A mental event is the subjective experience we are all familiar with. If the content of a mental event is different, then we have a different experience, so the content of a mental event determines which kind of experience one has. — MoK

A thought is a mental event, such as the thought of an apple.

But in your statement, can equally replace "content" by "form".

If the form of a mental event is different, then we have a different experience, so the form of a mental event determines which kind of experience one has.

It still needs to be shown why a thought needs both form and content, when form seems sufficient, in that the form "is" the content.

We first have to notice that each mental event has a certain content. — MoK

Not necessarily.

Unless each mental event "is" its content. The content "is" the form.

The Universe is built on fundamental particles which have no parts, yet things still happen.

The property is a (sometimes confusion) way of grouping this potency and actuality. — Count Timothy von Icarus

In scientific terms:

Suppose a boulder has a mass of 100kg.

When the boulder interacts with Earth's gravity, there is a force of 981 N pulling it towards the Earth. When the boulder interacts with Pluto's gravity, there is a force of 62 N pulling it towards Pluto. If the boulder was in outer space and not in a gravitational field, there would be no force on it.

The boulder has an "actuality" of 100kg regardless of any interaction.

The property of the heaviness of the boulder can vary between being heavy, being light or being weightless dependent upon location, but where this property is relative to a human on Earth.

The boulder's "potency" of 981 N is a function of its 100kg "actuality" and is "actualised" in an interaction with a gravitational field of 9.81 m/s sq.

The heaviness of the boulder (where heaviness is a property) is a function of its "actuality" (100kg) and the particular gravitational field it is interacting with relative to Earth's gravitational field.

The apple seems to be potentially red even when this event meeting is not occuring. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The apple appears red, because when hit by sunlight, the apple absorbs all colours except red, which is then reflected to our eyes.

A mirror reflects red light, but we don't say the mirror has the property of being red.

An apple also reflects red light. It is curious that we say an apple has the property of being red, yet we don't say a mirror has the property of being red.

I wonder at what stage in the process of this post's creation you found it appropriate to research the exact years of birth and death for each philosopher? — bongo fury

At the stage of making my point absolutely clear that for at least 400 years Western philosophy has not been built on a substance paradigm to the exclusion of a process paradigm.

Classical philosophy, like our everyday language, is built on the substance paradigm. — Astorre

Since the 17th C, with Indirect Realism, I don't think that philosophy has been built on the substance rather than process paradigm. Our language certainly isn't, as Wittgenstein's Language Games illustrates.

Indirect Realism asserts that we don't perceive the world directly but rather though representations in our minds

For example, René Descartes (1596–1650) argued that we perceive the external world through ideas or representations in the mind, not directly. John Locke (1632-1704) developed this idea. George Berkeley (1685-1753) argued that our perceptions are ideas in the mind and not physical entities. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) emphasized the role of the mind in shaping our understanding of reality.

We can go back even further to Plato's Theory of Forms, in that we don't directly perceive substances in the world, but are only able to process shadows in our minds.

I don't think it is true to say that Classical philosophy is built on the substance paradigm.

As I have already mentioned, the modus is what is contained in the hammer itself.......................So we come to the fact that when we call something something, we don't necessarily need to know all its boundaries, but they must exist somewhere, and once we know them all, we may call it something else....................Therefore, the modus is again a construct of the mind, rather than something that actually exists., — Astorre

I agree, in that I have the concept of Poland even though I have only visited four of its towns. My concept of Poland is necessarily bounded by my personal experiences, and I infer my concept of Poland is only a pale shadow of its true reality.

However you distinguish between the "modality" of something, objective and inaccessible, and its properties, dynamic and contextual.

I have the concept of a hammer in my mind. My belief is that objects such as hammers don't exist in the world, but what does exist are fundamental particles and forces.

In my terms, the "modus" of the hammer are fundamental particles and forces, which are objective and inaccessible, enable Realism, and do exist in a mind-independent world.

These fundamental particles and forces are the indirect but real cause of my concept of hammerness.

I can explain this property of hammerness as a set of events in which a hammer participates, such as hitting in a nail, hitting a rock, being an art object, being a weapon. A property may be understood by its extension.

The property of hammerness = {hitting in a nail, hitting a rock, being an art object, being a weapon}.

These events are dynamic and exist within a context, in that a hammer in the context of carpentry is a tool for hitting in nails and in the context of war is a weapon. The Context Principle has played an important role since Frege's 1884 Grundlagen der Arithmetik.

As you say "Even though we know that the hammer is unknowable, we can still use it to drive nails, right?".

All we need to know is appearance not the cause of such appearances. All we need to know are the properties of the hammer, not any hypothetical modus of the hammer.

