From a phenomenological perspective, in everyday life, we see the objects of our experience such as physical objects, other people, and even ideas as simply real and straightforwardly existent. In other words, they are “just there.” We don’t question their existence; we view them as facts.

When we leave our house in the morning, we take the objects we see around us as simply real, factual things—this tree, neighboring buildings, cars, etc. This attitude or perspective, which is usually unrecognized as a perspective, Edmund Husserl terms the “natural attitude” or the “natural theoretical attitude.”

When Husserl uses the word “natural” to describe this attitude, he doesn’t mean that it is “good” (or bad), he means simply that this way of seeing reflects an “everyday” or “ordinary” way of being-in-the-world. When I see the world within this natural attitude, I am solely aware of what is factually present to me. My surrounding world, viewed naturally, is the familiar world, the domain of my everyday life. Why is this a problem?

From a phenomenological perspective, this naturalizing attitude conceals a profound naïveté. Husserl claimed that “being” can never be collapsed entirely into being in the empirical world: any instance of actual being, he argued, is necessarily encountered upon a horizon that encompasses facticity but is larger than facticity. Indeed, the very sense of facts of consciousness as such, from a phenomenological perspective, depends on a wider horizon of consciousness that usually remains unexamined. Any individual object, Husserl wrote:

“Is not merely an individual object as such, a ‘This here,’ an object never repeatable; as qualified ‘in itself‘ thus and so, it has its own specific character, its stock of essential predictables which must belong to it … if other, secondary, relative determinations can belong to it.”

Hence, any individual object necessarily belongs to multiple “essential species,” or essential structures of consciousness, and “everything belonging to the essence of the individuum another individuum can have too…” — The Natural Attitude

This aspect of Husserl influenced Heidegger, even though the latter criticized some aspects of his mentor's philosophy. Husserl emphasized that all instances of being are encountered within a broader horizon of meaning, one that includes but surpasses the empirical. This horizon reflects the structures of consciousness, which condition how any entity can appear as meaningful. For Husserl, facticity (the empirical givenness of things) is always embedded within a context shaped by the transcendental structures of consciousness. (This is exactly what I meant in the OP, where I said that every statement about what exists contains an ineluctably subjective element that is not available to empirical observation.)

Heidegger took this idea further by situating the horizon of meaning in Dasein's existential structure—the way human beings are always already engaged with the world and interpreting it. Heidegger reinterpreted this in existential terms, arguing that Dasein is not just a passive observer but an active participant in the disclosure of Being. Heidegger’s notion of “Being-in-the-world” builds on Husserl’s insight that Being is never encountered in isolation but always within a lived context.

After reading many thousands of your words I am still not clear what you think the point at issue is — Janus

Plainly.

After reading many thousands of your words I am still not clear what you think the point at issue is if it is not whether or not this life is all there is. — Janus

OK. Well, a few pages back you said

I have no doubt I've read more Kant, Hegel, Heidegger and Merleau Ponty than you. — Janus

I will draw upon your expertise in these matters to comment on the following passage from Merleau Ponty which seems close to the point that I'm pressing:

For what exactly is meant by saying that the world existed prior to human consciousnesses? It might be meant that the earth emerged from a primitive nebula where the conditions for life had not been brought together. But each one of these words, just like each equation in physics, presupposes our pre-scientific experience of the world, and this reference to the lived world contributes to constituting the valid signification of the statement. Nothing will ever lead me to understand what a nebula, which could not be seen by anyone, might be. Laplace’s nebula is not behind us, at our origin, but rather out in front of us in the cultural world. — Phenomenology of Perception, p456

.

Even though I agree that this is perfectly evident, it is still not the point at issue, but after 12 months and many thousands of words, I am no longer going to beat a dead horse.

As Peirce said: " "Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts". — Janus

Notice the C S Peirce quotation at the top of the Medium version of the original post:

…to decide what our sentiments ought to be towards things in general without taking any account of human experience of life, would be most foolish’ — C S Peirce, Philosophy in Light of the Logic of Relatives.

