Of course not voting is a viable position. Your refusal to participate in who gets to make laws about you is fine. Just don't complain when people pass laws that you don't want. If you want to go with the flow of the river because fighting against the current is too hard, distasteful, or seems impossible, go for it. The current will always be happy to have one less thing it has to fight against.

Hello again Bob! A late reply, but I'll try to refresh where we were.

All possible numbers would be, with respect to the essay, a bounded infinite. — Bob Ross

We're in agreement then Bob! That's what I was trying to point out.

By true infinite, I think you are talking about something entirely different than me, but I could be wrong. — Bob Ross

I don't think so here. I was regressing through all numbers, and noted that all numbers themselves are a bounded infinite as well. I was trying to lead to the point that an unbounded infinite cannot be quantified or limited.

This is where it gets incredibly subtle, but equally incredibly vital: it is not “without it an unbounded infinity is negated” but, rather, without it there are an unbounded infinite of negations. Sounds kind of like the same thing, doesn’t it? I agree, but yet they are entirely different ideas. — Bob Ross

If we are in agreement that numbers are bounded infinites, then whenever we come up with an identity, we are creating some type of bounded infinite. If we use the word "negations" were are implicitly talking about bounds then. I don't think we can say an "unbounded infinite of negations". That's really, a "bounded infinite of negations". I can see an unbounded infinite negated, because an unbounded infinite is the base from which all bounded infinites are formed. But if we say that all possible bounded infinites are negated, isn't that the same as stating an unbounded infinite is negated? Can you give an example showing how they're entirely different ideas?

Is there a superordinate to 1? I'm not sure.

It is entirely possible to declare a particular derivation complete; that is, that it has been sufficiently justified and, therefore, can be put to rest. This doesn’t negate the principle of regulation’s truth: that assertion (i.e., that it has been sufficiently justified) is yet another conclusion which utilized the principle of regulation. — Bob Ross

Thank you, I re-read and realized you had covered that part. Also, you have not had the chance to show how sufficient justification works under your system, so I accept this for now.

In terms of the former (your version), I would have no choice but to concede that a sine qua non is simply a misapprehension; that is, not an unbounded infinite is to necessary conceive of it in toto to thereby flip its affirmation into a denial (i.e., negation): therefore, it would be nothing more than the masking of a bounded infinite under the name of an unbounded infinite. However, in terms of the latter (my version), it is simply the negation, sequentially, of everything (i.e., not …, not not {…}). I think this is potentially where you may be misstepping (or I may be simply incorrect). — Bob Ross

For myself, I think this is a crux of your argument that needs better explication. You are as usual, brilliant Bob, but I'm having a difficult time conceptualizing the latter as something real. In trying, the best I can come up with is that it is some conceptualization that is necessary for an unbounded infinite to be. The best I can think of is that we must be able to make conceptualizations out of/within the unbounded infinite. Because if something could not, then nothing could create any sort of differentiation between bounded, and unbounded. Does this somehow fit within your PoR?

Being in bounded infinites is not a bad thing however, as I believe its the only way we can have concepts. Perhaps we can simply reform your idea into, "A sqn is what is needed for concepts to exist." Basically try to find what is logically necessary for concepts to occur.

Unfortunately, that would defeat the point of the essay, as that is not a foundation (unless we speaking of contextual foundations). Likewise, a sine qua non is not deriving what is necessary for concept to occur, as that is within the sphere of critique of derivation (as opposed to its higher form of performance of derivation). — Bob Ross

This again is where I have a hard time. Without a sqn, nothing can be. Which means without a sqn, concepts cannot be either. The way I read the essay and your explanation, it seems to imply without a sqn, the infinite, bounded or unbounded could not be.

This would be true if the principle of regulation pertained soley to explicated superordinate and subordinate rules. It’s quite literally being postulated as an unbounded infinite of such. — Bob Ross

Again, I think this is really where my issue resides. The unbounded infinite is the source of all explicated infinites. Negating the unbounded infinite, negates all explicated infinites as well. Without a sqn, the unbounded infinite would be negated. And I think we agree there is only 1 unbounded infinite, as more than one would be by definition, two bounded infinites. All explicated infinites are within the unbounded infinite. Which means a sqn is necessary for all explicated infinites to occur as well. If this is the case, then a sqn must stand without contradiction in all explicated infinites. Meaning that if it does not stand within even one explicated infinite, it cannot be a sqn.

As I noted earlier, the burden of demonstrating this is nigh impossible to meet. But this again, is through my interpretation so far that the sqn is a misapprehension. If you can demonstrate your version " it is simply the negation, sequentially, of everything (i.e., not …, not not {…})." somehow is not logically equivalent to my version, then there may be something to explore.

Thank you for your reply Bob, I believe I'm beginning to see what you're going for more clearly. First, lets cover what I mean by the true infinite versus the bounded infinite. Lets look at the true infinite as all possible numbers. Within that infinite, you can have bounded infinites. For example, all numbers that end on the tenth's place is a bounded infinite within the true infinite. A bind is a limit. To speak of an unbounded infinite, is to speak to something without limits.

Within the infinite, I can create many bound ways of comparing numbers. I can create bounded ways of adding, substracting, etc. But does the negation of one of these comparisons negate the true infinity of numbers? No. But if we think about numbers for a second, we realize they are bounds as well. Each "number" is a bounded concept. So we get rid of numbers as well, and we are finally left with true infinity.

When you say a sqn is needed, because without it an unbounded infinity is negated, I'm not sure that's possible. The unbounded infinite is a total, and we can only represent it with a toto, or a bounds of some kind. For the most basic of bounds, we create a number, 1. To your principle of regulation, we can then create the number 2 as a subordinate to the idea that its a 1 and a 1 together. Is there a superordinate to 1? I'm not sure.

The point though, is that all ideas are bounded within unbounded infinity. Unbounded infinity is the stream from which all identities and relations are pulled from. Unbounded infinity is where all bounded infinities are created. An unbounded infinity is something we can never understand in total, but only in toto as well.

So when you declare a sqn is that without it, unbounded infinity cannot exist, it something that I'm not sure can ever be proven. The best you can do is use bounded infinity. But at that point, that seems to defeat the purpose of the sqn. The best we can do is re-create our "bachelor" example repeated among several different contexts. The PoR is no exception.

If we disregard all possible synonyms for "unmarried man" in all possible contexts, would this be a sqn?

It would not, because fundamentally we would have a situation where we are positing “without Y, there’s a bounded infinite of negative judgments”. That claim is not coherent if posited as an unbounded infinite because the omission of “unmarried man” leaves many concepts intact. — Bob Ross

Being in bounded infinites is not a bad thing however, as I believe its the only way we can have concepts. Perhaps we can simply reform your idea into, "A sqn is what is needed for concepts to exist." Basically try to find what is logically necessary for concepts to occur.

The PoR is a logical way of relating concepts. But can a being have a concept without conceiving of superordinate and subordinate concepts? Yes, we can prove this. To have a subordinate or superordinate concept, one must have two concepts. By the nature of a concept being a derivation, one must be formed before the other. If one cannot conceive of a single concept without the PoR, how does one conceive of the first concept?

One must conceive of that first concept prior to the second according to the PoR. That means one must be able to conceive of a concept without the PoR, because prior to the first concept, one has no concepts. If one can conceive of a concept prior to the PoR, than the PoR is not necessary to conceive of concepts. If this is the case, one could also conceive of a second concept that had no relation to the first concept. The ability to create concepts does not necessarily mean one will create derivated concepts, or use the PoR.

Thus we've shown that while the PoR is a way to view derivation itself, it is not necessary to hold or create concepts. Meaning that the PoR cannot be a sqn as the idea of "concepts" itself can still be conceived without it.

Overall, I think the true problem is trying to include unbounded infinity. Perhaps there is a sqn for unbounded infinity, but I don't think the PoR is it.

Snide comments are not an argument
— Philosophim

Irony noted. — Jackson

Ignoring the rest of what I posted noted. Do not troll.

Gosh, wiki. — Jackson

Snide comments are not an argument. Sources are cited at the bottom of Wikipedia. Feel free to post your own source about Aristotle, otherwise you've been shown to be mistaken.

That proves that “unmarried man” is not a sine qua non, which I believe (and correct me if I am wrong) you are thinking it would prove it if there’s an infinite amount of things that could be postulated without “unmarried man”. — Bob Ross

No, that wasn't my intention. What I was trying to note was there are an infinite number of things I could postulate with "unmarried man", that I could not postulate without "unmarried man". If unmarried man did not exist, then the defintions of bachelor and bachelum would not exist. Perhaps the words could still exist, but their meaning could never be "unmarried man", because "unmarried man" does not exist. If we disregard all possible synonyms for "unmarried man" in all possible contexts, would this be a sqn?

You see, as I would argue, that concept of Y, valid as it is by means of derivation, is a bounded infinite because I can abstract further by questioning the grounds of that very concept of Y, thereby invalidating it as an unbounded infinite. — Bob Ross

I think I understand this. Words like bachelor and bachelum all rely on the concept of "unmarried man". Again, it is not the words we are really referencing, but their meaning. Without "unmarried man", any derivations from the concept of "unmarried man" cannot exist. Of course, there are a potentially infinite number of derivations we can establish from "unmarried man" that we could not without the concept of "unmarried man". From the finite springs the infinite, though this infinite is bounded by the finite superordinate.

By “context”, I just loosely meant an idea that is sandboxed. So it is perfectly possible that “A IFF D” is only true within a sandbox, so to speak, and not true universally. — Bob Ross

The problem I see you running into is when you note a "universal" infinite. Having worked with infinite before, its very easy to lose the real consequences of true infinity. Real infinity has no limit. Which means practically any formation within that infinite can also be negated.

Think of numbers for example. Numbers are bounded limitations within true infinity. One such measurement is discrete data versus continuous data. Continuous data is a bounded infinite, such as "height". In theory, there is no limit to how high we can measure. A discrete data point would be 5 feet high.

As noted, continuous data is still a bounded infinite. Without the context of dimension, height just dissolves into the true infinite. There are an infinite amount of potential dimensions that we can create within that true infinite. To your point, I'm noting that the rule of regulation too would dissolve into the true infinite without certain bounded contexts. If a sqn must be true universally, then it must be true in the unbounded infinite.

If you are trying to inquire how it can be proven sans context (i.e., unbounded context), then I can provide further detail: I continually performed abstraction to its highest point, whereat I could not longer abstract higher and, thereafter, determine what (if anything) produces the negation of those abstractions if removed (or it could be thought of as the negation of particulars too, if you will). — Bob Ross

This is still within your own bounded context. I take no objection to there existing a sqn within a bounded context. It is completely true that you thought everything you did, and could only come to one conclusion. But is that true of all contexts, of the true infinity? That has not been proven. Let me give you an example. There are some people who cannot visualize in their mind. As in, they cannot think of images like most people can. They close their eyes, and the world is completely dark for them. Think of the host of conclusions and thinking you've done with your ability to visualize in your head, and then try to imagine the conclusions one can or cannot make if they cannot visualize.

In the same manner, a personal conclusion of thought within your own bounded context does not prove a universal context. In the same manner, we can imagine a creature that can think without the rule of regulation. Its difficult for those of us who use the rule of regulation on a daily basis to imagine this, but we already know that some things think differently from ourselves. This is what I was noting earlier. If you personally think using the rule of regulation, and nothing else, then yes, its a sqn for you. But that doesn't mean its a sqn for something that does not think like you do.

what about the principle of regulation do you think doesn’t hold for a plant that demonstrates it reacts to its environment (which, I would argue, pretty much happens in virtue of them being alive—no?). I certainly don’t think a plant would be able to affirm the principle of regulation, but I think I can affirm that they use it (which is a different claim, I would argue). — Bob Ross

First, there's the idea that we're assuming our own basis of thought applies to all other thinking things. We cannot conclude that just because you and I think in the terms of the principle of regulation, that every other thinking thing does as well. All it takes is one thinking thing that does not, and then we don't have a universal sqn anymore. I'm not saying you can't come up with a universal sqn, but it must be provably true within the true infinite. I don't see the PoR doing that currently.

