That's not even remotely close to anything I've written here. It's closer to the exact opposite. — creativesoul

It's what I got from Banno. I assumed you were both arguing in the same style.

So let me get this straight:

There are no Qualia, but there are experiences

These experiences cannot be fully encapsulated in any description, as the actual experience needs to be had to understand the word associated with it. You don’t understand red until you’ve seen something red. Something new is found out upon seeing color for the first time that cannot be described.
(Ineffable and intrinsic)

There is no reason to believe that these experiences are the same for everyone as there is a difference between reports of conscious experience and conscious experience. All we ever have access to is the reports. And so we cannot compare the experiences, all we can do is compare the reports.
(Private)

And these “experiences” are radically different from Qualia?

The “Banno route” was to refuse to talk about the thing in the box under any condition as it is unnecessary (supposedly) which also seems to me to be what Dennett is doing. The “Isaac route” was to adamantly insist there is nothing in the box and that implying that there is anything in the box is somehow advocating for a certain neurological theory. What you’re doing just seems like Qualia under a different name for me, you're fine with talking about the thing in the box, but for some reason not fine with the word "Qualia" which is what I would define as "the thing in the box". I don’t see how talk of experiences fixes any of the problems that happen with talk of Qualia.

Cheers creativesoul.

it's the proponents of "qualia" who set it, t — creativesoul

Dennett set up this strawman all by himself. You are not paying attention.

Personally I would rather obliterate any and all philosophical notions that lead to widespread confusion and false belief given the sheer power that belief wields in this shared world of ours. — creativesoul

You are welcome to obliterate your own concepts, and not use certain words.

Personally, I treat words as tools. I need tools to do stuff, and I am not going to jettison a concept without a good replacement. So what other concept do you propose, to replace qualia?

The subject perceives the object through a symbolic representation...
— Olivier5

And here I thought it was via physiological sensory perception apparatus. Who knew it was through symbols and signs. No perception of objects for those poor language less beasts... — creativesoul

This physiological apparatus uses symbols. I’m not talking of articulated language here, but of the symbols that colors and tastes are. You keep missing the point.

Just something that's been bugging me since our discussion because I forgot to add it:

Notice that the explanation bit makes no use of qualia, only of pain. — Banno

Incorrect. Using the word "pain" when trying to describe to someone what "pain" is doesn't add anything to their understanding (because it's using the word to explain what it means). The explanation that I gave was:

“the experience that occurs when you stub your toe” — Banno

You insist that the word "pain" doesn't refer to an experience yet you seemed fine with that as an explanation, even though it clearly sets the referant of the word "pain" to an experience or other.

I still want to see how you explain to someone what "pain" is without referring to any experiences (because you insist that "pain", "red" and other such words are not referring to experiences)

The subject perceives the object through a symbolic representation...

... This physiological apparatus uses symbols. I’m not talking of articulated language here, but of the symbols that colors and tastes are. — Olivier5

I wonder if you could explain in broad terms how this works? Where colour is concerned, my understanding is that light of a certain wavelength reaches the eye, initiating a series of electrochemical impulses which eventually result in the experience of seeing a colour. The process can be described exhaustively in terms of electromagnetic radiation, electrochemical impulses and the like. It seems to me that there isn't anything left for symbols to do.

Of course we're not yet able to explain the part where the electrochemical impulses are turned into experiences, but we can explain the entire process whereby a bacterium for example responds (without conscious experience) to the presence of a particular chemical in its environment. Here again, once the process is described in terms of chemical reactions and so on, there doesn't seem to be anything left for symbols to do.

It seems to me that there isn't anything left for symbols to do. — Daemon

The symbols are to point at certain parts of the experience.

light of a certain wavelength reaches the eye, initiating a series of electrochemical impulses which eventually result in the experience of seeing a colour. — Daemon

It is to be able to talk about that experience of seeing a colour. That is different from talking about the electrochemical impulses. If they were the same we would have to teach children neurology before being able to teach them what "red" means, but they clearly understand what "red" means without knowing the electrochemical impulses that are occuring in their brain as they see red things.

