You may disagree and I'm not going to die on a hill for it, but I thought it worth mentioning. Rödl at least has in common with Schopenhauer that he is a German idealist philosopher (although there are no references to him in the book, whilst there are numerous to Kant and Hegel.)

I did add page references in those notes. — Wayfarer

I was just reading the post as it appeared. Did not realize that you were drawing from your notes.

It must be an error to suppose that thought, in order to be objective, must be of something other than itself — Sebastian Rödl

Taken at face value, that is a description of things-in-themselves per Kant. Schopenhauer seems to repeat the same idea of thought and representation being displaced from what is objective. Perhaps Rödl is proposing an alternative.

Perhaps. Let's see what unfolds.

Yes, that's my hypothesis. — J

Okay.

Right, that's the natural next question. This is where Rodl's idealism comes in. He believes there's a great deal more to be said about the structure of thought1, the "I think". I'm still working on finding a clear and concise way of articulating his ideas here. — J

Okay.

I don't think I understand this question. Could you say more? — J

An example of a real distinction would be the Platonic model where there are real "Fregian" propositions and there are real temporal acts in which we leverage those propositions, such that there is a real distinction between thought1 and thought2 (i.e. a distinction in reality). An example of a mental distinction would be a model where there is only one (temporal) thought under two different guises; thought1 and thought2 can be distinguished mentally but these notions do not correspond to separate realities.

The oddity is that Rodl sounds a lot like Frege, given the way we are utilizing Fregian propositions. That is, there is a strong way in which thought1 resembles force and thought2 resembles content.

I believe we can now see that there are subtleties and distinctions we need to make here. On the hypothesis of there being these two construals of "think/thought," the first quoted statement would be "Thinking2 p requires thinking1 p." But was your statement "No one disputes this" based on the observation that this is a pointless tautology, or were you aware of the different senses of "thinking p"? It reads to me like you were indeed making that distinction, and going on to raise the question of self-consciousness. But now what we must ask is, How would you divvy up the "thinks" in the next statement? The relevant bit is "whether thinking p requires self-consciously thinking p; whether it requires thinking "I think p". Rather than guessing, I'll just toss it to you. How would you disambiguate the various "thinking/thinks" here? — J

What I am suggesting is that no matter how we rearrange the various senses of thought1/thought2, we won't get an answer to the self-consciousness question. This is because thought1 (event) and thought2 (Fregian proposition) do not possess the qualities necessary to generate conclusions about self-consciousness. It seems that we have stepped away from the basic thesis of self-consciousness (of being conscious of my own thinking).

Yes, that's right. Can you say more about why (with the necessary disambiguations) this is problematic? I may not be seeing your point. — J

It just feels very odd that this is what we mean by "thoughts" in that second sense. Note that for Kant:

The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; — Kant, CPR, B131-133 (pp. 246-7)

..There is a possessive ("my"). A Fregian proposition is not possessed, being "timeless, unspecific, 'the same' no matter who thinks it, or when." When we talk about "my representations" or "my thoughts" we seem to be talking about things that are temporal, specific, appropriated by a subject, etc. This makes a lot of sense given that Kant is apparently saying that the I think (which involves self-consciousness) accompanies some thoughts1 but not others.

Is someone expressing an opinion or fact when stating, "The oak tree is shedding its leaves"? — Harry Hindu

If I hear someone saying "the oak tree is shedding its leaves", as it is impossible to know what is in someone else's mind, I cannot know whether they believe in what they are saying, are lying, are certain in what they say or uncertain in what they say.

Even if they said "I am certain that the oak tree is shedding its leaves", they could be lying.
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Just because it wasn't about the world doesn't mean it isn't part of the world. Does the Lord of the Rings book not exist in the world even though it isn't about the world?.............................You misinterpreting a sound causes you to behave a certain way in the world. How can there be a causal relation between some thought you have and an action in the world if those thoughts are not in the world? — Harry Hindu

As an Indirect Realist, I believe that the Lord of the Rings exists in the world, but this world exist in my mind. What exist in a mind-independent world is, as Kant said, unknowable things-in-themselves.

