• Animalism: Are We Animals?
    So, you think that would mean something to an animal? Sure you're not being a tad anthropomorphic there?
  • Animalism: Are We Animals?
    And what do animals value, then?
  • The Biggest Problem for Indirect Realists
    We do not have to have ever thought of the concepts time or space, and we would still function because we are beings of time and space. The argument that our ability to function is innate knowledge, means that even a single cell amoeba has an innate knowledge of time and space. That's absurd.Philosophim

    I hadn't thought of that, but it's true! The amoeba must at very least have an innate sense of itself as being separate from its environment, otherwise it would perish. Of course an amoeba has no consciousness of its own existence, but in some fundamental sense time means something to it, that it does not mean to a rock.

    I wonder if this post, although not addressed to you, might have been relevant to your enquiries?
  • Animalism: Are We Animals?
    For me the difference all comes down to symbolic language which enables an augmented abstract-capable rationality.Janus

    Right. And all that this entails.

    It's an ontological distinction - a difference in kind.

    Anyway, I started reading the article linked in the OP, and I really didn't like it, so I'll leave this issue to the other participants.
  • Animalism: Are We Animals?
    I doubt how out of all those mentioned philosophers would deny that we are animals.Janus

    To save me the time of researching all of them I tossed it to ChatGPT.
  • Animalism: Are We Animals?
    It doesn’t need to stipulate the identity of whomever is in the chair. It is a general claim, to wit:

    (P1) Presently sitting in your chair is a human animal.NOS4A2

    So if the intention of the argument is to prove that humans are animals, then that premise begs the question, as it already assumes that the human is an animal.

    But that doesn't mean humans aren't animalsBaden

    I would agree provided the implication is that humans aren’t just animals, or only animals. It’s the philosophical implications of that I’m wary of.
  • Animalism: Are We Animals?
    And I said, the argument begs the question.

    Personally, I think we can acknowledge even a fundamental difference between animals with language and all that comes with that, such as humans, and other animals without being bothered by the fact that we are all animals.Baden

    We're related to all other species and descended from earlier hominids, but 'the human condition' is identifiable as a unique state. After all, scientists say we now live in the anthropocene.
  • Animalism: Are We Animals?
    Which premise do you disagree with?NOS4A2

    I said, if the aim of the argument is to prove that humans are animals, then P1 already says it, so it begs the question. Begging the question is 'assuming what an argument sets out to prove'.

    that there is a difference in kind between h.sapiens and other species
    — Wayfarer
    A difference, sure. A fundamental one? When did that change occur, or do you not consider humans to have animal ancestry?
    noAxioms

    I'm quite familiar with paleoanthropology and paleontology. The precursor species of early hominids would have gradually developed characteristics unique to humans such as the upright gait, opposable thumb, and enlarged cranium, but it really came into its own with the development of the hominid (neanderthal and h.sapiens) forebrain over a relatively short span of evolutionary time. It enables h.sapiens to do things and to understand levels of meaning that other species cannot.
  • The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism
    You said somewhere recently that Vervaeke's "relevance realization" operates at all levels of life. What could this be but some kind of understanding (however) rudimentary) that something is of whatever significance it is for the organism".Janus

    Agree. But Vervaeke would also say that h.sapiens have greater horizons of being than do other animals, because of reason, language, self-awareness, and all that this entails. So what is relevant for human existence has greater scope than for non-human animals, although that aspect of his work is more concerned with philosophy than biology, per se, whereas relevance realisation is something characteristic of organisms in general. But this is where evolutionary biology tends to be reductionist as its criteria are chiefly concerned with the requirements for adaptation and survival. As a Dawkins or a Crick would put it, you are ' robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes' or 'You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of identity and free will are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules'. Nothing buttery, as it has been called.
  • The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism
    What do you mean by the "sovereignty of reason"? Reason by itself delivers no knowledge.Janus

    But it delivers considerable capacity to gain knowledge, surely you would agree. H.sapiens by dint of reason is able to do many things which animals can not. (There have been interminable, and to my mind pointless, arguments about this in the Rational Thinking Human and Animal thread.)

    What is the actual argument for why accepting the evolution of reason would undermine those principles?Janus

    The 'argument from reason' is that reasoned inference must convey facts that are internal to reason. Seeking to justify such reasons with reference to the extent to which they provide an adaptive or evolutionary advantage undermines the sovereignty of reason by saying that it's claims have some grounds other than their self-evident nature. As Thomas Nagel puts it:

    The only form that genuine reasoning can take consists in seeing the validity of the arguments, in virtue of what they say. As soon as one tries to step outside of such thoughts, one loses contact with their true content. And one cannot be outside and inside them at the same time: If one thinks in logic, one cannot simultaneously regard those thoughts as mere psychological dispositions, however caused or however biologically grounded. If one decides that some of one's psychological dispositions are, as a contingent matter of fact, reliable methods of reaching the truth (as one may with perception, for example), then in doing so one must rely on other thoughts that one actually thinks, without regarding them as mere dispositions. One cannot embed all one's reasoning in a psychological theory, including the reasonings that have led to that psychological theory. The epistemological buck must stop somewhere. By this I mean not that there must be some premises that are forever unrevisable but, rather, that in any process of reasoning or argument there must be some thoughts that one simply thinks from the inside--rather than thinking of them as biologically programmed dispositions. ...

