Great post Bob! I agree with you that at this time there are a few differences of definitions, and we both have to clarify what we mean to a point where we can say we completely understand each other's viewpoints first.

However, I was using it in the sense that you were before: mere awareness (i.e., observation, identification, and action). ...In this case, there is no contradiction in terms because you can have a being which observes and has no qualitative experience. — Bob Ross

I think this was a misunderstanding of an implicit part of the definition of observation. As I defined it was always intended to be qualitative experience.

Observation is the receipt of some type of information. This could be a sense, sensation, or even a thought. Another way to look at is is "undefined experience". — Philosophim

This misunderstanding is on trying to blend our different terms together. I had used the example of a camera and an AI as an observer and identifier. The AI is the observer and identifier, the camera merely provides the information for the AI. Of course, its easy to then say the "camera" is observing. I tried to pivot to your notion of quantitative for the camera, or that we simply observe the camera follows basic set processes of filtering light. I agreed with you that a camera does not have qualitative experience, therefore it is not an observer. At that point I should have switched from "being that observes" to "an observer" to fit better within your terms. A camera quantitatively processes data, but it is not an observer. I can agree with this understanding while also using your terminology.

The point is that your objective consciousness is only this sort of quantitative experience, where “experience” is mere awareness/observation. — Bob Ross

Regardless of our opinions on what definitions to use, we cannot use the term 'quantitative experience'. This simply does not work. Objective consciousness is a quantitative analysis of consciousness. Not an experience, ie subjective viewpoint. If you note that a being can have a quantitative experience, then you are conceding that we can know what a beings subjective experience is like through objective means.

The word quantitative can only be used as an objective outside observation, not an internal one.

I think I agree: an AI is said to have no internal ‘experience’ (in the sense you are now using it) but is understood as still able to observe, and its ability to observe is explained via quantitative measurements. Is that what you are saying? — Bob Ross

No, I noted that an AI is an observer and identifies. Therefore it is subjectively conscious under my initial definition. However, we must more clearly define that this AI must have an "I" which can evaluate as well. I'll go into more detail that later. We objectively know it is conscious because we quantitatively, or by math, understand how it observes and identifies information through functions and algorithms. But do we know what its like to experience being an ai as it observes and identifies? No.

So, although I understand what you are saying, I think you are conflating consciousness proper with meta-consciousness; to keep it brief, there is a difference between having introspective access to one’s qualitative experiences and simply having them. Think of a beetle, they are such a low form of life that they have 0 introspective access to their experience, but they are nevertheless experiencing (qualitatively). — Bob Ross

I think one mistake we've talked past a bit on is what I mean by consciousness. My points are not concerned with higher levels of consciousness or meta consciousness. They really are just about whether there is an experiencing being or a mechanical process which has no experience. To ease confusion and simplify our points, meta-consciousness should not be brought up as I don't see the need for it. When considering consciousness then, we are discussing the minimally viable level to be conscious. That would be experiencing qualia, which requires an "I".

If a beetle can experience and identify, then it is conscious according to my definition. But you make a fantastic point with your example of your unfortunate experience. I have had to step back and wonder if my definition of consciousness was not detailed enough and too implicit. First, there is the question as to whether you were conscious, but you didn't remember that you were conscious. From my point of view, consciousness does not require a memory of being conscious. But does it require memory? For our discussion, I suppose it doesn't. Memory would perhaps involve higher level consciousness, but for base consciousness, no.

Of course, we then come to the other question of your experience. Is it that you didn't remember being conscious, or were you actually unconsciously doing things and no one around you knew? We can site sleep walkers who do things unconsciously and note that in every case, another person can tell they lack some type of consciousness. Still, there has to be some experience and identifying going on with sleep walking. So the question remains. Are they conscious and do not remember being conscious, or can the unconscious mind also observe and identify?

Ironically, my citation of brain scans can give us that answer. if it is the case that brain scans can detect that the unconscious mind is shaping what your conscious mind is about to do, then the answer is obvious. The unconscious mind can observe and identify. But is it itself an observer? I'll get to that soon as well.

From your perspective, I think you are inclined to say that the qualitative experience was gone during those blackouts, and that I was essentially a PZ during those moments. But, to me, we are thereby conflating the ego with the true ‘I’: I was still experiencing (e.g., folding my clothes, conversing with people, watching TV, etc.) but my ‘ego’ had left the chat, so to speak. — Bob Ross

I think this nails the issue down. In the common use of unconscious and conscious, there needs to be the "I", or ego. As I noted, when I said "observe" there's really the implicit I in that statement. So to be explicit, a conscious being is an "I" which observes and identifies. The question still remains as to whether you simply forgot your conscious experience, or if even an unconscious experience has a subjective viewpoint that we are unaware of.

So what does this change? Not much, but it does clarify. The unconscious portion of yourself would be "you", or what you are potentially able to access consciously, while the conscious part would be the ego "I" part of yourself. This would be your subjective consciousness. Where does that leave objective consciousness then? We would just expand our objective test to see by actions things that only a person with an I could do.

Now that I understand you don't divide the "I" between conscious and unconscious, I find your ideas more intriguing and understand some of the earlier points you were making. Also explicitly noting that subjective consciousness requires an I from me does make some of my earlier statements incomplete. I stated that a camera and an AI would be conscious, but no. At minimum it could be unconscious! We would need to have an AI that also would meet the standard for what an "I" is. Consciousness is a next step evaluation of unconscious processing (observing and identifying) that forms an "I".

There is a deeper question here as well. Just because "I" am not experiencing, does that mean that the subconscious has a subjective experience that we are simply unable to know? Schizophrenia is a condition in which a person can express multiple personalities. I've seen it first hand. What if Schizophrenia is a condition where certain unconscious portions of the mind which would normally stay unconscious suddenly enter into the realm of consciousness? Same with "voices" in one's head that don't seem to be one's own.

This is the natural consequence of not being able to determine what it is like for something to experience from its viewpoint. But if an unconscious mind does have a view point that our "I" is unaware of, does that change the notion of consciousness and unconsciousness? I'll need time to think on that personally. At least we both agree on something. It is impossible to know what another things subjective experience is like.

I think that you see the objective and subjective as two sides of the same coin, but you equally hold that the objective doesn’t prove the subjective—and these two claims are incoherent with each other. — Bob Ross

Let me clarify. It is not that the objective does not prove that other beings have subjective experiences. It is only that the objective cannot prove what it is like to BE that subjective experiencer. I've noted brain scans and surgery, which I understand you do not want to accept. If you cannot accept that your mind is caused by your brain, then of course we will have to agree to disagree here.

So I think we can conclude a few things from our excellent discussion.

1. You and I disagree on the definition of consciousness. I require a subjective "I". If I understand correctly, in your view the unconscious still has qualia, which I consider needing a subjective "I" to experience. In your view however the unconscious subject is still an "I" in the sense that this unconsciousness is potentially accessible to the conscious (speaking generally, I understand there are exceptions).

2. You and I disagree on whether or not the brain causes consciousness. A large part of this may be due to your definitions of qualia and consciousness. While you state you believe I have not given enough evidence to prove that the brain causes consciousness, under my terms I have. I have not seen the citations I've given be refuted in any way. Even if you note that the unconscious experiences qualia, the brain scans detecting what the unconscious is thinking about proves it still comes from the brain.
Perhaps it is true that the unconscious has a personal "I", just one that we are not privy too. I would need to look more into the study of the unconscious to make a decision here.

Since I'm not sure there's much more that can be said with these differences, I would like to explore another question. What is your reason for believing that consciousness is not caused by the brain? How will this line of thinking help society? Or is it merely that you just don't see the logical connections, and believe such conclusions are premature and prevent us from discovering the real alternative? My approach to philosophy has always been to make greater sense of the general understanding of the world. To take our common language, clarify it, and get rid of the skepticism or ambiguity that causes confusion at a deeper level. Paradigm shifts like yours seem like radical departures from the norm, and I've always wondered at the motivation for such. Obviously I am not in agreement with it, but it doesn't mean that I can't try to understand it.

This disagreement is also done in full respect Bob! Fantastic thinking was had by all sides, and I have a much better respect for your position now that I understand better the nature of your definitions and outlook. I look forward to your reply.

What you have done looks pointless. — I like sushi

And what you've done IS pointless.

I answered your initial question by informing you that Husserl does not have inductive hierarchies. That's a key point of the OP, and anyone who read it and Husserl would, looking at them in parallel, know what I said was true. Or at least try to show why I was wrong.

That was your test. You clearly didn't read the OP. Hierarchy of inductions is in the summary of the paper, as well as has its own underlined section. You were lazy sushi, and you got caught. Instead of owning up to it and actually trying, you dug in. A first time forum poster nailed the OP flawlessly, while you, a long time poster, mucked about wasting my time. You bet I'm disappointed in you.

I did not say that. — I like sushi

You didn't say the thing you said that I quoted? You're saying my answer that the hierarchy of inductions does not exist in Husserlian philosophy didn't answer your question? I spend my free time here with serious people. Attempt to make an actual point of discussion and I will engage. Otherwise I will be ignoring your posts going forward.

How is it different? — I like sushi

No, that's not the right way to approach this. Spend some time going over the argument, then explain why you believe the entirety of it and its conclusions is simply identical to eidetic reduction and nothing new.

This proves two things to me:

1. I know you've read the OP and actively tried to understand it.
2. You've read and understand what you've linked.

Do that, and I'll know you're serious about discussing. If you can't be bothered, neither will I.

Regardless, I have the view that the law of the excluded middle and other such basic elements of reason, are not dependent on human faculties, but because we have the faculty of reason we are able to discern them. It's precisely the ability of humans to grasp such facts which constitutes reason. — Wayfarer

Indeed, nothing can be said about what exists independently of human faculties (including reason) as whatever that might be, is beyond the scope of knowledge. — Wayfarer

Do you see how your own criticisms contradict your own statements? You claimed that "laws" exist apart from human reason, then in another reply you note that nothing can be said about what exists independent of our reason. Wayferer, how is that any different from humanities conclusion that physical objects exist apart from us, and we have the reason to discern them? Isn't precisely the human ability to grasp such facts which constitute reason? According to your own answer to Janus, your point is invalid.

As for your example, it doesn't stand, as the various forms of water are known a posteriori, whereas the law of identity is known a priori i.e. independently of experience. — Wayfarer

You're not comparing equivalent examples. "Can seven not exist in terms of bananas, dollars, and cars? " would be an equivalent comparison of a posteriori.

In the case of 7=7 could I not also say H20=H20, or "real physical properties" = "real physical properties"? Since real physical properties are equal to real physical properties, this is known apriori, or independently of experience right?

Personally, I do not believe in a posteriori or a priori as a good and clear separation of knowledge claims, but I will go with your separation for now. All I ask is for you to apply your criticisms against an outside physical world to your own ideas of the mental world equivalently.

I was referring to the instinctive belief in the 'mind-independent nature' of objects, which is just what has been called into question by quantum physics, where the act of measurement determines the outcome of the observation. — Wayfarer

That doesn't argue for the mind-independent nature of objects at all though. It notes that our ability to measure, which is applying X to Y and reading the bounce back, affects the outcome. It also notes that because we cannot track the exact location of an object due to very small objects vibrations and fluctuations, we use probability with limits to guess what the particles' location and velocity is to begin with. These are all physical realities, not mind-independent realities.

↪Philosophim So I just wasted my time reading your post? Thanks. Bye. — I like sushi

No, you wasted my time with that question. Obviously phenomenology does not have a hierarchy of inductions. I'm looking for serious discussion and contribution from your end, not troll posts.

The representation, the symbolic form, exists as matter, but the idea is real independently of it’s symbolic form. This is shown by the fact that the same idea can be represented by different forms, but 7=7 is true in all possible worlds. And that is so whether you think of it, or not, or whether it’s written down, or not. — Wayfarer

Referring back to your own words:

But this begs the question - it assumes what needs to be proven. — Wayfarer

Again your presumption of the reality of the object (the idea of 7) conditions your analysis - you presume that the object exists independently of any act of measurement, when that is precisely the point at issue! — Wayfarer

Aren't you just assuming there are other possible worlds? Aren't you assuming that 7=7 is independent of any brain that can think or process that symbology? As for the same idea being represented in different forms, can water not exist as both vapor, liquid, and ice? If H20 does not come together, water does not exist. It has the potential to exist, just as 7=7 has the potential to exist within a thinking mind as an idea. But if there is no thinking mind, there is no 7=7. If there is no combination of H20, there is no water.

Show me knowledge today of something that exists that is not matter and energy. If you do that, then I will concede. If you cannot, then my point stands.
— Philosophim

The number 7 is not matter or energy, yet it exists. — Wayfarer

I admit to some disappointment that my last reply was not addressed here, but I'll address this. What is the number 7 Wayfarer? It is an identity of the mind. Your ability to part and parcel reality into different identities, or "one" identity multiple times, is something most humans are capable of. The brain is as I noted previously, made of matter and energy. Your mind is your living brain. So is the identity of the number 7.

If you mark it down on a piece of paper, it exists in the form of ink and a dead tree. If you say it, it exists as a soundwave before dissipating. And if you think it in your mind, it exists as the energy and matter of your brain processing what we call a thought.

So how could it not exist as matter and energy?

The sense of sight (as a qualitative experience) has something it is like in and of itself. In other words, even if I don’t understand that I am qualitatively seeing, there is still something it is like for me to be qualitatively seeing. — Bob Ross

I think after hearing your explanation again, qualia boils down to subjective experience for me. But, we may dive a little deeper into what subjective experience means because I can see you don't quite mean that either.

