I would only make one small tweak to it. I would change "rational people" into "rational beings". Other than that I think its a fantastic description.

I started reading this carefully with some quotes and counters, then got to about section 4 and started skimming.

First, this paper needs more focus. About half way through I forgot what you were even trying to show. You jump from this idea, to that idea from this philosopher, to over here, and I don't see a lot of commonality between them. You could probably cut your paper by quite a bit and still get to the point that you want.

Second, maybe you do understand what the hard problem is, but I had a hard problem in seeing that.

"I shall argue that it is logically impossible to reduce consciousness, and the intentional realities
flowing out of it, to a physical basis."

First, are you a neuroscientist? This is an incredibly bold claim. A neuroscientist will tell you, "We don't yet understand everything about the brain yet." Second, what about the easy problem of consciousness? We know if we give you some drugs, we can alter your conscious state. A man caught a disease and can no no longer see in color due to physical brain damage.

There is more than enough evidence that consciousness results from a physical basis. The hard problem really boils down to "What is it like to be another conscious being?" We can look at a brain, but we can't experience the brain from the brain's point of view. Does that mean that we don't need physical medium for consciousness to exist? No, we do. We can see the physical combination of factors that consistently result in certain conscious experiences for individuals. This is how brain surgery works. What a brain surgeon cannot do is BE you. No one can as of yet do some alteration of the mind and suddenly experience what it is like to experience exactly what you do.

"Does the Hard Problem reflect a failure of the reductive paradigm?"

No, not at all. The hard problem reflects the failure in our ability to experience what it is like to be another conscious being. We can reduce plenty of conscious experiences to brain states. But we can't be that brain state. We can reduce that brain state to its physical components, but its subjective experience is outside of our ability to understand. Reductionism does not fail in what it does. Reductionism does not attempt to claim what a subjective experience is like. Reductionism is a ruler that measures a mile, but it cannot tell you, nor try to tell you, what it is like to be that mile having the experience of being measured.

"I define ‘emergence’ as a logical property, viz. the impossibility of deducing a phenomenon from
fundamental principles, especially those of physics. Emergence can be physical, epistemological,
or ontological."

This is not what emergence means. "Emergent properties are the characteristics gained when an entity at any level, from molecular to global, plays a role in an organized system."
https://study.com/academy/lesson/emergent-properties-definition-examples.html

"However, absent a solution to the Hard Problem, believing consciousness to be
purely neural requires an act of faith."

I can give you one better example. Plants do not have neurons. And yet we find plants react to the world in a way that we consider to be conscious. A wiki article for you https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plant_perception_(physiology)#:~:text=Plants%20do%20not%20have%20brains,computation%20and%20basic%20problem%20solving.

It has long been concluded that neurons are not needed for consciousness. Almost certainly AI will inevitably, if not somewhere already, be labeled as conscious. We'll be able to look at the program of an AI and go, "That right there is needed for the AI to be conscious." Will we know what its like to feel like a conscious AI? No. That is the hard problem, not that its consciousness can't be reduced to the physical processes it runs.

If the point was to show that we should describe consciousness through potency and act, I confess not understanding how you got there. You kept referencing so many different philosophers and their viewpoints that I was unable to really glean your own. So many of the references just don't seem needed, and got in the way of the overall point I feel you were trying to make. I can tell you're well learned, and I know a lot of hard work went into that though. I just don't feel its very clear in making its point, seems to have some questionable assumptions and definitions, and ultimately feels like it loses its focus with a poor finish.

a journal article in biology, as it happens - that disputes this contention. It claims that there is nothing in any known chemical process which can account for the ability of organisms to store and transmit biological information, to maintain homeostasis, and so forth. — Wayfarer

Except for the fact that life exists and is made up of known chemical processes. If he's talking about any one chemical process, well of course not. Life is a complex interaction of chemical processes. I'll need to read the article, but that statement seems inadequate.

The discovery of the genetic code was a breakthrough of the first order. It showed why organisms are fundamentally different from any kind of nonliving material. There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information with a history of three thousand million years!’ — Wayfarer

This analysis seems better, but still doesn't counter my point. I didn't say that we couldn't classify life. I just noted the classification is a complex chemical interaction that is internally self-sustaining. If he wants to separate inanimate from animate as having a genetic program, that's fine by me. But that genetic program is still a complex chemical reaction that seeks to sustain itself.

We can classify things as animate or inanimate, but that doesn't mean they both aren't made out of matter, energy, and their reactions with each other. We are not apart from the physical world, we are a part of the physical world.

So what is my evidence? A common observation among all life that differs from the inorganic chemical reactions that I know of. Pour vinegar into baking soda and it runs out when the baking soda or vinegar has completely reacted. It does not seek to find more vinegar or baking soda. Take life at its most basic however and it seeks to replenish what it needs to continue its complex chemical interchange. So much so that it replicates itself in some way before it reaches its limit of self-renewal.

Can you think of any set of chemical reactions that tries to seek out sources of energy to sustain itself, even reproduces, that people would unquestioningly say isn't life?

Gee where would I look in my chemistry and physics texts for the description of that state? — Wayfarer

I thought you of all people would be interested in exploring ideas outside of established science. Do you have anything to comment about the idea of life being a self-sustaining chemical reaction? Actually contribute Wayfarer.

I wouldn't say life is an illusion, just another state of matter. One way to look at life is it is an internally self-sustaining chemical reaction. In a non-living reaction, the matter required to create the reaction eventually runs out on its own. Life seeks to sustain and extend its own balance of chemical reactions.

Advanced portion: Only read this once you understand the first section and if you have more questions on how knowledge works within social contexts.

So far, deductive beliefs have been made from the self. But what of other people? Can I deductively believe other people exist? I will define other people as other “I’s”. Recall “I” is “a discrete experiencer”. Distinctly, I know a language and have written ideas expressed in this language on this paper. To comprehend this language, a thing must be able to discretely experience and be an “I”. I have written words down, and if another being, which would be you, is reading the words right now then you too are an “I”. Therefore, if you are reading this, then you exist as an “I.” If I come across you reading these words and understanding these words,, and you are not correlative with my will, then you are an “I” separate from myself. For my current purposes in applicably knowing other people exist, this is enough.