    The reliance we put on our reason implies a belief that even though the existence of human beings and of ourselves in particular is the result of a long sequence of physical and biological accidents, and even though there might never have come to be any intelligent creatures at all, nevertheless the basic methods of reasoning we employ are not merely human but belong to a more general category of mind.
    — Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion, from The Last Word, Thomas Nagel
  • Animalism: Are We Animals?
    If the aim of the argument is to prove that humans are animals, then it begs the question, because it starts by presuming the conclusion.

    Personally, I'm in agreement with Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, and Hegel, that there is a difference in kind between h.sapiens and other species, due to the human ability to speak, reason, create art and science, etc.
  • The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism
    Such explanations may be counted as false if it can be definitively shown that they cannot possibly explain what they purport to.Janus

    I think Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism and Victor Reppert's version of the argument from reason are both plausible arguments against evolutionary materialism. In evolutionary theory, the mind and capacity to reason are presented in terms of biological adaption. However if the mind and reason are reduced to these terms, then this undermines the sovereignty of reason. We can discuss the details of that if you like.
  • The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism
    Do you really believe that the Universe would not exist without us?Janus

    I've just fielded that question in the mind-created world thread. It would be better to discuss it there.
  • The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism
    Well this is interpretation dependentApustimelogist

    It's supported by an argument based on the double-slit experiment. That argument is that the interference exhibits the same wave-like pattern even if photons are fired one at a time. So the 'wave' is nothing like a physical wave, and it doesn't inhere in any medium so far as science can determine. (I put this to PhysicsForum, which said 'Don't be ridiculous, the particle interferes with itself' :lol: )

    This is why the nature of the wave function is contentious - its true nature is a lacuna that appears at the basis of fundamental physics. Sir Roger Penrose can't accept that due to his convictions about the way the world 'should be':

    It doesn’t make any sense, and there is a simple reason. You see, the mathematics of quantum mechanics has two parts to it. One is the evolution of a quantum system, which is described extremely precisely and accurately by the Schrödinger equation. That equation tells you this: If you know what the state of the system is now, you can calculate what it will be doing 10 minutes from now. However, there is the second part of quantum mechanics — the thing that happens when you want to make a measurement. Instead of getting a single answer, you use the equation to work out the probabilities of certain outcomes. The results don’t say, “This is what the world is doing.” Instead, they just describe the probability of its doing any one thing. The equation should describe the world in a completely deterministic way, but it doesn’t.

    Why should it? :brow:




    (It's OK not to answer, it's a rhetorical question.)
  • The Mind-Created World
    So, irrespective of what anyone else may believe, I am justified in believing there to exist a world external to myself, which I am a part of. If this belief is true (as I am convinced), it is an objective fact, not a subjective fact that is only true for me. It is an objective fact even if everyone else holds a false belief in solipsism.Relativist

    I have taken pains to word the essay we're discussing in such a way as to avoid solipsism and subjectivism.

    I am not arguing that it (idealism) means that ‘the world is all in the mind’. It’s rather that, whatever judgements are made about the world, the mind provides the framework within which such judgements are meaningful. So though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective. What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle.Wayfarer

    To quote from Schopenhauer:

    the existence of this whole world remains ever dependent upon the first eye that opened, even if it were that of an insect. For such an eye is a necessary condition of the possibility of knowledge, and the whole world exists only in and for knowledge, and without it is not even thinkable. The world is entirely idea, and as such demands the knowing subject as the supporter of its existence. This long course of time itself, filled with innumerable changes, through which matter rose from form to form till at last the first percipient creature appeared—this whole time itself is only thinkable in the identity of a consciousness whose succession of ideas, whose form of knowing it is, and apart from which, it loses all meaning and is nothing at all.

    Thus we see, on the one hand, the existence of the whole world necessarily dependent upon the first conscious being, however undeveloped it may be; on the other hand, this conscious being just as necessarily entirely dependent upon a long chain of causes and effects which have preceded it, and in which it itself appears as a small link. These two contradictory points of view, to each of which we are led with the same necessity, we might again call an antinomy in our faculty of knowledge… The necessary contradiction which at last presents itself to us here, finds its solution in the fact that, to use Kant’s phraseology, time, space, and causality do not belong to the thing-in-itself, but only to its phenomena, of which they are the form; which in my language means this: The objective world, the world as idea, is not the only side of the world, but merely its outward side; and it has an entirely different side—the side of its inmost nature—its kernel—the thing-in-itself… But the world as idea… only appears with the opening of the first eye. Without this medium of knowledge it cannot be, and therefore it was not before it. But without that eye, that is to say, outside of knowledge, there was also no before, no time. Thus time has no beginning, but all beginning is in time.