Second, we can speculate that a plant, or any other creature thinks with the PoR, but we have to prove that. The burden of proof is not on me within the true infinite, the burden of proof is on yourself. And even if we prove that, we must prove it for all plants of that type, then all plants, all creatures, etc. The PoR is not something provable, because it is a bounded idea that relies on certain bounded infinites thinking in a particular manner.

Now, if we have a bounded sqn, we avoid the problems noted above. That of course, brings about new problems. If sqns are bounded to contexts, which context should we choose? I think you know this, which is why you wanted to note a sqn is universal. The ultimate problem is that I believe you have not shown that the PoR is something true universally. As noted above, I'm not sure its something you can either.

That being said, it may be that there are things I still don't understand, so please correct me if I'm in error. I also think the PoR is a fine principle within bounded contexts, and see nothing overtly wrong with it within these bounded contexts. I just don't think at this time that you've provided what is needed to show it is true universally, and not just within the contexts you've been thinking in.

So “without which, not” is meant as an unbounded infinite negative (i.e., if not A, then an unbounded infinite of negative judgments). It is not meant to negate only one particular derivation. — Bob Ross

Could you clarify with an example here? When you mean infinite, do you mean "All possible derivations in total/tota"? To compare again to the bachelor, we could derive another term called a bachelum, which is an unmarried man that is about to be married. Again, we could not derive the term bachelum without the superodinate "unmarried man". As such, there are an infinite derivations we could not create without the concept of "unmarried man", many which we do not directly know or have been invented yet.

A sine qua non is not denoted by being the anchor of a biconditional statement (such as D IFF A); for that could entail that it is only valid within one or a finite set of contexts. For example, it’s possible that A IFF D is true of context C1 but not true of context C2. — Bob Ross

Could you give an example of what you mean by context here? If it is unbounded context, I cannot see a sqn forming simply by the fact language and thinking can change. Lets look at the principle of regulation. A fine principle, but can it be proven that its a sqn in unbounded context? What if something does not think in a derivative manner? This may be due to low intellect, or simply a brain that does not process in such a way. Does a plant think in terms of the principle of regulation for example?

The problem with an unbounded infinite is we can always come up with a situation that negates another.
To your end, I believe you are implying a bounded context. For example, in individuals who have the capacity to only think in superordinate and subordinate manners, we could say the principle of regulation holds. Because people in this context have no other way of possibly thinking, it is impossible to think differently. Among creatures that had alternative thinking processes, the principle of regulation does not apply to them.

Again, please correct me where I am incorrect Bob.

I logically concluded that "it simply is" here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1

I have a follow up as well where I go into what that means for the universe. But its pretty simple. There is no reason why anything exists. It simply does. This is logically concluded, not simply an opinion. So what does that mean for us? Honestly, just enjoy it!

Hello Bob, it is great to see you again! I'll address your paper the best I can.

Let me see if I can sum up your argument. sine qua non means "without which, not". Which means, "If this does not exist, this derivation cannot follow"?

As an example, A -> B. But also, C -> B. If we removed A from the derivation, we would still have C. So neither A, nor C, are a sqn. If however we had A -> D, and in the removal of A, it is no longer possible to ever derive D, we have a sqn. Does this approximate the idea fairly?

If so, this is similar to a contrapositive of derivation. Perhaps a way to view it is a bachelor is an unmarried man. The term bachelor is derived from the "unmarried man". Without an unmarried man, there can be no bachelor. A man is a bachelor if and only if he is unmarried. Being an unmarried man is the foundation of a being a bachelor. In this case, we could call "unmarried man" to be a superordinate rule. The subordinate rule would be the creation of the term "bachelor".

I think what you also wanted to note was that a superordinate rule can be a subordinate rule in relation to its previous derivation as well. So, I could look at the term "man", and note (as an example, not denoting the correctness) that some creature with an 46 chromosomes in an XY structure exist, and from there, we derive the word "man". In this case, the chromosomes would be the superordinate, while the term "man" would be the subordinate.

That being the case, we can create superordinate clauses that work, but do not negate the subordinate when removed. It is not necessary that I know of chromosomes to derive the word "man". I could note its a "human with particular reproductive anatomy". Thus while the chromosomes can be a superoridinate to man, it is not a sqn. This is simply a bounded capture of a man, but in tota, not in total.

Let me know if I'm on the right track or it needs some correction Bob!

What you are saying is extremely elementary and boring. Try to say something worth responding to. You want this? — Jackson

If you're going to be a snide person who just cares about your ego, we're done. If you want to chat, engage without the insults.

Art is about a human's personal experience. — Jackson

Could you go into more detail? Does this mean all of my personal experiences are art? Is breathing an art? My heart beat? Driving my car to work? Try to engage with more than one sentence Jackson. We're here to think right? Its not about winning, losing, or being smart. We're just juggling ideas, no judgement.

Sure. The objective/subjective dichotomy is meaningless. If there were no subjects no art would exist because no humans would exist. So, humans make objects. — Jackson

So what I mean by objective is something that exists apart from a human's personal experience. Think of a ruler for example. Whether I or someone else uses the ruler, the measurement will objectively be the same.

Back to art, what are the objective commonalities of art across all human experience? Why are a bunch of colored sguiggle lines slopped on a canvas considered art compared to a realistic picture of a lake? Is there a morality in art? Objectively good and bad art that we should encourage or inhibit? Questions like these had no objective answer back when I investigated years ago. Perhaps things have changed. If so, feel free to let me know, I'm always willing to hear of new things.

Currently art is considered subjective.
— Philosophim

By you. I see no argument for that. — Jackson

What would be helpful is for you to point out objective measures of art. I can give one, "The golden ratio" for example. Of course, there's the question of why that's considered so appealing in art. What creates a situation where art is involved? What are the degrees of art. Why are some things considered more artistic than others? There are lots of questions that I am not aware of any definitive answers to them. Feel free to enlighten me!

Desperate times call for desperate measures!

Microtubules & consciousness! Wild would be an understatement. Clearly, we're in a dark room, blind, wearing shades and looking for a black cat which isn't there. — Agent Smith

Oh my, did you hear of a desperate person who wanted to say we revolved around the sun? I mean, its plainly obvious by looking in the sky that it revolves around us. The need to escape God's glory, and our singular importance as human beings in this world is a mental illness for sure!

I think you get the point. The inquisitive and curious mind does not mock attempts at discovery, but always gives it a chance.

Art is largely founded on the subjective, so pulling out an objective result faces its own challenges.
— Philosophim

Then all of everyone's life is "subjective." — Jackson

I think you misunderstood. Currently art is considered subjective. Finding an objective explanation for art is one of the challenges philosophy has to yet solve.

A good topic Alkis. I've thought on this plenty of times myself. First, I don't think the forums are a great place to judge philosophy. This is an informal place where people are often learning about philosophy. To ask whether philosophy is moving forward, I think we need to look at the current academic movement of philosophy. It has been several years since I followed academia, but when I was in it, I would say, "No".

Philosophy at a casual level does not take much to get into. All it requires is a child like approach to problems. Take X assumption and simply ask, "Why?" Watch a frustrated adult who does not have the time or inclination to atomically break down the exact reason, and the child is amused and might think they are clever. And there is nothing wrong with this. When getting into any field, it is child-like wonder and amusement that first drives us there. And as children in a field, we poke and prod topics that have long been discovered, but need to be discovered anew by taking that journey.

As you mature, you start to reach the walls in philosophy. Perhaps this is because its successes become settled or science, and there is not much left to talk about. When I was in academic philosophy, there were only a few viable topics which had mysteries that needed to be solved.

1. Epistemology - Definitely problems and issues here that need answers. In my opinion, the most important philosophical problem.
2. Morality - Currently there is no agreed upon and established secular morality.
3. Art - What is it, and why is it needed?

Some people might say "Mind", but that's honestly been taken over by neuroscience. The problem of course, is the answers to these questions have been considered for thousands of years, and are incredibly difficult to solve. Incredibly difficult problems are not very open to the public, or casual philosophers.

Epistemology is likely going to find its advances in AI where its solution will result in billions of dollars of profit. I think this is the most likely candidate for progress due to the money and demand for its solutions. Morality is what we "should" do, which is a question about the future, culture, and context; so its a difficult puzzle to find a formula that adapts to all three variables. Even if you did, morality is very personal to many people, as well as a means of power and control for others; so I would expect immense push back. Art is largely founded on the subjective, so pulling out an objective result faces its own challenges.

Good post!

Proof requires something outside of a system. — god must be atheist

No, you can have something proven as a base that begins the system. If you show proof that there is nothing outside of the system, you do not need something outside of the system.

I was a math teach for five years, so I have my opinions.

1. Schools are designed by the state for a few reasons.
a. Create citizens that can read and thus contribute to a Democracy
b. Create citizens that can do jobs that society needs
c. Babysit so parents can work

So where does formal logic fit in with this? I don't mean logic, I mean formal logic. Formal logic is mostly academic in society, and really a form of math. As you noted, it is examples of logical fallacies that are valuable, and this is often taught through English classes through the evaluation of literature.
Whereas the math-like formal logical part of education is taught by math itself.

Both fields appear to have more immediate use towards the above goals. As such I just don't see room for an entire course on logic except as an extracurricular like debate class.

What is meaningless about human existence?
— Harry Hindu

That it's all for nothing. — Tate

What is all for nothing? What does that even mean?

↪Philosophim Firstly, the "we are doing fine" is a statement that doesn't even wholly pertain to the current state of human beings, let alone animals. — TheSoundConspirator

Well, let me back that statement then. Right now you are able to communicate with someone across the world in a way just 40 years ago would have most likely been impossible for you. We have modern conveniences of air conditioning which has only existed in the last 100 years. You likely live parasite free, which is a convenience most humans did not have.

We live in a time where war is at its lowest in human history. We can travel into space. Education and knowledge are at people's fingertips with the internet. Opportunity for business and creative enterprises are more than they've ever been. We've created technology that pulls energy from the sun and the wind.

So where are we not doing fine? I ask you to qualify those statements now.

I think gratitude is an extension of empathy or mirroring. I think we realize how much work it takes to make things go right for ourselves or others in life. When we see nice things happen to ourselves from things outside of our control, I believe its taking that sense about our self, and attributing that to whatever it was that had to work to make the reality you are experiencing.

The idea that humans have brought nothing but destruction and catastrophe was likely written by a depressed person. Thinking beyond the statement as emotional poetry shows us the absurdity of the statement. Did you not just write a thought provoking and emotionally laden piece of work? Was that destruction and catastrophe?

No, humanity has created a world in which people may sit around the internet and postulate imaginary scenarios. We're doing fine.

First and foremost I want to thank you for a wonderful discussion (as always)! — Bob Ross

I feel equally the same Bob! This is hands down the best overall discussion I've had with another person on the forums. My respect for you cannot be overstated. You've given me a conversation I tried to find for years. Even if this never goes anywhere beyond these forums, that has been enough for me to feel fulfilled. I look forward to your epistemology, and I will seek to give it the respect and thoughtfulness you have shown mine.

Thanks again,
Philosophim

As you'll see in the last reply prior to yours, I'm still having a nice conversation with Bob.
— Philosophim
I see. So you simply mean, "I have a nice conversation ..." :grin: — Alkis Piskas

No, I am having. As in ongoing, present tense. The conversation has not ended yet.

Alkis, you're being a troll, and its obvious. Anyone who doesn't read the OP, in which I go over how knowledge is acquired, then tries to critique something they haven't read is an ignorant person who is wasting my time. I thank people who are willing to engage in the OP and legitimately challenge the views here, not people like you.

A human cell has human DNA, it is human, but it is not a human being. — Angelo Cannata

Am I supposed to list every cell combination within the human body? You know what I meant. I'm sure you want people to respect your intent when you post, give it to others as well please.