My question is, do you not believe there is some component of the world/reality that, even if it is not captured in some particular concept, is still singular and shared across all these "constructed worlds"? — goremand

For example?

why are the use of concepts necessary for perception? — goremand

Growing up, I loved the Time Life books on evolution and biology. In one of them, they showed an experiment in which a bird-like shape was flown above a nest of young geese. When towed in one orientation, with an apparently long neck and short tail, the goslings wouldn't respond to it as it looked goose-like. But turn it around, to it appeared to have a short neck and a long tail, and they'd all duck for cover, as it looked like a goshawk. I think that amounts to a kind of illustration, doesn't it? Goose-gestalt vs goshawk gestalt, in Pinter's terms. An illustration of the idea of a 'meaning-world'.

seem to be real — Janus

Seems, being the key word.

The OP criticises metaphysical realism defined as follows: 'According to metaphysical realism, the world is as it is independent of how humans or other inquiring agents take it to be. The objects the world contains, together with their properties and the relations they enter into, fix the world’s nature and these objects [together with the properties they have and the relations they enter into] exist independently of our ability to discover they do.' - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

I won't re-state all of the points made in the original post and associated Medium essay. But in respect of animal cognition and the ideas of 'umwelt' and 'lebenswelt', and indeed in phenomenology generally, the key idea is that the world and the observing creature, be that human or animal, are co-arising. The kind of world the creature perceives is inextricably intertwined with its cognitive system, largely determined by evolutionary adaptation. Over and above that, humans are the 'symbolic species' , able to reflect on and analyse themselves, their environment, and their own cognition of it, through meta-cognitive awareness (awareness of awareness) which provides dimensions of understanding generally not available to other species. But for both animals and humans, the world is not an objective given but a relational construct shaped by the interaction between the observer and the observed. This is the basis of the phenomenological critique of realism/naturalism, which assumes the world exists independently of the way it is perceived and that the role of science is only ever to expand and make more comprehensive the knowledge of that already-existing world.

The original post draws considerably on a largely unsung book called Mind and the Cosmic Order, by Charles S. Pinter. Pinter was a mathematics emeritus who published that book at the end of his very long life. The book's sub-title is 'How the Mind Creates the Features & Structure of All Things, and Why this Insight Transforms Physics'. He lays out his case in great detail, drawing on cognitive science, philosophy and physics.

The book’s argument begins with the British empiricists who raised our awareness of the fact that we have no direct contact with physical reality, but it is the mind that constructs the form and features of objects. It is shown that modern cognitive science brings this insight a step further by suggesting that shape and structure are not internal to objects, but arise in the observer. The author goes yet further by arguing that the meaningful connectedness between things — the hierarchical organization of all we perceive — is the result of the Gestalt nature of perception and thought, and exists only as a property of mind. These insights give the first glimmerings of a new way of seeing the cosmos: not as a mineral wasteland but a place inhabited by creatures. — Abstract

(I say it's an 'unsung', because Pinter's other publications are all in mathematics - some of our mathematical contributors knew of his books in that discipline. But as he's not recognised in cognitive science or philosophy, his last book wasn't reviewed in the usual media, and went largely un-noticed by the profession. Which is a pity, because it's a very insightful book. Details can be found here.)

An interesting point: the word 'world' is derived from an old Dutch word 'werold' meaning 'time of man' (ref). The implication is that 'world' and 'planet' are not synonyms. A world is lived, it is inhabited. In that sense, there can't be 'unseen worlds', even though there may be trillions of unseen planets. For it to be a world, the planet must have inhabitants, beings (see blog post, Schopenhauer: How Time Began with the First Eye Opening.)

Thanks for dropping by. Perhaps you might glance at the OP.

So next absolutely loyal sycophant yes-man Trump wants to head (read demolish) an US institution is Kash Patel to head the FBI. — ssu

John Bolton, who has become embarrasingly sensible post-Trump. says he is Trump's Lavretia Beria. The one consolation is that Beria was executed by firing squad.

His confirmations hearing will be the acid test for whether the democracy will survive.

Reality boils down to the self/other binary. It is the essential platform supporting all empirical experience and abstract thought. — ucarr

Well, it's a bit glib. There's a classic Python sketch, now unfortunately paywalled, where Cleese says 'this week, we'll learn to play the flute. You blow in this end, here, and you move your fingers around on the bottom half, there. Next week, we'll show you how to create peace between Russia and China, and how to build a box girder bridge.'

Yes, self-and-other are the fundamental dynamic underneath all living things. The first thing an organism has to do is NOT succumb to physical laws. Otherwise, it's the same as all the dumb stuff around it. It has one scintilla of smartness - 'no, this is ME. I am going to STAY like this', Voila, a living thing. But there's a lot in that.

