Silly of me to offer some familiarity with the literature. — Banno
1. It is required to note that minds are ends in themselves because the identity of ‘an absolute end’ does not entail itself that those are only minds — Bob Ross
FIS does not afford an equation that one can determine exactly what one should do in every given situation: it is a general formula, not an exact science. I have never heard a normative ethical theory that is able to afford such an equation without biting a lot of bullets. — Bob Ross
If one accepts that accepting the premises entails the conclusion that one should treat minds as sacred, then if they either have deny a premise or accept that they should treat mind as sacred. — Bob Ross
Nor can you escape to "agency," because that too yields manys, many different kinds of agency. — tim wood
So is everything either part of an infinite/eternal chain of cause and effect, or alternatively is there some first thing? I don't know. — tim wood
Another way to express the Hard Problem is : "how does physical activity (neural & endocrinological) result in the meta-physical (mental) functions that we label "Ideas" and "Awareness"? — Gnomon
But, like Gravity, we only know what it does physically, not what it is essentially. — Gnomon
Recent scientific investigations have found that Information is much more than the empty entropic vessels of Shannon's definition. Information also is found in material & energetic forms. — Gnomon
The "physical capability" of Energy to exist is taken for granted, because we can detect its effects by sensory observation, even though we can't see or touch Energy with our physical senses*2. Mechanical causation works by direct contact between material objects. But Mental Causation works more like "spooky action at a distance". So, Consciousness doesn't act like a physical machine, but like a metaphysical person. — Gnomon
Again, in my thesis, Consciousness is defined as a process or function of physical entities. We have no knowledge of consciousness apart from material substrates. But since its activities are so different from material Physics, philosophers place it in a separate category of Meta-Physics. And religious thinkers persist in thinking of Consciousness in terms of a Cartesian Soul (res cogitans), existing in a parallel realm. — Gnomon
But my thesis postulates that both Physical Energy and Malleable Matter are emergent from a more fundamental element of Nature : Causal EnFormAction*4(EFA). The Big Bang origin state was completely different from the current state, in that there was no solid matter as we know it. Instead, physicists imagine that the primordial state was a sort of quark-gluon Plasma, neither matter nor energy, but with the potential (EFA) for both to emerge later. And ultimately for the emergence of Integrated Information as Consciousness. :smile: — Gnomon
The evidential Gap, beyond the evidence, can be filled with speculation of Creation, or a Tower-of-Turtles hypothesis. — Gnomon
However, Philosophical questions about Mind & Consciousness depend on personal reasoning (Inference) from that physical evidence. If you can't make that deduction from available evidence, then you live in a matterful but mindless & meaningless world. And the mystery of Consciousness is dispelled, as a ghost, with a wave of dismissal. — Gnomon
My point is that your moral judgments are subjective if they are true relative to the subjective moral judgment that one ought to be rational. But, then again, you seem to be defining objectivity in a manner where it is exactly that. — Bob Ross
Thank you, but I still don’t see how you making that inference. Here’s the part I am referring to:
E. Assumption: There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
F. If that is the case, then according to the reason that nothing should exist, that reason should not exist. Thus a contradiction.
This is the part I need a syllogism from you about, not the rest. This is the crux that I don’t get at all. I don’t see how a reason which justifies its own non-existence entails a contradiction (whether that be metaphysical, logical, or actual). Can you please give me an argument or elaboration for this part? — Bob Ross
I just want to note, so far, this is a subjective moral judgment; and is the underpinning of all your moral judgments, thusly making them subjective as well. — Bob Ross
What do you mean by “rationally or logically countered”? If make a syllogism that is logically valid which contains a moral judgment, is that moral judgment thereby ‘objective’ under your view? — Bob Ross
Please help check if this classic allegory is inspiring for your question? — YiRu Li
With mischievous playfulness/smart assed remarks. — Vaskane
But not physically necessary! — Vaskane
First of all, it seems to me that to raise the possibility of a first cause one must start from a simple entity [non-composite: since if it is composite we cannot speak of a cause in the singular but of causes in the plural].
Secondly, the creation of the world [as an effect] must be treated as a binary relationship Where A causes B. More than two make several causes, and not a single cause.
Thirdly, this binary relationship must be understood as creation from nothing [as God is supposed to have created the universe from nothing: Creatio ex nihilo]. Since if there were a thing B affected by a thing A, B would have to be presupposed coexisting with A.
