Thank you for posting Brenden, I will try to address your points the best I can.

I typically think of values as being arbitrarily asserted, so, it is more natural for me to make the claim, "It is possible to claim that existence is net good without contradiction," than to prove, like you appear to have done, that existence must be good if morality exists at all. — Brendan Golledge

Those two statements don't appear to be that far off. If existence is good, it must exist without contradiction. A contradictory existence is an existence which eliminates itself.

I have 2 more similar arguments: It appears that only living beings have the experience of "good" and "bad" (this observation is so fundamental, you might actually define life as being those things which have preferences). — Brendan Golledge

The middle part that you skipped covers this. I'll summarize it here. What we find is the math results in a hierarchy of existence pound for pound. First there is non-living matter. Than chemical reactions. Then self-sustaining chemical reactions (life), then intelligent life, then societies of intelligent lives. So while we will generally do more good in helping people, we should be conscious about the actions we do to unintelligent life as well. They matter as well.

The hierarchy also reveals one more thing. Its more existence for all levels to be able to co-exist in harmony then one of those hierarchies to simply destroy the lesser. If there comes a case in which there is an either or, one man or a society, one goat or a man, we choose the hire level of existence to save. But optimally we remove the either or. Both living is optimal.

The second argument comes from evolution/game theory. It seems to be necessarily true that those moralities which are good at propagating themselves will become more common, and those that are less good will not propagate themselves. I like to call this "God's morality", because assuming that God made the world the way he likes, then God likes moral beings to try to propagate themselves and their morality. This is the morality that WILL BE. — Brendan Golledge

Interesting take! I would simply add those that propagate themselves without unnecessarily destroying everything around it. I give an example later on that sheep, if left unchecked, would eat all the the grass killing all the plants. This would then make all the sheep starve and die. But wolves check sheep to ensure they don't grow out of control. We achieve environmental homeostasis, which is the highest possible level of existence over time.

The second argument leads me to the idea that morality is enlightened self-interest. I am composed of several parts, including a body, mind, and "heart". I am also a cell within a social body, and I am incapable of propagating myself into the distant future by myself. So, it makes sense that I ought to take care of each of my parts: take care of my bodily health, educate my mind, try to find (or assert) the good, try to do good to my social unit, etc. This train of thought leads roughly to the standard morality that most people would recognize. — Brendan Golledge

The comprehension of morality would be enlightenment. Not only for our self-interest, but for the interest of every thing that exists.

I appreciate your comments! Let me know if you have questions.

So, the universe is still growing? — ucarr

I'm not sure what you mean. Does time continue? Yes. Is it necessarily the case that more first causes will happen? No. Is it necessarily the case that first causes won't happen? No.

So, a first cause may not trigger a causal chain? Should it instead be called a birth? — ucarr

It will always be part of a causal chain the moment after it exists. Just thing of time. At any moment in time, there is something prior that exists within the causal chain of the first cause up to the first cause itself.

do you acknowledge you also imply anything is possible? — ucarr

I imply that any first cause is plausible. It doesn't mean that any one specific first cause can imagine has actually happened or will actually happen. To specifically state, "This first cause must have happened" requires us to prove it exists/existed.

Do you acknowledge all possible inceptions implies contradictory inceptions can coexist, and thus the universe allows existence of paradoxes? — ucarr

Lets carefully define what we mean by a contradiction. A contradiction is often defined as "Two things that cannot coexist". So can two things that cannot coexist co-exist? No. Because that's what they are. Would there be things that might seem contrary to us? Yes. But if they both co-exist, they are not contradictions.

If you mean two things that cancel each other out, sure. Matter and anti-matter for example.

These two claims, taken to together, suggest first causes, if self-actualized, impose identities upon themselves. Do you agree this implies the universe comes into being as self-will unlimited? — ucarr

No. There is no prior imposition. Its just existence. Does an atom will itself to exist? It is by the forces outside of its control. A first cause does not need to have any imposition, consciousness, or awareness of itself. It simply is. Could a first cause come about that had what you note? Yes. But that is only one possibility, it is not necessary.

"That is really similar to a hydrogen atom and it creates other existences besides itself". Sure. But its not a hydrogen atom as we currently define it, because hydrogen atoms cannot do that.
— Philosophim

Explain how the above is not weakened by the existence of water, as well as the other organic compounds containing hydrogen? — ucarr

Because part of the definition of a hydrogen atom is that it can merge with 2 oxygen to create water. This is a set rule. That is part of how we identify a hydrogen atom. If a helium atom joined with two oxygen, it won't make water. That's part of its defined identity by us. If we did not discriminate between a helium and hydrogen atom in our definitions, and called them both a hydrelium atom, we could say such an atom could either become water or not when combined with 2 oxygen. It is our naming that determines how we categorize things, but the reality of what a thing is does not care what we call it.

I just noted that there is no limitation on what could incept as a first cause.
— Philosophim

...we do not identify a hydrogen atom as being able to create ex nihilo.
— Philosophim

How do you explain the above two quotes as non-contradictory? — ucarr

I'm going to repost a quote from a few replies back:

Even if you're not talking about cosmic first cause and instead are talking about one of the subsequent first causes, why must cosmic cause acting without limitation incept a subsequent causality that resembles human logical thinking.
— ucarr

To detail into this, lets say a hydrogen atom appears as a first cause and causes another hydrogen atom. Whether we observe this or not is irrelevant, it is the reality of the situation. To cause something means there is some rule that indicates why the thing caused happened. Meaning, causal logic will always be in play.

If a hydrogen atom appears as a first cause then a helium atom appears as a first cause, the hydrogen atom did not cause the helium atom to appear. So you see, it is impossible for something which causes another to be free of causal logic. The first cause is not free of causal logic either, it is the start. — Philosophim

To state something arises 'ex nihilo' is to state it arises without prior cause. If a first cause, causes something else to appear it does not appear 'ex nihilo'. It arises due to the first cause, and not simply from nothing.

a first cause must act causally
— Philosophim

Do you agree the above contradicts:
A first cause does not necessitate that it be able to do anything.
— Philosophim

I think there's a difference between saying, "There's a reason for everything" and then spelling out what that reason is or how it must unfold.
— Philosophim — ucarr

No, can you add a little more to what you mean here?

Do you agree that:
...because all things are possible as first causes, its equally possible a hydrogen atom, as we identify it, just forms and exists as normal. There is not the need for anything out there...
— Philosophim

does not spell out what the reason is or how first causes unfold? Do you see that, instead, it's presented as a axiom from which your thesis proceeds. As such, it says in effect, eventually everything will be everything because things, like hydrogen, simply are. — ucarr

No, I don't see that conclusion at all. First causes have no prior cause for their existence, yet what they cause can be traced back to that first cause. There is great meaning in cause, which we use today. None of what I'm stating invalidates the scientific method.

Do you see that this -- the core of your thesis -- precludes scientific investigation? — ucarr

No. I believe it may be possible in some instances for us to find a first cause scientifically. The bar for doing so of course is very high, and may be impossible in some situations. I also believe the consideration of first causes as a plausibility should be something to think about. But at the end of the day because the bar is so high, we keep looking for prior causes first.

I do not believe in self-evident truth. Truth is what is.
— Philosophim

Do you see that in the above quote, immediately following your claim to dis-believe self-evident truths, you support this claim with a self-evident truth: "truth is what it is"? — ucarr

Let me clarify. "Self-evident" means "human's can grasp them without needing to prove them". I do not believe in that. I believe in knowledge as the best logical means we have to make claims about reality that are not contradicted by the truth in our use. Truth exists despite what we conclude or think. If you've read my knowledge paper I linked you in another thread, you'll know what I mean.

As for axioms, I believe axioms must be proven, not 'given'. An axiom should be extremely easy to prove, and generally is something that no one has ever been able to demonstrate as false.

Do you accept that some major implications of your thesis include:

a) the universe allows paradoxes — ucarr

No, as covered above.

b) the conservation law re: matter-mass-energy, instead of actually being a law, is merely a plank within a working hypothesis still liable to refutation — ucarr

Yes, but all laws exist this way. Laws are generally so time tested and above reproach that we do not need to call them theories anymore. However, no law is immutable.

c) the universe, because it continues to incept new matter-mass-energy into itself, exists as an open system. — ucarr

No. I've said this several times now and its very important that you understand this. I am not saying, "X first cause happened, will happen, or has happened". Its possible, but it must be proven. It is equally as possible that no other first causes have happened, or will happen. You cannot predict if a first cause will happen. You must conclusively prove that a specific first cause has happened to say it has.

Let me sum it as simple as possible: "All possibilities does not mean any one thing happened or will happen". The only way to see what happened is to prove it. The only way to see what will happen is to live through it. I make no claims that any one particular first cause happened, only that its logically necessary that there must have been at least one.

OK, this is the last arrow in my quiver: Any theory in which time is an emergent property within must be a dynamical theory (for example the theory that explains nothing to spacetime). Time however is the main variable in any dynamical theory. This means that time has to be emergent and at the same time the main variable of such a theory. This is however problematic since time is required for the emergence of time. — MoK

Trying to throw in some extra vocabulary doesn't solve the issue. Lord knows its a common tactic among many on the forums. :D We should be able to explain everything in simple terms. Simply put, if your conclusion is part of your premises "that something cannot emerge within nothing" then its not a viable argument. Remember as well, time cannot exist on its own, so we always have to be referencing spacetime as well. Spacetime is a substance, not emergent.

There is simply no point before the beginning of time so we cannot say what is before the beginning of time. Think of the beginning of time as a solid and impenetrable wall. We cannot get through this wall and ask what is before. In fact, we are committing an error in saying what is before the beginning of time since before indicates the existence of a time before the beginning of time. — MoK

Again, the added vocabulary and sentence structure does not negate the simple fact. There was either something, or nothing. If you claim we cannot reference before spacetime, that means there was nothing before spacetime. If you claim spacetime always existed, then we have an infinite regress. There is no third option, just a desire that we not pick one of the two. 'Nothing' and 'something' are binaries. If there is not something, there is nothing. If there is not nothing, there is something.

Well, that, nothing to spacetime, cannot happen. I think we agree that spacetime is a substance. — MoK

I think you've made a pretty good argument so far, but here is where you're stuck. I think its fine to call spacetime a substance, but plugging it into the argument we haven't proven that spacetime cannot come from nothing. We never noted that substances couldn't come from nothing, only that they needed spacetime. Saying, "Nothing to spacetime cannot happen" is the conclusion, so we can't use it as a premise. We have to have true premises that necessarily lead to the conclusion being true, without the premises needing the conclusion to be true.