A Direct Realist would have a different opinion to mine.

I believe that there is something in this mind-independent world that caused me to perceive a sound, caused me to have a thought, but I can never know what that something outside my mind is.

I hear a sound that I perceive as thundering, but I cannot know what in the a mind-independent world caused me to hear this sound. For convenience, I name the unknown cause "thundering". I name the unknown cause after the known effect, such that when I perceive something as thundering I imagine the cause as thundering.

I can imagine a mind-independent world, but such a world has derived from the world inside my mind.
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What is the difference between a "belief", "think", and "knowledge" for you? — Harry Hindu

For me, knowledge is justified true belief.

Truth is the relation between the mind and a mind-independent world.

As a 1st person experience, I hear a thundering sound. As a 3rd person experience, I can think about this thundering sound.

My belief is that it was caused by a motor bike and I can justify my belief.

However, as I can never know whether my belief is true, because as Kant said, in a mind-independent world are unknowable things-in-themselves.
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Ok, would you say that the structure of your thoughts is more like watching the movie or reading the book? If scribbles in the book invoke the images from the movie, would you say that the scribbles in the book refer to the actions and things in the movie? Could it ever be the other way around? If so, provide an example. — Harry Hindu

If I recognise a word, I imagine an image. Some images I recognise as words. In Hume's terms, there is a constant conjunction between some words and some images.

You had a previous question about meaning.



The pictogram of a plough has no meaning in itself. It must refer to something else to have meaning, such as a plough. The plough has no meaning in itself. It must must refer to something else in order to have meaning, such as the ability to grow food. Even the physical plough is a symbol for something else.

Therefore, in every act of thinking there are two aspects, I think p and I know I think p. — RussellA

If you know p, then you must be able to prove or verify you know p. How do you prove and verify that you know you think p?

For some reason, people seem to categorize words as having this special power or needing a special explanation that makes them separate from all the other visual experiences we have. I'm saying that is not the case. They are no different than any other visual experience you might have — Harry Hindu

Seeing words can make us think of things, and kinds of things, no other visual experience can. Things that wouldn't exist but for language. Rhyming, for example. If their weren't words, we wouldn't open a wooden barrier in a hole in the wall, behind which is a large, tusked pig, and bloody, dead body, and think:
The door
Hid the gore
Perpetrated by the boar

I'm sure there are things other than rhyming and poetry that can't wouldn't and couldn't be thought without words. Much of math and science must surely depend on them.

If you know p, then you must be able to prove or verify you know p. How do you prove and verify that you know you think p? — Corvus

I know my hand hurts. In the absence of telepathy, it is impossible for me to either prove or verify to you that my hand hurts.

I know my hand hurts regardless of whether I can prove or verify it to someone else.

I know that I think the moon exists regardless of whether I can prove or verify that I know that I think the moon exists.

I know my hand hurts regardless of whether I can prove or verify it to someone else. — RussellA

That would be a self knowledge with no possibilities of proof. Would it be correct?

I know that I think the moon exists regardless of whether I can prove or verify that I know that I think the moon exists. — RussellA

That would be a simple task in proof. You go out to the garden at night when the Moon is shining, you point to the Moon and say, I know the Moon exists. There is the Moon.

Problem is, your proof is true when the Moon shines, but it is false, when the Moon is not visible.

When you say, "I know", it raises a case for verification and proof, which judges your claim "I know" as sound and true, or unfounded and false.

"Fregian proposition". What's that? — Banno

The basic drift is that formal ideas - arithmetical proofs for instance - are true regardless of being judged so by anybody. They are in the 'third realm' of timeless truths which exist just so, awaiting discovery. It is at the nub of the argument. — Wayfarer

Yes, that's what I meant. I phrased it that way, in the context of disambiguating "thought," because of this from "Sense and Reference":

[Thought is] objective content that is capable of being the shared property of many. — Frege, 32n

Julian Roberts points out that "thought," therefore, is directly congruent with "sense," in Frege's usage.

