I like this. I think it's a useful way of looking at the issue. I hadn't thought of it in these terms before. — T Clark
Truth must exist first for reason to matter.
— Philosophim
Hmmm... I wonder if I agree with this. — T Clark
The mistake is thinking that if one has created a framework that leads to a conclusion through reason alone, that this necessarily makes the conclusion true. Truth must exist first for reason to matter. — Philosophim
Too bad, that's the definition of good.
— Philosophim
Nah my guy. The definitions of good vary between 'that which is desired', 'that which is required' and ; 'that which is morally right'. — AmadeusD
Why should one do that which is good? No, I don't think that good is synonymous with, "something one ought to do". — Hyper
Would this mean, then, that true evil is impossible, per Law of Conservation of Mass? — Outlander
Does that mean if we disallow cruel or violent (albeit new) interactions, inventions, ideas, and existences we are evil? Surely not? — Outlander
Example. Going with the premise. Say, in the not too distant future, man has advanced in warfare and weaponry birthing the existence of a bomb whose yield would destroy the entire planet. Say it is somehow known, this weapon would inevitably be used. Would a hypothetical contagion that wipes out 99.9% of life on Earth thus preventing said weapon from ever being used not be 'good' in such a scenario under the above circumstances? According to this premise, it would, as it prevents a larger decrease in quantitative existence. — Outlander
If you want to use ‘real’ in your more generic sense, then that is fine: it does not avoid the issue that the a priori preconditions for that experience are not a part of reality—they are, rather, the epistemic ‘tools’ which human cognition has for cognizing reality. Do you see this difference I am noting (irregardless of the semantics)? — Bob Ross
My point is, is that any discrete experience is real.
It is not a part of reality, though. Do you agree with that? — Bob Ross
“discrete” is a word which references an idea engrained, fundamentally, in space. You may say that ‘space’ is not conceptually known, self-reflectively, by merely discretely experiencing, but do you agree that, at least, space is the ingrained form of that experience in virtue of which it is discrete? — Bob Ross
I need clarification: are you asking for an example of a prior vs. a posteriori aspects of experience OR a priori vs. a posteriori knowledge? — Bob Ross
My point is that I am unable to see your division between aprior space and aposteriori space.
There is no a posteriori space—it is pure intuition. What I think you are confusing is self-reflective knowledge with transcendental knowledge (and innate capacities, as you would put it). — Bob Ross
1. Babies experience (outer objects) in space.
2. Babies do not have any self-reflective conceptual capacities (through reason) that they experience (outer objects) in space nor what ‘space’ is as ‘extension’.
3. A child can, at some stage of development, understand notionally what space is without being about to apply language to explain it.
4. Adults have a self-reflective understanding of what space is, and can apply language to explain it. — Bob Ross
No, we are continually experiencing. Then, we create discrete experiences
Hmmm, maybe I am misremembering your theory: I thought you agreed with me that our experience is inherently, innately, discrete; which implies that space and time are the forms, even if you don’t think they are pure a priori, of that experience. — Bob Ross
Here’s one of the roots of our confusion: you are failing to recognize that cognition has a dual meaning on english—it can refer to our self-reflective cognition (e.g., thinking about our experience) or our transcendental cognition (e.g., our brains thinking about how to construct experience). I would like you to address this distinction, because you keep equivocating them throughout your posts. — Bob Ross
Your thoughts are not represented to you. You experience them
Do you deny that your brain is organizing your thoughts in time to construct your experience of them (of which you can introspect)? — Bob Ross
it suggests that experience is structured by inherent cognitive faculties that synthesize sensations into a unified whole, making perception itself possible. — Wayfarer
That process is what is described as 'transcendental' - not in the sense of 'beyond experience' but implicit in the nature of experience. It is 'transcendental' in the sense that it refers to the conditions that are always operative within experience, shaping it from within, not transcending it in a mystical or otherworldly sense. The transcendental conditions Kant describes, which Brook highlights, operate in a way that is fundamentally invisible to direct introspection. They’re not accessible through casual reflection or even careful self-observation, because they are so ingrained in the structure of experience that we can’t “see” them directly. They function as the very backdrop against which experience is possible, like the frame of a picture that remains unseen because our attention is always focused on the content within. — Wayfarer
One of Brook’s focal points is Kant’s idea of the “transcendental unity of apperception,” which describes the self’s role in providing coherence to experience. Brook interprets this as a fundamental cognitive function: the capacity to unify various sensory inputs and thoughts under a consistent self-conscious perspective. He connects this to modern discussions on self-awareness, suggesting that understanding the self’s role in cognition is critical to grasping how mental states are integrated. Brook also argues that cognitive science benefits from a Kantian perspective in addressing issues like consciousness, self-reference, and the structured nature of perception, showing that Kant’s insights help bridge philosophical inquiry and empirical study, while deepening our grasp of the mind’s foundational structures. — Wayfarer
