As I have already mentioned, the modus is what is contained in the hammer itself.......................So we come to the fact that when we call something something, we don't necessarily need to know all its boundaries, but they must exist somewhere, and once we know them all, we may call it something else....................Therefore, the modus is again a construct of the mind, rather than something that actually exists., — Astorre
What I Propose:
The modality (or the name can be changed to your liking) of a hammer is its "shadowy depth" (like Harman's), objective and inaccessible in isolation. — Astorre
Because we don't learn to associate the word with one wavelength. We associate it with experiences, but those experiences reflect both physiological predisposition and cultural conditioning. Right? — frank
I think we just learn to associate a certain word with a certain range of visual experiences? — frank
Yea, but the OP wasn't saying that the set of red things is a definition of red. It was saying the set is redness because it has all the instantiations if it. — frank
I think you mentioned the choice: extension/intension? I suppose the latter is a proposed solution to: "we must know the set of red things before we can include an element in the set?" — bongo fury
Which isn't a problem (requiring a solution) in natural language. Usage there is guided by exemplification. See Goodman's Languages of Art which cashes in on the theoretical economy of analysing properties (or sets) away as predicates. — bongo fury
In formalised languages, sure. The circularity is famous since Russell B. — bongo fury
"Being an instance of redness" seems to be a property of all instances of redness, yet it seems to be a different property than redness itself. — litewave
This is an intensional definition of a set, a definition by specifying a common property of the set's elements. An extensional definition of a set would be a definition by listing all the particular elements. — litewave
What about these two: the property of redness, and the property of being an instance of redness (or the property of having the property of redness). Both properties seem to be instantiated in all instances of redness, so the instances form one and the same set. — litewave
But now it seems that there are genuinely different coextensive properties, which would dash the hope of identifying properties with sets. — litewave
Redness, then, is not inside the apple. It is born from the interplay of all three participants. — Astorre
Now you are assuming a force without acceleration, a force which is counteracting gravity to create an equilibrium. — Metaphysician Undercover
I suppose one issue might be circularity. How do you know what belongs in a set? — Count Timothy von Icarus
I think we had this discussion before. In general relativity, gravity is not a force. — Metaphysician Undercover
I propose that the set of all red objects is the property "redness" but this property probably does not look red, in fact it probably does not look like anything that could be visualized because it is not an object that is contiguous in space or time — litewave
I did say earlier that there are good grounds for saying that the mind is existentially dependent on the brain etc., but that nature of this dependence is not yet clarified. — Ludwig V
From the fact that I am here, I can reliably infer that I was born. I can also infer reliably that I will die.................. In a normal context, the answer would be 93 million miles from the earth...................................What earthly use is a map if you cannot relate it to what it is a map of? Is it perhaps possible to look at the world indirectly? — Ludwig V
Mental objects such as appearances, experiences, concepts are not physical objects, so do not occupy space. — Ludwig V
The mind-body problem has remained essentially unchanged since Descartes put it forward in 1641. The problem is: what is the nature of the conscious mind, and how does it relate to the body?
Today, the prevailing view is that the mind is really a physical phenomenon going on inside the brain. I shall call this view physicalism. It contrasts with two other broad views: dualism – which says the mind is irreducibly different from the brain; and mentalism – which denies the existence of the brain altogether.
The apple is in a static condition, the state of being on the table, for a duration of time. By what premise do you conclude that it also takes part in activity? — Metaphysician Undercover
A set is a different object than any of its elements. But if the box is black then it also contains instances of blackness, not just redness. For example the walls of the box may be black. Your example looks like the property of redness contained in a black box. — litewave
I am proposing that we could plausibly identify a property with the set of all things that have this property. — litewave
I am proposing that we could plausibly identify a property with the set of all things that have this property. — litewave
A static state of existence, even if temporary, is very distinct from an activity. In no way is a static state a part of an activity, as there is a causal relation which separates the two. A cause is required to bring the static thing into an active situation. — Metaphysician Undercover
Are you saying "is on the table" is an activity? In predication the verb "is" does not express an activity. — Metaphysician Undercover
What I'm trying to point out is that, whatever mental object you posit in my head, the actual work is done by my mind, interpreting, applying and so forth. Those activities - skills - are what matters. The mental object doesn't actually do anything. — Ludwig V
If I want to find my way from A to B, I can use a map - a representation of the terrain. But it is no use to me unless I can read the map, and identify what point on the map represents where I am - I have to link the representation to what it is a representation of. — Ludwig V
If we know that we don't know reality, we know it from our concepts, experiences, and what appears to us. Yet that's not what they tell us. All three of these concepts announce, quite clearly that they are about something. We have a concept of tables, our experience are experiences of chairs, and what appears in the morning is the sun. They are not identical with their objects, but they are existentially dependent on them. So denying the reality of those objects, or claiming that we don't know those objects, denies their reality. — Ludwig V
Hardly anyone today would defend the crude “objects exist only in the mind” version of indirect realism, or the equally naïve “mind is a passive window” version of direct realism. — Wayfarer
So the “overpopulation” worry—that there are too many relations to count as real entities—may dissolve once we stop treating relations as if they were objects alongside atoms and tables. They're on a different plane altogether. — Wayfarer
Color doesn’t exist “in the world” in the same way as a wavelength does, but it is also not merely mental — it’s a mind–world hybrid. — Wayfarer
So you’re right to notice that “relations” aren’t as straightforward as they seem, but I’d caution against setting it up as “either in the mind or in the world.” They belong to the very interface where mind and world meet. — Wayfarer
A table consists of various parts, suitably organized. In the real world, the organization is called a design. — Ludwig V
What matters is the "over-population". I don't see why "over-population" is a problem. Where does anything say what number of relations there should be in the world? — Ludwig V
If the relations occupy space, they cannot be in the mind. If relations are even located in space, they are not in the mind. — Ludwig V
One could even argue that it (physics) is impoverished because it can't recognize colours, etc. — Ludwig V
Where is the design of the table or chair? — Ludwig V
The distinction between table and chair is not arbitrary — Ludwig V
We don't experience tables and chairs through representations of them. If we can't compare a representation with the original, there is no way to know whether it is truth or illusion. — Ludwig V
The concept of a table is not a table. — Ludwig V
I have never managed to work out what "direct experience" means. — Ludwig V
That we can perceive objects-in-the-world, and how they are related does not mean that they exist in the mind. — Ludwig V
Just because you might have perceived erroneously that Mary is bored, it doesn't follow that you cannot depend on your understanding. — L'éléphant
The answer depends on what you mean by your question......................................However, one might start by asking whether A and B exist in the mind, the world or both. — Ludwig V
Therefore your proposed analogy is false. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think so. "2+3" has its meaning, and "5" has its meaning. The two are distinct. The left side of an equation always means something different from the right side, or else the equation would be totally useless. — Metaphysician Undercover
Huh? I only see one thing, "the combining of sets". And that is how you defined "+". Where is the other thing, which makes it metaphorical? — Metaphysician Undercover
do the fundamental particles and forces contribute to the higher order of a 'table'? If no, then the forces and particles aren't really doing anything... — Barkon
right, so you saying table is concrete and photon is not is... not quite it then is it? — flannel jesus
It takes the word out of the context of mathematics, it doesn't bring metaphor into mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover
I actually think a table is MORE abstract than a photon. — flannel jesus
sorry buddy, "table" is a concept in the English language, and concepts are something abstract. — flannel jesus
So give me an example of something material. — flannel jesus
Surely mathematical concepts cannot be classified as metaphorical. — Metaphysician Undercover