Fourthly, the first cause cannot be a single thing differentiating itself (monism) or being the cause of itself. That destroys the difference between cause and effect. The creator and the created. — JuanZu
How can the first cause affect nothingness to produce the world?
Can not. Ex nihilo nihil fit. — JuanZu
I apologize: I mis-re-read it: nevermind! I re-read it again and, yes, this is purporting that a first cause (an ‘alpha) is logically necessary, since the form of the argument is that there are 3 exhaustive options (A, B, and C) and both A and B entail C, so C is logically necessary.
I really should not indulge myself in this OP while we have two pending discussions going, but I can’t help it (: — Bob Ross
Let me just ask: what sense of the term ‘cause’ is being used here? It doesn’t seem to be physical causality but, rather, mere explanation: am I remembering correctly? — Bob Ross
And what exactly is prior causality? — tim wood
I see that as a problem considering that minds and their status are the fundamental lynch pin of your argument. Perhaps this could be answered if you define whether it is possible for something that is not a mind to be an end in itself.
I think this is just the fallacy of the heap. — Bob Ross
Likewise, it is not “the stronger wins”. It is entirely possible that, according to FIS, a mind holds higher precedence over another mind and the former is physically weaker than the latter. — Bob Ross
So if you accept that ‘one ought to be rational’ and that ‘minds are ends in themselves’ and that ‘sole means are not ends’, then it logically follows that one should not treat them as a mere means. — Bob Ross
An objective moral judgement would be a moral judgement that can be logically concluded on no matter the difference in subjective viewpoint
…
This is something that cannot be rationally agreed upon by all people.
Firstly, although I am trying not to import my definitions, this is not what objectivity with respect to morality standardly means, and this would, within standard terminology, be a form of moral subjectivism. — Bob Ross
You are just subjectively stipulating that what one should do is what is rational, and then calling ‘objective’ whatever can be reached as a consensus by people committed to that subjective moral judgment. — Bob Ross
Secondly, just to go with your terms here, if all you mean by objectivity is that there is a consensus amongst rational agents, then if your argument for ‘there should be nothing’ being logical contradictory is true then this would be an objective moral judgment by your terms. — Bob Ross
1. There is an objective morality
This is where I am not following: how does stipulating morality is objective entail that a reason which justifies its own non-existence entails a contradiction? How does it entail that ‘nothing should exist’ becomes ‘nothing should not exist’? I am not following. — Bob Ross
The fuse burning down, or at some point the burning fuse and the explosion occurring at the same time. — tim wood
And I am under the impression that scientists do not concern themselves much with cause-and-effect except either informally or when they know exactly what they mean — tim wood
The notion of cause being used is broken. — Banno
In addition, the very notion in the OP that something is cause to exist is problematic in logical terms. In classical logic things pretty much either exist or they do not; their existence is guaranteed by the domain of discourse. The special existential predicate "∃!" requires it's own special variant. — Banno
Finally, the structure of the argument in the OP is quite unclear. — Banno
I would like to just make a suggestion, reading through this OP for the second time I realized you don't seem to be actually claiming a first cause is logically necessary: instead, it is from the idea that all the options lead to a first cause based off of empirical claims. — Bob Ross
The problem is that you haven’t given any vocabulary for this, because you haven’t engaged your theory in anything related to the nature of moral properties and judgments, so there’s nothing for me to translate to. — Bob Ross
For example, what is the nature of an objective moral judgment under your view? — Bob Ross
But if that existence should not exist, then 'nothing should exist' becomes 'nothing should not exist'.
This does not follow: why would this be the case? It is a non-sequitur, by my lights, to say ‘If the existence should not exist because nothing should exist, then nothing should not exist’. — Bob Ross
nature of existence
— Philosophim
What does that even mean? What do you mean by "existence"? — Arne
but it is when we look at the logic of being
— Philosophim
Seriously, what is "the logic of being"? — Arne
this only begs the question. Being is still not required to conform to logic even if logic is "our" best tool. — Arne
If they express something objective, then they are true in virtue of corresponding (adequately) to a (mind[stance]-independently existing) state-of-affairs in reality.
