Please define a real cup, and a fake cup you are seeing. What are they, and what is the difference between real cup and fake cup? — Corvus

I agree that I must know the difference between a real cup and a fake cup if I say “I see a fake cup”.

But I am not doing that. I am saying “I see a cup and I don’t know whether it is real or fake”

Are you asking how we learn the language or learn the meaning of a word? Most often from other people. — Luke

If I don’t know the meaning of “infinity” I could ask another person. Suppose this other person knows the meaning of “infinity”. How did this other person learn the meaning of infinity?

The meaning of the word “infinity” cannot have come from i) a person’s individual, private experience, ii) any definition or description of “infinity” in language, iii) any use of infinity outside language, iv) any use of “infinity” within language.

Then how did this other person learn the meaning of infinity?
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PI 560. “The meaning of a word is what an explanation of its meaning explains.”

Very cryptic. What does this mean?

Anyhow, this was the point of my examples of dragon and infinity: that we have not experienced any dragons or infinity and yet "dragon" and "infinity" are not meaningless concepts. This goes against your argument that a word is meaningless if a speaker has never experienced its referent. — Luke

We agree that the meaning of the word “infinity” cannot come from private experience.
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I'm not arguing that the meaning of a word "comes from the language itself". My argument - which is my interpretation of Wittgenstein's argument - is only that the meaning of a word does not come from any person's individual, private experience. — Luke

The meaning of the word “infinity” cannot come from any definition or description within language, as definitions and descriptions will be never ending.

The meaning of the word “infinity” cannot come from any use of infinity outside language.

The meaning of the word “infinity” cannot come from how it is used in language. As you said:

How do you measure or determine a "successful use" of "xyz" here? How could "xyz" be used correctly or incorrectly in this example? I don't doubt that you could say or use the string of letters "xyz", but what does it mean? — Luke

How does one know the meaning of the expression “the number of numbers is xyz” without knowing the meaning of “xyz”?

Yet the word “infinity” does have a meaning to us.

The question is, where does “infinity” get its meaning?

Why not? — Luke

We can use a “hammer” to knock in a nail because we can pick up a hammer, but have you ever picked up an infinity and been able to use it for anything?

That is the proof the cup exists. — Corvus

Seeing a cup is not proof that the cup exists in the outer world. The cup may only exist in the inner mind.

That people see a mirage in the desert is not proof of the existence of water.
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I don't need a proof, because I know it is not an illusion or hallucination. — Corvus

There are many Persian sayings about illusions, including “The neighbour's chicken is a goose".

Because you cannot prove seeing a cup is an illusion or hallucination. Can you prove your seeing a cup is an illusion or hallucination? — Corvus

We see a cup.

I cannot prove it is an illusion or hallucination. You cannot prove it is not an illusion or hallucination.

Perhaps scepticism is the only solution.

Nobody has ever experienced a dragon before, or infinity before, either. Where does the meaning of these concepts come from? — Luke

An interesting question. Where does infinity get its meaning from if no one has ever had the private experience of infinity.
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Can a blind person never understand what others mean by the word, even if you explain to them what it means? — Luke

If a blind person has never seen a sunset, they can only know its meaning by description, such as “the disappearance of the Sun at the end of the Sun path, below the horizon of the Earth due to its rotation”

Some of these words the blind person will know the meaning of by direct experience, such as “disappearance, end, path, below, rotation.”

Some of these words the blind person will not know the meaning of by direct experience, such as “Sun”.

If a blind person has never seen the Sun, they can only know its meaning by description, such as “a massive, nearly perfect sphere of hot plasma”.

As before, the blind person will know some of these words by direct experience, such as “massive” but not others, such as “plasma”.

The problem is, there are no absolute definition of any word, no complete description. Therefore, any description to the blind person must sooner or later contain words that the blind person has never directly experienced.

But it remains true that infinity means something to us even if we have never directly experienced it and sunset means something to a blind person if they never directly experience it.

As you say:

My argument - which is my interpretation of Wittgenstein's argument - is only that the meaning of a word does not come from any person's individual, private experience. — Luke

I agree that there are some words in the language game, such as infinity and sunset to a blind person, whose meaning cannot come from a person’s individual private experience.

