But in real life we don’t add an continuous stack of meta-rules. We get trained into a practice where “following the rule” is already part of the technique, shown in what counts as going on correctly, what's a correction, what's a mistake. It's not a separate agreement; it’s built into what we do......................That’s why rule following isn’t just a vote, it’s a practice with standards that show themselves in use, training, and correction………….They’re norms embodied in shared practices — Sam26

This makes sense within a Form of Life, but the philosophical problem is how do we choose between different Forms of Life.

Within a Form of Life
For a language game to have meaning it must have rules. As you say, “That’s why rule following isn’t just a vote, it’s a practice with standards that show themselves in use, training, and correction”. Following the rule is part of our training within a Form of Life and are norms within shared practices. Meaning is use within this Form of Life (PI 43).

Wittgenstein raises the rule following paradox in PI 201, where no course of action could be determined by a rule as every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule, but dismisses it. He dismisses it because this is what it means to be a Form of Life. He writes in PI 219 "when I obey a rule I do not choose. I obey it blindly" and in PI 198 “I have a custom”. Within the Form of Life we have been trained, customs underpin meaning and we are embedded in a community of language users.

Kripke in his 1982 book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language gives his own example of the rule following paradox. Does the symbol “+” mean we follow the rule of addition or the rule of quaddition. For example, both may give the same result for numbers under 1,000 but may give different examples for numbers over 1,000 (@AtticPhilosophy, Wittgenstein and the Rule Following Paradox)

It makes sense that within a Form of Life there are in effect hinge rules that establish the framework of the language Game, such as “god exists”, which as hinge propositions are exempt from doubt.

Hinge propositions
Within a Language Game within a Form of Life, some propositions are exempt from doubt. They are not beliefs, not objects of knowledge, not subject to evaluation, not open to rational evaluation. They are ungrounded presuppositions, immune to enquiry, absent of evidence, objective certainties, not truth-apt and to reject them would be to reject all our knowledge. They are part of the framework of the Language Game, not part of the content of the Language Game, pre-rational certainties. Moore’s mistake was to say “I know there is a hand” rather than “there is a hand” (IEP, Wittgenstein: Epistemology)

The role of philosophy
Kripke was criticised because his is a philosophical solution, whereas Wittgenstein sets philosophy aside. Wittgenstein makes sense as to meaning within a Language Game within its own Form of Life, but avoids the philosophical problem of how do we know which Form of Life we should choose. Should we be part of the Form of Life that “god exists” or part of the Form of Life that “god does not exists”, should we be part of the Form of Life that “Direct Realism” describes reality or “Indirect Realism” describes reality and should we be part of the Form of Life that “democracy is the best form of government” or “an autocracy is the best for of government”.

As you say “That’s why rule following isn’t just a vote, it’s a practice with standards that show themselves in use, training, and correction”. This is true within a particular Form of Life having its own Language Game, but the philosophical question, which Wittgenstein avoids, is why should we choose one set of hinge rules over a different set of hinge rules. Why should we choose the hinge rule that “god exists” rather than the hinge rule that “god does not exist”, for example.

We can make up any rules on anything, and as long as we agree to follow, that would be the rule. — Corvus

Suppose we make any rule, which we agree to follow. But we need another rule that we agree to follow the rules. But we need another rule that we agree to follow the rule that we agree to follow the rules.

Ultimately, rules are no more than social agreements.

There seem many things operating under the rule of random selection or random events. — Corvus

Chess has rules and society has laws that are consciously made by humans

They say that we are living in a rule-governed universe that operates according to the laws of nature, meaning that there are rules and laws operating independently of humans.

Because humans are a part of the Universe, and our concepts are part of us, it may well be that our concepts are rule-governed operating according to the laws of nature. I don’t know.

I don't agree with any of this. I don't believe we have a concept of "freedom". It's just a word that's used commonly, and in a vast variety of different ways, without any real restrictions on usage. One could not locate, or isolate a commonly accepted "concept of freedom".....................you just follow the examples set by others. It's a form of copying, mimicking. This provides one with the basis for acceptable usage without learning any concepts. — Metaphysician Undercover

In language there is the word “freedom”, and although it is commonly used, I agree that it has no publicly accepted meaning, concept or definition.

As regards copying, person A sees person B say “freedom” and be given a sailing boat. Person A wants a sailing boat and therefore also says “freedom” on the expectation that they are given a sailing boat.

Person A copies person B’s behaviour saying “freedom” because they have the prior concept of wanting a sailing boat. Person A would remain motionless if they had no prior concept of wanting a sailing boat. Person A only speaks because they have a prior concept.

Person A may want the sailing boat in order to sail across the Atlantic, and person B may want the sailing boat in order to sail at the weekends. It could be that every member of the linguistic community has a different meaning or concept of “freedom”.

I agree that “freedom” is a word commonly used in a vast variety of different ways.

The expression “freedom” has a meaning in language because it is associated with observable, empirical behaviour, even if everyone’s meaning or concept of “freedom” is different.

The rule of random determination? Can't randomness be considered as a rule? — Corvus

Not as a rule.

