g. If it is [not good] for anything to exist then it is not good for that objective moral standard to exist. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Lets continue.

If its not good for the objective moral standard to exist, then according to itself, it ought not to exist.
If we are to know that it ought not to exist, then we should destroy it, ignore it, or not follow it according to itself. The only conclusion we can make then is we ought to conclude that existence should be, therefore existence ought to be.

Its a pretty clear contradiction from the conclusion. Any conclusion which leads to negating itself is irrational, and cannot be an existent objective morality.

I don't think your proposition proves that existence as a concept is moral, only that the existence of an objective moral system is moral (which is somewhat redundant and tautological). — finarfin

No, because the question is not, "is the objective system moral itself?" The question is whether there should be existence at all. If the answer is no, then the very objective morality itself shouldn't exist. But if it shouldn't exist, then it cannot claim that other things should or should not exist as it should not exist itself. If it should not exist, then it should not be followed. It contradicts itself.

Then isn't your proposition only proving that objective morality itself should exist, i.e. is a moral end? — finarfin

No. There is one assumption that I noted in the OP. We are assuming an objective morality exists. If it exists, logically, what must the answer be to "Should there be existence?" Logically, any objective morality must conclude, "Yes." We aren't proving that an objective morality exists, we are simply proving what it must entail if it does exist.

The hypothetical stated that they cannot both co-exist; but I understand what you are saying: it just doesn’t address the issue. — Bob Ross

How? I don't understand. Please give an example of the issue in another way so I can understand then. You can use the grandfather, the grandson, and the explosion to demonstrate if you wish.

That’s why I used the example: there is one thing that is good but should not exist; which contradicts your definition. — Bob Ross

Should not exist in that context. In another context both the boy, the grandfather, and the explosion ought to exist, just separately. Because when you get into existences, we find that some combinations create more potential and actual existences than others. But we're getting too far ahead now within the scope of this conversation. Lets just break the basic example down.

If you wish, chart it out. Take the boy, the grandfather, and the explosion and set them to every variation of true and false you can think of. True = exist, while false = does not exist. Of course the optimal set would be where all three are true. But if we're in a situation in which one must be false, that is a less optimal situation. Meaning we have a situation that is the greatest good, and situations which are not as good. As you can see, we can have one set which is the greatest good, with other sets that are not as good.

Perhaps you're missing the notion of relativite vs absolute. In an absolute sense (within the context of this simple thought experiment only, don't go any deeper than this!) all three should exist. But we are not Gods. Just because something ought to be, doesn't mean it can be. There are limitations in which we cannot reach the ideal. In this case, the explosion is going to exist and either the grandfather or son will be set to false. In such cases we must take the best of what is available to us. Meaning that when we cannot reach the case in which all three can exist without eliminating the other, we must chose from what is remaining. Meaning there is an ideal good, and a reachable good. If this is incoherent, please point out with clear examples, not abstracts.

Also, on a separate note, I’ve always thought something fishy is going [ (; ] on with your derivation of existence being good — Bob Ross

Ha ha! No worry. It needs to be challenged in every way. A claim to objectivity requires it.

In order for there to be a standard, there must exist already something that is morally good. If this is true, then existence cannot be that standard; because that would be circular. — Bob Ross

A logically necessary requirement for something is not a circular fallacy. Something circular would be something which tried to prove itself by illogical self-assertion. "The bible is entirely true." How do we know its true? "Because the bible tells us its true." I am using a proof by contradiction to note that existence should be, not circular logic. Consequently, it would be that something good already exists, but that is not being used as a proof for the claim that existence is good.

I think you might have an equivocation with your use of "should" here. "Should" can mean "ought," or "it would be good to..." but it can also be used as in "x should follow from y," where it is basically standing in for "x entails y." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I wouldn't say that x should follow from y is the same as 'entails'. Should or ought in are words of intention or preference. If x should follow from y, it means that there is a possibility that it does not. If existence should be, it doesn't mean that it necessarily will be for example.

It seems possible that an objective standard could exist that says "things ought not to exist." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Then how would it answer its own contradiction? Anytime you reach a contradiction in logic, its an indicator its something that's not possible. To be clear, the question is, "Should there be existence?" or the binary of "Something vs Nothing". Meaning in the face of an absolute void, there still ought to be something. Does this mean, "If we can have 2 somethings vs the 1 something, that the 2 something is always better?" No. We are setting a base good, and nothing more at this point.

Now, it is the case that if nothing exists, then no standard of goodness can exist. If that's what you're getting at, that seems fine — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's about the gist. So if there is an objective standard of goodness that exists, it cannot logically conclude that it ought not to exist. For if it did, then that logically means it would be good if the objective conclusion did not exist. If we got rid of the objective morality based on its own conclusions then, we are left with only one answer, that there ought to be existence.

Objective reality cannot be a contradiction. Objectivity is a state of reality that is, while a contradiction is a claim that something both is and is not at the same time in purely equivalent positive and negative terms or A = !A. No objective conclusion that I know of leads to a contradiction of itself, therefore anything which is a contradiction cannot be objective. Ergo, "Existence ought to be" is the only conclusion which an objective morality could conclude.

Do facts like 1+1=2 exist outside of created existence? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No. They are observations and logical conclusions about created existence. Everything that is exists. There are no ghosts 'outside of existence', floating concepts in the aether 'outside of existence', or other nonsense. You cannot get outside of existence. If it is, it exists.

Also, a better word than possible would be plausible. Something possible is the knowledge of something that has occurred at least once. So it is possible it could happen again. What is plausible is something in our imagination that we have not actually explored. So its plausible that a green man is outside of my home monitoring me right now. Plausibility however is not a very good induction if there is something above it, which is possibility or impossibility. What I am claiming is that it is impossible for there to exist an objective morality that contradicts itself, because that which is objective does not contradict itself. Therefore anything plausible to the contrary we can imagine is a consideration to explore, but by itself unexplored can be dismissed as a serious challenge.

So, if you believe it is plausible that there is an objective morality which concludes there ought to be no existence, feel free to propose a proof of its counter where I have proposed it is impossible. But if you cannot raise it to the level of possibility or impossibility, then cogently, we can dismiss the argument as a thought that cannot be elevated enough to be a serious consideration in the argument.

Okay, we're talking past each other. — 180 Proof

No worry. Feel free to chime in any time later if it hits something you feel like exploring.

You sidestepped what I said: mentioning that both co-existing would be better doesn’t address the hypothetical I gave you. ‘What should be’ is a final consideration: it leaves out any discussion of a hierarchy of good things that never make the cut for being things which should exist. — Bob Ross

Ah, it wasn't my intention to side step the issue. Let me take a look at it again.

Let's say you can only perform one of the combinations (as performing one eliminates the possibility of performing the other): obviously, you would choose the second one (because it is more "good"). However, if you what you mean by "good" is merely "what should exist" then both combinations should exist; but it seems perfectly coherent for you to say "the first combination is good, but it should not exist because the second combination is better (i.e., 'more good')".