In all these approaches, Kant’s idea that our minds contribute fundamental structures to experience remains a guiding principle. Each tradition takes up Kant’s insight in its own way, exploring how knowledge, perception, and meaning arise through active engagement with the world, rather than as direct imprints of objective reality. — Wayfarer
The a priori aspects of your experience exist (viz., ‘there are these a priori aspects to your experience) but they are not real (viz., ‘these a priori aspects of your experience are not in reality but, rather, modes of cognizing reality). — Bob Ross
Space, as a pure intuition, is not in reality nor it is a property sensed of the objects that are in reality: it is the way that your brain is pre-structured to intuit phenomena; and so space, as a pure form of sensibility, is not real (because it is not of reality) but certainly exists (as a pre-structured way for your brain to represent and intuit sensations). — Bob Ross
Perhaps what would help is to clearly show a non-empirical aposteriori example and an empirical apriori example?
I did that with space: what did you disagree with there? — Bob Ross
The scientific fact you pointed to was whether a young person knows what space is; and not if it transcendentally uses it to intuit and cognize objects for its conscious experience; nor if it transcendentally uses it with its self-reflective reason to understand its own conscious experience of things. — Bob Ross
Space and time are identities we create to label experiences
Then, you must believe that you aren’t consciously experiencing in space and time before you conceptually understood that you were; which is nonsense. — Bob Ross
Space and time are pure a priori, because they are not based off of sensations at all. — Bob Ross
How is this different from any other identity like 'red', 'giraffe' or 'Bob'? :)
It depends on what you mean. If you mean an concept which we self-reflective deploy for our conscious experience, then it is no different. — Bob Ross
No, reason does not fundamentally think in terms of space. It thinks in terms of discrete experience.
That’s what conceptual space is! It is transcendental, because it is necessary precondition for the possibility of using self-reflective reason. Therefore, I am right in concluding, even in your terminology, that we must already use space even when we don’t know what space is. — Bob Ross
There are only five of them.
We already agreed this is false; and scientifically it is utterly false. — Bob Ross
Let’s take the simplest example of inner sense: thoughts about thoughts. I can introspectively analyze my own thinking about other things, and this is because my inner thoughts are presented to me in time. If my inner thoughts were not presented to me, if they were not represented to me, then they would not be formulated experientially, consciously, in succession. — Bob Ross
there's a current philosopher, Lawrence BonJour, who writes about role of a priori knowledge and philosophical rationalism. As it happens, I've found a rather good and quite brief video on BonJour's ideas, by a professor of philosophy, which you can review here. — Wayfarer
I was using my terminology too loosely and that is my fault: what I should have said is “<…> independently of our experience of reality”, as that denotes the aspects of experience which are a posteriori—i.e., empirical. — Bob Ross
By “experience”, I just generically mean the conscious awareness of which one is having; so why would I say there’s an a priori and a posteriori aspect to that experience? Because, simply put, there are things which my brain is adding into the mix (i.e., are synthetical) which are not actually of the sensations (of objects in reality) in order for it to represent them in the conscious experience which I will have of them. — Bob Ross
If the sensations are intuited in space and time, then space and time are not contained themselves in the sensations; and it is even clearer when you realize that your brain cannot possibly learn how to represent things with extension nor succession to do it in the first place. — Bob Ross
So, e.g., space and time are forms in and of which your brain represents things and are not properties of the things-in-themselves (whatever they may be). — Bob Ross
— Bob Ross
No. I think that there’s a difference between the self-reflective reason—i.e., meta-cognition and self-consciousness—and non-self-reflective reason (i.e., cognition and consciousness). My brain has the “capacity”, as you put it, to represent in space and this extensional representation is not a reflection of any extension, per se, that an object itself actually has; but I must come to know, by experience, that I can extract out one of the forms of my experience as spatiality and that is is a priori. — Bob Ross
you cannot have thoughts without separation of objects/concepts/abstractions. This requires a spatial aspect not deduced frmo the objects/concepts/abstractions. — AmadeusD
It was an catchy way of saying “not all knowledge is acquired and grounded in empirical data—a posteriori data”: there are certain ways we are pre-structured to perceive which necessarily are not reflections of anything in reality. — Bob Ross
How is knowledge gained apriori?