If they are true in virtue of corresponding (adequately) to a (mind[stance]-independently existing) state-of-affairs in reality, then the chain of reasoning for why any given moral judgment is true ends at that state-of-affairs—which violates your point that all chains of reasoning bottom out at “to be or not to be?” — Bob Ross
My point is that all chains of reasoning (about morality) do not bottom out at “to be or not to be?”. — Bob Ross
If “one should exist” is a moral judgment which expresses something objective, then there must be a state-of-affairs (which exists mind-independently) that makes it true, which is not the case with your logical argument. — Bob Ross
Philosophim, you said we are presupposing ‘objective morality exists’. You can’t presuppose that and say moral realism might be false in your view — Bob Ross
This is why I was wanting to dive into metaethics so I could understanding what exactly the nature of those objective moral judgments are under your view. Instead, we skipped passed it to try and make headway. — Bob Ross
So, I would like to point out this is just an empirical question about what exactly has a mind, whereas my theory is simply proving that if it does have one — Bob Ross
Where does a mind begin and end?
I definitely can’t answer that, and, quite frankly, no one can. — Bob Ross
Why are animals and insects ends in themselves but clearly have less value compared to people?
They don’t have less value than humans: they are prioritized lower in the case of moral antinomies, which is most of practical life, than humans. — Bob Ross
The only issue is that P2: Person's are ends in themselves isn't proven, its more of a given assumption.
I added more sections that pertain to ends vs. means; and there is an explanation below the argument of why P2 is true. They are ends in themselves because they are the only beings with a nature such that they are an absolute end. — Bob Ross
Which premise do you disagree with? — Bob Ross
The reasoning demonstrates that even an infinite regress falls into a finite regress of causality.
— Philosophim
Why is that? I'm a little slow today — jgill
Meh. Causality is not found in formal logic.
Certainly not in modal logic.
A first cause is not logically necessary. — Banno
We know some things don't (have causality). That ought be enough to put this to rest. — Banno
I've answered on a number of occasions, the subject is philosophy of mathematics, and you haven't responded, other than repeating your point. — Wayfarer
I've said that numbers and other mathematical concepts are abstractions, to which your reply has been 'what are they made from'? But it is absurd to claim that mathematical concepts are physical. They solely comprise relations of ideas. — Wayfarer
It's certainly true that the h. sapien brain is uniquely equipped to discern these relations, but that no way proves that they are the product of hominid neurophysiology. At best it shows that the brain has evolved in such a way that it has attained the ability to understand such things. — Wayfarer
I acknowledge this a contested subject. There is no settled answer — Wayfarer
So, a platonist answer is that numbers are not to empirical objects, but are objects of reason. — Wayfarer
The demand to prove 'what numbers are made of' and 'where they exist' only illustrates the failure to understand this point, not an argument against it. — Wayfarer
You have failed to do so, and are instead doing me a favor by not calling me a name. How noble and strong you are!
— Philosophim
You will notice that I edited out that remark a long time before your reply appeared, but as you've brought it up, the description I had in mind was 'scientism'. And I'm not the least concerned with your 'tongue lashing', only the tedium of having to deal with it. — Wayfarer
Your entire ouvre rests of just one claim: science proves consciousness is the product of the brain and that all that is unknown is how. But that was just the subject of the bet:
Back to the bet between Koch and Chalmers: They agreed that, for Koch to win, the evidence for a neural signature of consciousness must be “clear.” That word “clear” doomed Koch. — Wayfarer
to say that "logic" necessitates a first cause is not the same as saying the "nature of existence" (whatever that means) necessitates a first cause. Being is not required to conform to our understanding of either logic or the nature of existence. Only we are. — Arne
And this is good, sensible place to leave it. — J
We simply have the true definition of unicorn that already exists in the verbal model of the actual world. — PL Olcott
My purpose in this post is to unequivocally divide analytic from synthetic even if this requires defining analytic(olcott) and synthetic(olcott). — PL Olcott
That brains create consciousness? We've figured that out.