What is before the beginning of time and nothing to something are sides of the same coin. It is not proper to say what is before the beginning of time since there is no time before the beginning of time. — MoK

Here you run into another problem. If there is no time before the beginning of time (spacetime), then what is there? There can't be something that's different from spacetime because you required that spacetime exist for change to happen. And you can't have infinitely regressive time as you've already ruled that out. The only option left is that nothing was before spacetime.

‘Swelling’ certainly, as a word, refers to something spatiotemporal, but not what space nor time actually are. In order to understand space better, I have split, conceptually, the concept into two: purely relational vs. actual space (i.e., a pure relation or a substance). — Bob Ross

True, 'swelling' is more of an implicit intention. My point is I don't think you need to introduce space as a 'thing in itself'. Anytime we try to define a 'thing in itself" beyond the barest logical necessity of its existence, we have to remember that we can't. The thing in itself is beyond understanding, identification, or knowledge.

If space is purely relational, then the actual extension which is the form of your experience does not have a correlate in reality—it is just that: the form of your experience. — Bob Ross

What is it for something to be purely relational? We have to relate something. And that thing has to exist somewhere in some form.

However, that does not mean that space does not exist, as if it is purely relational then the spatial relations of an object are real properties of that object and are not, like nihilists or transcendentalists on space think, purely modes by which we intuit and cognize objects. — Bob Ross

Ah, that's your target. I don't think you need "a thing in itself" to prove this. All you have to note is that objects represent things in themselves, and that space is a property of objects. I mean, all you have to do to a nihilist is ask them to volunteer to have a rock dropped on them from above if they don't think its real. :D

If space is actual (i.e., a substance), then, effectively, the extension (i.e., the depth)(e.g., the swelling of something) actually exists in reality just as much as what you phenomenally experience. — Bob Ross

We can't conclude that about the thing in itself. What we can conclude is that if we judge space correctly, then for our viewpoint of reality, the thing in itself does not contradict our conclusion. Does that mean our understanding of space represents the thing in itself's entire space accurately? We can't know because we cannot identify or know a thing in itself beyond it correlation or violations of our perceptions and judgements.

A person who claims space and time are purely relational are claiming that the spatiotemporal relations between objects are real (just like the code in a video game gives reality to spatiotemporal relations in that game) but the actual extension and temporality are not (just like how the game could very well have no means of rendering any extension or temporal sequences for the player to see). — Bob Ross

That's just silly then. A good ol' rousing game of "Drop the rock" will cure that.

The logical necessity is basically that some 'thing' needs to be there for us to observe.

No. Logical necessity is when it is logically impossible to posit any contrary (i.e., one cannot posit any contrary without violating a law of logic): it has nothing to do with what needs to be there for us to observe. — Bob Ross

We can't observe nothing, so we have to observe something. That something is the 'thing in itself'. Our representations of that observation are the way we view the world. As such we can never claim to identify or know "the thing in itself" only our observations of it.

What you seem to be going for is whether spacetime is substantive or imaginative. Which is fine. I just wouldn't use the terminology 'the thing in itself' combined with any explanation of identity or assertions of what it must be. This sentence in particular:

I find it very plausible that spatiotemporal relations are real constraints and properties of the things in themselves. — Bob Ross

We can't ascribe properties to things in themselves. We can represent thing as having properties, and that may, or may not match a thing in itself. Such things are outside of our knowledge. Like I said, it was a quibble of terminology, not a disagreement with the overall intent of your points.

I think its clear that we've both said our piece at this point and no further value can be added to the discussion. I think its fair to say we agree to disagree. Catch you in another thread.

Do you accept the following argument: Since by definition a first cause can't have any derivative first causes, each first cause is a discrete causality chain, and therefore the universe is coming into existence sequentially in time, and thus the big bang and its inception of the entire universe in an instant is wrong. — ucarr

This is really close. Let me break it down to be sure.

"Do you accept the following argument: Since by definition a first cause can't have any derivative first causes"

Yes, agreed.

"Each first cause is a discrete causality chain"

Results in a discrete causality chain that can intersect with other discrete causality chains, yes.

"therefore the universe is coming into existence sequentially in time"

Yes. Just to make sure, this does not preclude other first causes appearing during this time.

" and thus the big bang and its inception of the entire universe in an instant is wrong."

No, I want to clearly state that I am not stating "X is an actual first cause". We don't know how many first causes have happened since the big bang. We're not even sure if the big bang itself is a first cause. All we can logically conclude that there must be at least one, and its equally as probable that there could be more than one.

But to see if I can tackle another idea I see you might be conveying, lets say the big bang was the only first cause. The first cause is the bang. Everything that happens immediately after that is caused by the bang. If no other first causes appeared and had causal associations with what appeared from the big bang, then there would only be one first cause of our universe, the big bang. That of course must be proven.

Would grant me that spacetime is a substance, nothing to spacetime is a change, and spacetime is needed for a change? If yes, then it is obvious that we are dealing with an infinite regress when we deal with nothing to spacetime. — MoK

So I think what you're going for here is saying we would need spacetime to be for spacetime to appear. But that doesn't really make sense right? If spacetime already exists, it doesn't need to create spacetime. The simplest and clearest statement is that "There was nothing, then spacetime". We don't violate that we need spacetime for change. Spacetime appeared from nothing, therefore change. So no, I don't see a reasonable infinite regress that makes sense here.

You did not prove that spacetime cannot come out of nothing.
— Philosophim
If you grant me that nothing to something is logically impossible and spacetime is a substance then it follows that spacetime cannot come out of nothing. — MoK

For the first part, if I were to grant you that nothing to something was impossible, that would preclude the conclusion. That's what we're trying to prove, so I can't grant you that before we've proven it. I can definitely grant you that spacetime is a substance, but I don't see anything here that grants that it cannot come out of nothing. Granted, it doesn't mean we can't still attempt the conclusion, but we need some other premise here for a logical proof.

If the universe had a beginning, what is there before a beginning? Nothing.
— Philosophim
It is not proper to say what was before the beginning of spacetime because you need other spacetime to investigate that. If there is such a spacetime then we are dealing with spacetime as a substance before the beginning of former spacetime instead of nothing. — MoK

I didn't quite get this. You don't need spacetime for spacetime. Spacetime either exists, or it does not. If we say there is a first or beginning, that means at one point it did not exist. Since we don't believe an infinite amount of time (which is a property of spacetime) has existed, then it means that spacetime has not always existed. Meaning that before spacetime, there must have been nothing.

This is a nice attempt, but its just an empirical observation of change withing spacetime.
— Philosophim
I cannot understand. Why the argument is an empirical observation?

What we haven't observed is if its impossible for spacetime to emerge from nothing.
— Philosophim
I already argue against that. — MoK

Because our logic comes from and involves things that already exist. No one has every empirically observed 'nothing' then seen something come from it. Meaning that so far we have not seen this happen. That's the best we can say. We can't say its impossible within our general meaning of the term, 'possibility'.

What i like to do for instances like these is introduce a new term, 'plausibility'. Basically we can logically imagine and conclude all sorts of things. But its not really 'possible' unless its been empirically observed at least once. Anything which could logically be but has not been empirically observed or denied would be 'plausible'. Thus it is plausible that spacetime came from nothing. Of course, it would be equally plausible, at this point, that spacetime has always existed. Since we have two competing plausibilities, and it is currently outside the realm of empirical verifiability, we must demonstrate that one of the arguments is implausible.

Yes, that is one explanation, something can simply exist without any cause. Spacetime is one candidate for such a scenario. — MoK

If something exists without cause, that means 'nothing caused it'. And I don't mean that nothing literally caused it, but that there was nothing, and then something.

That's not quite what I was going for. My point is that we would need spacetime to form at or slightly before something else. In other words, what your notion is proves is that any change from nothing to something must be the emergence of spacetime. You definitely give a valid argument that something cannot form without there being spacetime, but you haven't demonstrated in any logical proof that spacetime cannot emerge within nothing.
— Philosophim
That is impossible because spacetime is a substance. — MoK

All you've been able to logically note so far is that for change to occur, there must be spacetime. You did not prove that spacetime cannot come out of nothing.

There are two arguments against the infinite past — MoK

I don't disagree with you. I think ultimately the logic that there is an infinite past doesn't work out. Some people don't agree with me though, and I'm always open to being shown otherwise. :)

Therefore, the universe has a beginning. — MoK

If the universe had a beginning, what is there before a beginning? Nothing.

It seems to me that you can prove that these are the only 3 options, if you assume that logic is linear. Either causality is a ray (it has a beginning), or a line (it goes to infinity in both directions). If you admit the possibility of noneuclidean geometry, then the line could loop back into itself or cross itself (time travel). Actually, I just realized that there are 2 more options: there could be something without causality (a point), or nothing at all. But these other two options are not consistent with our sensory experience. — Brendan Golledge

True. And I never make a claim that my point is empirically proven, its only logic.

I find it useful, therefore, to assume that there is a first cause, which would be consistent with a creator God, because then I can start to imagine what the purpose of the universe is. I don't see a way forward (with respect to having a moral foundation) if the causality of the universe is infinite. — Brendan Golledge

I have another thread where I'm exploring an objective morality with another fantastic poster, Bob Ross. Its evolved and become more clear than my initial post, but perhaps it might interest you to check it out. Long story short, existence is what is good, and ensuring the most realized and potential existence is what is best. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14834/a-measurable-morality/p1

Why do you say above statement is not knowledge of the identity of the first cause? I ask this question because you identify first cause as what acts without limitation in causing the inception of creation. — ucarr

No, I did not claim a first cause is the inception of all creation. A first cause is the inception of a causality chain. The entirety of our universe may very well be explained by several first causes over time culminating in today. A first cause does not necessitate that it be able to do anything. I just noted that there is no limitation on what could incept as a first cause. But once its incepted, it is what it is, which is possibly limited.

If first cause proceeds without limitation, why do you imply that first cause, acting to cause hydrogen atom, must follow limits that humans use to make sense of the world? — ucarr

To clarify, it is not that humans determine limitations on what can be, it is that identities are imposed limitations on what we call certain things. We do not call an elephant a human for example. Of course, someone could say, "What if a human formed that looked, behaved, and acted exactly as an elephant?"
I would simply say, "That's just an elephant".

