My understanding is that, traditionally, indirect realism has held that phenomenal experience (1) does not justify our knowledge because (2) it functions as an inaccurate representation of the world — Esse Quam Videri

I may have a phenomenal experience, which is a singular, specific and particular experience. Some call it a “qualia”, which may or may not be a useful term.

I may perceive a red circle, and this red circle may represent stop, where red, circle and stop are all concepts. Only a set of concepts may represent another concept.

As a phenomenal experience is not a concept it cannot represent anything, whether accurately or inaccurately.

There are different types of judgements. — Corvus

:100:

The burning pain and colour red are totally different things. The pain is your feeling, but the colour red is in the space out there. The perception of the colour red in your mind is your judgement, nothing to do with the colour red out there in the space. — Corvus

Pain is a feeling. As you say, when I feel pain, I don’t need to think about it for a while and judge that I feel pain.

Are you saying that when you see the colour red you have to think about it for a while and then make the judgement that you are seeing red rather than green, for example.

This is different to naming your feelings, which does require a judgement.

I would have thought they neither seeing a red colour nor feeling a burning pain require any judgement. Both seeing the colour red and feeling a burning pain must be immediate feelings and not judgements.

If that is the case, and both are feelings, why should one feeling, burning pain, not exist in the external world yet another feeling, the colour red, does exist in an external world?

Put another way, if you believe that the colour red exists in the external world outside the mind, then how do you know that a burning pain does not exist in the external world outside the mind?

The external objects such as chairs, tables, cars and postbox and colour of reds don't exist in your mind. You are just thinking, imagining and remembering about them. — Corvus

You see the colour red. You feel a burning pain.

You don’t think that the burning pain exists outside of a mind. Why do you think that the colour red exists outside of a mind?

What exists outside of a mind is the cause of a burning pain in your mind, which is not a burning pain.

Similarly, what exists outside of a mind is the cause of the colour red, which is not the colour red.
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I know you are seeing red, because we said you are seeing red. — Corvus

You know that I am seeing the colour red, because I say I am seeing the colour red. You know that I am feeling a burning pain, because I say I am feeling a burning pain

How do you know that I am telling the truth? How do you know what is in my mind?

Seeing red from the traffic light, and stopping is a similar type of perception and judgment / action, as getting pinched on your cheek by your wife, and screaming "ouch" from the pain. It doesn't involve any thought process, reasoning or relationships. — Corvus

I have had to learn that “red” on a traffic light means “stop”. Once I have learnt that “red” on a traffic light means “stop”, and have driven often, then, yes, stopping may require minimum thought or reasoning.

The meaning of a symbol has to be learnt.

Our linguistic community must have stipulated that “red” on a traffic light means “stop” before we know we have to stop at a "red" traffic light.

Similarly our linguistic community must have stipulated that a particular set of shapes and colours perceived in the mind represent a “ship” before we are able to talk about "ships".

IE, when we talk about “ships” we are referring to a particular set of shapes and colours perceived in the mind, not something mind-external.

We can then extend what we perceive in the mind to a mind-external world using “inference to the best explanation”.

We are only discussing driving license and traffic lights because you seem to think sometimes red colour exists in your mind. Hence I gave inductive reason how the license is issued to only to people who have normal mind set and normal perception. — Corvus

Where does the colour red exist
Within the language game of our community, the top light of a traffic light has been named “red”. Therefore, when I see the top light and perceive a colour, the name of the colour I perceive is “red”. Similarly, when you see the top light and perceive a colour, the name of the colour you perceive is also “red”.

But as you said:

But I don't know what you are actually seeing in your mind. I can only guess you are seeing same colour as when I see "red".

We agree that the colour we both perceive has the name “red”, even if the colour I perceive in my mind is not the same colour as you perceive in your mind.

That we both use the same name “red” when seeing the same thing makes us normal members of our linguistic community.

Indirect Realism and Epistemic Structural Realism
It should be remembered that the name “red” includes wavelengths from 625nm to 750nm, meaning that there are an infinite number of shades of the colour “red”. So when we perceive a colour in our mind that has been named “red”, we are perceiving only one particular instantiation of an infinite number of possible shades of “red”.

It should also be remembered that in order to be able to say “I see the colour red”, we must have previously learnt the concept “red” by taking part in our community's language game.

Henceforth, when we perceive a particular instantiation of a colour in our mind, and already know the concept under which that colour falls, we can then talk about “the colour red”.

Indirect Realism avoids scepticism about a mind-external world by “inference to the best explanation” within the broader topic of Epistemic Structural Realism (ESR). Judgements about any possible mind-external world are thereby based not only on the perception of a particular instantiation of colour in the mind, but also on knowing that this particular instantiation of colour falls under the concept that has the public name “red”.

Similarly, we can talk about “ships” within a public language because not only are we able to think about a particular instantiation of a ship but also know that this particular instantiation of ship falls under the concept that has the public name “ship”.

The Indirect Realist can make judgments about a mind-external world using “inference to the best explanation” within Epistemic Structural Realism. These judgments are based not only on perceptions in the mind of particular instantiations but also on knowing the public linguistic concept that these particular instantiations fall under.

Driving licenses are issued under the untold presumption that the drivers will think the colours of the traffic lights are in the traffic lights, not in the drivers mind. Indirect or Direct realism doesn't come to the issue. — Corvus

In a traffic light what is important is as much the relationship between the lights, top, middle, bottom, as the colours of the lights, red, amber, green. The rule to stop if the top light is on is as useful to the driver as the rule to stop when the red light is on. Perhaps more useful, as even if some people may not be able to distinguish red from green they are unlikely not to be able to distinguish top from bottom.