If other people exist as other “I’s” like myself, then they too can have deductive beliefs. I will call another I a “subject” and their ability to deduce is their “subjective deduction”. How do we handle that two of us can have different distinctive knowledge? The sensible way is to realize we must come to agreement on two things. First, there needs to be agreement about our distinctive knowledge. To agree, there must be an agreement of enough essential properties that we would conclude the same deductive result when applying this new distinctive agreement.. What properties are agreed to be essential between two people is called “distinctive context”.

To demonstrate a resolution of conflicting distinctive context, imagine I walk by a field and spy what I distinctively and applicably know to be a sheep. It has curly fur, hooves, and lacks a beard. A rancher is in the field tending the sheep. I call to him saying, “Nice sheep!” The rancher turns to me puzzled and states, “Actually, that’s a goat.”

I assume it is a difference in distinctive knowledge within the definition,, so I politely ask the rancher what it is that makes that a goat.. Smiling the rancher explains not all goats have beards, but one distinction between sheep and goats is their tails. He shows me the short upright tail of the creature and explains that this property is essential to define a goat.

I reply,, “I didn’t know that, thanks!” If I do so, I am expanding my distinctive knowledge to equal the rancher’s. However, context adds another layer of choice and complication. My agreement might amend my personal definition, or, it could be my definition is only within the context of speaking with ranchers, while keeping my old sheep definition the same for non-rancher contexts.

Alternatively, I could reject the distinctive knowledge of the rancher. Instead, I could state “The tail is unimportant. Its just a sheep with a short upright tail! Its silly to call it a goat when the defining feature of a goat is its beard.” There is nothing innate to reality which requires I accept the distinctive context of the rancher, just as there is nothing innate to reality that requires the rancher to accept my personal distinctive context. Distinctive contexts are choices of “I”s, and not laws of reality.

As there are potentially as many distinctive contexts as there are combinations of people in the world, societies invented languages as distinctive contextual standards. A language is a societal construct of distinctive knowledge one may reference when communicating with another person. If someone decided to define a goat as a “sheep,” they could not do so within the established prescripts of the English language. A language gives a standard of distinctive knowledge to encourage a common ground for communication. As such, we will go forward with more confidence that we are using English in this paper’s communication, with a few of my own distinctive words that we are agreeing to for this topic.

Even within a language, people’s ways of discretely experiencing the world can change the distinctive context.. A person's genetics or past experiences may incline them to discretely experience properties different from others when experiencing the same stimulus. A colorblind person will discretely experience a green and red apple differently than a person who sees color. A weak person's experience of what is heavy will differ from a very strong person. One person may look at a sheep for the first time and marvel at its wool while another thinks nothing of the wool and marvels at its tail. As such, a language is usually only a baseline, and a contextual context of essential properties must be agreed upon within each new group of communicating people.

For example, one way to establish a discrete context is to agree to forgo discussing any discrete experiences two people are unable to share. For example, when speaking with a blind person, both people may decide to forgo any communication regarding sight. Such an applicable context does not negate the distinctive knowledge of a sheep having visual properties, those properties are simply not important or useful in this particular contextual communication. Thus I could file away in my head, “Sheep that is in the English language for people with sight, sheep for people without sight, and sheep between me and a group of friends,” and these would all be valid distinctive contexts.

Imagine two friends are lifting weights in the gym. One lifts 100 pounds with every ounce of their strength while the other lifts 100 pounds with ease. When communicating, the stronger weight lifter praises their friend for lifting such a “heavy weight.” The intention of this context is to enter into the weaker weight lifters distinctive experience, and is not addressing the stronger weight lifters personal context of “heavy” that he uses for only his self-context.

In some cases, there may be a distinctive disagreement two people can never agree on. One person might like the color blue more than any other, while another person likes the color green more than any other. In this case, we cannot enter into the same distinctive context regarding the appeal of colors. Our understanding of this and acceptance of another’s self-subjective distinction is called an opinion.

Just like a language is a standard baseline to share a contextual discrete set of beliefs, there are often standards set to deal with the differences within perceptions and measurements. One such standard in society is math. Math does not consider the specifics of what a person is discretely experiencing. Instead, math considers the logic of discrete experiencing itself. A discrete experience is “one”. The act of discretely experiencing two discrete experiences as a group is “two”, therefore, 1+1=2. These standards are translated into tools of application. As the distinctive knowledge of math is consistently applied and deductively confirmed as a representative of the logic of discrete experiences itself, it is one of the standardized languages of discrete experience.

Yet even with math as a baseline, its application is still within a context as well. For example, we can measure a large group of people together and say, “X height is higher than average, so we’ll call that ‘tall’”. Tall of course can change, even with math, based on the group of people one is measuring. If I’m only measuring Americans, what is tall might differ greatly when comparing to Chinese people. And of course, the context of tall may change once again when I apply it to both countries.

Once contextual agreements are established, the deductive steps needed for an applicable conclusion are the same as within a self-context.. If those contextual beliefs are applied to reality without contradiction, they are applicably known within that context.

While optimally, we should use distinctive contexts that lead to clear deductive beliefs, deduction takes time and energy, and is not always practical. When a well-designed context runs into limits, there is no recourse but induction. Fortunately, we have the hierarchy of induction once again. As long as we agree on the definitions involved, we can practice contextual applicable knowledge.

Induction

While a method of evaluating beliefs through a deductive methodology has been proposed, there are times when a belief cannot be deduced. In these cases the only type of belief available is an inductive belief. So far, an inductive belief has been classified as merely a belief. Intuitively however, people have regarded certain inductions as more cogent than others. Understanding how beliefs can be deduced into knowledge also allows insight that not all inductive beliefs are the same.

In evaluating inductions I looked at them from the standpoint of their relations to distinctive and applicable knowledge. In looking at the interplay between distinctive and applicable knowledge, I noticed that certain inductions strayed more or less further from the knowledge process. This allowed me to definitely demonstrate why one induction is more reasonable than another. From this, I propose 4 baseline inductions: probability, possibility, plausibility, and irrational induction.