    Where I take issue with physicalism is that it accords the objective world with an inherent or supposedly mind-independent reality, so that it would remain just so, regardless of whether any being perceives it or not. Within that framework, the mind is considered a consequent fact, a faculty which owes its existence to the vast prior period of material and biological evolution that preceeded it. But this is dependent on viewing the mind as an object among other objects, so it is a judgement that is implicitly made from a perspective outside of the mind. Which is, of course, an impossibility - the inherent contradiction of materialist theories of mind.

    For heuristic purposes, we can behave as if the external world is mind-independent and exists just it would without us. But that is a methodolical axiom, not an existential fact. The error arises from regarding the contingent facts of scientific inquiry as possessing a form of absolute veracity which they don't have. In Husserl's terms:

    In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in any ontological sense—this would be a subjective idealism, itself a consequence of a certain naturalising tendency whereby consciousness is cause and the world its effect—but rather that the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness. Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role. For this reason, all natural science is naive about its point of departure, for Husserl (PRS 85; Hua XXV 13). Since consciousness is presupposed in all science and knowledge, then the proper approach to the study of consciousness itself must be a transcendental one—one which, in Kantian terms, focuses on the conditions for the possibility of knowledge.... — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p144
  • The Mind-Created World
    Truth is not subjective, although there are truths about subjective things. Objective truth: "The universe exists".Relativist

    Agree it's a difficult point to make. I'm saying that there is an implicit subject in every statement about what exists, including what exists in the absence of any observers. It is true that we can model the universe as if there were no observers in it on the practical or methodological level but it's not ultimately the case, because that model is mind-dependent. The universe exists for the subject - as you say, that doesn't preclude the discovery of objective facts about it, but their objectivity is not absolute or stand-alone.
  • The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism
    So I surmise that she is making a case for religious practice, or having God in one's life, not an intellectual basis for establishing the alleged fact of God's existence.Relativist

    Yes, I think that's reasonable. She's focussing on religious practice as a different mode of being, not as propositional knowledge. But that also has considerable bearing on the question of 'what is the nature of being'.

    Not sure what you are trying to convey here.Apustimelogist

    That Ψ is not inside space-time.
  • The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism
    Physicalism is not a reductive theory. It is a foundational theory that purports to show that the world cannot exist without matter or the physical components.L'éléphant

    I don't think you can have your cake and eat it. Physicalism is reductionist by definition. Why? Because it methodically excludes or reduces what may be deemed anything other than the physical to the physical. Physicalism is 'the view that all phenomena, including complex processes like consciousness, emotions, and social behaviors, can be explained without residue in terms of physical components and laws—typically those of physics and chemistry—without requiring additional principles or explanations'. It is of course true that when it comes to phenomena such as gravity and the composition of massive bodies, then physicalism is a sound assumption (which is the 'methodological' aspect). But the extension of that methodology to the problems of philosophy is what is objectionable about it.
  • The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism
    I'm not arguing for physicalismJanus

    It’s never clear what you’re arguing for but I do know that you enjoy an argument, regardless. ;-)

    Check out The Timeless Wave.

    I suggest that the interference pattern is not caused by a physical wave — because, as we shall see, no conventional physical wave can account for the actual observations. So what the “wave” is, is one of the greatest conundrums posed by quantum physics, and the philosophical implications are profound. Let’s explore them.
  • The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism
    But they're not explained by it, for reasons I won't try and articulate again. :angry:
  • The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism
    So what's the basis for claiming the world is actually mind-dependent? Then we can analyze whether that is a rational belief.Relativist

    It's a philosophical claim in support of idealism. It is developed in more detail in The Mind-Created World OP and its linked essay.

    I see no basis to claim the evolutionary sequence was too fast or "explosive" to be due to natural processes.Relativist

    I didn't say it wasn't due to natural processes. I said it opened up horizons of being and cognitive skills that are different in kind to other species, including abstract reasoning, language, art, scientific invention, moral reflection, symbolic thought, and awareness of mortality. I would have thought this a completely unexceptionable empirical claim, although the implications may not be obvious to empiricist philosophy. I say that amounts to an ontological distinction, a different kind of being. You seem to assume that I am therefore appealing to a 'creator God' but this is something even acknowledged by existential philosophers who are not in the least theistic in orientation.

    The review suggests that she doesn't actually make a case for God's existence.Relativist

    Curious, then, that the title of the book is The Case for God.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    It doesn’t matter if you want to call it a hate rally or a Nazi rally or an authoritarian Lollapalooza. Doesn’t matter if you want to call the speakers unhinged or ill-mannered or fascistic. I don’t care what you call the Trumpian spectacle that unfolded at Madison Square Garden last weekend.