But the meaning of the words cannot come from the language game either, as no word can be completely defined or described within the language game.

The meaning of these words cannot come from use outside language either, as we cannot use “infinity” as we can use a “hammer” to knock in a nail. So it cannot be the case of “meaning as use”.

Summarising, the meaning of a word “infinity” cannot come from i) private experience ii) description within the language game iii) use outside the language game.

So, where does the meaning of “infinity” come from?

The evidence was submitted to support the event in the real world as true statements which had taken place in the real world. It is an independent verification statement for the conclusion, not a circular argument. — Corvus

How can seeing a cup be evidence that a cup exists in the world, when your seeing may be an illusion or an hallucination?

You introduced the string "xyz" and stated that you don't know what it means. You are intentionally using it as an example of a meaningless symbol/word......................The point is that no individual's inner experience determines linguistic meaning. — Luke

Exactly, when hearing “what a beautiful xyz”, our first reaction is to ask what “xyz” means. If we don’t know what “xyz” means the expression is meaningless.

If there were no inner experiences, then where does the meaning of “sunset” come from?

The meaning of “xyz” cannot come from the language itself, otherwise we would know what “xyz” meant.

At this point, we can only assume and conclude that the questioner is engaging in "Argument by Refusal, Stubbornness or Denial", which means that the questioner refuses accept the rational logical conclusion from the evidence provided by the real events in the real world. — Corvus

What you say leads into a circular argument.

You are assuming there are real events in a real world, from which we discover evidence that there are real events in a real world.

If a blind person were to say "What a beautiful sunset", it would not make the phrase meaningless. Everyone else could still use the phrase meaningfully. Even the blind person could use it meaningfully. The blind person might be e.g. saying it as a joke, or in a self-deprecating way, or responding to someone else's story about a sunset, or in any number of ways................The point is that no individual's inner experience determines linguistic meaning. — Luke

Suppose a blind person said “what a beautiful sunset”, which is a possible scenario, even though they have never seen a sunset.

Yes, they could be saying it ironically, acknowledging that they have never seen a sunset.

If the word “sunset” means for the blind person “something I have never seen”, then “sunset” does have an inner meaning to the blind person, ie, something they have never seen.

Similarly, I could say “what a beautiful xyz”, even if I don’t know what “xyz” refers to.

I can successfully use “xyz” in a linguistic expression even if I don't know what “xyz” means.

Even though “xyz” can be successfully used within a language game, if no one within the linguistic community knows what “xyz” means, then “what a beautiful xyz” becomes a meaningless expression.

“What a beautiful xyz” doesn’t gain a meaning because it can be successfully used within a language game.

“What a beautiful xyz” only gains meaning if at least one of the linguistic community knows what “xyz” refers to, i.e. knows what it means.

You just make coffee in the cup, and drink it. If the cup was hallucinatory, then coffee will spill onto the table. If it holds coffee, and you cant drink the coffee out of it, then it is the real cup. — Corvus

How can you prove that you are not hallucinating drinking a cup of coffee?

Unless you can prove you were in the state of illusion, delusion, hallucination or dream during your visual perception, if you see X, then X exists. — Corvus

Suppose you think you see a cup. How can you prove that you are not hallucinating a cup?

One cannot deny something without existing. — Corvus

I can deny that ghosts exist.
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You can wave it, or grab a cup with the hand? You cannot deny the fact that you have a hand by that time? — Corvus

Moore says that he knows that here is one hand because he can see one hand.

But as you say:

One's own mind can always fall into illusion and misunderstanding — Corvus

Just because he sees one hand, it that proof that there is one hand?

"If we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and name' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant." — Luke

How does Wittgenstein overcome the problem that the expression “I am in pain” would be meaningless if the speaker never had the inner feeling of pain.

I know the speaker could pretend that they are in pain, but if every expression in language is based on a pretence about inner feelings, then again, language would be meaningless.