In other words, your qualitative experience is really a steady flow of experiences with no distinct boundaries between them; and you single out, or carve out, experiences to compare to others nominally. — Bob Ross

This matches my definition of consciousness. Observation and identification. However, we still have slightly different viewpoints here.

Do we give attention to certain experience over others?
…
Or is this about definitions/identities we create out of the stream of experience we have?

I would say both. — Bob Ross

Just a call back here Bob, but this is what a discrete experiencer does.

So I want to bring back the discussion to quantitative for a second. If a quantitative experience is an experience, is there something that has that experience? For lack of a better term, this would be an "unconscious experience"?

There is nothing it is like to have unconscious experience because it isn’t qualitative; and I think this is where we begin to disagree. — Bob Ross

Ok, I think I've finally narrowed down the problem. We have two different uses of quantitative. We have a quantitative observation and a quantitative experience.

I think we both agree on quantitative observations. If I observe a thing calculating, then the measurement of that would be quantitative.

However, a quantitative experience is a contradiction. You've designed the word quantitative to be something that has no internal experience. If it has no internal experience, it is not an experience. The word quantitative can only be used as an objective outside observation, not an internal one. Therefore it simply can never be an experience without a contradiction of its base term. While it would be easy to dismiss it there, I think you're still trying to nail down something in particular, and I want to invite you to think with me on this.

Lets not use blindsight yet, but something more basic that we can all relate to. There is a nerve that by passes a cell in your lower leg. Its constantly there sending signals, but you're not conscious of it. We can describe this quantitatively of course. But its still a part of you isn't it? Unlike a row of dominos falling (I thought the analogy was quite fine Bob :) ) I can become conscious of that nerve at that cell if I receive a cut. I can have a subjective experience of that nerve cell eventually. I can never have the subjective experience of a set of falling dominos.

So when you mean quantitative experience, I think you're referring to a set of mechanics in our body that we could potentially be conscious of. Or at the least, somehow impacts our consciousness. I'm not quite sure what to call it. But I can see where the word "experience" would tend to come in, because there's the desire for us to say that the nerve cell is us, even though we aren't currently having qualia of it at any particular time.

Initially I want to call it 'unconscious embodiment', or something like that. Some things we are unconscious of can potentially be made conscious of, but then some things within our body we'll never be able to be conscious of, only quantitatively. For example, I'll never be able to conscious of the cells that produce my nails to the point that I can grow my nails faster or slower. I can only quantitatively observe how fast or slow my nails grow.

Also, something that we have an unconscious embodiment of can only be known quantitatively until we can know it qualitatively. This would match with the finding here. https://qz.com/1569158/neuroscientists-read-unconscious-brain-activity-to-predict-decisions

In that article there is a link to the original research paper. As noted:
"Neuroscientists have long known that the brain prepares to act before you’re consciously aware, and there are just a few milliseconds between when a thought is conscious and when you enact it."

And here perhaps we have the missing link. We cannot qualitatively experience the unconscious portions of ourselves. If we do, it then becomes a conscious portion of ourself. That is what I identify as subjective experience. The difference between the quantitative and the qualitative is the objective and the subjective. And our unconscious mind is the qualitative part of us that eventually we become subject to.

The unconscious portion of ourself is not qualia. It is outside of our conscious experience, and this fits with your definition of qualia. Unconsciousness is not a stream of experience that I am deciding what to focus or not to focus on, it is the unbidden processing that eventually becomes a qualia that we can focus on, blur, or dismiss.

Since the unconscious mind is measured quantitatively, and we see that it has a repeatable and known cause of what we qualitatively experience, we have more proof that the brain causes our qualitative experience, or subjective consciousness. We can quantitatively measure the brain and predict qualitative, or conscious outcomes.

Back to blindsight. We cannot say the person experiences seeing an object that they have no subjective conscious experience of. This is part of their unconscious embodiment. Their unconscious embodiment influences their consciousness to say, "I guess it is this," and be correct. This can be quantitatively measured but the subject has no qualia of that experience.

With quantitative experience being a contradiction, I'm not sure where you can go from here Bob. I've shown how we can scan the brain during brain surgery and map the brains signals to a person's subjective experience. I've demonstrated that the unconscious brain can be evaluated to accurately predict what a person will consciously say or experience. I've demonstrated that drugs can affect the consciousness of a person. The only thing left to you, which we both agree on, is that we cannot objectively know what its like to have the subjective experience of a being subjectively experiencing. But this alone is not enough to override the other facts presented at this moment.

Qualia/qualitative experience is simply subjective consciousness while quantitative analysis is simply objective consciousness. There's really no difference between them

This was an ambiguous sentence on my part that you interpreted against what I meant. I meant there was no difference between qualia and subjective consciousness, and a quantitative analysis and an objective measure of consciousness.

I'll leave that here and see what you say Bob.

How anything you are saying is different from what he was outlining with phenomenology. — I like sushi

How to approach reading this paper: This may seem odd, but it is important to come to this paper with the correct mindset to keep discussion where it needs to be.

The discussion on this paper is intended to be an analysis of the terms and logic within it. Your primary approach should not be introducing your own idea of knowledge. Please make your own topic if that is what you desire. — Philosophim

Read the entire argument before posting please. If you have not read the full argument and have only read part of it, like just the summary for example, do not post here. I have encountered this multiple times in the past. It is extremely rude and a waste of my limited time to pursue a question or counter and find the person hasn’t read the entire argument where this would be answered. I welcome all background levels and will not find any discussion poor as long as you have read the paper. — Philosophim

I am not sure it can be made more accessible, though, without losing its inherent strength. At least that is something I am pondering whilst reading my earlier comment. It made an impact on me, but I imagine that was also due to it being outside my regular way of thinking, but also because of the specific instructions about how to go about reading it. Without both, it might just end up being mislabeled and added to other categories, without the growth in mindset it can have (More at the end). — Caerulea-Lawrence

Thank you for the valuable feedback. I have written and rewritten this over a long period of time. The first iteration was 200+ pages, more like a rough draft of ideas. Slowly I pared it down to what I felt was absolutely essential due to feedback from other people. It is nice to hear from someone else that it seems like there's not much else that could be cut without losing something.

To your point about the instructions, those came about because of responses in previous attempts to post this. You are correct. Without those, many people do not understand how to approach a discussion like this. To your point, tackling something outside of your normal line of thinking is difficult. It can be fun with the right mindset, but without that, its easy to let our emotions get the better of us and we look for surface level reasons to escape having to read it.

If there is a small nit-pick I can mention, I do not like the word Irrational... It has some bad connotations, and made it harder to focus on the content and remember it. — Caerulea-Lawrence

I appreciate this feedback as well. My intent was to use inductive terminology that was positive at best, neutral at worst. All four of the induction types have value in certain situations in life. Originally I used the word 'faith', but later stepped back from it because I was worried it would evoke an undue response from some people. I wanted people to focus on the logic first, so eventually I settled on a logic word. However, I agree with you that "irrational" still has more of a negative connotation. Any suggestions on what word you would rather it be named?

God-damn, I am so pleased about understanding the "secret" to the Evil Demon example. Well played by you, too, on that one. There were some hints there that made me question it a bit more, not sure how you did it. Like you subtly 'forced' the meaning or something, not sure. — Caerulea-Lawrence

It wasn't a secret or a trick, you simply used the internal logic of the argument and came to the correct conclusion! It makes me happy to hear that you concluded this yourself, as it lends credence to the internal consistency of the system.

The growth from reading this — Caerulea-Lawrence

That's the greatest compliment I could receive. Good philosophy should enable a person to enhance their life. If you feel you are better able to comprehend the world of ideas, then I am very glad. I use this theory myself in my daily life, so it is gratifying to see it help another.

And in that sense, maybe it is true to say that science is underestimating consciousness a bit too much, and talking about NDE's this way is a kind of backlash to a certain unwillingness, on the flip side, to bother with acknowledging Distinctive Knowledge at all. — Caerulea-Lawrence

Consciousness is sort of the hot topic of the boards recently. I highly encourage people to look to neuroscience over philosophy first, as I believe it is more up to date and necessary to know modern facts about the brain to have a discussion of any validity.

Thank you again for reading and contributing!

Read Husserl. — I like sushi

I have. Anything in particular you wanted me to consider?

Hello Caerulea! I'm so sorry that I never saw your notification that you had replied. I'm pretty upset about it as you spent such a nice amount of time in your reply. Hopefully you're still around to see my response.

First of all, this is a fantastic summary. You nailed the message all the way through. I may use your summary at a future date, so your reply is most welcome. I wrote this so that it would be able to be understood by even someone without a background in philosophy. The fact you nailed it so well, makes me extremely happy. :D

Onto your questions now!

Your summary of the Evil Demon, your point, and your conclusion, are all correct. It is the evil demon itself which is plausible, as no one has ever applicably known an evil demon before. But if we do remove the Evil Demon and use Descartes applicable knowledge of being flawed and misunderstanding reality, your statement:

He believes it is possible that he could view his current worldview as flawed and based on a false (view of) reality. — Caerulea-Lawrence

you are correct.

Maybe I am missing some obvious point, but I was wondering if it is also possible to include the subconscious with regard to the discrete experiencer, or see it as a parallel axis or something? As I am very much more fluent in intuition, emotions and feelings, I am trying hard to focus on the task at hand and not dive into that. Still, I thought this feedback could fit the bill without digressing. — Caerulea-Lawrence

Great question, and I'll need to think about it. You've waited long enough for a reply for now however, so I'll come back when I've had time to think about it and answer.

I think the approach of Bohr's was that it was pointless or impossible to say what the 'object' 'really is', apart from the act of measurement. — Wayfarer

I agree completely with you.

Again your presumption of the reality of the object conditions your analysis - you presume that the object exists independently of any act of measurement, when that is precisely the point at issue! — Wayfarer

I would say this another way. Obviously there's something there to measure. If not, we wouldn't get a measurement. What we do with measurements is create identities. Identities are fully shaped by us. There is nothing within reality that insists that anything must be identified in any particular way. However, in relation to ourselves, certain identities end up being more useful than others. In general, the most useful identities are those which have a clear difference in behavior than the existence around it.

A sheep eats grass for example. There is nothing in reality apart from our observation that necessitates that we identify the sheep and the grass as separate. We could just as easily group the sheep and the grass together. If then we can identify anything in whatever way we want, why do so? Because it turns out reality exists independently of our identities. If I think that rotten looking apple is healthy to eat, it makes me sick. If I identity a 40 foot drop as save to jump down to, I die. So how do we decide what identities work? We decide based on whether reality contradicts them or not.

I could go much more in depth with this in my theory of knowledge paper, you might actually like the ideas contained within. Long story short, we believe our identities represent something in reality as reality will prove us wrong otherwise. In the case of the quantum realm, we're in a serious case of not being able to accurately measure reality. We're working with what we have, which is a lot of probabilities.

As for decoherence, the Wiki article you point to says 'Quantum decoherence does not describe the actual collapse of the wave function, but it explains the conversion of the quantum probabilities (that exhibit interference effects) to the ordinary classical probabilities.' The 'collapse of the wave function' is not at all a resolved issue. — Wayfarer

If you read my conclusions again you'll see I concluded this as well.

As far as readings are concerned, try A Private Vew of Quantum Reality, Chris Fuchs, co-founder of Quantum Baynesianism (QBism). Salient quotes:

Those interpretations (i.e. Copenhagen, Many Worlds) all have something in common: They treat the wave function as a description of an objective reality shared by multiple observers. QBism, on the other hand, treats the wave function as a description of a single observer’s subjective knowledge. — Wayfarer

Yes, but we must be very careful not to translate this into the common meanings of the terms. Notice he's looking at the function, or the identity. Unlike bouncing light off of a sheep, bouncing particles off of quantum particles is going to affect the outcome. If the observation impacts the object, then of course the observation and the object are intertwined. If I push a sheep over for fun, then say, "The sheep will objectively fall over at this spot when someone touches it," that doesn't work objectively. If you touch the sheep with X force at Y velocity at Z location, then the outcome will happen.

A problem with quantum measurement is the sheep is constantly moving, writhing like a mass of worms, and we're trying to aim and hit the same spot every time without anyway to confirm exactly where we hit it. We can't. Don't take the analogy too literally, its just an easy thought comparison. It doesn't meant the sheep wouldn't fall over if the same exact force were applied in the same exact location and all of its internal forces were known. Quantum mechanics doesn't half of that to make a repeatable objective outcome. At best, it has to analyze the limits of possibilities, very much like chaos theory.

The entire point behind all of this conjecture really, is that identities don't create reality, reality impacting other reality is the reality. And sometimes the only identity which can be made is the identity of a reality impacting another reality. It doesn't mean that we cannot identify much of reality without changing it. Eyes are passive receptors of light bouncing off an object. Whether we are here or not, that light is affecting the object in the same way.

I believe his [i.e. Norbert Wiener's] assertion that information is more than matter and energy is wrong. DNA is made up of matter and energy. All life is made up of matter and energy and stores information.
— Philosophim

Again, your dismissal is simplistic. How DNA came into existence is still not something known to science. — Wayfarer

Simple does not mean wrong Wayfarer. In fact, it is my experience the best way to explain complex things is to put many simple things together. Don't mistake my notion that everything being matter and energy explains how something came to be. I don't know if you are a religious person, but none of my arguments refute the notion of a God or some creator. If your hope is that somehow getting away from physicalism saves God, I wouldn't. You can very much argue for a creator or God through the idea that there is a reality independent from us. In fact, I think its far easier. And if you're not a theist, no matter. It just seemed an odd thing to point out when I had never implied that we actually knew how DNA came into being.