To your point about a hydrogen atom, we do not identify a hydrogen atom as being able to create ex nihilo. Now, could someone say, "That is really similar to a hydrogen atom and it creates other existences besides itself". Sure. But its not a hydrogen atom as we currently define it, because hydrogen atoms cannot do that. Do you understand that this is mostly a semantics argument? What we call or identify as something does not limit what can be. But definitions limit us to looking at a narrow band of existence and saying, "That existence is the identity we call 'a hydrogen atom'"

Another thing to understand is that because all things are possible as first causes, its equally possible a hydrogen atom, as we identify it, just forms and exists as normal. There is not the need for anything out there, just as there is not the denial that anything out there is possible. While anything could have been possible, (and would still be as a first cause could happen at any time) what first causes actually happen are part of causality, and discoverable by working up the causal chain. So, if the big bang were a first cause for example, we could work up the chain of causality to find and prove that it is not possible that there was anything prior that caused the big bang.

You imply that first cause must act logically. Why do you not think that's a limitation upon the actions of first cause? Why do you not think implying first cause must act rationally is not a case of you projecting your logical thinking onto first cause? — ucarr

Because a first cause must act causally. A first cause has no prior cause for existence correct? Which means that a first cause cannot cause another first cause. It causes what it does, therefore what and how it causes something is rational. Only the inception of a first cause, and what it would be, is something which cannot be predicted with certainty.

Even if you're not talking about cosmic first cause and instead are talking about one of the subsequent first causes, why must cosmic cause acting without limitation incept a subsequent causality that resembles human logical thinking. — ucarr

To detail into this, lets say a hydrogen atom appears as a first cause and causes another hydrogen atom. Whether we observe this or not is irrelevant, it is the reality of the situation. To cause something means there is some rule that indicates why the thing caused happened. Meaning, causal logic will always be in play.

If a hydrogen atom appears as a first cause then a helium atom appears as a first cause, the hydrogen atom did not cause the helium atom to appear. So you see, it is impossible for something which causes another to be free of causal logic. The first cause is not free of causal logic either, it is the start.

The following is my paraphrase of something you said earlier: A cause that's the first of all first causes doesn't prohibit subsequent non-cosmic first causes for other things.

If this is so, then our universe can be filled with a vast number of non-cosmic first causes. — ucarr

Correct, that's one possibility if we don't yet know the reality.

This is similar to saying, "there's a reason for everything that happens." This is a trivial truth agreed upon by the multitudes. "Everything is everything (for a reason)." — ucarr

I don't see that. I think there's a difference between saying, "There's a reason for everything" and then spelling out what that reason is or how it must unfold.

Why do you not think a universe filled with first causes is a conception of the universe that explodes the following conservation law: matter_mass_energy are neither created nor destroyed. — ucarr

Because that's a law based on what we've observed with the matter that we've seen so far. Its been necessary to do physics. I would say that as an empirical law, this is true. As a logical law, this is not.

If non-cosmic first causes can pop material objects into the universe from nothing, then the total volume of the mass_matter_energy of the universe is constantly fluctuating instead of remaining constant through conservation. — ucarr

True. We are just assuming its remained constant. This logically is not necessarily the case.

If you say incept of every new first cause disappears an earlier, established first cause, the problem is solved. — ucarr

No, I'm not saying that. Its possible that some first causes incept then vanish. Its possible that there are first causes that could exist for trillions of years. I'm only asserting that its possible that first causes happened over the time of the universe's inception, and still today. It doesn't mean they did or will, its just possible if we don't know about them

Does this hold true for the cosmic first cause, with cosmic first cause = the first of the first causes? — ucarr

Yes. If it is the case that there was a 'first' first cause, it may have only existed for a short period of time then vanished. So prior to our universe, there could have been many first causes that blipped in and out of existence making a much more limited impact (or greater!) impact then our own.

Some characterize axioms as self-evident truths. — ucarr

I do not believe in self-evident truth. Truth is what is. Knowledge is our best logical attempt at capturing what truth is. There is knowledge that is clearly sound, and knowledge that is questionable and likely built on some inductions.

This characterization is a preface to saying the assumption upon which we're building our working premise lies beyond the reach of experimentation, observation, collection of data, compiling of data statistics, analysis of data and building logical arguments supported by data. — ucarr

I believe some of the things about first causes are beyond experimentation or observation. Since we cannot predict the inception of a first cause, we cannot predict when one will happen. We could, if the first cause were very specific, trace back through causality and arrive at a point in which 'this X' must necessarily have been a first cause. But this must be proven, which means all other potential causes of 'X's inception must be ruled out.

I hope this answers your questions!

I had to think about this one a while, as part of this conversation with you is learning what needs to be said and what is irrelevant in a discussion about this.

When someone posits a hypothetical with “all else being equal”, they do not mean that the variables at play are equal: they mean that there is a specified set of variables, or conditions, within the hypothetical and everything else that could be said of the hypothetical comparison should be considered equal. — Bob Ross

If we both have a clear grasp of the exact argument, of course. But this isn't a conversation where both of us have a clear picture of what the other is saying. It would be very easy for you to claim there are equal variables, but the situation you're imagining doesn't actually have equal variables. And on my side, I'm not sure what you mean by 'equal variables'. The example I gave are demonstrations of how to approach it for clarity.

That the one is more productive than the other is a variable within the hypothetical comparison, and it is exactly what is needed to demonstrate my point. — Bob Ross

What does "more productive" mean? Give me an example please. Demonstrate the variables that are equal, then the variable that demonstrates more existence than the other. That can be discussed clearly. Remember, we're discussing and I've noted before that this was more exploratory then me saying, "I've got this figured out" I'm not as keen at trying to prove anything at this point, but exploring and seeing ways to approach the idea that lay it out clearly. Lets get very clear examples so there's little ambiguity. THEN lets work on proving or not proving things.

Did you not understand my confetti example vs paper as a tool example?

It completely missed the point, and sidestepped the issue. — Bob Ross

It definitely wasn't intended to. I'm just trying to figure out what you're thinking about with this comparison. Are you including the purpose of a piece of paper? Are you including the fact that this is a conscious agent? If you aren't, then why include people and tools like paper? If you want to eliminate variables, pick situations and objects that don't have those variables in them first.

When you include a human, you include all of the variables that they bring. And I think listening to your examples for a while now has me realizing how best we can both dissect the theory. You have to think bottom up. You cannot think top down. You need to build up to complicated examples because it just causes confusion and a misunderstanding of how everything builds up otherwise. I've been doing this by noting the basics were needed prior to getting to these complicated situations, and now I can articulate why. Its bottom up. You have to start smaller and get larger.

One pattern I see that I need to point out is the pattern of exploding complexity. when we upgrade to chemical reactions, then life, then people, then society. One point that might help you is you can think of each as a factorial explosion in math. An atom is 1X1. Multiple atoms are 2X1. A molecule is 3X2X1. By the time we get to something like life, molecular existence is such an irrelevant factor compared to factor results at the conscious level. When you're talking about a human decision being something like 20X19X18...including atoms as a consideration is insignificant.

This is why I think your examples are confusing to me. You're up in a 20 level factor asking me about a level 2 factor. If you want to discuss level two factors, lets focus the discussion on level 2 factors. In general, we can discuss the factor and one factor higher and lower as a relevant scope to a moral discussion. For now, everything higher or lower than that would be too far out of significance, and I think too complicated to really have a good grasp over. So for example, if you're talking about a human, we can talk one lower which are just basic living things, and one higher which is a society. When talking about a society, we can talk one lower about humans, and one higher about multiple societies. I think this will make things more clear.

So, lets just address the cutting of the paper issue, which is essentially molecular separation, and for now, keep it in the molecular factor. This is good question, because I haven't done this before. :)

P1: More existence is better than less.
P2: Cutting a piece of paper in half, all else being equal, creates more existence than leaving it in one piece.
C: TF, cutting a piece of paper in half, all else being equal, is better than leaving it in one piece. — Bob Ross

Again, lets return to something simple. Lets start with molecules of paper. We have a situation in which right now 1 molecule alone, 2 molecules are together, and 3 are together. When they are together, there is a different type of expressed existence than merely "touching". We'll call it a bond. Let's calculate the total existence as it is now.

6 molecules + 1 bond in the two molecule and (assuming linear bonds for simplicity) 2 bonds on the 3 joined molecule. So 9 expressions total.

All molecules in this setting can bump into each other, and their interactions will be they can bond, not bond, or unbond. In both cases we have six molecules, and all molecules have the same potential interaction with each other molecule. So currently we have three bonds total. The bonds can potentially stay or go, and this will change no matter how many of the same molecules we introduce.

Lets 'cut' one of the bonds. So now we have two individual molecules, and two molecule bonds. Now we have 2 instead of 3 bonds. So 8 expressions total, but the potential existence is still the same in this basic setup. So while the current set up as is is not quite as good as the three bonds, the potential is the same. Of course, this is VERY simple. In this isolated example its better to keep the molecules together, but in general its not that big of a percentage change as long as the potential stays the same.

It is probably just me, but I think your view as evolved since your OP and some of your terms have not been clarified adequately. — Bob Ross

Oh, absolutely. This has been a great way to bounce nascent ideas around in my head, giving them much better form. Already I can tell the whole thing needs a rewrite if its going to be clear to people. Continue to ask any clarifications if you see ambiguities please.

1. Is ‘material existence’ denoting fundamental, identifiable, or concrete entities in reality? Or perhaps something else? — Bob Ross

Fundamental.

2. Is ‘expressive existence’ denoting the relations between fundamental, identifiable, or concrete entities in reality? — Bob Ross

Expressive existence starts as the response that happens when a fundamental comes into contact with another fundamental existence. If two fundamentals express in such a way as to create a new identity between the two; two atoms become a molecule for example, that is a new expressed existence that will respond differently than the expressed existence of the two atoms in their singular state.

3. Is more generic, fundamental, identifiable, or concrete entities better when you say “more existence is better”? — Bob Ross

This is something I hope you'll drill into more. I'll review again the criteria for existence, and now that you see how things work a little bit better, maybe you'll have more questions or another viewpoint on it.

The totality if existence comprises three identifiable parts.

1. The foundation. This is the base thing in itself.
2. The expression. This is how the foundation exhibits itself within reality at any one snapshot of time.
3. The potential. This is the combination of what types of expression are possible within the next shapshot of time.