But it seems that no rule is necessary for why concepts have rules and logic in them..........................Without the rules and logic in concepts, we wouldn't be able to build sensible statements or propositions. — Corvus

It seems to me that there are two aspects regarding concepts and rules.

I agree that there are rules as to how a concept should be used in language (what a concept does)

However, I don't see that there are rules that determine our concepts. In other words, what rules determines our concept of freedom (what a concept is).

But as you say, where is the rule that says we should use rules.
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We could only say some concepts are a priori, and some are a posteriori. — Corvus

:100:

Witt grants that. Words are sometimes taught by pointing...............“This slab is heavy” isn’t learned by defining slab through heavy and heavy through slab. It’s learned in practice……………..Ostension is one way of teaching — Sam26

I agree that ostension is one aspect of language.

As I wrote:

It seems to me that the Augustinian view is necessary for the meaning of certain core individual words and the PI view is necessary for the combinations of these core words into meaningful propositions.

However I disagree that Augustinian ostension may be totally ignored by language, as inferred by Wittgenstein's “the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” (PI 43)

I may have misunderstood you when you wrote:

It’s for resisting the idea that words get their meaning by pointing to hidden objects, inner items, or metaphysical entities. — Sam26

Ostension cannot work alone because it cannot cope with fiction and figures of speech, and Wittgensteinian meaning as use cannot work alone because of its circularity. Only a combination of the two can work.

You said the rock was hidden, but, assuming that it did break the window, it can be revealed. There is nothing that would count as revealing the hidden pain. — Ludwig V

I agree that it is sometimes possible to know the cause of a broken window, in that someone may have filmed it, but it is impossible to know the inner cause of someone grimacing.
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Lewis Carroll wrote "'Twas slithy and the mome raths outgrabe". — Ludwig V

Something can be part of a language even if it is meaningless to me.

For example, the fact that I may not know what “Je veux deux pommes” means does not mean that it is not part of a language
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What I actually asked is 'What does "plus" as in "2+2=4" refer to?' — Ludwig V

In the world, there are a total of four things if two things are alongside another two things.
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There is no king of France, so it refers to no-one - that is does not refer to anyone. — Ludwig V

There are no unicorns, but the word “unicorn” still refers to something
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Quite. So not all words refer. — Ludwig V

Does “nothing” refer to nothing. This is the problem of referring to non-existent entities.

The Merriam Webster dictionary accepts that we refer to nonexistent things

Equipment must endure subzero storage, while fuel and workers face remote transport via inadequate ports and nonexistent roads, WoodMac’s analysts wrote.

Betrand Russell distinguished between phrases that refer to non-existent entities and those that refer to actual objects. For instance, "the present King of France" refers to a non-existent entity, while "the present King of England" refers to a specific, existing individual. (Wikipedia) So we can refer to both existent and non-existent things.

I still don't understand what you could mean by "concept". Sure we can all use words such as those of your examples, "freedom, tree, happiness, colour or more/less" but unless there are definite rules of usage, how can you assume that there is any concept involved with these words? — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that we have the concept of “freedom” and there are rules as to how the word “freedom” is correctly used in language (rules as to what the concept does).

But there are no rules as to why we have the concept “freedom” in the first place (rules as to what the concept is)
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Why would you think that being able to use the word implies that there is such a thing as a concept of freedom. — Metaphysician Undercover

How could you use the word “freedom” in a sentence if you did not know what freedom meant, did not know the concept of freedom.

The concept of stone has the inherent meaning what stone is, which implies and states the clear logic and formal rule. — Corvus

It depends what rules you are referring to.

I agree that we have the concept of “stone” and there are rules as to how the word “stone” is correctly used in language (rules as to what the concept does). But there are no rules as to why we have the concept in the first place (rules as to what the concept is)

Concepts are logical structure and have formal rules. A human is not a cup. Consciousness is not unconsciousness. A fool is not wise. Socrates is mortal. etc. — Corvus

As there is a difference between what a rock is and what a rock does, there is a difference between what a concept is and what a concept does.

I agree that the concept “Socrates is mortal” has a logical structure, but this is what the concept does.

Another question is, does a concept, in the sense of what it is, have a logical structure.

A simple example from this thread is when someone (sorry RussellA) takes PI 43, meaning is use, and turns it into a premise in a formal proof, then objects that it’s circular. That move treats meaning as if it must be a detachable item attached to a word, and treats Witt’s reminder as if it were an axiom. — Sam26

Not a problem, I am appreciating the opportunity to learn more about Wittgenstein.

On the one hand is the Augustinian view of ostensive definition, whereby each word corresponds to an object that is its meaning and on the other hand is the Philosophical Investigation (PI) view, whereby the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

I don’t think either is sufficient in itself, although both are necessary.

The Augustinian view cannot cope with fiction and figures of speech.

The PI view cannot cope with an unavoidable circularity. For example, in the expression “this slab is heavy”, the meaning of slab is understood within the context of being heavy, and the meaning of heavy is understood within the context of being a slab. I don’t see how PI gets around this problem.