2 questions.
1) Do they also deny the fact that their own body exists in a mind-independent world?
2) Whose mind are they talking about here? — Corvus

1) Yes
2) Their own

Well, as you have just demonstrated, we can invent as many language games as we like, and then amalgamate them. — Ludwig V

There is a quandary

On the one hand, Wittgenstein is effectively saying that hinges are part of the framework of our language, our language game within our Form of Life, and are as such non-epistemic, indubitable.

But on the other hand, Wittgenstein can only talk about hinges if they are epistemic, and thereby doubtable.

The quandary is, how can Wittgenstein talk about things that he agrees cannot be talked about?
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I may be mistaken, but I had the impression that Wittgenstein did not actually accept Moore's argument. He seems to allow that, under suitable circumstances, in an appropriate context, "here is a hand" could be called into question......................Moore does not justify what he sees by justifying each proposition individually, but by demonstrating that he can see things in general. Which he does by his behaviour, verbal and non-verbal. — Ludwig V

Wittgenstein disagreed with Morre effectively saying “I know that here is one hand because I can see it”

Moore is saying that the evidence for knowing that I have one hand is because I can see one hand.

Wittgenstein points out the logical regression, and asks where is the evidence that Moore can see one hand.

For Wittgenstein, the only way out of this regression is for Moore to say “Here is one hand”.

You can wave it, or grab a cup with the hand? You cannot deny the fact that you have a hand by that time? — Corvus

An Indirect Realist and an Idealist would deny the fact that in a mind-independent world there is a hand.

If I say “here is one hand”, how do I justify it? Moore says “I know here is one hand because I can see it". But how does he justify what he sees!

There is no alternative but to accept “here is one hand" as indubitable by making it a hinge proposition within a language game.

If “here is one hand” can be a hinge, then also “here is one tree” can be a hinge. In a language game there can be many hinges. Other hinges may be “a hand has five fingers”. This allows the logical conclusion that within this coherent language game “here are five fingers”.

Another coherent language could be created using the hinge propositions:
“Here is one Walrus”, “Here is one Carpenter”, “Here is sand”, “Here is an animal that can walk”, “Here is an animal that can talk”.

These hinge propositions can then be logically connected to create the passage
“The Walrus and the Carpenter
Were walking close at hand;
They wept like anything to see
Such quantities of sand:
‘If this were only cleared away,’
They said, ‘it would be grand!”

It is possible to create innumerable coherent language games, each with their own hinge propositions and each with their own Form of Life.

The question is, how do we know which of the innumerable language games we should be using?

If for example we grow up from babies in a world where every aspect is theist, including language, buildings, events, organisations, then every aspect of our Form of Life will be indubitably theistic. Indubitable because that is all we know. A theist will not question their practices of prayer, worship and religious rituals. A theist will not say “I know theism is true” but rather “theism is true”. Basically , this is common sense.

A practice within a form of life may be pre-linguistic, but is more than animal instinct. Practices within a form of life may inform propositions within language.

The indubitable fact that the ground beneath a church is compressed because of the weight of the church is contingent rather than necessary, and therefore not a hinge.

That “theism is true” is indubitable for a theist, is not a fact as it is non-epistemic, and as neither contingent nor necessary, is a hinge.

Every aspect of a theistic form of life for a theist, both enacted, such as going to church, and propositional, such as “theism is true” will be indubitable, and as such hinges. Some hinge beliefs may be actions and some propositions.

In this sense, a hinge is not the role a proposition plays within a practice, but rather the role a practice and proposition play within a Form of Life.

So a few points on which we might find agreement. Being indubitable is a role taken on by a proposition in a language game, and not a property of that proposition. (Hence we can set aside ↪RussellA's muddle). — Banno

Where did I say that a hinge proposition has the property of being indubitable rather than the role of being indubitable?

In one sense, the proposition “here is one hand” must be a hinge within the coherent language game of which it is a part, otherwise its language game will fall apart. — RussellA

Where did I say that “here is one hand” is truth-apt?