Through experience, but not through empirical data. It is a transcendental investigation into how our cognition represents things, independently of what is being represented, in pre-structured ways. — Bob Ross
I was entertaining your idea that someone could be thinking, self-reflectively, without ever having an inner or outer sense of space. If that is true, then they still would implicitly being using the concept of space, because reason fundamentally thinks in terms of space. — Bob Ross
Of course there are inner senses: they are senses of oneself or, more broadly, any sense capable of sensing the being which has those senses. — Bob Ross
There’s so much densely packed into section 4, of which you wanted me to read, that I am clueless as to what you are wanting to discuss about it. — Bob Ross
Isn't how we perceive reality also how we empirically experience reality? A color blind person would have a different empirical experience then a normal color sighted person. Is that experience apriori or aposteriori?
“empirically experience” doesn’t make sense, and is the source of your confusion: like I said before, ‘experience’ is both in part a priori and a posteriori; and it necessarily must be that way. — Bob Ross
How can one have experience and also not have experience?
I was noting that not all aspects of experience are empirical; — Bob Ross
We do not have five senses: any pre-structured means of receptivity of objects (which includes ourselves) is form of sensibility. So, introspection, proprioception, echolocation, and electrolocation are straightforwardly senses; — Bob Ross
memory is just the reinvocation of previous experience and so is has both a priori and a posteriori aspects to it; and hallucination, although they didn’t mention it, has for its a posteriori aspects fabricated data. — Bob Ross
What truly separates the two?
I’ve made it clear what separates them: what are you contending is wrong with my distinction? — Bob Ross
a priori justification is linked closely to knowledge: it would be evidence grounded in the way we experience as opposed to what we experience if we take the Kantian use of the terms, and more broadly it would be any evidence grounded in the way we think about reality as opposed anything about reality itself (e.g., law of identity as a logical law by which we self-reflectively reason about our experience). — Bob Ross
In principle, there can be a human which lacks the faculty of understand and reason such that there is no space in which objects are being represented, because there’s nothing being represented (from the outer senses) at all. — Bob Ross
As I've noted, there really is no mental difference between the empirical and non-empirical. To me, the true difference is in 'application' or 'assertion'. The empirical asserts that one's mental constructs represent an intake of something independent of oneself, while 'mental' aspects, such as thoughts and memory, are taken to be something that is dependent on oneself. Or maybe a better phrasing is, "of the self". But they are both experiences. — Philosophim
Not everything you said is rooted in the empirical aspect of experience; and that’s what you are equivocating. That a person could think without experiencing anything in space and, let’s grant for your point, which I highly doubt is possible, who lacks a concept of space does not lack it because of lacking empirical data—they lack it because one of the a priori pure forms of sensibility, space, was never used by the brain (because perhaps their brain is damaged and cannot do it). They lack the concept of space self-reflectively because they’ve never had an outer experience (which would include that a priori form). — Bob Ross
On a separate note, this hypothetical is impossible in actuality; for one cannot think, self-reflectively, through reason without using the concept of space—even if they have never experienced it. — Bob Ross
How does a person who has no senses understand space?
Assuming you mean that they have no outer or inner senses; then they cannot understand space, because they lack the ability to understand anything—what you are describing is a dead person. — Bob Ross
Babies from birth represent objects in space, but they do not from birth know that in which the objects are represented is space; but once they have the sufficient self-reflective cognitive abilities, they can know it and it is a priori knowledge because it is not justified by any empirical data—it is justified by the non-empirical way that their brain is representing. — Bob Ross
Sorry I didn't see this: I wasn't linked to it. Philosophim, I am not going to make your argument for you (: — Bob Ross
I think you are thinking that a priori knowledge is knowledge which one has independently of ever having experienced anything; and I am partially to blame to for that: I was misusing the term a while back. — Bob Ross
a posteriori knowledge is knowledge which is grounded in empirical data, and is, thusly, about reality; whereas a priori knowledge is about how we perceive reality. — Bob Ross
Taking space as another example, the axiom in geometry that “the shortest path between two points is a straight line connecting them” is a proposition that is true in virtue of the way we experience as opposed to what we experience — Bob Ross
I'm talking about instincts as the being of a person prior to any experience.