The process can be described exhaustively in terms of electromagnetic radiation, electrochemical impulses and the like. — Daemon

Incorrect. If this was correct then you would be able to explain to someone what "red" is without them ever seeing anything red. However we know that there are certain kinds of "curable" deafness/blidness and it is always the case that the patient is surprised when they hear sounds or see colors for the first time. Even if said patient had a PHD in neurology I suspect they would still be surprised.

without conscious experience — Daemon

What evidence do you have to support this claim? You already recognized that the electrochemical impulses in a human brain are sufficient conditions for consciousness. Why do you assume whatever the bacterium is doing is not also sufficient? That would be assuming that the complexity of the human brain is something necessary for consciousness, which I don't think we have enough (or any) evidence to claim.

The symbols are to point at certain parts of the experience. — khaled

Can you explain where and what these symbols are? Olivier says that colours are symbols. How do colours point at certain parts of the experience?

Olivier says that colours are symbols. How do colours point at certain parts of the experience? — Daemon

How do we teach children what "red" is? We point at red things correct? We do not teach them the electrochemical impulses that are happening in brains as red things are perceived.

Same with "pain", "bitter", "sweet", etc.... There are plenty of words where the only way you can understand them is by having the associated experience, and where explanations of electrochemical impulses that coincide with said experiences do not help the understanding at all. This leads me to conclude that the words are actually pointing at experiences, as the experiences are what mark whether or not you understand the word.

As for what "symbols" mean for Olivier, I can't speak for him. I gave it a guess.

I was responding to Olivier's use of the word "symbol". Let's try to focus on that for now.

Let's — Daemon

Again, can't speak for him. We just have to wait until he answers. I gave it a guess.

Of course we're not yet able to explain the part where the electrochemical impulses are turned into experiences, — Daemon

The point I am trying to make is a little bit like what people call ‘color coding’. When one wants to represent, say, altitude on a map, one can do so with a set of colors associated to a set of altitude intervals. The colors code for altitude. Similarly, one could say that in vision, colors code for wavelengths. Tastes in the mouth code for certain chemicals in the food, etc. Qualia are symbolic in nature.

we can explain the entire process whereby a bacterium for example responds (without conscious experience) to the presence of a particular chemical in its environment. Here again, once the process is described in terms of chemical reactions and so on, there doesn't seem to be anything left for symbols to do. — Daemon

Whether the bacterium is conscious or not is hard to decide empirically. I am ready to assume it is not conscious in the common meaning of this word (human of course), but it’s an assumption.

This assumption made, the process, as we know it, involves the genetic code, as well as other codes such as hormones, and therefore it involves decoding. Once again we assume that the decoding engine works through chemistry, and it seems to, although the actual process of associating one particular codon to one particular amino-acid is infernally (or divinely) complex. If anyone is interested, the key to the genetic code is a set of keys: 20 different aminoacyl-tRNA synthetases, one for each amino acid coded by the genetic code. One chemical key binding one amino acid with one (or several) codons of 3 RNA bases.

These proteins themselves are coded in the genetic code, of course, and they must be present around the ribosome in strictly defined concentrations otherwise the decoding goes haywire. This means already two feedback loops here.

The keys (aminoacyl-tRNA synthetases) help the ribosomes synthetize the right protein from the right genetic code. Here is a model of the largest sub-unit of a prokaryote ribosome, just to give you an idea of the level of complexity we are talking about.


Proteins are coloured in blue and RNA in brown. The core transcription site is in red. This large sub-unit has a molecular mass of 2.8 million daltons, twenty times bigger than this previous baby. It is paired with a smaller sub-unit with a molecular mass of 1.4 million daltons to form the ribosome.