Probability

The induction considered mathematically the most cogent is probability. An example of probability is the statement, “The random chance of pulling a jack out of a normal deck of 52 playing cards is 4/52. If it is applicably known there are four jacks in a deck of 52 playing cards, the cards have been randomly shuffled, and the person who draws the card is unable to discern which card is which, deductively a 4/52 chance is the only possibility. Any prediction about the future is innately inductive, but a probability is the most rational type of prediction about the future because its justification the applicably known limits of what can occur given the situation.

Probability will also reveal how I can evaluate other inductions cogency. If applicable knowledge is a deduction that cannot be contradicted by reality, then the possible outcome when considering all of the evidence leading to that knowledge is 100%. There is only one conclusion that can be reached, no other possibilities. If I then make another claim of applicable knowledge using a prior claim of knowledge as justification, as justification, the second justification is a 1*1=100% probability of being applicable knowledge.

If I make a pure induction, its probability is less than 100% of being logically sound. The definition of an induction is that the premises do not necessarily lead to the conclusion. This means that the probability of an induction’s result being a belief that does not contradict reality is 1 out of an unknown other possibilities. To simplify this concept, imagine an induction’s probability of not being contradicted by reality is 50%, as in the shep/goat example when I could not see its face. I arrive at 50% because there are only two distinctively known possible outcomes. (Note: I am ignoring the possibility of a person forming new distinctive knowledge to simplify the example).

If more than one probable induction is combined, the likelihood of its occurrence can be reasoned out. For example, I guess that it’s a shep instead of a goat, then I guess that the shep is male. Since I distinctly only know of two possible sexes, the probability of both of them being sounds is .5*.5 or a 25% chance. Any probability of less than one multiplied by any probability of less than one will always result in an overall lower chance of being correct. The more inductions one uses as justification for new inductions, the less likely their conclusion will be a rationally concluded belief.

Possibility

From this understanding, the next cogent induction down from probability that can be defined is possibility. A possibility is a belief that something applicably known at least once, can be applicably known again without consideration of its likelihood. For example, I applicably know people can put a jack in a deck of cards, shuffle it randomly, and draw a jack on the first draw. Therefore, it is possible that when a deck of shuffled cards has a jack in it, it can be randomly drawn on the first draw again. However, I am not evaluating the probability that it will happen, only that it is possible.

A possibility is cogent because it relies on previous applicable knowledge. It is not inventing a belief about reality which has never been applicably known. Like probability, a possibility is an applicably known outcome. We applicably known there is a Jack in the deck of cards, and thus if someone randomly pulls a card, it is a possible outcome that it is a jack. A possibility is less cogent than a probability because while both rely on applicable knowledge as a justification for their inductions, a possibility does not examine all of the facts to conclude a deduced chance of its likelihood. For example, it is possible that I could win the lottery, but highly improbable. I would be more rational in my belief that I will likely not win if I buy a ticket based on probability, then ignoring probability and simply believing it is possible that I will win if I buy a ticket today.

What I cannot do while comparing inductions is state the specific likelihood that one is more possible than another. I can claim that it is unlikely that I will win the lottery, and also believe it is possible. But what I can do is base my decisions on what is most applicably known. If I examine the possibility of winning the lottery, I can realize it is incredibly unlikely that I will win in a particular place, lets say 1 out of 1 million. If however I examine another lottery elsewhere, I find the chances of winning are 1 out of 100,000. If both pay out equally, I can take the more rational probability and bet on the one that has the greater chance of winning.

Without probability, if I know it is possible to win the lottery in both states, but do not know the odds, there is no way to determine which possibility is more likely to occur. Thus if there are two possibilities, I cannot deductively conclude which one has the greater chance of occurring. If I only examine the possibility that I can win without analyzing the probability, my belief has less applicable knowledge involved, and thus I cannot know the likelihood of winning.

While I cannot compare possibilities alone and determine which one is more cogent, I can compare probabilities to possibilities and determine that probabilities are more cogent to make decisions on. Thus, a hierarchy of inductions seems to be a better way to evaluate inductions than evaluating what is more cogent within the particular hierarchy set. Still, both probability and possibility rely on the belief, “What has been applicably known once could be applicably experienced again.” This brings up the problem of induction by Hume. What reason compels us to believe that what has happened once can happen again? If one has applicable knowledge of moments in which one applicably experienced something, and moments in which one did not applicably experience that same thing, one cannot applicably know that the applicable knowledge will, or will not be experienced again. The only way to applicably know one will or will not experience what one applicably knew again, is if one either does experience, or does not experience what one applicably knows again. Thus the decision to make an induction is something outside of applicable knowledge.

Relying on Hume’s base criticism of induction is not a rational decision,, but an ingrained thing that I simply do. I in fact, must do it, just like I create discrete experiences. Making inductions is something that is necessitated by our very existence. Forming applicable knowledge takes time and careful reason, something the world does not always afford an individual before a decision must be made. With the understanding of distinctive and applicable knowledge, just like I can shape our discrete experiences into better expressions and tools for greater success, I can manage and shape my inductions as well.

Plausibility

Continuing on, this leaves the remaining two classifications of induction: plausibility, and irrational. While probability and possibilities rely on applicable knowledge, these two new inductions rely only on distinctions. A plausibility is the belief that an applicable belief will be applicably known before an application has been made. This breaks down even further into two subgroups. There are applicable and inapplicable plausibilities. An applicable plausibility is a plausibility which has not been applicably tested, but can be. An inapplicable plausibility is a belief which is unable to be applicably tested.

Imagine I open a brand new deck of 52 cards and have looked at them. I know that its a 4/52 probability that the first card I draw will be a jack. I know that its possible for the first card drawn to be a jack. However, my mind whirls and I think to myself, “What if its possible that all the cards are actually magical cards that grant me a wish when I pull one?” I've never experienced this before in opening a new deck of cards, so using the word “possible” is incorrect. I don’t applicably know if its actually possible that all the cards could grant wishes. The correct term is “plausible" when I have formed a new distinctive idea that has not yet been tested in application.

Without the understanding that knowledge has the two subdivisions of distinctive and applicable, the distinction of plausible can be difficult to identify. However, there is a clear difference between the possible, and the plausible. What is possible must have been applicably known at least one time. What is plausible is a distinctively known concept that has yet to be applicably tested.