Now have we proven that spacetime is required for change? No, what we've done is declare it by definition. This isn't necessarily wrong or bad, but we have to be aware it is by definition, and not by empirical discovery.
— Philosophim
Ok, I have an argument for that: Consider a change, A to B. A and B cannot lay at the same point otherwise A and B are simultaneous and there cannot be a change. Therefore, A and B must lay at two different points of a variable. Moreover, the second point, that B resides, must come after the first point, that A resides, if there is a change. This variable we call time. — MoK

This is a nice attempt, but its just an empirical observation of change withing spacetime. What we haven't observed is if its impossible for spacetime to emerge from nothing. Now, to be clear, what we're talking about is a negative. Proving a negative is nigh impossible. For example if I said, "Empirically demonstrate that a unicorn does not exist", the best answer we can give is, "We have not discovered one yet." With a unicorn especially, there isn't even any logical evidence that it needs to exist. So we can probably dismiss that claim.

But can we do the same with 'nothing to something'. There is another age old question which is the idea that as we work up through causality we either reach a point in which there was nothing prior, or we have an infinite regress. Of course, in both cases we ask the question "What caused there to be anything at all?" It can't be something else, as we've reached the limit. In the case of the finite regression, its obvious. A little less obvious, but we also conclude the same with an infinite regress when examining the entire thing as a set. There is no prior cause for why anything should exist. Meaning, something existed despite there being nothing to cause it to exist.

Well, if we accept that spacetime is a substance then nothing to spacetime is also a change that is logically impossible since we need another spacetime for this change. — MoK

That's not quite what I was going for. My point is that we would need spacetime to form at or slightly before something else. In other words, what your notion is proves is that any change from nothing to something must be the emergence of spacetime. You definitely give a valid argument that something cannot form without there being spacetime, but you haven't demonstrated in any logical proof that spacetime cannot emerge within nothing.

Lets take it one more way so you can see it from another angle. Perhaps we cannot empirically demonstrate that something came from nothing, but we also cannot empirically demonstrate that something always existed either. We need a logical reason why this would be, and I believe there are other compelling logical arguments that infinite time passing to get to our existent point today doesn't make any sense. Its a difficult subject for sure. :) But what do you think about this?

This is a good topic Bob. I think it helps to define what space and time are. Space is the property we attribute to a things 'swell of existence'. Space is often seen as relational, though if there was one existent thing, its swell would be space. Time is a measurement of a things state change. When there is a recognition of difference between any snapshot, we have time.

My only quibble is breaking this down into two separate considerations of substances in reality vs things in themselves. To my notion, a thing in itself is nothing that can really be understood except as a logical notation. The idea of a thing in itself is that any details beyond its base logical necessity are beyond human comprehension.

The logical necessity is basically that some 'thing' needs to be there for us to observe. Perhaps there are other base logical necessities that can be gleaned from this, but I'm not sure an analysis of space and time are one of them. For one, that requires us to label some property or aspect of a thing in itself, and the entire logical point of a thing in itself is that it cannot be labeled or identified in anyway beyond its logical necessity that it must exist.

it is not that I disagree with your points, I just think the separation of substance and things in themselves is unnecessary. You can simplify by stating that space and time are properties of things, and all of your points still work. A real 'thing' is always assumed to have a thing in itself behind it that we cannot identify, and thus is largely irrelevant unless we're in very specific discussion about knowledge.

I however think that spacetime is fundamental and cannot be created or emerge so I agree with you that it is better to replace time with spacetime in P1 and P3. — MoK

Ok, with that, lets see if we can break down the underlying essence of what makes the argument compelling.

Spacetime is 'something". Its an existent measurement. And its required for us to have change. Which means that 'change' in your definition, is something that can only happen when things exist.

Now have we proven that spacetime is required for change? No, what we've done is declare it by definition. This isn't necessarily wrong or bad, but we have to be aware it is by definition, and not by empirical discovery.

So then what we've done can be simplified as follows:

1. Spacetime is needed for any change

Basically we say we need something for change to happen. Specifically that something is spacetime. (Though the actual detail of 'spacetime' will be irrelevant to our conclusion. We could call it "A" and it wouldn't matter)

2. Nothing to something is a change.
But we noted earlier that we need something for there to be a change. The only way this still works is if something appears. And this makes sense. Nothing to nothing isn't a change, but nothing to something is.

3. There is no spacetime in nothing
This still works. But does our original conclusion?

C: Therefore, nothing to something is logically impossible.

With our clearer breakdown, we can no longer conclude this. Point two notes that a change can occur when we go from nothing to something. What is is impossible is that nothing to something cannot occur 'without spacetime'.

Revised C: Therefore, nothing to something is logically impossible without spacetime also appearing.

This is the real logical conclusion we can make based on our definitions and premises so far.

But lets follow up a bit because one conclusion out of a set of revised terms doesn't mean that we still don't want to prove our original intent. Maybe with a change we can still do so. To preserve our original intent we can add one thing.

P: Spacetime cannot appear within nothing.

The problem is, this is only by definition and not empirical proof. Meaning at this point we haven't proven anything, we've simply declared it. So I still don't see a way to my mind of salvaging our original intent which was to prove that change nothing to something is logically impossible. But what do you think?

You say, Establishment happens by first cause of the starting point of creation. You say, Inception of creation proceeds without limitation. How does what you say differ from what is said by the rabbi, the priest or the minister? — ucarr

Because the rabbi, priest, or minister claims to have knowledge of what the first cause is. I do not. My definition would put the rabbi, priest, or minister on the spot to prove that a God was the first cause because it is entirely unnecessary, and only one possibility out of an infinite plausible alternatives.

Given the part of your quote underlined above, why cannot a first cause incept a hydrogen atom not limited by its parts and the rules of itself? — ucarr

Because I am going by definitions that we ascribe to things. This is a larger conversation about when we should say, "That's a sheep" vs "That's different enough from a sheep that we call it a goat." Assuming that our definitions accurately describe what a hydrogen atom is, my point is that such an existence wouldn't be a hydrogen atom as we define it today. Whatever it is could exist, and to an untrained eye it might look like a hydrogen atom, but it cannot have the same exact composition as a hydrogen atom, or it would not have the special qualities you note.

Why is your 02) quote not a contradiction of your 01) quote immediately above? — ucarr

To clarify perhaps another part you may be implying, once something exists it enters into causality. So when a hydrogen atom exists, that is what it is. Anything that does not exist as a hydrogen atom, is not a hydrogen atom. Once the existence is in reality, its rules are set.

Do you agree that if a hydrogen atom as first cause is utterly alone, and yet nonetheless can cause things not a hydrogen atom to exist, as its definition of first cause requires, then its ability to cause subsequent inception of all things without limitation is indistinguishable from the creative power of a supernatural deity? — ucarr

Lets not use atom, lets use "object" so we avoid the previous confusion. No. For one, a deity is usually ascribed as having consciousness and intent. An object does not. Second, if an object can incept other things, it must do so within the limitation of what it is. Perhaps what it is does allow anything to come forth, but it would all come forth caused by the first cause and thus follow rules. Anything could be a first cause, but when it exists, it is limited by what it is.

Why do you not agree that positing an infinity of individual causes of an infinity of individual things is a trivial and circular statement about the universe as it's generally known by the public (everything is everything)? — ucarr

Sorry Ucarr, I did not understand the question. I'm not sure what statements I've made that you're referencing here.

It did not exist by any prior cause. It has no intention or possession, as that would be prior to its inception. It simply is, no prior cause.
— Philosophim

Why do you not think the underlined portion of your above quote implies something that simply is is eternal and thus has no inception? I ask this with the understanding inception implies establishment which, in turn, implies a process which is a cause. — ucarr

It does not need to be eternal. A first cause has the potential of happening five seconds from now. A first cause could have happened 10 seconds ago. What formed may very well be completely unstable and exist for a nano-second. Or five seconds. Or 500 years. Or eternal.

I'm just using inception as another term for "started to exist". A first cause does not need a prior process to be, it simply begins to exist.

I'm saying its axiomatic, but not beyond the domains of science, logic, and reason.
— Philosophim

How do science, logic and reason examine what simply exists without the possibility of explanation? — ucarr

I think this question is too broad and you'll need to focus on something specific. What are you referencing in particular that you believe is outside of explanation?

Again, very pointed questions Ucarr. Keep going until you are satisified.

It is not valid to sidestep the hypothetical by mentioning it is impractical, improbable, or to introduce new variables—and, I would argue, this is all you did in your entire response. — Bob Ross

My intention was not to side step your hypothetical. It was to note in this instance, especially because you are still learning the theory, it would be much more practical to give clear context and examples of this "all being equal" to clearly indicate what you mean.

As an example, my hobbyist example demonstrates, contrary to your response (as I think you brought up irrelevant points if we are agreeing that all else is equal), that, all else being equal, building model airplanes in one’s garage is morally better than trying to find a cure for cancer IF the former is done more productively than the latter because the former will produce more identifiable entities than the latter in this case.

Your response completely ignored ‘all else being equal’, and also mentioned or alluded to the probability and practicality of the hypothetical: all of which is irrelevant. — Bob Ross

But Bob, you stated that the one was done more productively than the later, so its not equal. My point is the example is too vague. What do you mean by "all else being equal" when you then also say one is more productive than the other? We have to be a little more detailed because the issue with you is you're imagining half a scenario. Don't just say something is equal, show what that looks like so we have a full intellectual and emotional picture as well.

In terms of the paper example, I don’t see how this doesn’t increase expressions of ‘existence’. Remember, you even agreed that material ‘existence’ is irrelevant: we don’t know what fundamentally exists. — Bob Ross

Did you not understand my confetti example vs paper as a tool example?

Likewise, if you are claiming that “more existence is better”, then it plainly follows that two pieces of paper is better than one all else being equal. — Bob Ross

Again, what does this mean Bob? I need clearer examples of what you're noting is equal here.

Again, material existence doesn’t matter; and expressions of existence are just identifiable entities and their relations. So I don’t see how there are more relations and identifiable entities in a healthy tree when compared to the ashes of a burned down tree. I am not saying you are wrong, I just don’t see it: — Bob Ross

Perhaps we skipped over life too quickly then. Please refer back up section 4 with a ctrl-f to "Alright, if there doesn't seem to be much wrong with the basics prima facia, then I think its time to go to the next step, life." and "To understand life, we first need to understand chemical reactions." The result that you should get from that is that life is, atom for atom, more overall existence than non-life. Perhaps we need to calculate more specifics, and if needed I will.

But in net total they have similar amounts of identifiable entities and relations thereof. What I am trying to express to you, in an nutshell, is that there are an infinite amount of identifiable entities and relations thereof; so they are effectively equal. — Bob Ross

No, they are not infinite. In each case we have a finite amount of matter that makes up that tree as well as time. Ash nor the tree will exist forever.

If, on the contrary, you are prioritizing the evaluation of or just evaluating relations produced from movement, then I see your point. — Bob Ross

Yes, that is one thing you can evaluate.