You might be missing context as the important factor. Within the context in which both can co-exist, it is good for both to co-exist. In the context in which only one can exist, it will be a greater good for one of them to exist over the other. But this second context does not universalize that the one which will not exist wouldn't be good if they could both exist.

Lets use people. An 80 year old man is out with their 5 year old grandson. As they pass by a building, an explosion happens. The still spry grandfather can leap out of the way, but his grandson will die. If he stays, he will die, but his grandson will live.

Ideally both should be able to live. But given the situation, only one can. In the situation between the grandfather and grandchild its not that the grandfather shouldn't exist, its that the best outcome within this specific situation is that the grandfather dies protecting the grandson. A moral outcome based on a limitation does not mean that we will have the same moral outcome with that limitation removed.

In sum, the objective fact of the matter is this: 'all human beings suffer — 180 Proof

There is no question that we all suffer. You view morality as a methodology of easing human suffering and providing benefits to humanity. But that's not objective. That's just a methodology that benefits mankind. I've defined morality as, "What should be." The problem with a human centric morality is, "Why should there be humans?" If the answer is, "I want there to be," then its really a culturally subjective viewpoint for self-benefit.

The morality I'm looking at is the deeper morality that would give us an objective justification for concluding that humanity should flourish. The morality I'm asking would exist even if humans didn't. Its a morality that can be applied to animals, and even the non-conscious universe itself. It does not care about our personal benefit, or our cultural subjective viewpoints.

Correct. But how should I respond to my suffering?
Prevent or reduce your (or another's) suffering without increasing your (or another's) suffering. — 180 Proof

Why? If I can benefit while hurting another, why not? Lets say I have no emotional feelings of empathy towards other people. In fact, murdering a person gives me great happiness. Why should I listen to your morality? If I can make a billion dollars and be respected by the world while giving my employees the most minimal of human respect and decency, why shouldn't I? An objective morality cannot be based on emotions, nor can it only appeal to normal or good people.

Humans exist, there is no "why" (because every conceivable "fundamental why" begs the question). Also, "why should ... exist" conflates prescription with description which is a category error; the question is incoherent (and therefore not "fundamental"). — 180 Proof

There's no category error here at all. Going back to my start, notice I never say, "I'm proving an objective morality exists." I'm noting, "If an objective morality exists, then this is what we can rationally conclude must be an answer to the fundamental question." If you claim, "I don't believe there is an objective morality," or that there is no objective answer to whether there should or should not be something, then there's nothing else to explore. We have subjective morality, and we all take our own corner of what we think ought or ought not to be. But in entering this discussion, we are assuming there is an objective morality. And if so, the question of, "Should there be existence?" is an absolutely imperative question that must be answered to build upon anything else.

"Murdering" is not a non-zero sum resolution to conflict, which may "help" you to survive but survival is not the sufficient condition for flourishing. — 180 Proof

Why should I care whether others flourish? Why shouldn't I eliminate every other person on this Earth for peace and quiet? Again, I personally agree with flourishing as a goal, but it is nothing we objectively conclude, only emotionally conclude.

However, if you what you mean by "good" is merely "what should exist" then both combinations should exist; but it seems perfectly coherent for you to say "the first combination is good, but it should not exist because the second combination is better (i.e., 'more good')".

That's not coherent to my claim. I already mentioned if both could co-exist then both should as that's more existence. The only case in which we decide one over the other is if both cannot co-exist, or we only have the capacity to choose one over the other.

Talking coherently about existence being “good” in the sense that it ‘should be’ doesn’t help: that’s talk about what you are ascribing as ‘good’, and not what ‘good’ is itself. — Bob Ross

I'm still scratching my head at this Bob. If good is "What should be", then that's what good is. If "X is good" then I am ascribing X as good. Can you give me an example of your terminology division?

This isn’t a definition of ‘good’ as a concept: ‘what should be?’ is not a concept, it is a question. — Bob Ross

Its not a question, there's no question mark! :D If I used the phrase, "This is what is", you understand that's not a question. Same here.

I'm not seeing what you're stating. Should "X" be? Then it is good.

This doesn’t explain what ‘good’ is. — Bob Ross

Right. Good = "What should be". If "X is good" then "X should be". We have the definition of what good is, and then a demonstration of something which has the attribute of being good.

‘to ought to be’ — Bob Ross

That's just an odd phrase. You can just drop the 'to' and leave it as 'ought to be' if the 'what' part of the phrasing is causing issues.
Good = ought to be
Something which is good = A specification of what ought to be"

is this the division you're looking for between good and what is ascribed as good?

If this is true, as you have stated, then your concept of 'good' is incoherent; which will not get resolved by elaborating on what you think is good. — Bob Ross

Can you drill into that more?

If I claim good is "What should be" then note, "Existence should be", then existence is good. If I go to the next step and say, "If existence is good, then more existence is better," how is that incoherent?

You are confusing an explication of the property of goodness with what can be predicated to have it. — Bob Ross

Considering good is "What should be" I'm not seeing what you're stating. Should "X" be? Then it is good. Should "Y" not be? Then it is not good. The property of goodness is something that a thing has, or it doesn't. The question of, "Why is X good?" is different from the property itself. Is that the division you're noting?

Suffering (i.e. dysfunction, loss of homeostasis, fear) happens, like life itself, is a ubiquitous, objective fact (e.g. human facticity). — 180 Proof

Correct. But how should I respond to my suffering? If I'm in constant pain, should I be on pain killers to the point that I become a blissful zombie? If I suffer in war, should I abandon my post? And this still does not answer the more fundamental: "Why should I exist to suffer at all?"

We flourish in order not to languish. Not to flourish is maladaptive. — 180 Proof

No disagreement here. But should we flourish to the point where we wipe out other species? What if in one section of the world can one person flourish 3 times as much at the cost of killing one person on the other side of the world? And the more fundamental: "Why should humanity exist to flourish at all?"

We are (often) reasonable in order to cooperate, or negotiate non-zerosum resolutions to conflict. Not to be reasonable (more often than unreasonable) is maladaptive. — 180 Proof

And what if it is reasonable that murdering the other person resolves my conflict and helps me to flourish? Lets say we have a resource, oil, that is limited and drives economies. Wouldn't it be reasonable to wipe out any competitors to oil on the other side of the world to greatly benefit the country where I live? And once again, to the more fundamental: "Why should beings with reason exist at all?"

Again, these are all nice guidelines to live a subjective moral life. But these are not objective moral answers which transcend personal benefit and self-interest. Morality is more than one's own self-interest. It sometimes asks us to suffer, die, or be 'unreasonable'. Why should I spend 18 years of my time and money raising a child I don't love? Who cares if the human race dies out after if I'm happy and flourishing? There are more fundamental questions that need to be answered.