All of this just goes to further indicate what a terrible time the word "thought" gives us, when we try to understand how it gets used. I'm hoping my thought1 and thought2 will be helpful; they don't by any means exhaust the field.

It must be an error to suppose that thought, in order to be objective, must be of something other than itself — Sebastian Rödl

It is an error. From a speculative metaphysical point of view, which is all we have for reference.

Thought. Not a thought, not the thought. Thought in general. Cannot be of anything but itself.

“…thought is cognition by means of the synthesis of conceptions …”, cognition in general being the object of thought in general, synthesis being the activity of thought, by which thought is represented as itself.

Hence…..wait foooorrr ittttt…..“I think”.

A thought, the thought, the cognition, is the objective to which active synthesis ascends, the conceptions conjoined therein judged according to the rules by which they do or do not belong to each other.

None of which even remotely presents, when I say I think the Yankees are a better baseball team than the Red Sox.

An example of a real distinction would be the Platonic model where there are real "Fregian" propositions and there are real temporal acts in which we leverage those propositions, such that there is a real distinction between thought1 and thought2 (i.e. a distinction in reality). An example of a mental distinction would be a model where there is only one (temporal) thought under two different guises; thought1 and thought2 can be distinguished mentally but these notions do not correspond to separate realities. — Leontiskos

Hmm. I don't know how to answer this without pulling in a lot of metaphysical commitments -- which I'd rather not do because I think the thought1/thought2 distinction is important and relevant no matter whether one thinks it's "real" or "mental," in your terminology. Sorry to lob this back to you again, but if you could say a little more about what might hinge on the choice of "real" vs. "mental," I might have a better sense of what we ought to say about that.

there is a strong way in which thought1 resembles force and thought2 resembles content. — Leontiskos

Yes, there is, and unless we want to go back to Kimhi's arguments, we should probably resist this. Where we stand in the discussion right now ("we" meaning all on this thread), let's go ahead and let thought1 be understood as unasserted, without force, "merely thought". We may have to change our minds at some future point.

What I am suggesting is that no matter how we rearrange the various senses of thought1/thought2, we won't get an answer to the self-consciousness question. This is because thought1 (event) and thought2 (Fregian proposition) do not possess the qualities necessary to generate conclusions about self-consciousness. — Leontiskos

That may be true, but I was suggesting earlier that we don't have to understand "self-consciousness" as a new thought. You may be right that tinkering with the targeted sentence won't produce any insight, but I think it might. I can take a shot at it if you'd rather not.

It just feels very odd that this is what we mean by "thoughts" in that second sense. Note that for Kant:

The I think must be able to accompany all my representations;
— Kant, CPR, B131-133 (pp. 246-7)

..There is a possessive ("my"). A Fregian proposition is not possessed, being "timeless, unspecific, 'the same' no matter who thinks it, or when." When we talk about "my representations" or "my thoughts" we seem to be talking about things that are temporal, specific, appropriated by a subject, etc. This makes a lot of sense given that Kant is apparently saying that the I think (which involves self-consciousness) accompanies some thoughts1 but not others. — Leontiskos

Good questions. I know I often blame translation for difficulties with Kant, and here again I'm tempted to say, "How would a German speaker of Kant's era understand 'my representations' or 'my thoughts'?" Would that possessive be taken to refer to a mental event Kant is undergoing, or would it be understood as pointing to the content? I'm not clear how the kinds of distinctions we're discussing here would have been conceptualized by Kant and his readers. Honestly not sure.

That would be a simple task in proof. — Corvus

I could prove "the moon exists", as the moon exists external to me, but I couldn't prove that "I know I think the moon exists", as my knowing that I think exists internal to me.

"I think I am" sounds like I am guessing I exist. — Corvus

Indeed, yes.

"I think therefore I am." indicates "I think" is the precondition or necessary foundation for "I exist". — Corvus

I would put it a bit differently, but this is fine.