Either I have not been thorough enough on the patterns of the building blocks leading up to this point, or you misunderstood or forgot the conclusion already established. One thing is for sure, the points and ideas are scattered all over the responses at this point and there's no one place for us to re-reference.
Maybe I need to do a rewrite to consolidate points as the ideas are pretty scattered now throughout the discussion and a more meaningful conglomeration might do better. Of course, such a large bit of writing is a lot of time to write, so we can keep going here as long as you're finding the topic interesting and aren't too lost Bob. If you're feeling like you're just not seeing at all what I'm pointing at despite my attempts at communication, maybe its time I do that.

I've seen you put up some examples of a possible first cause, (like a photon suddenly coming into existence from nothing), but none of your examples make any sense to me. A photon is a quantum of electromagnetic energy, it comes from an electron, it doesn't just come into existence from nothing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then why not ask me to give a better example? You've been accusing me of being dishonest and besmirching my character instead of asking. It wasn't meant to be a literal example, it was meant to give you a visual of something not being there, then there. The big bang is another typical example. Does that work better?

I've told you why it is illogical to say that there is nothing prior to the first cause, it's restated at the very beginning of this post, in my reply to ucarr. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I've asked you to give a concrete example. I've even noted that I believe you aren't doing it because you know if you do, your point will collapse. That's a challenge anyone who believed in their point would rise to.

A cause, by definition, has an effect on something. The thing which it has an effect on must preexist the cause. In other words, "cause" implies "change", and "change" implies something which changes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, and a first cause is that which is not caused by something else. This does not show that what I stated is wrong. Cause 'implies' change? What does that mean? The definition of cause has been clearly noted, you've recognized it, and this doesn't address the point at all. Also, no example despite my request.

Reasserting the same invalid conclusion gets you nowhere. That there is no prior cause does not imply that there is no prior reason, because reason is the broader term. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've already gone over reason and prior reason. I was the one to say these words first to Ludwig, " All causes are reasons, but not all reasons are causes." So are the words I used to validate my points now invalid?

So I think we're done. I hope our next conversation doesn't have as much animosity from you next time. Especially after we started off so nicely when I said it was good to see you. Remember that? Lets end this on a high note.

Except you can’t break it down that way because “This sentence contains 36 characters” is true but “The sentence in point A contains 36 characters” is false. — Michael

You didn't tag what was true and false in your breakdown, so I assumed that A was true and B was false in isolation. If your intention is that the break down accurately fits the intention of the primary sentence, it does not. My example was the breakdown of a contraction, yours is not.

This sentence contains 36 characters

Should we break the above sentence into the below?

A. This is a sentence
B. The sentence in point A contains 36 characters — Michael

That's another way to break it down if you would like. Same idea.

...there is no limitation upon what can be incepted.
— Philosophim

You're saying inception equals a supernatural deity? — ucarr

No, I'm saying there's no prior cause for a first cause to exist, so there cannot be any prior limitations as to what a first cause had to be. No prior cause means no restraints as to what could have been.

You're saying inception can incept a hydrogen atom not limited by its parts and the rules of itself? — ucarr

No, because then its not a hydrogen atom anymore. A hydrogen atom has a clear definition and limitation of what it can be.

Your saying inception can incept a first cause that possesses a boundary of selfhood beyond which there is no otherness? Moreover, you're saying the boundary of selfhood is simultaneously not a boundary since there is no otherness? — ucarr

By 'otherness' if you mean 'prior causes', then yes to your first question. I don't think that quite fits in for the second. If a hydrogen atom incepts as a first cause, its still a hydrogen atom because that's what it is. If a helium atom incepts as a first cause, its still a helium atom because that's what it is. If a first cause incepts as what appears to be a helium atom, but then turns into a hydrogen atom by the rules of its existence, that's not a helium atom but something else.

With the above two quotes you're saying each family of causation runs parallel with all other families of causation? — ucarr

No, I'm saying the origin of two causal chains cannot cause the origin of each causal chain, as each origin is a first cause. It doesn't mean that a first cause hydrogen atom cannot later bump into a first cause helium atom. Everything past that point would intertwine their causality chains going forward at that point. But this influence is only after the inception of each, and neither can incept the other. If one did, the inceptor of the other would be the first cause of the other. (I am not saying this is what actually happens, all of this is to give a simple example to the abstract)

Moreover, you're saying each new first cause requires a new study of causation starting from scratch? — ucarr

Let pretend we are working backwards up the causal chain for this hydrogen and helium atom. We see the bumped into each other. "So what caused the hydrogen atom to bump into the helium atom" leads off in one way to ultimately arrive at the hydrogen atom's inception. "So what caused the helium atom to bump into the hydrogen atom" leads off in another way to ultimately arrive at the helium atom's inception.

You're saying pre-existing causal chains suggesting general causality predating a new first cause have no pertinence to a new first cause? — ucarr

I'm noting that a first cause cannot have a prior cause for its existence. Meaning if a first cause incepts when there is other existence, that other existence is not the cause of its inception. Of course, claiming "This X" is a first cause that incepted among other existence is going to be difficult to prove. And it must be proven, not merely believed or asserted.

You're saying a first cause can enter into causality in spite of it having no cause? — ucarr

Yes. In fact, if it exists longer than the smallest unit of time, then the second unit of time is caused by rules and forces from the first unit of time. The first unit of time is of course the first cause, and has no prior cause for its existence.

You're saying that first cause, having no cause, took possession of its form by means of a non-existent cause? — ucarr

It did not exist by any prior cause. It has no intention or possession, as that would be prior to its inception. It simply is, no prior cause.

You're saying the number line has an end? — ucarr

No, I'm saying a point in the causal chain is always reached when there is no prior cause for a set of existence.

You're saying being able to intersect doesn't imply merging causal chains share a common first cause? — ucarr

Correct.

You're saying first causation is a phenomenon that transpires with time interval equal to zero? — ucarr

Its more accurate to say the limit to zero.

You're saying first causation is free to violate the conservation laws? — ucarr

Conservation laws are what we observe within what is existent now. There is nothing to prevent something from forming that by its own nature, would also dissolve into nothingness a few seconds from its inception. So if a first cause incepts like matter and energy as we know it, it would of course obey the laws of conservation. But if it incepted itself as something we are unfamiliar with, it of course does not need to follow the laws of conservation.

You're saying first causation is axiomatic and thus beyond the domains of science, logic and reason? — ucarr

I'm saying its axiomatic, but not beyond the domains of science, logic, and reason. Predicting when a first cause would appear or be is of course beyond us. But we can think about the consequences of a first cause and see if we can come to some reasonable conclusions. Further, if we were to trace a causal chain all the way up to a first cause, we might be able to prove that it is indeed, a first cause. It would be extremely difficult of course.

Fantastic questions ucarr, please drill in where needed.

But I don't understand you at all when you say
besides the fact that it exists.
— Philosophim
. Why don't you just say "therefore there is no reason (or cause) for its existence"? I'm not saying there can't be a reason for its existence, just that there may not be one. — Ludwig V

I say there can be no prior cause, and thus no prior reason. But reason is sometimes used as a term of explanation. Depending on a person's use of reason, they can state there is a reason, and that reason is "There is no prior cause". As I mentioned earlier, I don't think its the word "cause" that's giving people trouble, its the word "reason". Ironically it turns out "reason" is not a very reasonable word to use because it has multiple meanings. :)

Thank you very much for your positive contribution. — MoK

Not a problem! We're here to think with each other. Also welcome to the forums. You will encounter some people who will talk down to you or passively insult you for just bringing an idea up. Please ignore them.

P1. Time is needed for any change.
What is time? Without this definition nothing can be proven.
— Philosophim

Time is one component of spacetime that allows change to happen. Spacetime itself is a substance, by substance I mean something that exists and has a set of properties. Spacetime's property is its curvature. — MoK

Good start. Can time exist apart from spacetime? If so, can you describe what it is? If not, then we have to change premise one from "Time" to "Spacetime".

P1) Time is needed for any change
P2) Nothing to something is a change
P3) There is no time in nothing
C) Therefore, nothing to something is logically impossible. (From P1-P3) — MoK

Let me point out a weakness that needs to be resolved here.

P1. Time is needed for any change.
What is time? Without this definition nothing can be proven.

P2. Something appearing within nothing is a change.
Sounds good.

P3. There is no time in nothing.
Since you have not defined time this cannot be declared as true or false.

Its just a bad contraction. If we break out the sentence into its full meaning, its fine.

A. This is a sentence. True
B. The sentence in point A is a false sentence. False.

There ya go.

My difficulty here is that you seem to be treating "existence" as if it were a property of the things that exist. — Ludwig V

Existence is a set of all things that exist.

If that's right, pointing to existence as a cause of anything is incomprehensible. — Ludwig V

I note that its a set of existence. So for example I can say, "What causes rain?" Or, "What causes water?"

I wouldn't rule out the possibility of it qualifying as an non-causal explanation of something, but it can hardly explain why something exists (circularity). — Ludwig V

If we go up the causal chain, it is logically necessary that there be a first cause. The logical conclusion from there being a first cause is that there can be no prior cause for its existence, therefore there is no reason for its existence besides the fact that it exists. That's the full explanation. I don't get what you're missing here, can you try to drill into it a little more?

I had thought that it must be possible to "extend" our time-line beyond the Big Bang 14 billion years ago. If we treat "now" as the origin of the line. That's no different from treating the year Christ was born as the origin and extending it back from there. — Ludwig V

Sure, there is nothing wrong with treating the big bang as an origin. "This is as far back as we can currently go in terms of causality." This is not the same as saying, "We have proven that the big bang is a first cause, and there cannot be anything else which caused it to exist."

I'm not at all sure that this really makes sense. If there are other existences, then the question arises what caused them? If that question has an answer, then the first cause wasn't the first. — Ludwig V

The answer is there was at least one first cause that resulted in the rest of what exists. Just use the example of the big bang as if it were the first cause. If there was nothing that caused the big bang, that's it.

The cause of the explosion is the spark, the molecular structure of the explosive is (part of) the conditions. But that doesn't apply to a first cause like the Big Bang, which is the cause and origin of all the physical things in our universe. Or perhaps it does? — Ludwig V

If the big bang is a proven first cause, then it does. Can I explain the exact laws of how the big bang caused everything to appear from it? No. But that's not the point. The point is that there is no prior cause which made the Big Bang. It just happened.