Thus, in my understanding, evaluating the ground of all evaluations (i.e. judging the ground of all judgments) – e.g. "existence is inherently good" – seems to me viciously circular and therefore incoherent. — 180 Proof

That is fair as I have not delved deeper into it yet. I will have more time this weekend to do so.

As for "objective morality", I propose that its objective basis is nature in general and disvalues (i.e. suffering of natural beings) in particular – whatever harms, or is bad (dysfunctional, maladaptive) for, our kind (and other species) – which I summarize in this post ... — 180 Proof

While nice, I still don't see it as objective. For example, why should humans flourish? Why should humans be reasonable? All of this makes sense in a subjective self-beneficial viewpoint. But it doesn't answer anything more fundamental than this, and we all know how subjective morality ends up.

there is no such distinction between intrinsic (inherent) and extrinsic 'ought to exist". Either something ought to exist, or it shouldn't. — Bob Ross

This is true. Again, it seems I need to go into the second part where we actually measure what existence is and how we calculate it. For now as an intro, I'm not bothered by these issues. We'll see if they remain pertinent on the next drill down.

I think it would be objectively good if sentient beings existed but that’s only because I think sentience is intrinsically valuable and good. — Captain Homicide

I agree, but I believe I can objectively show this to be true as well. Just starting with this part and writing the next part after if this part seems rather clear with few objections.

I am glad to see you are more active again on the forum! I am guessing the new job has settle down a bit (: — Bob Ross

It has! I haven't had much energy to think about much else until about now.

I don't think this is internally coherent for your position: you use the term 'good' to denote things which you do not thereby concede should exist. — Bob Ross

I hesitate to go more than what is currently in the OP at this time as I am trying to focus it to be more approachable. The warning about what is to come are well appreciated, though I think it will be ok.

Let's say you can only perform one of the combinations (as performing one eliminates the possibility of performing the other): obviously, you would choose the second one (because it is more "good"). However, if you what you mean by "good" is merely "what should exist" then both combinations should exist; but it seems perfectly coherent for you to say "the first combination is good, but it should not exist because the second combination is better (i.e., 'more good')". — Bob Ross

Good as defined here is like "tree". Its describing a general concept. When we dive into more specifics, this is after directly defining what existence is, and how we can create situations that have more or less existence. Gradations still exist, because there are different combinations which result in more existential or less existential outcomes.

This of course relies on the context. If both combinations can co-exist without issue, then lets have both. But if we only have a choice of making one or the other, then that which creates more existence, is the better one. So yes, "Existence is good" at first glance does not appear to have gradations, but that's because we haven't set existence yet into a measurable quantity yet.

As an external critique, the other issue is that defining goodness in this manner eliminates many commonly accepted usages of the concept; e.g., by saying that this clock is good for telling the time, one is not at all implying that the clock should exist. — Bob Ross

I think this is fine. The same words are used within different contexts normally, and I don't think that most people will confuse the definition of good when talking about existential morality versus describing the effective and pleasing functionality of a clock. Or maybe they will and I'll have to cross that road when I get there!

Just food for thought (: — Bob Ross

It is always well cooked and appreciated!

I don't understand how "I exist, but I should not exist" is a contradiction. — petrichor

Its not. That's not the argument. The argument is not about "I".

e. If it is the case that there is something objective which concludes there should be no existence, that objectivity must exist.

f. But if it exists, then according to itself, it shouldn't exist.

g. If it shouldn't exist, then the answer "No" objectively shouldn't exist thus contradicting itself. — Philosophim

We aren't talking about a subjective viewpoint. We're talking about an objective fact, like the existence of gravity. We're not even claiming that we're proving that an objective morality exists. What we're noting is that if an objective morality exists, the fundamental question of, "Should there be existence?" can only be "Yes" to avoid contradiction.

I see little evidence for such a claim. As a theist I agree that existence is good, but there are non-theological forms of ethics. — Leontiskos

Simply present an ethical question that does not inevitably resolve to the underlying fundamental question I noted and you will have successfully refuted my claim.

Those who take existence as a given can still do ethics. — Leontiskos

I never said they couldn't. That wasn't my point. My point was that the base underlying question of, "Should there be existence?" exists under every moral question. If you can't answer that fundamental objectively, can you objectively answer anything built upon that fundamental objectively? Not likely.

I am to assume at this point you don't have any issue with the argument's conclusions in answering the fundamental, only whether this is a fundamental question for any objective ethics?

Not about outcome. About precondition for question. Question chases own tail. Therefore question silly. — Vera Mont

I fail to see how this is chasing its own tail. If you're going to start typing like the Hulk, I think you've run out of justification and simply don't like that the question is being asked.

Where "should not" isn't an option, the question is meaningless and pointless. — Vera Mont

Not at all. If you are chained to a wall watching helpless as a person kills a baby for their amusement, it doesn't mean they shouldn't have done that. Your ability to affect an outcome has no bearing on the question of whether it should be an outcome. That is a subjective self-inserting form of thinking. Your ability to affect or have an opinion on an outcome does not change the objective reality of whether that outcome should be or not.

How is there a "discussion" without the given that preexists any possible question of "shoulds" ? — Vera Mont

I'm not sure I follow. "Should" is a question of whether a state should be. Its irrelevant to whether that state currently is. If a baby has been killed for someone's amusement, should it have been done? No. What is, is not necessarily what should be if there are alternatives.

You can't assume anything unless you already exist. — Vera Mont

No disagreement there, but how does that effect the discussion in any way? This seems irrelevant.

How about we first moralize objectively....? — Kizzy

Because we must first objectively establish what morality is. Then, after we do so we can examine objectivity itself and ask whether it is moral or not.

Finding the fundamentals of morality to build a general understanding of morality. Are those examples then compared to the basis built from the fundamental findings or other understandings and examples? — Kizzy

This will build into our general questions about morality. Should we lie? Should we steal? Should we murder? Also common philosophical moral dilemmas like killing a crying baby while hiding from Nazis to save all the other people hiding under the floorboards from being discovered. Some will have final answers without much debate, while other debates may arise.

NOT ACCORDING TO ITSELF, IT SHOULDNT EXIST. OBJECTIVITY ISNT EXISTING, WE ARE AND WHAT WE DECIDE IS OBJECTIVE, IS. — Kizzy

I don't think this is correct. We will die if we don't get oxygen. No matter of definitions, subjective viewpoints, or beliefs will change this.

I think there is good reason for the making of this post. I applaud your work, Philosophim and also Bob's, in the specific area of "morality" you both frequently discuss on the forum . You two are dedicated, thorough, and well spoken! — Kizzy

Such a nice comment! Thank you. If you hate me after this discussion though, its ok. :) Not that I'll try to hurt your feelings, but I may conclude things you disagree with. It is my experience that often times the admiration of another person only lasts as long as that person delivers what one desires. As long as we can still respect each other despite differences or working through them, its a win for both of us. I appreciate your points here as well! They are something to look at and explore together.