Our judgements are often based more on the relations between things than the things themselves. The sun is hotter than the Earth, a car is larger than a bicycle, an apple is sweeter than an avocado, a mountain is heavier than a hill, etc.

If there were no relations of any kind between our perceptions we would be unable to make any judgements. For example, spatial relations, temporal relations, causal relations, relations of colour, relations of texture, relations of sound, etc.

Causal relations are central in our judgements about our perceptions. Mary Shepherd 1777 to 1847 developed this idea as part of her Structural Realism. As an Indirect Realist, she justified her belief in realism through an “inference to the best explanation”, accepting that we are denied direct sensory access to mind-external objects. From observations about our sensibilities we can reason about causal relations within any external world. Not only causal relations within such an external world, such that when the wind blows a tree moves, but also causal relations between an external world and us, such as when the wind blows we feel the sensation of coolness.

In Structural Realism, the Indirect Realist makes judgements as much from relata as from relatum.

(Edit) In a similar vein, in linguistics, closely related to both Indirect Realism and Semantic Direct Realism, Jacques Derrida developed the concept of "différance", which explored how meaning comes from the relationship between signs, as much as the signs themselves (Wikipedia, Jacques Derrida). Using reason, we can discover meaning from the relationships within our sensibilities.

The red light is always in the traffic light, not in the drivers' mind in reality. Hence indirect realists are wrong, and shouldn't be allowed to drive? — Corvus

Doesn’t the fact that a driving licence makes no reference to the driver’s belief in either Indirect or Direct Realism show that an Indirect Realist (phenomenal experience is indirectly determined by mind-external objects) can function in ordinary life just as well as a Direct Realist (phenomenal experience is directly determined by mind-external objects).

From inductive reasoning, under the same condition of lighting, and when the same red was seen by ordinary folks, it should appear the same red to all of them. Otherwise the traffic light system wouldn't work. — Corvus

Suppose, when the top light is illuminated, I perceive the colour green and you perceive the colour orange, will the traffic light system still work?

Why not, as long as we both know that when the top light is illuminated we stop.

The traffic light system will successfully operate regardless of whether the driver is an Indirect or Direct Realist.

But I don't know what you are actually seeing in your mind. I can only guess you are seeing same colour as when I see "red". — Corvus

:100:
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Why do you call it "mind-independent"? Why is it not just a world? — Corvus

There is the world (Wikipedia - The world is the totality of entities, the whole of reality, or everything that exists) and within this world are minds. Whatever exists between these minds must be mind-independent.
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In daily life, no one will understand what you mean by wave length 700nm. — Corvus

Hopefully on this thread they do.
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I meant that I know the alien will know colour red is same as wave length 700nm by reading the internet info. — Corvus

:100:

Direct perception has to be - by definition - a relationship that has two relata: the perceiver and the perceived. — Clarendon

It seems to me that all the defenders of Direct Realism in this thread are Semantic Direct Realists rather than Phenomenological Direct Realists. There is a strong overlap between SDR and Indirect Realism.

As an Indirect Realist, I cannot deny that direct perception is the relationship between perceiver and perceived. However, for me the perceived is internal to the perceiver rather than external to the perceiver.

Many supporters of “Direct Realism” also place the perceived internal to the perceiver as intensional content rather than external to the perceiver as a mind-external object.
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My point is that when we perceive a mind-external ship, — Clarendon

This is the problem. How do you know that what you perceive is a mind-external object rather than intensional content, when the perception of a mind-external object will be identical to the perception of intensional content?

As you say:

To return to my desire analogy: let's say I desire a $10 note and there is a $10 note on the table. Well, then that $10 satisfies my desire. But imagine it is not a genuine $10 note but a perfect forgery. Well, then it does not satisfy my desire, even though I might well think it does as a perfect forgery is indistinguishable from the real deal. What is phenomenologically indistinguishable from having a genuinely satisfied desire for a $10 note? Receiving a perfect forgery of one.

If the genuine $10 note is identical to a forged $10 note, and the genuine $10 note satisfies your desire but the forged $10 does not, how do you know that one note is genuine and the other is a forgery?

How do you know you perceive a genuine note when the perception of a genuine note will be identical to the intensional content of a forged note?
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Only minds can have desires. But to have a desire - which is to be in a certain sort of mental state - is to desire 'something'. That something doesn't have to itself be something mental. If I desire a ship, then that relationship has two relata: me and a mind external ship. — Clarendon

In the mind are desires and beliefs. As you say, only minds can desire something. Also, only minds can believe something.

Suppose the content of my desire, the intension of my desire, is a ship.

Suppose the content of my belief, the intension of my belief, is that there is a mind-external ship.

Then my desires and beliefs coincide, and can then act on them, such as moving a leg or raising an arm.

You have moved from a belief that there is a mind-external ship to knowing without doubt that there is a mind-external ship.

If your belief in a veridical mind-external ship is identical to your belief in an illusory or hallucinatory mind-external ship, on what grounds do you justify that your belief is veridical rather than illusory or hallucinatory?

You might argue that you not only see the ship, but you might also smell it, hear it, touch it and taste it. It is true that you can reinforce your belief that there is a mind-external ship using sensations through your five senses. But this not take away from the fact that sensations through your senses only exist in your mind. You may combine all these sensations through your senses and reason that there is a mind-external ship, but again, reason, as with belief and desire, only exists in the mind.