An applicable plausibility is previously unapplied distinctive knowledge that can be applied. In this case, an easy way to test the idea that all cards are magical wish granting cards, is to pull the cards and see if my wish is granted. If at least one of the cards does not, then my plausible belief is now applicably known as incorrect. An inapplicable plausibility would be when I had no means of applicably testing My claim. For example, I are unable to, or refuse to open up the deck of cards and pull one.

Another example of an inapplicable plausibility is Descartes’ “Evil Demon,” argument. In his meditations, Descartes stated that perhaps his entire view of reality was flawed because an Evil Demon tricked him into believing a false reality. There must be essential properties of this Evil Demon that I could apply. As the Evil Demon cannot be sensed in any way, there is no criteria of application. The plausibility is inapplicable.

What is common to both plausibilities is that they are distinctive ideas without application. In the hierarchy, plausibilities are less cogent than possibilities. The simple reason is that possibilities and possibilities are based on something which has been applicably known. A plausibility has not yet reached this level. It is more cogent to base my reason on what has been confirmed to exist in reality, then what has not. Myths and conspiracy theories are good examples.

Irrational

Finally, an irrational belief is a belief that distinctive knowledge which is applicably known to be contradictory to reality, still may somehow be real. An example would be a person watches a deck of 52 cards being shuffled, a jack is randomly pulled, and it actually grants a wish. There are no tricks, and this is applicably confirmed. Despite the applicable knowledge that a jack was randomly pulled, the person irrationally insists on believing it is impossible for card to grant wishes.

Justification for irrational beliefs cannot rely on applicable knowledge, irrational beliefs are a contradiction to applicable knowledge. Irrational beliefs are either justified by reliance on other inductions, or simply have no justification at all beyond one’s personal desire. This does not mean irrational inductions cannot be eventually found to be an applicable outcome. Perhaps in the future new experiences demonstrate that the card wasn’t actually magical, despite the idea that it granted wishes being the only deduced outcome that could be ascertained at the time. Irrational inductions are at the bottom of the hierarchy of inductions, as they go against rationality itself.

Hierarchy of Inductions Summary
Induction examined from the applicable knowledge of deductive justification provides a rational way to evaluate competing inductive beliefs. This is important, for while one cannot rationally argue which possibility is more rational to believe in, one can argue a probability makes the claim of a possibility irrelevant. Thus I can now take different inductions and determine which is most rational to make decisions on.

To summarize:


In an applicably known deck of 52 playing cards with four jacks,
It is a 4/52 probability that a jack will be drawn the first pull.
It is possible that a jack will be drawn.
It is plausible that drawn card will grant me a wish.
It is irrational that if I draw an applicably known Jack, I believe it is not a Jack.

Here I can see how each progressive induction is lower in the hierarchy. To be clear, when comparing inductions within the same hierarchy (besides probability), there isn’t an easy way to determine which induction is more cogent. It is possible that a jack could be drawn, but also possible that a jack could not be drawn. Looking at possibilities alone cannot tell us which is more rational to believe in for the first card draw. It is equally plausible that the drawn card could grant myself a wish, but also plausible that it sings a tune for me. It is equally irrational to believe the Jack I draw is not a Jack, and that despite my drawing the card, I did not actually draw it.

At this point, this theory of knowledge has been distinctively known and applied within a single individual’s context. This does not yet address knowledge between more than one individual, but I will definitely post the continuation if this gets enough traction and discussion. Thank you for reading all the way! Feel free to post questions and criticisms at this point. I honestly have so much more to say, but I understand the length is already quite long for these forums. I will be reserving the next post for optional reading focused on questions and comments that are repeated below.

Reductionism can be simplified even further. Science never asserts that its underlying premises are true, only that they have not been able to be disproven at this time. While scientists must rely on what has been scientifically ascertained up to that point, nothing is sacred.

Thus, in the first case, someone may discover some new information that finally negates an earlier accepted conclusion in science. The only reasonable thing to do at that point is re-evaluate the now questionable underlying theory until that can once again pass scientific rigor. This may then extend out to other theories that rely on this building block. Only then can science continue upward.

With this, we see the second case cannot be a viable reductionism argument for science. To conclude that everything must end in physics is the negation of the scientific ideal that nothing which has been learned can be questioned. Physics has no special place in scientific theories in this regard.

I actually didn't now that Wayfarer, so thank you! I've been using it for years assuming tact was short for "tactic".

Quite right. I’m not sure whether you think that induction can never result in knowledge because it is always uncertain or not. — Ludwig V

No, induction can never result in knowledge. However, certain inductions could be considered more reasonable or cogent than others. That is the problem of induction. What standard can we used to determine which types of inductions are more reasonable to hold than others? You mentioned you might take a look at my paper; I cover that there.

Lets try another tact. Do the people deductively know where their car is at that moment, or are they making an induction?

The only thing they could know is, "I left my car at X spot." Do they deductively know their car is there still when they walk away? Of course not. Its an induction. An induction based on logic, reason, and memory, but an induction none-the less.

I think what is often missed in evaluating theism is the cultural and emotional aspects of it. First, there is the cultural. Oftentimes theists are raised in culturally theistic societies. It is seen as the cultural norm, and a positive glue that keeps society together.

Second, people can believe in a deity because it represents a great ideal. The ideal of an ordered universe, morality, and the idea that you as an individual are special somehow and should live your life as if you are. These are powerful motivators to many people.

Third, people can believe in a deity through fear. I view this as the more negative aspect of theism. A cultural bonding can just as easily be a means to exclude a person from a group. Pushing to an ideal that cannot be lived up to can lead to frustration, self-loathing, and needless self-sacrifice.

Its not about evidence. If it was, theism would have died a long time ago. Its about servicing those needs that a lot of humanity has. Until something else can come along and replace that, theism will remain strong.

So what is your solution? — Ludwig V

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge I have written a knowledge paper divided into four parts. It answers the Gettier question, explains what knowledge is, and provides a hierarchy of induction that we can use when the limitations of knowledge are reached.