The fact that living things are able to maintain homeostasis, heal from injury, grow, develop, mutate and evolve into new species, all involve processes and principles that may not be explicable in terms of physics and chemistry, as there's nothing in the inorganic domain. — Wayfarer

To your earlier point Wayfarer, the "organic domain" is just an identity. While you may find some use in creating such a domain, there is nothing in reality that necessitates such an identity be apart from your world view. A more objective measure is to realize that the "organic domain" is simply when matter and energy behave in a different way. As I noted earlier, matter and energy create water. Think of lava, or complex crystal caverns. Why should any of that exist? Its magic. Same with life. Life is just yet another expression of matter and energy in particular combinations. You see some special difference, but I don't. Its all part of the wonderful reality of existence, something that has no right or reason to exist in the first place.

I much appreciate the link, its a good refresher on Husserlian phenomenology. I have my own theory of identity and knowledge I wrote here some time again. Here's a rewrite in which I greatly simplify the original that Bob and I poured over for almost a year. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context

Good thing I looked to, I had a reply and never saw it until now. :(

This is the original with Bob and I. It might be worth while if you have questions, you can read our back and forth. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge

Let me clarify my terminology with more technical verbiage as, although I do think we are progressing, I think we are (1) using the terms differently and (2) our usages thereof still contain nuggets of vagueness. — Bob Ross

Yes, a good idea. I think I'm going to spend the time really getting into qualia vs quantitative experience as I think that's the crux of where a lot of arguments go.

Also, you brought up some good points, and I just wanted to recognize that: you are genuinely the only other person on this forum that I have discussed with that forces me to produce razor thin precision with my terminology—and that is a good thing! The more rigorous the discussion, the better the views become. — Bob Ross

You as well Bob! It forces me to be clearer, and I think despite whether we agree at the end or not, it forces both of us to be better philosophers. I always enjoy your points, it is fun to be made to think. :)

I am going to revert back to ‘qualia’ being best defined as ‘instances of qualitative experience’; but by ‘qualitative experience’ I would like to include in the definition the property of there being ‘something it is like to have it in and of itself’. — Bob Ross

I feel your definition is not concise enough to give a clear and unambiguous identity. "something it is like to have it in and of itself" is too many words. I can't make sense of it. I'm trying though. In trying to pare the words down I start with "something it is like to have it", and I'm still not quite sure here. If I look at "In and of itself", that seems similar to "experience unidentified". So if I'm seeing, I'm not trying to describe or identify what I'm seeing, I'm just in the moment per say.

If that's the case, then I can combine this into "Something it is like to have experience". Something can be separated into some thing, which I think can be translated to, "What it is like to have experience". Now, I'm not saying that was your intention, but it was the closest I could get to with the definition.

I think this fits more what I am trying to convey, as I think you are thinking that ‘qualitative experience’ and ‘qualia’ are two separate things: the former being non-quantitative experience and the latter being a ‘mental event whereof there is something it is like to have such in and of itself’. — Bob Ross

What I was noting is that there didn't seem to be a discernible difference between qualitative experience and qualia. If my pared down definition of "What it is like to experience" works, then this fits. The hard problem would apply to both in my view. If my pared down definition is also correct, I see no reason for the terms qualitative and qualia. They're the same thing in regards to the assessment. Or so I thought until I read this:

So, to clarify, ‘qualia’ is just an instance of a stream of qualities that we experience which we nominally single out to meaningfully navigate our lives; and the experience of the stream of qualities has of its own accord the property of something it is like to have such. — Bob Ross

I tried to pare this down again. "Qualia is just a stream of qualities that we experience. This is not just any experience though, but experience that we nominally single out to meaningfully navigate our lives".

First, what does "nominally single out" mean? Do we give attention to certain experience over others? So if I'm not paying attention to something in the corner of my eye, is this not qualia? If so, what is it? Or is this about definitions/identities we create out of the stream of experience we have? So for example I say, "That's a TV", because that's meaningful to me in my life.

I then tried to pare down the second sentence. "The experience of qualia has of its own accord, what its like to experience." or "Qualia is what its like to experience". Is this right?

This leaves me now with a question of what quantitative experience is. I'm going to confess something. Words which have the first few letters the same as another are something my brain easily mixes up. I looked back briefly and am not sure that I did not accidently do that between the words quantitative and qualitative. It is something I've worked on a long time, but I still slip up occasionally.

So I want to bring back the discussion to quantitative for a second. If a quantitative experience is an experience, is there something that has that experience? For lack of a better term, this would be an "unconscious experience"? In the case of blindsight, the person would unconsciously see the object, but has no actual qualia, or conscious experience of doing so. I believe this is what you confirmed, but I'm making sure. If so I am fairly certain I had the two terms crossed in my head unknowingly as I was writing them, and most definitely recant that you had a problem in your qualitative/qualia comparison.

When you say we can tell objectively that a being observes, identifies, and acts upon its environment, you are describing a quantitative being through-and-through (or at least that is the conceptual limit of your argument: it stops at identifying Pzs)--not any sort of qualitative experience. — Bob Ross

Yes, I agree with this fully.

If I understand your definitions correctly, then you and I don't disagree. Qualia/qualitative experience is simply subjective consciousness while quantitative analysis is simply objective consciousness. There's really no difference between them. "Quantitative experience" is essentially unconscious experience. If so, then you agree with my division between objective and subjective consciousness as a viable means to assess consciousness. Let me translate my argument to yours so you can see.

Qualia (Subjective consciousness) can be neatly described as, "The viewpoint of consciousness itself".

Quantitative analysis (Objective consciousness) occurs when we can know that something that is not our qualia is also experiencing qualia with identification. The problem in knowing whether something is qualitatively conscious is that we cannot experience their qualia. So the only logical thing to do is to observe what a quantitative consciousness does that only an observing and identifying thing could do.

Quantitative consciousness then requires the addition of one other term, "Action". Only through a thing's actions can we ascertain that it can observe and identify. Combine baking soda and vinegar together and it merely "reacts". Its a simple chemical process with no means of control, identification, or observation. Chemicals collide and results happen.

So there we go, in the end we went about defining a few terms which are semantically no different from one another. :)

I'll stop it here and confirm with you if this is a good breakdown of your definitions. If so, then I'll address the second half.

OK, I appreciate that, and I apologise for it — Wayfarer

Water under the bridge. I've had my bad days, thanks for staying. :) You're a good person Wayfarer.

I'm pointing out that the assumption that organisms can be understood in solely physical terms is the point at issue. You're assuming that organisms can be accounted for solely in terms of matter-energy, and brushing off a reasoned argument (illustrated with references), which calls this into question. That's what 'begging the question' means. — Wayfarer

My attempt was not to ignore this point, I still don't see from my view how I'm begging the question. If I had said something like, "Ice cubes are cold because they are ice", yeah, that would definitely be on me. I'm not saying it is truth that everything in the universe is made out of matter and energy. I'm stating everything that we know of in the universe is made out of matter and energy. To me that's the same as saying, "Ice cubes are known to be made out of H20 that is at a temperature below 32 degrees F." Maybe the reality is that its not. But that's what we know today.

Knowledge is not the same as truth. Going with your example, it used to be known that the Sun rotated around the Earth. I mean, it would be obvious right? You look up in the sky and there it goes! If someone came along and said, "Actually, we rotate around the Sun", that person might be ridiculed, even though what they said was true.

I'm no stranger to ideas that challenge the status quo. As such, I don't dismiss or ridicule new ideas. The point I've been trying to convey is that I'm very open to the idea that we rotate around the Sun, but there has to be some evidence for it. I'm very open to the possibility that there is more than matter and energy in the universe. Correct me if I'm wrong Wayfarer, but it seems your assertions are that this must be true. To me that's different from it could be true.

So if you claim is that there is more to the universe than matter and energy as an assertion, I'm looking for evidence or proof of that assertion. Its not to belittle the idea, its to see if there is something behind it more than doubt or speculation. Its not an assumption that everything in the universe that we know of is made up of matter and energy, its currently a fact. Facts can be wrong, but they need other facts to challenge them.

I mentioned already the aphorism that 'information is information, not matter or energy'. So, do you think that is wrong? Do you think that Ernst Mayr's assertion that the genetic code cannot be accounted for in terms of matter and energy, but implies something over and above them, is also wrong? I provided both of those as examples, and you haven't discussed them or even acknowledged them, beyond saying 'it's kind of silly'. — Wayfarer

Sure, my apologies if I was too short in analyzing your point. I believe his assertion that information is more than matter and energy is wrong. DNA is made up of matter and energy. All life is made up of matter and energy and stores information. Computers are matter and energy, and they store information. Its wonderous that matter and energy can do so, and honestly makes me want to go down other speculative paths about reality.

Now is it possible that information could be more than matter and energy? Sure, I'm definitely open to it. But if the claim is to be more than speculation, it needs a few good points to back it. For example, does the current model of matter and energy have weaknesses, failings, and inadequacies. Most certainly! To my mind, there is not a single system invented by humanity that explains the world that we can't find issues with. Even math, what we would consider the gold standard! So I am listening and considering challenges to the current matter and energy model with seriousness.

Back to the point of "information" being something different from matter and energy. One criticism I can definitely get behind is that it is difficult to explain information in terms of matter and energy. It would be like me explaining how to start your car by using quantum theory. Quantum theory is fantastic and explains a lot of things, but its pretty worthless in explaining how to start your car. Does explaining that you need a key to insert and turn it an invalidation of quantum mechanics though? No. Does quantum mechanics invalidate the need for a better model of communication to explain how to start your car? No here as well!

In my readings of challenges to a matter and energy or a physicalist model, it seems to me many think that a problem with the current model or the introduction of a new model somehow invalidates the old model. This is where I'm looking for evidence, and so far have not seen it. Can we make an information model of reality and apply it to dna? It might be fantastic to do so and allow us to communicate in new ways with new ideas. But does that invalidate that dna is also made up of matter and energy? No.

Its really the core issue Bob and I are debating right now. Bob wants to claim that consciousness cannot come from the brain, whereas we know it does. I'm very open to there being something new introduced, or even seeing how a new model of understanding mind apart from the brain might be more useful to us then using the brain model alone. But at the end of the day, if there is a claim the old model is simply wrong, it needs to show where it is wrong in its realm of knowledge by demonstrating evidence of contradiction, and a replacement that fixes it.

Subjective reality does not alter objective reality.
— Philosophim

This is precisely what the measurement problem in quantum physics calls into question — Wayfarer

My point was that a "wave" in math is not he same as a wave in the ocean. I've waded into mathematical terminology before, and often times English is an attempt to convey what the math is saying, but often times is interpreted much more literally to our understanding of the terms than their mathematical meaning.

For example, particle and wave do not mean that particulate matter stops being particulate matter. Particle math is useful for straight line mathematical assessments. So for example you fire a ball from a cannon, you treat it as a "particle". Wave math is about a mathematical distribution of odds when a straight path is not certain. Electrons are not the solid orbits of the Bohr model, but constantly "buzzing". As such, it becomes more mathematically accurate if when we move an electron that we calculate the probability that this "buzzing" will affect the final outcome. This is most readily communicated as a "wave" or predicted high and low outcomes based on the limits of probable possibilities from the "buzz".
This is why you can treat an electron like a wave or a particle. It all accounts on what you're doing to the electron, and what you're trying to measure.

My point is that our subjective reality of whether we treat the electron as a wave or a particle does not alter reality, it just alters are mathematical predictive or post assessment models. Having our eyeballs focused in the direction of a particle does not change its behavior. Our eyes are just receptacles, they do not affect reality outside of this receipt. Blasting particles with another type of particle to measure it at the quantum level however distorts the outcome.

Here's a good summary of the issue. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Measurement_problem

If you read, you'll notice when they're talking about the collapse of the wave theory into classical particle mechanics, they're trying to figure out why and how exactly that math occurs. Decoherence theory sums it up best for me.

"As it is well known, [many papers by Bohr insist upon] the fundamental role of classical concepts. The experimental evidence for superpositions of macroscopically distinct states on increasingly large length scales counters such a dictum. Superpositions appear to be novel and individually existing states, often without any classical counterparts. Only the physical interactions between systems then determine a particular decomposition into classical states from the view of each particular system. Thus classical concepts are to be understood as locally emergent in a relative-state sense and should no longer claim a fundamental role in the physical theory."

Put in layman's terms, it is more of a natural state for there to be probabilities within matter and energies' next predicted movement. Instead of X energy at Y velocity = Z location every time, the reality is more =Z+ or - 2. Only by the relative interaction of object forces can classic particle type analysis be viewed. So when we take a dense cannon ball and fire it from a cannon, the natural state is truly that of a wave. The cannonball, unlike the classical particle model, will not travel exactly X feet at a exactly the angled arc of the cannon. But, the variation may be so insignificant for our purposes, that a classic particle model is all we need for the accuracy we desire.

Finding the exact relative situation that causes wave collapse, or essentially gets rid of the probabilistic + or -2 wiggle, is a very real challenge at the sub atomic level. There may be impacts in our measurements that suddenly resolve the predicted outcomes of a probabilistic wave into closely resembling a particle model. So while we might expect, due to probability, that a particle could end its path within this variance of outcomes, oddly it more often then not acts like the limits of its possible variants do not exist, or mostly lands on just z, and can be treated as a particle.

None of this changes the idea of what is subjective or objective, at least to my understanding of the definitions. If you could explain why you think they negate subjective and objective outlooks, I would love to hear it. I do appreciate the links Wayferer, but they aren't access to the books themselves. While they may be interesting reads, is there something I can read more immediately to contribute to the conversation at this time?