So how can the same "I think" imply guessing, and also the solid reasoned precondition for the existence? — Corvus

Because context matters. The same word or phrase can have wildly different meanings depnding on the full context on which they appear.

Or are they different "I think"? — Corvus

They are different. The additional word "therefore" changes the meaning of the full sentence exactly as you just described.

The “mental event” sense of “think” could be shown as “I think: ‛p’ ”. The propositional sense could be shown as “I think that p” or just “I think p”. Or we can just attach numbers to discriminate them: thought1 vs. thought2, think1 vs. think2. — J

"I think" and "p"
If we want to distinguish between the mental event and the propositional sense, between the act of thinking and the something being thought about, perhaps what is being distinguished is "I think" and "p".

In which case thought1 = "I think" and thought2 = "p".

Let p = the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

Frege and Rodl agree that thought1 cannot exist in the absence of thought2

Frege argues that thought2 can exist in the absence of thought1. The content of a thought can be objective, independent and accessible to any rational being.

Rodl argues that thought2 cannot exist in the absence of thought1. In opposition to Frege's anti-psychologism, this leaves no space for the psychological concept of judgement.

"I think "p"" and "I think p"
I think "p" = I think "the oak tree is shedding its leaves". I am not making any judgement about p. I have no propositional attitude towards p.

I think p = I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves. I am making a judgement about p. I have a propositional attitude towards p.

Mental events
For Frege, a thought is truth apt, which seems sensible. (The force and content of judgement by Rodl)

I know my hand hurts is not truth apt, therefore a mental event need not be a thought.

Knowing and consciousness
When I know that my hand hurts, I am conscious that my hand hurts.

When I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves, I know that this is my thought rather than Pat's thought, for example. I am conscious that this is my thought.

To know something means consciously knowing something

1st person and 3rd person
In the 1st person, I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves
In the 3rd person, I think about my thought that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

See The force and content of judgement by Sebastian Rodl 2020 referring to van der Schaar.

In the 1st person, I am conscious that my hand hurts
In the 3rd person, I am conscious that I am conscious that my hand hurts.

In the 1st person, I think about something external to me.
In the 3rd person, I think about myself as if I was external to myself.

Being conscious about myself as if I were external to myself is easier to understand than self-consciousness.

Again, really appreciate your précis. A few thoughts:

Judgment is a fundamental activity of thought—when we make a judgment, we assert something about the world, such as "the sky is blue." Rödl is interested in the self-consciousness inherent in judgment: the way in which, whenever we make a judgment, we implicitly understand what it means to judge. This self-consciousness isn't an explicit, theoretical knowledge but an implicit, practical understanding embedded in the act of judging itself — Wayfarer

Two important points here: First, as @Banno and others have noted, Rodl is clearly using "thought" in a way that excludes many perfectly ordinary examples of thoughts: memories, questions, musings, etc. Second, we mustn't understand "self-consciousness" as explicit, a "further thought."

The validity of judgment, then, not only is objective; it is also self-conscious' — Wayfarer

This is where he winds up, but the argument is complicated. I read him as saying that we couldn't have a conception of "objective" that was not self-conscious. He brings in Nagel here to support this idea. Nagel says that "we can't understand thought from the outside." For Nagel, the very concepts of objectivity and validity can only be maintained within thought (or within the bounds of reason); any attempt to understand them (or refute them) from a 3rd person view will fail. I'm not totally comfortable with whether Rodl can use Nagel's point here, but it's interesting to consider.

His task is not to discover something new but to clarify and express the implicit understanding that makes judgment possible — Wayfarer

Yes. We should resist all impulses to read Rodl as talking about "layers of thought" or "thoughts about thoughts." Implicit understanding is key. This is oddly transcendental -- a point about what is constitutive of thought -- another link he has with Kant.

"I think I am" sounds like I am guessing I exist. — Corvus

"Are you that baby's father?"
"I think I am."

I know that's not what you meant. I just couldn't resist. :grin: