Whatever the things are in-themselves is entirely impossible to know. — Bob Ross

This is the position of the Indirect Realist. The Direct Realist would say that things-in-themselves are possible to know, as the world we see around us is the real world itself, where things in the world are perceived immediately or directly rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence.

We can talk about things-in-themselves even if we don't know what they are

There are many passages in the Fourth Paralogism of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason where the thing-in-itself is declared to be the cause of appearances.

For example in A199/B244: Now if it is a necessary law of our sensibility, thus a formal condition of all perceptions, that the preceding time necessarily determines the following time (in that I cannot arrive at the following time except by passing through the preceding one), then it is also an indispensable law of the empirical representation of the temporal series that the appearances of the past time determine every existence in the following time, and that these, as occurrences, do not take place except insofar as the former determine their existence in time, i.e., establish it in accordance with a rule. For only in the appearances can we empirically cognize this continuity in the connection of times.

When we perceive the colour red, there is the appearance of the colour red in our sensibilities, which we can reason to have been caused by a particular thing-in-itself. When we perceive the colour green, there is the appearance of the colour green in our sensibilities, which we can reason to have been caused by a different particular thing-in-itself.

It is true that we cannot know the thing-in-itself that has caused our perception of the colour red, but we can reason that it is different to the thing-in-itself that has caused our perception of the colour green.

We may not know what the thing-in-itself that caused our perception of the colour red, but we can reason that it exists, and we can reason that it is a different thing-in-itself to what caused our perception of the colour green. We can name the unknown thing-in-itself that caused our perception of the colour red as R, and and we can name the unknown thing-in-itself that caused our perception of the colour green as G.

The names R and G are not descriptions, as a description of an unknown thing-in-itself would be impossible, but they are, as Wittgenstein says in Philosophical Investigations, replacements for the unknown thing-in-itself. As with the Beetle in the Box, PI 293, this allows us to talk about unknown things-in-themselves.

For the Indirect Realist, thing-in-themselves may be impossible to know, but we can talk about them.

There is experience, therefore something exists. — Bob Ross

As an Indirect Realist, I agree.

As both good philosophy and good science are founded on sound logic, your argument aiming at being logical is as much science as it is philosophy.

Odd, isn't it, that when some folk discover that the chair they are sitting on is composed of atoms, and is overwhelmingly space, they sometimes decide that therefore it's no longer really a chair. — Banno

It depends whether one is an Indirect or Direct Realist

My belief is in Indirect Realism, whereby our ideas of objects existing in a mind-independent world are interpretations of sensory input derived from a mind-independent world that is real. I also believe that Kant and @Bob Ross can be said to be Indirect Realists.

I am sure that your belief is in Direct Realism, whereby objects in a mind-independent world are perceived immediately or directly rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence

Odd, isn't it, that millions of years ago even before there were folks, lakes and seas existed, even though there was no mind present at that time able to judge whether a large stretch of water was a lake or a sea.

Odd, isn't it, that millions of years ago even before there were folks, that the colour red existed, even though there was no mind present at that time able to judge a similarity in the wavelengths of 620nm to 750nm.

Odd, isn't it, that that millions of years ago even before there were folks, there were rocks that could function as either a table or chair, even though there was no mind present at the time able to judge whether the rock functioned as a table or chair.

As lakes, seas, the colour red, rocks, tables and chairs only exist as concepts in the mind and names in language and don't exist in a mind-independent world, they cannot be perceived immediately or directly in a mind-independent world as required by Direct Realism.

Direct Realism is invalid as one cannot perceive something immediately or directly in a mind-independent world if that something doesn't exist in a mind-independent world.

Yes, but not for scientific reasons. — Bob Ross

What non-scientific reasons are there to hold the view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework.

I am starting to embrace transcendental idealism, — Bob Ross

Am I right in thinking that your position is that of Indirect Realism, as described by the Wikipedia article Direct and Indirect Realism

Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework.

When an object changes from existence to non-existence (the book on the table),  the property of the object changes from extension to non-extension. — Corvus

On the desk is a book. One could say that the book exists because the atoms that make it up exist in different locations, for example, atom A and atom B. One could also say that the desk exists because the atoms that make it up exist in different locations, for example, atom C and atom D.

The mind connects atom A and atom B as being part of the object book, and also connects atom C and atom D as being part of the object desk. Therefore, these objects, the book and the desk, exist in the mind.

But outside the mind, what connects atom A to atom B but not to atom C?

If there is nothing outside the mind that preferentially connects atom A to any other particular atom, then objects as we know them don't exist outside the mind.

Outside our minds, atoms exist but not objects (treating the "atom" as a figure of speech for something that does physically exist)

Objects as a concept in the mind don't exist outside the mind, meaning that we can perceive something as existing in the world that in fact doesn't exist in the world.

IE, we perceive something where in fact there is nothing.

You can perceive the essence of the Absolute Nothingness via Husserl's phenomenological method called Bracketing, which is to bracket the distracting details of the perception such as the book, existence, the table ...etc, and just concentrating on the subjective experience of Absolute Nothingness - i.e. {the non-existence} of the book at that moment of your perception. — Corvus

There seems to be a family resemblance between Bracketing and Nominalism.

Wikipedia - Bracketing (Phenomenolgy)
The preliminary step in the philosophical movement of phenomenology is describing an act of suspending judgment about the natural world to instead focus on analysis of experience.

Wikipedia - Nominalism
In metaphysics, nominalism is the view that universals and abstract objects do not actually exist other than being merely names or labels.

But the universe will contain no objects, — universeness

As a Nominalist, rather than a Platonic Realist, that's my present understanding of the universe today, in that there are no such things as objects in the world outside the mind. What we perceive as a book only exists in the mind. What exists in the world outside the mind are elementary particles and elementary forces existing in time and space.