LITERALLY NO ONE: "SHOULD THERE BE EXISTENCE"
My inner voice: "nO"
EXISTENCE: "TOO BAD." — Kizzy

Ha ha! What you're stating is that the question of whether there should be existence is irrelevant because there its going to be here at the end of the day. But morality is not about what is. Morality at its core is understanding that states of reality can change. I reach a fork in the road and I ask myself, "Should I go left, or right?" Implicit in this is that there might be a 'better' outcome depending on what I choose.

As a very simple example that most people agree on, we don't kill babies for fun. There is one future in which a person kills a baby for fun, and another where they do not. Almost everyone agrees that the existence of a future where a baby dies for someone's amusement is not as moral as a future where the baby lives. If we have an objective measurement that can prove this, that would be a start. But to get there, we have to start with the fundamentals.

Maybe if I truly believed it, when I allowed my mind and inner voice to go there (answering "nO" to question B of the argument) I would have more justification or explanation and I WOULD BE HAPPY TO EXPLAIN IT, except...I cant, because I think and believe there SHOULD be existence. — Kizzy

And there is nothing wrong with that. When we don't have objective answers, all we can go on is our subjective understanding. We don't have to understand the mechanics behind why we walk to walk after all. Not understanding how we walk does not deny the objective reality that we do walk. Morality is the same.

But in the case in which a person loses their leg and we want to make an artificial replacement, its helpful to know how we walk right? Subjective moral values are typically good enough in many day to day actions. Its when we hit the edge cases, subjective moral value conflicts, or a subjective loss of moral evaluation entirely that we need an objective methodology that helps ground us.

The good and the bad are how we can be moral agents — Kizzy

True, this is where we will build to. This foundation and our moral actions are inclusive of one another, not exclusionary. My question to you now is if the initial logic I've noted above seems sound. If I can get a general consensus that this seems like a logical start, I can build from here. Yes, your initial impression might be an emotional rejection or not understanding what the point is. But ignoring that, does the logic hold?

.if this is an actual question, no judgement, I genuinely want to know WHO is ASKING WHO or WHAT and WHAT they get from the answer and how to carry on from there — Kizzy

Me. Its not what I get, its that we get a foundation for an objective morality. How do we carry on from there? We build from there. That's what I do in the other paper if you want a hint. I'm planning on writing a follow up that breaks the build up down a bit more as that first post was a discussion draft for really one person. But first, that there is a fundamental question, that this is the fundamental question, and this is the answer to that question need to be established and explored first.

I totally get that but when/if it is other than that, its pretty bleak. — Kizzy

I did not find the answer bleak, but incredibly hopeful! This lets us develop a tool and measurement system to evaluate if certain situations are more moral than others. This will eventually build into human morality, but demonstrates morality at a molecular level, animal level, and eventually high intelligence level. It will help us actually answer the moral questions we have apart from social norms, culture, and personal opinions.

This apple on a tree at exactly 1.23 seconds after existence is an apple.
— Philosophim
I do not understand this sentence. Also, "existence" =/= "existing" (i.e. ground =/= grounding). — 180 Proof

I'm trying to demonstrate a snapshot versus existence over time. Existing only happens over time, as actions only happen over time. Do you have a counter proposal for existence 180 Proof? Seeing what you're thinking might help me understand your questions more, or let me explain in terms you think in.

Why would moral theories be required to answer this question? I think most moral theories simply do not answer the question at all. — Leontiskos

Because most moral theories cannot answer that question. There is currently no accepted objective moral theory. They are all subjective at this point in time.

But why are they required to? If they are objective, they need to answer that question because it is the question that underlies all moral questions. How can you claim how one should exist before you can claim that they should exist at all? Subjective moral theories stop at this point because it gives up the game, or they just aren't deep enough to go that far.

Regardless, the question has now been pointed out, shown its importance, and answered.

Existence can be an action ...
— Philosophim
Explain. — 180 Proof

Sure. Actions only happen over time. This apple on a tree at exactly 1.23 seconds after existence is an apple. An apple over time is aging. It is not just an existence, it is existing.

If we are to take that good is, "What should be", then we can take at a base level that there should be existence over nothing.
— Philosophim

Why?
Because existence already is, we're in it, and we want it going?
But by what standard is an "is" a "should be"? — Vera Mont

I'll focus on that part of the OP for you.

a. Assume that there is an objective morality.

b. This leaves two answers to the question, "Should there be existence?". They are, "Yes", or "No".

c. Assume the answer is yes. There is no innate contradiction.

d. Assume the answer is no.

e. If it is the case that there is something objective which concludes there should be no existence, that objectivity must exist.

f. But if it exists, then according to itself, it shouldn't exist.

g. If it shouldn't exist, then the answer "No" objectively shouldn't exist thus contradicting itself.

existence is good
— Philosophim
– for what? — 180 Proof

If we are to take that good is, "What should be", then we can take at a base level that there should be existence over nothing. This is because any morality which proposed that existence should not be would contradict itself.

"There should be existence"
This statement doesn't make sense (i.e. is a category mistake) because "existence" in not an action or practice and therefore cannot be prescribed. — 180 Proof

Existence can be an action or a state. Actions are states over time. States are what existence looks like within a snapshot of time. A person who runs or the picture of someone mid run. We can imagine a button that could eliminate all of existence. Is it objectively moral to press it, or not? Any objective moral approach must answer this fundamental question. While I can't prove that an objective morality exists, if it does exist, the only non-contradictory answer is that existence is better than there being nothing.

Well written Bob!

I think the below hammers it home.

The problem with this sort of rectification, is that the moral judgment is no longer a proposition: the indexical statement is the proposition. Therefore, the moral subjectivist is no longer accepting (implicitly) moral cognitivism. — Bob Ross

Welcome Gingethinkerrr!

Are there any stupid questions? To other people maybe, but you are the ultimate judge right? If you don't know something, it doesn't matter if everyone else does. The only way to know sometimes is to ask a question that's perceived as stupid by some. But there will always be people who understand and want to tell you.

Ask away!

Philosophim: In fact, the first five pages of the document contain a number of arguments for my philosophical positions. I am looking for any constructive feedback, such as counterarguments, corrections, and enhancements. — Philo Sofer

I do understand and did read it. Its more of a "This is what worked for me," summary then a "This is logically why you should do this." I personally disagree with moral nihilism, but then you are also acknowledging that your approach is not factual, but personal. Since there is no moral way to live, you can live however you want. Moral nihilism is a removal of oneself from the stress of discussion, because there can be no right or wrong way to live. So, you have some nice thoughts, life seems to be working for you, and I hope it continues to be so!

If there was anything you doubted, wanted another take on, or were looking for some other alternative answer, feel free to post it. Otherwise who am I to tell a person who's living a good and satisfying life with their world view? I personally could not be happy living in moral nihilism or the removal of politics and managing a house. For me, peace of mind is not the most important thing, living a life where I can challenge myself is. But what works for me does not necessarily work for you. All good. :)

It was a nice little read. It was more of a, "This is how I live my life" sort of paper than really much of an argument for anything. And that's perfectly fine. I'm of the mindset that people live their lives however they want. Did you want any feedback on anything in particular? Some aspect you were looking to have challenged or have a deeper discussion on?

