Are you sympathetic to the Kantian notion that space and time are part of the human cognitive apparatus and allow us to make sense of our experience, but not an aspect of the noumenal world? — Tom Storm
And why is this the way Will chooses to individuate itself? — schopenhauer1
Kastrup would say that our perception is simply representing the world as if it was a certain way. The physical world is representation, not the thing itself. — schopenhauer1
Suppose "representation" is the "thing in itself" (just as the tip of an iceberg is also an iceberg) ...The physical world is representation, not the thing itself. — schopenhauer1
In terms of science, I think that science proper is the acquiring of how entities relate to each other and not what they fundamentally are — Bob Ross
'Prior to' - ontologically prior. Not 'outside' as in 'located somewhere else'.Forms || Outside Time/Space — schopenhauer1
If the nature of reality is essentially experiential does this mean that prior to experiential animals there was no reality or is this a teleological claim or has there always been something that is capable of experiencing?....I would say that the physical world is represented. It is not the thing itself, but both what is represented and experience are of something.
Is the assumption that there is something that is experienced and something that is represented mistaken? — Fooloso4
So if I understand this correctly, reality is the total abstraction of an observer
Isn't this just solipsism?
Because this seems to run into the problem of multiple beings each having a separate, and often times conflicting representation of reality.
If the observer is doing the abstracting, what is the observer? Is that also an abstraction of itself? In which case, what is it?
For example, if I abstract that I can fly, but fall and shatter half of my body, while I am in the hospital I have to find an explanation for why my abstraction failed.
They cannot understand what it is like to experience a green pen from your point of view.
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This is where we run into the hard problem. How do we objectively handle personal qualitative experience when it is impossible to know if we can replicate it on ourselves? Is what I call green your qualitative green when you see the waves that represent green? So far this seems impossible.
No, we know you're going to see green when a green wavelength hits your eyes and the proper signals go to your brain.
The fact that everything you experience is from your brain is not questioned in neuroscience at this point, only philosophy.
What is it like to be a fire for example?
Just because we don't understand all the mechanics to the exact degree in a system does not invalidate the overlaying mechanics that we do understand about that system.
qualitative experiences being linked to the physical brain
it is that a physicalist method cannot account for what it is like to be the thing experiencing that qualitative experience, because it is purely in the realm of the subject having the experience
We cannot objectively know through the mechanics of stimulating the brain what it is like to have the experience of that brain, as we can never be that other brain.
Check out brain surgeries, or the case of the color blind painter who had brain damage that removed his ability to ever see or imagine color again
Does science suggest that there was mind experiencing itself experiencing?
Or that there is something experienced that is not experience? That there is a difference between experience and what is experienced?
There is a logical leap from our being experiential to the universe being experiential. We have no experience of the experience of the universe or of it being experiential. It seems to be a form of anthropomorphism. The ancient assumption of like to like. Microcosm and macrocosm.
This is still within the world of human experience.
It is the best because the best theory must be reductive?
That there must be a single something that is fundamental?
We have no experience of something fundamental.
Yes, it seems to me that 'panpsychist' arguments (e.g. analytical idealism) consist of appeal to ignorance / incredulity, hasty generalization and compositional fallacies.
but I adopt the Kantian principle of there being innate categories and functionalities of the mind which are not simply given but which the mind brings to experience.
I don't have much substantive to offer here, but I wanted to compliment you on a well written and clear OP. You obviously put a lot of thought and effort into it.
Under analytical idealism, the entirety of reality is fundamentally mind and is thusly conscious: not just animals. — Bob Ross
Explain why you have not just contradicted yourself, Bob. Thanks.Analytical Idealism is not a form of pansychism. Furthermore, could you please elaborate on why you think such? — Bob Ross
what would those categories be exactly? — Bob Ross
…..reductionism is the best means of explanation….. — Bob Ross
The problem with your argument is that it assumes you can get outside your understanding of the world to see it as it truly is, without any observer. — Wayfarer
Good question: no. Solipsism is the idea that everything is in my mind, whereas analytical idealism is the idea that both our minds are in a universal mind. — Bob Ross
By analytic idealism, I take it to be that reality is fundamentally (ontologically) one mind which has dissociated parts (like bernardo kastrup's view). Thusly, I do find that there really is a sun (for example): it just as a 'sun-in-itself' is not like the sun which appears on my "dashboard" of conscious experience--instead, I think the most parsimonious explanation is that it is fundamentally mentality instead of physicality — Bob Ross
Truth, I would say, is a relationship between thinking (cognizing) and being (reality) whereof something is true if our concept corresponds to what it is referencing in reality. This can include concepts referencing other concepts as well. — Bob Ross
They cannot understand what it is like to experience a green pen from your point of view.
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This is where we run into the hard problem. How do we objectively handle personal qualitative experience when it is impossible to know if we can replicate it on ourselves? Is what I call green your qualitative green when you see the waves that represent green? So far this seems impossible.