Where is the muddle in the following:

Hinge propositions are interesting as part of the framework of our language and as such are beyond doubt. A framework cannot doubt itself. — RussellA

Maybe we agree that there is no difference between “here is one hand” and “here is one tree”. Either i) if “here is one hand” is a hinge then why isn’t “here is one tree” also a hinge? Or ii) if “here is one tree” is not a hinge then why should “here is one hand” be a hinge? — RussellA

Hinges are not an inventory of what we find in the world. — Fooloso4

As I see it, JL Austin’s performative utterance is “I name this ship Queen Elizabeth”. Subsequently we can say “here is the ship Queen Elizabeth”, where the proposition “here is the ship Queen Elizabeth" is beyond doubt, because a performative utterance, and as such is a hinge proposition which we can find in the world.

This hinge proposition then allows us to carry on our language game by saying things like: “the ship Queen Elizabeth was built in 1938, provided a weekly transatlantic service between Southampton and New York City and was built at Clydebank”

If the proposition “here is the ship Queen Elizabeth" was in any doubt, this would throw the rest of our language game into a mess.

A coherent language game requires certain propositions to be beyond doubt in order to establish a bedrock for the language.

That is the opposite of my point. Not everything we point to is a hinge proposition. — Fooloso4

Maybe we agree that there is no difference between “here is one hand” and “here is one tree”.

Either i) if “here is one hand” is a hinge then why isn’t “here is one tree” also a hinge?

Or ii) if “here is one tree” is not a hinge then why should “here is one hand” be a hinge?

If "here is a hand" a hinge proposition then is "here is a tree"? How about "here is a blade of grass" and "here is an ant" and so on with everything in the world? — Fooloso4

Exactly. I made this point years ago.

Every proposition within a coherent language game is in a sense a hinge proposition beyond doubt.

In one sense, the proposition “here is one hand” must be a hinge within the coherent language game of which it is a part, otherwise its language game will fall apart.

However, the proposition “here are no hands” must also be a hinge within a different coherent language game of which it is a part, otherwise its language game will fall apart.

Therefore, a proposition is a hinge within a coherent language game if without the hinge its language game will fall apart.

But there can be different coherent language games each with their own hinge propositions.

In fact, there can be innumerable different coherent language games, and innumerable hinge propositions.

But each language game is an expression of the Form of Life within which it exists.

Therefore, if there are innumerable different coherent language games there must be innumerable different Forms of Life.

Each individual has a choice as to which language game they play, which hinge propositions are for them without doubt and which Form of Life they exist within.

Should I be a theist or an atheist, a Realist or an Idealist, a democrat or an authoritarian?

For each choice, hinge propositions are available.

Hinge propositions are interesting as part of the framework of our language and as such are beyond doubt. A framework cannot doubt itself.

However, some propositions which exist within this framework are more open to doubt than others, but all can be doubted.

For Wittgenstein, as regarding hinges:

Mathematical propositions are hinges.

The personal propositions “I am here” (OC 10) and “the existence of the external world” (OC 20) are hinges, because they are exempt from doubt.

The personal proposition “I am called……….” plays the role of a hinge because of overwhelming evidence and is regarded as incontrovertible.

OC 314 - That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, and are as it were hinges on which these turn
OC 655 - The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of incontestability. I.e: “Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your dispute can turn”
OC 657 - The propositions of mathematics might be said to be fossilized. - The proposition "I am called...." is not. But it too is regarded as incontrovertible by those who, like myself, have overwhelming evidence for it.

Ultimately, logically and grammatically, something that plays the role of a hinge cannot be a hinge.

At the risk of repeating myself I will repeat what Wittgenstein actually says about hinges: They are propositions that belong to our scientific investigations. As such they are epistemological in the traditional sense. He does not simply accept them, he concludes that they are incontrovertible. (OC 657) — Fooloso4

For Wittgenstein, part of Moore’s mistake is in saying “I know here is one hand” rather than “here is one hand”.

These hinges are not limited to science, but apply to our complete Form of Life. They form part of the framework of rational enquiry, and as such are not objects of knowledge but are exempt from doubt and not subject to evaluation. In this sense they are incontrovertible.

Philosophy is the fundamental and inescapable activity of creating, analyzing, and assessing belief systems — Sam26

I think you're a bit confused about Witt, but so aren't most people. — Sam26

I think I have been reasonably clear in setting out my understanding where Wittgenstein is correct, incorrect or vague.