When we have two different things, such as objective and subjective, outer and inner, physical and mental, or any A and B, we should not assume that understanding and having explained A is the same as understanding and having explained B. — Patterner

I agree. But we can still know of A and B, and not fully knowing B does not negate what we fully know of A.

Wayfarer, matter and energy is the only true existent that we know of.
— Philosophim

Says who? Quote a source for that. See, what you always argue is basically 'materialism 101'. Then you are exasperated that it can be questioned, when it seems so obvious. — Wayfarer

I'm not exasperated Wayfarer, you're the one stamping down on the stone here (Callback! I liked that story.). You agree that its materialism 101, so you know all the evidence. If you want to challenge it, go ahead. Its on you, not me to disprove. Provide me evidence of something that exists that is not matter and energy, and we have a discussion. If not, I'm right. I don't have to prove that the evil demon doesn't exist, you have to prove it does.

the fact that we do not know what tomorrow will bring does not negate what we know now.
— Philosophim

It might completely revolutionise it. If we were having this discussion in 1620, you would be utterly convinced that the Earth stands still and Sun goes around it. If we were having it in 1840, you would know nothing about electromagnetic fields. — Wayfarer

Of course. We could only know what we knew then. Suppositions are great for exploration, and questions are always needed. But do you know how many other proposals there were that also weren't correct? Some people thought the world existed on the back of a turtle. We don't countenance ideas that do not have anything substantial to them that add to what we can know. My problem is not with the idea that there might be more than matter and energy in the universe. Sometimes I feel you don't catch that in our discussions. Its your insistence that there is something beyond matter and energy without actual evidence.

A wave function is formed as a mathematical concept to deal with our inability to get a fine tune.
— Philosophim

The ontological status of the wave-function is one of the great unanswered questions of modern science and philosophy. The fact that you think you can sweep it aside with a sentence speaks volumes. — Wayfarer

This is not a counter. This is a statement from a person that suddenly realized they got into territory they weren't familiar with. It was also more than one sentence, many of which you did not address. If it was so easy to discount my hand waving, why didn't you do it? Educate me, don't insult me because all that tells me is you don't actually have anything substantial to say.

If you google the phrase, science disproves objective reality, you will find many discussions of the radical implications of this idea. And they are radical - far more so than you're apparently aware of. — Wayfarer

Ah, there we go again with the condescending insults. Apparently I'm not aware of them. Without checking with me, you just assume I'm some plebe beneath you eh? You didn't even bother to link a specific paper and use it to make a point.
I've been in a lot of debates over the years Wayfarer. Did you mean this one? https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/03/12/136684/a-quantum-experiment-suggests-theres-no-such-thing-as-objective-reality/ Supperposition, quantum entaglement? Spooky action at a distance? Even if I wasn't familiar with these concepts, how would I ever know how you thought these concepts countered my point? Not a very good argument.

I've respected you Wayfarer. I've always asked you your viewpoints, asked you to clarify, give evidence, etc. instead of simply dismissing you. Because I might learn something from anyone. You see Bob Ross here? The first time he replied to me in a thread it was a wall of text. I had to paste it into word and spent time spacing the paragraphs out so I could read it. And you know what? It was brilliant. If I had simply looked down on Bob without giving him a chance like you seem so willing to do with me here, I would have missed engaging with one of the most brilliant, insightful, and thoughtful people on this board. (Sorry if I embarrassed you Bob)

I wouldn't be this direct normally, but I hold you in higher regard than snippy insults and then leaving. Am I wrong? I took a rain check discussing this topic because we were in Bob's thread. I'm cashing that check Wayfarer because this is my thread. You in, or out?

Doubt or skepticism alone does not refute what is known.
— Philosophim

It is not something known, but something assumed by you. You assume that it is scientifically established that matter~energy is the only true existent. — Wayfarer

Wayfarer, matter and energy is the only true existent that we know of. Please show me someone who knows of something that exists besides matter and energy. You're evil demoning it up here! :)

Let me rephrase it thus: We know that sometimes what we conclude as knowledge can be changed at a future date with new discoveries or thinking. We also know that sometimes what we conclude as knowledge is not changed with new discoveries or thinking. Therefore what is known today, could be known tomorrow, or change. But the fact that we do not know what tomorrow will bring does not negate what we know now.

Show me knowledge today of something that exists that is not matter and energy. If you do that, then I will concede. If you cannot, then my point stands.

It is exactly what is called into question by that article. It is saying, there is a capacity or attribute which cannot be accounted for by physics and chemistry, namely, information. — Wayfarer

That's just silly. Obviously DNA is matter and energy, and honestly it is a storage of information. So is the brain. So is your hard drive. Do we think that a fly or a roach is something magical because it can retain information? Even plants do. Viruses. There are tons of example of matter and energy that store information. Its just your perspective. We mistake our awe of the magic reality for something that is separate from reality itself.

However, it can also be misleading. It may give the impressions that uncertainty arises when we lumbering experimenters meddle with things. This is not true. Uncertainty is built into the wave structure of quantum mechanics and exists whether or not we carry out some clumsy measurement — Brian Greene, The Fabric of the Cosmos

Viable and predictable uncertainty comes about two ways. By our measurement's effects, and our inability to measure. Any uncertainty by wave math that does not rely on the former is due to the later. A wave function is formed as a mathematical concept to deal with our inability to get a fine tune. Its like Newtonian physics versus relativity of large objects. Newtonian physics works at certain scales, but larger scales require us to add in variables we could eliminate as insignificant. Quantum mechanics is a theory full of probabilities, possiblities, and poor measurement, and yet its been brilliantly put together to the point we can create reliable cell phones.

This is because science understands well you can't wait to understand everything before applying what you do know. Carefully applying what we can be certain of in quantum mechanics, including the certainty of uncertainty, allows us to create a theory which works in many applications. Our lack of understanding everything about it does not negate what we do know about it.

Could we one day find something in physics that changes our entire outlook? Of course. Does that mean we discard what we know today? No.

it seems obvious that matter and energy are conscious.
— Patterner

That is panpsychism, which seeks to resolve the apparently inexplicable nature of consciousness by saying it is elementary, in the same sense that the physical attributes of matter are. — Wayfarer

I did not say anything about panpsychism. I don't care for broad theories that don't make any sense, nor care to be attributed to them unless without my explicit consent. I never said consciousness was elementary. Consciousness arises when a particular combination of matter and energy produces what we identify as consciousness. Think of water. Its a Hydrogen and two Oxygen atoms. Separate, they express completely differently then if we combine them together in a particular fashion. We don't blink at that utter, inconceivable, mind blowing magic, and yet we blink at consciousness? Why? Every single existent thing is a marvel of impossiblity that it exists, and yet it does. Why is consciousness suddenly an exception?

Just like not all combinations of matter and energy create water, not all combinations of matter and energy create consciousness. Water is not elementary, and to my mind, I cannot see consciousness as elementary either.

As you then correctly observe there are aspects of consciousness that are external to the models of physics. That is the subject of philosophy of mind, in particular, and there are many involved in trying to come up with a theory. — Wayfarer

Certainly, but unless the theory is testable and objective, its conjecture. The philosophy of mind is not going to solve this without being lock step in with neuroscience. It is not going to come up with anything new if it proposes the idea that consciousness does not come from matter and energy, when that is all we clearly know. Anyone can come up with a "what if". Great philosophy comes up with, "What is".

However, some aspects of consciousness do not seem to be explainable by what we have learned about the properties of particles, the forces we are aware of, and how they all interact. I have not heard a theory that attempts to explain how those properties and forces can explain those characteristics. The stance seems to be an unspoken "They just do." — Patterner

Sure, we don't know everything yet. Just like we don't know how quantum physics fully works. Doesn't mean we can't take what we do know and work with it from there. Doesn't mean that we don't understand the part of quantum physics that we do. Subjective states are internal, whereas we measure externally. If we could one day measure something internally, perhaps? Or its just something that isn't possible. We don't have to know everything about component parts to use the parts that we do know.

But this begs the question - it assumes what needs to be proven. At issue is the claim that organisms can be understood solely in terms of matter and energy, or physics and chemistry. But this is a contentious claim. What if there is something about even the very simplest forms of organic life that is not observable in inorganic matter? What if organism have attributes that are not reducible to physics and chemistry? — Wayfarer

There's not question being begged here. Doubt or skepticism alone does not refute what is known. Its the old "evil demon" argument Wayfarer. What if everything you know and understand is being manipulated by an evil demon? What if there's something we don't know?

That's always the case. What ifs, imagination, and maybe's are always second class citizens to known facts. Now if something legitimate is found, for example a new energy, matter, or substance, then of course we have a valid question to look into. You must ask the question, then provide something tangible to look into. Is there anything in the universe besides matter and energy? No.

The idea that life evolved naturally on the primitive Earth suggests that the first cells came into being by spontaneous chemical reactions, and this is equivalent to saying that there is no fundamental divide between life and matter. — What is Information?

Largely, there's only a slight difference between life and matter, its true. We have this human centric way of looking at things and sometimes forget we are not special or separate from the rest of reality. I've described life like this: Life is a set of chemical reactions and processes that actively acts to keep its processes going. Contrast this with baking soda and vinegar. The reaction doesn't seek out new baking soda or vinegar, it just reacts and is done. Life is a fantastic delicate balance of all these reactions that seek self-sustainment when the process is about to run out of energy.

The reason is that natural selection, the cornerstone of Darwinian evolution, does not exist in inanimate matter. In the 1950s and 1960s, furthermore, molecular biology uncovered two fundamental components of life — What is Information?

I'm ok with this definition. Once again though, DNA is just more matter and energy. I would argue this is organic life, as I believe we could create an inorganic system of life with AI. I have no issue with expanding the definition to be "matter and energy that can hold and process information".

Ernst Mayr, one of the architects of the modern synthesis, has been one of the most outspoken supporters of the view that life is fundamentally different from inanimate matter. — What is Information?

Nothing wrong with that either. We can define life as we see fit, then apply it across matter and energy. But it does not negate that life is still just matter and energy. Beyond the need to feel unique, there is no evidence of any kind that life is not matter and energy.

But this overlooks the role of the observer in physics. This shows that the act of observation and the establishment of measurement outcomes seem to play a fundamental role in determining the observed properties of the objects of the analysis, which are, purportedly, also the fundamental particles of physics. — Wayfarer

This is a largely misunderstood understanding of quantum physics. Our "observations" are bouncing light particles and photons off of other smaller particles. We read the "bounce" like we do with light, hearing, and everything else, but our actual measurement alters the course of the particles we are tracking. Depending on what we're trying to track with the bounce, we can know one state, but not the other state. It is not that fact that your eyeballs are in the direction of light that quantum outcomes are altered. Its fun science fiction, but not reality.

This is what gave rise to physicist John Wheeler's theory of the 'participatory universe', in which our participation as observers is as essential to the nature of the Universe as are the objects of analysis. So that torpedoes any neat separation of the objective and subjective poles. But that, in any case, is also called into question by 'enactivism', which shows that the organism and environment (or subject and object) are 'co-arising', such that it is impossible to draw an ultimate dividing line between one and the other. — Wayfarer

Now this I like! I agree with this entirely, but perhaps the conclusion may differ from what you're proposing. I wrote a paper that Bob Ross and I had a lengthy conversation over that does somewhat question the neat separation between objective and subjective, but salvages it. Too dense to go into here! At a very basic level, subjectivity is the ability to experience. We can create identities, then attempt to apply them to reality. Those identities that can co-exist without contradiction by reality become objective. Its too dense to get into here, so if you want to make a point, please go to that article, "A theory of knowledge".

Again, our mere presence of having ears and eyes does not alter reality, well beyond being in the way of light and sound like anything else. But, our active measurement can very well affect the reality of the situation then if we never measured it at all. In cases in which our measurement is relatively low mass and energy, the affect to the object being measured is negligible. But in the cases like the quantum realm, its like slinging a que ball at an eight ball.

Further, because we have the capability to identify, we can determine what type of matter and energy is important. Without an identifier, sheep, clouds, and grass would still exist. But there would never be an aspect of reality outside of those identities, that could identify them in a particular way. Our ability to identify, the existence of living brains, creates an interaction with reality that could not happen with a simple reacting object. We are most certainly not apart from reality, but one expression of matter and energy within it that causes a unique type of identity and interaction from anything else.

The properties of matter and energy are even farther removed from the characteristics of consciousness than liquid water from skyscrapers. At least water and skyscrapers are both physical objects, composed of primary particles. — Patterner

I've never understood this thinking. Every animal living thing is matter and energy. Many living things have consciousness at a basic level. Therefore matter and energy can be conscious. Why deny what's in front of your eyes?

Well, I hope you're right. But I think we face a situation where a significant portion of the populace doesn't favor the law, and believes it shouldn't be enforced, in this case as to this individual. That anyone could accept him as credible or honorable mystifies me; he seems a kind of paragon of brazen deceit and selfishness. But there are those who do. — Ciceronianus

It is an easy mistake for good people to make, that they believe everyone else has a tendency towards trying to be a good person as well. This is not the case. People who support Trump generally know he's not a good man. They don't care. Its about self-interest. Trump gives them low taxes, and a sense of cultural superiority. If they have that, they don't care how it was obtained.

Democracy is not about creating good. Its about competing self-interests. We hash out those self-interests and if its difficult for one block to get everything it wants, generally everyone gets a little of their own self-interest and avoids extremism. But we should never attribute that people care about how they obtain their self-interest. Many wouldn't care if you murdered people they didn't particularly agree with. I feel that the Republican party understands this more than the Democratic party. Its why conspiracy theories and false narratives work. Its about selling to someone's self-interest, not their morality, intelligence, or higher human functions.