Let's ignore language or communicating with others. Do you think it's possible for an existent to perceive 'nothing?' internally? — universeness

Or if there was a book on the desk this morning. You saw it there lying on the desk. But when you saw the desk when you returned home from the town after few hours of errands, it has gone. There is nothing on the desk....................At that moment, in your mind, you have the feeling or perception of "absolute nothingness" about the existence of the book. — Corvus

A book at one moment in time can only exist in one location. For example, in the morning, it exists on the desk. But in order for it to exist on the desk, it cannot exist anywhere other than on the desk, for example, under the desk or ten metres to the right of the desk.

As I perceive the book existing on the desk, at the same time, I also perceive the book as not existing under the desk.

Generalising, to be able to perceive something somewhere, I must be able to perceive nothing somewhere else.

What are the counterpart words for "car", "book" and "Coca Cola"? — Corvus

For Derrida, the meaning of a word derives from how it contrasts with other related words.

In this instance "car" contrasts with bicycle, train and pedestrian. "Book" contrasts with film, ebook and radio. "Coca Cola" contrasts with orange juice, Pepsi Cola and water.

From the Britannica article on Jacques Derrida
Building on theories of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, Derrida coined the term différance, meaning both a difference and an act of deferring, to characterize the way in which linguistic meaning is created rather than given. For Derrida as for Saussure, the meaning of a word is a function of the distinctive contrasts it displays with other, related meanings. Because each word depends for its meaning on the meanings of other words, it follows that the meaning of a word is never fully “present” to us, as it would be if meanings were the same as ideas or intentions; instead it is endlessly “deferred” in an infinitely long chain of meanings. Derrida expresses this idea by saying that meaning is created by the “play” of differences between words—a play that is “limitless,” “infinite,” and “indefinite.”

There is a table in front of me. On the left there is not a unicorn and on the right there is not something.

As there is no logical necessity that a word such as "unicorn" refers to a thing that exists outside of language, there is also no logical necessity that a word such as "something" also refers to a thing that exists outside of language.

Regarding the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?", as we know that "something" and "nothing" exist in language, but cannot know whether something and nothing exist outside of language, our reply can only be in terms of language and not in terms of what may or may not exist outside language.

Why is there something rather than nothing? — Ø implies everything

"Something" and "nothing" are words. As only words that are part of a pair (more or less) have any use in language - hot/cold, up/down, sense/nonsense, good/bad - the fact that a word exists in language assumes it has a counterpart - something/nothing. If a word had no counterpart, it wouldn't be part of language in the first place.

IE, the reason there is "something" is that it has the counterpart "nothing". In other words, as Derrida might have said "vive la différence".

Could you then please explain how the brain generates the mind? Please explain in detail how can the mental can emerge from the physical. — Corvus

If I could explain that, then I would be world famous.

I feel that self is a special perception (apperception of Kant's term), that looks inwards into the mind, whereas all the standard perceptions look outwards into the external world. — Corvus

But dragging the brain into the Epistemic discussion has been always the same - nothing much in essence and nothing really fruitful to add into the conclusion apart from just muddling up the points. — Corvus

The self is a special form of perception which looks inward into your mind, being conscious of all the mental events taking place in your mind. The self perception would be invisible or unknowable by all your outward perceptions. It can only be intuited via mediation or self introspection. In that sense, it is transcendental in nature. — Corvus

If I correctly understand your position:
1) You distinguish between standard perceptions looking outwards into the external world, and special perceptions that look inwards into the mind
2) Within the mind are both inward and outward looking perceptions
3) The mind is somehow generated by the brain
4) The self is known by inward perception, and the self knows both inward and outward perceptions.

As both inward and outward perceptions are part of the self, then one would expect that the outward perceptions would know the inward perceptions, as they are both part of the same self. Yet you say that the outward perceptions don't know the inward perceptions.

Kant's apperception is not a special kind of perception, but is a unity of apperception that applies to all perceptions, whether inwards or outward looking.

A common epistemological question is the relationship between the mind and brain, the relationship between the mental and the physical, in asking how can the mental emerge from the physical.

If the physical brain is excluded from the epistemological discussion, then Realism is also being excluded from the epistemological discussion, as, in Realism, a material substance such as the brain does exist outside the mind.

The discussion then reduces to that of Idealism, in that there is no material substance outside the mind, no physical brain outside the mind.

When you say "all the standard perceptions look outwards into the external world.", if epistemology has been reduced to Idealism, then the external world would exist in the mind, meaning that all perceptions look inwards into the mind. In that event, any distinction between inward and outward looking perceptions disappears, such that the self does then become available to Kant's unity of apperception.

However, Realism and the physical brain cannot be excluded from the epistemological discussion.

So it is not very fruitful to bring the brain into the epistemological discussion yet until the sciences made some real progress on explaining the hard problems. — Corvus

As you wrote: The mind has two sides, i.e. the inside (self) and outside (perceptions for the external world).

The relationship between the mind and body, and how the mind can emerge from a physical brain, is part of the epistemological debate. To say that the physical brain cannot be brought into the epistemological debate is to take the side of Idealism, thereby excluding the possibility of Realism.

The Direct Realist would say that our perceptions of the external world are directly of the external world, rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence.

The Indirect Realist would say that our perceptions of the external world are not directly of an external world, but are directly of an internal representation in our mind of an external world. Such a representation may or may not directly correspond with the external world that is causing such representations

The Berkelian Idealist would say that the external world exists in the mind of God.

The Solipsist Idealist would say that the external world only exists in the mind of the perceiver.

The Realist would say that the external world exists independently of the mind. They are not Immaterialists, in that there is such as thing as material substance. They can be either a Monist, where there is only one fundamental substance, the mind/body, or a Dualist, where there are two fundamental substances, the mind and the body.

The idealist would say that there is no external world existing independently of any mind, and are Immaterialists in that there is no such thing as material substance

Personally, I am an Indirect Realist, Neutral Monist and Nominalist.

I feel that self is a special perception (apperception of Kant's term), that looks inwards into the mind, whereas all the standard perceptions look outwards into the external world. — Corvus

Light enters the eye from outside, is processed in the brain, and "I" perceive the colour red.

When "I" perceive the colour red, where is what I am perceiving exist.