They cannot explain why anyone experiences the color green. A strong correlation between a brain function and the qualitative experience of greeness does not entail that the latter was produced by the former. — Bob Ross
I don’t deny that we can manipulate conscious states by affecting brain states, this is also expected under analytic idealism. — Bob Ross
Under analytical idealism, the entirety of reality is fundamentally mind and is thusly conscious: not just animals. — Bob Ross
Analytical Idealism is not a form of pansychism. Furthermore, could you please elaborate on why you think such? — Bob Ross
Explain why you have not just contradicted yourself, Bob. Thanks.
The argument is that we cannot account for consciousness by the reductive physicalist method ... — Bob Ross
Science only tells us how things behave, not what they fundamentally are. — Bob Ross
I am not simply assuming the world out there is mind because I am mind: that is a bad argument. — Bob Ross
What do you mean? My point is that we use reason to infer, based off of experience, things which are not a part of our experience (and this is perfectly valid). — Bob Ross
Analytical idealism is not the best theory simply because it is a reductive methodololgical approach — Bob Ross
It is the best metaphysical theory I have heard (so far) for what reality fundamentally is. — Bob Ross
There is nothing in reality that necessitates substance monism; however, the best theories are the one’s that use occam’s razor: otherwise, theories explode into triviality. — Bob Ross
I think we can know things without directly experiencing them. — Bob Ross
... the universe is experiential in essence.
I've heard something similar to this before. Its sort of a "God observer of reality" idea (does not necessitate a God). I've seen this type of thought as the idea that if we could have an observer that could observe and comprehend reality, that would be the true understanding of reality.
Isn't reality itself the substance the God observer observes, while the entire rational interpretation of it all can be known about that substance?
If I understand what you're going for here, its the idea that the "sun-in-itself" only has identity because of rational beings. Let us imagine a child who looks at a picture and see a sun in a sky. If the child has never been told that there is a sun and a sky, would the child necessarily see the sun and sky as separate? We identify it as separate, and so it is. But without a rational being doing the identifying, would the concept of the sun and the sky exist? Would there really be a separation, or would it just be a blend of atoms?
If I have this right, this still does not eliminate the sun as an existence if an observer did not exist.
If "being" is reality, why not just call it "being" instead of reality?
In which case, why not simplify it to state that reality is what exists regardless of our observations, or our being, while what we know about reality is a combination of our rational identifications that aren't contradicted by what exists?
Would you consider yourself an idealist? — Tom Storm
I would say that the physical world is represented. It is not the thing itself, but both what is represented and experience are of something.
Is the assumption that there is something that is experienced and something that is represented mistaken? — Fooloso4
Suppose "representation" is the "thing in itself" (just as the tip of an iceberg is also an iceberg) ... — 180 Proof
'Prior to' - ontologically prior. Not 'outside' as in 'located somewhere else'. — Wayfarer
Could you elaborate on why one should believe that these categories are what our minds use as functions to produce phenomenal experience? — Bob Ross
What are your guys' thoughts? — Bob Ross
Think of it this way: if no one is looking at the tree, then it does not continue to exist in the manner that we perceive it, but it continues to exist in the sense that it is an idea in the universal mind that if we were to go perceive it we would expect to see the same tree (because our ability to perceive will represent the ideas the same manner it did before).
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The substance of reality under analytic idealism is mentality and the universal mind is fundamentally the one existing brute fact, and we are derivatives thereof (i.e., priority monism). — Bob Ross
Because what we observe is also real (i.e., a part of reality). When I imagine a unicorn, that unicorn exists as an imaginary unicorn. My concept of a car exists in my mind and is thusly a part of reality: humans and other conscious beings are a part of reality. — Bob Ross
If one simply calls what is real what is perception-independent (or something similar) than (I would say) it fails under more in depth scrutiny. For example, one cannot evaluate the concept of concepts as true (even in the case that it references what a concept is correctly) because it doesn’t correspond to something outside of perceptive-experience (which is what you would be calling ‘reality’). — Bob Ross
Science (proper) tells us how things relate and not what they fundamentally are. — Bob Ross
For example, if a person claims that this mental state X is strongly correlated to this brain state Y, there is still the valid conceptual question of “how did Y produce X”? The physicalist then has to explain this either (1) by another appeal to the same relationship (i.e., “because Y is correlated with Z”) of which the same conceptual question applies (i.e., “how did Z and Y produce X?”) or (2) by positing that “because strong correlation entails or implies causation” — Bob Ross
The universal mind is not experiencing itself directly like we experience the world but, arguably under Kastrup’s view, it is experiencing itself via us (as we are alters of that mind). — Bob Ross
If the nature of reality is essentially experiential does this mean that prior to experiential animals there was no reality or is this a teleological claim or has there always been something that is capable of experiencing? — Fooloso4
Under analytical idealism, the entirety of reality is fundamentally mind and is thusly conscious: not just animals. — Bob Ross
There is no "aha!" point or moment in time that can be pointed at, and then it can be said "here it is!". There is no magical combination or point in evolutionary progression that consciousness suddenly appears, resides, or has emerged as we know it. — creativesoul
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