DNA. The reason you're a human and not an apple. Nothing else really matters.

↪Philosophim
I've been having a fantastic discussion with a member on this forum
— Philosophim
You mean, simply, "I had a fantastic discussion ..." :smile: — Alkis Piskas

As you'll see in the last reply prior to yours, I'm still having a nice conversation with Bob.

I know of course that this is far from being an actual reply to the whole topic, which BTW sounds quite interesting, but too mauch for me to get involved.. I just brought up some basics of knowledge. — Alkis Piskas

No offense, but if you aren't going to read the OP, you have no idea what you're talking about and are not offering anything useful. Feel free to read it and bring your full criticism and knowledge to bear on the subject. We'll chat then.

I completely understand the desire to prevent irrelevant derailments on the thread, and I can see how diving into my epistemology could do just that. — Bob Ross

My concern was less with derailment, but not giving your theory its proper due when you're constantly trying to compare it to the d/a distinction. I've had time to build up the d/a distinction, then we've drilled into it. You have not been given the time to build your theory up, but are building it while comparing. That makes it very difficult for me to evaluate your theory fairly, while also trying to explain mine. In reading your reply, I see my suspicions were correct. Your definition of PoN was different from my understanding of it, and that's only because you haven't had time to let your own epistemology be explored and carefully constructed like I've had time to do here.

I do not mind at all exploring your epistemology here! Next post, feel free to get the last responses to the points I'll make here. I will not respond to them, but give you time to post your theory. You can use this spot as a draft if you would like before making your own post. Once I understand your theory, and get to ask my questions about it without the d/a comparison, we might come back to this later. You have had patience and curiosity with my proposal, the least I can do is return that favor. If this sounds like something you would like, I'll post my final points on the d/a distinction (for now!).

To keep it brief, my point is that my use of PoN is not meant as a logical construct like those, and its precise definition holds no immediate favoritism on the battle between paraconsistent vs consistent logical languages. I am defining PoN in the form of predicate-logic:

"a predicate cannot contradict its subject concept" — Bob Ross

Ah, I completely misunderstood this. I don't think this is called the principle of negation as often understood, but simply a consequence of language construction. First, lets break down what a predicate and subject are Feel free of course to amend my understanding of these definitions to fit your intention!

Subject - the "thing" being addressed in the sentence
Predicate - some type of assertion attributed to the subject in the sentence. An attribute, action, etc.

First, we can clearly see this is not more fundamental than discrete experience. This is a linguistic construct, whereas discrete experience requires no language, and is the foundation for language. One must be able to discretely experience to define a subject, and within my theory, you are able to define an essential or non-essential attribute of said subject. This is essentially a predicate; a further breakdown of the discrete experience of a subject into more discrete component parts. The "thing" is currently running. The "thing" is red. But I don't have to note that its running or red. The "thing" can exist as simply the discrete experience itself, unbroken and without any attributes but itself. Predicates are not required for subjects to exist.

Now if we are to note that properties are sub-discrete experiences of a subject, then by consequence we've constructed a system of distinctive logic that entails that a predicate is part of a subject. Thus we could propose that a predicate cannot contradict a subject, as that would mean we created attributes of a discrete experience that cannot exist on that discrete experience (the subject). But this does not predate the ability to discretely experience, it is built up from it. As such, "The predicate cannot contradict the subject" is not needed as a fundamental. It is a derived logic.

As for it being impossible that a predicate cannot contradict a subject, lets go further. What is the nature of a deduction? That the conclusion follows the premises. This also means that the conclusion does not contradict the premises. That the predicates do not contradict the subject. An induction is a conclusion that does not necessarily follow from the premises. This also means one possible type of induction is a conclusion which does negate the premises! I believe Dan is running right now. If so, it is distinctively implicit that Dan may in fact not be running right now. I look at Dan, and applicably determine he is not running. So here I have an induction who's resolved conclusion is that the predicate counters the subject. This was something I distinctively knew and held, despite reality showing otherwise. How does your epistemology handle the fact that inductions also implicate a predicate that contradicts the subject?

Let go even further. I applicably conclude Dan is running. But it turns out I made a mistake. It turns out this was Dan's twin that I was not aware existed. His name is Din, and he was the one running. Dan was also walking nearby with his back to us, and he turned around to let us know that was his brother when we yelled at "Dan" (who was Din) to turn around. Yet prior to Dan turning around, I distinctively and applicably knew that "Din" was "Dan" and that he was running. Barring the d/a distinction, was I not holding knowledge of a subject that had a contradictory predicate? Because the actual Dan was walking. In short, a Gettier type problem. How does your epistemology handle this?

The d/a distinction does not require the principle of subject non-negation (PSNN?) This is because I can distinctively know inductions, which implicitly allow me to distinctively hold knowledge of a sentence that could in application, have a predicate that contradicts a subject. Now, we can state that we distinctively know through deductions. This is true. But why should we hold to deductions over inductions? As I've noted, there is a hierarchy. But why is there a hierarchy? It is not because there is some necessary logical construct. It is because this logical construct gives us the best chance of survival, and actually understanding the world in a way where we can control or predict its outcomes accurately. Again, I do not see the PSNN as a fundamental. A nicely derived logic, but necessary for my epistemology.

Thinking further, someone could most certainly construct a distinctive knowledge that does not follow the PSNN. The construction of an all powerful God is one. All three omni's make this God. Despite a person being pointed out how that would be a contradiction, the person simply adds another property to God, "God can do all things, including holding predicates which are contradictory to its subject." Are we to say they do not distinctively know this? No, they distinctively know this, despite the predicate contradicting the subject. We can construct a separate distinctive logical system which would show this to be a poor distinctive bit of knowledge to hold, but we cannot deny that this is what they distinctively know.

I think this is similar to your green circles example.

It is perfectly possible to hold sincerely that something is A and not A without contradiction as long as the subject concept is not contradicted by the predicate — Bob Ross

Except for the fact that there are contradictory predicates. But if the predicates are contradictory in themselves, how does this relate to the subject? In the d/a distinction, I can claim I do not applicably know of any thing that is both existent and non-existent at the same time. But I can distinctively create such a thing in my mind. Which means I can say "There is a thing which is everything and nothing at the same time." and it be "possible" because I can create this in my mind. In your argument, these predicates do not contradict the subject. Whereas with the d/a distinction, I can demonstrate distinctively such a thing is possible, but applicably, it is something we cannot know. I do not have to concern myself to a linguistic game of predicates and subjects.

Finally, I want to ask if a subject can hold two contradictory predicates, why can it not hold a predicate which contradicts its subject? If a thing can have the predicate of both being there, and not being there, then isn't the subject a contradiction in itself? Which again, we can imagine such a thing distinctively. At best we can only speculate that such a thing could be known applicably. If I can distinctively create whatever subject with whatever properties (predicates) I want any time, then doesn't that hold to the notion I've been stating this entire time? That is, distinctively, I can hold whatever system of logic I want. And I am not seeing the argument that convinces me that I cannot create a system of logic in which the predicate can contradict the subject.

Again, the only way to counter such a hold, is with applicable knowledge. By asking them to show that such a being exists, we can escape the fact that we can distinctively know almost anything we want/are programmed to hold. In applicable knowledge we use deduction, but again, we use deduction not because we need to, but because it is more helpful to our survival and outcome in life.

"The bread I am eating is purple"

Well, I am not eating bread. So I am neither eating bread that is purple nor bread that is not purple, because I am not eating bread. Therefore it is neither true nor false. Imagine I am eating cereal and I claim: — Bob Ross

I had to note I don't believe this is the case. This is a combined sentence, and we can break it down.

I am eating bread.
The bread is purple.

Both are false, I cannot see this as being neither true or false in application.

"this sentence is false"

I could simply concede that the liar paradox outputs {t, f}, which is essentially the same thing as defining a liar paradox sentence as having a property of being contradictory (just like being green and not green). — Bob Ross

Again, we can break the implicit combination down.

This is a sentence "This sentence is false."
The previous sentence is false.

That results in t,f. No paradox or indeterminency. I would argue that when one cannot break a sentence down into t and f, that is a weakness of sentence construction, not a revelation of knowledge.

You are subscribing your epistemology to LEM and PoN, most notably as described by classical logic. This rules out the actual applicable usages of paraconsistent, fuzzy, and first-degree entailment logic. My epistemology still accounts for these within their own respects. — Bob Ross

I never claimed my epistemology ruled these logical constructs out. If anything, I've noted repeatedly you can construct whatever logical system you want distinctively. Can those logics be used in application? If so, then they are fine. I think this is a situation again in which I do not fully understand your theory.

Thus I would conclude using the POI that what is distinctively known is what we discretely experience, and I would add the claim we could discretely experience both something, and its negation at the same time.

I don't think you can posit this unless you are redefining discrete experience: the subject concept necessitates, categorically, that it be distinct, which necessitates that one cannot experience both something and its negation at the same time in the same place. — Bob Ross

No, we just affirmed I could do this. Can't I say a thing is both green and non-green at the same time? That is indeterminency. I can distinctively know this. Can I applicably know such an indeterminency? So far, no.

A potential infinite, of the type I am describing, is not claiming "it could, or could not be", it is claiming that a particular finite operation would be infinite if given the sufficient resources to continue. For example, counting the positive integers starting at 1 is a potential infinite. This claim is not an induction whatsoever. — Bob Ross

I agree with your definition here. But we know this because the design of numbers allows this to be. Such a description is not necessarily meaningful for any designed system. What we can discretely experience is potentially infinite. What we can applicably experience is potentially infinite. Any formulaic system with an X variable will always be so. My question to you so I understand better, is whether your foundation is finite. The system of numbers is formed by symbols, addition, subtraction, and for our purposes, base 10 rules. Does your epistemology have a solid and unquestionable base that does not need potentially infinite regress?

This is why it is important to note the necessary inseparability of time and space, for the sentence "Space contains A and not A" does not violate predicate logic PoN, nor does "Time references A and not A at the same time": it's only when combined, the union of the two concepts, where the predicate contradicts the subject concept. — Bob Ross

I don't believe this is correct Bob.

Space contains A and not A
Time references A and not A at the same time
Therefore space and time contains A and not A, and references A and not A at the same time

So again, we have contradictory predicates to a subject. What might help is showing a genuine situation in which a predicate contradicts a subject, and why, without using the d/a distinction.

Mine contains no potential infinite regress.

I think it does. You can construct PoN and LEM based off of my definition of PoN, but cannot prove my definition of PoN without recursively using it. This is just like how you can't ever stop counting positive numbers granted enough resources and claim you've hit the last positive integer. — Bob Ross

I think I clearly did using discrete experience. If you discretely experience within another discrete experience, then that sub discrete experience is part of the bigger one. But we could also discretely experience that the sub discrete experience is not part of the bigger one. Perhaps it is a parasite, or foreign entity that we find not necessary to the greater experience. If the predicate cannot contradict the subject, can the subject contradict the predicate? What happens then if in my mind I reverse what the subject and predicate are? Claiming a predicate can never contradict a subject is a logical rule you have constructed after understanding what a subject is, and what a predicate is. It is not foundational.

If you would like to end the conversation in this discussion board here, that is totally fine! Sometime soon I will post a discussion board of my epistemology anyways. — Bob Ross

Coming back to this, I think it is simply needed that you construct your epistemology from its foundation at this point. I believe I don't fully understand your theory, as you've noted you define things different from what I think you are. Coming from me, I understand. :) So until you really have room to build your theory, I think we'll be talking past one another. Again, feel free to respond to my points that I have made, and I will let you have the last word on those. Then, if you would like to continue, feel free to construct your epistemology here, even as practice before posting it on its own thread. I will address it without using the d/a distinction. If we get to a point where you and I both feel we understand your theory, then we may go back to those final points that you'll make. Great discussion as always Bob!