I am indirectly perceiving light that exists outside in the world

But am I directly perceiving light that exists outside in the world, or am I directly perceiving a process happening inside my brain?

This idea is absurd in that, if all these ideas/concepts/mental objects are the self, then you end up having 1000s of different selfs. — Corvus

You used Kant's concept of Apperception when you wrote:
Idea or concept of self is a type of intuition or Apperception (in Kant's terms), that looks into the Mind.

The Wikipedia article on Transcendental apperception wrote:
Transcendental apperception is the uniting and building of coherent consciousness out of different elementary inner experiences (differing in both time and topic, but all belonging to self-consciousness).
1) All experience is the succession of a variety of contents (an idea taken from David Hume).
2) To be experienced at all, the successive data must be combined or held together in a unity for consciousness.
3) Unity of experience therefore implies a unity of self.
4) The unity of self is as much an object of experience as anything is.
5) Therefore, experience both of the self and its objects rests on acts of synthesis that, because they are the conditions of any experience, are not themselves experienced.
6) These prior syntheses are made possible by the categories. Categories allow us to synthesize the self and the objects.

It seems to me that the whole point of Kant's concept of the unity of apperception is the possibility of the unity in the mind of different experiences.

Is your understanding of Kant's apperception different?

So, the purpose of this thread is to explore those ideas/concepts/mental objects that might be required for the formation and sustenance of the self, assuming the self is contingent on previously formed concepts; — Daniel

At one moment in time, if I am conscious, I must be conscious of something, there must be an intentionality about my consciousness. For example, at one moment in time, I can be conscious of the concept circular shape, the concept of pain, the concept of the colour red and the concept of an acrid smell.

As regards my consciousnesses of the concept circular shape, at the same time not only am I conscious of a simple concept, a circular shape, but also I am conscious of a set of composite concepts, an arc at the top, an arc to the right, an arc at the bottom and an arc to the left.

As for my consciousness of a single concept, it may be the same for my consciousness of a set of concepts

For a single concept, at the same time I am conscious not only of a simple whole but also a set of composite parts. Similarly, for a set of concepts. At the same time I can be conscious of a simple whole, ie, a self, as well as a set of composite parts, ie, the individual concepts making up the whole.

From Kant, Hegel, and the Transcendental Unity of Apperception, by Kourosh Alizadeh, Hegel takes the basic Kantian idea of the original unity of apperception.

It may be that this unity of apperception becomes a single conscious self out of the many different concepts that we are aware of at any one moment in time.

IE, rather than certain ideas/concepts/mental objects pre-existing the self, these ideas/concepts/mental objects are the self.

I don't think this view is supported by the text. The complaints coming from Wittgenstein regarding the excesses of science as culture is expressed as an overindulgence in generalizations. No limits upon what science could actually produce were promulgated therein. — Paine

The Wikipedia article is about the Investigations. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein writes that whilst logic lies at the bottom of science, this is not the case for language and thought. IE, science and language/thought are different.

Where in the Investigations does he write about the excesses of science?

What I'm getting at, is I believe you can create a formal system that, in its axioms, defines the "laws of choice" that act on its fundamental objects, agents. These laws would of course be unchanging, unbreakable, and, in some sense, determine the proceedings of phenomena in this world. If this is indeed a possible world, what I have described is a deterministic world with the concept of free will embedded in the system, at the axiomatic level. — Jerry

I can imagine a world where there was an event yet nothing preceded it, ie, a deterministic world of free will. I can imagine a world where elephants were orange, could run at 100 km/hour and every afternoon would stop for a coffee at Pret A Manger.

Because I can imagine such a world, why would it follow that such a world is possible?

The complexity of 'philosophical' questions, that perhaps could be "shooed out of the bottle" is not the same as recognizing the complexity of the 'ordinary.' — Paine

As regards the Investigations, I read it more as an attack on "bad" philosophy than scientism.

I see the key to the Investigations as PI 43: the meaning of a word is its use in the language, and this is what the Investigations considers.

Scientism is a pejorative word. Scientism is an overconfidence in the power of science, trying to explain all experiences in mechanical terms rather than accepting them as part of the inexplicable wonder and mystery of life. I am sure that the majority of scientists are also opposed to scientism. Though if anti-scientism was taken too far, beliefs such as astrology, witchcraft and aliens in Mexico would be excluded from scientific investigation and blindly accepted as fact by the un-philosophical.

When someone says "I know your pain", Wittgenstein is not attacking the scientist for wanting to carry out experiments on the brains of the speaker and listener, but rather is attacking the "bad" philosopher for questioning such an expression in the first place. A "bad" philosopher being someone who attempts to discoverer something using language that exists outside of language, and is therefore logically outside of the ability of language to discover.

For Wittgenstein the meaning of "I know your pain" in our common sense and ordinary language is given within the context of the language game being used, and cannot be explained other than being part of its language game. In science it will be an axiom of a theory. In On Certainty it will be a hinge proposition, As he wrote in OC 501: 'Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described? You must look at the practice of language, then you will see it' . In the Investigations it will be what founds language. As he writes in PI 217 If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do.". These are not concessions to the scepticism of the "bad" philosopher, but are acknowledgements that most of our actions are normative.

In my terms, words such as "know" are figures of speech used in a non-literal sense. They can only be explained by understanding the wider context of the language game existing within a particular form of life. As "the language game" is a figure of speech, the "form of life" is a figure of speech, then also "know" is a figure of speech.

From what I have gathered, not only was Aristotle an advocate for using "theory" in way that Wittgenstein questioned but Aristotle considered himself able to distinguish the inquiries by kind. That endeavor is far removed from the criticism of 'scientism' put forward by Wittgenstein. And it is the matter of 'science' distinguished from philosophy that I directed my comments toward — Paine

The Investigations is not the work of a sceptic, but that of someone confidently expounding the theory that the meaning of a word is its use in the language. An approach more that of common sense than the metaphysical.