It seems to me that the Augustinian view is necessary for the meaning of certain core individual words and the PI view is necessary for the combinations of these core words into meaningful propositions.

If the concrete principle is “don’t touch a hot stove”, then the principal concept involved is "do not touch", and that itself looks to me like a formal rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that some concepts can be rules, such as “do not touch”, but some concepts are not rules, such as freedom, tree, happiness, colour or more/less.
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I think concepts are logical structures with formal rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is a difference between what a concept is and what a concept does.

I agree that as regards what a concept does, it can be a rule or not be a rule, but as regards what a concept is, I don’t see that a concept is something with a logical structure or formal rules.

Wittgenstein's remarks on private language in PI were partly in relation to Frege's private language arguments, and part of the later Wittgenstein's attempt to reduce Frege's third realm of sense to an interaction between the psychological realm (Frege's second realm) and the physical realm (Frege's first realm). — sime

I’m curious how Wittgenstein can reduce the third realm of sense (presumably language) to an interaction between the second realm of psychology (presumably inner feelings) and the first realm of the physical (presumably the world)?

On the one hand, the second realm of inner feelings drops out of language (the analogy of the beetle) and on the other hand the first realm, any correspondence with the world, also drops out of language (as the meaning of a linguistic expression is its use in language).

Yes, of course you can. But you can then discover the rock that caused the damage, show it to you, lodge it as evidence, as so forth. There is nothing that you can do with pain that is equivalent to that. — Ludwig V

That there is a rock lying on the floor is not proof that the rock caused the window to break. It may be evidence, but not conclusive evidence.

That someone grimaces is not proof that they are in pain. It may be evidence, but not conclusive evidence.

These seem quite equivalent.
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What does "nothing" refer to? — Ludwig V

The fact that “ouch” is in quotation marks shows that it is part of language.

“2+2=4” refers to 2+2=4
“The present king of France” refers to the present king of France
“Nothing” refers to nothing.
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Grimacing and "I am in pain" are connected to pain, and provide me with grounds for saying that "S is in pain". I wouldn't say they are clues exactly, because the connection is not empirical - can't be empirical, because we can't demonstrate the connection with pain as we can demonstrate the connection between rain and rainbows. — Ludwig V

I agree that grimacing and "I am in pain" are connected to pain, and provide me with grounds for saying that "S is in pain"”

As you say, the connection is not empirical, as is the connection between rain and rainbows.

But seeing a dog writhing on the floor in what seems to be in pain, no one would not try to help the dog. Few would say that because there is no empirical connection between the dog’s behaviour and its inner feeling, one may as well walk on by.

An axe is also a mass of metal at the end of a handle, so is a mace (as used in battle). All these objects were constructed so that they could be used in certain ways. The fact that one could use a spanner or a rock as a hammer does not contradict that. What something is and what it does are intertwined and not usually separable in the way you suggest. — Ludwig V

On the one hand, a rock can hammer in a nail, such that what a rock is is different to what a rock can do.

On the other hand, as you point out, a hammer was designed for a purpose, and it is true that what a hammer is is as a result of what a hammer does.

But even though what a hammer is as a result of what a hammer does, once the hammer has been created, the hammer exists as it is independently of any use, of what it can do.

For example, once the hammer has been created, it can be used in many different ways, of which knocking a nail into wood is only one. What the hammer is is not limited by one particular use, is not limited by only one thing that it can do.

Wittgenstein is saying the same thing, in that the meaning of a word such as “slab” depends on its context. Wittgenstein in PI is saying that what a word is not fixed by one thing it can do.

Doesn't, "an abstract idea that serves as a foundation for more concrete principles", say to you, "logical structure with formal rules"? What else, other than a logical structure with formal rules, could serve as a foundation for concrete principles? — Metaphysician Undercover

Let the concrete principle be “don’t touch a hot stove” and the abstract concept be “touching a hot stove causes pain”. A logical structure can be thought of as synonymous with formal rules.

Where are the formal rules in the abstract concept that touching a hot stove causes pain?

Think of it like chess. If you don’t know chess, you can’t use the move castling. You can treat it as something happening in the game, ask what it is, watch, imitate, get corrected, and finely learn. The meaning of castling just is its role in the game, but you only grasp that role by learning the game. — Sam26

In PI 43, Wittgenstein wrote “the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” We could apply this to chess and say “the meaning of the rule of castling is its use in the game of chess”

When playing chess, there are two stages a person goes through. First as a beginner learning castling and then as an expert using castling.

You support the idea of “meaning as use”.

To simplify matters for the moment, I will only look at a chess player who already knows the rules of chess.

One of the rules of chess is castling. There are two aspects to castling, what it does and what it is.

What something does is different to what something is. For example, a hammer does jobs such as knock nails into wood but is a mass of metal at the end of a handle. What a hammer is is prior to what a hammer does. The hammer did not become a mass of metal at the end of a handle because it was used to knock nails into wood, the hammer was a mass of metal at the end of a handle before it was used to knock nails into wood.

What something is is prior to what it does.