The other explanation is that this is all going on in a universal mind we and the animals are all connected to. I don't deny that possibility, but it seems to me by far the least plausible explanation. And it seems you don't want to even posit that, which makes your position seem to be completely lacking in explanatory potential. — Janus

Hey, that would require knowing the One Mind. And I don't claim to know the One Mind. I'm just tracking the footprints.

And I keep replying that we are attributing walls, trees and brick walls to animals' cognition, WALLS, TREES and BRICK are concepts, not mind-independent things. — Manuel

Totally :100:

Those are not citations. They are your homespun truisms on realism. Earlier I mentioned the phenomenological ideas of lebesnwelt and umwelt. Meaning, roughly, 'meaning world' and 'living world'. The meaning-worlds of different species are vastly different to our own. And for that matter, the meaning worlds of different cultures are vastly different to the meaning-world of this culture. But I don't agree that there is 'mind-independent substratum' behind all of those different meaning-worlds.

f you agree there are external objects that are real independently of human perception and that their characteristics determine what we see — Janus

But I don't agree and it's not what I said. I said there are external objects, but

What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle. — Wayfarer

And that is definitely all out of me for the time being.

So, Biden pardons Hunter. Me, I think it was perfectly justifiable, but what's the bet that within a New York minute, you know who will be citing it in support of pardons for January 6th felons.

Citations, please.

The example I gave was the surface of a table... — Janus

But I don't deny the fact that there are real objects external to us. I will try one more time:

There is no need for me to deny that the Universe (or the table) is real independently of your mind or mine, or of any specific, individual mind. Put another way, it is empirically true that the Universe exists independently of any particular mind. But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective. It is not solely constituted by objects and their relations. Reality has an inextricably mental aspect, which itself is never revealed in empirical analysis. — Wayfarer

So I'm not denying that there are objective facts (and therefore the existence of objects). What I said was

By investing the objective domain with a mind-independent status, as if it exists independently of any mind, we absolutize it. — Wayfarer

And 'absolutizing it' amounts to metaphysical realism:

'Metaphysical realism is the idea that the existence and nature of things in the world are independent of how they are perceived or thought about. It's also known as "external" realism.'

That's what I think you're defending, and I'm criticizing. And that criticism is in line with:

Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p139

Furthermore I've pointed to the fact that physics itself has not arrived at an unambiguously objective entity at the most fundamental level. The experiments I referred to previously are about that very point.

So please stop telling me I'm not addressing the question or evading the issue. I'm really not. I know it's a contentious issue and a difficult problem - not a simple point! - but I'm not being evasive about it.

You simply cannot address the objections I make to your position. — Janus

I do address them, and you object to my objections. I'm not lecturing you, just making my case. You don't like, fine. You can't say I don't make an effort.

The only remaining issue then, would be if matter came before mental properties, or if mental properties came before material ones. — Manuel

I think it's rather deeper than that, but I'll leave it at that.

What I do is separate "mind" from "soul", in the way described by Aristotle. Soul is the base, so that all the potencies, capacities, or powers of the various life forms (self-nourishment, self-movement, sensation, and even intellection), are properties of the soul. This allows that mind, or intellect, in the human form, as a power of the soul, can come into existence through the process of evolution. But soul itself is prior. — Metaphysician Undercover

I could go along with that. I always find the translation of 'On the Soul' as 'D'Anima' very suggestive of that - an 'animating principle.

The things we perceive are not ideas. — Janus

We say 'the things we perceive are not ideas' because we instinctively think of ourselves as separate from the world. We see the apple or chair and think the 'idea' of it is something that occurs internally in the mind, distinct from the external object itself. This is the outlook of John Locke's representative realism: external objects cause ideas in our minds, and perception is the mental awareness of those ideas.

But Kant and Schopenhauer challenge this. For Kant, the object as perceived is not the thing-in-itself but a phenomenon—what appears is a product of the mind’s structuring activity. The 'idea' is not something separate from the act of perception; the perceived object is itself the idea, or more precisely, a phenomenon shaped by mind.

Schopenhauer takes this further, describing all perceived objects as representations (Vorstellungen), inseparable from the perceiving subject. Thus, the apple or chair is not a separate 'thing' causing an internal idea; it is a perceived idea, always within the phenomenal realm. This dissolves the divide between external objects and internal ideas that representative realism assumes.