We drive along a road and stop when we see a red light. The fact that colours don't exist in the world but only in our minds as concepts has no bearing on the fact that we stop when we see a red light. In our daily lives we are only interested in the properties of an object, such as the property of redness. We have no practical interest in any hypothetical modus of an object (though we may have a philosophical interest).

By Occam's Razor, there is no reason why we cannot remove the concept of modus altogether, as it serves no purpose. As you say "My fascination with the processual approach to ontology is a kind of response to speculative ontology (object-oriented ontology and so on). "

My modus of the hammer are fundamental particles and forces that I believe do exist in a mind-independent world (accepting that even fundamental particles and forces are concepts).

But is what you mean by modus different to this?

What I Propose:
The modality (or the name can be changed to your liking) of a hammer is its "shadowy depth" (like Harman's), objective and inaccessible in isolation. — Astorre

An object in the world such as a rock has an almost infinite number of possible relations. As you say "properties infinitely vary in processes". For example, hitting another rock, hitting a bird, hitting a molecule of air, hitting a different molecule of air, being used by a person as a hammer, being used as a person as a paperweight, being used by a person as an art object, etc.

As you say, "as a property emerges as an event-dynamic and contextual", which cannot be argued against.

But you also say "The modality..............of a hammer is its "shadowy depth"..........objective and inaccessible in isolation"

If the modality of an object can only emerge within dynamic contexts, and there are an almost infinite number of possible dynamic contexts, this makes the modality of an object unknowable.

If the modality of an object is unknowable, then we cannot even talk about an object having a modality.

Then modality is an unknown unknown.

Because we don't learn to associate the word with one wavelength. We associate it with experiences, but those experiences reflect both physiological predisposition and cultural conditioning. Right? — frank

That's how I see it.

We are physiologically predisposed to see a family resemblance in the wavelengths from 625 to 750nm.

We are then culturally conditioned to call this family resemblance "red".

I think we just learn to associate a certain word with a certain range of visual experiences? — frank

Let the property of redness = {postbox, Northern Cardinal, sunset}

Suppose we are told to find another object, object X, that has the same property of redness and include it in an enlarged set.

All these objects emit different wavelengths.

How do we learn that object X has the same redness as a postbox, Northern Cardinal and sunset when it will be emitting a different wavelength.

Yea, but the OP wasn't saying that the set of red things is a definition of red. It was saying the set is redness because it has all the instantiations if it. — frank

Yes, for the OP:
Property redness = {postbox, Northern Cardinal, sunset}

Nelson Goodman proposed that "red" doesn't name a universal redness, but just applies to an object:
Red = {postbox, Northern Cardinal, sunset}

But it seems that the same problem applies to both. We understand the LHS by the elements in the RHS, but the elements in the RHS are determined by the LHS.

Bertrand Russell's Type Theory does not seem to negate this circularity.

One solution is the brain's ability to find family resemblances in different objects. Necessarily a meta-linguistic solution (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations)

Are there other solutions to avoiding this circularity?

I think you mentioned the choice: extension/intension? I suppose the latter is a proposed solution to: "we must know the set of red things before we can include an element in the set?" — bongo fury

My solution is that it is a feature of the brain that a person can discover family resemblances in different things. For example, a postbox and Northern Cardinal share a family resemblance, and this particular family resemblance has been named "red"
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/1010119

Which isn't a problem (requiring a solution) in natural language. Usage there is guided by exemplification. See Goodman's Languages of Art which cashes in on the theoretical economy of analysing properties (or sets) away as predicates. — bongo fury

Suppose a person sees a postbox and a Northern Cardinal. Goodman says "red" doesn't name a universal redness, but just applies to an object. In ordinary language, I can understand a person applying the word "red" to a postbox emitting a wavelength of 650nm, but how do they know to apply the same word to a different object, a Northern Cardinal, emitting a different wavelength of 700nm?

In formalised languages, sure. The circularity is famous since Russell B. — bongo fury

In formal language, Russell's problem of sets of all sets that do not contain themselves can be formally resolved, such as by using the axiomatic Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory.

But the same problem remains. In the set of red objects R = {postbox, Northern Cardinal}, we understand red by the elements in its set, but we must know that an element is red before putting it in the set.

"Being an instance of redness" seems to be a property of all instances of redness, yet it seems to be a different property than redness itself. — litewave

"Being an instance of redness" is not a property.

"Being an instance of redness" is referring to a particular instance, which is a single concrete thing, as in "the first instance of seeing a Northern Cardinal in the wild".

The Northern Cardinal may be red in colour, but "being an instance of redness" is referring to the instance not the colour.

"Being an instance of redness" is an element of the set.