Hello again Bob, this was more delayed than I had liked due to Memorial week activities and summer starting here, thanks for waiting. This was also a doozy of a post as there are a couple of central themes. As a summary, I can state I feel I've lost you somewhere along the way on the d/a distinction, and that may be an insurmountable issue at this point. For my part, you have given me every single examination and critique of the d/a distinction I have ever wanted, and I am eternally grateful for that. At this point, I feel we are getting into your own outlook and view of knowledge, and I greatly respect that as well.

The goal of this exploration was to see if someone could poke holes in the d/a distinction within the argument itself. I feel that has been adequately explored. At this point, it seems to be the dissection of your theory, and I'm not sure I want to do that on this thread. It is unfair, as you have not had the time and space to adequately build it up from the ground floor. Further, my emphasis on this thread is my own theory, and I have a bias towards that. Perhaps it is a time for another thread where you write and construct your theory, and then I will be able to adequately address it properly, minus the d/a distinction I've written here. There are a few questions I could ask about the basis of your theory, but then the thread would get derailed, and the posts here would reach new record lengths. :smile: You'll see below a lot of my disagreements with your points are merely due to perhaps not understanding how you built the theory from the ground up. As such, I feel we might be talking past each other, and I would rather just give your theory its full focus and due. I do feel at this point though that we'll need to address either your theory, or mine, and the combination of both will just explode too much writing and exploration for one thread.

With that, I'll begin.

I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you are arguing for discrete experience in virtue that the brain (or whatever object is required, to keep it more generic) must produce this discrete experience for me to even contemplate and bring forth PoN (in other words, I must discretely experience). — Bob Ross

Yes, this is correct.

However, to claim that that is truly a fundamental in relation to the subject is to take a leap, in my opinion, to bridging the gap between mind and brain, which, as of now, I do not hold. — Bob Ross

Again, I would ask how a person could even realize they were a subject without discrete experience. What I believe I can agree with is the speculation that a self could exist that could not discretely experience. Such a thing would have no awareness of itself, much less the capability for knowledge.

Discrete experience is the fundamental simplicity of being able to notice X as different from Y. Non-discrete experience is taking all of your experience at once as some indesciphable.

This is simply outlining the fundamentals of how a brain works. I find nothing wrong with this. I do not hold the brain as the subject, which I think is clearly where we are actually disagreeing (realist, materialist vs anti-realist, idealist--generally speaking, I'm not trying to force us into boxes). — Bob Ross

I don't think we're disagreeing here. I've never claimed that "I am the brain", just "I am the discrete experiencer". Focus on your breathing for a second, and control it. There you are discretely experiencing your breathing. But a few minutes ago, you were not discretely experiencing breathing. It was part of the entirety of your existence, but you didn't parcel it out of everything. Now we know from other knowledge that the brain is still what causes you to breath, but as the discrete experiencer, you do not always discretely experience breathing. To form the initial theory, knowledge of the brain is not needed, much like the knowledge of the material a ruler is made out of is needed to use the ruler.

However, the flaw I think you are making is bridging the gap, so to speak, between mind and brain in virtue of this: there are aspects of the brain which will never be explained from it. The brain is simply a representation of the mind, which can never fully represent itself. — Bob Ross

Stating that there are aspects of the brain which will never be explained from this methodology is an induction, not a fact. Everything the mind can comprehend is a representation of the mind, including itself. That is exactly what discrete experience is. It is creating discrete experiences out of the entirety of existence. An atom is a creation of discrete experience. It is a concept. As I've noted, we never had to create that concept. Think of the Bohr model versus quantum model of atoms. https://pediaa.com/difference-between-bohr-and-quantum-model/#:~:text=Main%20Difference%20%E2%80%93%20Bohr%20vs%20Quantum%20Model&text=Quantum%20model%20is%20considered%20as,particle%20duality%20of%20an%20electron.

Are any of those models "the thing in itself"? Is even "the thing in itself" something that is existent in nature as a concept apart from the minds creation? No. They are all discrete experiences. Everything is a representation of the mind, the brain is no exception.

But we could not begin to use deduction about discrete experience, without first being able to discretely experience. We cannot prove or even discuss the PoN without being able to understand the terms, principle, negation, etc.

Apart from the fact that, again, you are fundamentally positing objects as more fundamental than subjects, I want to clarify that explicating PoN and utilizing PoN is not the same thing. — Bob Ross

I want to clarify again that I am not positing objects as more fundamental than subjects, at least in regards to knowledge. First, I never use the word "object" in the theory. Knowledge never claims "truth" or that there is a "thing in itself" that exists out there. Knowledge is a logical tool developed by a subject (the discrete experiencer) to create a model of one's discrete experience in such a way that it ensures our survival and success. PoN can be part of that model, but it is not a fundamental that is first needed to derive other things. The PoN is derived and proved. I showed you how I did it with the a/d distinction. The ability to discretely experience is required first for the PoN to be derived and proven.

As I have noted in an earlier post, one can use something without applicable knowledge of it. Many of our conclusions are filled with implicit inductions. We may use the PoN without first proving that it is applicably known. But for the PoN to be applicably known, we must then examine it. And the point that I was making is that when we finally get around to seeing if the PoN is applicably known, we must prove it. And to prove it, we need the d/a distinction. A thing's use does not make it fundamental. What makes it fundamental, is that there is nothing deeper that needs to be shown to logically explain it as a concept. We may have a fundamental disagreement here, which is fine. For my purposes, fundamental construction of logic is in both explication and utilization. And to explicate and utilize PoN as knowledge, one must distinctively and applicably know the d/a distinction. I'll keep exploring below why that is.

Yes, but you must first understand what the terms "true" and "false" are.

I don't want to be too reiterative, but this argument is sound in relation to the utilization of PoN: without PoN, the best way to describe it would be "indeterminacy". — Bob Ross

Lets list what the PoN is. In Western Philosophy it is often associated with Aristotle and comprises several principles. The law of the excluded middle and the law of contradiction for example.
'if p, then not not-p,'
'if not not-p, then p.

In India you have the principle of four cornered negation. "S is neither P, nor not p, nor both p and not p, nor neither p nor not p. And that is not necessarily agreed with by all people.

The point is that these are distinctive knowledge constructs that then must be applicably known to be useful. My theory can explain how they can be known without assumption. We may have assumed they were true, but the PoN is not proven as a fundamental truth, or thing in itself. It is a construct of the mind like everything else. The reason why it works, is that it works both applicably and distinctively.

One further, I'm going to go back to something I said very early on. Humans aren't the only discrete experiencers. Animals, and even insects discretely experience. If they did not, they could not identify what was food, and what was not food. A thing that does not discretely experience is like a coma patient on a drug trip of indeterminate sensation and thoughts. Its not an "I" at that point, but what we might call a "thing" that exists without any determinate realization of anything in the world, including its own existence.

Does an insect need the PoN? No. Its beyond its capability to realize or think such a thing (in theory). Yet it can, and must, discretely experience. This is why the ability to discretely experience is more fundamental than the PoN. You see the PoN as fundamental to human thinking and logic. I'm noting that human thinking and logic relies on the fundamental of being able to discretely experience.

So back to "truth" and "false". Yes, without the PoN, we could create another identity called "indeterminancy".

I think this derails quickly though because I can posit PoN for the terms as well: it isn't that X can't be "true" and "false", it is that it can't be true and false at the same time. — Bob Ross

We can create a distinctive logic model which notes that it is possible for a thing to exist, and not exist at the same time. "Truth" is when a thing exists in its state. "False" is when it does not. "Indeterminancy" is when it exists in both a true and false state. We'll call this the "PoI".

What we cannot do is applicably know such a thing, which is why it is not used by anyone seriously within science. But a human being can live their entire life believing in the "PoI" if they so desired, and live a life. "Somewhere out there, I believe we'll find a thing that both exists and doesn't exist at the same time." Again, this is speculative at best. But why it isn't useful is it has not been applicably known, seems inapplicably and arguably illogical, and is not useful to daily life. But the reason why we distinctively and applicably know this, is not because of the PoN. Its because of the knowledge formula formed with the d/a distinction. While I can distinctively know indeterminancy, I cannot applicably know it.

I don't think this is going to be productive, but my ask back to you would be to try and "create" PoN using the a/d distinction without utilizing PoN: you can't. — Bob Ross

A deduction assumes that the conclusion follows the premises. I will instead use the PoI. All deductions instead would be hypothetical, as the deductions state could exist, but it could also not exist at the same time. A conclusion would not necessarily follow the premises, because the premises and the conclusion could potentially be, and not be at the same time. At that point we would have to tweak it to say, "But if it were the case that the involved premises and conclusions were not indeterminate", we could get something like a determinate theory. It is not required that we have the PoN, it just makes things cleaner, and is something we have applicably known.

Thus I would conclude using the POI that what is distinctively known is what we discretely experience, and I would add the claim we could discretely experience both something, and its negation at the same time. I would say then that we could applicably know something, and we could applicably know something that exists, and does not exist at the same time. But after determining the d/a distinction, I can then go back and ask myself, "Is the PoI something I can applicably know?" No, using the theory from there, I determine I cannot applicably know the PoI. Therefore its a distinctive theory that cannot be applicably known, and is unneeded. At best, it would be included as an induction. But I did not need the PoN to create the d/a distinction as shown. What I could do is form the PoN to make the proof cleaner, but it is not required.

Without the d/a distinction, there is a problem that the PoN must answer. "Just because I have not experienced an existence and its contradiction at the same time, how do I know I won't experience such a thing in the future? Isn't claiming that the PoN will always exist just an induction without the d/a distinction? And if it is an induction, why is it any better than the induction that in the future, we may experience the PoI?" The d/a distinction can answer this clearly. With the d/a distinction, the PoN is something which is possible, the PoI is speculatory at best. As they are competing inductions, it is more cogent to use the PoN over the PoI. How do you answer such a question without the d/a distinction? Despite your disagreements with the d/a distinction, this is an essential question your theory must answer.

I have no problem if you aren't trying to convey any position on free will in your epistemology, my problem is that when you state "I've noted you can create whatever system you want distinctively", that implies free will of some sort (I am not trying to box you into a specific corner on the issue). I don't see how that could imply anything else. — Bob Ross

The I is the discrete experiencer. It is what discretely experiences. I'm using "want" broadly here, and should probably have used "will". What the discrete experiencer experiences, is what the discrete experiencer experiences. Whether it has constructed a logical idea of will that is free or deterministic are non-essential properties.

It is the transcendental aspect of the mind which determines what is a contradiction and what is not. I didn't choose that something cannot be in two different places at the same time, nor that two objects cannot be at the same place at the same time. Likewise, I didn't choose the validity of the causal relations of objects. — Bob Ross

And yet someone could choose to use the PoI distinctively. The reason why its not useful is because it cannot be known applicably. Just because you couldn't choose to create a different distinctive knowledge, doesn't mean its not possible for others to do so. You have never observed these contradictions, but as noted earlier, how do you explain that this gives you knowledge that it is not possible somewhere in reality? Without the d/a distinction, your argument is only a subjective induction and cannot necessarily explain why it is superior to the PoI.

Where does the idea of negation come from? True and false?

Metaphysically the mind. Explain to me how you can derive PoN without using PoN to derive PoN. I don't think you can. — Bob Ross

I create the idea of PoN distinctively, then applicably show it to be true. Then, I note that any competing principle when used in the future, the PoI for example, is not as cogent of an induction as the PoN.

I think part of the problem is you may not have fully understood or embraced the idea of "discretely experiencing". If you don't understand or accept that fully, then the a/d distinction won't make sense

I most certainly have not fully embraced it. I am not sure how that would make the a/d distinction make sense, but you definitely know better than me. — Bob Ross

Then this is absolutely key. If there is any doubt or misunderstanding of the idea that we discretely experience, that has to be handled before anything else. Please express your doubt or misunderstanding here, as everything relies on this concept. You keep not quite grasping the a/d distinction, and I feel this is the underlying root cause.