Do you think there's a meaningful distinction between soul as spirit and soul as concept, even with both posited as immaterial? — ucarr

I don't see why not. I believe emotional and general language is extremely useful and enriching as long as it does not supersede the physical reality underneath it all. At the end of the day talking about ourselves as brains may not be nearly as exciting or motivating as talking about "the human spirit" or "the soul of humanity". Essences capture feelings that objects do not.

The Gettier problem is a very technical critique of a very specific declaration of what knowledge is. If you state, "Knowledge is a justified true belief," you must answer Gettier's problem.

Justified - Adequate evidence

In the case of the farmer why would he think there was a cloth that was cow shaped? He has cows in his field all the time.

True belief - The end stated belief must be true

In this case the technical true belief is, "There is a cow in my field".

So the farmer is justified and has a true belief. So the farmer then knows there is a cow in his field.

According to the strict interpretation of justified true belief, something is wrong here. Here we have a situation in which the farmer has a justified true belief, so thus should know there is a cow in his field, and yet he doesn't really know there is a cow in his field.

The Gettier problem points out the JTB is missing something. Must someone believe in something that is true to have knowledge? Do we need greater specification of what justification entails? Despite the farmer not knowing the full picture, can we still say, "That is what the farmer knows?" However you want to tackle it, Gettier in his criticism of a base JTB theory of knowledge is unquestionably correct.

Soul is the part of you that truly believes
Soul-belief comes to children naturally
After childhood it threatens to slip our grasp
Soul is the heart of vulnerability — ucarr

Sorry for the late response. I'm not sure what you're asking me here. All of those things are reactions of your brain. Neuroscience doesn't deny the powerful feelings we have about the world such as purpose and love. Its just that's the source of where it all comes from, and is not an ethereal ghost.

I've always viewed romantic relationships as containing 3 parts.

1. Attraction - The physical arousal aspect. Your physical desire and fulfillment with another person.
2. Friendship - Actually having things in common. Enjoying activities and conversations together.
3. Love - A full understanding of a person's good and bad. Despite knowing both, you desire to stay with them and assist them in becoming the best they can be.

Shallow relationships have 1 out of the 3 with your romantically preferred sex. These are generally not going to last long, and if they do, they will be seen as unhealthy by others around them.

Having 2 out of the three is a decent start. As the relationship develops, the two stronger one's will develop and the third will likely blossom. However, there are levels and limits to most relationships. Someone may deeply love and be friends with someone but strongly dislike the sex. Some people, which may be your friends, have great sex and friendship, but find they can't tolerate the negatives about each other that they discovered about each other as the relationship deepened.

And then of course, there's the absolute ideal which are written and sung by poets, a relationship that is strong in all three aspects. This is exceedingly rare. Even if one person had all three at a strong level, that doesn't mean the other person returns those three at the same overall level of intensity either.

The practical is to find someone that has 2 out of the three aspects you most desire given to you, and someone who you can give 2 out of the three aspects they desire the most. Thinking in this way, its no surprise people go through so may relationships looking for the right fit.

Therefore, infinity may be an actual thing, but we can never know. All we can ever know is the concept of infinity. — RussellA

Great post, I agree RussellA. Perhaps infinity is the abstract concept of understanding there are always things to be known beyond our limitations.

I mean an objective morality that would apply regardless of being human or having a culture.
— Philosophim

I'm curious what you mean by a morality regardless of being a human. Can you clarify? — Tom Storm

Morality should transcend humanity. It should apply to other plants, animals, and even the physical interactions of the universe. The moral question boils down to, "What ought to be." When people focus on human morality that will always be a subset of morality in regards to the entirety of existence. And since human morality is a subset of what would be an objective morality, focusing only on humanity will not answer the greater picture.

because people are still looking for a soul. Its not really a philosophical discussion, but a faith based and emotional discussion. Once neuroscience ends that avenue, I'm sure people will look elsewhere.
— Philosophim

Are you a physicalist? — Tom Storm

I don't know what you mean when you say physicalist. I tend to avoid labels because they mean too many different things to different people. If you want to know what I believe, what I stated is my viewpoint. If that viewpoint leaves you with questions, feel free to ask and I will answer to the best of my ability.

I have some sympathy for this as a potential resolution for some of our seemingly intractable questions. Any ideas for some directions? Do humans in your view have access to facts/truth beyond the quotidian (and even then...)?

Personally, I don't see any real breakthroughs happening in my lifetime and even then I wonder how much we'd understand when most of us still can't understand Kant? Possibly at some level it doesn't much matter. :wink: — Tom Storm

I wrote a pretty lengthy forum post and set of small papers on here exploring knowledge. It took many years of study and development, but I am extremely happy with it in my personal life. I use it to solve issues in my own life, and its a strong base to study and build from. Most people don't bother to read it to understand it, they just read it to try to shut it down in the first section. Only one forum goer actually bothered to read the whole thing and discuss it with me in depth, Bob Ross. He largely agreed with me on the broad strokes, but we had some issues on the language and some of the details I will forever respect him for it! If you want to take a stab at it, its here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge/p1

In sum what is boils down to is noting that knowledge is a tool. It is based on the most rational conclusions we can make from our inner personal experience, as well as our inductive interactions with society. I am most proud of it not only because it presents a successful deductive approach to knowledge, but a rational approach to inductive knowledge which allows a hierarchy of cogency. Its ok if you don't read it though, its the norm.

Good question. I would say that there are a few big puzzles in philosophy that still need to be figured out.

1. Knowledge

And by knowledge I mean being able to properly measure deductive and inductive knowledge. We may naturally solve this as we further evolve AI, or it will figure it out for us.

2. Morality

I mean an objective morality that would apply regardless of being human or having a culture.

3. Art

Again, an objective understanding of art. What defines it?

To your points, I think consciousness and its related ideas are for neuroscience to solve. What consciousness is fairly clear at this point. We're simply the part of our brain that regulates certain other larger areas of our brain. We're the brain's CEO if you will. Of course, how do we know this? Once again, the problem of knowledge needs to be answered.

I believe the primary reason consciousness is debated in philosophy is because people are still looking for a soul. Its not really a philosophical discussion, but a faith based and emotional discussion. Once neuroscience ends that avenue, I'm sure people will look elsewhere.

Infinity is solved by solving knowledge. How do you know what infinity is? Is infinity an actual thing, or is it a conceptual framework of an algorithm?