Then the root of our disagreement there is merely semantical: that’s not usually what an “instinct” means. For example, Webster’s is “a largely inheritable and unalterable tendency of an organism to make a complex and specific response to environmental stimuli without involving reason”. — Bob Ross
The point that I was making with “applicable” vs. “distinctive” knowledge, is that it doesn’t preclude a priori knowledge; and it would be applicable knowledge in your theory (assuming I grant our theory in its entirety). — Bob Ross
Space data is not empirical—you are using the terms to loosely. There are aspects of your experience which your brain produces as a matter of how it is pre-structured to represent vs. the actual empirical data it is representing. — Bob Ross
I was noting that not all aspects of experience are empirical; and I can’t tell if you agree with that or not — Bob Ross
I would say it is also independent of the imagination, thoughts, memories, etc. being that it is the necessary preconditions for that as well. — Bob Ross
Not quite: an instinct is a way one is predisposed to reacting to experience; — Bob Ross
whereas the a priori means of cognizing objects is a way we are pre-structured to experience. To your point, we could very well say that there are a priori instincts we have vs. ones we learn. My point here is just that you are invalidly forming a dichotomy between ‘instincts’ and ‘experience’ which turns out to be a false one. — Bob Ross
You aren’t thinking about it properly, and this is what is the root of the confusion. Not everything that is a priori is instinctual (like I noted before); and a priori knowledge is any knowledge which has its truth-maker in the way we experience as opposed to what we experience. — Bob Ross
This is why Kant noted that math is a priori; because no matter what you are experiencing, the propositions in math are true in virtue of the way we cognize objects in space and time which is true for anything a human will experience. — Bob Ross
“1 + 1 = 2” is true as grounded by the way our brains cognize, the mathematical axioms which it has, and not because of something we learned about something which we experienced (in terms of its purely empirical content). — Bob Ross
This is why Kant famously said that all knowledge begins with experience but that does not mean all knowledge arises out of experience. — Bob Ross
The space which objects are presented to you in is purely synthetic: it is something your brain added into the mix—not empirical data. — Bob Ross
What we are discussing is not if knowledge begins with experience, but if there aspects of our experience which are not experiential. — Bob Ross
Bases are just different ways to represent numbers: I am talking about numbers themselves — Bob Ross
If you understood the essential properties and context of what grue and bleen is, then yes
You can tell when things were created down to the year just by looking at them? When you drive through a neighborhood you know the year each house was built just as readily as the the color it is painted? — Count Timothy von Icarus
This seems like "because difference is not a logical contradiction it is arbitrary." — Count Timothy von Icarus
Human languages distinguish between shape and color — Count Timothy von Icarus
If someone argued that chemistry should be split into chemistry done by people with blue eyes and chemistry done by people with other colored eyes, or argued that we should divide chemistry into pre and post 1990 chemistries, or a chemistry of federally recognized holidays, they would be rebuffed for non-arbitrary reasons. — Count Timothy von Icarus
This might be filtered through "personal preference," but personal preference doesn't spring from the aether uncaused and neither do our concepts and languages. — Count Timothy von Icarus
A theorem (as opposed to an equation that's given a real-world interpretation) isn't described as effective, it's described as true, or at least provable in L. — J
Do you want to abandon that way of talking? If a correspondence theory of truth demands that we do so, I'd argue that it represents a reductio ad absurdum and should be rejected on that ground. — J
Suppose bleen is "green and "first observed" during or before 2004," or "blue and 'first observed' after 2004." Could you go walk around where you live and determine what was grue or bleen? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Suppose there is a famous green landmark in your town and it got flattened by a tornado in 2006. It was rebuilt with largely with materials salvaged from the original, but has a substantial amount of new material. Is it bleen or grue? — Count Timothy von Icarus
What if only small parts of it were replaced each year since 2004? — Count Timothy von Icarus
↪Philosophim What a cromulent response! :smile:
This just pushes the question back a level -- why is it effective? — J
Wouldn't it make more sense for you (if I've understood your thinking here) to abandon any talk of accuracy or truth? — J
Well, perhaps, but how can "accuracy" be a factor at all? What would make something an "accurate representation," to use your phrase, and of what is it a representation? None of the three factors talk about how such an idea could arise.