What castling does is external to castling. Castling has a use in the game of chess, it has a role in the game of chess and is one of the rules of the game of chess. Castling has a meaning within the game of chess because it has a use within the game of chess.

What castling is is internal to castling. Castling means moving the king two squares towards a rook and then moving that rook to the square the king crossed over. But the rule of castling exists within the game of chess even if never used within a game. The rule of castling exists prior to any use.

What castling does is different from what it is. It is true that as regards what it does, it has a meaning because of how it is used in the game of chess. But as regards what it is, castling has a meaning even if never used within a game of chess.

I would not use the word "concept" here. I think concepts are logical structures with formal rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

From Wikipedia - Concept

A concept is an abstract idea that serves as a foundation for more concrete principles, thoughts, and beliefs. For example, a basic-level concept would be "chair". A concept is instantiated (reified) by all of its actual or potential instances, whether these are things in the real world or other ideas.

I have never thought of a concept as a logical structure with formal rules. For example, if I think of the concept of a slab, there is no logical structure to my thoughts of slabs and there are no rules limiting my thoughts of slabs.

If "I am in pain" refers to hidden inner pain, then, surely, it is not hidden. — Ludwig V

It is possible to refer to hidden things. For example, if I see a broken window, I can say that something caused it to break. What caused the window to break may be unknown, but I can still refer to this unknown something.
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"Ouch!" isn't part of language, so it can't refer to anything. — Ludwig V

I agree that uttering ouch is not part of language, but saying “ouch!” must be part of language. As it is the nature of language that every expression must refer to something, “ouch!” must also refer to something.
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"S is in pain" — Ludwig V

As regards language, there is form and content. How does language work?

The form of language, the symbols used, is as much a physical thing in the world as grimacing, and both are empirically observable. The form of language is as empirically observable in the world as a person’s behaviour, such as grimacing. It is the form that gives clues to the content, in that observing someone grimace gives clues to their being in pain. If, when I feel pain, I instinctively grimace, then when I observe someone also grimacing, it is a reasonable assumption that they also are in pain.

As the form of grimacing gives clues to the inner feeling of being in pain, the form of the linguistic statement “I am in pain” must also gives clues to the inner feeling of being in pain.

This suggests that is the form of the linguistic expression “I am in pain” that gives us clues about the speaker’s inner feelings rather than the content of the linguistic expression “I am in pain”.

So, yes, the meaning of "beetle" preceeds you, and you learn it, and then you know it, and based on that knowledge you use it. — Dawnstorm

Person A sees a beetle in the world which causes a thought in their mind of a beetle. It may be that when they see a beetle in the world they also see alongside it in the world the name “beetle”. They can then begin to associate their private thought of a beetle with the public name “beetle”.

Person B sees the same beetle in the world which causes a thought in their mind of a beetle. It may be that when they see a beetle in the world they also see alongside it in the world the name “beetle”. They can then begin to associate their private thought of a beetle with the public name “beetle”.

Person A can then say “I saw a beetle” to person B, who will then know what person A means.

It may well be that my-red-is-your-green, and the beetle in person A’s mind is different to the beetle in person B’s mind, but as regards language this doesn't matter because the common factor is the beetle in the world, which is the same for both persons A and B.

Language is not communicating the private thought of person A to person B, because their private thoughts may be different, but is communicating the knowledge to person B that person A is thinking of the same observable, empirical fact in the world.

Language can be used to communicate knowledge between people because public facts have private meanings.
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When you know that the water in this tub is 36° Celsius, then that knowledge has no influence at all on the temperature. — Dawnstorm

If there is a beetle in the world, this is a public fact, independent of private thoughts.
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When you know the word "beetle" means [beetle] (square bracket for the private meaning that - according to Wittgenstein - drops out - if I'm not mistaken), then you use the word "beetle" to mean {beetle} (squiggly brackets for a token in a language game). — Dawnstorm

On the one hand the private beetle drops out of the language game, but on the other hand the private beetle cannot drop out altogether otherwise the mind would be an empty blankness, and there would not be any language game at all.

What I had in mind was more like the difference between the dictionary definition of a word, and what the word actually means in any particular set of circumstances (context). — Metaphysician Undercover

If I understand:

My concept of “slab” must be similar to yours, but cannot be the same as yours, because we have experienced different Forms of Life.

Because we have learnt our concepts of “slab” through an extensive personal Form of Life, our concepts are too complex to be defined.

Our concepts of “slab” probably generally overlap, but it is unavoidable that sometimes my concept of “slab” will be different to yours.

Your objection assumes you need meaning first and then use, but the actual learning process runs the other way, you enter the use through training, and that’s what we later call “knowing the meaning.” — Sam26

That is true, there needs to be a learning process in order to learn what an utterance means.

On the first day, the builder says “niletee ubamba” to the assistant. The assistant does not know what this utterance means, it is only a sound. The builder then physically brings a slab and again says “niletree ubamba”. The assistant guesses that the builder wants him to bring a slab, and so the assistant brings a slab to the builder.