Ultimately, everything we know about any mind-external ship exists in the mind, meaning that there is only an indirect link from our mind to any mind-external object. This is why the concept of Indirect Realism is more satisfactory than Direct Realism, which ignores the fact that everything we know about any mind-external world can only come through our five senses, of necessity introducing an indirectness between the mind and any mind-external world.

The only reason I know you perceive it as red, is because you claim that you perceive it as red. — Corvus

In our language game a wavelength of 700nm has been named “red. In another language game it could have been named “rouge”.

Therefore, when I look at a wavelength of 700nm, I know that within our language game, regardless of my particular mental perceptions, I can say “I see the colour red”.
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What is a "mind-independent world"? Where is it? — Corvus

All around us.
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If the alien has been surfing the internet, and saw the colour red is wave length of 700nm, and thought it was true, then he would. I know it by inductive reasoning. — Corvus

Yes, in our language game a wavelength of 700nm has been named “red”. Therefore, when you look at a wavelength of 700nm, by inductive reasoning, you know that the name of the colour you perceive is “red”, regardless of what colour you actually perceive in your mind.

Ordinary folks don't come across this type of problems in daily life. — Corvus

But then, we are not ordinary folks.
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You have already perceived the colour of the postbox, and it appears "red" to you, and you are making your personal judgement "The postbox is red." — Corvus

In the world is a postbox and within the language game the colour of the postbox has been named “red” in a JL Austin performative utterance kind of way.

Henceforth, everyone playing the same language game agrees that “the postbox is red”.

However, this is regardless of what is in our minds. I may perceive the postbox as green and you may perceive the postbox as orange. But we both agree that in our language game “the postbox is red".
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The colour is not in your mind or in my mind. It is on the postbox — Corvus

How do you know that colour exists in a mind-independent world?

Science tells us that a wavelength of 700nm travels from the postbox to our eyes. Our only knowledge of the colour of the postbox, if it has any, is the information arriving at our eyes, which is 700nm .

In what sense is a wavelength of 700nm the colour red?

If an alien from the Andromeda Galaxy sees a wavelength of 700nm, are you saying that you know that they will also perceive the colour red? How do you know?

My gripe is with direct realists — Clarendon

Specifically, are you against Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR) or Semantic Direct Realism (SDR).

The Indirect Realist would agree with SDR that there is an indirect perception of the ship, whilst accepting a direct cognition of it. The term “direct cognition” already presumes a mental state, whether a model, picture or concept. As you say, most SDR are probably Indirect Realists in disguise.

As those who believe in PDR are probably as rare as those who believe in a flat Earth, you may have trouble finding someone willing to defend PDR.
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I think indirect realism is false as an account of what it is that we're perceiving in normal cases of perception. When I look at a ship in the harbour it is the ship, not a 'ship in the harbour-like' mental state that I am seeing if, that is, it is to be true that I'm perceiving the ship. — Clarendon

In what sense can the Direct Realist say we directly see a ship, something that could weigh 100,000 tonnes, be 300m in length, contain 3,000 guests, have restaurants, bars, cafes, an engine room, propeller, etc when all we may be seeing through our eyes is a set of coloured shapes.

When you see a ship in the harbour, what are you actually seeing? You are seeing a variety of coloured shapes, such as a white horizontal rectangle, a smaller central red vertical rectangle and an upper black line.

In our language game, such a combination of coloured shapes is known as a “ship”. This allows us to talk about ships, such as saying “there is a ship in the harbour. Even if we have only seen a ship from a distance, we can still talk about ships, in the same way we can talk about the Sun even if we have never been there.

So in what sense is the Indirect Realist wrong in thinking that a set of coloured shapes that we know as a “ship” is not the same as directly looking at a ship?
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Maybe they could say that the experience - the mental state - is constitutive of the two place perceptual relation between the perceiver and the perceived. — Clarendon

What you say seems along the lines of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism in his Critique of Pure Reason, where he attempts to combine Empiricism with Rationalism. In our case, the Empiricism of the Direct Realists who believe they directly perceive the ship and the Rationalism of the Indirect Realists who believe they directly perceive the concept of a ship.

A transcendental solution is needed, because we cannot know we are looking at a ship without the prior concept of a ship, and we cannot know the concept of a ship without a prior look at a ship.
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So, crudely, I take indirect realists to think we're looking at pictures of the world and (the current crop) of direct realists to think we're looking through windows onto the world. — Clarendon

Indirect Realism makes sense that we are looking at pictures of the world, but a Direct Realist’s analogy that we look at the world as if through a window is hard to justify.

For the Direct Realist, where exactly is this window, in the eye or in the mind? In neither case can the window have no effect on what passes through it. If the eye, on one side is a wavelength of 700nm and on the other side is the colour red. If the mind, on one side is the instantiation of a ship and on the other side is the concept of a ship.
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But it seems to run into problems accounting for hallucinations. — Clarendon

Yes. We see a ship, but if a veridical experience is identical to an illusory or hallucinatory experience, how can we ever know whether our experience is veridical, illusory or hallucinatory. The Direct Realist argues that they do know. But how exactly?

I think you may have a difficulty finding someone who supports PDR, whilst, it seems to me, SDR is Indirect Realism in disguise.

Then, why are you an indirect realist? — Corvus

As an Indirect Realist, when I look at the colour red, I am directly looking at the colour red. I am not indirectly looking at the colour red.

When I feel pain, I directly feel pain. I don’t indirectly feel pain.

Both the Direct and Indirect Realist would agree that we directly look at the colour red. They would, however, disagree where this colour red exists. The Direct Realist would say that the colour red exists in a mind-independent world. The Indirect Realist would say that the colour red exists in the mind.