The property redness = {being an instance 1 of redness, being an instance 2 of redness, being an instance 3 of redness}.

Note
Has anyone addressed the core problem of circularity. We understand the property of redness by the elements in its set, but we must know the property of redness before we can include an element in the set?

This is an intensional definition of a set, a definition by specifying a common property of the set's elements. An extensional definition of a set would be a definition by listing all the particular elements. — litewave

Also:
Extensional definition of Ship = {ferry, tankers, icebreakers}
Intensional definition of Ship = {large boat, travels on water}
===============================================================================

What about these two: the property of redness, and the property of being an instance of redness (or the property of having the property of redness). Both properties seem to be instantiated in all instances of redness, so the instances form one and the same set. — litewave

A common example of coextensive properties

The property of "having a heart" = {human, dog, cat}
The property of "having a kidney" = {human, dog, cat}

True, a heart is a distinct thing to a kidney.

However, the above example is invalid, as a human can exist using an external dialysis machines. With medical progress, hearts and kidneys are no longer necessary to what makes a human.

Is "being an instance of redness" referring to one thing

Taken at face value, an instance is one particular thing. This infers that "being an instance of redness" is also one particular thing, meaning that it cannot be a property.

Therefore, the expression "the property of being an instance of redness" is not a valid expression.

Is "being an instance of redness" referring to several things

However, if "being an instance of redness" is referring to several things, as in "being an exemplification of redness", then it means the same as "redness".

"Being an instance of redness" and "redness" are then not distinct as a heart and kidney are distinct, meaning that "the property of redness" and "the property of being an instance of redness" is not an example of coextensive properties.

There may not be examples of genuinely different coextensive properties, meaning that it doesn't prevent us from associating a property with a set.

But now it seems that there are genuinely different coextensive properties, which would dash the hope of identifying properties with sets. — litewave

We learn the concept of an abstract property, such as redness, by discovering a family resemblance between a set of concrete objects in the world, such as a car, flower, cherry, sunset.

This set of concrete objects, being an abstract concept, is distinct from its concrete objects. In other words, the set is not contained within itself.

So it makes sense to identify properties with sets.

Are there really genuinely different coextensive properties?

Redness, then, is not inside the apple. It is born from the interplay of all three participants. — Astorre

Thing A is predisposed to emit a wavelength of 550nm, and an observer perceives colour X. Thing B is predisposed to emit a wavelength of 630nm, and the same observer perceives colour Y. Thing C is predisposed to emit a wavelength of 700nm, and the same observer perceives colour Z.

Although the observer perceives the colours X, Y and Z as different (there can be different shades of the same colour), the observer also perceives a family resemblance between colours Y and Z (such as the concept of redness).

If a person's intuitive grasp of a family resemblance between colours Y and Z is processual, a dynamic interaction between thing, light and observer, what is there in this dynamic interaction that causes the observer to treat colours Y and Z as being different in some kind to colour X (red rather than green)?

As an analogy, my feeling of pain when touching a hot radiator is not caused by the interaction, but is caused by my internal disposition to feeling pain when touching a hot object. An objective, existing mode of my being.

Now you are assuming a force without acceleration, a force which is counteracting gravity to create an equilibrium. — Metaphysician Undercover

Within general relativity, Einstein's Equivalence Principle shows that being at rest in a gravitational field is equivalent to being accelerated. (Wikipedia - Equivalence Principle)

I suppose one issue might be circularity. How do you know what belongs in a set? — Count Timothy von Icarus

One possible solution to the problem of circularity.

Suppose the property of redness = {red car, red building, red book}. We understand the property of redness by the elements in its set, but we must know the property of redness before we can include an element in the set.

Suppose there are many different objects of many different colours.

It is a feature of the human brain that a person can discover family resemblances in different things. We cannot explain how the brain does this, but we know that it does.

The family resemblance may be the colour red, being large in size, being angular in shape, being distant from the observer, etc.

Family resemblance is a term used by Wittgenstein on his book Philosophical Investigations 1953.

If a person does discover a family resemblance, this becomes a concept, such as the concept of redness, largeness, angularity, etc.

This concept of redness is abstract and singular, and is different in kind to the concrete instantiations in which the brain discovers family resemblances, such as red car, red building, red book, etc. The property of redness is distinct from its set of concrete instantiations.

Calling these objects a set is an acknowledgement that they are parts of a whole, they are parts of the concept of redness.

This can be formalised as redness = {red car, red building, red book}.

In other words, a red car has the property of redness.

The circularity is broken by the ability of the brain to discover family resemblances in different things.

I think we had this discussion before. In general relativity, gravity is not a force. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not say that in general relativity gravity is a force.