The next day, when the assistant hears the builder say “niletree ubamba”, the assistant already knows what it means, and immediately brings a slab to the builder.

Once the assistant knows that the utterance “niletree ubamba” means bring a slab, the assistant knows that the utterance is being used to bring a slab.

We learn the meaning of an utterance by comparing the utterance to observed behaviours, and once we have learnt the meaning of the utterance, as you rightly say, we are “knowing the meaning”.

Once the assistant knows the meaning of the utterance “niletree ubamba”, rather than just being a sound, this ensures that language now has a use.

I think you ought to consider that "use" has two principal meanings, one referring to the universal, the other the particular. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see what you mean.

There is the universal aspect, in that the function (meaning) of a word is to be used in a language game and there is the particular aspect, in that the meaning of a word is its use in the language game.

Suppose someone says to you “niletee ubamba".

There is the universal aspect, in that the function (meaning) of the expression is to be used in a language game. I assume there is agreement about this.

The problem is the particular aspect. The problem is, how can you respond to an utterance if you don’t know what the utterance means. You must know what the utterance means before being able to respond to it.

The language game would not work if we did not know what utterances meant prior to being able to respond to them.

The problem is the picture behind your P2. “Language is a set of words with meanings” treats meanings as already attached to words and then collected into language. Witt’s move is the reverse, language is a practice, a way of using signs in activities with teaching, correction, and going on, and in that practice, we speak of words/concepts as having meanings, often just their use. — Sam26

If some says to you “niletee ubamba", how do you use that statement, act on that statement, if you don’t know what it means?

Can you give a practical example of how you use the utterance “niletee ubamba” without knowing what it means?

If Frank and Russell are treating meaning as an inner object or a foundation that must be supplied first, then yes, that’s the confusion. — Sam26

If someone says to you “niletee ubamba”, how do you know If you are meant to act, and if you know you are meant to act, how do you act?

Because I know that “niletee ubamba” means “bring me a slab", I know exactly what to do, take them a slab.

But what exactly is the mechanism for you knowing what to do if the meaning of the utterance “niletee ubamba” is irrelevant?

(Edit) If you don't know what "niletee ubamba" means, then how do you know what to do?

We say a word has meaning insofar as it can be learned, applied, explained, corrected, and understood. — Sam26

There is a problem here with language, similar to Cargo Cult Thinking, where a person might mimic the usage of a word without understanding the underlying concept.

I can learn that a quark is “any of a class of six fundamental fermions” without it having any meaning to me.
An AI when asked can apply the expression “a quark is any of a class of six fundamental fermions” without knowing what it means’
I can explain that “a quark is any of a class of six fundamental fermions” without knowing what it means.
I can correct someone when they say that “a quark is any of a class of two fundamental fermions” without knowing what it means.
I can understand that “a quark is any of a class of six fundamental fermions” without knowing what it means.

It is a more general epistemological problem. How do we know what “quark” means?

First, P2 is not Wittgenstein’s view. — Sam26

P2 was intended to be Wittgenstein’s view, but I can reword:
P2 Language is a set of words having meanings, where the meaning of a word is its use in language
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P1 isn’t a premise in any Wittgensteinian argument, — Sam26

From PI 43

For a large class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

I would have thought that P1 “The meaning of a word is its use in the language” is quite central to Wittgenstein’s argument.
=======================
Wittgenstein's view seems to be:

P1 The meaning of a word is its use in language
P2 Language is a set of words having meanings, where the meaning of a word is its use in language
C1 The meaning of a word is its use in a set of words having meanings, where the meaning of a word is its use in language

This still seems a fallacious circular argument.

It is an important part of language that when we are in pain, we do not - and do not need to - apply the usual processes of deciding on the truth of "I am in pain"................That's why I think that "I am in pain" is not exactly synonymous with "Ouch!". — Ludwig V

I agree that when we are in pain we do not need to decide the truth of the statement “I am in pain”.

Being in pain can cause the behaviour of grimacing. I can say “I am in pain” if I am in pain. I can say “ouch” if I grimace.

“I am in pain” refers to being in hidden inner pain, whilst “ouch” refers to the behaviour of outward observable grimacing. In this sense, as they refer to different things, they are not synonyms.
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I don't see how "inner feelings" could create anything unless they interact with outer facts. — Ludwig V

You are assuming we can directly interact with outer facts. A Direct Realist would agree, but an Indirect Realist would disagree. An Indirect Realist would say that we are directly interacting with an appearance of what we assume to be outer facts.
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Yes, people too often think of language and society as fixed, complete structures. Nothing could be further from the truth. — Ludwig V

:100:

People hear circularity and assume fallacious argument — Sam26

P1 - “The meaning of a word is its use in the language”
P2 - Language is a set of words having meanings.
C1 - The meaning of a word is its use in a set of words having meanings.