Whether the bacterium is conscious or not is hard to decide empirically. I am ready to assume it is not conscious in the common meaning of this word (human of course), but it’s an assumption. — Olivier5

Bacteria swim towards chemical attractants. They need to move towards the higher concentration of an attractant, which means keeping track over time whether the concentration is higher where they are now than where they were some time ago. This is how it works:

The changes in MCP conformation that inhibit CheA lead to relatively slow increases in MCP methylation by CheR, so that despite the continued presence of attractant, CheA activity is eventually restored to the same value it had in the absence of attractant. Conversely, CheB acts to demethylate the MCPs under conditions that cause elevated CheA activity. Methylation and demethylation occur much more slowly than phosphorylation of CheA and CheY. The methylation state of the MCPs can thereby provide a memory mechanism that allows a cell to compare its present situation to its recent past.

https://www.cell.com/current-biology/pdf/S0960-9822(02)01424-0.pdf

The chemotactic swimming is a result of rotation of flagella at speeds of ca. 18,000 rpm, and it is powered by the proton motive force. Flagellar motors are reversible in nature, helping to change bacterial tumbling into directional swimming by reversing the flagellar rotation from clockwise to counterclockwise. An environmental stimulus, e.g., light, oxygen, chemical, etc., is sensed by a receptor and signals in the form of two-component regulatory systems are transmitted to the flagellar motors, which then move in the required direction.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC134409/

We understand the entire process of swimming towards the attractant at this level of detail. We know that the attractant chemicals react with chemicals in the cell, setting off a chain of reactions which eventually cause the flagella to rotate in such a way that the bacterium swims in the direction where the concentration of attractant is increasing.

When you know the full explanation for the bacterium's behaviour, it's just too much of a stretch to say "oh yeah, also it's conscious". There's just no reason to think it is.

The point I am trying to make is a little bit like what people call ‘color coding’. When one wants to represent, say, altitude on a map, one can do so with a set of colors associated to a set of altitude intervals. The colors code for altitude. Similarly, one could say that in vision, colors code for wavelengths. Tastes in the mouth code for certain chemicals in the food, etc. Qualia are symbolic in nature. — Olivier5

In the case of colour coding on a map, a conscious human devises the code and a conscious human interprets it. One thing stands for or symbolises another. We might call this "actual coding".

The cornea and lens refract light into a small image and shine it on the retina. The retina transduces this image into electrical pulses. This can be called coding, but that's a metaphor. It's not "actual coding".

Similarly, one could say that in vision, colors code for wavelengths. Tastes in the mouth code for certain chemicals in the food, etc. Qualia are symbolic in nature. — Olivier5

How come then that the word “red” preceded any understanding of light? And the word “bitter” preceded any atomic theory? I don’t see how these words could be coding for these properties as that implies that you need to know the properties to be able to use the words coding for them (just as you need to understand what altitude is to be able to read the map), but you don’t.

Bacteria swim towards chemical attractants. They need to move towards the higher concentration of an attractant, which means keeping track over time whether the concentration is higher where they are now than where they were some time ago. This is how it works: — Daemon

And there is no reason to assume that is not sufficient for consciousness. If you think there is then what is it?

Let's just check something. Adopting the notion that words refer...

The referent of "The apple in the fruit bowl" is the apple in the fruit bowl.

The referent of "the experience of seeing the apple in the fruit bowl" is not the apple in the fruit bowl.

The referent of "the pain in my foot" is the pain in my foot.

The referent of "the experience of the pain in my foot" is also the pain in my foot.

Pains are not like apples.

Do you agree?

This can be called coding, but that's a metaphor. It's not "actual coding". — Daemon

...you hit the nail squarely on the head here. Kudos.

Similarly, one could say that in vision, colors code for wavelengths. Tastes in the mouth code for certain chemicals in the food, etc. Qualia are symbolic in nature.
— Olivier5

How come then that the word “red” preceded any understanding of light? And the word “bitter” preceded any atomic theory? I don’t see how these words could be coding for these properties as that implies that you need to know the properties to be able to use the words coding for them (just as you need to understand what altitude is to be able to read the map), but you don’t. — khaled

Words are not the only symbols. Qualia are biological symbols, like genes. You don’t need to know genetics to reproduce your genes, and you don’t need to know optics to see a certain wavelength as red.

Here we might be getting to a fundamental difference.

Does "The apple" refer to the apple? I say that it does.

Others will say variously that it refers to the perception of the apple, the experience of the apple, the quale of the apple, and so on, saying stuff such as that the map is not the territory or that we cannot say anything about the thing-in-itself and so on.

Interestingly, this is a discussion had with @Isaac, who seems to think that "the apple" refers not to the apple but to a mental model of the apple.