    In this, the blessedly final week of the 2024 presidential campaign, that rally was only the latest s--t stain in a decade-long political career rooted in scapegoating and fear-mongering. After a decade of stoking fear and hatred, we have now reached Peak MAGA.

    What started in the tacky atrium of Trump Tower with a rant about Spanish-speaking immigrants ends with a lame joke by a s--tty comic about Spanish-speaking Americans, with another speaker calling Donald Trump’s political opponent “the antichrist.” We’re ten years into the Trump Era, a decade marked by racist scandal upon sex scandal upon financial scandal upon criminal scandal.

    To say that we’re numb to it all would be an understatement. Another woman came forward last week to allege sexual abuse by Trump (with a cameo by Jeffrey Epstein) this week and it barely got covered. She is the 27th woman to accuse Trump of sexual assault. Nobody cared. We expect these Trump scandals. Worse, too many Americans crave them.

    When he or his surrogates attack Puerto Ricans or Muslims or Black people or legal Haitian immigrants or people from “s--thole countries;” when Trump sits down for dinner with a Holocaust denier; when he refuses to disavow David Duke’s support or when he elevates the bats--t and antisemitic QAnon movement; when he attacks trans people; when he spends day after day spreading lie after lie, he scrapes away, layer by layer, whatever used to pass for American civility until we are left here, a raw and unnerved people looking at our fellow Americans with suspicion and fear.

    He did this.

    In 2015, Trump’s initial candidacy was dismissed as the vanity project of a reality television star. That wasn’t an incorrect assessment, but it miscalculated Americans’ appetite for inauthenticity and vulgarity. It wasn’t that Trump was a reality star whose schtick translated to real America, it’s that real America turned out to be more of a reality show than we were willing to admit. The cruelty, interpersonal conflicts, and erratic personalities that fuel our addiction to bad TV has now become central to an entire half of our electorate.

    The Madison Square Rally rally this week wasn’t an outlier, only a very special episode of The Trump Show.

    It’s been ten f---ing years of this. If, ten years ago, as Trump mulled his candidacy, somebody had sat down to write a satire of what a successful Trump campaign would look like, it would have looked very much like the coverage of the actual event. Consider the following paragraph from the actual New York Times’ coverage: “David Rem, a childhood friend of Mr. Trump, called Ms. Harris ‘the devil.’ Grant Cardone, a businessman, declared that the sitting Vice President had ‘pimp handlers.’ Sid Rosenberg denounced Hillary Clinton as a ‘sick son of a bitch’ for linking the Trump rally and a pro-Nazi event at the same arena decades ago.”

    That’s not even mentioning the fact that Hulk Hogan tried, and for a time failed, to rip off his shirt, the only Black speaker walking out to the song Dixie, and that the rally started with Tony Hinchcliffe calling Puerto Rico a floating island of garbage.

    I’m sorry, but that doesn’t read like a bad episode of Veep? (Actually, that sounds like an awesome episode of Veep but only because Veep is making fun of f---ing idiocy!)

    I don’t know how many felony convictions the collected speakers had between them, but it was a lot. Why? Because sometimes the crooks win. Sometimes, the worst among us convince the rest of us suckers and losers that we’d be better off with them running the show. When people compare Trumpism to Nazism, it isn’t because we anybody thinks Trump is “literal Hitler” as his supporters like to say.

    It’s because Trumpism displays the same hatred and buffoonery of the early Nazis with their bloviating, self-aggrandizing speeches and their cadre of big, dumb goons swinging fists in the streets. It’s because we recognize the same ugly impulses that compelled what was, at first, a minority of Germans to sacrifice their character and morality. It’s because we recognize the fear that caused good Germans to keep their mouths shut and the cold calculations that made powerful German industrialists look the other way at Nazi abuses, and which led them to ultimately collaborate.

    It’s because we know that dehumanizing language about people eventually leads to the state dehumanizing people. Can’t happen here? May I refer to you to Trump’s plan to round up millions of people from their homes and put them in detention camps? May I refer you to the fact that a recent poll found that half of all Americans, including a quarter of Democrats, support such a mass deportation? What does that look like, exactly, when the National Guard goes house-to-house in neighborhoods across the country? I’ll tell you what it looks like. It looks like Nazi Germany in the 1930’s.

    When I sat down to write this column, I thought I’d try to keep it light. But you know what? This s--t is scary. It’s scary because we’re a week away from the close of this election, but I don’t think there’s an American out there who believes that this election will end quietly.

    Drop-off ballot boxes are already exploding. Poll workers are being attacked. After one voter was told she couldn’t wear her MAGA gear into the polling station, she tore off her shirt, pushed the poll worker, and told the worker to “suck her c---.” JD Vance later tweeted about the woman, “what a patriot.”

    That’s where we are. That’s who we’ve become over the last ten years. So yeah, it doesn’t matter to me what you want to call Trump’s rally or Trump’s movement. The name doesn’t matter so much as the human rot that feeds it. For decades, we’ve been wondering how much more divisive American politics can become.