To put it in simple terms (borrowed from Sider), are we really not in a position to say that the Bleen people have gotten something wrong? — J
By referring to "accurate representation," you've introduced an epistemologically normative factor that is nowhere implied in the first three factors. — J
OK. So no one of your factors would be something like "This set of concepts more accurately reflects the ontological structure of the world"? — J
Heck, we even disagree on which of us is more focused on 'what we want' and 'what is most likely'. Hehe. It's that kind of topic, eh? — Patterner
Not sure it's possible for the two of us to not talk about it, though. If you say something I disagree with, I'll often want the other person to know there is another pov. — Patterner
Sider uses the "grue and bleen world" example (which you can read about here, p. 16) to refer to a situation that he believes needs explaining: If we encountered a people who used grue and bleen as their concepts, we'd be unable to fault them on any logical grounds. — J
Firstly, “a priori” refers, within the context of transcendental investigations, as “that which is independent of any possible experience—viz., independent of empirical data”. — Bob Ross
“Knowledge” is just a justified, true belief (with truth being a version of correspondence theory) or, more generically, ~”having information which is accurate”. — Bob Ross
The proposition “all bodies are extended” is universally true for human experience and a priori because the way we experience is in space (necessarily); and so this is a priori known. — Bob Ross
This immediately incites the question: “if A is knowledge and B is knowledge, then aren’t they inheriting the same type of knowledge and, if so, thereby the question of ‘what is knowledge?’
Of course, you probably have an answer to this that I don’t remember….it has been a while (; — Bob Ross
Briefly, I will also say, that your schema doesn’t negate the possibility of a priori “knowledge” (in your sense of knowledge): it would be applicable knowledge, as the whole metaphysical endeavor of transcendental investigation would be applicable knowledge. — Bob Ross
The question becomes: “why don’t you think that we can apply a priori knowledge without contradiction and reasonably to the forms of experience (viz., the necessary preconditions for the possibility of experience) given that we both agree that our experience is representational?”. — Bob Ross
The fact that we can do math in different bases does not negate that the same mathematical operations are occurring, and that they are synthetical, a priori propositions. — Bob Ross
It is purely an abstract thing that cannot be applicably known.
Ehhhh, then you cannot claim to know that there must be a thing-in-itself at all; or otherwise concede that you can know applicably, through experience, that if our experience is representational then there must be a thing-in-itself. — Bob Ross
"The thing in itself" is a space alien
Then a thing-in-itself is not a concept which is purely logical—that was my only point on this note. It is referencing something concrete. — Bob Ross
↪Philosophim I did read the summary. Is this the passage you're referring to (concerning "privileged structure" or the like)?: — J
I just think this needs further explanation; logic and noncontradiction alone won't get us to why some matches seem more natural or reality-mirroring than others ("privileged structure"). — J
But we don't have any idea how the micro physical properties give rise to subjective experience. We can't figure it out. And, as I've quoted a few times, Brian Greene, who Has a BA in physics from Harvard, and DPhil (PhD) in theoretical physics at Magdalen College, says the micro properties don't seem to have any connection to consciousness. — Patterner
I see what you mean, but we can construct an infinite number of worlds with different abstract entities highlighted (see "grue and bleen", Sider, p. 16) and most of them won't "work" at all, if by "work" you mean "give us a useful conceptual basis for navigating the world." — J
Yet there is nothing wrong, logically, with the way these abstractions are being matched to reality. — J
Interesting point. But if the images in dreams are from the memories, why some folks see images that they have never come across in their lives, or meet people they cannot recognise and never met, or go to the places they have never been in their whole lives before? — Corvus
Saith him wanting to be logical. I'm looking for a discussion with clarity on a serious problem. You just want to play. It's too bad you do not know how to do either. — tim wood
I don't agree with it. I just don't have a problem with it
— Philosophim
You're taking issue with it, saying he's mistaken, so don't be too polite about it. :wink: — Wayfarer
If you read more of Chalmers, you will see he in no way discounts the neurological perspective. — Wayfarer
Andrei Linde has given a deep reason for why observers enter into quantum cosmology in a fundamental way. It has to do with the nature of time. The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time looses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271
I don't think that its another category of thinking. It's the first- and third-person perspectives. — Wayfarer