I wrote: "According to general relativity, an apple on a table is subject to a force and because subject to a force is therefore accelerating, actively accelerating."

I am saying that the apple remains on the table because the table is exerting an upward force that stops the apple from falling

Even in general relativity there are forces.

I propose that the set of all red objects is the property "redness" but this property probably does not look red, in fact it probably does not look like anything that could be visualized because it is not an object that is contiguous in space or time — litewave

A football team is a set of football players. An example of a set that does not contain itself.

Football team = {player 1, player 2, player 3,............................player 11)

A football team is a distinct thing to 11 football players. 11 random football players does not make a football team. These 11 football players have to work together in order for there to be a football team.

In naive set theory, sets can contain themselves. However the Axiom of Foundation in Zermelo-Fraenkei set theory states that sets cannot contain themselves, in order to avoid Russell's paradox. An example of a set that would contain itself would be a set of sets.

ZF ensures that things like football teams are more than a random collection of football players.

I will stick to Copilot's analogies.

The football team is like a container within which are football players. Such containers are distinct to what is being contained.

In addition, the football team may be thought of as Frege's sense and the football players as Frege's reference. Sense is also distinct from reference.

In addition, within Wittgenstein's language game, the football team may be thought of as a concept and the football players as the context of the concept. Concepts are also distinct to their contexts.

A football team is an abstract entity, whilst the football players are concrete entities.

Generalising, an abstract thing, such as a football team, is a set of concrete things, such as football players.

Equivalent examples would be:

A University (an abstract thing) is a set of buildings and teachers (concrete things)
University = {university building 1, university building 2, teacher 1, teacher 2}

The property redness (an abstract thing) is a set of red things (concrete things)
Redness = {red car, red book, red apple}

Am I right in agreeing with you that the property of redness is the set of all red things?

I did say earlier that there are good grounds for saying that the mind is existentially dependent on the brain etc., but that nature of this dependence is not yet clarified. — Ludwig V

My belief is also that the existence of the mind depends on the existence of the brain, and the nature of this dependency is still in doubt, as you say.

My working hypothesis at the moment is panprotopsychism, the view that fundamental physical entities are protoconscious.

From the fact that I am here, I can reliably infer that I was born. I can also infer reliably that I will die.................. In a normal context, the answer would be 93 million miles from the earth...................................What earthly use is a map if you cannot relate it to what it is a map of? Is it perhaps possible to look at the world indirectly? — Ludwig V

As an Indirect Realist, I agree with your inferring. I can infer a cause for my sensations, indirect rather than direct knowledge.

I see a broken window and can infer what broke it.

From the appearance of something bright and yellow and the experience of something hot in my senses I can infer the existence of the sun. From other appearances and experiences, I can infer the existence of an Earth and a Sun that is 93 million distance from this Earth.
===============================================================================

Mental objects such as appearances, experiences, concepts are not physical objects, so do not occupy space. — Ludwig V

It depends on one's position regarding the mind-body problem.

My position is more Physicalism than Dualism.

As Peter Lloyd writes in his article Is the Mind Physical?: Dissecting Conscious Brain Tissue

The mind-body problem has remained essentially unchanged since Descartes put it forward in 1641. The problem is: what is the nature of the conscious mind, and how does it relate to the body?

Today, the prevailing view is that the mind is really a physical phenomenon going on inside the brain. I shall call this view physicalism. It contrasts with two other broad views: dualism – which says the mind is irreducibly different from the brain; and mentalism – which denies the existence of the brain altogether.

The apple is in a static condition, the state of being on the table, for a duration of time. By what premise do you conclude that it also takes part in activity? — Metaphysician Undercover

According to general relativity, an apple on a table is subject to a force and because subject to a force is therefore accelerating, actively accelerating. (Wikipedia - g force)

A set is a different object than any of its elements. But if the box is black then it also contains instances of blackness, not just redness. For example the walls of the box may be black. Your example looks like the property of redness contained in a black box. — litewave

Consider the singleton set containing one element, such as Socrates = {Socrates}.

From Zermelo-Fraenkei set theory, no set can be an element of itself, meaning that a singleton set {Socrates} is distinct from the element it contains, Socrates. (Wikipedia - Singleton (mathematics))

Does this not mean that saying the box can only be black if it contains instances of blackness violates the Zermelo-Frankei set theory, in that the singleton set must be distinct from the element it contains?

IE, thinking about set theory, a black box would then not be distinct from the instances of blacknesses within it.

I don't know, but am curious to know.

I am proposing that we could plausibly identify a property with the set of all things that have this property. — litewave

I am just wondering:

Suppose only three things in the world have the property of redness.