    Now we know. Hopefully next week’s election pulls us back from the brink. But what if it doesn’t? What if Trump wins? Conversely, what if he loses? What feels like the last straw often turns out to be just another straw. How many more straws before he’s broken America’s back?
    — Michael Ian Black, The Daily Beast
  • Quantum Physics and Classical Physics — A Short Note
    *1. Heisenberg later stated that "My mind was formed by studying philosophy, Plato and that sort of thing" and that "Modern physics has definitely decided in favor of Plato. In fact the smallest units of matter are not physical objects in the ordinary sense; they are forms, ideas which can be expressed unambiguously only in mathematical language".
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Werner_Heisenberg
    Note --- Is his "prerequisite work" good enough for you?
    Gnomon

    To me, he's the most congenial of the Copenhagen scientists, and yes, he was a lifelong Platonist (in fact, a Christian Platonist, unlike Neils Bohr, who professed no religion.) Heiseberg was philosophically both deep and adept, and I think his Physics and Philosophy is still well-regarded. Here's an excerpt from a public lecture of his delivered in the 1950's:

    ...the inherent difficulties of the materialist theory of the atom, which had become apparent even in the ancient discussions about smallest particles, have also appeared very clearly in the development of physics during the present century.

    This difficulty relates to the question whether the smallest units are ordinary physical objects, whether they exist in the same way as stones or flowers. Here, the development of quantum theory...has created a complete change in the situation. The mathematically-formulated laws of quantum theory show clearly that our ordinary intuitive concepts (such as 'it exists' - wf) cannot be unambiguously applied to the smallest particles. All the words or concepts we use to describe ordinary physical objects, such as position, velocity, color, size, and so on, become indefinite and problematic if we try to use them of elementary particles. I cannot enter here into the details of this problem, which has been discussed so frequently in recent years. But it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on.

    During the coming years, the high-energy accelerators will bring to light many further interesting details about the behavior of elementary particles. But I am inclined to think that the answer just considered to the old philosophical problems will turn out to be final. If this is so, does this answer confirm the views of Democritus or Plato?

    I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or — in Plato's sense — Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics.
    Werner Heisenberg, The Debate between Plato and Democritus

    Regardless, it is a sad but unavoidable fact that Heisenberg's association with Hitler's nuclear program has tarnished his name. I did read an OP many years ago, which I can't re-locate, to the effect that he was less than a willing participant in this effort, and may even have surreptitiously stalled the program by directing it in ways that he knew would prolong the amount of time necessary to develop it. But the fact still remains.
  • Quantum Physics and Classical Physics — A Short Note
    Did scientists "catch god with his pants down", or are they too far from the measured "forest" (quantum field) to clearly see the statistical "trees" (fluid/solid wavicles)?Gnomon

    I loved Zizek's whimsical analogy. Obviously to be taken with a large grain of salt, but still....

    It's a philosophical question that I don't trust philosophers to answer.flannel jesus

    Don't know if I agree. In our culture, since the Enlightenment, we've been told time and again that Science is the Arbiter of Truth, that scientists will provide answers that you can't find in the hazy fog of metaphysics, etc. People were willing to shout about LaPlace's Daemon from the rooftops, you'll still find many here today who believe in physical determinism. But when Heisenberg came along and basically torpedoes that idea, well, let's not venture there, you can't do the math!

    I've frequently mentioned several excellent books on meaning of modern physics (see this post.) Yes, they're difficult reads in places, and there are definitely some aspects that are beyond the skills of those without mathematical physics training. But that doesn't kick the whole debate into the long grass.
  • What Does Consciousness Do?
    Right! Excellent start, and thank you for the acknowledgement. My knowledge of McLuhan is second-hand although I do recognise that he was a pivotal thinker. (Another in that vein is Neil Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death.)

    Trying to think of a few of the books that influenced my philosophical development over the years: The Tao of Physics, Fritjof Capra; Where the Wasteland Ends, Theodore Rozak; Why Us? James le Fanu; Understanding the Present, Bryan Appleyard; The Sleepwalkers, Arthur Koestler - to name a few. What they have in common is the asking of Big Questions, against a backdrop of history of ideas. Of how the Western worldview developed. I recommend a synoptic and thematic approach - following how ideas develop over history. Actually another book that comes to mind in that respect is Russell's History of Western Philosophy - despite its critics, it is very good at putting things in that historical context.

    So - please do carry on, but try and anchor your insights against sources. There is a practically endless amount of media on YouTube, plus quality publications like Aeon.co, Quantumagazine.org, Ted talks, BigThink, to mention a few. Find some articles that elaborate the points you want to make, and try to digest and present what you think is important about them. That would be my advice.
  • The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism
    Here's the thing, the angst-driven "What do I focus my attention on?" precedes everything. Even someone who represents naive physicalism, someone like say a "Dawkins type", someone who supposedly "only cares about facts", has to "care about" something, that precedes the "facts" that are deemed most important.schopenhauer1

    :100:

    One of the bits of terminology I've picked up from Vervaeke is 'relevance realisation', which operates right from the inception of organic life. However in human life, the requirement is extended beyond the requirements of survival into the domain of meaning.