As Wikipedia in its article Philophical Investigations wrote:
The Investigations deal largely with the difficulties of language and meaning. Wittgenstein viewed the tools of language as being fundamentally simple, and he believed that philosophers had obscured this simplicity by misusing language and by asking meaningless questions. He attempted in the Investigations to make things clear: "Der Fliege den Ausweg aus dem Fliegenglas zeigen"—to show the fly the way out of the fly bottle.

I read Wittgenstein as being troubled in the vernacular of Plato more than confident in the way of Aristotle...................I don't understand how "common sense" is a given in the text. Many of the examples treat what is given as commonly understood as odd when looked at as general reference. — Paine

Wittgenstein is confident in the Investigations, in the way of Aristotle, that the role of the philosopher is to bring clarity to the ordinary use of language, rather than investigating the nature of reality.

As language is only capable of doing certain things, it is inevitable that outside what language can do there will be mysteries.
PI 38 For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday.

For Wittgenstein, the role of philosophy is to be able to think clearly and clear up confusions about words such as know, believe, desire, intend, think as they are ordinarily used, not about the nature of reality, not about the validity of Realism or Anti realism .
PI 126 Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us.

For Wittgenstein, the philosopher starts with language as it is ordinarily used, where the meaning of a word is its agreed use, and where language is grounded in common sense.
PI 122 A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words

It is true that he does give many examples, such as imaging people around me as automata, that are much discussed within philosophy, but is making the point that, as there are limits to what language is capable of, such discussions, being outside what language is capable of, become meaningless.
PI 420 But can't I imagine that the people around me are automata, lack consciousness, even though they behave in the same way as usual?................But just try to keep hold of this idea in the midst of your ordinary intercourse with others, in the street, say!............And you will either find these words becoming quite meaningless; or you will produce in yourself some kind of uncanny feeling, or something of the sort.

For Wittgenstein, problems arise when the philosopher tries to use language beyond what it is inherently capable of, and beyond the common sense use of language as it is used in the everyday.
PI 133 For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.

Does the ordinary user make this claim about aliens and Trump? There is nothing ordinary about that claim. — Fooloso4

It is the ordinary user of the language rather than the philosopher who puts demands on the words they use, for example, making extraordinary claims about aliens and Trump.

Assuming that we are both ordinary users of the language, you did write that "The problem is that the Trumpsters do not want to preserve democracy.", and many would say that this is also an extraordinary claim about democracy and Trump.

IE, it is the ordinary user rather than the philosopher who puts demands on our use of words such as "know".

It is not a matter of a misuse of a word but of a misguided demand being made on the concept "know" which leads to a denial that we know the things we know. — Fooloso4

It is more the ordinary user than the philosopher who puts demands on our use of the word "know" when, according to the Evening Standard, they might say things like:

"I know that Aliens exist and have deal with Donald Trump’ claims ex-Israeli space official. They don’t want to start mass hysteria. They want to first make us sane and understand. The UFOs have asked not to publish that they are here, humanity is not ready yet."

Having spent much of his time correcting philosophers he surely did know that they are not using terms in the ordinary sense. This is a mistake he attempts to correct by pointing to the ordinary use of terms such as 'know'. If they did not make these inordinate demands on language the problems that arise as a result would dissolve. — Fooloso4

It is right to point out when someone misuses a word, whether a philosopher or an ordinary man, because that is when problems arise.

But there is no one ordinary use of a word. A word can have a range of meanings, but such a range cannot be prescribed. The boundaries of the acceptable use of a word can be fuzzy. In effect, there is a family resemblance of different meanings about the same word. This family resemblance is impossible to be determined within a public language, but can only be determined in the minds of the individual users of the language. It is also the case that where each individual places the fuzzy boundary of meaning of a particular word is unique to that particular individual.

There is no ordinary sense of any word, something that is known to both the philosopher and ordinary man, as illustrated by Homer Simpson's remark that “Donuts. Is there anything they can’t do?”

Willfully ignore, or be autistically oblivious to? — wonderer1

According to www.grizzalan.com: Ludwig Wittgenstein was almost certainly autistic. Several notable psychiatrists, such as Christopher Gillberg in A Guide to Asperger Syndrome, have written extensively about the evidence backing this assertion.

As Wittgenstein writes in the Preface to the Investigations: After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed.

Wittgenstein refers many times to the ordinary use of a word: But do I parade the meanings of the words before my mind when I make the ordinary use of them?

In the Investigations, Wittgenstein seems to suggest that the ordinary man is only able to use words in the literal sense. Such that when the ordinary man says something like "I know your pain", the ordinary man is not aware that this is a figure of speech. It is then the philosopher who comes along and complicates matters by asking "how can I know another person's pain".

But it is surely the case that the ordinary man is well aware that some of the words they use are figures of speech, possibly metaphors and can only be understood in the context they are spoken. They don't need a philosopher to explain this to them.

In the Investigations, Wittgenstein seems to be making a distinction between the language of the ordinary man and the language of the philosopher, but surely he knew that this distinction didn't exist in practice in the ordinary people he came across in his daily life.

I think of incommensurability as the inability to describe the world in an older framework because there weren't even ideas for the new findings. — schopenhauer1

True, even though Einstein's theory may be incommensurable with Newton's theory, Einstein would be able to understand Newton's theory. However, Newton would not be able to understand Einstein's theory, not because he was intellectually incapable of doing so, but because he was not aware of Einstein's theory in the first place. One cannot know what is unknown.

As Wittgenstein wrote: If a lion could talk, we could not understand him. The incommensurability is in the alien nature of a being whose particular thoughts and feelings are more than likely incomprehensible to us.

This kind of incommensurability makes more sense for I think what you are saying with extreme relativism. — schopenhauer1

The Investigations discusses human language, and because of the similarity between humans - all descended form the same Mitochondrial Eve - even though human language may vary, any difference may be explained within Moderate Relativism.

However between species, between humans and dogs, between humans and Martians, differences between languages are probably so great that they can only be explained by Extreme Relativism.