Understanding has two aspects. First there is understanding what Wittgenstein wrote about meaning in language, and second there is understanding whether Wittgenstein was correct, incorrect or vague about what he wrote about meaning in language. The first aspect is the role of the historian, the second aspect is the role of the philosopher.

As you say “Philosophy is the fundamental and inescapable activity of creating, analyzing, and assessing belief systems”, but it should be noted that first one must create a belief system in order to be able to analyze and assess other belief systems.

Therefore, I needed to set out my own belief system as regards meaning in language, which I think was reasonably clear, prior to being able to judge Wittgenstein’s belief system for correctness, incorrectness and vagueness.

The first step in avoiding philosophical confusion is in creating one’s own belief system, against which other belief systems may be judged for correctness, incorrectness and vagueness.

Philosophy is the fundamental and inescapable activity of creating, analyzing, and assessing belief systems — Sam26

:up:

This does not sound very Wittgensteinian, who accepted hinge propositions rather than assess them.

I want to speak to something that keeps happening in this thread, because it's a good example of the very confusion Witt's tools are meant to address. — Sam26

A useful post

I will give my solution to meaning in language, and try to show it answers all of your questions.

My solution to meaning in language

As in PI 258, I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of my sensation of sadness. Therefore, every time I have the sensation of sadness, which causes me to cry, I record my crying in my calendar by writing the sign “S”.

The sign “S” cannot point to the private sensation of sadness, which is hidden, but can point to the public behaviour of crying, which is not hidden.

There is no criteria for correctness between the sign "S" and the private sensation of sadness, but there is a criteria of correctness between the sign “S” and public behaviour of crying.

The sign “S” is an ostensive definition that points at the public behaviour of crying, not the private sensation of sadness.

I know that if I feel sadness then I cry, so when I see someone else cry I can infer that they too also feel sadness. I can never know that someone else feels sadness, but I can infer that they do from their behaviour.

For example, if you saw a cat with all the behaviours of being in pain, would you walk on past saying “I don’t know that this cat is in pain” or would you say “I infer that the cat is in pain from its behaviour” and take the cat to the vets?

Therefore, the sign “S” refers to and means the behaviour of crying, from which it can be inferred that the person is experiencing sadness.

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Several responses keep making the same argument but in different forms.......................… without inner feelings there'd be no language games………………..Without oxygen there'd be no fires. From that statement it doesn't follow that "fire" means oxygen — Sam26

Without the sensation of sadness there would be no sign “S”.

You are correct that the sign “S” does not mean the sensation of sadness. The sign “S” means the behaviour of crying, from which the sensation of sadness is inferred.
=========================================================

If meaning were fixed by private inner objects, you'd need a way to pin the right word to the right inner item privately, with no public check, which is crucial. — Sam26

You are right that there is no criteria of correctness between the sign “S” and the private inner sensation. The criteria of correctness is between the sign “S” and the public behaviour of crying.
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What drives the misreading is the assumption that meaning must work by a word pointing at some thing, and if outer objects are ruled out, then an inner object is all we're left with. — Sam26

Meaning must work by pointing at something, and it is not the case that outer objects are ruled out, as it is the outer object of crying that is being pointed at.
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Meaning doesn't need a hidden referent, inner or outer. It needs a practice, i.e., training, use, correction, context, the possibility of getting it right or wrong in ways others can recognize — Sam26

You are correct that language would not work if the referents of the words were hidden. Language works because the referent of behaviour is not hidden.

Even when the meaning of a word is the referent of behaviour, you are correct that this still needs practice, training, use, correction, context and right or wrong.

It is true that the behaviour of crying may have different causes, such as sadness of losing a family pet or watching a particularly funny comedian, and this is where other factors such as context are needed. Is the person crying looking at an empty dog kennel or looking at someone on a stage.
==================================================================

When I say "inner states don't fix meaning," I'm not saying they don't exist or don't matter. I'm saying they can't play the specific role that keeps being assigned to them, the role of a private foundation that makes meaning possible by itself, apart from any shared practice. — Sam26

Wittgenstein agreed in PI 304 that there are inner feelings

You are correct that inner feelings cannot make meaning in language possible by itself, because it is the behaviour caused by inner feelings that makes meaning in language possible.