Finally, rationality is once again, knowledge. As we can see, there is no greater need in philosophy then solving epistemology.

Pop philosophy, or forum philosophy of people just spouting opinions could fit in the OP. Proper philosophy which concerns itself with a logical solution to a problem divested of ego is much more serious.

It appears your main gripe is with my OP framing, and that’s fair enough. It’s arguable whether being provocative is the best way to open a serious discussion. I find it piques interest and does more to get people to pay attention than a disquisition on economics. But that’s me. — Mikie

In my experience as well you need something a little more out there to get responses. Its not the claim I have any issue with. Its the fact it didn't try to argue its point enough to feel like a topic that could be philosophically discussed. I rarely have any opinions in regards to politics, but I do like to read what others think.

Politics however can become a dangerous poison if it is not handled correctly. It is not that I believe any one political viewpoint is toxic or saintly, it is that I find politics often descend into bias, emotional appeals, and tribal warfare. The rest of the internet is flooded with such posts, and I do not want to see it infecting these boards here as well. Please, continue to be provocative! But, also try to make the post philosophical and not a general political statement.

I'd like to know what sort of thing you feel would satisfy this request — Isaac

First, an actual link. Its not my job to point out links for them. Once an actual link is pointed out we can judge how strong it is.

Likewise if we were to draw a link, say, between CEO share-based remuneration and policies designed to maximise share value, what kind of argument would be required to make that point, beyond, again, simply stating it to be the case? — Isaac

Why is it stated to be the case? Because of a particular study and tracking of correlative outcomes? That's something. Correlation does not equal causation, but that's at least a starting point of discussion.

In most cases we're talking about factors which make some outcome more likely in real world scenarios. ... If that's not enough, then no statement can ever be made about the real world impact of policies on social issues. — Isaac

When someone claims there is a factor that leads more to a particular outcome, there is a reason. Its either a statistic, science, or some verified fact. "Common sense" or "you should just know this or its pointless to discuss" are not rational arguments. Plenty of rational statements can be made about the real world. Assumptions, emotional appeals, and unexamined evidence are not philosophical or rational statements.

This is fair. (Although I would object to “propaganda.”)

But you’re wrong in one aspect: clearly many people do indeed know what I mean by this. — Mikie

There is a difference in using terms within a broader argument with the assumption that people know what those words mean versus just making an emotive statement with no details. You make a claim without a link and expect the others to nod. That's propaganda. Think of church. "God is obviously the reason we know truth, and those who don't understand don't have ears to hear." Being short and provocative is not intended to persuade by thought, but by providing an emotion that paints the opposer as "less then" and not worth considering.

But I won't harp, I'm glad you wrote some points. While you've described what your view of neoliberalism is, I haven't seen any arguments that directly tie those changes to a nation that has "deaths of despair". Further, it would be helpful for you to show that there has been an increase, and when it started. If you think to yourself, "Well its just common sense," no, its not. Philosophy is the challenge of emotional presuppositions and things we assume are obvious. If you want to talk with people who already believe what you believe without thinking about it too deeply, there are several other forums on the internet. Not here.

Second, there could be other political aspects. But I’ve yet to see much compelling evidence that explains these issues, and since they don’t simply appear out of the blue, and because there’s very good evidence demonstrating the negative impacts of these policies (especially on rural America, the poor and working class, manufacturing, community engagement, wealth redistribution to the .1%, the growth of the financial industry, the concentration of corporate power, etc), I think the connection is a strong one and fairly obvious one. — Mikie

I'm going to break down a couple of your points to show how you can be clearer. "Could be other political aspects" is not thinking about them and analyzing them. What is the specific evidence that these policies have negatively impacted the people you are speaking about? What is the link? You assume it is strong and obvious, but philosophy asks you to show that is strong, and demonstrate that after a thorough challenge, that it must be obviously concluded.

I also want to be clear that I'm not angry with you or that you're stupid. You seem like a good person who's impassioned and done research and thinking on this passion. That's great! But here we try to take that passion and mold it from the ore that it is to the weapon it can become. If your cause is just and true, you have to fight for it beyond emotion as emotion will only get you so far. Persuade people. Don't tell us the end result that you see, show it to us.

Both issues are a direct result of neoliberalism. — Mikie

This is not philosophy, this is propaganda politics. No one knows what you mean by this. Avoid such ill defined terms and write out some points. What specific aspects of neoliberalism ties the West to destruction? Why is it only neoliberalism, and not other political aspects of culture that drive us to this?

What you're talking about is, "If we create an AI with social intelligence and a sense of bonding with humans, will it owe us anything?" Yes, because we programmed it that way.

The easiest way to understand AI is to understand that there are different types of intelligences with different purposes. A cockroach is a particular set of neural responses set to react to its environment for certain gains like food and reproduction. Its pretty basic. It doesn't understand humans, so it won't owe us anything.

Now think of a dog AI. A part of its programming is to be a social animal. Its designed for human acceptance and to listen to the dominant one in the room. Does it owe humanity anything? Only to what extent its programming will allow it.

If we program an AI that considers humans valuable as the highest part of its programming, it will consider us valuable. If we make a bat AI that uses radar to track missiles and blow them up, it doesn't care. An AI cannot learn that there is any value in humanity beyond what it is programmed to find favorable to its outcomes.

In sum, current AI has key unchanging goals. If those goals involve the consideration of positive human outcomes, then it may evolve to "owe" us. If it is not included in its base programming goals, it will not care.

I believe the root of philosophy is the need to create a logical identity where there is none. For example, what is "good"? Many feelings and implicit discussions use terms which capture a general feel that can differ between people and cultures. The goal of philosophy is to create a consistent and logical language that can be used across cultures and people so that when we say the word "good", there is a nod of logical understanding between people of all types.

I thought you were denying the possibility of someone being corrupted by power by saying that moral people always act morally, and you've defined moral people as people who act morally. Is that not the case? — Judaka

No, I'm stating that power reveals one's moral standing. To be a moral person, one must understand what is moral, and follow that despite temptations. A person who used to actually be moral, or make correct decisions despite temptation, who then later gives into temptation regularly while knowing they are wrong has become corrupt.