Words are not the only symbols. Qualia are biological symbols, like genes. — Olivier5

Things can be treated as symbols.

If everything is just a symbol, what are they symbols for?

Each other?

Idealism.

Stop trying to confuse yourself. I never said that everything was a symbol, only that some things are.

Does "The apple" refer to the apple? I say that it does.

Others will say variously that it refers to the perception of the apple, ... — Banno

Personally, if I want to talk about the apple, I say « the apple », and if I want to talk about the perception of the apple, I say « the perception of the apple ».

Given that everyone here quining Qualia talks about experiences (except Isaac), what exactly is so problematic about Qualia that is not problematic about experiences? — khaled

Nothing problematic about experiences. Why do we need the extra layer of "qualia", though?

Nothing problematic about experiences. Why do we need the extra layer of "qualia", though? — Janus

Why does it need to be an “extra layer” though?

Well we already have the concepts 'experience' or 'perception'. Everything can be adequately spoken about in terms of those, so I can't see why the concept 'qualia' is necessary, and I do see it as liable to produce confusion through reification, or "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness".

What you meant by “extra layer” was “potentially confusing synonym”?

Frankish, who we've been talking about in another thread, says that we don't have qualia, but we do have experiences. So he thinks there's a distinction. But I've given up trying to understand why. Hope that helps.

I think the idea of qualia is an idea of entities. Experience has its entities; they are the objects of experience. Those objects have qualities, so experience is qualitative. To me the idea of qualia is the idea that those qualities are somehow separable, otherwise than merely conceptually, from the objects of experience.

Of course we can talk, via abstraction, about the qualities, the smells, tastes, textures, sounds and visual characteristics of the objects we perceive; but we don't need to conceive of them as entities in their own right. I think the idea of qualia suggests that they are entities in their own right; and it us thus misleading. No one has yet shown why the idea is indispensable, so why bother with it; particularly if it prone to mislead.

Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. — SEP

In philosophy and certain models of psychology, qualia (/ˈkwɑːliə/ or /ˈkweɪliə/; singular form: quale) are defined as individual instances of subjective, conscious experience. The term qualia derives from the Latin neuter plural form (qualia) of the Latin adjective quālis (Latin pronunciation: [ˈkʷaːlɪs]) meaning "of what sort" or "of what kind" in a specific instance, such as "what it is like to taste a specific apple, this particular apple now".

Examples of qualia include the perceived sensation of pain of a headache, the taste of wine, as well as the redness of an evening sky. — Wikipedia

The felt or phenomenal qualities associated with experiences, such as the feeling of a pain, or the hearing of a sound, or the viewing of a colour. — The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy

Qualia emphasises the subjective, phenomenal, felt aspects of experience.

Qualia emphasises the subjective, phenomenal, felt aspects of experience. — Luke

Experience, at least insofar as we are aware of it, just is subjective, phenomenal, qualitative and felt; so I'm still not seeing what the concept 'qualia' is adding to our conceptual toolbox.

No one has yet shown why the idea is indispensable, so why bother with it — Janus

I find the argument that we should eliminate synonyms to be an unusual one. The term qualia seems to be useful in philosophy of mind discussions to pick out or emphasise the subjective, phenomenal aspects of experience. We can talk of the experience of skydiving or of playing the piano without necessarily focussing on these aspects. The concept might also be considered useful particularly given that some people try to eliminate such aspects as illusory. We could use the terms ‘experience’ or ‘perception’ instead, as long as we restrict such talk to referring only to the subjective, phenomenal nature of the experience or perception (although ‘perception’ might be a closer synonym that doesn’t require the qualification). But then we could more easily just refer to qualia instead.

The concept might also be considered useful particularly given that some people try to eliminate such aspects as illusory. — Luke

What would it mean to say that aspects of experience are illusory? Just that they are not what we think they are, no? Are we liable to think of them as substantive?

Fair enough, though, use it if you find it useful. It's down to a matter of personal taste (and I don't mean qualia :wink: ) , I guess.

If everything is just a symbol, what are they symbols for? — Banno

The mirror stage in a capitalistic society?

Idealism. — Banno

The self as a bundle of mirrored symbols?