The question remains, though. In these sad times, no matter how clearly it is shown that the law has been violated, will it matter? What is or is not lawful doesn't seem to be a concern in our politics, nor does it seem to be a concern of many of our politician — Ciceronianus

That is why we have the law and courts. At the end of the day, if the courts conclude guilt, the opinion of the public does not matter. America in general might complain about rulings, but we abide by them. Trump will go to jail, many people will insist they don't believe it, but he will suffer the consequences under the law if found guilty. The court of opinion is always a biased rabble of logically inconsistent feelings and emotions struggling for power. Its irrelevant in the face of a country that solidly favors and enforces the law.

Definitions aren't enough, even if the "transgender community" accepted them, that doesn't mean they would accept your conclusions using these definitions — Judaka

Its not a matter of whether someone accepts the conclusions, its whether the conclusions are logical. People dismiss logical conclusions all the time, but objective society can dismiss those subjective conclusions in favor of the objective ones.

Nonetheless, my aim was to provide an explanation for why political discourse has strayed so far from how we might wish people would act, I hope you continue to conduct yourself as you have. — Judaka

Fair enough, and kind words Judaka, thanks.

To think the brain does not cause consciousness is to invalidate decades of working science and medicine.
— Philosophim
That answers the question of Where. My question is of How. How do the physical processes that explain our senses, and our behaviors resulting from the signals our senses send to the brain, also aware at different levels? These physical processes are doing two things at once, and one of them isn't physical. And the one that isn't physical isn't necessary. — Patterner

Its all matter and energy Paterrner. I already covered that with Bob in my last reply, so feel free to sort through to that section. If my reply to Bob doesn't fully answer your question, feel free to ask again.

So let me try to use a more technical definition of ‘qualia’: ‘a mental event whereof there is something it is like to have such in and of itself’. — Bob Ross

I think this is a good approach and agree on this.

In these cases, there is still something it is like in and of itself to qualitatively experience (e.g., to see in the case of a blindsight person or to dream in the other case) and, thusly, they still have qualia. — Bob Ross

I like your separation of qualitative and qualia at first, but then you erase the distinction making qualitative experience just a subordinate of qualia. You didn't answer my question about the difference between conscious and unconscious either. In every normal case of those words, we would say that what is qualitative can be received unconsciously, but what is qualia is what is received consciously. Are we saying then an unconscious being has qualia? A P zombie would be completely qualitative right? It would have to see and act upon different stimuli. If you start to say that qualitative processing is also qualia, then is a P zombie a conscious being? Because we would be saying there is something it is like to have such in and of itself.

If qualitative experience is qualia, then it is a part of qualia. If I agreed with you, in our conversation then its pointless to note what is qualitative and what is not. My reasoning about qualia would still be "the experience from the subject", and you already said that we can match the brain to qualitative experience. Which means we've now associated brain states directly with subjective experience. If it can observe, identify, and this is confirmed in its actions, we just say its a qualitative analysis or objective consciousness that doesn't concern itself with any other type of qualia.

This is a very real problem you'll need to address Bob. If there's no difference between qualitative and qualia beyond qualitative being a specific type of qualia, then it doesn't disprove my argument. The "subjective consciousness" of higher qualia that you note would still just be qualia. If the qualitative is just a form of qualia, brain scans can explain qualitative actions, therefore qualia.

You switched the terminology mid-argument here: the first sentence is about “consciousness” in the sense of qualitative experience—i.e., qualia—and the second was about mere observance/awareness. — Bob Ross

I don't think I switched terminology here. I divided consciousness between the subjective and objective, but they are descriptor of the totality of consciousness as it is generally used today. "Consciousness" as a whole contains both the subjective and objective aspects. Objective consciousness is the expression of the actions that something subjectively experiences. The objective is simply what we can scientifically observe and conclude, while the subjective is impossible to know.

If you are going to say we can evaluate “objective consciousness”, in the manner you have described, then you can’t equally claim that that gives us insight into “subjective consciousness” which is what you would need to prove “subjective consciousness” is caused by brain states. — Bob Ross

Objectively, subjective consciousness is explained by brain states. That we are certain of. Just go back to my brain surgery example. What we cannot know, is what that subjective experience is like from my viewpoint. Objectively, it doesn't matter exactly what the subject is experiencing from its perspective. If the person states they see a tree, we don't need to know exactly how they subjectively experience a tree to believe they see a tree right?

I'll give you another example, a car. We see that a car runs. When we look under the hood we see an engine. How does it move? Gas burns and some weird thing happens that turns the engine. Later we find out its the combustion of gas that leads to magnetism. How does magnetism work? Well... we don't fully know. Its kind of a mystery really. Does that negate that the truck is ultimately run by magnetism, even though we don't understand why exactly magnetism actually works? No.

What I mean by “cause” is the actual reductive explanation of phenomena and not necessarily a physical chain of impact. So, for me, “impact” and “cause” are two different things. — Bob Ross

Sure, lets for now say they don't need a physical impact. But in the case of the brain, it is physical, and it impacts consciousness. Therefore consciousness is caused by the physical brain. The clarification does not negate that. Now if you want to speculate that something else besides the brain causes the mind, we can look at that. I'm not saying the brain is necessarily the only cause.

My problem is that you seem to be claiming that “objective consciousness” and “subjective consciousness” are two sides of the same coin, and the side we see is just relative to our epistemic access — Bob Ross

Yes.

but by this “objective” observation of “consciousness” we gain absolutely no insight into the being also qualitatively experiencing — Bob Ross

Correct.

there is a disconnect there in your argument. When I refer to “consciousness”, I am talking about that private qualia that we definitely cannot empirically observe (which I think you are agreeing with me here) and this has no connection to an empirical merely observation of a being observing, identifying, and acting upon its environmen — Bob Ross

Incorrect, but by just a tweak of wording. Yes, the act of knowing what it is like for another being to be subjectively conscious is unknowable. We can know what its like for ourselves of course. As I've noted, we are incredibly close on our analysis. I think its just a few syntax and definition differences.

We know that as subjectively conscious beings, there are certain actions which we can only do while conscious. So first we define consciousness. I noted it was the ability to observe/experience and identify. I cannot know what exactly another being subjectively experiences while its observing and identifying, so it cannot be part of my definition of consciousness in regards to other beings. But I can know that only a being which can experience and identify can make certain actions. If a being makes those particular actions that require it to observe and identify, then objectively, I can note they are conscious.

Subjective consciousness is for ourselves. It is our personal understanding that it is possible to have a state of experience subjectively. But objectively, no one can ever know that experience, and we cannot know theirs. Can we know they are conscious by their actions? Yes. That is objective consciousness. The analysis of subjective consciousness is a belief system. It is not objective.

Did you know some people cannot visualize in their mind Bob? Its just dark when they close their eyes. Unless they told you, you might never figure it out. Even then, I can't actually know what not being able to visualize is like. I can make conjectures and beliefs, but it is outside of my personal knowledge. Does that mean that I can know people claim they cannot visualize? Yes. Can we make objective tests that a person who can visualize would pass while a person who cannot visualize can fail? Yes.

Its like truth Bob. We can never know the truth. The truth is what is. But can we set up a logical system of deduction called knowledge that works for us in objective society? Of course. Does that fact that we cannot directly know the truth invalidate knowledge as a useful tool? No. Does the fact that we can never know what is true negate the knowledge of the identity of truth as a concept? No. Same with an objective consciousness and its relation to the subjective mind.

Can we doubt that when we know something, it isn't true? Of course. Does doubt alone negate knowledge? The idea that we are being manipulated by an evil demon or are brains in a vat? No, you know this. An objective consciousness is what is within our capability of knowledge. Same with the concept of a subjective consciousness. Does pointing out that because we cannot know what it is like for another being to be subjectively conscious change anything about our objective conclusions? No.

To negate the knowledge that the brain causes subjective consciousness Bob, you have to have more than a doubt. More than a, "But it doesn't quite answer everything." Doesn't matter. All of our knowledge that we hold can be criticized in this way. We may wonder at the mystery of magnetism on the quantum level, but we still use it objectively to power our cars. As well, your own assessment is not free of this criticism either. If you claim brain states do not cause subjective consciousness, you have to combat modern neuroscience and medicine, which holds this to be known. This requires a replacement.

What does your replacement offer? If brain states do not cause consciousness, then what have we been doing wrong all these years in medicine? It is not your notion that we cannot know exactly what it is like to be a subjective being that I disagree with. It is the idea that because we do not, we have to throw away all the other objective knowledge we've accumulated. This knowledge does not make claims about the exact subjective experience of an individual, so where is the logic in throwing it away?

There must be more than doubt, or skepticism, or the idea that our current knowledge cannot identify or understand certain aspects of reality. We must offer an alternative that gives us something better than the current system. I asked this a while back and I'll ask again. What do you hope to get out of your system? I can invent the idea that an evil demon controls all of our actions, but it cannot be proved, so what does it do for us in reality?

What you are referring to, I think, is our ability to affect consciousness with what looks like from our perceptions as physical objects (e.g., popping a pill to get rid of my headache, cutting part of a brain off and observing the person’s personality change, etc.). This doesn’t mean that we have a reductive, conceptual account of brain states producing mental states. Within my perspective, popping a pill is just an extrinsic representation of mentality: the pill doesn’t fundamentally exist as something physical. — Bob Ross

No, the pill is physical because it fits the terms of what physical means. The pill is an identity with a particular set of essential properties. It matches those properties in reality, therefore we know it as a pill. We use the identity of "physical" to represent reality, and our analysis of reality works. Everything is matter and energy, so far that's held. If someone pops a rock instead of a pill, it doesn't matter that they identified and believed the rock to be a pill, its not going to have the same effect. Again, this is general knowledge Bob. You can't come to it and start saying things like "it looks like from our perceptions". If we go that route, we don't have knowledge. And if we don't have knowledge, any system goes. And if any system goes, people are going to choose the system that works in reality, not yours.

"All of existence consists,it is claimed,solely of ideas—,emotions,perceptions,intuitions,imagination,etc.—even though not one’s personal ideas alone."

I did look up the paper, and wanted to point this summary out. Bob, we've already discussed knowledge before. This author is a person who clearly does not understand knowledge. Knowledge and personal experience consists of all of these things. Yet reality is ultimately what all of these are tested against. I can have a dream that I can fly, but when I awake and imagine myself flying, I can't do it in reality. We've discussed this at length in the past, so I do not feel the need to revisit it. His theory is a theory we can invent, but a theory that fails when tested against reality. I will not debate this point as a courtesy since we already have before. This may be a point in which we agree to disagree here. If this is a key point of difference between what is stated here, then we will not be able to continue the conversation. I still have full respect for your thought process, passion, and intelligence, it is just something we have already explored at length.

I'm not sure what you mean by "mind-independent". The brain and the mind are one.

Not quite. Either the brain produces the mind, and thusly the mind is an emergent property thereof (and so they are not one and the same) or vice-versa. — Bob Ross

Let me clarify then, a "living brain" and the mind are one. A dead brain of course produces nothing. But a living brain which fires synapses and has a subjective experience is the mind. Beyond the science of "death", You can do an experiment to confirm this. Note where your consciousness is in your body. Now move to a new location. Does your consciousness move with you? Can you by concentration extend your consciousness out past your body to where you were? I know I'm unable to. Therefore the only reasonable conclusion is that consciousness follows physical movement, and is therefore subject to physical reality. It is located at a particular physical location. With our scientific understanding of the brain, the only reasonable conclusion is that physical location is the brain. I am open to hearing reasonable alternatives.

The point is it is logically consistent to hold that matter and energy can create consciousness internally.

Something being logically consistent doesn’t make it true in metaphysics nor science: idealism and physicalism are both logically consistent. — Bob Ross

That's an avoidant answer Bob. I don't hold to idealism and physicalism because I often find they are summary identities that are not logically consistent when examined in detail. Unless you can show me why its not logical to hold that matter and energy can create consciousness internally, you do not have a logical argument yourself. You either need to present a logical alternative, which I have not seen so far, or demonstrate where my logical claim fails explicitly.

Being able to associate people’s mental activity with brain states doesn’t prove in itself that the latter causes (i.e., reductively explains) the former: you keep bringing up examples of this as if it does prove it. Why do you think it proves it? — Bob Ross

Its not "associate", its real claims of knowledge and science. If you deny this, then once again we're going to have to agree to disagree here. I've given plenty of examples in neuroscience and medicine. I have yet to hear any counters to them besides an insistence its just a correlation. You need to prove they are correlations, not causations, and you have not done so. Expressions of doubt just aren't enough.

Think of lower-life forms, like squirrels: they don’t self-reflectively know (cognitively) that there is something it is like to see from there eyes nor that they qualitatively experience in general. According to your definition, then, one would likewise have to have the over-and-above cognitive abilities to gain self-knowledge of one’s qualia, which is different than the qualia itself. — Bob Ross

According to our discussion of qualia, it is not simply self-reflectiveness. It is the experience of the subject itself. Self-knowledge of qualia is a higher consciousness, but unnecessary to be conscious. If a thing experiences and identifies, it has consciousness. You seem to be implying that only meta-consciousness is consciousness. But its not, its why we note "meta". A squirrel likely may not be able to evaluate its own qualia. That has nothing to do with being conscious at the most basic level.

But the cogitated “2+2=4” or “I am seeing the color red” are self-reflective notions of the qualia--they are not the qualia themselves. — Bob Ross

Self-reflection is also qualia. I don't understand how its not. You even noted that qualitative processing is qualia, so why is this all of the sudden not qualia? On your next pass, lets see if we can really clearly identify what qualia is as a unique identity that does not have these inconsistencies or questions.