Consider the set {red car, red apple, red book}

It seems that a set is not the same thing as the elements within the set, as a box is not the same as the things inside the box (an analogy given by Copilot). For example, even though all the things inside the box are red, the box itself could be black.

So to say that we can identify a property with the set of all things that have this property may be like saying we can identify the property of redness with something that is black.

Is this valid?

I am proposing that we could plausibly identify a property with the set of all things that have this property. — litewave

This seems a similar concept to using set theory to define the natural numbers.

Frege and Russell proposed defining a natural number n as the collection of all sets with n elements.
Wikipedia - Set-theoretic definition of natural numbers

A static state of existence, even if temporary, is very distinct from an activity. In no way is a static state a part of an activity, as there is a causal relation which separates the two. A cause is required to bring the static thing into an active situation. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are assuming that instants of time, static states of existence, are metaphysically possible.

Henri Bergson is one philosopher who argued that time is not a series of discrete, measurable instants but is a flow of durations. (Wikipedia - Duration (philosophy))

Alfred North Whitehead believed that if we denied the possibility of instants of time, this would solve many philosophical puzzles. (https://whiteheadresearch.org/)

For example, if there are instants of time, and if the apple is on the table at one instant in time, where is the cause that ensures the apple is still on the table an instant of time later. In the absence of any cause, this would mean that time will stop.

It is more likely that there are not instants in time but rather durations of time. It would follow that the apple being on the table is part of an active situation.

Are you saying "is on the table" is an activity? In predication the verb "is" does not express an activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Even though the verb "is" expresses a state of existence, the phrase "is on" suggests a temporary situation, as in the apple is on the table, the apple is under the table or the apple is on the floor.

The apple currently being on the table is part of an active situation.

What I'm trying to point out is that, whatever mental object you posit in my head, the actual work is done by my mind, interpreting, applying and so forth. Those activities - skills - are what matters. The mental object doesn't actually do anything. — Ludwig V

Yes, to express a complete idea, a sentence needs both a verb (an activity) and generally a noun (object).

There is no complete idea in "apple", but there is in "the apple is on the table".

As Wittgenstein wrote in Tractatus "the world is the totality of facts, not of things", where "the apple is on the table" is a fact because it encompasses relations between things.

If I want to find my way from A to B, I can use a map - a representation of the terrain. But it is no use to me unless I can read the map, and identify what point on the map represents where I am - I have to link the representation to what it is a representation of. — Ludwig V

This is from the viewpoint of a Direct Realist, who looks at both the map and directly at the actual world and compares the two.

But for the Indirect Realist, they only have the map. They cannot directly look at the actual world to compare it to the map.

If we know that we don't know reality, we know it from our concepts, experiences, and what appears to us. Yet that's not what they tell us. All three of these concepts announce, quite clearly that they are about something. We have a concept of tables, our experience are experiences of chairs, and what appears in the morning is the sun. They are not identical with their objects, but they are existentially dependent on them. So denying the reality of those objects, or claiming that we don't know those objects, denies their reality. — Ludwig V

Where is this reality?

There are appearances in our five senses, such as seeing a circular shape. We have experiences through these five senses, such as seeing the colour yellow and feeling hotness.

Our five sense are between our minds and a reality the other side.

We can interpret these appearances and experiences and derive the concept of a sun.

As you say, we accept that our concept of the sun is not identical with its object, in that our mind, contained within our brain, being of the order 30cm diameter, is less than the 1.39 million km diameter of the sun.

As you also say, our concept of the sun is existentially dependent on its object.

The question is, where is this object? Where is this sun?

As an Indirect Realist, from appearances and experiences in my senses I can infer that their cause was the fact of there being a sun in reality. But this can only be an inference.

But you seem to be saying that we don't just infer but know for a fact that there is a sun in reality when you say "So denying the reality of those objects, or claiming that we don't know those objects, denies their reality."

But how can we know without doubt the cause of the appearances and experiences in our senses?

As an Indirect Realist, this is not a problem. I simply name the unknown cause of my appearances and experiences after the appearances and experiences themselves, such that I name the set {appearance of a circular shape, experience of seeing the colour yellow, experience of hotness} as "sun".

As an Indirect Realist, I believe there is an unknown fact in reality that has caused these appearances and experiences in my senses, and this unknown fact in reality I simply name "sun". But this "sun" is no more than the name of the set of appearances and experiences in my senses.

But if you are saying that the sun is a fact of reality, how do you know?

The flow of information in a causal chain is directional. Forwards in time, a single cause determines a single effect. Backwards in time, a single effect may have multiple cases. Forwards in time, a stone breaks a window. Backwards in time, how can anyone know that the cause of a broken window was a stone or a bird when the observer was not present when the window broke?