— Philosophim
Did we figure it out in the sense of figuring out the truth of a proposition — sime
I think the problem is something like this: You want to say that “Consciousness can only be identified through behaviors” and also “Therefore, anything with certain specified behaviors is conscious.” I’m not persuaded by the idea that “being alive” consists of behaviors, but let’s grant it. — J
The argument is still shaky. The fact that (at the moment) we can only identify consciousness through behaviors doesn’t mean that all things that exhibit those behaviors must be conscious. Compare: Some Xs are Y; a is an X; therefore a is Y. This doesn’t follow. — J
Wouldn’t it be prudent, then, to assume that our current reliance on behavioral markers to identify consciousness is an unfortunate crutch, and that there is no important connection between the two? After all, we know that behaviors don’t cause consciousness, but something does. When we learn what that something is, we may be able to abandon functional “explanations” entirely. — J
A final thought: Perhaps all you’re saying is that AIs and robots and other artifacts might be conscious, for all we know. — J
If there are no brains in the universe, there is no math
— Philosophim
There is a long history of the ‘maths is discovered, not invented’ school of thought which says numbers are not produced by the brain but discerned by rational insight. But this is nowadays considered controversial because it appears to undercut materialism. — Wayfarer
The brain produces or is involved in producing neurochemicals, endocrines and so on, but it doesn’t produce numbers or words. Your ontology is simply that because matter is fundamental, the brain is material then it must be the case. — Wayfarer
IN fact most of what you write comprises what you think must obviously be true, because 'science shows it'. There's rather derogatory term in philosophy for that attitude but I'll refrain from using it. — Wayfarer
Concepts are not physical things. Find me one reputable philosopher who says otherwise. — Wayfarer
That brains create consciousness? We've figured that out.
— Philosophim
This again demonstrates that you're not 'facing up to the problem of consciousness'. — Wayfarer
I'll bow out — Wayfarer
But these atoms in my brain produce consciousness," I think to myself. And I wonder, "why are these brain atoms producing consciousness? What is special about them?" "Well maybe when you arrange atoms in that way they are conscious?" "But Not Aristotle," I say to myself, "that is entirely an ad hoc explanation and besides, why would the arrangement of the atoms matter?" And I am unable to answer. And that's the hard problem as I understand it. If you have an answer to that problem, I would be happy to hear it. — NotAristotle
‘In our brains’ is another reification. It has no location, it isn’t in any place. If an intelligent creature were to evolve by a completely separate biological pathway, they would discover the concept of equals, But it’s a concept, an idea, it is not a physical thing. — Wayfarer
Being alive is not a behavior, it’s a state or condition. This allows us to say things like, “I don’t care how ‛lifelike’ the behavior of X is, the fact remains that it’s not alive.” — J
No, it’s an intellectual process. 2+2=4 is an intellectual operation. There is no such thing as ‘=‘ in the physical world, it is an abstraction. — Wayfarer
That is the Hard Problem. "Through our physical brain" is a where, not a how. "In the sky" does not tell us how flight is accomplished. "In our legs" does not tell us how walking is accomplished. "In our brain" does not tell us how consciousness is accomplished. The details are not insignificant. They are remarkably important. And they are unknown. — Patterner
But the existence of 'an immaterial entity' was not the point at issue. The claim being considered was this:
It (the act of typing) is physical in some respects, but the salient point, our understanding of what is being said, the expression of intentional meaning - that is not a physical process.
What is the non-physical part? A sub-space where my consciousness resides?
— Philosophim
The interpretation of meaning. The constant, underlying, subliminal processes of 'this means that', 'this is that', 'this word has that meaning' - otherwise known as judgement. That is not a physical process. — Wayfarer
It is a philosophical argument: that the act of rational judgement is not reducible to the physical or explainable in physical terms. — Wayfarer
Consider what is involved in judgement - every time you make an argument, you're inferring causal relations and equivalences, saying that 'this means that....' or 'because of this, then....'. These processes inhere entirely in the relations of ideas. And evidence for that claim has already been given, which is that the same ideas can be expressed in an endless variety of physical forms whilst still retaining their meaning. — Wayfarer
Humans are metaphysical beings because they can see meaning above and beyond the sensory. They seek to understand principles and causes. — Wayfarer
As far as the effects of drugs and inebriants on the brain, it is obvious that this is so. But it does not establish that consciousness is a product of the brain. It is still quite feasible that the brain as a central organ behaves in the sense of a receiver — Wayfarer
As Patterner pointed out, consciousness is not empirically observable. — NotAristotle
Or perhaps to put the question more precisely: How is the brain different from non-conscious physical stuff? My answer is that it's not different and that's the mystery. — NotAristotle
I understand. But that is not what the Hard Problem is. The Hard Problem is explaining how subjective experience exists at all. — Patterner
Although the verbal model of the actual world already exists it may take millions of labor years to write this all down. — PL Olcott
It still wouldn't be time travel. It would be recreating the past in the future. Just like recreating a natural diamond perfectly in a lab, doesn't make another natural diamond, rather it is a natural appearing lab grown diamond. — LuckyR
The axioms of the verbal model of the actual world stipulates that unicorns are fictional. — PL Olcott