I am well aware of this general idea, the problem is it is plainly false. I don't want to argue here and derails Bob Ross's fine thread, but in general such challenges to accepted theory are fun to consider when first entering philosophy, but are eventually solved. — Philosophim
This is not true that idealism has been 'solved' or refuted generally. There are quite a few people of scientific bent, of whom Bernardo Kastrup is one, who have made detailed arguments for philosophical idealism, which have not been refuted.
When discussing these matters, just be aware that your physicalist views are not supported by philosophical argument, but are simply expressions of your 'gut feel' as to what can and can't be true. Incredulity is not itself an argument.
The smooth stone will be carried along by the current, the jagged one will catch and snag — Fooloso4
The example you're giving takes 'the objective' as independently real - independently, that is, of any judgement or perception on our part, and imputes self-evidence to it. The basic argument remains: look, these stones are far older than our minds, how can you say they don't exist independently of our perception of them? They were around millions of years before anyone perceived them.
But idealism does not necessarily call the
empirical reality of objects into question. It's not saying that the world is only 'in the mind' (although certainly Berkeley can be interpreted as saying that, which is why, in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant added a section distinguishing his philosophy from what he called the '
problematic idealism' of Berkeley.)
What idealism, analytic or transcendental, is drawing attention to, is that the mind creates the framework within which our judgements about the stone (or any object) are meaningful. Schopenhauer, for example, published an early book,
On Vision and Colors, which is his analysis, based on the neuroscience of his day, of how the brain synthesises visual data to generate color cognition. The basic outlines of what he said have been abundantly confirmed by later science. Cognitive and evolutionary psychology have revealed that conscious perception, while subjectively appearing to exist as a steady continuum, is actually composed of a heirarchical matrix of interacting cellular transactions, commencing at the most basic level with the parasympathetic system which controls one’s respiration, digestion, and so on, up through various levels to culminate in that specifically human ability of rational thought (and beyond, although this is beyond the scope of current science and a matter of controversy.)
Consciousness plays the central role in co-ordinating these diverse activities so as to give rise to the sense of continuity which we call ‘ourselves’ and also the coherence and reality of the world of appearance. Yet it is important to realise that the naïve sense in which we understand ourselves and the objects of our perception to exist is dependent upon the constructive activities of our consciousness, most of which are unknown to us. We have no more knowledge of them than we do of cell division or of our hair growing or our food digesting.
When we perceive something - large, small, alive or inanimate, local or remote - there is a considerable amount of work involved in ‘creating’ the object from the raw material of perception. Your eyes receive the lightwaves reflected or emanated from it, your mind synthesises the image with regards to all of the other stimuli impacting your senses at that moment – acknowledging it or ignoring it depending on how busy you are; your memory will then compare it to other objects you have seen, from whence you will recall its name, and perhaps know something about it ('star', 'tree', 'frog', etc - this is the process of 'apperception').
And you will do all of this without you even noticing that you are doing it; it is largely unconscious.
In other words, your consciousness is
not the passive recipient of sensory objects which exist irrespective of your perception of them. Instead, your consciousness is an
active agent which constructs experiential reality - partially on the basis of sensory input, but also on the basis of a huge number of unconscious processes, including memories, intentions and cultural frameworks. This is how we arrive at what Schopenhauer designates as 'vorstellung', variously translated as 'representation' or 'idea'. And that is what reality consists of. It includes the object, but it is not in itself an object. As Schopenhauer says in the
first paragraph of WWI, discerning this fact is the beginning of philosophical wisdom.
our perception relies on an internal categorization of reality and that to fully understand it we instead require imagination based on understanding scientific data. — Christoffer
Their remains no scientific account of which neural systems are able to generate the subjective unity of experience. See
The Subjective Unity of Perception in a paper on the Neural Binding Problem. He notes that the problem posed by David Chalmers in his paper Facing Up to the Hard Problem of Concsiousness, remains 'intractable'.