If the Indirect Realist did say that they only indirectly see the colour red, then they would fall into the homunculus problem, and trap themselves into saying that they are seeing a representation of a representation of a representation, etc.

I see the colour red because a wavelength of 700nm entered my eye, not because the postbox is red. It may be that when you look at a postbox and a wavelength of 700nm enters your eye, you see the colour purple, but this I will never know, as I can never know what exists in your mind.

We both look at the same postbox and the same wavelength of 700nm enters our eyes. I see the colour red and you see the colour purple. How do we decide whether the postbox is actually red or purple?

I think that direct realism 'proper' would have to be the view that perceptual relations have 2 and only 2 relata: the perceiver and the perceived......................I am interested in hearing any objections to this 'proper' form of direct realism — Clarendon

There seems to be two main forms of Direct Realism. There is Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR), a direct perception and direct cognition of the object ship as it really is in a mind-independent world. There is also Semantic Direct Realism (SDR), an indirect perception but direct cognition of the object ship as it really is in a mind-independent world.

Your “proper” direct realism seems to be PDR, although many direct realists support SDR.

For the SDR, language is crucial. For example, David Armstrong, who emphasised the role of language in understanding reality, and Michael Dummett, who emphasised the link between language and the world.

I agree that Indirect Realism and SDR overlap in many ways.

However, PDR is far more difficult to justify, and it may be that few Direct Realists actually support PDR.

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The mistake they accuse indirect realists of making is to confuse a 'vehicle' of awareness with an 'object' of awareness.........................Fair enough that the indirect realists are making a mistake. — Clarendon

I don’t think that Indirect Realists are making this mistake. For example, as an indirect Realist, when I look at a pixel on my computer screen that is red, I am well aware that I am directly looking at the colour red.

As an Indirect Realist, I am also well aware that it is the pixel that is red. If there were no pixel I would not be able to see the colour red.

How can you say that the past is fixed, when what I remember as past is changing all the time? — Metaphysician Undercover

It cannot be the case that in December 2025 “Caesar crossed the Rubicon” and in December 2026 “Caesar did not cross the Rubicon".
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A "judgement" as your example of something which occurs "in the present", takes a lot longer than Plank time. The average human reaction time is 25 one hundredths (,25) of a second. — Metaphysician Undercover

0.25 seconds is a period of time. Similarly, one week is a period of time and one decade is a period of time.

To call 0.25 seconds a present moment in time would be like calling a decade a present moment in time.
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The issue is that you cannot believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, and also believe that it is possibly in Reno, without implied contradiction — Metaphysician Undercover

I can believe one thing and imagine another thing.

Believing is not the same as imagining.

Premise that only the present exists
My premise is that the world only exists in the present. It may be there is a minimum duration of time, such as Planck's time, It may be that even though clocks show a different time when either near a mass or accelerating, and even though the “present” may be different for each clock, it remains a fact that for each clock there is only one present. In this present we can remember the past but not the future.

Free will vs determinism

This is why we ought not extend the fixedness of the past into the present. Doing this produces a determinist perspective ("perspective" being present), and obscures the truly dynamic nature of the present..........................
If we consider the present to always be a duration of time, we ought to allow that not only does part of the present share the properties of the past (fixed), but we need to allow that part shares the properties of the future (not fixed). This is necessary to allow that a freely willed act, at the present, can interfere with what would otherwise appear to be fixed. — Metaphysician Undercover

That we can remember the past but not the future means that for us there is an arrow of time. Between the past we remember and the future that we cannot remember is the present, the “now”.

Both the past and present are fixed, in that we can only remember one past, and by the Law of Non-contradiction there can only be one present. Therefore, both the past and present must be static rather than dynamic.

As regards the future, also by the Law of Non-contradiction, the future that will exist must be fixed, and thereby static rather than dynamic. As we cannot remember this future, we don’t know what this future will be. However, we do know from the laws of logic, necessary and universal, that this future will be fixed, static rather than dynamic.

A reality that is fixed must be deterministic, meaning that free will must be over and above any deterministic fixed reality, and within a meta-reality. By its very nature, a meta-reality must be unknowable within any deterministic reality. Similarly, the meaning of a language cannot be discovered within the language itself, but can only be known in a meta-language external to the language itself. As we cannot use language to discover meaning within itself, but only through a meta-language, we cannot use a deterministic reality to discover free will within itself, but only through a meta-reality.

Whether one believes in a meta-reality enabling free-will in our reality is a matter of faith rather than logic.

Memories

The reason i am making this distinction is because we experience the present as active, and changing, so we ought not think of it as "fixed".................
"The present" is very difficult because things are always changing, even as we speak. ……………….
Then the statement “there is a truck coming round the corner” is judged to be true, or stated as true, based on that observation which is now past. — Metaphysician Undercover

We experience the present and have memories of the past. If the present has a duration, then it may well be of the order of Plank’s time, but certainly not much more than that. I observe a truck coming round the corner, which quickly becomes a memory. I can then make a judgement, such that the truck was travelling too fast, but this judgement was made in the present and based on a memory of the past.

Imagination

If the Eiffel tower is in Reno, then it is not in Paris. If I believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, then it is implied that I also believe it is impossible that it is in Reno, which is somewhere other than Paris. Therefore to believe that it is possible that it is in Reno, implicitly contradicts my belief that it is in Paris. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see an apple on the table and imagine a yoghurt in the fridge. It is not a contradiction to observe something and imagine a different thing. Similarly, I can see the Eiffel Tower in Paris and imagine the Eiffel Tower in Reno. Neither is this a contradiction.