So philosophim refers back to causation, saying the reason for the first cause is the first cause itself, and that produces the vicious circle. But a vicious circle does not constitute a reason or explanation. — Metaphysician Undercover

We've already gone over this, but I'll say it again if it was missed. If there is no prior cause, there is no prior reason. There is no unspecified temporal point. You ignore the fact that I conjoin 'prior reason' as different from "a reason". A first cause is that which has no prior cause for its existence. I note: " What is the reason why this infinitely regressive chain of causality exists? There is no prior cause for it, it simply is." There isn't a prior reason for its existence, I've simply noted the reason for its existence as an explanation. If it helps, change the sentence to, "What is the cause of this infinitely regressive chain of causalities existence? There is no prior cause for it, it simply is."

But random is inconsistent with "reason". So philosophim refers back to causation, saying the reason for the first cause is the first cause itself, and that produces the vicious circle. But a vicious circle does not constitute a reason or explanation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Random is not inconsistent with an explanation, I'm not sure what you're saying here. And my point is not circular. Its simply a result of what a first cause is. Circular would be something like, "The bible says God exists, and we know the bible is true because God says it is." We're obviously leaving out that we first have to know each is true, and that requires something outside of the reference to each other. I am not doing this to my awareness.

:up: Something circular going on here. It's a feeling I have had for this entire thread. — jgill

Prove that something is circular. Your opinions on the matter don't make them correct.

I have noted many times why this must be, but it might have been missed. First, I'm using 'reason' as an explanation. "Why is this a first cause?" Reason: Because it has no prior cause which caused it. Pretty simple.
— Philosophim

It's not as simple as you make it sound. The question is not "why is this a first cause" because you have not identified a particular "concrete" cause which you claim is a first cause, and asking why is this a first cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've given several examples. All I'm asking is for you to do the same. I'm not asking for proof that such a thing exists, just give me a possible example of something which makes logical sense that could exist. In my mind you're dodging the issue here.

We cannot simply assume that there is nothing prior to the first cause because that is unjustified. — Metaphysician Undercover

Metaphysician...I've been kind so far and given you as much benefit of the doubt I can. This is stupid. You are better than this. Go to anyone else besides me and say that sentence and watch their confused looks. This is why I keep asking you for examples. If you cannot show how such a statement can logically exist I'm going to assume you're trolling or you are arguing in bad faith. Work on this and give me something good to think about please.

Since you refused to accept conventional philosophy concerning different types of causation, I've found that I have to approach your argument from the distinction you've made between "cause" and "reason". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, that's how a philosophical discussion works. The OP sets up clear definitions and makes logical conclusions from it. You can ask for definition clarification, which I have answered. You can critique the conclusion from those definitions, which I have answered. You can even introduce different definitions into the discussion and see if they work within the scope of the argument. This is not about me refusing anything. Please contain your frustration and keep personal accusations out of this.

Look, if there's no prior cause for something, there's no prior reason for something either.
— Philosophim

That is unjustified. To make that claim, you need to demonstrate how all reasons are necessarily causes. — Metaphysician Undercover

What? No. If there's no prior cause, then there is nothing prior which caused a first cause to exist. If there is nothing prior to cause something, there is no prior reason for the existence of it either. Now we can reason about the existent thing. But we cannot say there is a prior reason, as there is nothing prior that caused it. Please demonstrate a situation in which there is no prior cause for something, yet there is a prior, and by this I mean temporal, reason for it.

Furthermore, you have no premise which allows you to conclude that the reason for the first cause is not prior to the first cause, because you have not properly established the reason for the first cause. All you've said is that the reason for the first cause is that there is no prior cause. But that's only the reason why it is "first", it is not the reason why it is "cause". — Metaphysician Undercover

I'll try explaining again. Lets take an example of a photon that appears without prior cause. Now, once it exists, it is bound by causality by what it is. Meaning it can't suddenly act like an atom, because it is a photon. It can't interact with other things as an elephant suddenly, because it is a photon. It is the first cause in a causality chain only because nothing caused it to exist. But its continued existence begins a causal chain with whatever happens at the next time tick of its existence.

I don't know what you're talking about here. You've excluded the possibility of a prior reason being the cause of the first cause through definition. Therefore a prior reason of the first cause must necessarily be something other than a cause, and what you ask is nonsensical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Great, we agree then. Thus you can't have a prior reason if there is no prior cause. Lets stop going over this.

A concrete example of the prior reason for a first cause is not required until you produce a concrete example of a first cause. I tried giving you concrete examples of first causes already, with free will acts, but you ended up rejecting them because they refuted your argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have given several examples of potential first causes and how they would work. You gave me examples of free will and claimed they were first causes. I noted they could not fit the definition of first causes and that's when you lost your cool. Its obvious to me your motivation for being against my definitions is you want free will to be a first cause. But you realized quickly that if my arguments about what a first cause is, and its logical consequences are true, then you couldn't have what you wanted.

Give me an example.
— Philosophim

Example of what? — Metaphysician Undercover

You are stalling and trying to avoid it because you know you can't give one. Prove me wrong and give me one.

As said above, "it simply exists" does not qualify as an explanation. So if you are using "reason" as synonymous with "explanation", you'll have to do better. — Metaphysician Undercover

It does when there is no prior cause.

I don't dispute your argument about "there necessarily must be a first cause", I dispute the further unjustified conclusion you make, that the first cause cannot have a prior reason. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, so far you don't like the conclusion, but I haven't seen any examples or reasonable logic to show this point. If you do not attempt to do so in your next reply I will be moving on.

I've already demonstrated that. How quickly you forget. A "first cause" is "first" in relation to a specific chain. There may be a multitude of different chains. The "first" of one chain may be prior in time to the "first" of another chain. Therefore the assertion "there can be no cause prior to a first cause" is illogical. — Metaphysician Undercover

There can be no prior cause that causes a first cause. Not that there cannot be other first causes and chains of causality from those first causes. Those other chains obviously do not cause other first causes. This is basic.

As I've explained to you already. Your conception of "first cause" is a product of an unnecessarily restrictive definition of "cause", one which does not provide for all the things which are commonly, in philosophy, known as causes. Therefore it really is an opinion, your opinion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ah, you do understand that the argument I've presented works. You have not demonstrated it is unnecessarily restrictive. That's a pretty poor way of just saying, "Yes, your argument is consistent with your specific definitions." Its not an opinion, that's philosophy. Definitions, logic, conclusion. Please give some examples and focus more on the argument then on "me" as the problem in your next reply please.

Because there is no prior cause for a first cause, there is no limitation on what a first cause could be.
— Philosophim

Regarding no limitation, what about the selfhood of the first cause? If selfhood establishes a boundary between self and other, and the first cause is a self, then: a) it's limited by the boundaries of its selfhood; b) the necessary network of self/other, upon which first cause depends for its existence as a self, prevents the solitary, temporal primacy of that said self. — ucarr

To be clear, there is no limitation upon what can be incepted. Once a first cause exists, it is bound to causation by what it is. For example, lets say a hydrogen atom appeared as a first cause. As soon as it exits, it is a hydrogen atom. Its limited by its parts and the rules of itself.

So then:

a) it's limited by the boundaries of its selfhood; — ucarr

Correct

b) the necessary network of self/other, upon which first cause depends for its existence as a self, prevents the solitary, temporal primacy of that said self. — ucarr

I don't think that's quite it. The network of its continued self existence is bound by its formation. Its formation is a first cause only. After that, it is in a temporal and state chain of causality for every tick of time.

You're saying a particular first cause can have a non-causal relationship with other things prior to it? — ucarr

No. I'm staying there can be no prior cause which influences the inception of the first cause. After a first cause exists, it enters into causality with everything it can interact with. So again, something prior could exist, but if none of what exists causes a new existence, that new existence is a first cause. As an example we could have a photon appear in our universe right now uncaused by anything that exists.

Moreover, you're saying the attribute of first cause generally allows for a multiplicity of independent first causes temporally sequenced across a positive interval of time? — ucarr

Correct. There can be no limitation as to how or why a first cause could come to be.

Does this not imply that a particular first cause has a bounded domain of first causal influence upon a sub-set of the totality of existing things? — ucarr

If you mean that when a first cause appears, it is bound by what it is and then is bound by the natural consequences of its specific interactions with other existences, yes. Does this mean that two chains of causation, each with a first cause, cannot intertwine somewhere over time? No. I've described before that with multiple first causes, the intersection of their consequential causality over time ends up being more like a web with the start of a strand representing the first cause. The causality chains are also each one way.

Is this not a description of everyday causes such as: a) a virus causes pneumonia; b) a cloud saturated with water causes rain? — ucarr

No. What you and many other people are accidently doing is confusing an origin with a first cause. An origin is a start for measurement. On a X/Y graph, the common origin is 0,0. However, we can also make the origin 50,50. Does that mean 0,0, suddenly does not exist? No. So imagine a line that represents a finite chain that starts at 1,2. We could do an origin at 0,0, but it would be pointless because there's nothing there. We could follow the line and make the origin at 10,15. Does that mean that the start of the line isn't at 1,2 No, its still there no matter where we create or origin, or pick any point in the causality line as a starting point for our measurements and discussion.

Meaning, I can say, "What caused a fire in the forest? It was a lightning bolt". And if that's all we care about, we end the inquiry. Does that mean the lightning bolt is a first cause? No, that's just an origin on the chain and we need no more explanation. There is of course a much larger chain. "What caused the lightning? What caused the cause of the lightning?" And so on. A first cause is when there is a point in which there is no prior cause. It is irrelevant whether we measure it or realize it. And, as the argument shows, its logically necessary that there eventually be at least one.

Am I mistaken in my understanding of your purpose as being an examination of the first cause of all existing things, including existence itself? — ucarr

Yes, I think by now what I'm stating is that there is at least one first cause. But there could be several.

If first cause passes through time from its first tick to its second tick, time is co-equal with it. — ucarr

A first cause cannot pass through time. A first cause is an inception event. Every time tick afterward is a causal chain that necessarily traces to the inception event.

Further, there is nothing that forbids one thing existing in isolation in theory.
— Philosophim

I'm inclined to think the conservation laws forbid the total isolation of a thing. — ucarr

Yes, if a first cause appears that follows conservation laws. But there is no prior cause which would prevent a first cause from appearing that does not follow conservation laws. It doesn't mean such a thing has happened, I'm just noting there is nothing logical that I can see that would forbid such a first cause from happening.

Alright, I think I addressed everything that didn't repeat! I love your intelligent and pointed approach Ucarr!