Here's a case. You hate yourself. You want to die. Everything in your life is horrible, no one will miss you, and there is no rational reason for you to keep living. And yet you decide to anyway.

Here's another. You live in an oppressive society. And yet you decide to fight. Rationally, you have almost no chance of winning. You could simply leave the country and go someplace nicer. But this is your home.

I leave you to judge.

Your reasons make me ask, "Is being a theist about what I can get for myself?"

Hi Bob, sorry for the delay on this reply. I've started a new job and been much busier lately. Lets go ahead and wrap this one up as I think we're nearing the end. Feel free to take the last reply. :)

Firstly, what you are noting is a deficiency in the understanding of the reader and not the syllogism itself; and, thusly, it is impractical to provide the exact amount of elaboration needed to expound the view because the knowledge a person comes in with, as a reader, varies. — Bob Ross

True, but this isn't a formal philosophy paper. Its a discussion forum where you have a reader asking for elaboration. And prior to publication, there's usually high levels of review with potentially months of rewrites and careful citations. Its just you and me Bob!

From my view a syllogism is a tool to formalize an argument, but it is not the argument itself, especially on an informal philosophy board. The argument is what I'm addressing.

Secondly, to have a “complete” argument, in the sense you described, is impossible; and I can demonstrate it. For every premise I give, a person can validly ask for clarification; thusly, there is no end to the length of an argument that is fully “complete”. — Bob Ross

I'm not claiming you need an infinite set of validation. I've noted your argument is not complete enough for me to understand the logic that you're undertaking, and I'm not trying to needle in on any gotchas. Again, if you're unable to reach me or convey the idea you see accurately, it doesn't mean the argument is wrong. But from my point, what I do see is subjective to me, and I'm not seeing clear arguments that show otherwise.

Asking “what is intrinsic value?” in the proof that pain has intrinsic value is not an demonstration of an implicit step being skipped. If there were an implicit step in the syllogism, then you would be able to demonstrate that the syllogism is not logically valid; that’s how you know. — Bob Ross

I see it as vague and seems to be a blend of words without underlying concepts. Pointing out you may be missing implicit steps is just something to think about. As your student of your philosophy here, its not adding up to me, but I'm trying to help you show me otherwise.

The nature of an emotion is objective, because it is not dependent on what a subject desires or believes about it. — Bob Ross

If it is spoken about objectively, yes. If we would say, "Hate feels like this objectively," it would be wrong. If we say, "Hate is intense feeling of wanting to destroy something without remorse," then it can be seen as objective. We aren't describing the personal intensity or feeling of experiencing hate, but describing hate in terms of actions that a person will take.

The "nature" of a thing is a bit outdated of a term, and again, something I would want fully detailed in a good conversation. By nature you could mean, "reality" which just 'is'. What just 'is' could be, but often is not the same as what is known. Objective and subjective arguments are not about what 'is', but about the approach we take to claims of belief and knowledge. I prefer the 'definition' of the thing to its 'nature'.

But we're not studying emotions, we're studying 'value'. How you define value is through other people's emotional evaluation of something. That is by definition, subjective. If you defined value something like, "The emotion, rational decision, or societal context that causes humans to preserve, protect, or promote actions or states of being relative to other actions or states of being," then we would have something we could start with that we could objectively evaluate. Stating, "Value is an indefinable concept, we just know it innately" means its a subjectively defined word.

Secondly, not all states are emotions—not even the one’s I have given you up to this point. For example, the state of flourishing is clearly not an emotion. — Bob Ross

True, but to get to flourishing you first need the steps of defining value, then intrinsic value, and showing how we can objectively determine it. It seems like flourishing is a step you consider after establishing all of those basics. I mean, we all like flourishing. We all want flourishing to be good. But feelings are not objective proof.

I know you have a philosophical background, so I would like to say that if you are familiar with Aristotelian ethics, then it is worth mentioning that my view has many similarities to it — Bob Ross

I read Aristotle a very long time ago now. Let me tell you what I learned overall by reading many different philosophies. Any philosophy that was considered good enough for objective measure has been turned into a science. What you are reading are the leftovers, the failures. They are fantastic references to see where humanity has already explored and found to be a dead end. If you want to use some aspect of them that you still think are valuable (after all, its the end that's a failure, not some of the parts necessarily) then its best to make it your own and clearly explain to the audience what you mean.

You've seen this as well in your past posts. You reference one part of an older philosopher's work, and suddenly everyone has their opinion of that philosopher's end work, when you just want to talk about the part. Not explicitly telling people that these are often old, outdated, and ultimately philosophies that could not take the step to science, is in my opinion, philosophies' greatest failure as a study. It elevates the wrong points to discuss, does not explicitly teach the lessons it has learned, and does not clearly tell its students, "You are studying our failures."

So, one of the reasons why I engage so much (thank you by the way, you do as well!) is that I do not apply outside philosophical work to your work, I apply logic and discussions to your ideas. Its your definitions, your thoughts, and your outlook, not Aristotle's. Everything that can be said about Aristotle has likely already been said. But not everything about your idea has been said. :) Good discussion Bob, feel free to cap it.

the premise itself is expressing something objective is to say that its truthity is NOT relative to subjective dispositions (e.g., “this is green” as opposed to “I think this is green”). — Bob Ross

Ok, we might be getting closer here. I think I might finally be understanding what you're implying, but as always, correct me where needed. :) "This is green" is only objective if we know there are objective ways to determine that 'that' is 'green'. There is an implicit understanding in that sentence. The problem with your argument is we don't know if there is an objective way to say, 'This has implicit value." I think what you're saying is if you can craft an argument that's worded without addressing this question.

Let me put it another way.

1. An evil demon exists.
2. Evil demons always compel people to do wrong.
3. Therefore if people do wrong, it might be an evil demon.

As I noted with your argument earlier, this argument is incomplete. The first thing I would ask is, "What's an evil demon?" Then, "How do we know an evil demon exists?" Those need answers, and I would not be able to call this argument objective or subjective until I got them. If you're crafting an incomplete argument and calling it objective while having incompletely defined words, or refusing to answer questions which would let us know whether the premises are concluded by objective or subjective means, its objectivity or subjectivity is not really assessable.

I (hopefully) see our differences now. This reminds me of a similar problem I ran into when learning and teaching math. Let me see if I can show you.

Solve for X: 2X + 1 = 3
2x = 2
2x/2 = 2/2
Conclusion x = 1

The answer is correct, and to a mind who knows that you get 2x = 2 by doing the implicit step of:
2x + 1 -1 = 3 -1, this is a full and logical argument. The problem I would run into in math tutorials was often times implicit steps like this were skipped. My students would note this, and I would have to adapt and make these implicit steps explicit for them to understand.