I view the term "metaphysical" as its most base definition. "Analysis of the physical"

This isn’t what metaphysics means: it is the “study of that which is beyond the possibility of all experience”. — Bob Ross

The word includes "meta", which essentially means, "about the subject", and the subject is physics, or the physical. Physical in later years has been replaced with "experience", but metaphysics always refers to what is real. It is about taking the real and identifying it in a way that we can logically process. For example, "Gravity pulls everything together", is a metaphysical description of the math and science of gravity. But it relies on there actually being the math and science of gravity. Metaphysics that does not rely on existence or reality isn't metaphysics. Studying what is beyond the possibility of reality is not metaphysics, but speculation and imagination.

Regardless of your definition, the underlying meaning is all that matters. I am discussing matters of experience. Anything that cannot be experienced, is outside of what can be known. Anything outside of what can be known is speculation, and while fun, is pointless to debate the veracity of any one speculation over another.

Finally,

No, objectivity is something that can be logically concluded to the point that any challenge against it fails. A falsifiable claim that cannot be shown to be false essentially.

What do you mean by “logically concluded to the point that any challenge against it fails”? Do you mean logical necessity?

I would say that objectivity is that which its truthity is will-independent.

Also, “a falsifiable claim that cannot be shown to be false” is a contradiction in terms. If it is falsifiable, then it is possible to shown to be false, whereas an unfalsifiable claim is something which cannot be shown to be false. — Bob Ross

Objectivity is deduction that is not contradicted by reality. Going back to a long ago conversation, applicable knowledge. if we don't want to go down that road again, the closest view would be scientific laws and tested theories.

As for falsifiable, all falsifiable means is that we can imagine a situation in which a claim could be false. For example, "I will be at a dinner at 2pm". Its falsifiable in the fact that there is a state in which I am not at the dinner at 2pm." But if I am indeed at a dinner at 2pm, my statement cannot be shown to be false. Apologies for the unclear sentences there.

A good deep dive again Bob! I now these replies are getting long again. I'll try to pare down the next reply.

What I am saying is that explaining the qualitative experience that drunk person has in terms of the brain functions, as opposed to those functions being the extrinsic representation of mental activity, has the explanatory gap of ‘I see how those functions impact consciousness, but how do those functions produce consciousness?’. — Bob Ross

Perhaps its the construction of your sentence I disagree with, and maybe not your underlying point. The problem is you keep saying "impact" as if its different from "cause". They aren't. Now, does that mean they are the entire cause? No one could say that. But you can't separate "impact" from "cause". They are essentially the same thing.

What I think you're trying to get at, as this is what the real problem of "consciousness" is, is that you cannot see the internal subjectiveness of a function. We see because light bounces off of objects. Measurement is essentially all done by bouncing something off another thing. But a subjective experience is the internal process of matter and energy. We cannot "bounce" off of the subjective internal. We can see the brain and its functions by bouncing off photons and other measuring tools, but those are inadequate to get inside the thing itself.

When you say “ The only gap is you don't know what the other person is subjectively experiencing while they are drunk”, I feel as though you are somewhat agreeing with me but you still do not agree that the qualitative experience is different than our conceptual account of the brain functions. — Bob Ross

Perhaps the confusion is that I am talking about the external measurement of consciousness, not the internal. Regardless of the qualia one experiences, the brain states are the outside objective measurements of that creation. If an apple falls from a tree, gravity suddenly impacts the living cells. They react to it. Do we know what its like to experience that reaction internally as a cell or group of cells? No, its impossible. Does gravity still affect the apple and we can observe the reaction of the cells? Yes.

Seeing with a brain scanner that alcholol inhibits this and that doesn’t produce any conceptual explanation of how the brain functions (inhibited or still functional) are producing the qualitative experience (e.g., the drunk person’s experience of seeing the color red) of that person. That’s where the explanatory gap is. — Bob Ross

To be clear from my end: the brain scanner cannot measure the internal experience of what its like to have the qualia of being drunk. It can scan the brain and note that the individual is inebriated, and through testing, we can note that when the brain is in a particular state, inebriation of the subject occurs. Hands down Bob, alcohol changes the brain which causes drunkenness. That's not debatable. What you seem to think is that because we cannot measure the internal subjective experience of consciousness, that we can't say the brain causes consciousness. That doesn't work. Its illogical.

If you already hold that the brain produces consciousness, then, yes, I would expect you to try to explain the mental event as the wavelength interpretation: but whether one can actually give a conceptual reductive explanation of that is what is in question. — Bob Ross

Its not in question. We can give a conceptual reductive explanation of why alcohol inebriates a person. We cannot give a conceptual reductive explanation of what it is like to internally experience that inebriation. This is because we cannot measure the subjective with the tools we have. That does not mean the objective measurements of what we can measure, suddenly cannot make objective conclusions and measurements of consciousness by the beings actions and responses.

I think you may agree with me here insofar as you hold some aspect of our subjective experience as off limits (and thusly non-reducible to the brain), and, in that case, it is important to note that if you agree then I think you are conceding that you do not have an conceptual account of how a mind-independent brain allegedly produces consciousness and, thusly, you cannot prove it. I am not saying it is impossible nor that it isn’t the case: I am saying you cannot prove it if you cannot conceptually reduce mental states (such as seeing the color red) to brain states—and, no, as seen in the form of the argument, appealing to how functions impact consciousness says nothing about them producing consciousness. — Bob Ross

Again, I think the issue here is vocabulary. Functions cause consciousness. "Impact" is part of causality. If a cue ball impacts the eight ball, it causes it to fly in a particular direction. Cause is what produces an affect. If I touch a person's brain with an electrode at a particular location, scan the brain, and they say, I see a red car, I start to associate brain scans with their expression of what they consciously perceive. If we can repeat it every time and the person is being honest, then we see the brain causes the person to see the color red.

What we cannot see is the internal of being that brain stimulus. We can see the neuron's cascade. We can see they do it every time and produce a particular result. But that is all by external measurement. We cannot measure internally. We cannot measure existence as its subject. Our inability to do so does not mean that the external results of brain stimulation suddenly do not cause consciousness. Its proven. There's no gap here. The only gap is again, our inability to measure something as a subject itself.

Given what I have said hitherto, if you agree with me that we cannot gain insight into qualitative experience then you are equally conceding that we cannot reduce qualitative experience to brain states; which means you have no proof that the former really is from the latter. — Bob Ross

We're so close on agreement here Bob! The only problem is that we have reduced qualitative experience to brain states repeatedly in science and medicine for decades. I really feel at this point you're just using the wrong words to describe a situation. We can measure qaulitative brain states to measure levels of consciousness as an outside observer. we can never measure qualitative brain states to measure levels of conscousness as an inside observer, the subject itself.

Chalmer’s never said that consciousness (as qualitative experience) being explained through the brain is an easy problem, he said that awareness aspects of consciousness (such as the functions which you quoted later on) are easy problems. — Bob Ross

Agreed, this is what I meant.

If you hold that the brain produces consciousness, then the only logically consistent views available to you are physicalist accounts of the world: there’s no way around that. — Bob Ross

Again, you'll have to explain what you mean by physicalist. Yes, the terms are great if everyone holds exactly to what they are and if we all agreed on what they meant. In experience for any serious discussion, I've found the person using the term must clearly explain what they mean as it is often a subjective use for them.

Dualism and idealism are not objective, so of course the hard problem doesn't exist. When you don't care about objectivity, a lot of problems go away

If by “objective” you mean “something which we can empirically observe”, then no metaphysical theory, including physicalism (including the view that the brain produces consciousness), “cares” about “objectivity”. — Bob Ross

No, objectivity is something that can be logically concluded to the point that any challenge against it fails. A falsifiable claim that cannot be shown to be false essentially.

I believe you define qualia as

Nowadays, I think it is recognized a lot more, by philosophers in philosophy of mind, as irreconcilable for physicalism. — Bob Ross

Would you mind linking to a philosopher who believes that mind does not come from the brain? I would like to read from one.

Philosophim, if you think that the brain produces consciousness and the brain (and the world) is mind-independent, then you are a physicalist. — Bob Ross

I'm not sure what you mean by "mind-independent". The brain and the mind are one. Mind is not independent of matter and energy, it is the internal result of matter and energy. We are not separated from matter and energy. We are matter and energy. Which tells us that matter and energy can be conscious in the right combination. If that makes me a physicalist or contradicts a physicalist view according to your view of physicalism, I don't care.

The point is it is logically consistent to hold that matter and energy can create consciousness internally. We can see evidence of this internal experience by our own experience, and the actions that an internal consciousness results in. But knowing what the subjective experience of matter and energy that is not ourselves, is currently impossible with our tools and understanding of reality.

So in your viewpoint, if I am actively thinking, "I know 2+2 equals 4", is that qualia? If not, what is it?

I would say that it is qualitative in the sense that it occurred at a timestamp within a steady flow of qualitative time, but it was non-spatial—so not qualitative pertaining to that. Likewise, I would also hold that the imagination is qualitative. I hold that our faculty of reason is a sense that takes perceptions in as its input and generates concepts of them. — Bob Ross

Then this disagrees with every notion of qualia I've ever known. If "you" are thinking, that's "your" qualia. Qualia is "you" experiencing something. I can observe and identify thoughts correct? I can consciously dream. This is a massive definition gap in the discussion, and if this is not agreed upon, we will simply talk past each other.

In my understanding of qualia, qualia is a base requirement for consciousness. Meaning that like all tigers are cats, all consciousness is qualia. It is possible to have qualia but not have consciousness. From my example, one could observe, but not attempt to identify. This is qualia. But if you are thinking, you are observing and identifying. Therefore that is consciousness.

Your proposal of qualia seems to imply a person can be conscious of something, but not have qualia of that something. That seems very contradictory to me. Can you try to give a logical reason why? Lets remove qualitative and spatial as I think these terms add nothing to the point. Nothing in your head is spatial, and any identification can be considered qualitative upon examination. "4" and "red" are just concepts that we give a limit to, but we're talking about the qualia of experiencing "4" and "red". You're a person thinking "2+2=4". Why is that any different from "I see the color red"?

However, I think it is important to note that you are making metaphysical claims, not just scientific ones. — Bob Ross

I view the term "metaphysical" as its most base definition. "Analysis of the physical". Put another way, its the interpretation of reality in a way that makes logically consistent assessments of that reality. All language is metaphysical. As such, I find the term not very useful. All that matters to me is if my definitions are consistent, logical, and accurate in assessing reality.

What is higher consciousness? Why is higher consciousness different from lower consciousness?

Through evolution, not all conscious beings have the same capabilities—e.g., my dog lacks the cognitive capabilities to abstract his perceptions as much (or at all) like I can. — Bob Ross

So really this is the ability for a being to be conscious of more abstracts than another. If that's the case I don't see how higher consciousness affects any of the points here. Its still consciousness, just more of it.

You seem to imply that our direct attentiveness to it is not required. So in the case of blindsight, the man is conscious of that which he cannot attend to

I believe so (if I am understanding you correctly). My mind’s ability to identify with or have self-knowledge of the qualitative experience is different than merely having it. He cannot “attend to it” because he isn’t meta-conscious or perhaps he simply can’t identify as “his self” having them (so it could be an ownership thing). — Bob Ross

Again, this is a unique view of consciousness to me. I have never heard of consciousness without qualia.

After thinking about the larger discussion, I believe I can summarize our differences down to a few points. We may have to simply agree to disagree on some of these points, but I think a conclusion one way or the other on these will bring the discussion to a close.

1. The definition of qualia

I define qualia as essentially "subjective experience". This subjective experience does not need to be identified, but a stream of sensations, emotions, etc. would be qualia. Anything that I do not subjectively experience, for example the blood pumping through my left leg, would not be qualia.

You seem to think that there is a subjective experience that is qualia, and and a subjective experience that is qualitative. A person can have a qualitative experience without having qualia. This seems a semantic difference from my above evaluation. However, our conclusions differ. You seem to imply that something quantitative that does not have qualia is conscious, while I would call that an unconscious event. To help clarify this issue, what would you define as unconscious?

2. You believe that because we cannot measure the subjective experience of being conscious, that this proves that we cannot claim that consciousness comes from brain states. I note that science and medicine has for years evaluated objective consciousness through medicine and has determined that brain states cause consciousness. I also note that we cannot measure the subjective experience of consciousness, but that it is irrelevant to the conclusion that brains cause consciousness as objective measures of consciousness aren't trying to evaluate subjective measures, just objective outcomes.

I hope that summary accurately depicts our current differences, as well as some similar stances we hold. I honestly believe that we're not very far from one another's view points, and it seems a few semantical differences are leading to two different conclusions. Thanks again Bob, I look forward to hearing from you.

Its not that we can't know how consciousness occurs by measuring brain states.
— Philosophim
If we can, can you explain it? — Patterner

Sure, lets use a modern medical practice, anesthesia. If you've ever had a major surgery, they give you different types of chemicals with the sole purpose of knocking you unconscious. Here's a paper talking about anesthesia and unconsciousness if you're interested. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2743249/#:~:text=According%20to%20this%20framework%2C%20anesthetics,patterns%20available%20to%20cortical%20networks).

Let me also clarify what I mean. We cannot get inside of the subject of consciousness. Its impossible. No outside measurement will reveal what is inside. Subjective consciousness is inside. But can we measure brain states and find causality between a person's ability to express subjective consciousness? Absolutely. To think the brain does not cause consciousness is to invalidate decades of working science and medicine.

You've interpreted gender as overriding sex, which it might be based on your perspective on gender & sex, what you think these words mean and based on what you consider "overriding" but that's where the subjectivity is. — Judaka

Its not interpretation. Its using the definitions provided in the OP which the transgender community accepts to come to a conclusion. Hopefully a logical conclusion, but that's what debate is for.