Here is a state of affairs: John walked from the entrance to the park to the exit. There simply is no requirement that a state of affairs must be a temporal instant. We can talk about a state of affairs at an instant or a state of affairs over time. — Banno

I have been assuming that a state of affairs is to be understood as something existing in the world rather than in the mind.

If states of affairs exist in the mind, I can understand that in the mind there can be a state of affairs over a period of time, such as “John walked from the entrance to the park to the exit.” We do have memories of the past. I understand that we can talk about a state of affairs at an instant and over time if it is a concept in the mind. If states of affairs exist in the mind, they can be both static and dynamic.

But how can a state of affairs exist in the world over a period of time when in the world a period of time does not exist. In the world only the present exists. In the world the past and present don’t exist at the same time. If the past and present don’t exist at the same time, there can be no existent period of time in the world. If states of affairs exist in the world, they can only be static.
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So all the seemingly profound "Past events cannot exist in a world that only exists in the present" says is that if we only talk about the present, then we can't talk about the past. — Banno

Even though we only exist in the present, we can talk about the past because we have memories of the past.

I have a memory of being at the entrance of the park and have another memory of being at the exit of the park. This allows me to say “I walked from the entrance of the park to the exit of the park”.
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And the odd result of stipulating the restriction of putting all our sentences int he present tense is that a simple sentence such as "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" ceases to have a truth value... no small problem. — Banno

My memory allows me to put my sentences in the past. I remember that “I was at the entrance to the park”.

The proposition “I was at the entrance to the park” is true because I remember that I was at the entrance to the park.

Propositions in the past tense still have truth values because of present memories.

We think about what we want and how to get it, without necessarily thinking about the way things are. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have the thought that there is an apple on the table.

If I did not believe that there was not a correspondence between my mind and the way things are in the world, I would not attempt to pick the apple up.
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You contradict yourself. If, in your mind the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, you contradict yourself to say that in your mind it is also possible that the Eiffel Tower is in Reno. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is possible to think about different states of affairs in the world.

I can believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, whilst also imagining the Eiffel Tower being in Reno. These are not contradictory thoughts.

Allowing that counterfactuals are possibilities violates the principle of truth as correspondence in a fundamental way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Using your term “ontological possibility”. As regards the proposition “there will be a truck coming round the corner”. In the present, we cannot know whether this proposition will be true or not. However, we can know that either it will be true or won't be true. This is a future possibility

Using your term “epistemic possibility”. As regards the proposition “there is a truck coming round the corner”. In the present, it may be that we don’t know whether this proposition is true or not. However, we can know that either it is true or is not true. This is a present possibility.

You base your claim on counterfactuals. You say “but they are not truly "possible" in any rational way, so they need to be excluded, as not possibilities at all.” It is true that both the past and present are fixed. The present is as fixed as the past. If there is a truck coming round the corner then it is true that “there is a truck coming round the corner”

There are two senses to the word “possible”, one used in logic and one used in ordinary language.

In the sense of logic, if “the truck is coming round the corner” then it is not possible that “the truck is not coming round the corner”. This would break the Laws of Non-contradiction and Excluded Middle.

In the sense of ordinary language, if “the truck is coming round the corner” then it is possible that “the truck is not coming round the corner”. In ordinary language we use possibility all the time. It depends on whether present facts are necessary or contingent. It is certainly not the case that it is a necessary fact that “the truck is coming round the corner”, as the driver could have over-slept, been caught in a traffic jam, had a flat tyre, etc.

It may be argued that counterfactuals which violate the laws of nature, such as “the truck was travelling faster than the speed of light” must be necessary and therefore not possible, whilst counterfactuals which don’t violate the laws of nature, such as “the truck is not coming round the corner” are contingent and therefore possible.

Counterfactuals don’t necessarily violate the principles of truth if they are contingent rather than necessary.

If we have a true (by correspondence) world, the other proposals which contradict are false, and they cannot be considered as possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

That my thoughts do correspond with my actual world is the very basis for enabling me to think about other possibilities.

In my mind is the thought that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris. In my actual world the Eiffel Tower is in Paris.

There is a correspondence between the thought in my mind that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris and the fact that in my actual world the Eiffel Tower is in Paris

In my mind is the thought that it is possible that the Eiffel Tower could be in Reno. In a possible world the Eiffel Tower is in Reno.

There is a correspondence between the thought in my mind that it is possible that the Eiffel Tower is in Reno and a possible world where the Eiffel Tower is in Reno

That there is a correspondence between my mind and my actual world does not nullify any correspondence between my mind and a possible world.

That my thoughts do correspond to my actual world (I think that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris and in fact it is in Paris), is the very basis for enabling me to think about other possibilities (I think that the Eiffel Tower could be in Reno).

But the state of affairs that snow is white doesn't sound right. — Ludwig V

In Wikipedia State of affairs (philosophy)

For example, the state of affairs that Socrates is wise is constituted by the particular "Socrates" and the property "wise".

I have been assuming that a State of Affairs is something like “Socrates is wise”

I cannot see a reference to States of Affairs In SEP Possible Worlds 1.1. Do you mean 2.2.1. But 2.2.1 is part of 2.2 Abstractionism.

Further, there is more to states of affairs than objects and properties. The drop back to the intensional, Aristotelian notion of properties and objects is retrograde. Substance-property ontology is far too simplistic. Much better to continue to use extensionality. — Banno

As I see it so far:

Truth by T-sentence
“Caesar crossed the Rubicon” is true IFF Caesar crossed the Rubicon. But this does not tell us whether Caesar crossed the Rubicon or not

Extensional truths
Suppose there are two sets
Set 1 = {not Caesar, Mario, Francesco}
Set 2 = {Caesar, Mario, Francesco}

Suppose there is the proposition “a person crossed the Rubicon”.