For a person who knows how 2x=2 happened, the implicit step does not need to be made explicit. Lets go one step further. None of us need a primer to know what 2X is. We've already learned that. Its an implicit step that if listed, would be redundant and a waste of time for both of us. But if you introduced this to a person who said, "I don't know what 2X is," your argument is incomplete for them.

Now, imagine that the person asks, "What does X mean?" and you replied, "It can't quite be defined, its a fundamental that we simply understand," I would be scratching my head because, "But at the end x = 1. Isn't that a number?" If you replied "No, you just have to understand it" then I am right in saying, "Then this is a subjective argument.".

I'm posting it this way because the argument to solve for X is correct and objective if we know all the other objective implicit information that goes along with it. So lets assume that your argument is correct Bob. Its missing steps for me as a reader to see how you arrive at your conclusion. How can we say value is objective when it can't be defined apart from our 'innate understanding? How do you claim that this is objective when every example given so far has been about subjective feelings?

So from your viewpoint, maybe you're seeing something implicit and obvious that doesn't need to be explicated. Either that, or you're unaware there is something implicit underlying your argument that you have not realized. Your readers will help you see that. Remember that this is your idea, and its your job to convince the readers that it makes sense. You could have the perfect idea, but if its implicit steps are not fully explored, a reader is going to think its faulty or subjective. And from their viewpoint? They are going to be right.

I want you to recall some of past conversations over my own writing. Not that I am perfect, but I always intended to follow certain rules. Nothing you asked was too small or stupid. Maybe a question was too complex or out of order, and another concept had to be explained first, but I tried to never shelve a question or point and not come back to it later. If I tried explaining it to you one way and it didn't make sense to you, I tried another example or approach. Because sometimes the writer doesn't understand the implicit step that they're missing as well. A good conversation allows both the writer and reader to catch steps like this and hopefully makes the argument better. If the reader is trying to understand, and cannot despite your explanations, in extremely rare cases its the limitations of the student. 99 times out of 100 its the teaching.

Looking at your example of an objective and subjective argument, all you did was repeat your definition of implicit vs explicit. That didn't answer my question. I asked you to create a claim for intrinsic value that contained the same result, but was from a subjective viewpoint. Just like, "I know green because I experience green," (turns out they are colorblind) vs "I know this is green because of the wavelength." So the examples didn't help me. Its like if I asked, "How did you go from 2X + 1 = 3 to 2x = 2", and all you did was repeat the steps I already have in front of me. It doesn't help.

You cannot overexplain a new concept or theory, but you can very much under explain it. My discussion with you has never even gotten to 'flourishing', because there are steps from my view point that are necessary for me to even start thinking about your conclusion.

Look at when I asked this as well:

How do you specifically evaluate the intrinsic value of things without requiring subjective viewpoints?

One would evaluate whether or not the thing is a source of motivation and is not itself a subject; and this can be done by analyzing other people than oneself OR oneself through an unbiased lens. — Bob Ross

The answer is underexplained. How are we analyzing other people? Are we analyzing them through their subjective feelings about the source of motivation? Are we measuring things like people actions when faced with the source of intrinsic value? What process are we using to determine that someone is viewing oneself through an unbiased lens? You're missing steps that need answering for this to be a complete explanation if you're going to claim this is objective.

How would a psychologist objectively conclude that X has intrinsic value?

This would not be specifically a psychologist’s job, as this endeavor would require knowledge from multiple different sciences—such as sociology, biology, etc. — Bob Ross

This answer essentially says, "I don't know." This is a supposition. We need at least one example from you that a psychologist could at least start with. For example: "Here's the method I propose which works with this one individual. Now we would need to repeat this method thousands of times to make sure that the results stay consistent, and that is out of the scope of what I can do here." Otherwise you don't know, which is fine to admit in an argument.

Finally lets look at this question and reply:

1. What's an example of an object that has intrinsic value? Not our emotional states. Most of your core examples seem to do with pain, awe, etc., or our personal emotions. I'm having a hard time seeing how you're not simply describing personal emotions demanding attention and action instead of the objects themselves.

1. No objects have intrinsic value that I am aware of, although they may exist (I guess, since I cannot technically eliminate their possibility).

2. Not all states that have intrinsic value are constituted of emotions—e.g., a state of indifference. — Bob Ross

Point one is incomplete. How can we not eliminate their possibility? If this is an objective argument, you should demonstrate a situation in which there would be a doubt, vs the times when we're certain it does not have objective value.

Point 2 doesn't counter my point that I'm just seeing this as an analysis of our emotions, and whether they compel us to action. Indifference does not compel us to action, (or does it compel us not to act?) and fits within the point I made. This would be a good time to dig in and demonstrate how this is not merely an analysis of emotions and how we are most likely to respond to them. Because you did not, I as the reader am going to view my interpretation as unchallenged.

I hope you know how much I respect you Bob, and I can tell that emotionally, there's something you really value and see here. If you still see some value on it, keep working on it. Currently your explanation and walkthrough is unclear and incomplete to me. If you want to keep trying to make it clearer through other examples and explanations, we can keep trying. If you feel you've reached your end and you can't explain it any other way, that's also fine. My personal agreement is not contingent on your argument, and I will end this with a salute your way whenever you are ready. :)

Making this sort of distinction, is inevitably to distinguish between two different dependency relations: one being a dependency on subjective dispositions, and the other not—objectivity, in your sense, is defined negatively in relation to subjectivity. — Bob Ross

Logically this is equivalent to noting that subjectivity is defined negatively in relation to objectivity. Objectivity and subjectivity in the general sense are binary. If you're being objective, you're not beings subjective and vice-versa. I'm not sure how this point is anything new, its part of the fundamental relationship between the two concepts.

I'm not intending to use the term truth, but arguments.
— Bob Ross

An argument is about truth: you can’t separate them in any way that would be meaningful for this discussion. The premises, which are propositions, are expressing something objective if they can be evaluated (as true or false) independently of what any person feels or believes about it—and this is what your definition entails (quoted above). — Bob Ross

Are you saying that whatever type of premises we stick inside of a syllogism, are now objective because the structure of a syllogism is objective? That's fundamentally wrong. If I have as a premise, "I believe the color blue is the best color in the world," its true, but still a subjective belief. Subjective and objective premises can be evaluated as true or false. That doesn't change the fact they are subjective or objective.

Same with the structure of what a premise or syllogism is. These are objective structures. That does not suddenly make what the premises contain objective. If I understand what you're saying, you're claiming that anything within a syllogism is objective because the structure of a syllogism or premise is itself objective. If true, that's simply incorrect. Let me know if I have the correct understanding of this.

Objectivity is an approach to thinking that minds take to ensure that the subject of the self is not dependent for the argument

If this is true, then a premise is objective (or expressing something objective) IFF whether or not it is true or false is NOT dependent on any given subjective disposition. — Bob Ross

Incorrect. The truth or falsity of subjectivity and objectivity are irrelevant to what they are. The contents of a premise can be objective or subjective based on what they are claiming.