    It does not follow that the properties of particles do not exist until measured.Janus

    Then read some of those refs I mentioned. That is *exactly* what is being said.
  • The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism
    We have anxieties foisted upon ourselves, mental disorders even, and then we have ANGST. It's reflected in literature going back to Egypt and Babylonia, ancient China, India, and anywhere where man could write more than a few thoughts down beyond the transactional.schopenhauer1

    It's existential angst, isn't it? That's the subject of John Vervaeke's 52-episode lecture series on Awakening from the Meaning Crisis, which I'm part way through.
  • What Does Consciousness Do?
    If consciousness functions as a boundary administrator, formatting the picture of reality into the physical world of material objects with discrete boundaries in space and time, then there is the suggestion that at the QM scale on down to the Planck scale, an interval wherein, presumably, consciousness is not yet assembled, the state of the system is superposition. If so, then we can associate superposition with Kant's noumenal realm of things-in-themselves.ucarr

    The problem with your ideas is that they are too idiosyncratic, and that they don't reference anyone else's work in philosophy, cog sci and other fields. You've taken bits here, pieces there, and tried to combine them into what you see as a synthesis, but the problem I have is that I can barely make sense of the result. Your posts often contain many sweeping statements with deep implications, but that alone doesn't guarantee quality. I would recommend you find some established authors who's published works represent what you think is the best synthesis of these ideas and provide references to them, a practice that you will notice I try to do in many of my posts. (Sorry for being blunt, but you did request feedback.)
  • The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism
    My contention is that our perceptions provide a reflection of objective reality, not identical to it, but we can have success at uncovering additional objective truths about reality.Relativist

    Sure, but that doesn't refute the objectivist claim that at a fundamental level, the objects of scientific analysis are 'just so', independently of any knowledge of them. They are not, in that sense, truly mind-independent. That is where quantum physics undermines the intuitive sense of the objectivity of the external world. I'm not denying that there are objective facts - that would be out-and-out relativism - but that objectivity can ever be complete. Consider the titles of three of the popular books I've read about it - Quantum: Einstein, Bohr and the Great Debate About the Nature of Reality, Manjit Kumar; Uncertainty: Einstein, Heisenberg, Bohr, and the Struggle for the Soul of Science, David Lindley; and What is Real?: The Unfinished Quest for the Meaning of Quantum Physics, Adam Becker. Notice the common thread in all these titles. It says something serious about the limitations of objective science and the conundrums that modern physics throw up. And I don't think Armstrong's style of objectivist materialism has the resources to deal with that.

    Of course there's more about reality than we truly understand at this time, and I believe it likely that there are aspects of reality that we will never understand. But just because we don't understand everything about the way the natural world works does not imply there is something unnatural at play in the world. To argue that would be an argument from ignorance.Relativist

    No, it's an argument from epistemic humility.

    It's not true that homo sapiens are the only organisms that think logically. At its core, logical reasoning entails remembering cause-effect relationships. Many animals exhibit behavior that entails multiple steps to achieve an objective. This is basic logical thinking.Relativist

    It is an established fact that the forebrain of h.sapiens evolved explosively over the period from the early australopithecus until the arrival of h.sapiens approximately 100,000 years ago. The neural capacities that this provide are exponentially more powerful than anything possessed by other animals including our simian forbears. My claim is that due to this, h.sapiens crossed an evolutionary threshhold that cannot be explained purely in terms of biological theory, as we have realised 'horizons of being' that are simply not available to other animals. These include abstract reasoning, language, art, scientific invention, moral reflection, symbolic thought, and awareness of mortality, that are all uniquely human. They indicate a qualitative leap, a difference in kind, rather than a mere quantitative increase in cognitive ability.

    (Interestingly there's a 1950's book by one of the founders of the modern neo-darwinian synthesis, Theodosius Dobzhansky, called The Biology of Ultimate Concern, one of many books that address this theme, but notable because of Dobzhansky's status in the formulation of modern evolutionary science. (It was Dobzhansky who coined the phrase 'nothing in biology makes sense except for in the light of evolution'.) This book contradicts Dawkin's type of argument that there is an irredeemable conflict between evolutionary biology and religious philosophy.)

    I say that Armstrong's type of philosophy is hanging on to the remnants of the Christian belief in divinely-ordered nature, sans God, which was replaced with the scientist.
    — Wayfarer
    It's not "hanging on" for the sake of hanging on. It wouldn't make sense to deny the existence of laws of nature just because past natural philosophers identified them as laws ordained by God.
    Relativist

    I think it's unarguable that Armstrong's belief in the power of natural law is a natural outcome (pardon the irony) of the trajectory of Western religious and philosophical thought.