The entire point was not to conflate or omit your terminology, when I used "application" I was referring to "applicable". I should have been more clear though: the point is that one does not know distinctively anything without performing application to know it. — Bob Ross

No, this is fundamentally false. Applicable knowledge absolutely requires distinctive knowledge first. If there is no distinctive knowledge, there is nothing to match to. When you first encounter a new sensation, you can try to match it to something you have already distinctively known. But if you have no distinctive knowledge, or do not try to match it to something distinctively known, your knowledge of the sensation will be distinctive, not applicable.

If I see a swamp thing for the first time, and name it a "swamper", that is how I distinctively know it. If I encounter it again and deductively match it to a "swamper", then I applicably know it as a swamper. But I can't applicably know it as a swamper, until I've first distinctively known it as a swamper.

Forget for a second that you have obviously imagined a "pink elephant" before (or at least odds are you just did). Now image you "discretely experience" "pink", in isolation. Now, imagine you "discretely experience" "an elephant". Now, without imagining a combination of the two, you assert "I have imagined a pink elephant". That is a conceptual conflation. You did not, in fact, imagine a pink elephant. — Bob Ross

That's not a conceptual conflation, that's a lie. If I say I've imagined something, but I have not, then obviously I have not. Words without any essential properties to them are just words without any essential properties to them. I'm not seeing the problem.

I wasn't referring to consistency, I was referring to completeness. Consistency is when the logical theory proves for all provable sentences, S, either not S or S. Completeness is when the logical theory proves all sentences in its language as either S or not S. — Bob Ross

I think completeness is more than clearly showing distinct identities. It also must be able to adequately answer questions and critiques of it. Anytime a theory must reference an infinite regress is when it is inapplicable, and incomplete in my eyes. As I've stated many times, you can form many distinctive logical arguments in your head that fail in application. My theory notes that ability to create a distinctive logical concept is only one half of the equation. I'm quite certain someone could construct a distinctive logical concept that is in exact contradiction to your own. The proof is whether the logical construct can be applicably known. Without applicable knowledge, how can your theory compete with someone who uses a completely different theory using different definitions for words and concepts?

I was never attempting to argue you were using "truth". You are arguing for what is "true", which is "truth", but you are refurbishing its underlying meaning (to not be absolute). That is what I meant by "truth outruns proof". — Bob Ross

Yes, absolute truth outruns proof. Which means any theory which relies on absolute truth can never be proven. But I am not arguing absolute truth. Anything which relies on absolute truth is inapplicable, and therefore not useful. My theory is applicable, and therefore useful and logically consistent.

What I am noting is that an infinite regress is something that cannot be applied, and therefore an inapplicable speculation.

It is applied. I think I noticed clearly in my previous post how one could negate it. Also, I want to clarify I am referring to a potential infinite regress, not actual. — Bob Ross

No, its not applied, and by this, I mean applicably known. Any distinctive reference to the infinite can never be applicably known. Long ago when we first met on the "A First Cause is Logically necessary" thread, you were the only one to point this out, and I conceded you were correct. If there is potential infinite regress, then you don't have a deduction. That's an induction.

My system can be constructed distinctively, and applicably used, while not using infinite regress

You just previously conceded "despite using some assumptions...like PoN". You can't finitely prove PoN. It is not possible. — Bob Ross

I think I've done that. Using the d/a distinction, I constructed the idea that I cannot distinctively experience both a thing and its negation at the same time. Then, I've applicably known this. As such, I hold the induction that it is not possible for me to experience both a thing and its negation at the same time. This is the principle of negation, and requires nothing else then the steps shown.

Mine does not rely on such an induction, and is therefore more sound.

If I were arguing for an actual infinite regress, then it would be an induction. A potential infinite regress is deductively ascertainable. — Bob Ross

A potential infinite regress is an induction. You can deductively ascertain this induction, but it is an induction. Potential means, "It could, or could not be." If your theory has a potential infinite regress, you have an unresolved induction as the base of your argument. This leads anyone to ask, "What separates your theory which has an induction as its base, from any other theory that has an induction as its base?" Mine contains no potential infinite regress. It is all a finite logical system, and needs nothing more than what I've given.

The justification for this seems to be "Anytime I discretely experience, I know that I discretely experience". The question is why would this be valid? I would argue it is valid in virtue of PoN, spatiotemporal contemplation, etc. — Bob Ross

As I've demonstrated, PoN can be replaced with the PoI, and I can still conclude this. In other words, I'm not claiming that I cannot discretely experience indeterminancy. Discretely experiencing indeterminency would still be discretely experiencing. The PoN is a logically concluded limit to discrete experience, because if we explore our discrete experiences, we find it impossible to applicably know that we can discretely experience both an identity and its negation at the same time. Space and time are later identities we can both distinctively and applicably know within our discrete expereinces as well. But they are not required to know I discretely experience.

Causality are simply the connections of your mind. There's nowhere to point to in objective "reality" that validates the causal connection of two objects in space and temporally in relation to time: it is a potential infinite regress of validating connectives in virtue of assuming the validity of others and so on and so forth. — Bob Ross

I've never spoken about causality or objective reality so this does not apply to my theory. We can discuss how causality would apply with the a/d distinction, but that shouldn't be in the conversation at this point. I would address it here, but this post has already been long enough!

3. This involves, sensation, memory, and language.

I think all of these are aspects of the brain in a derivation of objects and their relations. But the relations themselves are of the mind. This is why I am careful to relate my position to reason as opposed to consciousness. — Bob Ross

I do not claim the mind or brain on first construction of this theory. Yes, these are all distinctively constructed identities that we can then applicably know. I don't disagree with your notion, but they don't disagree with the knowledge theory either.

I see and understand your theory, but it is separate and apart form the a/d distinction. Your criticisms seem to miss the mark on the a/d distinction, and at this point I'm not sure what else I can do except ask you to review either parts of the original paper again, or go back and see previous replies. Again, I do not want to imply that the PoN is wrong, or that spatiotemporal identities are wrong either. I'm also not denying that you couldn't conclude the a/d distinction with those identities. What I'm trying to point out is they are not necessary, and thus not fundamental to the idea of discrete experience. They are also not necessary, and thus not fundamental to the a/d distinction either.

The key between us at this point is to avoid repetition. I fully understand that two arguments can be made, and eventually it may be that each side is unpersuaded by the other. It may be time where if you feel you are repeating yourself, feel free to state, "I disagree because of this previous point." and that is acceptable.

I feel I understand your positions at this point, and they are well thought out. But there are a couple of fundamental questions I've noted about your claim that the PoN is fundamental that I think need answering. Neither are a slight against you, you are a very intelligent, philosophically brilliant individual; the best I have encountered on these boards. So, if you would like, either we can start a new thread addressing your knowledge theory specifically, or we can simply spend the next post only going over your theory from the ground up, without the d/a distinction. I leave it up to you!

I don't think I have quite made my decision - though I do appreciate your post, and the supportive tone in which it is written. I suppose I am afriad because I cannot logically rule out the possibility that hell exists. And if it exists, I'm going there. I can't morally justify not going there, as I can't morally endorse God's decision that hell should exist. — RolandTyme

Well, perhaps I can help out a bit with that. When I was young, I was raised in a Christian household, and I genuinely wanted to believe a God existed. In my mind, who wouldn't want a great and good being helping us do better in the world for ourselves and those around us? I was very fortunate as an Episcopalian that I did not have to attend a church where hell was every really spoken about.

I also read the bible myself from beginning to end. I used a fantastic bible that would break down the historical significance of passages, and explain meanings better. What I found was that what was often taught in churches didn't necessarily work with the entire message of the bible.

For starters, "Hell" as a fire and brimstone place of eternal torture is more an invention of society, and not in the original New Testament works. Jesus notes the only way to eternal life is through him. That was because in Judaism, when you're dead, you're gone unless God himself allows you not to. Without Jesus, you didn't live forever to be tortured, you simply died.

The penalty for sin is death, and all people sin. Jesus died as a payment for that sin, so that all would be forgiven and rise on the last day. All a person had to do was to accept this sacrifice, and they too would live eternally.

Whether you believe all of that isn't the point. The point I wanted to note is that Christianity in the bible itself, does not threaten eternal life and torture. There is death, or eternal life. Anything that seems to reference a hell is more metaphor than actual prophesy.

The people who threaten you with hell fire want your money for the church, and they want control over you. But lets not even dwell on that. I want to reference the overall acts of the New Testament to demonstrate an eternal hell fire torture just doesn't seem inline with the overall message.

Jesus:

Takes care of kids and insists they are precious and never to be harmed
Forgives all manner of sinners. Whore's, corrupt politicians, and tax collectors.
He heals people who have horrid diseases and afflictions.
He turned water into wine so people could get drunk at a wedding
Spoke to all people, not just the wealthy, the political, or the religious. In fact, he had fairly harsh words against the Pharisees and Saducees who often emphasized the "Letter of the law over the spirit of the law"

He states the only way to come to the father (God) is to come through him. But he doesn't seem like some mafioso, or punished people who refused him. In fact, as he dies on the cross he asks God to forgive them for they no not what they do. Jesus doesn't sit around and talk about how everyone is going to burn if they don't accept him. He speaks wisdom and lets people make their own choices.

The fire and brimstone thing was made by a priest somewhere for their congregation. Its fear and intimidation from people who don't seem to understand the message themselves. If I recall, on the last day all are to be risen, and those who accept the gift are allowed, those who willingly reject it die. That means you don't have to decide now right? That's really the way Christianity is written. I believe there's even a passage from St. Paul where he notes that Christians will receive no greater reward than non-believers. The point of being a Christian is that you know what's coming, and it gives you so much joy that you can't help but spread it to other people so they'll have the advantage of knowing now!

You seem like a very good person, and I don't want to see you suffer over some "bullys" who want to threaten you with horrible things if you don't believe. However long left you have to live, please enjoy it without fear. Live life, and love it while you can.

Your answer to my last question was no so I assume you are confirming that in your opinion, if there ever was a first cause, it may well have no significance at all, to our current Universe and therefore the theists are wasting their energy when the show deference to the god posit? Do you agree? — universeness

In a way, yes. It isn't that one couldn't prove that a God existed through evidence, but that the existence of the universe does not necessitate that the origin be a God.

I would aslo like to ask, after your 19 page thread and the comments the contributors made,
did you have any doubts about the 'causality' route as being absolutely fundamental to the question of origin of the Universe? — universeness

No, none. Causality is a very useful and easy to prove concept. People may have problems with the generality of the word and desire more specifics, but that doesn't negate its effectiveness.

I tend to concur with the viewpoint that 'existence' does not require a cause. — universeness

This would be the definition of a first cause. An existence that has post existent causality, but does not have any prior causality for its existence.

How do posits like the multiverse or the Penrose bounce affect your view on the infinite regression and a necessary first cause? Does it not matter how many times, time is reset back to 0? — universeness

No, not at all.

Is it only the 'first time' that time progressed from t=0 that a first cause is needed? and if so, does it matter how far back that was? — universeness

No.

Would this first cause still need to have a significance to our Universe other than as some original mindless spark that occurred at the start of an unknown number of t=o resets ago? — universeness

No.

It is not necessary something is self explained. The universe can't explain it's own existence. Gods, being eternally intelligent, don't need an explanation. Gods are the only reasonable reason for the universe's existence. — Hillary

Your first premise is false because it should start with "IF" rather than "IT", that is, under assumption that something is self-explained rather than claim that something is self-explained.

We know nothing in the nature is self-explained, do you have anything that is self-explanatory? — SpaceDweller

I proved it was logically necessary here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary

Of course, logically, a God is also not necessary
— Philosophim

A god, better, lots of them, are logical necessary to provide final closure. If the final gap is closed, only gods offer reason. A logical conclusion. You can't argue gods away by logic. — Hillary

Hello Hillary. According to the logic I've presented, I haven't argued away the possibility of a God, but I have argued away their necessity. Take the premises below:

1. It is necessary that something is self-explained.
2. If something is self-explained, there are no prior rules that explain why it existed.
3. Because there are no rules that limit why or how a self-explained existence can be, one cannot put a limit on what could possibly be self-explained when one does not know the origin(s) of the universe.