Those kinds of themes are greatly expanded and explored in later phenomenology and existentialism.

there's not much of a difference. — Manuel

On the contrary, it's a difference that makes a difference!

I just don't see why I have any reason to deny that experience comes from modified physical (world, immaterial, neutral, whatever you want to call it) stuff. — Manuel

Because it's materialism, and I reject materialism.

Your own words:

If it signifies anything it signifies something that is not an idea. — Janus

I'm using the word 'idea' in the philosophical sense that anything that we recognise and perceive is 'idea', something we can form a concept of. So if you perceived something but have no idea what it is, then how could you know it was material in nature? In order for to be recognisable at all, it has to have some form.

Why can't mind be a specific configuration of matter? Is there a principle in nature that prevents mind from arising from certain combinations of matter? Not that I know of. — Manuel

I’ve been reading Hans Jonas and Evan Thompson on the phenomenology of biology. They’re dense and complex, so I wouldn’t claim mastery, but one idea stands out: life and mind might be isometric—that is, wherever there’s life, there’s also something like mind, even if it’s not conscious or sentient in the way we think of it. This is because organisms, by their nature, maintain themselves and distinguish themselves from their surroundings; without this, they’d just be subject to the same physical and chemical forces as everything else. This is evident even in the most rudimentary forms of organic life - they're in some basic sense, intentional, in a way that, crystals, say, cannot be.

Which raises an interesting possibility: could this self-maintenance be the earliest appearance of mind, even if in a rudimentary form? If so, then complex minds in higher organisms wouldn’t just be the product of matter—mind could also be understood as a causal factor. The fact that mind is not something that can be identified on the molecular level is not an argument against it - as everyone knows, identifying the physical correlates of consciousness is, famously, a very hard problem ;-) .

Speaking of symbols, the one chosen to represent UWF, Ψ , is called "psi". — Gnomon

That is the symbol for the wave-function equation. I go into that in an essay I've published on Medium, The Timeless Wave.

About the 'miracle required' cartoon, that was in respect of 'the proposal that DNA kind of just spontaneously ravelled itself into existence, which a lot of people seem to take for granted, is far-fetched.' But I don't mean to imply or support a kind of inventor or tinkerer God.

You should read God does not Exist (and no, it's not an atheist polemic, it's by an Episcopal Bishop, but very much in acccord with the ancient 'Negative Way'.) It suggests something I've been mulling over, that God and the soul are very much what Terrence Deacon means by 'absentials'. They're not something that exists but they may nevertheless be real.

By the way, in my earlier reply to you about Nancy Cartwright and Karen Armstrong, it shouldn't be taken to imply that either of them would support or argue for Stephen Meyer's types of arguments. Armstrong has written a book (which I haven't read) on religious fundamentalism. But I suspect she would say that Stephen Meyer illustrates just the kind of mistake she accuses the early modern scientists of making, by trying to use scientific arguments in support of belief in God, which really belongs to an altogether different register, so to speak. For a good primer on Cartwright, see No God, No Laws (pdf). For a sympathetic review of Armstrong's Case for God, see In Defense of the True God, Alain de Botton.

Meaning, you can't have any idea of it. :wink:

What sort of thing is the world as it is? — Banno

I've often said before that there is a convergence between cognitive science and idealism (or constructivism) insofar as the former recognises the centrality of the mind in the construction of understanding. So it differs from empiricism in recognising that the mind is not tabula rasa, and reality not something that exists just so, independently of it. But ultimately, the question you're asking is a very deep question indeed. Isn't that the subject matter of the Parmenides, and much of the philosophy that followed it? It's easy to make glib statements about it, but it's really not so easy.

Seeing things in the same way and seeing the same things are not the same. We can see the same things in different ways. — Janus

But the point is, physics itself, which one would expect to have the most definitive answer to that in the general sense, cannot arrive at a conclusion as to whether there is any fundamental thing which is the same for all observers.

You defer to science as the arbiter of reality, saying that anything that can't be known by science is a matter for faith. Yet the observer problem or measurement problem has long since undermined the ideal of absolute objectivity. This has been known for a century, since the famous Fifth Solvay Conference. It is the nub of the debate between the realist Einstein, who upheld just the kind of realism you're appealing to, and the discoverers of quantum mechanics, Bohr, Heisenberg and others. Their view was considerably more nuanced. 'Physics does not show us nature as it is in itself but nature exposed to our method of questioning'.

