my guess is that Old French had a much larger, more sophisticated corpus than Old English did — Bitter Crank

I see no reason to assume such an imbalance. What I’d say is that due to the Norman conquest, two languages merged to form modern English: old French and old English. This means that modern English has more flexibility and power than any other language, me think. Hybrid vigor.

It sets out what counts as pretheoretical conscious experience. But, since you've expressed no interest in that criterion, calling it a "strawman" built by Dennett, I suspected you may not have taken note that I'm not in complete agreement with Dennett, because I'm neither a dualist, nor a monist. — creativesoul

I am quite interested in pretheoretical conscious experience. In fact, I taught you how to use this word, remember? https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/469904

We understand the entire process of swimming towards the attractant at this level of detail. We know that the attractant chemicals react with chemicals in the cell, setting off a chain of reactions which eventually cause the flagella to rotate in such a way that the bacterium swims in the direction where the concentration of attractant is increasing. — Daemon

We can’t synthetise the mechanism from scratch yet, which means we are still guessing how it might work. Note that all the flagella have to paddle in the same direction, so the process involves some uniform sense of spatial direction, which ain’t easy to do with mere chemistry.

But this is just nitpicking. More importantly, how would you propose that we differentiate « real codes » from « unreal codes »? Is the genetic code not real, and why?

What do you think about the three kinds of conscious experience I set out recently? — creativesoul

Didn’t see that.

Stop trying to confuse yourself. I never said that everything was a symbol, only that some things are.

Does "The apple" refer to the apple? I say that it does.

Others will say variously that it refers to the perception of the apple, ... — Banno

Personally, if I want to talk about the apple, I say « the apple », and if I want to talk about the perception of the apple, I say « the perception of the apple ».

Similarly, one could say that in vision, colors code for wavelengths. Tastes in the mouth code for certain chemicals in the food, etc. Qualia are symbolic in nature.
— Olivier5

How come then that the word “red” preceded any understanding of light? And the word “bitter” preceded any atomic theory? I don’t see how these words could be coding for these properties as that implies that you need to know the properties to be able to use the words coding for them (just as you need to understand what altitude is to be able to read the map), but you don’t. — khaled

Words are not the only symbols. Qualia are biological symbols, like genes. You don’t need to know genetics to reproduce your genes, and you don’t need to know optics to see a certain wavelength as red.

fear and ignorance, one that man will sadly never find redemption from. Of course - and even more sadly - it's not a crime really.. — Tim3003

It's a crime when it is engineered. Murdoch made sure that every 1 in 2 native English speakers in this world ends up a total moron by the age he or she can watch the tely.

Of course we're not yet able to explain the part where the electrochemical impulses are turned into experiences, — Daemon

The point I am trying to make is a little bit like what people call ‘color coding’. When one wants to represent, say, altitude on a map, one can do so with a set of colors associated to a set of altitude intervals. The colors code for altitude. Similarly, one could say that in vision, colors code for wavelengths. Tastes in the mouth code for certain chemicals in the food, etc. Qualia are symbolic in nature.

we can explain the entire process whereby a bacterium for example responds (without conscious experience) to the presence of a particular chemical in its environment. Here again, once the process is described in terms of chemical reactions and so on, there doesn't seem to be anything left for symbols to do. — Daemon

Whether the bacterium is conscious or not is hard to decide empirically. I am ready to assume it is not conscious in the common meaning of this word (human of course), but it’s an assumption.

This assumption made, the process, as we know it, involves the genetic code, as well as other codes such as hormones, and therefore it involves decoding. Once again we assume that the decoding engine works through chemistry, and it seems to, although the actual process of associating one particular codon to one particular amino-acid is infernally (or divinely) complex. If anyone is interested, the key to the genetic code is a set of keys: 20 different aminoacyl-tRNA synthetases, one for each amino acid coded by the genetic code. One chemical key binding one amino acid with one (or several) codons of 3 RNA bases.

These proteins themselves are coded in the genetic code, of course, and they must be present around the ribosome in strictly defined concentrations otherwise the decoding goes haywire. This means already two feedback loops here.

The keys (aminoacyl-tRNA synthetases) help the ribosomes synthetize the right protein from the right genetic code. Here is a model of the largest sub-unit of a prokaryote ribosome, just to give you an idea of the level of complexity we are talking about.