A god would be one type of possible self-explained entity. But so is anything else. A spec of dust. An atom. A bang. All of these are possible. As such, a God is not necessary. I wrote a separate OP going into more detail here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12847/if-a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary-what-does-that-entail-for-the-universes-origins/p1

Very nice start. I explore a somewhat Cartesian based approach to knowledge here, and eventually show how inductions can be ranked by cogency. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge/p1 Don't be intimidated by the parts, each part is only a couple of pages at most.

I suspected this would be the case, and I agree to a certain level: in my previous post I purposely refrained from going into a meticulous derivation of the fundamentals so as to prevent derailing into my epistemology as opposed to yours. I can most certainly dive in deeper. — Bob Ross

Please do Bob! You have been more than polite and considerate enough to listen to and critique my epistemology. At this point, your system is running up against mine, and I feel the only real issue is that it isn't at the lower level that I'm trying to address. Perhaps it will show a fundamental that challenges, or even adds to the initial fundamentals I've proposed here. You are a thoughtful and insightful person, I am more than happy to listen to and evaluate what you have to say.

"discrete experience" and any argument you provide (regardless of how sound) is utilizing PoN at its focal point. Nothing is "beyond" PoN. Therefore, I view "discrete experience" as a more ambiguous clumping of my outlined fundamentals. There's nothing wrong, at prima facea, of thinking of them in terms of one lumped "discrete experience", but this cannot be conflated with "differentiation" nor "spatiotemporality". — Bob Ross

As a reminder, one cannot think about the PoN without first being able to discretely experience. Its been a while since we last discussed this, but if you recall, the same with differentiation and spatiotemporality. Discrete experience is the fundamental simplicity of being able to notice X as different from Y. Non-discrete experience is taking all of your experience at once as some indesciphable.

As a reminder of discrete experience, a camera lens that takes a picture is a non-discrete experience. Everything that comes into the camera lens is spit out on the picture without the lens being able to differentiate anything within the light it receives. All it does is receive light. A being that can discretely experience can parcel that experience into things that it might later identity and differentiate into colors, shapes, etc.

Therefore a fundamental which a being must have before it can identify, is it must be able to discretely experience.

It is not what one can derive via PoN as the grounds which is the fundamental, it is what was used in the first place to derive it (e.g. PoN). — Bob Ross

We used the PoN to deductively assert that we discretely experience. But we could not begin to use deduction about discrete experience, without first being able to discretely experience. We cannot prove or even discuss the PoN without being able to understand the terms, principle, negation, etc.

I claim PoN is false, it is thereby true. I claim X, it used PoN, I verified that because PoN is true. — Bob Ross

Yes, but you must first understand what the terms "true" and "false" are. I believe truth and falsity are more fundamental than the PoN. While I do believe that fundamentals can be applied to themselves, an argument's ability to apply to itself does not necessitate that it is a fundamental.

I will create the PoN using the a/d distinction now. Instead of truth, its "What can be discretely experienced", and instead of false its, "What cannot be discretely experienced. What is impossible is to discretely experience a thing, and not the very thing we are discretely experiencing at the same time. Such a claim would be "false", or what cannot be discretely experienced. As you see, I've built the PoN up from other fundamentals, demonstrating it is not a fundamental itself.

I believe you have mentioned prior the idea of temporal fundamentalism. In other words, the order of discovery determines what is "fundamental". If for example, molecular theory was used to discover atomic theory, you would say molecular theory was more temporally fundamental.

Fundamental to me means the parts that make up the whole. While we may have discovered molecular theory first (hypothetically) molecules are fundamentally made up of atoms and rules that we might not have been aware of. But the use of a tool which discovers another fundamental does not mean that the underlying make up of the tool is not fundamental, nor that we necessarily needed that particular tool to discover the underlying fundamental. As we could use molecular theory as a starting point to discover atomic theory, we can also use atomic theory to discover molecular theory once we discover atomic theory. A fundamental when discovered, either confirms the higher order we used to discover the lower order, or adds clarity to that higher order concept.

I've used the a/d distinction to demonstrate an explanation for why the PoN is not a fundamental as it is made out of component parts. Barring your agreement with my proposal, you would need to identify what "true" and "false" are. As such, I think its been clearly shown that the PoN has parts and logic prior to its logical construction, and is not a fundamental.

At this point, I still don't think a/d distinction is very clear. Some times you seem to use it as if it is "abstract" vs "non-abstract", other times it is "creation" vs "matching": these are not synonymous distinctions. Sometimes it is: — Bob Ross

I think the problem is you are trying to use terms for synonyms to the a/d distinction. It is not as simple as "abstraction vs non-abstraction" or "creation" vs "matching". I can use these terms to assist in understanding the concept, but there is no synonym, as it is a brand new concept. Imagine when the terms analytic and synthetic were introduced. There were no synonyms for that at the time, and people had to study it to understand it.

I think part of the problem is you may not have fully understood or embraced the idea of "discretely experiencing". If you don't understand or accept that fully, then the a/d distinction won't make sense. But you cannot use derived systems to explain the fundamental system that allows those derived systems to exist. I think this is ultimately the source of your misunderstanding and confusion. You are still at a higher level of system, and assume that higher level is fundamental. What I've tried to demonstrate is your system is derived, and rests on the assumptions you are trying to negate. Can you use your derived system without my system underlying it? No. Until that changes, it cannot be used as a negation of the very thing it uses to exist.

I've noted you can create whatever system you want distinctively.

Other times it is:

Free will is not necessary to my epistemology. Free will is a distinctive and applicable concept that is contextually formed. — Bob Ross

"I" is the discrete experiencer. You've been attributing the "I" as having free will. I have not meant to imply that or used those terms.

Quite frankly, your descriptions are "free will" heavy (in terms of implications): — Bob Ross

But I'm not implying free will. I think you're mapping your own outlook on this when it has never been my intention.

The way I understand it is:

- If distinctive knowledge is "creation", then by virtue of the term it implies some form of "free will" to "create" whatever one wants. Unless you are positing a "creation" derived from an external entity or process that is not the subject. — Bob Ross

No. Distinctive knowledge is the creation of the discrete experiencer. If I see the color red within the sea of existence, that is my creation. If I am color blind, then what I discretely experience might be different. A person might see a tree while another sees two plants, "green leaves" attached to "brown trunks". A camera lens cannot see the color red within the light that it absorbs. It is unaware of any difference. There is no "I" within the lens. There is no distinction.

- If distinctive knowledge is "abstract", then it renders "free will" irrelevant, but necessarily meshes "creation" and "matching" into valid processes within "distinctive knowledge" due to the fact that "abstraction" can have both. — Bob Ross

As I've noted, its about deduction vs induction within your chain of reasoning. It depends on your context of what you mean by "abstraction". In one context, everything is abstraction. Our sensations are abstractions, as well as thoughts. Arguably a person could state we never experience "the thing in itself".

Distinctive knowledge is the knowledge of the experience itself, knowledge of the abstraction one creates. The key is that there is no deduced uncertainty of one's will. If I see red while you see blue, we both distinctively know our own experiences. But the moment I introduce deduced uncertainty, "You see the color blue, while I see the color red," that is a belief that my will alone cannot assert. Have I experienced how you see the world? No. That is an application I must experience before I can determine if my belief is true. Do I have the distinctive knowledge of this belief? Yes. Is that belief applicable knowledge? No. At best, such a belief is an inapplicable speculation.

I am arguing the exact same thing conversely. I don't think your "discrete experience" is the fundamental: it is an ambiguous lumping of the fundamentals into one term. — Bob Ross

This is why it is a fundamental. A fundamental is part of everything that derives from it. Atoms are the fundamentals of molecules. We don't have to create the concept of molecules, and the fundamentals of atoms will still exist. Discrete experiences are the necessary atoms that make up your higher level concepts. That's not an ambiguous lumping. All I'm noting is your molecules are made up of atoms, and atoms can be used to make more than the molecules you are noting.

Neither of us can derive a/d, or any distinction, without first using PoN, connectivity, negations, equatability, spatiotemporality, and a will. These are not after nor do they arise out of discrete experience. — Bob Ross

I think I've shown the thinking that they do not arise out of discrete experience to be incorrect. Where does the idea of negation come from? True and false? Each of your terms rest on concepts that you have not proven yet, or shown where they come from. Mine does. Negation is the discrete experience of one thing, and then that thing not being experienced anymore. True is what is and can be discretely experienced, while false is what cannot. From this, I can derive the PoN. Can you derive the PoN differently, or demonstrate how my derivation is incorrect?

Likewise, depending on what distinction you mean by "distinctive" and "applicable" it may or may not be the case that one can derive PoN in those two contexts separately. — Bob Ross

As with everything, you must clarify whether your knowledge is distinctive or applicable. The problem with epistemology has been it has lacked this distinction, and has conflated very two different identities. I can distinctively know of a pink elephant, and I can applicably know if I've encountered one. What one distinctively knows does not necessitate it can be applied.

One cannot know of their own definition before they perform application to obtain that. Once they know, then they can distinguish that from whether the definition's contents hold. It would be a conflation to claim that the definition proves it owns validity beyond it: which doesn't have any bearing on a/d. I claim "I cannot hold A and not A". I didn't know I made that claim until I applicably determine via PoN that I did claim it. Thereafter, it is a conceptual conflation to claim that in virtue of the claim it is true: this is the distinction I think should be made. — Bob Ross

Notice how you used "know" without clarifying whether this knowledge was distinctive or applicable. If you don't clarify what type of knowledge, then you aren't using the epistemology. At that point you aren't disproving the epistemology through a contradiction of use, you are simply showing how not using the epistemology causes confusion.

Let me reconstruct your sentence. "One cannot applicable know their own definition before they perform application to obtain that." While that sentence still doesn't make much sense, it is not addressing distinctive knowledge. Did you mean to say, "One cannot distinctively know their own definition before they perform application to obtain that?" That doesn't work, because distinctive knowledge does not require applicable knowledge.

Perhaps what you meant was that you cannot distinctively know something prior to experiencing it. Which is true. But you also cannot applicably know something before you experience it. If the a/d distinction cannot be used to divide a generic use of knowledge or runs into a contradiction, then I think we can safely say there is a flaw. But using a generic definition of knowledge alone is a straw man.

That is my point: there is only one form of knowledge. — Bob Ross

Knowledge is a chain of deductions. The difference between distinctive and applicable knowledge has been clearly made. Do they both use deductions as an underlying fundamental? Yes. But it is clear that we run into situations in which we have beliefs that must be resolved, and cannot be resolved by our will alone. When a chain of inductions contains a resolved induction, it is an important enough difference to note a new identity. The separation of the knowledges notes this important event, and avoids the problems other epistemologies run into.

If you imagine a pink elephant combining your memory of pink and elephant, that is distinctive knowledge. There is nothing wrong with that.

Depends on what you mean. If you are conflating concepts, then there is something wrong. A "pink elephant" in combination is not the same as "pink" + "elephant" in isolation, it would be wrong to abstractly conflate the two. — Bob Ross

Please clarify what you mean by this in distinctive and applicable terms. I didn't understand that point.

If we distinctively identify a square and a circle to have different essential properties, than they cannot be the same thing distinctively.

This is necessarily the case because we fundamental utilize PoN as the focal point. This is not a choice, it is always abided by. — Bob Ross

No disagreement, as this is a logical consequence of using a logic derived from the context of distinctive knowledge.