    Regarding a case for God, I'd be interested in hearing moreRelativist

    The book I referred to was by Karen Armstrong, published around 2009. To give you an idea, here's a review by philosopher Alain de Botton, and also an OP by Armstrong, Should We Believe in Belief?

    Personally, I don't evangalise faith in God, but as I am critical of the philosophy of secular humanism it sort of puts me in the camp of those who do.
  • The Biggest Problem for Indirect Realists
    I get what Kant was saying hundreds of years ago, but we've learned much more about the brain since then.Philosophim

    I don't think you can deflate Kant's claims so easily. Despite the 'marvellous progress of modern science' there are philosophical issues which will not yield so easily to those clever folks in their white lab coats.

    A scholar named Andrew Brook has published books and papers on the intersection of Kantian philosophy and modern cognitive science, exploring how Kant’s insights align with and contribute to contemporary understanding of the mind. Brook’s work emphasizes that Kant anticipated several concepts central to cognitive science, particularly the notion that cognition involves active processes of structuring and organizing experience rather than passively receiving sensory input. Brook sees Kant as a precursor to theories in cognitive science that propose the mind as a system that imposes order on incoming data, emphasizing the mind’s role in synthesizing raw sensory data into coherent experiences.

    For Kant, as Brook underscores, this means that the mind doesn’t simply react to raw sensory data; rather, it actively organizes and interprets it in line with certain fundamental principles that are implicit in the nature of experience itself. These principles—such as causality, unity, and temporality—are not derived from experience but are necessary for experience to have any coherent form. Brook views Kant’s insight here as crucial: it suggests that experience is structured by inherent cognitive faculties that synthesize sensations into a unified whole, making perception itself possible. This structuring role of the mind underpins cognitive processes, creating a foundation on which experience unfolds.

    That process is what is described as 'transcendental' - not in the sense of 'beyond experience' but implicit in the nature of experience. It is 'transcendental' in the sense that it refers to the conditions that are always operative within experience, shaping it from within, not transcending it in a mystical or otherworldly sense. The transcendental conditions Kant describes, which Brook highlights, operate in a way that is fundamentally invisible to direct introspection. They’re not accessible through casual reflection or even careful self-observation, because they are so ingrained in the structure of experience that we can’t “see” them directly. They function as the very backdrop against which experience is possible, like the frame of a picture that remains unseen because our attention is always focused on the content within.

    One of Brook’s focal points is Kant’s idea of the “transcendental unity of apperception,” which describes the self’s role in providing coherence to experience. Brook interprets this as a fundamental cognitive function: the capacity to unify various sensory inputs and thoughts under a consistent self-conscious perspective. He connects this to modern discussions on self-awareness, suggesting that understanding the self’s role in cognition is critical to grasping how mental states are integrated. Brook also argues that cognitive science benefits from a Kantian perspective in addressing issues like consciousness, self-reference, and the structured nature of perception, showing that Kant’s insights help bridge philosophical inquiry and empirical study, while deepening our grasp of the mind’s foundational structures.

    Kant’s influence persists in social sciences and philosophy precisely because his insights about the mind's role in shaping experience laid the groundwork for modern theories that emphasize the constructive nature of perception and knowledge. Constructivism, for instance, echoes Kant by asserting that knowledge is actively constructed, not merely passively received. Enactivism, with its focus on the dynamic interaction between organism and environment, builds on Kant’s notion that perception depends on structures and activities within the perceiver, rather than solely on external stimuli. Phenomenology also draws deeply from Kant by emphasizing the role of consciousness in constituting the meaningful world around us, exploring how subjective experience shapes our understanding of reality.

    In all these approaches, Kant’s idea that our minds contribute fundamental structures to experience remains a guiding principle. Each tradition takes up Kant’s insight in its own way, exploring how knowledge, perception, and meaning arise through active engagement with the world, rather than as direct imprints of objective reality. This ongoing influence shows that Kant’s work continues to offer essential insights into how we understand ourselves and our place in a world that we, in part, construct through our own cognitive and perceptual frameworks.

    Ref: Kant’s View of the Mind and Consciousness of Self, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Andrew Brook.

    *ChatGPT was utilised in drafting the above text*.
  • Where is AI heading?
    geez there are times when you really know ‘I’m living in the future.’
  • The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism
    My point is that the set of properties that emerge are objectively presentRelativist

    And mine was that they're not objective until they're measured. And even then, there are experiments which indicate that those measurements will vary for different observers, which again throws their objective status into question.

