I thought an aporia is a paradox and thus different to epoché. Do you think Husserl suspends judgement about the existence of an external world or denies it?

Is aporia a paradox? I recall in Theatetus that it was more a question to which there were several possible answers and no way to tell which is right.

In the Theaetetus, aporia emerges in the dialogue’s examination of knowledge, where Socrates leads the participants to recognize the inadequacy of various definitions. The state of aporia isn’t necessarily a paradox but rather a deliberate moment of intellectual humility or openness, signaling that more inquiry is needed.

That’s what I was getting at.

I don’t think the passage I quoted considers that question. The key point for me was his objection to treating consciousness as part of the domain of naturalism. And the mistaking of the ‘idealized and objectified’ concepts from the natural sciences as providing a real account of reality in itself. (oh sorry that was a reference to the passage posted in the other thread.)

From Websters Online Dictionary:

aporia
noun
apo·​ria ə-ˈpȯr-ē-ə
1
: an expression of real or pretended doubt or uncertainty especially for rhetorical effect
2
: a logical impasse or contradiction
especially : a radical contradiction in the import of a text or theory that is seen in deconstruction as inevitable

I wasn't thinking of the meaning in the context of rehtorical devices, but of the second definition,
from here:

1. What the sight of our eyes tells us is to be believed.

2. Sight tells us the stick is bent.

3. What the touch of our hand tells us is to be believed.

4. Touch tells us the stick is straight. (2)

The aporia, or "apory" of this syllogism lies in the fact that, while each of these assertions is individually conceivable, together they are inconsistent or impossible (i.e. they constitute a paradox). Rescher's study is indicative of the continuing presence of scholarly examinations of the concept of aporia and, furthermore, of the continuing attempts of scholars to translate the word, to describe its modern meaning.

I don’t think the passage I quoted considers that question. The key point for me was his objection to treating consciousness as part of the domain of naturalism. — Wayfarer

Seems to me those questions are closely related, even intertwined.

Seems to me those questions are closely related, even intertwined. — Janus

Which questions? Incidentally, my reference to 'the passage I quoted' was actually a reference to the excerpt about Husserl that I posted in the Mind-Created World thread - I got my wires crossed between these two threads. I think discussoion of the 'mind-independence in Husserl' question ought to be in that other thread.

Which questions? — Wayfarer

The questions concerning whether consciousness is part of the natural world and the question about the existence of the external world.

in contemporary philosophy, to be included in the book of the real requires that an entity be able to manifest in some way to consciousness. And therein is today's primary leveler of "degrees" of reality (as opposed to exist/not-exist). An object of consciousness is an object of consciousness is an object of consciousness. . .

Meister Eckhardt and the Jewish Tradition
Albert H. Friedlander

European Judaism: A Journal for the New Europe
Vol. 27, No. 2 (Autumn 94), pp. 78-90 (13 pages)

"Eckhart" is the more common though not the only spelling.

Knew I'd read that spelling somewhere.