The most plausible explanation I can think of is that there is something there independent of the human that we are all seeing — Janus

A number of others have already addressed that - we're equipped with the same senses and inhabit a world of shared definitions, so we tend to see things the same way. But not always. People can reach radically different conclusions when presented with the same evidence.

I tried to explain before the distinction between empirical and metaphysical realism, which you dismissed as 'wordplay'. It really isn't.

It appears she (Nancy Cartwright) suggests there may be a greater disconnect between laws of physics and true laws of nature, than is commonly believed. Is that correct? — Relativist

She questions the very idea of there being natural laws in the sense of universally proscriptive or determinative principles. Why? Because what we call "laws" in physics are more like descriptions of observed regularities rather than prescriptions for what must happen. These laws are derived from idealized, abstracted, and isolated conditions—they describe how ideal objects behave in ideal circumstances. However, in the real world, there are countless extraneous factors and complexities that interfere with and influence outcomes, making reality far less tractable than the clean, quantitative descriptions provided by physics. Which is not to say that they don't work, but to question their universal status, as their universality is very specific in scope.

For that matter, I still stay that much of modern materialism can be seen as a descendant of the tendency in early modern science to reify natural laws as intrinsic features of the physical world. As Karen Armstrong notes in The Case for God, early modern thinkers took Newton's laws and similar discoveries as literal evidence of divine handiwork, turning what began as metaphysics into mechanistic descriptions in a clockwork universe. Much modern naturalism carries forward this approach, treating laws as real entities immanent in nature and universal regularities as the bedrock of reality, sans the God who purportedly put them there, who has become a ghost in his own machine.

However, this perspective inherits the same pitfalls that Nancy Cartwright critiques: it assumes that the abstractions of physics—idealized and purified of real-world complexity—correspond directly to the way the world is, rather than the way specific aspects of it are modeled under controlled conditions. The result is a metaphysical framework that continues to conflate the descriptive utility of scientific laws with their ontological status as supposedly fundamental truths about reality - however, with the distinct disadvantage of providing no conceptual space for the mind at all, save by way of some kind of ad-hoc epiphenomenon.

Take two people and ask them to point to tiny marks or blemishes on the surface of a table, for example, and they will point to the same things. — Janus

But put them in a physics lab.....

(Referring to video 'Is Reality Real) Are they saying that it is not the case that "reality is real"? — Banno

I took the time to generate a transcript (with some comments).

Beau Lotto (what an excellent name by the way): Is there an external reality? Of course there's an external reality. The world exists. It's just that we don't see it as it is. We can never see it as it is. In fact it's even useful to not see it as it is. And the reason is because we have no direct access to that physical world other than through our senses. And because our senses conflate multiple aspects of that world, we can never know whether our perceptions are in any way accurate (an exaggeration in my view). It's not so much do we see the world in the way that it really is, but do we actually even see it accurately? (I think there are obviously degrees of accuracy but it's a rhetorical point.)

Alva Noë on how our reality projects into our nervous system. However paradoxical it sounds, if we think of ‘what is visible’ as just what projects to the eyes, we see much more than is visible. Let me give you an example. I walk into a room and there's graffiti on the wall - and imagine it's graffiti that I find really offensive. I look at it, I flush, my heart starts to race, I'm outraged, I'm taken aback. Of course, if I didn't know the language in which it was written, I could have had exactly the same retinal events and the same events in my early visual system, without any corresponding reaction. Much more shows up for us than just what projects into our nervous system.

Donald Hoffman on if our senses are telling us the truth. Our senses are making up the tastes, odors and colors that we experience. They're not properties of an objective reality. They're actually properties of our senses, that they are fabricating. By ‘objective reality’ I mean what most physicists would mean, and that is that something is objectively real if it would continue to exist, even if there were no creatures to perceive it. Colors, odors, tastes and so on are not real in that sense of objective reality. They are real in a different sense. They're real experiences. Your headache is a real experience, even though it could not exist without you perceiving it. So it exists in a different way than the objective reality that physicists talk about. So it was quite a stunning shock to me when I realized that it's not just tastes, odors and colors, that are the fabrications of our senses and are not objectively real. Space-time itself, and everything within space-time. Objects, electrons, quarks, the sun, the moon, their shapes, their masses, their velocities, all of these physical properties are also constructions (compare Schopenhauer's 'vorstellung', representations.)