This still seems a fallacious circular argument.
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A language game isn’t defined by one statement. It’s a practice with many moves, learning the word, using it, responding to it, correcting misuse, withdrawing claims, giving help, etc. — Sam26

I agree. A language game is a complex and coherent set of words and expressions.
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Pain can be the occasion for saying “I’m in pain,” but it can’t be itself the standard for correct use. — Sam26

I agree that pain can be the occasion for saying “I am in pain”, but being in pain does not tell us anything about the correct use of language.
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Wittgenstein isn’t trying to ground language in something outside it. He’s describing how meaning is shaped in a form of life — Sam26

I agree that I may go to the theatre because of my inner feelings, and the experience may then change my inner feelings.

But it cannot be the case that having no inner feelings I decide to go to the theatre, and the experience then gives inner feelings within me.
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Third, the idea that “rules must be external” is too quick. Wittgenstein’s point is that rules aren’t hidden rails behind language, and they aren’t external foundations either. They’re exhibited in how we go on, in training, correction, and settled practice. That’s why definitions eventually run out and we reach bedrock, not as a set of axioms that ground a system, but as what stands fast in our doing. Hinges in On Certainty aren’t Austinian performatives, and they aren’t scientific axioms. They’re the background hinge certainties that show up in how inquiry and doubt operate. — Sam26

There are innumerable possible coherent language games each with their own hinge propositions. For example, in language game A the hinge proposition could be “god does not exist” and in language game B the hinge proposition could be “god exists”.

Within each language game there can be innumerable statements logically connected to the hinge proposition. For example, in language game A, “humans have to develop their own ethical system”, “souls don’t exist”, “morality is determined by mutual agreement”, etc.

It would be possible to develop a coherent language game independent of all inner feelings. For example, “here is one xyz”, “and here is another”, “there are at least two xyz in abc”, “therefore, abc exists”. Such a coherent language game fulfils many requirements, including each statement within it has been correctly used and it has a hinge proposition, “here is one xyz”. But even so, each statement is meaningless.

Something else is needed to give each statement a meaning. If meaning does not of necessity come from the language game itself, then it must come from outside the language game, extra-linguistically.

It is the case that if there were no inner feelings then there would be no language games, meaning that each statement within a language game must take into account inner feelings. Inner feelings are extra-linguistic to the language game, but give each statement meaning. For example, “here is one hand” is true IFF here is one hand. Meaning comes from a correspondence between language and the world.

It is true that a statement must be used correctly within its language game, but even if used correctly, the statement may still be meaningless. A language game cannot give itself meaning. Only something extra-linguistic to the language game can give the statements within it any meaning.

I think it may be that some circularity is unavoidable. On the one hand, language may influence the way we think.........................On the other, it may be that some aspects of the way we think are innate so that pattern recognition isn't starting from a blank slate. — frank

That is how I see it. Part of our thinking is innate and part of our thinking derives from language and society, meaning that some circularity is unavoidable.

But what I am against is the idea that some interpret Wittgenstein's “meaning is use” as being that 100% of our thinking derives from language and society.

“For a large class of cases–though not for all–in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” Sect 43 of Philosophical Investigations.

As Wittgenstein pointed out, I am also against the idea that 100% of our thinking derives from innateness.

IEP - Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889—1951)
The main rival views that Wittgenstein warns against are that the meaning of a word is some object that it names–in which case the meaning of a word could be destroyed, stolen or locked away, which is nonsense–and that the meaning of a word is some psychological feeling–in which case each user of a word could mean something different by it, having a different feeling, and communication would be difficult if not impossible.

The expression “meaning is use” should not be taken literally.

But it doesn’t follow that inner feelings are the ultimate foundation in the sense of what fixes meaning, normativity, or rule following. — Sam26

In our Form of Life is going to the theatre, but we only go because of our inner feelings, not because other people are going to the theatre, or because someone says “you must go to the theatre”.
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The foundation Wittgenstein is talking about, when he talks about bedrock or what stands fast, isn’t a hidden inner item that guarantees correctness. It’s the public practice itself, viz., training, shared responses, correction, agreement in judgement, the whole web in which “right and wrong use” has a place. — Sam26

Wittgenstein talks about the bedrock, about hinge propositions, which found a language.

For example, if I say “I know a hot stove causes pain”, this can be a hinge proposition, a performative utterance and not an empirical observation. We can then talk about “I was in pain yesterday”, “avoid hot stoves if you don’t like pain” and “they ought not manufacture hot stoves”.

I am saying that I say “a hot stove causes pain” because a hot stove causes the inner feeling of pain. You are saying that “a hot stove causes pain” because it is part of a coherent set of linguistic statements.

Yet there can be an enormous number of sets of coherent statements, none of which may relate to the human condition. However, in order for a coherent set of statements to be part of a language game they must relate to the human condition, and they can only relate to the human condition because when I say “a hot stove causes pain” I feel pain when touching a hot stove.
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Their inner feeling might be identical, but the meaning of “excited” vs “anxious” isn’t fixed by that inner feeling. It’s fixed by the public grammar, again what counts as appropriate use, what follows from it, what kinds of reasons support it, what responses you might get, what counts as correction (“No, you’re not excited, you’re worried”), and how we learn the words. — Sam26

One person says “I’m anxious”. Another says “Je suis anxieuse” and yet another says “Ich bin ängstlich”.