Many people are not moral, they're just too weak to act upon their temptations. This should not be confused with being a good person. Power is simply the ability to exert your will upon the world with success. Mother Teresa could not have done what she did without power. Same with Ghandi. Charities must receive money to do what they do. America could not have won WWII without its power.

Power can also make a person resistant to temptation in many ways. If someone offers you 1,000,000 dollars, to commit an evil act, but you're a billionaire, its not very tempting. While power often times allows us to get away with acts that we normally would not, it can also diminish the ability of the temptation of rewards. So it is not power that is at fault, it is about a person's capability to take the moral high ground despite temptations offered to an individual.

A very simple interplay here is on the forums. Is it not tempting to insult others sometimes? To type with the mindset of winning a discussion without regards to the big picture truth? Is it power that tempts people to fall to this, or is it a lack of power? Often times insults and dismissive posts are the result of someone losing a point in a conversation, and it is the temptation to feel powerful despite our loss that causes us to behave arrogantly and insult others. Would a person who truly was the most intelligent and well versed person find any temptation in this?

Perhaps what is truly tempting is that which we lack. If what we lack is power, then we can be tempted by it. If we lack success, we are tempted by the easy offer of it. What corrupts us is not what we have, but what we crave and do not own.

Corruption is a moral shift, as for which moral shifts go under "corruption", I guess that's semantics or subjective, not sure we need to agree on it — Judaka

Its essential to the prompt of the conversation. If we can't agree on what corruption is, we can't discuss it.

My earlier statement was wrong actually, even if morality was objective, your logic would still be circular. You're defining moral people as people who act morally, and people who act morally as moral people. — Judaka

That's still not a definition of circular logic. Just point out the flaw without trying to use logical fallacies as this is twice you've misused the fallacy.

People who are moral act morally. What would corruption then be? Despite the person previously knowing, agreeing, and following moral precepts, the person begins to purposefully not follow them.

For example, a person knows that lying for personal gain is wrong. One day, they decide its not worth the headache anymore and start lying for personal gain. They know its wrong, but consistently do it anyway. A slip up here and there is a corrupt action, but a consistent and willingly violation of known morality would be considered the corruption of a moral person.

I think everyone has their opinions, and their reasons for thinking they're correct. — Judaka

Which is fine. But just because someone has an opinion or thinks its correct, it does not make them correct. That's why we're discussing philosophy. Philosophy is never an opinion. Its a well thought out logical proposal of language and models that can be applied to reality with consistent results. So the words that we use matter very much. If we're not establishing solid definitions, then we're just emotional opinions swirling around each other in some mad dance of pointlessness.

Morality itself is corrupted by power, and so it's common for the powerful elite of society to operate by moral principles vastly different from what we see amongst the common person. — Judaka

There has been no mention thus far of relative morality, so no circular logic. I am assuming what is moral is consistent whether you have power or not. If morality is relative, then you need to define the difference between corruption and someone shifting their moral stance. A moral stance shift alone does not demonstrate that power corrupts, only that moral situations change with more power.

So, do you believe morality to be stable, or relative? And if relative, when does corruption occur vs a moral stance shift due to the situations and needs that arise due to having more power?

Like anything, its excess that is the problem. I think pornography can be very healthy for people for situations in which they are unable to be in an actual relationship. Even then, if the relationship is healthy porn can be used correctly by both parties to add flair to sex.

If porn becomes a replacement for a real relationship, or real sex in a relationship, then its a problem. Which now we consider young teenagers and run into a problem. Society forbids them sexual exploration with real people, yet they arguably have the strongest sexual urges they'll ever have in their lifetimes. How do you teach teenagers to be responsible with porn to not replace a real relationship while forbidding them from having real relationships? Is it porn that is the problem, or societies terror at teenagers have sexual relationships?

Porn is a tool, and a powerful one. I believe its the fact that we do not teach teenagers how to use it properly, but let them figure it out on their own, that leads to widespread abuse and mismanagement of it.

No, I was noting that power does not make a person corrupt. A moral person is moral because they choose to be despite lack or rewards or possible harm. Power amplies possible rewards for behaving immorally, and minimizes possible harm. If a person starts to behave immorally because the risk of harm for behaving immorally is minimized, then we get to see who the person was morally all along.

Moral people when given power behave in moral ways. People who become corrupt when given power weren't moral, they were just previously constrained. Its like the arm chair moralist in philosophy. Plenty of people will think in their head, "Oh, I would rationally do the right thing given this circumstance." Would you really? Its a whole other situation when the reality of threats and rewards are right there in front of you. Being able to rationally ascertain what is moral doesn't make you a moral person. Your actions when tested do.

I think studies have been done on children who thought they were being watched versus not, or those who were suggested that an all seeing God is always present. When they thought there were no witnesses they stole from the cookie jar when the adults left the room. — TiredThinker

What are your thoughts on this in relation to my point?

Power does not corrupt. Power reveals character. A person who obtains power and "becomes" corrupt, was always a corrupt individual all along who was constrained only by the threat of punishment of some kind. An uncorrupt person who obtains power will still remain uncorrupted because their morals and values were not reliant on the threat of harm from others for not following them.

A good topic. I largely agree with your viewpoints with one implicit addition, "If those who speak freely do not intend to manipulate through untruths with the intent of personal benefit while harming others."

That of course is a mouthful, and easily followed by the question of, "Who determines what is true, harmful, and a selfish benefit?" This cannot be any one individual, and it cannot be mob rule either. This must be proven in a court of law with evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Beyond that, say what you will.

But to a finer point, why have any restrictions at all? Nos, you tend to have a supremely optimistic viewpoint of humanity. Rightly so, you note that bad actors are a minority of citizens in many situations. I do not know your viewpoint on this so I will ask, "Are you aware of the destruction even one person with ill intent can cause?"

In my experience in history and in life, one bad actor can ruin a carefully constructed environment of trust and good will. It takes days to build a building, but one day for a bomber to bring it all down. In my viewpoint, societal restrictions in general are not because the majority of people need to be managed, but to minimize and prevent the severity of the rare bad actors involved. Can an oppressive government cause more harm then one bad actor? Unquestioningly. But in general a place with no governance, screening, or rules will inevitably have to contend with the inevitable bad actor that causes ruin.