Proteins are coloured in blue and RNA in brown. The core transcription site is in red. This large sub-unit has a molecular mass of 2.8 million daltons, twenty times bigger than this previous baby. It is paired with a smaller sub-unit with a molecular mass of 1.4 million daltons to form the ribosome.

One can write pretty good, best-selling texts in predominantly Anglo-Saxon and Middle-English; Tolkien wrote several volumes of it. Granted, Tolkien didn't have the problem of explaining viruses, the risks of anal sex (which is probably what the orcs preferred) or proper condom use. — Bitter Crank

As a native French speaker, one of the tricks in writing English is to avoid overusing words of French origin and tap into words of Germanic origin, often shorter and more colloquial. Reading Tolkien can help expand one's vocabulary in those directions, also Kipling. But an English text avoiding entirely words of French origin would be just as artificial as one exclusively relying on them.

Yes, you see some of that happening.

The subject perceives the object through a symbolic representation...
— Olivier5

And here I thought it was via physiological sensory perception apparatus. Who knew it was through symbols and signs. No perception of objects for those poor language less beasts... — creativesoul

This physiological apparatus uses symbols. I’m not talking of articulated language here, but of the symbols that colors and tastes are. You keep missing the point.

It’s not me talking but professor Shravan Vasishth, an Indian-origin professor of psycholinguistics at the University of Potsdam in Germany.

How would you describe Chomsky’s approach?

Do you have a special interest in tools for machine translation Olivier? — Daemon

I use them professionally. DeepL is my favorite.

Google Translate is useful — Bitter Crank

There’s this new tool, DeepL, which is a bit better. I use it a lot. These things are similar to the Chinese room, in their principle.

Une canaille in French now means a person without any morality, someone you can’t trust under any circumstances. I didn’t know it came from Italian.

I always try to squeeze one inordinate word in every paper I write, for the fun but also to wake the reader up. The editors often wack it off. The last time, I used « impelent ».

Have tried dictation but it doesn’t work well for me.

it's the proponents of "qualia" who set it, t — creativesoul

Dennett set up this strawman all by himself. You are not paying attention.

Personally I would rather obliterate any and all philosophical notions that lead to widespread confusion and false belief given the sheer power that belief wields in this shared world of ours. — creativesoul

You are welcome to obliterate your own concepts, and not use certain words.

Personally, I treat words as tools. I need tools to do stuff, and I am not going to jettison a concept without a good replacement. So what other concept do you propose, to replace qualia?

Well, I suppose that's one way to deal with the confusion of the subject/object distinction. — Banno

It is one way to connect a subject and his objects, yes. It’s called perception. The subject perceives the object through a symbolic representation. The symbols used in this representation include qualitatively different tastes, colors, sounds, etc. which are generically called qualia. They can evoke emotions and memories, thus engaging the subject fully.

Confusing things is your specialty here, I guess.

As you must be aware of, one can objectify a subject without difficulty...

They are subjective and objective? — Banno

Correct, like a lot of other things. Words for instance.

Dennett was trying to attack the idea of qualia as ineffable, private and directly apprehensible in consciousness. Yet all he achieves with his intuition pumping is to show that qualia are ineffable, subjective and private, but also objective, scientific phenomena. The scientists who objectively and verifiably invert poor Chase’s taste buds in IP #8, the pill that changes Dennett’s experience of cauliflower in IP #11, and the inverted spectacles of IP #12 affirm the objective existence of qualia, since they imply that taste and visual qualia can be objectively manipulated by science.

Why did he fail?

For one, he is attempting the impossible: concepts are always ambiguous so they cannot be ‘nailed’ like he is trying to do.

For two, deconstructing a concept is only useful if you can propose an alternative, which he doesn’t, and therefore he cannot show a better way to speak about subjective apprehension of qualities.

For three, he is attacking the wrong aspects of the concept. There was something useful to be said about qualia being a risky concept to use, but you won’t find it in Quining Qualia. The correct and useful critique of the concept ‘qualia’ is related to them not being atomistic, permanent, absolute and objective. This is perhaps why some materialists have trouble understanding them.