How can you know the cause of an appearance or experience in the senses when no one cause is necessary but many possible causes are contingent?

Hardly anyone today would defend the crude “objects exist only in the mind” version of indirect realism, or the equally naïve “mind is a passive window” version of direct realism. — Wayfarer

However, I do think that there is a distinct division between some people who believe in an absolute sense that tables and chairs do exist in the world, and who may be called Direct Realists, and some who believe in an absolute sense that tables and chairs only exist in the mind as concepts, and who may be called Indirect Realists.

As an Indirect Realist I also fully support Enactivism, in that the human mind has evolved in synergy with the world. The human mind is not separate to the world, but is a part of the world. But even so, my Enactivism does not change my belief that tables and chairs only exist in the mind as concepts.
===============================================================================

So the “overpopulation” worry—that there are too many relations to count as real entities—may dissolve once we stop treating relations as if they were objects alongside atoms and tables. They're on a different plane altogether. — Wayfarer

Even if we stop treating relations as if they were objects, how should we treat them?

Relations may be on a different plane, but where exactly is this plane?

Has anyone ever seen a relation existing independently of the human mind?

What do relations in a mind-independent world actually do? What purpose do they serve?
===============================================================================

Color doesn’t exist “in the world” in the same way as a wavelength does, but it is also not merely mental — it’s a mind–world hybrid. — Wayfarer

I agree with Kant's concepts of Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism.

We may have the subjective experience of seeing the colour red. The scientist may point out that when someone says that they see the colour red, they may be looking at a wavelength of 700nm.

The situation is, as you say, a mind-world hybrid. If there was no wavelength of 700nm we would not see the colour red, and we would not see the colour red if there was no wavelength of 700nm.

But a hybrid mind-world does not mean that the colour red, as we subjectively experience it, exists in the world in any way.

We could define a wavelength of 700nm as being the colour red, but this does not mean that a wavelength of 700nm "is" the colour red, where "is" is that of identity.

What we know as the subjective experience of the colour red may exist in the world, but if it does exist in the world, it must exist as a thing-in-itself, and therefore in Kant's terms, unknowable to us.
===============================================================================

So you’re right to notice that “relations” aren’t as straightforward as they seem, but I’d caution against setting it up as “either in the mind or in the world.” They belong to the very interface where mind and world meet. — Wayfarer

I agree that there is an interface where mind and world meet, but there are two different directions, from the world to mind and from the mind to world.

From the world to mind, I cannot know what is in your mind. I cannot know whether your subjective experience of the colour of a red postbox is the same as mine.

From the mind to world, I only know phenomenological appearances. I cannot know what caused those appearances.

There is an interface between mind and world, but it is an interface that blocks the passage of knowledge across it.

You may say, for example, that we have the knowledge that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, but this knowledge still exists in the mind, not in a mind-independent world.

A table consists of various parts, suitably organized. In the real world, the organization is called a design. — Ludwig V

Does this not mean you can be thought of as a Direct Realist, in that objects such as tables exist in the real world.
===============================================================================

What matters is the "over-population". I don't see why "over-population" is a problem. Where does anything say what number of relations there should be in the world? — Ludwig V

If relations ontologically exist in the world, then between every single elementary particle and force in the Universe there is a metaphysical relation.

As four things give rise to six relations, there are more relations than there are things.

This means there is a vast number of metaphysical relations in the Universe. A significant over-population of metaphysical relations in the Universe.

I agree that over-population in itself is not problematic.

But what exactly are these metaphysical relations doing? What purpose do they serve? Are they needed? Wouldn't the Universe carry on equally as well if there were no metaphysical relations? By Occam's razor, let's get rid of the ontological existence of relations in the world.
===============================================================================

If the relations occupy space, they cannot be in the mind. If relations are even located in space, they are not in the mind. — Ludwig V

As with Kant's things-in-themselves, if relations existed in the world but not the mind, how could we know about them?
===============================================================================

One could even argue that it (physics) is impoverished because it can't recognize colours, etc. — Ludwig V

Does the colour red exist in a mind-independent world?

How can the mind ever know what exists in a mind-independent world?

Physics is only a tool of the human mind. If the human mind cannot logically know what exists in a mind -independent world, then neither can physics.

It is not the case that physics is impoverished, but rather the fact that the mind cannot logically know what exists outside itself.
===============================================================================

Where is the design of the table or chair? — Ludwig V

In the human mind.

Are you saying that tables and chairs exist independently of the human mind?

Even if tables and chairs existed independently of the human mind, their design would still exist in the human mind that created them.
===============================================================================

The distinction between table and chair is not arbitrary — Ludwig V

I agree. They have different functions.