It just takes a generation or two of users of the language game to make it an informal rule of that game. — schopenhauer1

Yes, when someone says "here is one hand", the hidden rule is that this is a hinge definition not a description, and as a definition is founding the language of which it is a part.

My point about hinge propositions was that language itself can be studied further as to why we have language games, how it developed, what part of the brain is involved, how it evolved differently from other animals, what its evolutionary use was, etc. — schopenhauer1

There are two main theories as to how language evolved, either i) as an evolutionary adaptation or ii) a by-product of evolution and not a specific adaptation. As feathers were an evolutionary adaptation helping to keep the birds warm, once evolved, they could be used for flight. Thereby, a by-product of evolution rather than a specific adaptation.

Similarly for language, the development of language is relatively recent, between 30,000 and 1000,000 years ago. As the first animals emerged about 750 million years ago, this suggests that language is a by-product of evolution rather than an evolutionary adaptation.

As with Kuhn's paradigms, evolution can be rapid. For example, even though it may have taken 100 million years for feathers to have evolved in order to keep the animal warm, it could only take a week for the animal to discover that it can use these feathers for flight.

Presumably, things like tool use, hunting, understanding the social standing of others was an evolutionary pressure and an effect of having the ability to be able to collaborate in a space of shared intentionality. — schopenhauer1

Yes, Language can only be understood by knowing not only what it is but also why it is as it is. The Investigations may have asked questions about what it is, but would have been more rounded if it had asked questions about why it is as it is.

For example, animals like dogs have a great capacity for associative learning. Is associative learning a substrate for linguistic learning, or is it another mechanism? — schopenhauer1

Personally, I believe associative learning is at the foundation of language. In other words, Hume's theory of constant conjunction. This is the relationship between two events, where one event is invariably followed by the other: if the occurrence of A is always followed by B, A and B are said to be constantly conjoined. As described by the Lancaster University article on Hume, our belief in causality is a projection onto the world of a habit of our minds.

In the case of language, I see many different particular examples of things in the world and discover a family resemblance between them. I can then name this family resemblance "slab", but noting that it is not the case that any particular example has been named "slab", but rather the family resemblance between them has been named "slab". In other words, a constant conjunction that originates in the mind when observing two seemingly different events occurring in the world.

Apes can make tools, but it dies out in a generation. T — schopenhauer1

Yes, language is crucial in sharing knowledge between different individuals. Even though Caesar died more than 2,000 years ago, I still have knowledge of him through the medium of language. I can have intentionality about something by description about which I have no knowledge by acquaintance.

Did verbs come first, or nouns? — schopenhauer1

By looking at many examples of physical things or physical events that exist in the world , when we discover a family resemblance between them, we can give this family resemblance a name such as "slab" or "running". The same principle applies to both, things that exist at one moment of time such as the object slab or things that exist through time such as the event "running".

Both verbs and nouns exist in the form of physical things, regardless of whether they exist at one moment in time or through time.

Michael Tomasello's intentional theory of language — schopenhauer1

One feature of evolution is the human propensity to form into groups or tribes. This is an understandable evolutionary trait allowing us to maximise our co-equal co-ordination. But as Tomasello points out, human evolution has not caught up with the sheer number of humans on the planet, such that the actual number of humans today is more than what any individual has been evolutionary programmed to cope with. This must inevitably lead to strife between these tribes, not as a result of deliberate intention on the part of the individuals but because it is in their evolutionary makeup.

I don't think Witt was posing any kind of failure to learn and perform language games, though this may break down for various participants in various contexts (people who are not academically trained in theoretical mathematics might not understand much from a theoretical math lecture aimed at mathematics professors, for example). — schopenhauer1

The position of the Investigations is clearly that of Moderate Relativism, as Wittgenstein discusses different types of language games, such as that of the philosopher and that of the ordinary man.

But Wittgenstein seems to wilfully ignore what the ordinary man knows. When the ordinary man says "I know your pain", Wittgenstein treats this as a literal belief on the part of the ordinary man, yet even the ordinary man knows that he is using this as a figure of speech in place of "I believe you are in pain". The ordinary man knows that when I see you behaving in a particular way, and as I behave in the same way when I am in pain, I thereby infer that you are also in pain. Even my grandmother who left school at 14 knows that the expression "I know you are in pain" is being used figuratively. Yet Wittgenstein seems to take it as literal when said by the ordinary man.

Even the ordinary man knows that one word can have different meanings, in that that slab can mean cake in a bakery and concrete on a building site. The ordinary man knows to use the word appropriately in different situations. It is more the case that these so-called language games dissolve into one, and within this one language game an individual word may have more than one meaning.

Perhaps Wittgenstein should also have tried to come up with a few answers to his questions in order to make a more rounded case. For example, the nature of cause and effect. If I observe someone behaving in a particular way, this is presumably the effect of a cause, and even though the cause may be unknown, we know that there must have been one. Even an unknown cause can be named, in that the name "pain" is not the name of something that is inherently unknowable, but is the name of an effect that is directly knowable.

But this is not something Wittgenstein does, making his work incomplete and thereby ultimately unsatisfactory.

But of course, that is just grounding an "is" with an "ought". That is to say, because we need to "get shit done to survive", thus all our inquiry stops about what grounds reality. But Wittgenstein might turn that around again and say, "There is no problem with inquiry, as long as it is "useful" for the game you want to play called "philosophy"". And I'm afraid that's all you're going to get as far as Wittgenstein and philosophy's value, perhaps. — schopenhauer1

As you say, first we come up with a few questions (which the Investigations does do), then we hypothesise a theory or two (which the Investigations doesn't do) and then we test out our hypotheses by comparing them to what happens in the world (which the Investigations doesn't do).

Extreme Relativism

Taken to its extreme, in Extreme Relativism, in Cognitive Relativism, each language game is autonomous, and in Kuhn's terms incommensurable. Not only can the user of one language game not be able to judge a different language game, but also the user of one language game would not be able to contemplate any meta-language game. The user of a scientific language game would not be able to judge the religious language game, and the user of the philosopher's language game would not be able to judge the language game of the ordinary man. Such would be exemplified by the instance of showing Hemingway's The Old Man and the Sea to either a dog or cat, who would not even recognize that there was a different language game to the one they know. As Wittgenstein wrote: If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.