    See Quantum by Manjit Kumar, which is a very detailed account of the Bohr-Einstein debates. Whilst there are many arcane details, the basic point that comes through very clearly is that Einstein held to scientific realism, pretty well exactly in Armstrong's sense, while Bohr challenged that realism, saying things like 'It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how Nature is. Physics concerns what we say about Nature', and 'No phenomenon is a real phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon.' John Wheeler said of Bohr: 'The dependence of what is observed upon the choice of the experimental arrangement made Einstein unhappy. It conflicts with the view that the universe exists "out there" independent of all acts of observation. In contrast, Bohr stressed that we confront here an inescapable new feature of nature, to be welcomed because of the understanding it gives us. In struggling to make clear to Einstein the central point as he saw it, Bohr found himself forced to introduce the word "phenomenon". In today's words, Bohr's point - and the central point of quantum theory - can be put into a simple sentence: "No elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is a registered (observed) phenomenon".

    there's nothing about the application of logic that is inconsistent with physical mechanismRelativist

    As we ourselves understand logic, we are able to create systems that perform logical operations. But that doesn't mean that the mechanistic analogies for organism or natural thought, such as those often entertained by materialism, provide an account of the nature of logic. Materialists never tire of telling us that the Universe is devoid of logic and that everything we see is a consequence of the undirected physical 'laws of nature'. So how an organism (if that is indeed what we are) which is purportedly a product of those same undirected forces can come to some degree of understanding the Universe is rather a mystery, isn't it? Charles Darwin himself expressed doubt - 'But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?'

    We interact with the world to survive. Successful interaction is dependent on our pattern-recognition capacity which enables us to distinguish types of objects and activities.Relativist

    Right. And practically every other species apart from h.sapiens has survived, often for hundreds of millions of years (such as crocodiles) with no capacity for logic whatever. And trying to account for reason in terms of evolutionary theory reduces reason to an adaptation serving the purposes of survival. But if that is what it is, why do we place trust in reason?

    Empiricism in science leads to theories, established by abductive reasoning. By extension, we can abductively conclude there are laws of nature, on the basis that this best explains the success of science.Relativist

    I've pointed out a number of times that it's not clear that the 'laws of nature' are themselves physical. We never observe the laws, but only predictable outcomes which indicate that they exist. Physics can be carried out without reference to such laws, which is instrumentalism or pragmatism. Some have used abductive reasoning as evidence for a higher intelligence. So the point is, the existence of laws is not evidence for physicalism. I say that Armstrong's type of philosophy is hanging on to the remnants of the Christian belief in divinely-ordered nature, sans God, which was replaced with the scientist. There's another Armstrong, Karen, who has an excellent book, The Case for God, on the way the modern belief in natural law grew out of the faith of early modern science, but eventually gave rise to atheism.
  • The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism
    thank you for your explanations. I have learned something more about D M Armstrong.
  • Quantum Physics and Classical Physics — A Short Note
    Quantum physics observes what appears to be a statistical "glitch in the matrix"Gnomon

  • Evidence of Consciousness Surviving the Body
    Ian Stevenson, who we have discussed previously in this thread, provided studies of somewhere around 2,700 cases in his two-volume Reincarnation and Biology. However as you will probably understand, his research is not well-regarded by mainstream science, as reincarnation is a scientific and religious taboo in Western culture. He's regarded by many as a crank.
  • US Election 2024 (All general discussion)
    If Trump doesn't loose, Elon Musk will become one of the most powerful people in the new Establishment.

  • TPF Haven: a place to go if the site goes down
    thank you. (Incidentally I did sort out my multiple ID issues on Discord so can now find the life-raft in the event of further trouble.)
  • Evidence of Consciousness Surviving the Body
    Yes. As is everyone else. Do you think you die when you go to sleep?Clearbury

    I think that would rather over-dramatize it, although I do recall Alan Watts saying that dying is like going to sleep without waking up the next day.

    I'm extremely reticent to speculate about 'the life hereafter', however I have a firm conviction that our life overflows the bounds of physical birth and death, if I could put it that way.
  • The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism
    Objects are made of these particles, and each particle has a well-defined set of properties. The existence of these particles were deduced, not perceived by the faculties of our "phenomenal awareness", but over time - their existence has been confirmed through measurements in particle accelerators. So tell me in what sense is this NOT objective reality.Relativist

    The properties of particles are not defined until they are measured. That is the central philosophical problem of modern physics. The Copenhagen interpretation says it's pointless to second-guess what lies behind these measurements as it is indeterminate. The many-worlds interpretation attempts to deflate that mystery but at the cost of infinitely many proliferating universes.

    There's an anecdote, told by Werner Heisenberg, of Neils Bohr giving a lecture to the remaining Vienna Circle positivists in the 1950's (some of their principals having died or retired by then.) Bohr laid out the basics of quantum physics, in line with the 'Copenhagen' approach which he helped define. At the end of his talk, the audience applauded politely but had no questions. It was this that prompted Bohr to say 'if you're not shocked by quantum physics, then you can't have understood it!'
  • Evidence of Consciousness Surviving the Body
    Fair enough. As I've said many times in this thread, I think research into children with memories of previous lives is corroborative in some ways to NDE reports. Both indicate modes of being beyond physical birth and death.