That our perceptions and experiences are private and inaccessible to others is a fact, which empiricists should respect I think. I cannot read your mind and you cannot read mine. René Descartes did not invent this fact.
— Olivier5

It seems the dress retailers are not familiar with the Cartesian "facts". — Andrew M

It seems you are not particularly familiar with facts either....

I think the concept is useful, as it allows for an understanding of how we can recognize tastes, smells, colours and voices, by assuming the existence in the human mind of somewhat stable, memorizable and comparable elements in the form of ‘patterns’ or ‘qualities’.

To the extent that the concept is treacherous, it may be in giving:

1. a false impression of permanence, when qualia can evolve through life;
2. a false sense of absoluteness, while it would intuitively seem to me that qualia are always relative to a context and to other qualia;
3. a false idea of an unbreakable atom, while qualia are always aggregates and hence I never use the singular ‘quale’ - qualia is to me always plural like data; there’s no such thing as one datum or one quale;
4. an illusion of objective reality, when qualia are obviously symbolic, they code for something else, eg for physical variables such as wavelengths of light or for chemical composition of food.

From this POV, qualia are to perception what concepts are to articulated language: infinitely adaptative and breakable and recomposable elements of a language that tries to describe the world. Their flexibility is a bit bewildering at first but it’s an asset, and we can still memorize them, recognize them, and use them to think. Or to perceive, in the case of qualia.

I've cited several examples of very poor philosophical theories that use qualia. Qualia are misleading. — Banno

Well then, drop qualia and use another concept to try to say what you want to say...

So, I'm asking any of the proponents of Qualia...

What meets these standards? Better yet what could? — creativesoul

My question would rather be: who gives a flying rat’s ass, and why? If Dennett prefers to use another term than qualia, who is stopping him? Why does he care so much for the words other people use?

You should thank Apokrisis, who clued me on to this vibe.

This said, it has nothing to do with Dennett so I have posted it on another thread. The mods are welcome to delete it here.

On the advice of Apokrisis I’ve been reading about Pierce theory of signs, and the importance of interpretation by a subject, which according to Howard Pattee lies at the core of the ‘hard problem’. (Pattee doesn’t solve the problem but exposes it quite well in Cell Phenomenology: The First Phenomenon by Howard Pattee.

I think a philosophy of life as language along the lines he exposes can work quite well to understand both human language and ´biolanguages’. Currently on:

On the Origin of Language - A Bridge Between Biolinguistics and Biosemiotics, by Marcello Barbieri

Barbieri is an embryologist from Ferrare University. So far (p.3) he gives a good primer on the ‘school’.

Interestingly (for some), there's a neo-thomist connection, through Jacques Maritain and Thomas Sebeok.

something to do with fish. — Punshhh

and chips...

My take is: the crime of anachronistic nationalism.

I don't think Dennett's counter thought experiment does the trick. — Marchesk

What a surprise!

If you are interested in philosophy, as opposed to the speculative mental expertiments of the anti-mentals, I’ve been reading about modern biosemiotics by Howard Pattee, Thomas Sebeok and others. I know enough biology to understand what they say, and also to see how a philosophy of life as language can work. Currently on:

On the Origin of Language - A Bridge Between Biolinguistics and Biosemiotics, by Marcello Barbieri

Barbieri is an embryologist from Ferrare University. So far (p.3) he gives me a good primer on the ‘school’.

I can also recommend Cell Phenomenology: The First Phenomenon by Howard Pattee. Apokrisis told me about this. It’s all based on Pierce theory of signs, and the importance of interpretation by a subject, which according to Pattee lies at the core of the ‘hard problem’. (Pattee doesn’t solve the problem but exposes it quite well)

Thanks, interesting take by Chris Grey. He ends up with:

It is not clear what crime we have committed to have to endure the endless torture of Brexit. — Chris Grey

That’s a good question.

Well, he uses the robot version of Mary to counter the knowledge argument because Robo-Mary can learn how to modify their code or circuits to put themselves into the state of seeing red directly. Which presumably human Mary could do with brain surgery or a transcranial magnet. — Marchesk

Ok, I’l bite... And the conclusion is?

(I suppose a female would never have come up with such a biased thought experiment on account of biological reality). — Marchesk

Mary’s room is what happens when a traditional male ‘thinker’ tries to behave all pro-women: 1) choose female guinea pig for your thought experiments; 2) then forget that she is supposed to be a woman, with a womb that will discharge a lot of red colour every month.