Although causal chains seem to be aligned with a passage of time for each link, one has to be cautious about saying "first tick" or something similar. Then you move into relativity of time measurements and if one makes them smaller and smaller the dynamical system described by the chain tends to a continuous process, with associated philosophical interpretations. — jgill

Absolutely. The reason I say "time tick" is because if I said seconds, then we could divide into milliseconds, then...you get it. A first cause exists upon its formation, then enters into causality through time and how its original self influences it from them on.

The first cause is only in the first time tick.
— Philosophim

From this I conclude you're grounding the primacy of first cause within temporal sequence. So, the first cause is first in time before all other things existing in time. — ucarr

No, and I made a slight mistake in my wording here. "A" first cause. Because there is no prior cause for a first cause, there is no limitation on what a first cause could be. As such, there's also no limit to how many first causes could be. The key to being a first cause is that it is not caused by something prior. That does not mean that other things prior to a first cause cannot exist like other first causes.

For example, a photon appears with no prior causality here. Five minutes later and thousands of miles away, a big bang appears uncaused as well. The photon did not cause the big bang; they are both first causes of their respective causality chains.

Sidebar 1 - Notice I've made "forms" bold. If there's a "forms" before the first time tick of existence of the hydrogen atom, then this preceding "forms" (i.e. physical processes) exists before the first time tick of the hydrogen atom. — ucarr

To clarify again, there could have been other first causes and their resultant causality before any one particular first cause and its resultant causality. The important note is that nothing within the prior chain of causality caused the second first cause to exist.

Sidebar 2 - Notice I've made "there" bold. If there's a "there" before the first time tick of existence of the hydrogen atom, then this preceding "there" (i.e. spacetime) exists before the first time tick of the hydrogen atom. — ucarr

If a first cause appears in nothing, its not that nothing caused the first cause to be. Absolute nothingness is also not a thing, but the absence of all things.

If you can posit theoretically the popping into existence of an atom as first cause, why cannot you posit theoretically the popping into existence of a universe as first cause? — ucarr

You can. I've noted this several times through this massive discussion. I'm not expecting you to have read it all, just noting this has long been stated from my end.

In either case, when you categorize the variety of existing things as being unified as one collective thing: a) atom; b) universe, they're all equal (by your own argument above) with respect to temporal primacy of existence. — ucarr

True.

If there's no reason to partition atom and universe with respect to which collective can be first cause temporally, then first cause in terms of temporal sequencing is meaningless. In other words, existence in general, being first cause, makes the notion of a first cause in terms of temporal sequencing meaningless — ucarr

So it is possible, like anything else, that there was only one first cause and that's all of existence. It has the same meaning as any other kind of first or set of first causes we could have. There would be no prior causation for its existence.

If, on the other hand, you posit an innate temporal sequence of existing things, with some things not existing in any conceivable way prior to a specific point in one-directional time, then you must ask yourself if positing any existing thing generates an infinite regress of prior existing things because: a) no existing thing exists in isolation; b) every existing thing is a roadmap to other existing things (i.e. quantum entanglement); c) an existing thing, if divisible, cannot pre-exist that thing's sub-components necessary to its existence. — ucarr

I don't believe so if my point has been clarified.

a. No existing thing exists in isolation

To clarify, there's a reason I call it a first cause. Because immediately after its existence it enters into causality. Meaning one time tick after, its has its own reference at a prior time tick to explain why it state of existence is as it is at the second tick of time. Further, there is nothing that forbids one thing existing in isolation in theory. Nothing I'm noting is negating the universe as it is today, and we clearly have a lot of things. :)

b) every existing thing is a roadmap to other existing things (i.e. quantum entanglement)

Once a first cause exists, it is within causality within its own temporal changes, or if there are other resulting chains of causal existence from other first causes.

c) an existing thing, if divisible, cannot pre-exist that thing's sub-components necessary to its existence. True. Though as you mentioned earlier, " when you categorize the variety of existing things as being unified as one collective thing: a) atom; b) universe, they're all equal (by your own argument above) with respect to temporal primacy of existence."

Really great questions ucarr!

Pretty soon, you've got the entire phenomenal universe as you and I know it today popping into existence as the first cause. But the phenomenal processes I've been describing happen in time. If you remove the time element for an atom, or for a universe, either way the primacy of being first becomes meaningless. — ucarr

Exactly. Which is why a first cause is a cause which has no prior cause for its own existence.

Let's suppose the entire universe is the first cause. If everything has always existed co-temporally, then first cause is meaningless. — ucarr

The universe cannot always have existed co-temporally as a first cause. The first cause is only in the first time tick. In the second time tick, the state of existence is caused by the first cause.

In this example, logical necessity is, by definition, logically prior to the ontic status of the first cause it necessitates. It is the logical cause of the "first" cause. — ucarr

By example, I mean give me an imaginary concrete. I need something less abstract to understand what you're trying to convey here. No cause can come before a first cause. Logic can lead us to conclude what a first cause is. Reason can explain what it is. But there is no prior cause that can cause a first cause.

As an example, my hobbyist example demonstrates, contrary to your response (as I think you brought up irrelevant points if we are agreeing that all else is equal), that, all else being equal, building model airplanes in one’s garage is morally better than trying to find a cure for cancer IF the former is done more productively than the latter because the former will produce more identifiable entities than the latter in this case. — Bob Ross

The problem here is you are looking at the numbers only, yet including emotional implicit outcomes that would likely not align with the numbers.

For example, lets use a much more simple and tried argument. Let us say that I present to you a math situation in which if we kill a baby, more existence will be produced then if we let the baby live. This of course horrifies you and you state, "This can't be right, its monsterous!"

Now I add the details. 20 Jews are hiding under a house that is occupied by Nazi soldiers. If they find the Jews, they'll kill them all including the baby. The baby begins to make noise. If the mother does not muffle the babies noise, the soldiers will find and kill them all. Unfortunately, there's no way to muffle the noise of the child without suffocating and killing the child. Its still a terrible sacrifice and situation, but it now brings context and clarity to the math.

So with your cancer vs model air plane comparison, its important that you mention the specifics of the outcome, not just a casual observation of the math. If not, our brains will fill in implicit situations that seem immoral, and if calculated out, would not align with the actual outcome of the math. I'll just give you a few examples.

1. A person has no background in science and wants to research cancer in their garage. They have no connections with other scientists and no plans to reach out to anyone else even if they found cancer. The works is stressful and that stress negatively impacts their life. Or, they could build model planes. The work is relaxing and positively impacts the rest of their life. Its more moral for them to build model planes.

2. A person could research cancer and save millions of lives with their result. They also build model planes and share it on youtube. Because they did, a certain kid became fascinated by them and spent him time building them. Turns out, if the kid hadn't seen that youtube channel, he would have gotten into politics, started WWIII, and ended the human race. Its more moral for the person to build model airplanes.

My challenge to you, which is what we need to really test the idea, is to think of examples in which we have a case where building model airplanes is factually more moral, but is so against our intuitions that it would be anathema to almost all decently moral minded people.

Another way of thinking about this problem, is that of a simplified example. Take a piece of paper: now, all else being equal, me tearing it in half creates more identifiable entities in reality (because there are now two pieces of paper instead of one); and, thusly, under your view, is seems as though I am obligated to do this, all else being equal, because the goal is to maximize identifiable entities. — Bob Ross

No, the goal is to maximize expressed and potential existence. We need to go back to the atoms example again. Everything starts there, as that's the pattern that continues onwards. I feel like I've already said about all I can on the subject without new feedback, so I'll reference where to read again. All of your criticisms apply to the basics, so again, that's where we must go.

Page 4 ctrl-F for "1. Existence as 'the parts'."
Page 3 ctrl-F for "Lets say that the atoms of our universe are hydrogen."
And of course you can reread the math portion of the OP again if needed.

The point that should be gleaned from all of this is that the build up or tear down is good only if it results in more potential and expressed existence. A conglomeration of paper molecules together or separate offers no innate value on its own. The value of the paper, is that it is a construct of people as a tool. Destroy the tool, and it is no longer useful as that tool, thus destroying its potential existence as a tool into something else.

If I needed confetti, it would be better to tear the paper into chunks. If I needed to print a document, it would be better for me to keep it whole. If I destroy all of my paper for confetti, I will be unable to print a document when I need it. And if there's not cause for the confetti, it most certainly would have been a waste.

Perhaps a better example would be a concrete tool like a wrench. If I so desired I could break my wrench. Cut it up into base chunks of metal. But at that point it loses its intended function to me as a person, the ability to tighten or loosen nuts on a screw. Now my potential existence goes down unless I use the metal parts for something else. What is the outcome of the destruction? Does it generate new existences and potentials around it, or does it just diminish what can be done?

In terms of the destruction vs. construction, let’s take an example. Imagine a tree in perfect health vs. a tree burnt to the ground: what makes the former have more identifiable entities, all else being equal, than the latter? The molecules and atoms are probably about the same, and identifiable relations (i.e., ‘expressions’) between the parts is roughly equal. So what so you? — Bob Ross

Again, you're speaking far too generally without the context. Does the ash on the ground grow trees that could not grow before? Did the tree warm humans? Was there something gained from the tree being burnt?

If it is in isolation from any other consideration, that a tree merely burned to the ground vs it would be alive, the expressed existences aren't even close. A guideline as I've mentioned is that life, per molecule, is a much more condensed set of existence over time than non-life. So alone, it is not the case that the dead and burnt tree has the same overall existence of its continued life and possible reproduction.

If you don't know why, think of all the chemical interactions in even just one cell of the tree. Think of its continued interactions with the soil and air that it breaths. Much more is going on per atom per second than ash on the ground and carbon in the air.

Same thing with non-life. Is an adult human more complex, full of more expressive existences, than a hurricane? I am not sure, and I don’t even see, in principle, how you could make that calculation. — Bob Ross

It would be a difficult calculation for sure. I don't have all of the answers Bob,

As an external critique, I think it should be obvious that a human adult has more moral worth than a hurricane in every reasonably inferred scenario. — Bob Ross

When talking about calculations, we must demonstrate why it is so. Per culture and the survival of the human race, it definitely behooves us to believe that.

Finally, AmadeusD's point is a good similarity to compare explain what I'm stating. Feel free to drill in further.

Alright Bob, I hope that answers some of the questions, I expect many more. My apologies if I'm a little slow in responding, my other 'first cause' thread has been very busy lately so more of my time has been spent answering multiple queries.

It is my experience in philosophy that when you have to bend over backwards and create a convoluted argument why your ultimate goal still holds, its an indicator it does not. But, it DOES mean that there is something to that overall goal that has universal appeal, and we sure do want something about that goal.