In politics, "Ten people who speak make more noise than ten thousand who are silent". The worst thing you can try to do is change the minds of those who staunchly disagree with you, a lot of effort with no payoff. Instead, convince people on the fence, or those who were slightly on your side to fully commit. — Judaka

There is wisdom in that, but if I wanted to discuss politics or try to change the political world, I wouldn't be on a philosophy forum. :) I was once deep into religion Judaka. I had a mother who was highly manipulative and used lies and half truths to get what she wanted. I know what its like to be emotionally manipulated into something that another person wants without regard to logic or an objective world view. I have no desire to do that to anyone else.

Logic and philosophy is not about convincing others to change. Its not about our own personal egos. Its about finding a logical conclusion that at the end of the day, can be discussed objectively. A person then chooses to change their life based on what they've read. Its not manipulation. There are people like me who need more than politics, religion, or a whole host of emotional sways. Sometimes we just need to think and wonder if our emotional impulses and cultural beliefs actually make sense. People like me reject the emotional manipulations of the world. Let others do that, that is their job in life.

Maybe there is someone else like me who is tired of manipulations as well. And if not? I got to think through it myself. Philosophy after all is not the love of debate or the love of politics, its is the love of wisdom.

We know where in the brain certain aspects of consciousness take place. But we don't know how. — Patterner

Its because we cannot measure from within a conscious state. All objective measurements are from "without". We bounce stuff off of things to detect features. Vibrations for sound, photons for light. But consciousness is subjective, which means it comes from within a state. We can't currently bounce something at a state to measure what its like to be within that state.

Its not that we can't know how consciousness occurs by measuring brain states. Its only limited to an examination for consciousness as an observing being outside of the conscious state. We don't know "how" it is to be conscious from within the state, but we can know how it is conscious state outside, or the consequence of the actions of that inner state, work and function.

The problem with focusing on the "logic of the language" is that language, generally, but especially with the word "gender" is deeply influenced by one's views on the matter. — Judaka

I disagree. Logic allows you to question your views on the matter and offer a stable reason where bias and subjective opinion may have once been your influence. I do not say this as a matter of opinion, I say this as one who has lived it.

Even if that wasn't true, how a word is defined shouldn't compel anyone to think in any specific way. If the language around sex or gender didn't fit the logic that I thought was accurate or best, then I would simply use the words in the way I wanted instead, and that's 100% common practice. — Judaka

It is common practice, but it is not a practice that entails a solution that all parties can logically agree on. At that point its a power struggle of opinion and emotions. You will never get anyone to agree with you who does not share your emotional desires. If you can remove subjective prejudice and focus on the logic of the situation, I believe it is conclusive that a subjective identification of oneself should never override societies objective classification of biology. My conclusion is a logical conclusion even a transgender person cannot refute. It has nothing to do with how we feel about the situation.

You aren't even remotely neutral here, your political views are included in your interpretation of these concepts and ideas, and I say that as someone who pretty much agrees with you. — Judaka

Incorrect. I have attempted to look at both sides of the issue. I've attempted to take the definitions that the community has provided and largely agreed upon, and come to a logical conclusion. My feelings on the matter are irrelevant and unknown to you. A problem in trying to be a neutral party and discuss such things is that people rush to assumptions and political emotions that cloud the ability to judge accurately. This causes people to not think of the idea, but instead simply accept or reject the person. That is not thinking, that's just bias.

Though for me, the reason why separation by sex shouldn't be overridden by gender is that the reasons for separating people by sex are primarily physical and have nothing to do with gender. — Judaka

Agreed. The point of this OP was to analyze why that was at a deeper level. To explore that gender is entirely subjective, biology is objective, and even if there are slight overlaps in some areas, why those overlaps are not enough to override the biological divisions we've created. We need more conversations with each other instead of camps where we insult each other as "an other". Logic can break down such walls and remind each other we're both people who even if we cannot come to a common agreement, can discuss and hear another way of looking at the issue.

I was very glad to hear Josh's viewpoint on the matter. I very much considered his points, despite them not changing my mind. I am now aware of a viewpoint that I had not considered before, and I can take it with me in future conversations. If we had just yelled at each other, that never would have happened.

quote="Bob Ross;814253"]The point is that I don’t. It is not a scientific fact that brains produce consciousness.[/quote]

We may be at an impasse here Bob. I respect your view point, but I can't agree on this one. Being able to express doubt about a theory does not disprove a theory. A scientific theory is not like the layman's meaning of theory.

"The way that scientists use the word 'theory' is a little different than how it is commonly used in the lay public," said Jaime Tanner, a professor of biology at Emerson College in Boston. "Most people use the word 'theory' to mean an idea or hunch that someone has, but in science the word 'theory' refers to the way that we interpret facts." https://www.livescience.com/21491-what-is-a-scientific-theory-definition-of-theory.html

One way to think of it is all the science up till now points to the brain, in the case of people, being the source of consciousness in people. Its like evolution. Its not a scientific law for sure, but every single attempt at refuting it has come up short. This is why I asked you to give a counter. You need to take the scientific knowledge that we have at this time and demonstrate why it cannot come from the brain. A simple way to do this is provide an alternative that we can use.

This is why I always note a distinction, when discussing the hard problem, between awareness and experience: the former being “how a being has knowledge, be aware, of its environment” while the latter is “how a being has qualitative, subjective experience of its environment”. — Bob Ross

I'm having a hard time understanding the difference between those terms. If you have knowledge of something, you are aware. And if you are aware, that attention is qualia is it not? Can you give me example of something that you could be aware of that was not also qualia, or subjective experience? To me it appears you're comparing unconscious awareness with conscious awareness.

Explaining functions, for example, is an easy problem—e.g., a being can know that something is green by interpreting the wavelength of light reflected off of the object. However, explaining how those functions produce experience is a different story—e.g., why does the being also have a qualitative experience of the greenness of the object? — Bob Ross

I'm not sure that's the right comparison. Its not "also have a qualitative experience", its "why is that a qualitative experience?" The interpretation of the wavelength by the brain is the qualia is it not? Perhaps with blindsight I can see it more to your viewpoint. The man sees something that he is not aware of. I suppose I would say his unconscious mind sees the object, but his conscious mind does not. So comparing that to your point, the unconscious mind would see green, while the conscious mind would not experience the qualia of green, but he would know that it was green. Is that a good comparison to what you're saying?

Does this also fit into your definition of awareness and experience? So in blindsight terms, we would say he is aware of the object in front of him, but he does not experience it in his qualia. Generally I would not use the term awareness for such a situation, but if that is your definition, and it fits this situation, then I think I understand your argument better. Please correct me here.

A good link to Chalmers. Let me point to these two paragraphs in section 2.

"The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.

It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does"

I've bolded that sentence explicitly. Chalmers agrees on the technical aspects of mind as brain within his easy problem explanation, so what is he saying here? He's not saying that we can't observe all of the processes that give rise to consciousness. He's asking, "Why is there subjective experience?" He's not saying, "Its impossible for the brain to produce subjective experience". He says it seems unreasonable, but it clearly does. We can simplify Chalmer's entire line of questioning to, "Since we cannot experience the subjective experience itself, how can we possibly reconcile subjective experience with the observable mechanics in front of us?"

The answer is of course, "We cant'." You and I agree on this entirely. We're only off by a slight understanding of what Chalmer's means here. Nothing we study about the brain will ever give us insight into its subjective experience. It is outside of our knowledge. That's why its a hard problem. The solution as I gave, is to work around it.

The hard problem even admits that consciousness is explained through the brain

I think you may be misunderstanding. Yes, the hard problem presumes, in order to even be a problem in the first place, that one is trying to explain consciousness by the standard reductive naturalist methodological approach. However, this is not the same thing as it being true. The hard problem is only such for physicalism, not other accounts such as substance dualism and idealism. — Bob Ross

According to Chalmer's here, it is not presumption. That is the easy problem. I do not care about physicalism, dualism, or idealism. I care about logical consistency, philosophical schools of thought be damned! :) To me its like I use a martial arts move that does not fit in with karate and someone berates me that it destroys karate. If the move is effective at defending oneself, what does it matter?

It is not that the hard problem comes about from physicalism, its that the hard problem is for our ability to understand the subjective nature of consciousness an an objective manner. Dualism and idealism are not objective, so of course the hard problem doesn't exist. When you don't care about objectivity, a lot of problems go away. I care about objectivity. Subjectivity has never interested me beyond some fun, "What ifs". Musing about the subjective without any objective basis is fantasy. While it is fun, it does not solve anything in reality.

Again, I am not claiming that the mind does not come from the brain but, rather, that we cannot prove (even theoretically in the future) because reductive physicalism affords no such answers—the methodology fails in this regard. — Bob Ross

Again, the fact that we cannot objectively experience the subjective experience of another brain itself, does not negate that the subjective experience is coming from the brain itself. Chalmers demonstrates that by the easy problem here:

"The easy problems of consciousness include those of explaining the following phenomena:
the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
the integration of information by a cognitive system;
the reportability of mental states;
the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
the focus of attention;
the deliberate control of behavior;
the difference between wakefulness and sleep."

All of this is consciousness, and all of that comes from the brain. Chalmers never disputes this. Please show where he does if I am mistaken.

The form is as follows: “consciousness is [set of biological functions] because [set of biological functions] impacts consciousness [in this set of manners]”. That is the form of argumentation that a reductive naturalist methodology can afford and, upon close examination, there is a conceptual gap between consciousness being impacted in said manners and the set of biological functions (responsible for such impact) producing consciousness. — Bob Ross

No, there is not a conceptual gap between the biology and the experience. Get someone drunk and they become inebriated. This is due to how alcohol affects the brain. No one disputes this. The only gap is you don't know what the other person is subjectively experiencing while they are drunk. Objective consciousness vs subjective consciousness.

How do you explain modern day neuroscience? Medical Psychiatry? Brain surgery?

From an ontological agnostic’s perspective, those fields are getting much better at understanding the relation between brain states and mental states but they say nothing about what consciousness fundamentally is. — Bob Ross

They can know what consciousness is objectively. They simply can't know what a consciousness experiences subjectively. Brain state A can be switched to state B, and every time they do, you see a Cat, then a Dog in your mind. You can tell them this, but no one knows what that experience you have of seeing a cat or dog is like.

Think of it like the video game analogy: if a character, Rose, hooks up another character, Billy, to a brain scanner and observes Billy qualitatively experiencing a green tree, she would be factually wrong to conclude that the Billy’s brain states were causing his mental experience of it because, in fact, the tree and his brain and body are fundamentally representations of 0s and 1s in a computer. We conflate our dashboard of experience with what reality fundamentally is—mentality. — Bob Ross

This just seems to be a language issue. The words I'm stating are not the subjective words in my head correct? When I type a sentence, you don't know everything I'm thinking. But that doesn't mean the words aren't an attempt to represent what I'm actually thinking right? The words that you are seeing are just a bunch of black pixels squiggled together. Without translation, someone who didn't speak English would have no clue that these squiggles mean anything.

So we can translate Billy's thoughts to comprehend that he is thinking of a tree, but of course we can't get to the actual subjective experience of Billy seeing a tree, because we're not the subject, or Billy in this case. If billy confirms he his seeing a tree after we hook up the computer, and every time the computer is hooked up, says Billy is thinking of a tree, and Billy then states, "I'm thinking of a tree", then we are on the road to causality. Current neuroscience is way past this simple example, and way past the point of possible correlation.

Please find me a reputable neuroscience paper that shows that the brain most certainly does not produce consciousness, and then also provides evidence of what is.

If I could, then I would be proving myself wrong. The point is that science doesn’t afford an answer, so it would be contradictory of me to provide you with a scientific explanation, which is a reductive naturalistic approach, to afford an answer. — Bob Ross

Again, I think we're in agreement that it is impossible for science to ever know what it is like to subjectively experience from the subject's viewpoint. This in no way backs a claim that the brain does not produce a subjective experience.

Finally, just as an aside, how do you explain the mind seeing? The eyes connect through the optic nerve straight to your brain. It has no where else to go.

I would say, in summary, that the extrinsic representation of qualitatively seeing a world, from the side of another being that is qualitatively seeing, is light entering the physical eyes and brain interpreting it—but this is just the representation of it on our dashboard of experience. — Bob Ross

Certainly, just like language is a representation of the thoughts I am trying to convey. It being a representation does not mean that language does not convey thoughts. It does not mean that I did not write them. It does not mean that I don't have thoughts. It just means you can never see my thoughts from my subjective viewpoint.

Meta-consciousness is the knowledge of one’s qualitative experience: I am not qualitatively experiencing my qualitative experience—I have one steady flow of qualitative experience. — Bob Ross

See I view the consciousness of knowledge as qualia. Unconsciously knowing things would not be qualia, or subjective consciousness to me. I see qualia as the subjective experience of consciousness. it is that attentive awareness. So in your viewpoint, if I am actively thinking, "I know 2+2 equals 4", is that qualia? If not, what is it?

The point is that, under Analytic Idealism, you are still conscious when you are in a coma—you just have lost your meta-consciousness and other higher level aspects to consciousness (such as potentially the ability to cognize). — Bob Ross

So according to my definition of consciousness, a person in a coma could be considered objectively unconscious, but still subjectively conscious. Even then, perhaps there are still aspects of the brain that are still conscious. So for example, if we analyzed their brain and found that they were dreaming. Would we be able to know what that dreaming was like? No, but dreaming is observing and identifying.

Also, for my sake, instead of saying, under a philosophical theory x results, can you simply give me the logic why X results? My experience with people citing such theories is that everyone has a different viewpoint on what that theory means, so I want to understand what it means to you.