Moderate Relativism.

But in practice, there is Moderate Relativism, a Cultural Relativism, where individuals often have different roles within their community. Sometimes a chef, sometimes a builder, sometimes the ordinary man and sometimes the philosopher. As a chef, "slab" means a cake, as a builder "slab" means a block of concrete, as the ordinary man "slab" means slow, loud and bangin and as the philosopher, "slab" means a section of critical text. The meaning of a word then depends on which particular role the individual is playing at the time: PI 156 The use of this word in the ordinary circumstances of our life is of course extremely familiar to us.

The Investigations must be Moderate Relativism

The Investigations must be that of Moderate Relativism, in that different human language games are referred to, such as those of builder, the teacher, philosopher, the shopkeeper and ordinary man. As different language games are referred to, this cannot be the position of Extreme Relativism where the user of one language game would not be aware of the existence of a different language game. Wittgenstein refers to these different language games when he wrote: PI 116 What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.

Within Moderate Relativism, there are many language games. Each Language Game has its own Form of Life, each language game has its own set of grammatical rules, each language game has its own truth, and the meaning of a word depends on its context within its language game . Each language game has a foundation that cannot be justified but must be accepted, and are, in effect, hinge propositions
PI 217 If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do."

The Investigations in moving between Language Games must be that of Moderate Relativism, whereby all Forms of Life are cognitively accessible. The problem is, of course, is that we don't know what we don't know, as was the case with the dog or cat when presented with a copy of a Hemingway novel, in that there may well be a language game outside of ours whose existence we cannot even contemplate.

I was thinking that Wittgenstein meant the content of the thought (like your Martian example) more than belief about the nature of the content, — schopenhauer1

There may be a problem if thought and content of thought are separated. I have the thought "I am in pain". If the content of the thought is "I am in pain", this leads to PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

If the thought and content of the thought are separate, this leads to infinite regression, in that if the content is "I am in pain", then what is thinking "I am in pain" .

Perhaps in order to avoid infinite regression it is best to say that the thought IS the content.

This is similar to when @Banno wrote: The picture can be seen in different ways, and so does not, as it where, give the meaning of what is pictured. That is found in what is done with the picture.

Perhaps it is not the case that the picture gives a meaning to what is pictured, but rather the picture IS the meaning.

I would say this is accurate though Witt doesn't seem to discuss "ability of the mind", which makes it as I said mainly about "inside politics of language use" rather than a theory proper. — schopenhauer1

Yes, he is describing something that depends on the mind but avoids talking how the mind works. A little bit of science would have helped.

That family resemblances exist, as I see how he is presenting it, is not a positive theory for epistemology, but rather a negative theory of opposing a certain view that words correspond to exactly one kind of meaning. — schopenhauer1

I look out of the window and see a "tree", but no two trees on Earth are identical. Every tree is different in some way to every other tree.

In one sense "tree" has a single meaning as a concept, yet in another sense has many different meanings, an Oak Tree, a Yew Tree, an old tree, a short tree, a green tree in the summer, etc.

There seems to be an ability of the brain to discover family resemblances in things in the world that are different yet have something in common. It is because of this ability we have concepts.

I can only see this ability as a positive thing. Why would Wittgenstein see it as a negative thing?

Meaning becomes a sort of emergent phenomenon (he doesn't use that word I don't think), by way of the community's acceptance of the word as being referred to that. — schopenhauer1

Yes, being born into a community where the word "tree" has an accepted meaning, I have to follow convention if I want to fit in with society. The individual generally has to comply with the wishes of the majority.

But all this being said, my particular critique is that Witt insufficiently posits his theory because it is very common sensical. — schopenhauer1

Yes, my belief is that every paragraph of Investigations should be read from a common sense point of point, as I am sure that is what Wittgenstein intended,.

The problem is the inherent ambiguities in language , where one word can have several meanings and the context is often unclear. There is always more than one way to read a paragraph

I'm not sure we should take the advice as regards Wittgenstein of Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley who argued in their essay "The Intentional Fallacy" that "the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art".

I think when interpreting one of Wittgenstein's' paragraphs we should always look for the simplest, most straightforward and most common sense reading, in other words what Wittgenstein calls the "good philosopher" rather than the "bad" philosopher who creates problems out of nothing.

@schopenhauer1

Could you please scan the following for anything you think is not logical:

As shown by PI 293, it seems that it is not only private beliefs about private sensations such as pain that fall out of consideration in language but also private beliefs about public objects such as slabs

Language is grounded on the ability of the animal (and human) mind to perceive family resemblances in several different physical things in the world. It is the family resemblance that is named, not one particular example of it. For example a family resemblance of slabness can be named "slab", a family resemblance of wincing behaviours can be named "wincing behaviour", which in practice can be replaced by the figure of speech "pain". The Platonist would say the family resemblance exists in the world independent of the mind. The Nominalist would say that the family resemblance exists in the mind as a concept and is projected onto things that exist in the world.

The Investigations discusses family resemblances, but doesn't discuss why there are family resemblances. IE, the Investigations doesn't ground language.

PI 293 proposes that the private belief in private sensations such as pain drops out of consideration in language. One can extrapolate this and propose that private beliefs in public objects such as slabs also drop out of consideration in language
PI 293 - the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant

It is a fact that individuals with different private beliefs are able to successfully communicate using one language. For example when the foreman says to the assistant "bring me a slab" and the assistant brings a slab, this is regardless of whether either the Foreman or assistant are :

i) a Berkelian Idealist - where a slab is an idea in a mind
ii) A conceptualist - where the slab exists as a concept in the mind
iii) A Nominalist who accepts the ontology of relations - where a slab exists as a momentary set of atoms related to each other
iv) A Nominalist who doesn't accept the ontology of relations - where a slab exists as a momentary set of atoms independent of each other
v) A Platonist - where a slab that exists in the world as a universal
vi) An Anti realist - where a slab that exists in the world because it exists in the mind
vii) A Direct Realist - where a slab that exists in the world
viii) An Indirect Realist - where a slab exists in the world as a representation in the mind

Therefore, the meaning of the word "slab" in the sentence "bring me the slab" cannot be the private belief of either the foreman or the assistant, but can only exist in the language itself, as language is agnostic about the private beliefs of the users of the language .