So in the case of happiness, I think we all want to be happy. But as has been noted, happiness as the goal in itself has problems. Drugs, evil, and even sloth. We can gain happiness from unvirtuous actions, and to your notion you note that virtues give happiness which is greater and true. As a logical statement, I think we both know there's something wrong with that. But to the deeper notion, that there is more value in happiness from being virtuous over happiness from being unvirtuous, there's an appeal.

So lets dig into that. Maybe happiness is simply an outcome of doing steps, and sometimes the steps can be good or evil. In general, we think of positive happiness when doing the right things, so we mistakenly associate the emotion with doing the right thing. What gives us happiness then?

The fulfillment of our desires. But if we say fulfilling our desires is moral, I think all would disagree. We all have desires that if fulfilled would be less than moral. But why are they less than moral? Because they damage us or people around us. A drug user damages the rest of their brain for an emotion. A person who would make everyone else dumb and happy does the same thing to others. A glutton damages their own body and takes resources from others.

Virtues are ways of fulfilling ones, or others desires without harm to the self or others. To your note about 'maturity', maturity is a skilled and experienced way of fulfilling yours and others desires in the world with minimal harm. This can result in happiness, but not for those who are broken and can only gain pleasure from unvirtuous actions.

For sure one that jumps right out at me is the Unity Principle. Now, I made the term up. So, don't go looking into philosophical canon for it. But you will recognize the idea. The idea is that essentially, 'You are me and I am you.' Every permutation of that statement is true. 'You are God', 'I am God', 'We are each other', 'You are everything.', and even something as wacky as 'You are the table', or 'The table is you.' These are all true and represent the Unity Principle as a concept. — Chet Hawkins

I think this is a good first reason to give if someone asks, "Why should I care if I harm myself or others."

Proof is for cowards. Proof is a bid to certainty, which is delusional. "Doubt may be an unpleasant condition, but certainty is absurd." - Voltaire Is that wisdom. You bet it is. — Chet Hawkins

Ha ha! I had to laugh at this, and I get it. The reality is that much of our life and decisions must occur without proof. Proof is for the academic, and when talking to others who have a different cultural or emotional outlook in life than ourselves. When speaking to those in similar cultures or emotional outlooks, proof is often not needed.

Objectivity relies on facts or reason that must necessarily exist. Otherwise, isn't it just a subjective opinion that an objective morality exists?
— Philosophim
Of course it is and that is also irrelevant. So, what are you asking in that? — Chet Hawkins

If its a subjective opinion that there is an objective morality, then one has not proved that there is an objective morality, they have just given a subjective morality that believes in an objective morality. Again though, it depends on who you are speaking with. Less discerning people, or people of similar culture and values to yourself, will not need much convincing to be persuaded in your direction. In the case of discerning academic, or someone with a far different culture or emotional outlook on life, they will not be convinced.

If maturity is what causes genuine happiness, isn't the real moral thing to chase maturity?
— Philosophim
Wisdom, maturity, and moral aims are synonymous. So, yes.

But Pragmatists mean something different when they ask this question you just did. So I will challenge it. Do you mean people should grow up and stop being idealists in equal measure to pragmatism? Is that what you immorally call maturity? If so, you are wrong. — Chet Hawkins

No, I learned long ago that labels are lazy. I meant what I said in regards to your definition of maturity and nothing more.

Good conversation Chet! :) I appreciate your passion.

So nothing can be prior to it, whether cause or reason.
— Ludwig V

Based on what I said above, this is not a sound conclusion. It appears like the intuitions and concepts which we use to understand our world, and our universe, would not be applicable toward understanding the reality of whatever the conditions were prior to the Big Bang, but this does not imply nothing can be prior to it, in any absolute sense. What it is that was prior to the Big Bang would most likely require a completely different conceptual structure to understand it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you understand that if there is something which caused the Big Bang, then the Big Bang is not a first cause? A first cause is not an opinion or belief. It is a reality that we either know about, or do not know about.

My discussion of intention, free will, final cause, did not consist of vague maybes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your point has largely been, "Maybe there's a prior cause to the first cause." This is what I'm addressing. I have not seen a concrete example that demonstrates a situation in which there is a first cause, then you show that logically, there is actually a prior cause to that. If we had a concrete example, we could look at that. And if you have and I've missed it, don't get mad, just repost it.

Ok, this is a much better point! What you're missing is the phrase 'prior reason'. If you noted I'm not saying that there isn't a reason for a first cause, I'm saying there is not a prior reason.
— Philosophim

That, as I demonstrated is a faulty conclusion. The conclusion is that there cannot be an event prior to the first cause as the cause of it. The conclusion "there is not a prior reason" is unsupported. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is just a repeat of a belief you have, you're not demonstrating why the point I gave you is incorrect. Look, if there's no prior cause for something, there's no prior reason for something either. Give me a concrete example of what you mean by a first cause having a prior reason without that prior reason being the cause of the first cause.

You have no premise to draw this conclusion. A "cause" as described by your "chain of events", is an "event". We might say that a cause, or an event suffices as "the reason" in some instances, but it does not in all instances. This implies that "reason " is the broader term, with a wider range of meaning. If the inverse was the case, if all reasons were causes, then "no prior cause" would imply "no prior reason". But that is not the case, so "no priior cause" does not imply "no prior reason". Conversely, "no prior reason" would imply "no prior cause" as "reason" has logical priority over "cause", "cause" being included within "reason". — Metaphysician Undercover

Give me an example.

Again, you have no logic to support this conclusion, that the reason for the first cause could only be "it simply exists". Your argument does not deal with reasons at all, it deals with causes, so any assertions you make about the reasons for the first cause are only unsupported opinions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I just typed out the definition of reason and noted I'm using it as a synonym to 'explanation'. I'm uninterested in your opinions that I have no logic, I'm interested in if you can take the logic I've noted, and give a good example of counter object that would demonstrate that my logic is wrong.

My reference to empirical evidence was simply to show that your definition of "cause" is not consistent with empirical evidence, it is therefore a false premise. — Metaphysician Undercover

Incorrect. You only have empirical evidence of things which have prior causality. As I've noted, we do not have empirical evidence of things which do not. This does not negate the logic that there necessarily must be a first cause.

Your definition of "cause" is false, and as I've explained many times to you already, you need to broaden your understanding of what a "cause" is. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I don't need to do anything. I've clearly laid out what a cause and first cause is as defined here. You need to demonstrate with some concrete examples why this definition is either impossible, contradictory, or doesn't make sense. If you simply don't like it, that's not my problem. Its on you to demonstrate how one of the most basic logical statements you can construct, "There can be no cause prior to a first cause" is somehow illogical. To my mind where I have given you every benefit of the doubt I can, you have not done so.

n my usage. which I think is also common philosophical usage, a reason is not a cause, because it does not need to be an event or even a spatio-temporal entity. — Ludwig V

I have not been intending to use reason as a cause, but as an explanation. Of why "X" is a cause. I think the problem some people have been having is this is not a universal, and that sometimes reason can be substituted for cause. Part of the reason why some people may have problems with cause is people are having a difficult time grasping what a reason is.

And, as I explained to Philosophim already, if we move to allow that "cause" of an event includes also the "reason" for the event, as a type of cause, then we must remove the defining feature of a chain, series, or sequence, because this type of cause does not occur in a chain.
— Metaphysician Undercover
Quite so. — Ludwig V

I also agree this would be a problem. But I am not using the term reason to explain another cause. That would clearly contradict my notion that a first cause is absolute, so I think even a moderately charitable reading of what I've been expressing would conclude I'm not attempting to blatantly contradict myself.

The reason why there can be no prior reason for a first cause, is that there is no prior causal event. There can be a reason as an explanation for why a first cause exists, "That is it simply exists." But there cannot be a prior reason, as there is nothing prior which causes it. Does this clear up the issue?
— Philosophim

Again, you have no logic to support this conclusion, that the reason for the first cause could only be "it simply exists". Your argument does not deal with reasons at all, it deals with causes, so any assertions you make about the reasons for the first cause are only unsupported opinions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have noted many times why this must be, but it might have been missed. First, I'm using 'reason' as an explanation. "Why is this a first cause?" Reason: Because it has no prior cause which caused it. Pretty simple.

As I tried to say earlier, the reason you suggest for the first cause/reason is, to me, not a cause/reason at all, but a rejection of the request to provide one. "Because it exists" marks the limits of our explanations - a brute fact or a first cause. — Ludwig V

And I'll note again, "reason" is not being used as "cause", but explanation. So to your point, "Because it exists" marks the limits of our explanations, yes.

I always thought that the existence of something was always an empirical, not a logical question, so I'm treating your first cause as a possibility, not a certainty. — Ludwig V

What is logically necessary may not be empirically certain, this is true. No disagreement from me!

...a photon can appear without any velocity
— Philosophim

Do you dispute that a photon with rest mass entails infinite quantities, and that equations describing practical situations break down upon approach to functions with infinite input/output values? — ucarr

I will clarify with more care. I'm simply using this as an example, not trying to say such a thing actually exists. My point is that there is no way to predict when or how a first cause would form or exist. To say a first cause must form a particular way or is likely to form at a particular time would require a cause outside of itself. A thing which has no causality outside of itself thus can have no restrictions as to what it could be upon existing. I am not sure where you are getting the infinite qualities though. Could you give an example?

More generally, how can something be first cause if its essential makeup entails differentiable constituent components co-equal in primary status? — ucarr

Great question. Lets keep it extremely simple so its clear. Lets imagine that we first spy a hydrogen atom that forms with apparently no prior cause. Any time tick before this, the atom is not there. Once it is there, we know an atom is composed of particular parts. Lets pretend, for simplicities sake, that protons, neutrons, and electrons are fundamental particles. We say, "What causes this atom to exist?" We note the protons, neutrons, and electrons in a particular order. But this is not a prior cause, just the inner causal make up of the atom in general.

Once we get to the fundamental particles, there is no other cause for those particles in terms of parts, or prior time. Meaning that they are the first causes. So what caused the atom? The combination of fundamental parts of the atom formed without prior cause at the same time.

Why do you not think the logical necessity of a first cause positions it as an antecedent to the first cause it necessitates? — ucarr

Could you clarify this with an example? You definitely make good points ucarr, I'm just not quite getting it here.

Why do you not say a first cause is Y & ~Y in superposition? I ask this particular question with the assumption that a first cause must instantiate motion. — ucarr

A first cause does not have to instantiate motion. A first cause may be already in motion, with again, no prior cause as to what it is in motion. As an example, a photon can appear without any velocity, or with velocity. A first cause has no restrictions on how it can or must exist. If it did, there would be something else which caused those restrictions, which is impossible.