Have your read Dennett's paper about Robo-Mary? — Marchesk

Err.. no, I’m not a big fan of Dennett. I think he is bulshitter.

A robot, a dead man and a blindsighted nun are lying next to you on a sunny beach. Describe the different effects of the sunlight on each of them. Do not write on both sides of the paper at once. Your time starts...now.
— Daemon

Add a man day dreaming and another one meditating. — Marchesk

Add a brain in a vat, a brain in a bat, a cat in a box, and poor Mary who never had her periods.

I’ll try my chances with the nun.

Because you're describing your perceptions and experiences as private and inaccessible to others. That's the Cartesian theater model of perception. — Andrew M

That our perceptions and experiences are private and inaccessible to others is a fact, which empiricists should respect I think. I cannot read your mind and you cannot read mine. René Descartes did not invent this fact.

Your recommendations are noted. Do you have any evidence regarding the issue being discussed, which was FYI:

There was a famous experiment a while ago that showed that neurological behaviour associated with motor responses fired before correlated decision-making processes in the prefrontal cortex.
— Kenosha Kid — Daemon

Variations of the test have been performed for decades now as criticism of this form of yes-buttery is ongoing, all verifying the original result. — Kenosha Kid

I seriously doubt it. Don’t believe all the hype.

Err... can you narrow down your query? If you have a particular paper or experiment — philosophically relevant — that you want to point me to, I’d be glad to look at it and try and explain it to you.

Your argument is circular. You're assuming conscious decision-making in precisely the sorts of behaviours (e.g. split-second decisions when driving) that are suggested to be decided unconsciously. — Kenosha Kid

Not really. I’m not talking of conscious vs. unconscious here, but of predictable in advance vs. unpredictable. Libet’s experiment was testing the ability of a computer coupled with an MRI system to predict the choices made by folks in the MRI, opting between a red and a green button to press (with no consequence to the choice, no punishment or reward, which simplifies the problem quite a lot). Beside pressing one of two buttons, the ‘guinea pigs’ were also asked to note the moment when they felt they took the decision. If memory serves, the finding was that the computer, after some training, could predict the folks choice something like 5 seconds before the tested person was conscious of her choice. The interpretation given by Libet et al. was that choices are made unconsciously in advance of them becoming conscious, ie that consciousness is not an active function in human choice making.

My point was that there is a difference between leaning towards pushing the red button and committing to that choice. We know that our decisions are often taken after some deliberation, that we commit to a choice after contemplating that choice, which explains how Libet’s apparatus could predict some of those choices in a highly simplified and artificial context with a lot of time for deliberation.

But this apparatus would not work in a real life scenario where a decision has typically some stake in it, eg in a chess game that one wants to win or while driving a car; and in a context where a decision has to be taken very quickly, like under one second, eg in blitz chess or to avoid an incoming obstacle while driving. In those cases the decision cannot logically be taken 5 seconds in advance, because by then the obstacle wasn’t seen yet or the opponent hadn’t made his move yet. There was not yet a decision to make, 5 seconds ago and there is no time to quietly deliberate, so Libet’s machine won’t work. Another difference is that the stake involves emotions (fear for instance) which modify the way the brain operates. So from the moment I become conscious of the wild boar crossing the road in front on my car, my brain enters a different state, a different modus operandi than before I noticed the wild boar. How would a computer be able to predict that? Finally, another crucial difference is that the options available are much more numerous than in the case of Libet’s experiment (2), and they are not given, they are to be invented or imagined by the person before any choice can be made between them. Like I can veer the car (left or right), or brake, or any combination of these two, or do nothing if I want to kill that boar. In chess, the number of theoretical options is often very large.

For all these reasons, It is highly dubious that Libet’s apparatus could predict any real-life choice, because in my view it picks up clues from our deliberation that sometimes prepares decision making. When the deliberation time is reduced, when the alternatives have to be invented or imagined prior to deliberation, or when emotions systemically affect deliberations in sudden ways, I predict that no computer can predict my choices in advance.

no explicit dissolution or even mention of the hard problem, — bert1

The whole idea of an “epistemic cut” is precisely how Pattee phrases what others call “the hard problem”.