In fact, for the foreman, a "slab" could mean a blue Martian with purple ears and for the assistant a "slab" could mean a giraffe with orange legs, but as private beliefs of private sensations and private beliefs about public objects drop out of consideration in the language game, when the foremen says "bring me a slab", the assistant will bring a slab.

Therefore the meaning of the word "slab" doesn't exist in any user of the language but exists within the language itself, as Wittgenstein wrote
PI 43 - the meaning of a word is its use in language

This doesn't mean that language exists as a Platonic Form independently of its users, as the language was created by its users. But it does mean that language is independent of the private beliefs of its users. Language is grounded in the ability of the mind to discover family resemblances in different physical things in the world. These different things can then be given a public name by one or more individuals within the language community. One should note that it is the family resemblance that is being named, which for the Nominalist is a concept in the mind, not any particular physical thing in the world.

The "common factor" is what is done with the utterance. — Banno

I agree that a word wouldn't be in language in the first place if it didn't have a use, An almost infinite number of words could be created, but only about 170,000 of these possible words have been found to have a use to the users of the language.

So it is true that only words that have a use to the users of the language mean anything to the users of the language. As Wittgenstein wrote: PI 43: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

As only those words that have a use to the users of the language are included within language in the first place, even though every word has a meaning, ie, it has a use, to say that a word has a meaning becomes redundant. As Wittgenstein wrote in PI 246:"It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?".

As you wrote: "As if our words all have meanings apart from what we do with them."

However, there is a difference between a word having a potential use and a word having an actual use. I can learn the meaning of words to which I don't have an actual use for. For example, I may know the meaning of "transmission", as "acts as the medium that transmits power generated by the engine to the wheels via a mechanical system of gears and gear trains.", even if I never use such knowledge.

Every word in language has a potential use, otherwise it wouldn't be in language in the first place, but to any particular individual, even though they may know the meaning of these words, only some of these words ever have an actual use.

Obviously not. — Banno

I wrote "These two minds are independent of each other". If two minds are not independent of each other, is telepathy a possibility one should consider?

The slab does not exist only in the mind, nor only in the world. You seem stuck on this false dichotomy. — Banno

I think a large part of the philosophical problem is that any word can have more than one meaning, and it is not always clear from the context which particular meaning is intended.

For example, the word "slab" in the sentence "The slab does not exist only in the mind, nor only in the world."

Using inverted commas as used by Davison "snow is white" is true iff snow is white, where a word in inverted commas refers to language and without inverted commas refers to the world (ignoring the question of where the world actually exists, whether inside language or outside language).

For example, "slab" could refer to:
i) the concept "slab" that exists in the mind to a Conceptualist
ii) a slab that exists in the world as a particular to the Nominalist who accepts the ontology of relations
iii) a slab that exists in the world as a particular to the Nominalist who doesn't accept the ontology of relations
iv) a slab that exists in the world as a universal to the Platonist
v) a slab that exists in the world because it exists in the mind to an Anti realist
vi) a slab that exists in the world to a Direct Realist
vii) a slab that exists in the world as a representation in the mind to an Indirect Realist

As the Britannica article on Relation between mental and physical events wrote
For the later Wittgenstein and many philosophers influenced by him, the proper role of philosophy is not, as it was for Russell, to develop theories in answer to philosophical problems but to clear up the conceptual confusions through which philosophical problems arise in the first place. These confusions invariably come about through misunderstandings of the complicated ways in which terms with philosophical import—such as know, believe, desire, intend, and think—are used in everyday life.

The question is, which slab is being referred to?

I think the history of events surrounding the Rosetta Stone shows hieroglyphics to have been language even when no one in the world understood the interpretation of the language. — wonderer1

As you point out, the common factor is a mind.

The patterns of ink on paper in the form - b r i n g m e t h e s l a b - can exist independently of any individual, and could still exist even after every individual had disappeared from existence.

However, language requires a mind, whereby a particular pattern, such as - s l a b - represents something else, such as a large, thick, flat piece of stone or concrete, typically square or rectangular in shape.

For example, I could see a stick on the ground, but we wouldn't say that this was a language. However, if I thought of the stick as representing the straightness of the path that I should be taking, then in becoming a symbol it becomes part of language.

I don't think that a pattern in itself can be a language. Only when a mind turns the patterns into representations of something else can the patterns become part of a language.

I'd suggest that language can exist in different physical forms with no need to appeal to Platonic entities. — wonderer1

If everyone who had used the language disappeared from existence, and all that was left were patterns of ink on paper, would these patterns of ink on paper still be a language if there was no one who knew what these patterns of ink on paper meant?

Depends on your flavour of antirealism. But the label is not important, so much as the content....the world is such that we can treat part of it as a slab, allowing us to talk about them and move them around.................We don't "create" the slab – that's the idealist error. Nor are there no slabs until we start to talk about them – the nominalist error. — Banno

From Tarski and Davidson "the snow is white" is true IFF the snow is white. Using the inverted commas in a similar way, "there is a slab in the world" and there is a slab in the world.

I am curious as to your take as regards Anti realism. If "the slab" is considered as a concept that exists in the mind, does the slab exist as a particular, existing "in itself", or as a universal, existing "in" something else? (Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy)

Searle might say that this sort of thing counts as a slab; that sort of thing counts as a block. The assistant gets to recognise the difference not by any internal, private process, but by getting a clip around the ear when they bring the wrong one. Of course, that does not mean that there are no internal processes. Just that "slab" is public. — Banno

On a building site are millions of objects, such as workbenches, trucks, chairs, sandwiches, mugs of tea, slabs blocks, cranes, doors, windows, etc. The Foreman says to the assistant "bring me a slab".