Frank Wilczek on how we perceive color and sound Scientific knowledge of what light is shows us that our natural perception leaves a lot on the table. The human perception of color is limited by the principles of quantum mechanics. It's interesting to compare the human perception of color, to the perception of sound. When you have two pure tones together, like a C and a G a simple chord, that's a fifth. If you hear that, you can hear the separate tones, even though they're played together and you hear a chord, you can also sense the separate tones.

Whereas with colors, you have two different colors, say spectral green and spectral red and mix them. What you see is not a chord where you can see the distinct identities preserved, but rather an intermediate color. In fact, you'll see something that looks like yellow. It's as if in music, when you play to the C and a G together, instead of hearing a chord, you just heard the note E the intermediate note.

So at this most basic level, we don't represent even the information we're getting in any accurate way. And the reason is because it was useful to see it this way. So what are you are seeing is the utility of the data not the data. Evolution by natural selection has shaped us with perceptions that are designed to keep us alive. So if I see a snake, don't pick it up. If I see a cliff, don't jump off. If I see a train don't step in front of it. We have to take our perceptions seriously, but that does not entitle us to take them literally.

Daniel Schmachtenberger on perception, choice making, and navigating reality. A perspective on something defined by perception is inherently a reduction of the information of the thing. My perspective of it is going be a lot less total information than the actual thing is. I can look at the object from the east side or the west side or the top or the north side or the inside, microscopically, telescopically, they'll all give me different information. None will give me the entirety of the information about the situation. So there is no all-encompassing perspective that gives me all of the information about almost any situation.

What this means is that reality itself is trans-perspectival. It can't be captured in any single perspective. So multiple perspectives have to be taken. All of which will have some part of the reality, some signal. There may also be distortion. I may be looking at the thing through a fish eye lens or through a colored lens that creates some distortion. Why does this matter? The ability to take multiple perspectives, to see the partial truth in them, and then to be able to seam them together into something that isn't a perspective it's a trans-perspective capacity to hold the relationships between many perspectives in a way that can inform our choice-making is fundamental to navigating reality well.

Greetings, and welcome. You've chosen a difficult and perennial topic to start with, philosophy of mind and/or nature of consciousness.

Presumably you're familiar with the well-known expression in Descartes' Meditations, cogito ergo sum, translated as 'I think, therefore I am.' The thrust of Descartes' argument was that, even if I were to be deceived by an evil demon into a completely illusory picture of reality, I cannot doubt that I exist, as I must exist in order to be deceived.

Descartes uses this as a foundation for what he describes as 'clear and distinct ideas'. This puts Descartes in the tradition of rationalism, which can be traced back to Plato, in which the mind's ability to know rational truths directly, without the mediation of sense, is taken as guarantee of their veracity.

Descartes influence, not only through his philosophical writings, but also through his dualist model of mind and matter, and his invention of Cartesian co-ordinates which revolutionized mathematics by allowing the expression of problems of geometry in terms of algebra and calculus, makes him hugely influential in modern culture (more so than many people realise, in fact.)

Now to solipsism. Solipsism is the idea that only one's own consciousness can be known with certainty. I think that this is implied by the cogito, as the expression is written in the first person (*I* think therefore *I* am.) But I don't believe Descartes himself considered solipsism a possibility. He believed that God would not deceive him about the reality of the world. As he believed that humans comprised body and mind (or soul), presumably he saw no reason to doubt the existence of minds other than his own. Nevertheless Descartes' philosophy was later criticized for the suggestion that the knowledge of other minds can only be inferential, which can indeed give rise to solipsism.

The belief that others have consciousness, as we lack the evidence, is pure faith. — Reilyn

Accordingly, I think this sets too high a bar for what constitutes knowledge. A world in which oneself is the only conscious being strikes me as being dangerously close to psychopathology. There is abundant evidence, overwhelming evidence, that other beings feel as we do, suffer as we do, behave for similar motivations as we do. Awareness of that fact is the basis of empathy, which is a sure-fire antidote to solipsism. The role of empathy and inter-subjective understanding has been explored in many schools of modern philosophy specifically existentialism and phenomonology.

Another point is that idea that consciousness is one's own unique possession, is itself a kind of mental construction. It relies on there being a sense of 'I' and 'mine' which is something that is acquired in infancy and forms the basis of ego. There's nothing the matter with that, it is an essential component of normal psychological functioning. But I think the solipsistic view, again, distorts this functionality by projecting it as the only real knowable. If you ever study Buddhist philosophy, you will discover that this projective functionality of the psyche is described as 'I-making' and 'mine-making', and is one of the roots of all human suffering according to Buddhism.