What you are trying to explicate with your example of smoking, is NOT that the proposition is subjective but, rather, that it is anecdotal and thusly cannot be used to demonstrate a statistic on the effects of smoking on the human body. — Bob Ross

Partially Correct. Upon reviewing that paragraph I neglected to include the conclusion. The old man concludes that smoking is safe for people based on his own experiences. Yes, it is objectively true that the old man has never gotten cancer, but it is his conclusion that is subjective because it relies on the old mans' personal experience, or anecdote. Therefore the argument is a subjective argument, not an objective one.

That you asked for some sort of measurable entity in reality, as opposed to a phenomenal quality, demonstrates sufficiently to me that you are using your definitions incoherently — Bob Ross

You are drawing an incorrect conclusion from my example. If a phenomenal quality can be confirmed independently of one's subjective experience, it is objective. If I claim, "I like the color blue," you know its true, but no one else can get inside of your head to confirm that you actually have the experience of liking it. If you say, "That color is blue," we can confirm it independently of our own subjective experience of 'blue'.

Same with me claiming "Because my favorite color is blue, everyone's favorite color is blue." The conclusion is drawn from a purely subjective experience. Whether its true or not is irrelevant. The argument is drawn and concluded from a subjective viewpoint, not an objective viewpoint. Therefore the argument is a subjective argument.

Now, to provide ample clarification, the feeling of awe does have intrinsic value, although the Grand Canyon does not, because if one removes all the desires and beliefs a person has about the feeling of awe while they are having it, the feeling of awe, as per its nature, will motivate them, to some degree, to value it. — Bob Ross

At this point it seems like all states of intrinsic value are simply what we feel. I'm going to make two requests for your next post.

1. What's an example of an object that has intrinsic value? Not our emotional states. Most of your core examples seem to do with pain, awe, etc., or our personal emotions. I'm having a hard time seeing how you're not simply describing personal emotions demanding attention and action instead of the objects themselves.

2. You claim your value morality is objective. As you've noted, I've been giving both subjective and objective examples of arguments. Now its your turn. Write me an argument for your value morality that is subjective under your view. This will help me to see how you view subjectivity and objectivity beyond the abstract. There should be no barrier to this.

it is still possible to analyze what mind-independent 'things' motivate subjects---by study of the brain, psychology, sociology, the nature of the mind-independent thing, etc. — Bob Ross

I'm not saying its not. But you need to give a specific example and not just a claim that we can. I've given some examples that would fit this, but it doesn't mean they work for your theory. How do you specifically evaluate the intrinsic value of things without requiring subjective viewpoints? How would a psychologist objectively conclude that X has intrinsic value?

I guess I am not fully fathoming what you mean by subjective vs. objective definitions and arguments. I thought you were saying that 'subjective' refers to something which has its truth relative to mind-dependent dispositions (e.g., feelings, thoughts, beliefs, etc.) and that 'objective' refers to something which has its truth NOT relative to mind-dependent dispositions. Am I misunderstanding? — Bob Ross

I'm not intending to use the term truth, but arguments. I would not use 'mind-dependent' as a description for subjective or objective at all. This leads to the mistake in thinking that objectivity exists like some Platonic form. It does not. Objectivity is an approach to thinking that minds take to ensure that the subject of the self is not dependent for the argument. Subjectivity is an approach to thinking that minds take to ensure that the subject of the self is dependent for the argument.

Thus, things like logic, math, concepts, studies, and findings are used for objective arguments. Personal experiences, intuitions, and desires are all subjective arguments. Both are tools, have their strengths and weaknesses, and a complete thinker will be able to apply both effectively to an argument. After all, we are subjects that have personal experiences, and many discussions that involve personal experiences have no objective approach. A lack of understanding this distinction can easily allow confusion between the two.

Consciousness is a great example of this. There are objective ways to approach consciousness, and subjective ways to approach consciousness. Realistically, the only way we can measure consciousness in a human is by physiological measurements and behavior. Asserting a person's personal experience is outside of objectivity because we can never know what its like to be that person.

Subjective consciousness is our individual experience of reality. A person may not exhibit any physical signs of pain, but inside, its an undeniable reality. And it WANTS things. For example, it can want to be immortal, so it invents an idea that it can exist once its body dies. It wants to pretend its not tied to the brain, even though the objective reality is that this is so. It often tries to claim its experiences are objective reality, when they are just really strong feelings of desire that X should be real.

A good thinker can marry the two. You cannot discuss consciousness only in objective, nor only in subjective terms. A good thinker can find the strength in each side, and uses it for its particular tool in the argument. Am I master at this? No. But it is something I and many philosophers who strive to do well will do.

When I point out that you have subjective arguments in your ethical theory, it is not that you should never use subjective arguments. You should be aware of their strengths and weaknesses and use them effectively. People are rarely persuaded by math. They are persuaded by feelings. Feelings without math may be fun, but can lead to alcoholics losing everything they have. Math without feelings may be brilliant, but can die in a dusty book that no one will ever read.

Is intrinsic value objective or subjective?

Is the argument you are giving for intrinsic value subjective or objective? This is determined by what you are using to determine whether something is intrisicly valuable. If your reliance is on the feelings and desires of people, its subjective, plain and simple. "I've smoked every day until 90 years old and never gotten cancer" is subjective. "Smokers have a X% higher chance of getting lung cancer is objective". When you appeal to me to recognize a feeling of value that you call intrinsic value, you are appealing to subjective notions. There can be good reasons for that. But it is not objective.

Is the claim that things can motivate minds objective or subjective?

How could it possibly be subjective? — Bob Ross

Again, is your argument for why things can motivate minds a subjective, or objective one? Do we have evidence of rays that emit from objects, interact with brains, and compel them to do things? Or do we have some people who really WANT that thing over there, therefore believe its not their fault, it must be compelling them? Do you see which argument is objective vs subjective?

To your credit, value is always assigned but, to my credit, it is not always extrinsic value. — Bob Ross

I'm not saying this isn't possible. But you would need something like a 'value atom' or a proof that demonstrated X had value that could be confirmed logically.

Intrinsic value, unlike extrinsic value, is objective because, although we assign it, it is being assigned because the thing actually (mind-independently) motivates people to value it for its own sake and not for the sake of something else: a person is motivated, even if they overcome it, to value a thing with intrinsic value despite what they believe or desire to value it at. It is external motivation (for the subject) which they can not think or desire away. — Bob Ross

This is a run on sentence, so lets break it up into something that goes step by step and we can walk through.

1. There exist things which can compel people to value it.
2. This value is something which does not benefit the person. The person may even hate the thing. But innate to their experience, they still value it.
3. The value is a consistent and undeniable reality within a person's mind, and this is because of the object itself.