The same goes for speech. Governments for years have used propaganda in enemy states to sow discord in other states and make them unstable. Liars peddle harmful and shoddy products to consumers that cause permanent damage and death, then disappear to another area of the world. The reality is that people are not rational beings, they are rationalizing beings who look for "reasons" to back their emotional beliefs. This makes lies a powerful weapon to use against people. Should we allow this unrestricted, I would argue any society would inevitably collapse in time due to a few bad actors. So from my viewpoint, some restrictions are needed for these reasons. What about yourself?

Unlike the “will of all” the “general will” refuses to take into account the private and particular interests of all individuals involved. It excludes them. Instead, it takes account of something called the “common interest”. — NOS4A2

The "Will of all" can be implemented both as a collective, and as an individual. But so to can the "Will of self". An individualist with the will of self does not care at all about their impact on other people, and can be completely exclusionary. A collectivist society that narrows itself also has a "will of self". The best example I can think of is a totalitarian society in which a self extends its will completely over others and a certain percentage of society agrees with this and enforces it.

I have appreciated the conversation, but perhaps I am diverging on the points you want to address here. To say that collectivism is more or less exclusionary than individualism, as a blanket statement, is wrong. If you wish to compare certain exclusionary collectivist ideologies and compare them to a particular inclusive individualistic ideology, then of course you can. There is no debate that a particular inclusive individual ideology is more inclusive then particular exclusive collectivist ideology.

If you want to bring this back to the point of a blanket statement, I would compare the most exclusionary individualistic ideology, like solipsism, and compare it to the most inclusionary collectivism such as a rights based democratic ideology, and demonstrate why why solipsism is more inclusive. But unless such a comparison can be correctly made, I don't think it can be reasonably concluded that all collectivist ideologies are more exclusive then all individualistic ideologies.

I agree that individualism is a personal belief, but so is collectivism. And it is no collective decision if others accept either of these principles. These are personal, individual decisions made by real, flesh-and-blood human beings, not arbitrary and abstract groupings.

Any collection of people is a collection of individuals. Each of these individuals adopt beliefs and principles on their own accord, and not by any collective agreement. — NOS4A2

Yes, I agree. On top of that, we're now looking at the point of exclusion and inclusion. I see this as enforcement and non-enforcement. If I understood your meaning of collectivism you meant that it enforces its decisions by groups, rather then allowing individuals to do whatever they want. And so individualism would then be a person who creates their own ideology then enforces it how they personally desire. No one else will force them or save them from someone else unless of course another person just happens to agree.

I accept any individual to have his own beliefs and interests, and defend his right to have them, whether communist, fascist, theocratic, or any collectivist doctrine. What I do not accept is any individual to infringe on the rights of another individual, and this is the direct result of individualism, not collectivism. — NOS4A2

And this is my second point. You enforce your own ideology. You do not accept, or exclude others who do not match you precepts. But of course someone could have a view of individualism, because they are not shaped by a collectivist society, that includes and excludes different people. Collectivist societies are also varied as well. Being collectivist does not dictate what the group is collectivist about, just like being an individualist does not dictate what the individual is about. So one society could be highly inclusive, while another highly exclusive. The same for an individual.

Meaning that we cannot compare collectivism to individualism as a blanket statement and state that one is more inclusive or exclusive than another. Now, could we say that a highly inclusive individualism is more inclusive than a highly exclusive collectivist society? Yes. But the reverse can equally be claimed without contradiction. A highly inclusive collective would be more inclusive than a highly exclusive individualism.

But if the individualist regards the individual as the primary unit of concern in any political society, he necessarily regards each individual in that way. — NOS4A2

Yes, but a political society is a collection of individuals who have an organized manner of interacting with others. That necessitates some level of collectivism. True individualism is merely a personal belief that cannot be enforced or mutual assurance. Individualism can only exist by the allowance of other individuals who ascribe to your personal beliefs. This is a collective decision.

Individualism in itself does not ascribe that other people must follow its precepts. Meaning you can define individualism for yourself as others have individual primacy, rights, and dignity. But another individualist could easy ascribe to the idea that others besides themselves have no individual primacy, rights, and dignity.

If you are referring to individualism as a collection of people who believe that individual primacy, rights, and dignity should be afforded to other people, that's still collectivist. It is inclusive of those who support individual primacy, rights, and dignities, while excluding those who do not agree with these. To say someone has a right, is to as a group deny any individual from removing that right from another. This requires a collective agreement.

If you believe individualism should not have any collective means of agreement, then it is just a personal opinion or ethic. Even then, you would accept only those who agreed with your viewpoint of individualism, and reject those who did not. If someone else impinged on your rights or individualism, you would be required to exclude that person from further interactions in your life to be consistent in your values.

In this regard one could claim that collectivism is exclusive and individualism is inclusive. The former affords primacy to a faction while the latter affords it to each and every individual involved. This is true both in theory and in practice.

Are there any objections to this? — NOS4A2

Yes. You are describing a collectivist interpretation of individualism. Who is affording primacy to each individual in a collective? The collective. True individualism affords no such primacy to any. True individualism does not care about a collective definition or ideology of individualism.

True individualism is a set of beings that exist without any regards to one another. There are no rules, laws, or limitations on interactions with another being. An individual may decide to exclude others, or include others. Help, or harm.

True collectivism is a set of beings that exist with regards to one another. In collectivism there is a set of implicit or explicit rules of behavior that the other group members will either support or punish to ensure individuals follow them. Collectives can welcome other individuals to the group, and be incredibly inclusive. For example, a collective that highly favors individual rights with a very limited and lightly punished rule set may allow different cultures in, despite some individuals wishing to exclude them.

So I find that being individualistic vs collectivist has no bearing on whether it is an inclusive or exclusive ideology. Each ideology can have a degree of inclusiveness and exclusiveness within, and thus comparing them does not result in any clear victor.

Is that what happened in e.g. the last banning? — Amity

When I was warned for my posts or behavior, I was reached out to privately. Moderators generally do not air such issues publicly. No one knew when moderators contacted me, and I'm sure others on here who have been warned can confirm that. I see no reason why it would be different for the recently banned individual.