I may try to apply whatever my contextual use of square is, and find that I run into a contradiction

The real underlying process here I think is trying to relate, whether abstractly or non-abstractly, concepts to one another and whether it results in an invalid conflation. You tend to be using "applicable" as if it is "non-abstract". — Bob Ross

I will note, I did not introduce the term "abstract" into the conversation. It depends on your context of "abstract". Applicable knowledge comes about from the deduced realization of an uncertain belief. The "uncertainty" is a deduction that our will alone is not enough to ascertain it cannot be contradicted. I may believe this apple is healthy, but upon eating it I discover it was rotten on the inside. Can the terms "eating, rotten, apple, action, etc" be all termed as abstractions? Sure. Can everything in the mind be termed an abstraction? Yes. This is probably where the confusion comes from. You are using a general word that can have its essential properties switched with its accidental properties depending on the context you are using.

As such, if I have used the terms "abstract" it has been to meet what I evaluated your context to be at the time. In the largest abstract of the word, discrete experience can be called an abstraction, and everything is made up of discrete experiences, including applicable knowledge. If we are to use the term abstraction going forward, could you define it clearly in your own terms so I can understand your meaning?

This would be a flaw in your proposal then...An infinite regress cannot prove itself, because it rests on the belief in its own assumptions.

Firstly, a finite regress of reason should never prove itself: that is circular logic. Secondly, a system cannot prove all of its true formulas. Goedel's incompleteness theorems thoroughly proved that truth outruns proof: it is an infinite regress wherein a system has at least one unprovable, but yet true, formula which is only proven by using another system (aka it is non-computational). — Bob Ross

What I meant by "proving itself" is it is consistent with its own rules, despite using some assumptions or higher level systems like the PoN. I assumed several higher order logics to be true, and I can use the epistemology to demonstrate why logic works. I may ask the question, "Why do I discretely experience?" but that answer is not necessary to know that I discretely experience, and can use it to form knowledge. Just like I don't need to know molecular theory to use a ruler for measurement. There is (to my mind) nothing underlying or apart from the theory itself that needs to be given to explain the theory itself.

Also, I am not using truth. If you wish to use Goedel's incompleteness theorem in relation to this theory, feel free. Goedel's is also not a free pass to set up an infinite regress. What I am noting is that an infinite regress is something that cannot be applied, and therefore an inapplicable speculation. Such an argument is flawed, and as my system is more fundamental than yours, can conclude Setting up an explanation for knowledge as infinitely regressive is therefore a flaw. I can construct your system distinctively, but it is inapplicable. My system can be constructed distinctively, and applicably used, while not using infinite regress. Because an infinite regress is inapplicable, it is an inapplicable speculation, or induction. Mine does not rely on such an induction, and is therefore more sound.

All concepts, even in your derivation, are referencing other concepts in a potential infinite fashion. — Bob Ross

No. I avoid that flaw that most other epistemologies fall into. Everything starts with the foundation that I discretely experience. All distinctive knowledge boils down to that. I need no other outside reference. If I do, please show how I do.

If you are the creator of the definitions of A and B, then there is no uncertainty.

There's always uncertainty. When someone claims they are certain of what they defined as A, they really mean that they very quickly ascertained what they defined, but necessarily had to perform application to discover what it was. — Bob Ross

Correct. My note was there is no uncertainty in distinctive knowledge. When there is uncertainty, or when it is deduced that one's will, will not necessarily result in the will's outcome, we have a situation in which we must experience the deduced outcome of that induction. That is acting upon a belief until that beliefs outcome is found.

There is no application within distinctive knowledge, because it is our experience itself. You don't match the experience itself to the experience itself. It is simply the experience itself. The act of being. What you are, is what you are. What you remember is what you remember. What you define something as, is what you define something as. There is no regress. There is no induction in this. This has been deductively shown by noting that you discretely experience, and all of these things logically flow from this fundamental.

Let me be clear by what I mean by distinctive. Distinctive is like binary. Its either on, or off. Either you have defined A to have x property, or you have defined A to have y property.

This is not " A deduced concept which is the creation and memorization of essential and accidental properties of a discrete experience", you have defined PoN here, which is true of both of your distinctions. — Bob Ross

Poor wording with lots of implicitness on my part. Let me rephrase it.

Distinctive knowledge is a deduced concept. This deduced concept is that I discretely experience. Anytime I discretely experience, I know that I discretely experience. This is distinctive knowledge. This involves, sensation, memory, and language. This is not the definition of the Principle of Negation, though we can discover the principle of negation as I noted earlier.

And no worry Bob if we retread old ground a bit! Many of those subjects were disparate, but now we have a nice consolidation.

Well done Bob, a great analysis! No need to apologize for long pauses between replies, I believe we are both out of our comfort level of easy response at this point in time. I find it exciting and refreshing, but it takes time to think.

The problem I have with your fundamental concepts, is I do not consider them the most fundamental concepts, nor do I think you have shown them to be. The most fundamental concept I introduced was discrete experience. Prior to discretely experiencing, one cannot comprehend even the PoN. Arguably, the PoN works because we cannot discretely experience a real contradiction ourselves. I have never experienced a situation in which I have existed in two different spots at the same time for example.

That being said, I don't necessarily disagree with your fundamentals as system that can be derived from the fundamental that you discretely experience. But I don't think you've shown that it isn't derived from the more fundamental a/d distinction.

Having discussed this with you for some time now, I believe this has been a re-occurring difference between us. You've typically been thinking at a step one higher, or one beyond what I've been pointing out. Your ideas are not bad or necessarily wrong. I am talking about a system from which all systems are made, while you're talking about a system that can be made from this prime system.

The d/a distinction applies as a fundamental formation of knowledge from discrete experience. As you've noted, you had to use the d/a distinction to use the concepts that you created. I'm noting how knowledge is formed to create systems, while you are creating a system. Your creation of a system does not negate the d/a distinction, but only confirms it can be used to create a system.

For myself, you have to demonstrate that you can form a system without using the d/a distinction, and that system must invalidate or demonstrate why the d/a distinction is invalid. To do so, I believe you have to show there is something more fundamental than the ability to discretely experience. Or if not more fundamental, something along the lines of that fundamental ability that can lead to knowledge without needing discrete experience.

But, let me address of a few of your derived concepts that cross into my derived concepts so I can clarify this position.

Free will is irrelevant. The determination of "knowledge" is not related directly to control, which dissolves any issues or paradoxes related thereto. — Bob Ross

Free will is not necessary to my epistemology. Free will is a distinctive and applicable concept that is contextually formed. Whether a person defines free will, or does not, is irrelevant. What I have attempted to note are situations that separate distinctive knowledge from applicable knowledge. One could use a concept of free will to describe a difference, but its not necessary.

What is necessary is the concept of a will. A will is an intention of the self, and an outcome is the result of that will. At its most basic, a will is the intention to eat to live. I believe this is very similar, if not identical to our previously agreed upon definition of "reason". It is very clear to any willing/reasoning being that one's intention does not always result in the outcome they wished. Situations in which one's will is provably certain is essentially distinctive knowledge. This is the act of discretely experiencing expressed as memory, identity, and sensations. Some in philosophy might call this, "being".

But, when your reason is placed in a situation in which it is provably uncertain, the deduced results of the experience are applicable knowledge.

Creation & Application are irrelevant. The distinction being made has no direct relevancy to whether a given concept was "created" or "applied", just that the conceptions appropriately align with the fundamentals. — Bob Ross

As I mentioned earlier, your fundamentals are not fundamentals. I can both distinctively and applicably know what you claim to be fundamentals. I distinctively know the PoN, and I applicably know the PoN. If I did not applicably know the PoN, you would have to prove it existed correct? Which means you would have to show some application of it that would demonstrate to me it wasn't something you just distinctively identified, but something that can also be utilized apart from our direct distinctions.

The problem is that I can conflate distinctively concepts. If I, in isolation, imagine the color pink and, in isolation, imagine an elephant, it would be a conflation to claim the concatenation of the two produced a literal "pink elephant". Given the nature of imagination, it isn't so obvious that there's a conflation occurring, but a more radical example explicates it more clearly: I imagine a circle and then imagine a square, I then declare that I distinctively know of a "a circle that is a square". What I really distinctively know is a square, a circle, and a contradiction (impossibility in this case). — Bob Ross

Conflation is not a function of my epistemology, but a way to demonstrate separations of knowledge and context. If you imagine a pink elephant combining your memory of pink and elephant, that is distinctive knowledge. There is nothing wrong with that. The conflation occurs if you think that you have applicable knowledge that a pink elephant exists apart from your imagination. If conflation is allowed to occur in this epistemology without explanation, I would consider that a contradiction and flaw that should be pointed out. I just don't see where this is happening at this time.

The concept of "square", and its properties (essential properties in your terms), as a predicate (such as "this circle is square") contradicts the subject concept "circle" and is therefore "impossible". It contradicts it because the properties are related to the concept as necessitous by nature and therefore a contradiction in the predicate to the properties of "circle" (the subject concept) results in rejection (due to PoN): this is what it means to be "impossible". — Bob Ross

If we distinctively identify a square and a circle to have different essential properties, than they cannot be the same thing distinctively. But our definition of square and circles are not applicably necessitous by nature. I may try to apply whatever my contextual use of square is, and find that I run into a contradiction. In your case, you are using a societally agreed upon contextual definition of square and circle that is both distinctively, and applicably known and proven. Using those current societal definitions and applicable knowledge of square and circle, there are certain things you cannot distinctively conclude. That is a distinctive impossibility. But will the rules and applicable knowledge of a square and circle remain the same tomorrow? That is an applicable unknown. That is where induction comes in.

Potential vs Possibility is now resolved. There's no more confusion about possibility because what you are defining as "possibility" is not fundamentally what it should be, however the distinction you made is still relevant. "Possibility" is truly when a predicate does not contradict its subject concept. — Bob Ross

If you want to create a system in which you define possibility as when a predicate does not contradict its subject concept, that's fine. I've noted you can create whatever system you want distinctively. But, when you make the claim that your derived system invalidates the underlying system, you are applicably wrong. The fact that I use the word possibility to describe the concept of making a belief that because X is applicably known 1 time, it could be applicably known again, is irrelevant. You and I may be using the same sign/word, but the essential properties are widely different. We can discuss why you may be more interested in a different word than possibility to describe the essential properties of this particular kind of induction, but you have not shown that these particular properties of the induction are flawed in and of themselves.

As you probably noticed, there is a recursive nature to my definitions: they are all concepts. This is purposely so because, quite frankly, it is an inescapable potential infinite regress of reason. — Bob Ross

This would be a flaw in your proposal then. The d/a distinction has a finite regress of reason. That is to what is discretely experienced. An infinite regress cannot prove itself, because it rests on the belief in its own assumptions. In other words, an infinite regress cannot be applicably known. You may have created a distinctive set of logic that fit in your mind, but it has no capability of application. The a/d distinction is complete. It start with finite experiences, and ends with them. You can use the a/d distinction in the formulation of the a/d distinction itself. That is a major strength of the theory compared to all others which I know of that are not able to use the very theory they propose to prove the theory itself.

But there is no uncertainty involved. How I define A, B, and synonyms are all in my solo context.

There's a difference between saying A and B are synonyms, and trying to discover if they currently are synonymous. Maybe the latter is applicable knowledge? However, that would be solely abstract consideration, which I think you were stating was only possibly distinctive. — Bob Ross

If you are the creator of the definitions of A and B, then there is no uncertainty. You aren't trying to discover anything. Synonyms are identical distinctive knowledge. When we are trying to match an unknown identity with a distinctive identity, that deduced result is applicable knowledge.

applicable knowledge always involves the resolution of a distinctive uncertainty

Would you agree with me then that there is such a thing as uncertainty distinctively? Because prior it felt like you were stating there's never uncertainty because I am "creating" the definitions: — Bob Ross

Let me be clear by what I mean by distinctive. Distinctive is like binary. Its either on, or off. Either you have defined A to have x property, or you have defined A to have y property. You can define A as having X property for 1 second, then define A to have Y property the next second. You can even alternate every second for eternity. But there is no uncertainty that at any point in time, what you have defined or not defined as an essential property of A is the distinctive knowledge of A then.