I agree that within a particular language game, certain words are appropriate and some are not. What is appropriate is something we have to learn about correct usage, but that does not take away from the fact that the words anxious, anxieuse and ängstlich mean the same thing, which is an inner feeling.

In Frege’s terms, they have the same sense, the same referent and the same truth value.

In Tarski’s terms, who also requires a metalanguage, the truth values of the T-sentences are the same. “I’m anxious” is true in the English language IFF I’m anxious. “Je suis anxieuse” is true in the French language IFF I’m anxious. “Ich bin ängstlich” is true in the German language iFF I’m anxious.

Truth is determined within the metalanguage of inner feelings, it cannot be determined within the language itself as you suggest.

If today “I’m in pain” and tomorrow “I’m hungry” were random noises with no stable pattern, the practice would collapse. But that point is about the conditions under which the practice is usable, not about the meaning being fixed by a private inner object.

If I say “I’m in pain” alone, it’s often pointless, but it isn’t meaningless. The meaning is still what it is because the expression belongs to a language I already speak.

Where your argument goes off is when you say the language game is founded on a rulebook that asserts a consistency between feeling and saying. That “rulebook” isn’t an extra layer behind the practice. It just is the practice as it’s lived,

So, the relationship is the following: inner life is necessary for these language games to exist at all, but inner life doesn’t fix meaning privately, by itself. Meaning is stabilized publicly, by the norms of use that make it possible to distinguish correct use, misuse, pretense, and error. — Sam26

As I see it, your approach leads into the problem of circularity, whereby the meaning of the statement “I am in pain” is fixed by the language game, and the language game is fixed by the statement “I am in pain”.

There is the question of what makes language possible, what makes the statement “I am in pain” have meaning within the language game and there is the question of what fixes the meaning of the statement “I am in pain”.

A circular solution would be that the meaning of the statement “I am in pain” is fixed by it having a meaning within the language game.

Such a circularity is avoided if the meaning of the statement “I am in pain” is fixed by the extra-linguistic being in pain.

This is the same problem of circularity with the rules of language, where you say that the rules of language are built into the language itself. But we know that the rules of language cannot be internal to the language, they must be external. This is why words such as “pain” cannot be defined within the language itself. This is why Wittgenstein proposes the extra-linguistic hinge proposition, in other words, a performative utterance as described by JL Austin or axioms in science.

This is also the same problem with the Form of Life, whereby an inner life is necessary for there to be a Form of Life, and it is the Form of Life that determines one’s inner life.

There needs to be a way out of this circularity. One way is that statement such as “I am in pain” is fixed by the extra-linguistic being in pain rather than being fixed by a language game that already includes the statement “I am in pain”.

But I don't see how inner feelings can be the only essential condition for language. They are necessary, perhaps, but not sufficient. If we were not social beings, there would be no language. Our form of life would be unrecognizable without inner feelings, social living, and language. — Ludwig V

There are inner feelings, language and social life.

But we would not have any language if we did not have inner feelings and we would not have any social life if we did not have inner feelings. Both language and a social life are creations of our inner feelings.

I agree that there can be feedback between language and inner feelings and social life and inner feelings. "Feedback occurs when outputs of a system are routed back as inputs as part of a chain of cause and effect that forms a circuit or loop" (Wikipedia).

As inner feelings created both language and social life, and there can be feedback between them, inner feelings can be both necessary and sufficient to both language and social life.

Wittgenstein is asking how all this "thinking" got started: — Paine

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32. Someone coming into a strange country will sometimes learn the language of the inhabitants from ostensive definitions that they give him; and he will often have to guess the meaning of these definitions; and will guess sometimes right, sometimes wrong. — PI, 32, translated by Anscombe

We can only understand language extra-linguistically. When someone tells me “bring me a xyz”, how do I know what action I should take?
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The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have this or something else. — PI, 272

No one knows what another person is thinking or feeling. No one knows another person’s private language, but even so people are able to communicate using a public language.
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One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it. — ibid. 114

The meaning of a proposition cannot be understood within language itself.

The meaning of “bring me a xyz” within the language game cannot be understood by the language game itself, but can only be discovered extra-linguistically. For example, by observing a person’s behaviour, using bedrock hinge propositions, saying “xyz” and pointing to an xyz, using a meta-language or understanding the logical framework of the language game within which are contained propositions.
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Here we see that solipsism, taken to its conclusion, coincides with pure realism. — Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 5.64

There is the private self and the public language game. Solipsism is the theory that we can only know the self. But the public language game only exists because the self exists, in that the public language game is a creation of the self.

The public language game allows one user to communicate to another user that they are in pain by saying “I am in pain” even though no one user knows the private pain of another user. If the self consists of thoughts, ideas and feelings, such as that of pain, the language game may be able to refer to some one’s private pain, but is not able to describe, define or explain that private pain.