But these functions are human functions,

Suppose a table and chair existed next to each other in a mind-independent world. Assume that they are made up of atoms (in the old sense of fundamental parts).

What in a mind-independent world would "determine" whether a particular atom belonged to the chair or the table?

Suppose an alien visited from Alpha-Centauri, how would they know that one set of atoms should be related together in what we call a table?

Suppose the table lost one atom, would it still be a table? Who would make the judgement in the absence of the human mind?

We don't experience tables and chairs through representations of them. If we can't compare a representation with the original, there is no way to know whether it is truth or illusion. — Ludwig V

As an Indirect Realist, I would say that tables and chairs only exist as concepts in my mind. They are representations of something in the world, as the word "house" functions as a representation.

I agree that as we cannot compare a representation in our mind with the original in the world. There is no way of knowing whether tables and chairs do actually exist in the world.

You say "But I don't think I'm a Direct Realist"

If we don't experience tables and chairs through representations of them, how do we experience them?

Do you think that tables and chairs exist in a mind-independent world?
===============================================================================

The concept of a table is not a table. — Ludwig V

I agree.
===============================================================================

I have never managed to work out what "direct experience" means. — Ludwig V

But you said that "Relations are not unlike the lines of latitude and longitude. If those lines don't exist in the world, how can they enable navigators to know where they are in the world?"

Doesn't that mean that navigators have "direct experience" of the lines of latitude and longitude existing in the world?

How can the navigators know about the lines of latitude and longitude existing in the world if they don't have "direct experience" of them?
===============================================================================

That we can perceive objects-in-the-world, and how they are related does not mean that they exist in the mind. — Ludwig V

Perceive can mean i) perceive in the mind, as in "I perceive Mary is bored" ii) perceive through the senses, as in "I perceive a loud noise".

I agree. For the Indirect Realist, that we can perceive through the senses appearances of things-in-the-world does not mean that these things-in-the-world exist in the world. For the Indirect Realist, the concept of tables exists in the mind even if tables don't exist in the world.

However, in order to perceive the appearances of things-in-the-world, something must exist in the mind.

This relates to the homunculus problem. A machine making an image of an image would lead into infinite regress. I agree that the machine does not need to form an image of an image in order to recognise it. Similarly with humans, in that I don't need to form a representation of a representation in order to perceive it.

Are you saying that can we perceive things-in-the-world without something needing to exist in the mind?
===============================================================================
To be continued:

Just because you might have perceived erroneously that Mary is bored, it doesn't follow that you cannot depend on your understanding. — L'éléphant

"Esse est percipi" may be translated as "to be is to be perceived".

Presumably, "to be" is referring to the world

But there are two main meanings of "perceive". Something in the mind "I perceive that Mary is bored" and something through the senses "I perceive a loud noise". From Merriam Webster Dictionary, "perceive" may mean i) to attain awareness or understanding of ii) to become aware of through the senses

Is "is to be perceived" referring to something in the mind or something through the senses?

Problems arise if "is to be perceived" is referring to something in the mind rather than through the senses.

Just because I perceive something in my mind doesn't mean that it is a fact in the world. I perceive that Mary is bored and I may be right or I may be wrong. There is no logical reason to believe that just because I perceive something in my mind then it must be a fact in the world .

It seems more likely that "is to be perceived" is referring to something through the senses.

The answer depends on what you mean by your question......................................However, one might start by asking whether A and B exist in the mind, the world or both. — Ludwig V

"Esse est percipi" may be translated as "to be is to be perceived". Are the relations we perceive perceived only in the mind or perceived of the world through the senses?

Do relations exist in the mind, the world or both?

If relations existed in the world but not in the mind, as with Kant's things-in-themselves, we would not be able to discuss them, as we would not know about them.

For the Indirect Realist, objects such as tables and chairs only exist in the mind and not the world. The Indirect Realist believes that they don't experience the world as it really is, but only through representations of it.

For the Direct Realist, the experience of tables and chairs in the mind is a direct experience of the same tables and chairs that exist in the world. The Direct Realist believes they experience the world directly, and there is a direct correspondence between their concept of a table and the table in the world.

An object such as a table exists as a relation between the parts that make it up.

For the Direct Realist, if the table exists as an ontological object in the world, then the relations between the parts that make up the table must also ontologically exist in the world. If ontological relations did not exist in the world then neither would the table ontologically exist in the world.

For the Indirect Realist, relations exist in the mind otherwise they would not have the concept of table, but relations between the parts in the world are unnecessary. There need be no ontological relations between parts in the world in order for the Indirect Realist to have the concept of tables and chairs.

The Direct Realist needs the ontological existence of relations in the world, whereas the Indirect Realist doesn't.

If it can be shown that ontological relations don't exist in the world, then Direct Realism is no longer a valid belief.