An example I would give is, "The Grand Canyon". Such a feeling is usually described as 'awe'. Some might hate the Grand Canyon, but still feel awe, or value. Still, this is a subjective claim. Saying "The Canyon" is causing this is a feeling/belief. There is nothing here that we can measure or evaluate beyond a person's individual feelings about something.

What would an objective claim for this look like? As I noted before, perhaps a wave that extended from things that would provably interact with the mind and cause consistent physiological interactions. Perhaps a massive study that could quantify value and demonstrate how it affects people with researched statistics.

If you wanted to objectively demonstrate that eudaimonia had more value, you would of course have to clearly define value, and then demonstrate that societies with eudaimonia had generated more of this defined value then societies that did not have this.

I hope you can see the difference now. Let me know what you think.

Maybe we're getting closer here Bob. I think you're confusing that a syllogism is itself objective when we're talking about the definitions and concepts within the syllogism. A syllogism's validity is not the focus here. It is the evidence the syllogism uses that determines whether the argument is objective or subjective. When I said it was incomplete, its incomplete to call its arguments subjective or objective.

If you'll read it again, it was not an issue with the premise, it was a request to flesh out your definitions so we could see whether they were objective or subjective. As it was initially written, it was impossible to classify the argument as objective or subjective because I simply don't understand what you mean. Its fine if you wish to write it that way, but then you can't claim its objective either. If a reader needs aspect of your syllogism fleshed out or explained, its a syllogism that needs more work to have the proper rigor. That in itself is not a claim as to whether its arguments are subjective or objective.

I made a point not to dispute your definitions, I only noted what it would take to classify them as subjective or objective. That's why I gave you examples for both sides.

My premises fit this description: they are not themselves appeals to subjective dispositions. — Bob Ross

If you use definitions, it must be known what concepts those definitions represent. Do they represent subjective definitions and concepts, or objective definitions and concepts? Its a fact of language, and not something that you appeal to. Even if they cannot be explicated, is that claim based on subjective or objective premises? It is unavoidable in any discussion, especially when you actively claim they are objective.

I am asking if this syllogism itself is objective—not whether some subsequent one is or not. P1 is a claim which is expressing something objective: it is not saying ~”Something has intrinsic value if I want it to”. — Bob Ross

P1: A thing that is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid or acquire it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it) has intrinsic value. — Bob Ross

No, the argument is not objective, nor can I tell if its subjective at this point. This is an assertion. How you justify the assertion is what makes it objective or subjective. Is intrinsic value objective or subjective? Is the claim that things can motivate minds objective or subjective? Those are the questions that need answers.

If, by this, you are claiming that an argument is subjective if the fully expounded list of syllogisms (required to prove it)(which would be infinite, by the way) anywhere contains a subjective element; then, my friend, there are not objective arguments. You can’t prove ‘1+1=2’ with an ‘objective argument’ if you are that absurdly strict with your definition of ‘objective argument’. — Bob Ross

No, I'm not asking you to infinitely expand syllogisms. That's silly. Also you cannot objectively claim

"A mind is unique to every person and cannot be explicated," then we have a subjective definition of mind

Do you mean to say that, in this hypothetical, the term ‘mind’ is defined as something of which its meaning is relative to the given subject-at-hand? The fact it is inexplicable, in this scenario, has nothing to do with it being subjective. — Bob Ross

Correct. A claim that something is inexplicable can be founded on objective or subjective premises. In this example, it is a subjective premise.

In sum, I'm not questioning whether the premises are true or false, I'm demonstrating how we can determine if they are subjective or objective. Let me repost part of my conclusion in the last post once again: "A subjective argument is not necessarily wrong, nor is an objective argument necessarily correct. It is about the type of concepts presented and being analyzed." It seems my points were taken as an attack on your theories truth or falsity, when they are simply examples that point out why some of your arguments are subjective, and also examples of how you could make them objective. Address those examples specifically without regards to the truth or falsity of the premises and I think we'll be able to reconcile on subjectivity vs objectivity.

Now, I don't want you, right now, to contend with the premises in the sense of what you merely disagree with; but, rather, I want you to tell me if this syllogism meets your requirements for being an 'objective argument'. — Bob Ross

This is a good start. As written, the argument is incomplete. I'll point out why, and then point out how based on the answers, this can end up being a subjective or an objective argument.

P1: A thing that is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid or acquire it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it) has intrinsic value. — Bob Ross

How do we determine that it is a thing which motivates a mind? Can it rationally compete with and invalidate the idea that a mind that is motivated towards goals simply uses things to obtain its goals? Is it that the food in front of me has an internal compulsion that expels outward towards my mind demanding that I eat it? Or is it that my mind desires food, and seeing the food triggers my mind to want it for what it wants/needs?

If the answer is, "

I believe in external motivation — Bob Ross

, then this is a subjective answer to the question because belief alone is entirely subjective. Because you have a subjective answer as part of a major foundation of your argument, any part of your argument that relies on this foundation is now a subjective argument.

If the answer is, "Here is the proof that external motivation exists, and we can see this proof holds up despite differences in our feelings or personal experiences", then you have an objective foundation, and any part of your argument that relies on this foundation without including subjectivity is now an objective argument.

As a quick aside, I like that this is a much more straight forward definition of intrinsic value. It might be incomplete from my view, but it gives a much clearer picture of the definition of intrinsic value in one sentence.

P2: The state of pain is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it). — Bob Ross

My second question would be, "How have you proven that a state of pain is not a mind?" I'll give you a faux example that seems reasonable. "The mind is defined as the aspect of consciousness which analyzes its own states and make decisions based on those states. Pain is a state that the mind decides to act on or react to, therefore it is not the mind itself, just a state that the mind considers."

If we both agree that this is a clear and provable definition that can be accurately applied despite differing states of human subjective experience, then we have something objective to reference. If however we defined it like, "A mind is unique to every person and cannot be explicated," then we have a subjective definition of mind, and thus a subjective argument at its foundation.

A subjective argument is not necessarily wrong, nor is an objective argument necessarily correct. It is about the type of concepts presented and being analyzed. An objective argument can have its definitions challenged as new information comes along. A subjective argument may be the best argument we can present with limited information. So having a subjective argument is not a death knell based on what we know, but it is important that it not claim to be an objective argument. In the case of moral theories, there are countless subjective moral theories out there, so another subjective argument has a high bar to reach to out compete every other theory. The problem is most subjective arguments boil down to subjective preference at their core, meaning people just do what they want and call it moral. And if that's the end case, why bother with a theory at all? Escaping that end result is incredibly difficult, but maybe you can do it.

I hope that was a clear answer to the question!

I appreciate the good question, its in reference to my Measurable Morality thread. I'm planning on rewriting it to start smaller and be tighter in its initial argument due to my discussion with Bob over it, but if you want to read it as is, its here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14834/a-measurable-morality/p1

My fault for referencing an outside thread. This is Bob's thread and the context should be kept to it.