I don't think we're makiing progress.................So, the point of my threads is to get the information out and let the chips fall where they may. — Sam26

I am doing the same. I believe the points that I am making are correct, even if no one else agrees. But what else can one do? At the very least I am improving my own understanding. If someone accepts my arguments, then that is a bonus.

As long as you are making progress and I am making progress, perhaps that is sufficient, even though our progress is different, even though our language games are different.
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EDIT - I have deleted the rest of the post as it did not add much.

Witt’s reply to the rule following question/anxiety isn’t “custom makes it fine, end of story,” and it isn’t “we vote on correctness.” The point is that interpretation isn't the whole story, because interpretations also need a way of being applied. At some point you master of a technique, you go on without consulting a further interpretation. — Sam26

In PI 201 talks about the rule-making paradox, and as you say, grasping a rule is not an interpretation and it is not custom that makes a rule. However, it is more fundamental than mastering a technique.

As with the hinge proposition, the rule is part of the framework of the form of life, within which is the language game. Customs, interpretations and techniques are part of the content of the framework, and as such have no control over the rules to which they are subject to.

Grasping a rule is living within a framework that is exempt from doubt, not an object of knowledge, not open to rational evaluation and an objective certainty.

One should not say “I know how to use the language game”, but should say “I use the language game”.

You’re raising a bunch of issues, and they get tangled because “form of life,” “hinge,” and “worldview” are being treated as if they’re the same kind of thing. They're not. — Sam26

I agree that a hinge is not the same kind of thing as a form of life, but the hinge is crucial to there being a form of life in the first place.
=========================

Witt’s “form of life” is usually the shared human backdrop of practices that makes language, rule following, correction, and inquiry possible. It’s not typically “theism versus atheism,” “direct versus indirect realism,” or “democracy versus autocracy.” — Sam26

Are theism and atheism different forms of life in Wittgenstein’s terms?

I would say that they are. Wittgenstein's "form of life" refers to the shared cultural practices, activities, and ways of living that provide the context for language and meaning (Wikipedia), and theism and atheism have many practices, activities and ways of living that are not shared.

One’s language is closely linked to one’s form of life, and the more diverse one’s language the more diverse one’s form of life. The theist and atheist certainly have different language games.

PI 19 And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life
PI 23 Here the term language-game is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life
PI 241 “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” - It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.

I am not saying the situation is black and white, In that there are degrees of difference. For example the form of life of a theist is different to the form of life of an atheist, but not as different as the form of life of a human and the form of life of a lion.

However, that the language game of a theist is different to the language game of an atheist, then so must be their form of life.
======================

We do make choices, shift commitments, and so on, but we’re rarely choosing between forms of life from some meta or neutral standpoint. — Sam26

This is the point I am making. The Wittgensteinian man in the street rarely chooses between forms of life from a meta or neutral standpoint, but this is the role of the philosopher. The philosopher should be trying to choose between forms of life from a meta or neutral standpoint

It is the role of the philosopher, sidetracked by Wittgenstein, to stand outside our language games, forms of life, hinge propositions and rules accepted by custom in order to attempt to understand the bigger picture.

It is the role of the philosopher to break the atheist out of their atheistic language game and the theist out of their theistic language game to arrive at a better understanding of the reality of the world.

So what is going on when the waiter adds up the bill (whether by pushing buttons on a machinie or the old-fashioned way)? — Ludwig V

Yes, that is when someone says “add 2+2”. That is different to someone saying "2+2=4".
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So is it false to say that unicorns don't exist? — Ludwig V

Unicorns exist in fiction.
====================

He shows how to talk about non-existent entities without referring to them. — Ludwig V

It is impossible to talk about something without referring to it.
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I shall ask how you connect the outward signs to the inner feelings if you have no access to them. — Ludwig V

By inference. If when I feel pain I grimace, when I see someone else grimace I infer that they also are feeling pain.