We don’t know which set is the domain of the proposition.

But if we did know that set 2 is the domain of the proposition, then “Caesar crossed the Rubicon” is true because Caesar is within the domain {Caesar, Mario, Francesco}. This is an extensional truth. But in this case, this extensional truth is analytic, as we included Caesar because we know it is true that he did cross the Rubicon.

Intensional truths
Given the proposition “Caesar crossed the Rubicon”, this is either true or not true, but it may be that we never know.

Necessary a posteriori truths
We could have a necessary a posteriori truth. It is necessarily true that either Caesar either did or did not cross the Rubicon (assuming Caesar existed). We may not know the truth today, but we may know the truth in the future. Then “Caesar crossed the Rubicon” will be a necessary a posteriori truth.

Necessary contemporaneous truths in the mind
The only real truths are necessarily contemporaneous in the mind.

I see a red postbox and it is true that I see a red postbox. But the fact that I see a red postbox does not mean that it is true that in the world is a red postbox. In the world may be a green bollard.

Actions are usually differentiated from events, such that an action requires an actor and is intended by that actor. — Banno

Properties - actions - events

Property = the characteristic of a being, such as “John is a walker”

Action = something done by a sentient being, such as “John is walking”

Event = something that is done to either a sentient or insentient being, such as “John is winning” or “snow is falling”.

States of Affairs (SOA)

A SOA is the way the world is.

Some consider a SOA to be a static truth rather than a dynamic process.

Being a static truth, the predicate will be a property, such as “John is a walker”

The predicate cannot be an action, which is dynamic, such as “John is walking”.

An action changes one SOA into a different SOA, such that the action “John is walking” changes one SOA, “John is at the entrance to the park” into a different SOA “John is at the exit to the park”.

The predicate cannot be an event, which is dynamic, such as “John is winning” or “snow is falling”

An event changes one SOA into a different SOA, such that the event “John is winning” changes one SOA, “John is poor” into a different SOA “John is rich”.

You say that a SOA can be dynamic. It seems to me that a SOA is static. Is there any authoritative judgement?

In section 1.1, I discovered that states of affairs are in fact expressed by gerund clauses — Ludwig V

There is the SOA (snow is white)
There is also the SOA (snow, being white, is well known)

There is the problem of disconnecting the world from the thought of the world, when we only know the world through our thoughts.

Being known is a thought, but then being white is also a thought.

Possible world semantics necessitates that the propositions, states of affairs, or whatever, reference our ideas, not any independent physical world.……………This is why truth by correspondence is excluded…………………That is why I claim that possible worlds semantics is fundamentally sophistry. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would have thought that the main purpose of Possible World Semantics (PWS) is to reference the world, meaning that correspondence is a core part of PSW. The terms possibly, necessarily, ought, could, might, etc are central to understanding the meaning of ordinary language, and ordinary language is useful when it does refer to the world. “If I cross the road now, there might be a truck around the corner, and I could be knocked down” is a real world situation where modal terms are critical.

In your own writing, an understanding of modal terms is necessary if we are possibly to understand the meaning of the paragraph.

We should look at combinatorialism. It's a bit more complicated, but I think it may provide the best approach out of the three. The problem which jumps out at me, is the issue with substantiating the proposed "simples". This idea of simples is similar to the ancient atomists. That the concrete world could actually be composed of such simples as the fundamental elements, is shown by Aristotle to be problematic.

I agree that some philosophers may be more interested in publishing articles than coming up with an agreed solution, but that is always the case. However, it does not take away from the day to day relevance of PSW.

I would say leave out the word "reality." — frank

But TLP 2.063 The sum-total of reality is the world
And 2.12 A picture is a model of reality
If Wittgenstein is a major source for the meaning of a state of affairs, we will need to consider reality
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Wittgenstein (in the Tractatus) is saying that the boundaries of what we call the world are precisely the same as the boundaries of thought. — frank

Yes, TLP 5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world
But how can I know states of affairs in the world if my knowledge of the world is limited by my language. Does this infer that states of affairs only really exist in my language.
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When we talk or think about the world, we don't usually think of it as a collection of objects, but rather as a complex of relationships and events. We'll call these complexes states of affairs. They're closely kin to propositions. — frank

But TLP 2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)

And it seems to me that in trying to make sense of both logic and mind, you mix these two. — Banno

Some thoughts:

For Wittgenstein, States of Affairs (SOA) are the fundamental building blocks of reality in the world, and are about how objects can be arranged. The parts of these SOA’s naturally go together, such that it is in the nature of Socrates to be wise. If a SOA exists in the world then it is a fact.

Using brackets to try to make things clearer. IE, “snow is white” is true IFF (snow is white).

There are two aspects

Aspect one - a State of Affairs is not an object’s action

A State of Affairs is the relation between an object and a property, such as (snow is white).
An action is not a property. Therefore, (snow is melting) cannot be a State of Affairs.
As crossing the Rubicon is an action, (Caesar crossing the Rubicon) cannot be a State of Affairs.

Aspect two - a State of Affairs is an object’s property

Situation one, an existent object in the present
Consider the proposition “Sir James Hockenhull is a General”

“Sir James Hockenhull is a General” is true IFF (Sir James Hockenhull is a General).

This is true, as (Sir James Hockenhull is a General) is a State of Affairs that obtains..

Situation two, a non-existant object in the present
Consider the proposition “Caesar is a General”.