At the least, I don't see how it counters my point about Blindsight. The person does not have any qualia, or consciousness, of seeing what is in front of their eyes.

Let me ask you this: what about blindsight indicates, to you, that they don’t have qualia? Simply because they can no longer identify that they are seeing? — Bob Ross

Qualia to me is something you experience. While the unconscious portion of the brain is processing, your subjective awareness is not. Qualia is the requirement for subjective consciousness. Unconscious processing is not qualia, at least to my understanding of the general use of the word.

Isn't it the attention to these, the conscious experience of them, that is qualia?

No, that is an aspect, a ability, of higher conscious forms. — Bob Ross

What is higher consciousness? Why is higher consciousness different from lower consciousness? You seem to be implying that higher consciousness is the ability to remember what you just did, then analyze it. How is that any different from my definition of observing than identifying?

To me, perceptions are representations of the world, which are qualitative (and thusly are constituted of instances of qualia). — Bob Ross

Just trying to get the vocabulary down here. Perceptions are sensations which a mind processes into a representation of the world. So I could have the smell of a flower flow through my nostrils, but if I don't try to represent it as anything beyond the sensation of the smell itself, I don't have a perception. That is very similar to my observations/identity point. I have a feeling we're both off slightly with each other through semantics than a clash of ideology.

Sensations, on the other hand, are just the raw input which is also qualitative. — Bob Ross

I also agree with this. I think the difference is that if I am not attentive to the sensation, its an unconscious sensation. You seem to imply that our direct attentiveness to it is not required. So in the case of blindsight, the man is conscious of that which he cannot attend to. Does this capture your thoughts correctly?

So then are you advocating for epistemic solipsism? To me, this confirms that you can’t actually claim that objectively conscious beings are subjectively conscious and, thusly, we cannot know that there are other subjects but, rather, just that there are other observing beings. — Bob Ross

For an easily identifiable terminology, yes. We cannot know what another's subjective experience is, or even if they have it. Blindsight is proof of that. What we can do is have a cogent belief that others do. We can also analyze this objectively by looking for the consequence of having a subjective viewpoint. If I know that the ability to observe an identify is my subjective consciousness, then I can conclude that it allows me to do things that I could not if I were not an observing and identifying being. As a very simple test, I could put a puzzle in front of another being.

Lets take a crow for example. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NGaUM_OngaY

In accordance to the definitions I've given, the crow is objectively conscious. Can we know what its like to be a conscious crow? No. Its impossible. Can we still objectively analyze its consciousness? Yes. Can we muse what it must feel like to be a crow? Of course, but its nothing we can know, just something we believe.

Finally, here's a link to a fairly good philosophy professor online who breaks down the hard problem. I'm posting it so that you know I understand the subject, and to also help clarify what I mean by the hard problem, and why we should just separate consciousness into objective and subjective branches. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aaZbCctlll4

Thank you Bob for taking the time to really break down your methodology for me. This subject comes up every so often and I find most people are either unable or unwilling to really go into the details. Another long discussion already, but one that I am glad to explore!

I thought your definition of gender was whatever someone says it is, because your view of social construction is randomly assigned behavioral definitions by individuals, or groups who wield power over individuals to force them to act in certain ways. — Joshs

No, my definition of gender is clear, its simply a social construct. Of course that construct can be used for good, evil, power, pleasure, etc. Social constructs are tools, and humans use tools in every way possible.

The key notion I want to emphasize from this summary is that for Foucault socially constructed knowledge and values are not imposed on a community by an individual or group wielding power and desiring that the community act a certain way. Instead, they form an integrated pattern of understanding with its own internal ‘logic’ not imposed by anybody in particular, and not in top down fashion but disseminating itself through a culture from the bottom up , as a shared pattern of thinking and behaving. — Joshs

Certainly, there are groups of people who use gender exactly like Foucault states. Does everyone? Per my first set of comments, of course not.

The transgender view of gender is a consequence of gender being a social construct — Judaka

Yes, the transgender idea is that you can cross the culturally perceived gender barrier. The arguments you present are commonly known. However, if such arguments settled the issue, it would be done by now. I find there is a lot of vitriol between parties when the discussion is approached this way, and so this was an attempt to make the argument which sometimes has subtle notions of power and manipulation at play from both sides, and instead focus on the logic of the language.

Philosophy is best when it can look at a problem that people are stuck on, and find a new way of approaching it that can settle the issue. Philosophy should not care about the politics of the issue, and its intent should be a fair and equal logical conclusion for all parties involved.

This was that attempt. I simply find that the language of sex and gender, when taken to their logical conclusions, entail that separation by sex should never be overriden by gender. Its not political, personal, or intended to harm anyone. Its just what logically works best for all involved.

On a personal note, I do sympathize with people who feel the need to switch sex, know they are unable to truly do so, and so desperately cling onto gender as a lifeline to fulfil their fantasy or erase their distress. But, when you have to lie or hold illogical statements for emotional value, I have found this inevitably causes harm to yourself and those around you. It is not truth. And a life not lived true, is a far worse life than lived as a lie.

"Objective consciousness is the observation and logical conclusion that the other being is observing"

Objective consciousness is logical conclusion. How can it not be conscious? Logical conclusions don't think themselves. — Pantagruel

First, you cut off the rest of the quote which includes identification, and action. Second, your grammar is starting to fail. "is logical conclusion" "logical conclusions don't think themselves". This shows me you're not thinking about things, but putting out sloppy and quick replies.

I had to do a German translation for Unsinn. Why? I'm not German. And finally your point about the p-zombie shows me, again, that you have no idea what the definitions are that I've clearly described in the OP and in follow ups.

I've been more than patient, but its clear you're not taking this discussion seriously. Have a good day Pantagruel, we'll try again another time.

Except that you keep saying objective consciousness is not conscious. Ascribing these properties to objective consciousness contradicts this. — Pantagruel

I don't say that at all. The statement doesn't even make any sense. Please re-read the definition of objective consciousness, subjective consciousness and my explanations. Pull some quotes demonstrating where I've said this, as I don't understand how you're drawing that conclusion. I can't attempt to clarify for you until you give me my exact words that back your claim.

And even if I just ignore the self-contradictions of "objective consciousness," — Pantagruel

Please point out these self-contradictions. And quote me. At this point it is safe to say you have trouble reading and understanding the OP. This could be due to the lack of clarity in my terms or arguments. But I cannot know this if you do not cite.

there are senses in which we are co-conscious. Mirror-neurons function through identification with the observed cognitive state of others in certain circumstances. Empathy is a co-awareness of the subjective plight of another. And it is a critical developmental stage in conscious development. — Pantagruel

This has nothing to do with the definitions or topic here. Lets ensure that you first understand the definitions and arguments being made before you try adding new definitions like co-conscious.

If it is an observation and a logical conclusion then it is subjective consciousness. These are both elements of subjective consciousness. — Pantagruel

Correct. Meaning that if you are observing and identifying, that experience you are having of observing and identifying is your subjective consciousness.

So I am not ascribing any inner experience of consciousness when I am describing objective consciousness.
— Philosophim

Nevertheless, as I mentioned, you say objective consciousness should not "try to ascertain that it can know." Ascertaining and knowing are also operations of subjective consciousness. — Pantagruel

Please finish what I claimed.

"should not try to ascertain that it can know what another subjective consciousness is like"

You agreed with me on this. You cannot know what it is like for another being to be conscious. You cannot know another beings subjective consciousness. You can of course know your own subjective consciousness. But because I can never know your subjective consciousness, I cannot make any claims to the experience of your subjective consciousness objectively. I can't know what its like when you see green. You can't know what its like that I see green. We can objectively know that we both see the wavelength we call green. But we cannot objectively know what the subjective experience of seeing green is like.

I think we get into the same problems of stereotyping you pointed out in trying to distinguish objective from subjective with regard not only to gender but to the seemingly simple task of defining what it means to be attracted to someone on the basis of their ‘sex’. — Joshs

So that is a bit of a different subject. The terms at this time note attraction based on biological sex, but one could invent a word that notes attraction based on gender. The problem of course again, is that one's gender definitions are not universal across cultures, but are subjective and cultural themselves. I am not saying you shouldn't invent a language or go by gender in your personal culture. Do what you want. Its when we try to create clear terms that can be objectively identified and assessed across all cultures that we need to be more careful in our terms.

You might argue that it has been useful to offer legal protections for same-sex relations and partnerships because one is able to define and identify same-sex attraction objectively. — Joshs

I'm not arguing that though. I believe you can sexually commit to anyone you want as long as they are not a child, an animal, dead, or severely cognitively impaired. The reasons of course being the inability of the other party to make a clear decision on the matter. Two people who want to hook up and commit for life are all good.

But as I suggested, the lines are being blurred between what is subjective and what is objective in this arena. Many now argue that the concept of psychological gender is no more subjective that what labels like gay and lesbian supposedly refer to. — Joshs

Here we've discussed at length about clear lines and divisions. It doesn't matte what they say, it matters what's been discussed here. I've demonstrated, and you've confirmed, the problem with gender as a subjective, wishy-washy, line blurring definition. Its not that they aren't clear from the one's who invent and use them. When a person has a clear idea of what "feminine" is, they can list off all the features easily. The problem is that we can very easily find another person, ask them what feminine is, and they could easily list off a set of completely different and contrary points.

It may not be practical for a community to make political decisions protecting the rights of individuals to behave in ways that that community considers to be the result of private whim or compulsion on the part of the individual, and does appear to belong to a larger pattern, constellation or theme of personality that all of us possess, each in their own way. — Joshs

The practicality is irrelevant. The rights are already there to do so are they not? Do we not have free speech? Should we not have the right to act, wear, and dress as we wish within the privacy of our homes? I would love to say public places, but abuse, and not of the sexual sort, has long shown there needs to be some regulation to assure public safety and health. I would definitely argue that the limitations on dress and actions should be minimized, and only limited if real public harms can be demonstrated by their allowance.

my view of gender is actually much closer to the social constructionist approaches to gender of authors like Butler and Foucault than your cultural perspective is. Like me, they view gender in terms of a constellation of shared patterns of behaviors that bind communities. — Joshs

Of course, but that's in full agreement with my definition of gender as well. Gender is socially constructed, and gender is often used as a binding or enforcement tool for behaviors that the particular culture desires people to act on. That actually doesn't change the questions I've put forward.

I see you haven't addressed those questions directly, and if I had to guess, it is because you are concerned that this could somehow be used against sexuality itself. I assure you, it does not. Having spoken to several different people within the sexual variance community (I much prefer that term to the alphabet mix), I believe they agree in essence with what I'm stating, but are afraid that they will be seen as hypocritical in someway, or damage their own societal acceptance they have worked so hard to gain.

Such fear is often damaging, because this causes lies, half-truths, and evasive answers. But that is not the intention here. In philosophy we must be willing to examine issues at their core without fear of where people will try to go from there right? But I understand the fear. So don't answer my questions, its fine. I've ascertained enough at this point to hold to my original conclusions.

Objective consciousness then requires the addition of one other term, "Action". Only through a thing's actions can we ascertain that it can observe and identify. — Philosophim

Ok, this is better Pantagruel.

You left out the next few sentences in the quote, which are important. You need to read more than a few sentences before making judgements. Sentences are part of an overall idea right? Don't read the sentences in isolation. Read the sentences to understand the idea.

Objective consciousness occurs when we can know that something that is not our subjective consciousness is also observing and identifying. The problem in knowing whether something is objectively conscious is that we cannot experience their subjective consciousness. So the only logical thing to do is to observe what an objective consciousness does that only an observing identifying thing could do.
"Objective consciousness then requires the addition of one other term, "Action". Only through a thing's actions can we ascertain that it can observe and identify."
— Philosophim

Objective consciousness is not subjective consciousness. Objective consciousness is the observation and logical conclusion that the other being is observing and identifying things through their actions.
Subjective consciousness is the direct subjective experience of being conscious.

You clearly say that objective consciousness occurs in the observing subject as a function of the awareness of another conscious being. — Pantagruel

I want to break down your words here to make sure I understand. You use the word "occurs in" with regards to objective consciousness. Objective consciousness is observed and known by the observing a subjects actions. It does not assess the inner experience of the subject. It does not assess the inner experience of the self. So its a little odd to say objective consciousness occurs in something. Objective consciousness is an observation of consciousness that does not require understanding the inner subjectivity of that consciousness.

So I am not ascribing any inner experience of consciousness when I am describing objective consciousness.

Ok, yes, when I see something which I believe to be conscious, I am conscious of an object that I deem to be conscious. You are absolutely correct. And I don't experience the contents of other minds. For sure. — Pantagruel

To simplify this further:

When I see something that I believe to be conscious, I study its actions. If the actions of the being are actions that can only be done by something which can observe and identify, then objectively, it is conscious.

My own experience of being conscious, is subjective consciousness. My experience is only within my knowledge, no one else can know exactly what I am experiencing. I of course know what its like to be conscious from my point of view. But just like no one else can know what its like to be conscious from my point of view, I cannot know what its like for someone else to be conscious from their point of view.

Because subjective consciousness cannot be known by anyone besides the subject, it should be in a separate category than objective consciousness, which can be known and studied by everyone.

Pantagruel, you've pulled statements out of context, accused me of misleading, and apparently have not read the OP, or simply lack reading comprehension. I clearly defined what objective consciousness is in the OP. This is philosophy, the term and its definition is a proposal to be debated on that I did NOT mislead people about. I do not mind answering questions, clarifying issues, or addressing relevant critiques. I'm not interested in discussing with someone who is not making good faith efforts to address and understand the OP.