That's right, and as such the beetles are insufficient as analogous of "a concept". Each person's concept of "beetle" would be private and unique, so there would be no such thing as "the concept of beetle", only a multitude of distinct concepts. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly, my concept of “beetle” must be different to yours because we have lived different lives in different countries and have had different experiences.

There is no one dictionary definition of “beetle”, only a multitude of distinct concepts.
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First, you argue that if a person simply observes the use of a word, they must have an inner concept of that word. Now, you ague that the meaning of the word is dependent on the person' use of the word. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is the stage of learning the meaning of a word and the stage of knowing a word.

In the learning stage, a child can play with a toy without knowing its name. They gain a concept of the object when they play with the object, ie, use the object. The child then hears their parent say “toy” when the parent picks up the toy. The child can learn to associate the name “toy” with the object toy and their concept of toy.

Subsequent to the learning stage, a person knows the concept of toy and knows its name “toy”, and as when a child are able to use the toy.

A person can have an inner concept of an object prior to knowing the name of the object.

Japanese and Korean language say in the order of "Frog to me pass over." They have different order of saying words in sentences, i.e. the different rules. — Corvus

Yes, each language game needs its own rules

But if you say "Pass me over the frog.", then they will not know what you mean, even if you meant the cup. But your wife will know what you mean, because you two have the private agreement that frog means cup. — Corvus

Yes, the meaning of a word depends on its context. In a zoo, “frog” means “a short-bodied, tailless amphibian vertebrates”, but with one’s wife it could mean “cup”.

And there are rules how a word should be used in a sentence, in that “over pass frog me the” would not be correct English

"the inner cause of someone grimacing" could be taken to refer to the sensation of pain. But the private language argument shows that there's no such thing. — Ludwig V

Wittgenstein never said that we had no inner feelings.

PI 257 What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc)?
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Yes but the sign "+" does not refer to that fact. It is, in effect an instruction to do something, so it can't refer to anything. — Ludwig V

If I hear someone say “it is hot today”, I know it refers to it being hot today. There is no instruction for me to do anything.

If I hear someone say “2+2=4”, I know it refers to two objects being alongside another two objects. There is no instruction for me to do anything.
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Unicorns are mythical creatures, so they do not exist, so "unicorn" cannot refer to them — Ludwig V

“Unicorn” refers to a mythical creature.
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No, Russell's point, as I understood it that propositions that appear to refer to non-existent entities can be assigned a truth value by interpreting "The present king of France is bald" by analysing it as consisting of two claims - 1) that there is a king of France and 2) that he is bald. A conjunction of two sentences is true iff both conjuncts are true. In this case one of the conjuncts is false, because the reference fails, so the entire sentence is false. No non-existent entities required. — Ludwig V

Russell’s definite descriptions allow us to refer to and discuss non-existent entities because we can reduce expressions, such as “the present king of France is bald”, into constituent truth-apt propositions.

Have you never watched a child learn to speak? It is not true that a person "only speaks because they have a prior concept". — Metaphysician Undercover

A child hears their parent say “toy” and sees them pick up a toy. Already the child has a concept of “toy”, because they have heard "toy" and seen a toy.
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And isn't this exactly the type of conclusion which Wittgenstein is trying to avoid? There is no beetle in the box, no concept of freedom in the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein is not saying that there is no beetle in the box. He is saying that because no one can see into anyone else’s box, each person’s beetle could be different.

Despite this, people can still use “beetle” in conversation.

The beetle could be pain. Wittgenstein is not saying that people don’t have inner feelings

A public language allows communication about inner feelings, not directly, in that no one can know another’s pain, but indirectly, on the assumption that inner feelings are linked to outward behaviour. For example, grimacing, which is empirically observable, thereby enabling public conversations about “ pain”.

The meaning of the word “pain” in a public language is directly determined by empirically observable outward behaviour, and only indirectly by an assumed inner feeling.

On the one hand it is true that meaning in language is directly determined by public and observable objective criteria, but on the other hand, there is the assumption within language that outward behaviour has been caused by inner feelings.

It is therefore true that a public language cannot be based on inner feelings alone.