This can be neither true nor false, as Caesar does not exist in the present. Therefore, (Caesar is a General) cannot be a State of Affairs.

Situation three, a non-existant object in the past
Consider the proposition “Unicorns were white”

This can be neither true nor false, as Unicorns do not exist either in the present or past. Therefore, (Unicorns were whitel) cannot be a State of Affairs.

Situation four, an existent object in the past
Consider the proposition “Caesar was a General”.

1 - On the one hand
States of Affairs exist in a mind-independent world.
The world only exists in the present.
Past events cannot exist in a world that only exists in the present
Therefore the past event (Caesar was a General) cannot exist in a world that only exists in the present.

Therefore, (Caesar was a General) cannot be a State of Affairs

2 - On the other hand
We may have the concept of a possible world where there is the State of Affairs (snow is white), and we may also have the concept of a possible world where there is the State of Affairs (snow is black).

If we can have the concept of a possible world where there is the State of Affairs (snow is black), it seems to follow that we could also have the concept of a possible world where there is a State of Affairs (Caesar was a General).

The problem

As you say, “There is a big difference between "The apple is on the table" and "Russell thinks there is an apple on the table". And it seems to me that in trying to make sense of both logic and mind, you mix these two.”

We can only know about a State of Affairs in a mind-independent world through concepts in the mind, yet we are trying to determine States of Affairs independently of the mind

Ultimately, States of Affairs cannot be about what exists in a mind-independent world, but must be about our concepts of what exists in a mind-independent world .

If that is the case, then the enquiry is not about the State of Affairs in the world (Caesar was a General) but more about the State of Affairs in the mind “Caesar was a General”.

Quantification is not reference. So “there is no apple on the table” is ~∃x(Ax ^ Tx). But "There is no apple in the set” is ambiguous between ~∃x(Ax ^ Tx) and ∃(x)(~A(x) ^ T(x)) This last asserts that there are no apples at all. it's as if we read "There is no apple in the set” as saying that there is a non-existent apple on the table. — Banno

I am slowly working through your posts.

Yes, the word “obtain” is redundant in possible worlds, although still relevant in First Order Logic.

Yes, we cannot list all possible positions between two points, as such a list would be infinite.

What makes an apple the same apple in different possible worlds?
Russell’s Theory of Descriptions may have a flaw that truth is not always the property of a sentence. Kripke’s Rigid Designator may have the flaw in that names can still be used non-rigidly. Gareth Evans in his own theory of names attempts to combine a theory of descriptions with rigid designation.

As regards Plantinga
I can understand that in a possible world there may or may not be an apple. I can understand that if there is an apple, then this apple has its own unique haecceity. But I cannot understand that if in a possible world there is no apple, there still is the apple’s haecceity (though I listened on YouTube to a talk he gave at New York University about Naturalism and Evolution, and his arguments seemed quite weak)

As regards states of affairs being dynamic.
An apple falls off a branch and hits the ground. We cannot describe the movement of the apple from tree to ground by listing each position it will be in, as this list would be infinitely long, but we can describe its position knowing it is falling under a gravitational force of 9.8 m/s sq

What exactly is a state of affairs.

SEP - States of affairs

According to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the totality of states of affairs exhausts the space of possibilities; the totality of states of affairs that obtain are the (actual) world.

Wikipedia - State of Affairs (philosophy)

In philosophy, a state of affairs (German: Sachverhalt),[1] also known as a situation, is a way the actual world must be in order to make some given proposition about the actual world true; in other words, a state of affairs is a truth-maker, whereas a proposition is a truth-bearer

This suggests that a state of affairs is part of the actual world.

But the actual world can only exist at one moment in time. There is one moment in time when the apple leaves the tree, there is one moment in time when the apple hits the ground, and many moments in time between the two. At each moment in time, the apple will be at one position.

Even so, it may be that this moment in time has a duration, such as Planck time, and a position in space has an extension, such as Planck length.

Even if time has a minimum duration and space has a minimum extension, if a State of Affairs does exist in the actual world, then it can only exist as something within a moment in time, meaning that it is static rather than dynamic.

The equation s = 0.5 f t sq, which describes a change in position with a change in time, cannot exist as a State of Affairs in the actual world, as a State of Affairs can only exist in one moment in time, and a change in time cannot exist within one moment in time.

If a State of Affairs is something that is part of the actual world, because in the actual world time can only exist as a series of moments, a State of Affairs can only be something static.

What are the implications that existence is not a predicate
In a possible world, there may or may not be an apple.

If there is a single apple in this possible world, it would be redundant to say that “the apple exists in this possible world”, as this would be equivalent to saying “an existent apple exists in this possible world”. It would be better to say “there is an apple in this possible world”.

In there are no apples in this possible world, it would be redundant to say that “the apple does not exist in this possible world”, as this would be equivalent to saying “a non-existent apple does not exist in this possible world”. It would be better to say “there is no apple in this possible world”.

If existence is not a predicate, then neither can non-existence be a predicate

Similarly with the mind. I may or may not have the concept of an apple.

If I have the concept of an apple in my mind, it would be redundant to say that “the concept of an apple exists in my mind”, as this would be equivalent to saying “an existent concept of an apple exists in my mind”. It would be better to say “there is the concept of an apple in my mind”.

If I don’t have the concept of an apple in my mind, it would be impossible to say that “the concept of an apple does not exist in my mind”, as it would be impossible to say “a non-existent concept of an apple does not exist in my mind”. One cannot say anything.

Even though there is no apple in my actual world, I can still have the concept of an apple in my mind. Then when I refer to an apple, I am not referring to something in the world but am referring to something in my mind.