As you say "Counting relations is not as straightforward as it looks." A relation suggest two things. There is the relation between a table and a chair. But there is also a relation between the table top and its legs. But then again there is a relation between the atoms that make up the table top. And there is a relation between the elementary particles and forces that make up an atom. There is an "overpopulation" of relations.

As you say "Existing in both the mind and the world is hardest of all to understand. Does it mean that there are actually two relations? Which of them is the real one?" This is a problem for the Direct Realist as the relations in the world are duplicated in the mind, a case of "over-determination". For the Direct Realist, which are the real relations, the ones in the world or the ones in the mind. But this is not a problem for the Indirect Realist, in that the real relations are the one that exist in the mind.

You ask "Relations are not unlike the lines of latitude and longitude. If those lines don't exist in the world, how can they enable navigators to know where they are in the world?" The colour red exists as a subjective experience in the mind but not the world. Scientists point out that when someone says they see the colour red, in the world can be a wavelength of 700nm, and in a wavelength of 700nm no colour red can be found. A driver sees a red traffic light and stops. Relations don't need to ontologically exist in the world in order for there to be lines of latitude and longitude as the colour red does not need to ontologically exist in the world in order for there to be traffic lights.

You say "I'm very puzzled by the question where relations - even spatial ones - are. I don't think there is an answer to it. But it doesn't make any sense to me to deny that they are in space (the clue is in the name), even if we can't assign an exact location to them." This raises one problem. How can we know that relations exist in the world if we don't know where they are. If there is a relation in the world between A and B, and the relation cannot be found in A, the relation cannot be found in B and the relation cannot be found in a section of space between A and B, then why should we think that there are relations in the world at all.

In summary, the ontological existence of relations in the world is unnecessary, as Indirect realism, a valid theory of perception, does not require them. In addition, if relations did ontologically exist in the world, further problems would arise, including mereological overpopulation, the arbitrariness of determining the existence of objects, the question of whether a relation can exist independently of what it is relating and any scientific explanation of their nature alongside fundamental particles and forces.

Therefore your proposed analogy is false. — Metaphysician Undercover

Probably. My basic idea is sound, but I am making a hash of explaining it. I will take a break and have a re-think. :smile:

I don't think so. "2+3" has its meaning, and "5" has its meaning. The two are distinct. The left side of an equation always means something different from the right side, or else the equation would be totally useless. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly, fulfils the definition of a metaphor.

A metaphor is a figure of speech that describes one thing as if it were another.

For example, saying "time is a thief" or "2+3=5".

Berkeley's Absolute Idealism
"Esse est percipi" may be translated as "to be is to be perceived". Abstract perceptions in our minds, such as "I have an indescribable inchoate feeling", may be made concrete by perceptions through our senses, such as "I feel I am aimlessly drifting". Making the abstract concrete is a function of the metaphor.

The metaphor
We understand abstract ideas by making them concrete, as described by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their book Metaphors We Live By 1980. For example, we understand the abstract concept of argument by making it concrete, as in "argument is war". We understand an abstract feeling by making it concrete, as in "I am feeling low".

We understand the abstract concept of 2+3=5 by the concrete picture of 2 pebbles next to 3 pebbles and seeing a total of 5 pebbles. We can formalise the addition of pebbles on the ground using set theory, such that {2} + {3} = {2 + 3} = {5}.

Set theory
Frege and Russell proposed defining a natural number n as the collection of all sets with n elements. Set theory is foundational to mathematics. Set theory provides a framework whereby operations such as addition can be built from first principles (Wikipedia - set theory)

The abstract addition of the natural numbers 2 and 3 can be achieved within the framework of a set theory that is built on concrete first principles, similar to the function of the metaphor.

Huh? I only see one thing, "the combining of sets". And that is how you defined "+". Where is the other thing, which makes it metaphorical? — Metaphysician Undercover

The most basic interpretation of addition is in the combining of sets.

When two or more sets are combined into a single set, the number of objects in the single set is the sum of the number of objects in the original sets (Wikipedia - addition).

Addition is a metaphorical concept, because one thing, namely 2 + 3, refers to a different thing, namely 5.

do the fundamental particles and forces contribute to the higher order of a 'table'? If no, then the forces and particles aren't really doing anything... — Barkon

If fundamental particles and forces did not exist in the world, there would be no concept of "table" in our mind.

Our mind projects our concept of "table" onto the material of the world, as you project the concept of the letter "E" onto a set of points.

The letter "E" does not exist in these points, though you would not see the letter "E" if it were not for these points.

Similarly, the table does not exist in the fundamental particles and forces, but you would not see the table if it were not for these fundamental particles and forces.