If the assistant can only learn what a slab is by taking random things to the Foreman in order to see the Foreman's reaction, then learning what a slab is will take an inordinate amount of time. Presumably, once the assistant has learnt what a slab is, the next time the Foreman says "bring me a slab", the assistant will be able to take a slab to the foreman the first time asked.

I prefer the pointing method, where the foreman points out several examples of slabs to the assistant until the assistant has learnt the concept of "slab". Then as soon as the foremen says "bring me a slab", the assistant is able to take a slab to the foreman the first time.

In neither case, the clip over the ear method or pointing method, does the assistant learn the meaning of "slab" by using the slab. In the first method, the assistant doesn't know they are taking a slab to the Foreman. In the second method, the assistant learns the meaning of slab before using it.

Why must language exist within the individuals - why not between them? — Banno

Consider the sentence "bring me a slab". Where does it exist?

If there were no individuals, then it couldn't exist. We know it could exist if there were only two individuals.

The question is, if there are only two individuals, where does the sentence "bring me a slab" exist ?

It cannot exist in the space between the two individuals as some kind of Platonic entity independently of either individual, but can only exist in the minds of the two individuals.

I assume that we don't believe in telepathy, such that each mind exists independently of the other.

Therefore:
1) We know that the sentence exists in the mind of the first individual and it exists in the mind of the second individual
2) These two minds are independent of each other
3) Therefore a sentence can exist in one mind independently of any other mind
4) If a sentence can exist within the mind of an individual, then also can a language, as a sentence is a very short language.

IE, a language must be able to exist within the mind of an individual in order for a community of individuals be able to share this language.

I'm not putting forth my own belief about language; rather, I'm presenting this hypothetical scenario to critique Wittgenstein's idea that language use is sufficient as a foundation. The main point is to stress the necessity of a robust foundation for language, especially if we claim it's rooted in community or "Form of Life." — schopenhauer1

Wittgenstein writes that the meaning of a word is its use in language:
PI 43 the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

Language has a use in the world:
PI 1 Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked "five red apples". He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked "apples"

But Wittgenstein in the Investigations doesn't say where this world exists, in the world of Realism outside language or in the world of Anti realism inside language.

As @Banno wrote: Wittgenstein to a large extent set up the discussion of realism/anti realism in the nineties and noughties.

As the IEP article on Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) wrote: Both Realism and Anti-Realism, though, are theories, or schools of theories, and Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the advocacy of theories in philosophy.

Therefore, if you want a theory explaining the true foundation to language, the Investigations is not the place to look.

So far all of this is trivially true. — schopenhauer1

Yes, the philosophy of the common man, which was, it seems to me, Wittgenstein's goal in the Investigations.

Imagine I produce a bunch of what appears to you as random symbols. And I proceed to tell you that this is a language. If you ask, “how do you use these symbols”, and I reply, “I cannot tell you how to use them, but rest assure I know how to use them in similar ways as how you use your language, and thus it is a language. — Richard B

The fact that I have my own language does not mean that I can of necessity understand another's language. For example, Egyptian scripts couldn't be translated until the discovery of the Rosetta Stone.

The Rosetta Stone was written in 196 BC in Ancient Egyptian hieroglyphic, Ancient Egyptian Demotic Script and Ancient Greek It was found in Egypt in 1799 by a French Officer during the Napoleonic campaign, and taken to London in 1801. The Greek text was translated in 1803, enabling a translation of the Egyptian scripts in 1822.

If there’s no foundational criteria, public cases cannot truly be “corrected” either. — schopenhauer1

Critiquing Wittgenstein's Investigations:

The public language is founded on private languages

From the position of Nominalism, if all the individuals within a community disappeared, no community would remain. With the disappearance of the community, language, thought, meaning and rules would also disappear.

From the position of Platonic Realism, if all the individuals within a community disappeared, there would still be a community, and there would still be language, thought, meaning and rules. Personally I find the idea of Platonic Realism incomprehensible, unless someone can justify it as a possibility.

As a Nominalist, language, thought, meaning and rules are not external to the individuals who make up the community, but are internal to the individuals who make up the community.

Therefore language within a community can only exist within the individuals who make up the community.

Therefore any public language must have been created by the individuals who make up the community.

But for an individual to be able to take part in creating a public language, they must first have the ability to be able to manipulate language within themselves.

The ability of an individual to be able to manipulate language within themselves independently of a community can be called a private language.

IE, without a private language a public language would not exist

Therefore any public language within a community must have been founded on the private languages of the individuals within the community.

An individual may be corrected by a public language, but recognising that such a public language has previously been collectively corrected by the individuals who make up the community.

Yes, without the foundation of private languages, a public language cannot be corrected.

Writing "S" in one's diary when experiencing the sensation of S

PI 258 is not how one names personal sensations. If I want to name my toothache, I don't point at my inner sensation of a toothache and write "T" in my diary. I point at my outward pain behaviour, such as wincing, rubbing my face with my hand, refusing to drink anything cold, putting a hot water bottle on the affected part, etc, all behaviours distinct to having a toothache.

This outward pain behaviour is visible to not only me but others, and can be given the name "toothache".

Note that the name "toothache" doesn't directly refer to the inner sensation, but to the outward visible behaviour. As humans naturally assume that an effect must have had a cause, they naturally assume that a particular visible behaviour has had a particular cause, which is unknown in this case. As humans also conflate the name of the cause with the name of the effect, and although the toothache pain behaviour has been named "toothache", this also becomes the name for the unknown cause. IE the word "toothache" refers to not only the visible toothache pain behaviour but also the unknown cause.

It is a public language that has the memory of the connection between toothache pain behaviour and the name "toothache", both things that physically exist in the world.

A child can then learn the word "toothache" by being pointed at the connection between toothache pain behaviour and the name "toothache"

Note that the child cannot learn such a connection from a single example, but only from many examples, where every example is different but all share a family resemblance.