In the way you have defined it from the dictionary, I am no longer certain "hypothetical" is the correct term. — Bob Ross

That may be the case. I do agree there is a difference between "I believe" versus, "I don't know". But the IFF is an affirmative of a possible outcome, which is an assertion that there are other possible outcomes. But we may be splitting hairs at this point.

I really think going through the terms has helped me to see where you are coming from, and I hope I've demonstrated the consistency in my use and argumentation for the a/d system. Everything we've mentioned here so far, has been mentioned in prior topics, but here we have it summed up together nicely. I look forward to hearing from you again Bob.

One could use rationality to address faith as gods offer a reason for bringing the universe into existence. — Hillary

That's a rationalization, not rationality. A rationalization is a plausible reason we invent to support a belief or desire, but is not necessarily rational. Rationality is not used with the intention to prove or disprove a belief, but see if it holds when placed against critical critique.

Why did Jews NOT lose their faith in a (benevolent) God? — Agent Smith

You are using rationality to address faith. Faith is belief despite rationality showing you otherwise. There are plenty of rational reasons not to believe in God prior to the Holocaust.

The real question then is, "What causes people to have faith?" Since its not about rationality, its about other things. I think if you ask a lot of people you'll find its community, purpose, morality, and believing in something bigger than yourself.

Well I have clearly missed the mark yet again ): It seems as though we are not semantically disagreeing but, rather, fundamentally disagreeing. — Bob Ross

Not a worry at all! Please continue to shoot arrows. I think comparing this epistemology to the a/s distinction is inevitable and necessary to fully understand it. I am glad we are exploring this route, as I think it can help clarify what my proposed epistemology means. Further, there needs to be a reason why we should use this epistemology over the a/s distinction if it is to have any worth. Lets dive in.

I have to perform this (comparison) for everything, which is the problem with your distinction. For example, if I distinctively define A and distinctively define B, but they are by happenstance defined the exact same, my conclusion that they are defined the same is a comparison of the two distinctively defined concepts, A and B, to derive that they are indeed a match: this didn't involve anything "outside of my control", so to speak. I think you would regardless consider it holistically in the realm of "distinctive knowledge", which I would disagree with. — Bob Ross

Again, this depends on how the comparison is made. Lets say I hold A and B in my head as merely definitions. Further, I define a synonym as "Two identities which have the same essential and non-essential properties. Then I say, "A and B are synonyms". At that point, I have to compare the essential and non-essential properties. But there is no uncertainty involved. How I define A, B, and synonyms are all in my solo context. I could change the identities of A, B, and synonym anytime I desired. But I don't. Perhaps this process should receive a new identity such as "logical distinction".

If a situation arises in which we are wondering if a distinctively unknown specific experience matches the definition of B, we are applying the identity to something else which is outside of our creative identification. We are still distinctively committing to what the identity of B is, but we are purposefully not creating a new identity for this currently undefined experience. At this point it requires an investigation of what this new identity is, and if it can deductively match to our B identity.

As such, applicable knowledge always involves the resolution of a distinctive uncertainty. There is no certainty that the match of this new uncertainty will match with something I distinctively know. I cannot change what B means, and I am choosing not to create a new identity for the undefined experience. The premise that the undefined experience matches B is not a necessary conclusion. But the attempt to match is the belief, or induction that it could. This is what I've been trying to narrow in on their difference. Distinctive knowledge has no uncertainty. Applicable knowledge only happens in the resolution of an uncertainty.

Distinctive knowledge - A deduced concept which is the creation and memorization of essential and accidental properties of a discrete experience.

Applicable knowledge - A deduced concept which is not contained within its contextual distinctive knowledge set. This concept does not involve the creation of new distinctive knowledge, but a deduced match of a discrete experience to the contextual distinctive knowledge set.

These are both very well written general definitions. For applicable knowledge, perhaps we need to tweak it a little with my above analysis. "A deduced resolution in the uncertainty of matching a distinctively undefined experience to a contextual distinctive knowledge set."

Applicable knowledge does involve the creation of a new concept: the synthetic joining of "A = B", which is a separate concept from A and B. There was a concept A and a concept B, now there's a new concept that "A = B". This is not necessitated in the concepts A nor B, but yet true of them (i.e. it is synthetic). But there was an analysis that was required to determine "A = B" which was the analysis of what is contained in the concept A and, likewise, what is in the concept B, which is analytical. So both were used to obtain "applicable knowledge". I think this, as of now, is the true pinpoint of the distinction we are both really trying to portray (but I may be wrong, as always). — Bob Ross

This also sounds good. If one uses the a/s distinction, they will have to use both within distinctive and applicable knowledge. Distinctive and applicable knowledge do not divide into a/s distinctions themselves however. I'll clarify further with the pink elephant example early.

Imagine I never imagined a "pink elephant" but, rather, I envisioned "pink", in isolation, and "an elephant" in isolation. If I then claimed "pink elephant", it would make just as little sense as envisioning a "pink elephant" and claiming "there's a pink elephant in my backyard". — Bob Ross

Distinctively, there is nothing strange about taking the terms pink and applying it to an elephant. We create whatever definitions we wish. The part that doesn't make sense is stating there is some unknown distinctive identity apart from our imagination or fiction that matches to the identity of a pink elephant. The creation of distinctive knowledge does not necessitate such knowledge can be applicably known. The a/s distinction is what causes the confusion, not the d/a epistemology.

Alright, back to the original flow!

It is more about creation of identities versus deduced matching of experiences to already established identities.

I don't think this directly explicates the recognition of indexical conflations. It is more of a byproduct. — Bob Ross

No, taken alone, the process of distinctive and applicable knowledge do not explicitly involve context.

Language A: A bachelor is an unmarried man. (Distinctive)
This person is found to be unmarried. (Applicable)
Therefore this man is a bachelor (Logical distinction)

Language B: A bachelor is a married man. (Distinctive)
This person is found to be married. (Applicable)
Therefore this man is married (Logical distinction)

By this I mean the context does not affect the logical process itself. The context only determines the defined starting point. The process itself is not contextual, only the identifications and capabilities of the observer/thinker.

To translate into this epistemology, we always start with distinctive knowledge.

I think that we start with analysis (which is empirical observation) and therefrom derive synthesis. I haven't found a way to neatly map this onto your d/a distinction. I don't think we always start with distinctive knowledge as you've defined it. — Bob Ross

You are correct! The analysis is the introduction to discovering we discretely experience. That is how we analyzed and discovered the term "distinctive knowledge". Nothing I've proposed is done without analysis, and all is attempted to be shown using distinctive and applicable knowledge where possible (barring inductions).

Likewise, I could then counter myself with "well, bob, you just performed synthesis in determining that you analytically discover synthesis". And I would be correct, however I didn't realize that necessarily until after I analytically observed the claim (i.e. that I analyze to discover what is synthesized). I am always one step behind the synthesis, so to speak. Hopefully that made a bit of sense. — Bob Ross

I believe so. It is one reason why I found the a/s distinction to not tell the whole story. It is a useful distinction, but one that diminishes in usefulness the more granular you get with them.

The act of experiencing imagery in ones mind is part of discrete experience: the conclusion that it is a remembrance of the past is not. — Bob Ross

I want to tweak this sentence a little to ensure we are on the same page.

The act of experiencing imagery in ones mind is part of discrete experience.
The act of experiencing that is a remembrance of the past is part of discrete experience.

The deduced conclusion that it is an accurate remembrance of the past is the discrete experience of applicable knowledge.
The deduced realization that I believe my memory to be an accurate remembrance is the discrete experience of distinctive knowledge.

Unfortunately, I don't think we are merely semantically disagreeing on this either. I think you are conflating "uncertainty" with "induction". You can have deduced uncertainty. — Bob Ross

I don't believe there is conflation, but perhaps I am wrong. An induction is a claim of uncertainty. Certainly we can deduce that an induction is all we can make.

Therefore, a premise that is hypothetical is not necessarily, when stripped of its if conditional, an induction. It could be a deduction or an induction. If I say Premise 1 = IF X, I am not thereby implying necessarily that X is an induction. — Bob Ross

No, X alone is not an induction. "IF X" is an induction. It is the same as my saying, "I believe it will rain tomorrow." If I remove "I believe", then we are left with "It will rain tomorrow" as a fact. I can create deductions based on the premise "It will rain tomorrow". The addition of the IF lets the reader know that this is not a fact, or a conclusion that followed from the premises we had. It may, or may not rain tomorrow.

Adding the IF makes it hypothetical.
Hypothetical - involving or being based on a suggested idea or theory : being or involving a hypothesis : CONJECTURAL https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hypothetical

A hypothesis is an induction. A conjecture is an induction. A claim that asserts a conclusion that is not certain, is an induction. The IF is the assertion of a conclusion that is not certain, therefore an induction. IF the induction turns out to be correct, then we can deduce what will follow.

Hypothetical: IF the penny lands on heads (Implicit uncertainty of the initial premise happening)
Non-hypothetical: The penny lands on heads (A solid and certain premise)

Again, I agree with this analogy, yet it doesn't prove that the hypothetical is an induction when the if conditional is removed: I might deductively not know whether or not the penny will land heads. — Bob Ross

If the IF condition is removed, it is no longer a hypothetical deduction. At that point, it is simply a deduction. The penny lands on heads is not an uncertainty, but a certainty at that point. The identities of our chain of reasoning are based on the zero point we pick. Its all about the starting point in our analysis.

Pure Deduction chain: Deduction -> Deduction all the way down.
Hypothetical: induction -> Deduction with the induction stating an outcome that will happen (But has not yet).
Deduced induction: Deduction -> Induction due to limited information
A Deduced Inductions Hypothetical Deduction -> Induction -> Deduction.

So if I take a hypothetical induction, and remove the induction as a premise within my chain of reason (removing the IF) it is now just a deduction.

Again, this is implying to me the indexical conflation consideration: it seems to me you are implying, rightly so, that "a guess" entails uncertainty which entails that some sort of empirical observation (analysis) is required. I am simply noting that this is true of both "applicable" and "distinctive" knowledge. — Bob Ross

I hope I have explained why this is not true of both applicable and distinctive knowledge at this point. Distinctive knowledge does not require empirical observation. An induction itself is distinctively known. But the resolution to that induction is applicably known.

Then I think you may be agreeing with me that we do not know that a possibility is more cogent than a speculation in the relation to the future, we only know that it is true of the past. The grounds of the induction hierarchy in relation to the future (which is the whole purpose of it is for the future) is an induction. — Bob Ross

I want to make sure its understood that cogency does not mean "truth" or "deduced certainty" Cogency originally is defined as "a strong inductive argument with true premises." Here it is amended to be "A strong inductive argument based on how many steps it is removed from deductions in its chain of rationality."

That has been shown distinctively, and I believe can be shown applicably. But I don't claim that taking a cogent induction determines that the induction will come to pass. Its simply shown to be more likely to pass when taken over a large sample space. And if a person is to be rational, they will take the induction type that gives them the greatest odds of being correct.

Also I never claim that we can applicably know that any form of induction will necessarily lead to its outcome. It is reasonable to guess that an outcome that will occur 99% of the time will happen, but you will be wrong 1% of the time.

Any claim about the future is always an induction. The question is, do we have a rational way of sorting out which inductions are more reasonable based on logic and past experience? Yes. While it is an induction that logic and our past experiences will be the same tomorrow, we must also not forget that it is also an induction that our logic and past experiences will NOT be the same tomorrow. As no one has experienced logic suddenly altering, or the past suddenly shifting reality, it is a speculation that this may change, while it is a possibility it remains stable. Therefore it is more cogent to act as if the known certainties of today such as logic and needing to breath and eat to survive, will be the known certainties of tomorrow. My inductive hierarchy can justify itself. Can any other rationalization of inductions do so? I leave that to you.

Fantastic post Bob, and I hoped I adequately addressed your thoughtful points!