What we need is a way of seeing through the problems so that we can understand that they are illusions created by our misunderstanding of language. That's what the logical analysis is intended to do. — Ludwig V

:up:

Semantics do not imbue existence. — Relativist

A book could be written on that topic.

Linguistic determinism regards language as determining how people perceive existence.

Plantinga, being a Christain philosopher, may argue that "In the beginning was the Word", and from the word came existence. Benjamin Lee Whorf proposed that language does not merely describe objects, but rather determines what we perceive an object to be. Wittgenstein argued that the limits of our language define the limits of our world. Plato considered that conceptions of reality are embedded in language. For the Indirect Realist, objects such as a red postbox only exist as the name “the red postbox”.

We can talk about Sherlock Holmes who does not exist, and Meinong’s logic can deal with non-existent objects, such as round-squares

Strictly speaking, we do not "observe" time at all. If a person sees an apple moving one can deduce that time has passed, but we do not observe time. So "time" itself is a mental construct. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that on the macro scale, such as an hour, we cannot observe time, because we exist within time. Only a being outside of time could observe time. As you say, time is a mental construct that we deduce. For example, from our memories.
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So, what I would say is that we are always experiencing and observing a duration of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that on the micro scale, such as a second, I do feel that I experience a duration of time, even though intellectually I believe that there can be only one moment in time. Very mysterious.

The representation of the present as a "moment in time" is completely inconsistent with empirical observation, therefore a falsity. — Metaphysician Undercover

When I see an apple falling to the ground, are you saying we are able to empirically observe more than one moment in time at the same time?

This would mean that we are able to empirically observe the moment in time when the apple left the tree and at the same time also empirically observe the moment in time when the apple hits the ground.

It is more the case that when we empirically observe the apple hitting the ground, we have a memory of the apple leaving the tree.

But ¬∃x(P(x)∧Q(x)) identifies a different state of affairs, which does not refer to any apples. — Ludwig V

Learning about logic statements.

¬∃x(P(x)∧Q(x)) is the situation that there is not something that that is both an apple and on the table

∃x(P(x)∧¬Q(x)) is the situation that there is at least one thing that is an apple and not on the table

In possible world, say W34, there are no apples at all. Then the proposition “there is no apple on the table” is true.

What would the logic statement be for this possible world W34?

I suggest that it's simpler to semantically equate, “there is no apple on the table” with the fact that apples are not in the set of objects on the table. — Relativist

In ordinary language we can say “there is no apple on the table”.

We could also list the set of things on the table = {book, pen, cup}, and then say “there is no apple in the set”.

To say “there is no apple on the table” is no different to saying “there is no apple in the set”.

In both cases we are referring to something that does not exist.

Do you mean that the apple that might be on the table does not exist? — Ludwig V

As I understand it:

In ordinary language we can say “there is no apple on the table”, so we seem to be referring to an apple that does not exist, which is a puzzle.

But we must be referring to something.

In logic, this problem is avoided by treating the apple as existing regardless of whether it obtains or not

The proposition "There is something that is an apple and this something is not on the table" can be written as ∃x(P(x)∧¬Q(x)) where P(x) means "x is an apple" and Q(x) means "x is on the table"

We can then refer to an apple that exists regardless of whether or not it is on the table.

There is no "actual moment in time". Time is continuous duration, or flow, without any moments. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your only direct and immediate knowledge of time is that of the present, the present moment in time. Within your present, you have memories of the past. You can theorise, hypothesise, that time is a continuous duration, but you have no direct or immediate knowledge that this is the case.

3 and 6 appear to be identical — Ludwig V

True, in ordinary language
Possibility 1 - the apple is on the table
Possibility 2 - the apple is not on the table
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"There is no apple on the table" which doesn't refer to anything non-existent and "There is an apple on the table", which refers to the apple on the table, which does exist. — Ludwig V

In ordinary language, if “there is no apple on the table” is true, then there is no apple. The proposition is referring to something that is non-existent. This seems like a puzzle.

As you say “I don't see how one can say anything at all about non-existent objects. They have to exist in some sense if we are to talk about them at all.”

This is the problem that modal logic solves. The apple exists even if it does not obtain. If it exists then it can be included within modal equations.
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But whether the apple in W3 is the same apple as the apple in W6 or the apple in W9 is the same as the apple in W12, - or perhaps the same apple is in question in all four worlds - is a question of trans-world identity. That's an awkward question — Ludwig V

Yes, in modal logic, if in W3 the apple exists but does not obtain, and in W6 the apple exists but does not obtain, is this the same apple or a different apple even though it is identical.

Plantinga suggests that the apples in W3 and W6 are different even though they may otherwise be identical. This is why he attaches a haecceity to each entity that exists.

This makes sense, in that how can two entities that exist but not obtain be the same thing.

In ordinary language, if x does not exist and y does not exist, how can there ever be the possibility of x and y being the same thing. This is why it becomes a problem for logic to solve.

A state of affairs isn't perspectival. The expression of a proposition will generally have the hallmarks of a certain POV, but a state of affairs is not an expression. A state of affairs that obtains is a fact. — frank

As I see it:

Suppose in the world are the States of Affairs i) the apple is on the table ii) the apple is not on the table. These States of Affairs are not perspectival.

If the State of Affairs, the apple is on the table, obtains, then it is a fact. This is also not perspectival.

A State of Affairs exists even if it does not obtain.

A State of Affairs expresses a possible world.

When I say “the apple is not on the table”, this is perspectival from my point of view.

Then my proposition “the apple is not on the table” is false because the apple is on the table.