So I hope that provides food for thought, and again, welcome.

Nothing further to add at this point.

Are you familiar with the arguments in How the Laws of Physics Lie?, Nancy Cartwright?

What is it that you think this video shows? — Banno

Hint: has to do with the original post.

I think the evidence indicates that atoms, protons and so on existed prior to us. — Manuel

I'm not denying it, if you read carefully. I hadn't heard of Collier, but perusing the Wiki entry, he seems a kindred spirit!

Neuroscientists that deny the reality of neurones? — Banno

Cognitive scientists who understand the fundamental role of an observing mind. Notice the cameo by Richard Dawkins muttering incredulously about 'a conspiracy to deny objective reality.'

If we never arose, there would still be something there. It must be assumed otherwise how could we exist at all? Something had to happen that led to us, which did not depend on us. — Manuel

I really do understand the perplexity here. The issue is, as soon as you say 'something', then you're bringing your mind to bear on the question. In the OP, I'm careful to say that I'm not claiming that, in the absence of an observer, things literally become nothing. It's rather that the mind provides the framework within which the whole concept of 'existence' is meaningful - including the units of time by which it is measured (13.7 billion years).

It is in this context where I reference a quotation from the Buddhist texts (not in support of a religious argument!):

By and large, Kaccāyana, this world is supported by a polarity, that of existence and non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, “non-existence” with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, “existence” with reference to the world does not occur to one. — Kaccāyanagotta Sutta

But the Buddha is not referring to the geological origin of the world. It's a reference to the 'world-making process' which the mind is involuntarily engaged in at each successive moment. The 'origin of the world', in Buddhist terms, is the process which gives rise to that world-making process ('the chain of dependent origination'.) The 'cessation of the world' is the ending of that process, namely, nibbana (in the Pali texts.)

What I'm relating that to, is the insights of cognitive science (ultimately traceable back to Kant) about how 'mind creates world'. It does not create the objective world, but then, what is 'objective' without there being the subject or observer for whom it is an object? It's interesting that in many of the early Buddhist texts, you will encounter the expression 'self and world', as in, 'the self and world arises' or 'the self and world exists'. That is why Buddhism has been phenomenological from the outset. That is also why there is a convergence between Buddhist philosophy, phenomenology, and cognitive science, which we see in books such as The Embodied Mind.

This is why I say at the outset that grasping this point requires a perspectival shift, a gestalt shift.

Sure. I still maintain, time and space rely on an element of perspective, and that the perspective is provided by the observer.

Henri Bergson insisted that duration proper cannot be measured. To measure something – such as volume, length, pressure, weight, speed or temperature – we need to stipulate the unit of measurement in terms of a standard. For example, the standard metre was once stipulated to be the length of a particular 100-centimetre-long platinum bar kept in Paris. It is now defined by an atomic clock measuring the length of a path of light travelling in a vacuum over an extremely short time interval. In both cases, the standard metre is a measurement of length that itself has a length. The standard unit exemplifies the property it measures.

In Time and Free Will, Bergson argued that this procedure would not work for duration. For duration to be measured by a clock, the clock itself must have duration. It must exemplify the property it is supposed to measure. To examine the measurements involved in clock time, Bergson considers an oscillating pendulum, moving back and forth. At each moment, the pendulum occupies a different position in space, like the points on a line or the moving hands on a clockface. In the case of a clock, the current state – the current time – is what we call ‘now’. Each successive ‘now’ of the clock contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct. But this is not how we experience time. Instead, we hold these separate moments together in our memory. We unify them. A physical clock measures a succession of moments, but only experiencing duration allows us to recognise these seemingly separate moments as a succession. Clocks don’t measure time; we do. This is why Bergson believed that clock time presupposes lived time. — Who Really Won the Bergson-Einstein Debate

The following makes the same point:

The problem of including the observer in our description of physical reality arises most insistently when it comes to the subject of quantum cosmology - the application of quantum mechanics to the universe as a whole - because, by definition, 'the universe' must include any observers.