This is because language is a system of representation which can only represent a person’s private pain using the symbol “pain”. Language cannot describe, define or explain that pain.
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The move from "general explanations" in PI does not seem to have weakened Wittgenstein's view of the limited role of the "psychological" or "scientism" while looking at thought and language. — Paine

As science is founded on axioms, self-evident or universally recognized truths, language is founded on hinge propositions, statements that serve as foundational beliefs, or in JL Austin’s terms, performative utterances.

For both Wittgenstein and the phenomenologists, feelings are not inner data but world-directed engagements. — Joshs

Wittgenstein's and the Phenomenologist’s approaches are quite different.

For Wittgenstein, he starts from the viewpoint of a public community and asks the question, how can a community communicate private subjective experiences whilst at the same time “bracketing” any understanding of a private internal world.

For the Phenomenologists, they start from the viewpoint of the individual and ask the question, how can an individual make sense of their private subjective experiences whilst at the same time “bracketing” any understanding of a public external world.

Whilst Wittgenstein is concerned with what is happening in the public external world, the Phenomenologists are concerned with what is happening in the private internal world.

But, for Wittgenstein, the ultimate foundation is not "inner feelings", which are a language game in themselves, but "form of life" or "way of life". — Ludwig V

Without inner feelings there would be no Form of Life. There would be no social activities such as playing football, no cultural events such as going to the theatre, no language game, no financial systems, no production, distribution and trade of goods and services, no Philosophy Forum.

As our Form of Life would literally not exist without our inner feelings, in this sense, it seems that the ultimate foundation can only be “inner feelings”.

But it doesn’t follow that the meaning of “I feel xyz” is fixed by a private inner object called xyz. — Sam26

If we felt no xyz, pain, hunger, thirst, fear or love, then there would be no need for a language.

In language, we say things such as “I feel xyz”, “I feel pain”, “I am hungry”, “I am thirsty”, “I am in fear” and “I am in love”.

It seems highly likely that there is a consistency between what we feel and what we say, in that the language game would be unworkable if when feeling pain one day I said “I feel pain” and the next day I said “I feel hungry”.

I agree that on the next day I could be lying, but the language game can only work on the assumption that people are generally truthful.

The language game can only work if when a person feels pain they generally say “I feel pain”.

In general, the language game can only work if when a person feels xyz they say “I feel xyz”.
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but what fixes the meaning is the expression’s role in a shared practice, when it’s appropriate to say it — Sam26

It is true that it would be pointless for a person in an empty room to say “I feel pain”. It would only be useful to say “I feel pain” if another person knowing the same language game hears them. But the meaning of “I feel pain” does not change when someone hears it, in that “I feel pain” does not mean one thing when spoken in an empty room and means a different thing when spoken in a crowded room.

It may be a waste of time to say “I feel pain” in an empty room, but it does not follow that the expression “I feel pain” has no meaning when spoken in an empty room.
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So inner feelings matter, they’re part of the background, but they don’t supply the rulebook that makes the words meaningful. — Sam26

The language game is only workable if there is a general consistency, in that, if a person feels in pain, they don’t one day say “I feel pain” and the next day say “I feel hungry”.

The language game is founded on the rulebook that says there is a general consistency between what the person feels and what the person says.
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Inner life makes language possible, while the meaning of our words is stabilized by their public grammar, the shared practices of use, correction, and uptake that give those words their place in our shared language life. — Sam26

There is a contradiction here.

Without inner feelings there would be no language game, but you say that the meaning of “I feel pain” is determined by the language game, not inner feelings.

This raises the question, if the language game is independent of feelings, of what use is a language game that can exist independently of the feelings of the people who are actually using it?

I am sure that somewhere in the Andromeda Galaxy there is a species who have their own language game, but of what relevance is that language game to us If it exists independently of any human thoughts, emotions, desires or feelings?

Here’s the key point Wittgenstein is trying to keep us from blurring: criteria versus causes.
Criteria answer: “What would count as correctly applying this word here?”
Causes answer: “What produced this state or this behavior?” — Sam26

As you say, both Criteria and Cause are important

“I also don’t think it’s right to say that a word only has use if it “refers to what they objectively do” as opposed to what they’re thinking.”

I agree that if a person is motionless and says “I am in pain”, we can often assume the Cause, their inner hidden feeling, even if there is no Criteria, such as flinching or moaning.

He’s telling us to get clear on what we mean first, what would count as using the word correctly, and only then go looking for causes where causes are the right question. — Sam26

This is a problem.

How can we use a word correctly if we don’t know the cause of why we are using the word in the first place. For example, how can a person know whether it is correct to say “I am in pain” or “I am not in pain” if they don't know whether they are in pain or not? First they must know whether they are in pain or not and then they can correctly say whether “I am in pain” or “I am not in pain”.

causal stories and inner experiences can be real, but they aren’t what fix the meaning. — Sam26

If people had no inner feelings, then there would be no language games.

It follows that we have language games because we have inner feelings.

Therefore, if I did not have the inner feeling of xyz, there would be no language game of “I feel xyz”

Therefore, “I feel xyz” in the language game must be referring to my inner feeling of xyz.

The meaning of "I feel xyz" in the language game must be referring to my inner feeling of xyz.