Andrei Linde has given a deep reason for why observers enter into quantum cosmology in a fundamental way. It has to do with the nature of time. The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time looses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. This 'vanishing' of time for the entire universe becomes very explicit in quantum cosmology, where the time variable simply drops out of the quantum description. It may readily be restored by considering the Universe to be separated into two subsystems: an observer with a clock, and the rest of the Universe. — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271

Moved below

Now we know that there is such a thing as time and space absent us, which are quite different from our intuitive understanding of them. — Manuel

How do we know that, by the way?

Wayfarer won't agree with you about the human-independent existence of space and time by the way. — Janus

I keep emphasizing that there are two distinct meanings of 'mind-independent': a practical meaning and a metaphysical meaning, the latter corresponding to metaphysical realism.

The practical meaning refers to the fact that many things—trees, mountains, other people—exist independently of your mind or mine in the sense that they do not rely on our individual perceptions to exist. This is uncontroversial and consistent with everyday experience.

Metaphysical realism, however, illegitimately extends this practical sense to claim that the world-at-large exists entirely independently of all mind, as if it is fundamentally separate from the act of perception or any cognitive structuring. — Wayfarer

:up:

I think the fact that we all see the same things and can agree down to the smallest detail as to what we see and that our observations show us that other animals see the same things we do, suggests very strongly that these things are not just mental constructions. — Janus

Speaking of 'smallest details', there's a long (and not very entertaining) video interview on Essentia Foundation's website at the moment (Essential Foundation being Kastrup's idealist philosophy publishing organisation.) It comprises an interview with three European physicists who have won a prestigious award in physics for experimental demonstrations of the so-called 'Wigner's Friend' argument. The abstract goes:

Prof. Dr. Caslav Brukner, Prof. Dr. Renato Renner and Prof. Dr. Eric Cavalcanti won the Paul Ehrenfest Best Paper Award for Quantum Foundations. Their different no-go theorems make us reconsider the fundamental nature of reality. Bell's theorem in quantum mechanics already confronted us with the fact that locality and 'physical realism,' in the sense that particles have predetermined physical properties prior to measurement, cannot both be true. But in certain variations of the Wigner's Friend thought experiment an additional metaphysical assumption is now also put in question: the absoluteness of facts. In different words: can we safely assume that a measurement outcome for one observer is a measurement for all observers?

This is in line with QBism - that observations in quantum physics have an ineluctably subjective element, so that each observation is indeed unique to a particular observer. Of course it is also true that observations tend to converge within a certain range - it's not as if the observation will yield a frog or a tree, so it's not entirely random. But it's also not entirely objectively determined.

The very idea of science from the usual point of view is to take out everything to do with human subjectivity and see what remains. QBism says, if you take everything out of quantum theory to do with human subjectivity, then nothing remains. — Christian Fuchs, founder of QBism

Note the resonance with the Kant quotation.

One has to be willing to face criticism on a public forum, as it's integral to participating. But I don't accept that my responses are at all evasive.

From this it follows that prior to the advent of mind nothing could have existed. Everything known to science seems to contradict this. — Janus

I have addressed this objection many times, both in this thread and elsewhere. Of course it is true that h.sapiens is a recent arrival in evolutionary and geological terms. That is an established fact and not in dispute. But it is also not the point at issue in this argument. The starkest illustration of the point at issue is the exclamation by Immaneul Kant, in the Transcendental Aesthetic, 'If the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, be removed, the whole constitution and all the relations of objects in space and time, nay space and time themselves, would vanish; and as appearances, they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us.'

So I'm not disputing the empirical facts of science. In the OP, I say

What I’m calling attention to is the tendency to take for granted the reality of the world as it appears to us, without taking into account the role the mind plays in its constitution. This oversight imbues the phenomenal world — the world as it appears to us — with a kind of inherent reality that it doesn’t possess. This in turn leads to the over-valuation of objectivity as the sole criterion for truth.

So appealing to objective fact does not constitute an objection to the OP.

then the idealist will say that lived experience is prior to science, which of course for us it is — Janus

That is a point made from outside experience. It is viewing humans among other phenomena, as paleontology would do, or as anthropology would do.

I don't think the question even really matters for human life, unless you are religious and believe in the possibility of some kind of salvation/ redemption which must involve belief in a life beyond this one in order to make any sense at all. I believe that is often the unacknowledged premise. — Janus

Yet I am accused of arguing tendentiously on the basis of religious motivation, when it seems clear to me that, as you can't understand the argument, and believe that it contradicts common-sense realism, then the author must have religious pre-conceptions. Which speaks to preconceptions of your own.

Knew I'd read that spelling somewhere.