Good discussion Bob, lets see if we can come to common ground here.

First off, potentiality is an abstract consideration. You seemed to be trying to apply potentiality distinctively and applicably (and finding issues with it): abstract considerations are always applications to reality. I don't think that "application to reality" is limited to empirical verifications: abstract considerations are perfectly reasonable (I think) — Bob Ross

I think the notion of something abstract is it is a concept of the mind. Math is abstract thinking, and we discussed earlier how "1" represents "an identity". We really can't apply an abstract to reality without greater specifics. I need to apply 1 brick, or 1 stone. The idea of applying 1 is simply discretely experiencing a one.

Anything that "isn't contradicted in the abstract" (assuming it isn't directly experienced as the contrary) is something that got applied to reality without contradiction. I might just be misremembering what "distinctive knowledge" is, but I am thinking of the differentiation within my head (my thoughts which haven't been applied yet to see if the contents hold). If that is the case, then potentiality can never be distinctive knowledge, it is the application of that distinctive knowledge in the abstract. — Bob Ross

I am not sure what you mean by applying distinctive knowledge in the abstract. All this seems to be doing is sorting out the different ideas within my head to be consistent with what I know. Math again is the perfect example. I know that 1 + 1 make 2. Could I add another 1 to that 2 and get 3? Yes. But when its time to apply that to reality, what specifically is the 1, the 1, and the 2?

I've realized that, although your epistemology is great so far, it doesn't really address the bulk of what epistemologies address. This is because your epistemology, thus far, has addressed some glasses of water (possibility, probability, and irrational inductions), but yet simply defined the whole ocean as "plausibility". Even with a separation of "inapplicable" and "applicable", I find that this still doesn't address a vast majority of "knowledge". — Bob Ross

Plausibilities are not deductions though. They are inductions. And inductions, are not knowledge. Now can we further study inductions now that we have a basis of knowledge to work with, and possibly refine and come up with new outlooks? Sure! You have to realize, that without a solid foundation of what knowledge is, the study and breakdown of inductions has been largely a failure. I wouldn't say that not yet going into a deep dive of a particular induction is a weakness of the epistemology, it just hasn't gotten there yet.

Now, let's dive into your example you gave about the coins:

"Smith thinks Jones potentially has 5 coins in his pocket, but we the audience knows, that he does not (thus this is not an applicable potential). — Bob Ross

But at a deeper level, imagine Smith has never experienced 5 coins in a pocket, but he's experienced coins before. Therefore, Smith cannot claim that it is "possible" for there to be 5 coins in Jones' pocket. — Bob Ross

Correct. And I see nothing wrong with that. Once he slides the coins into a pocket, then he'll know its possible for 5 coins to fit in a pocket of that size.

He can claim "it is potentially the case that Jones' has 5 coins in his pocket". — Bob Ross

Again, I'm not seeing how we need the word potential when stating, "Smith speculates that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket."

But this can get weirder. Imagine Smith has experienced 5 coins in his own pocket, but not 5 coins in Jones' pocket: then he hasn't experienced it before. Therefore, it is still not a possibility, it just has the potential to occur. — Bob Ross

We have to clarify the claim a bit. Does Smith know that Jones' pocket is the correct size to fit five coins? Further, Smith knows it is possible if Jones' pocket is that big that 5 coins could fit into that pocket. But as to whether there are five coins in there at this time? Smith has never seen Jones put the five coins in his pocket. Its plausible, not possible.

So Smith can know that its possible five coins can fit into a pocket of X size.
What is it Smith is saying is possible vs his speculation?
Is he saying he knows Jones' pocket is big enough to where it is possible to fit 5 coins? Is he speculating that there are 5 coins in Jones' pocket right now, even though there is no evidence? Is he trying to claim it is possible that Jones' slipped five coins into his pocket earlier when Smith wasn't looking?

Again, the term possible vs. speculation/plausible all results in the specific claims of what are being stated. I see nothing wrong with noting very clear states of Smith's limited knowledge and inductions.

If we allow Smith to decide what a context is, then it seems as though the epistemology is simply telling him to do whatever he wants (as long as he doesn't contradict himself). — Bob Ross

The epistemology is not telling Smith to do what he wants. The epistemology recognizes the reality that Smith can do whatever he wants. Of course if Smith does whatever he wants, he'll likely end up doing the wrong thing, and we can give a host of reasons to Smith to use certain contexts over others.

Imagine Smith has experienced 5 coins in Jones' pocket yesterday, but he hasn't today. Well, if the context revolves around time, then Smith still can't claim it is possible. — Bob Ross

Correct. What you're running into is what happens if you consider every context that a person could be in. The problem isn't the reality that anyone can choose any context they want. The problem is that certain contexts aren't very helpful. Thus I think the problem is demonstrating how certain contexts aren't very useful.

Also, I would like to point out, it wouldn't really make sense for Smith, although it is a speculation, to just merely answer the question with "I speculate he has 5 coins in his pocket", because Smith isn't necessarily claiming that Jones does have 5 coins, he is merely assessing the potentiality. Again, at a bare minimum, he would have to had experienced 5 coins in Jones' pocket before in order to claim it is possible. — Bob Ross

If Smith isn't claiming that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket, then he's speculating Jones could, or could not have 5 coins in his pocket. And if Smith had experienced that Jones had 5 coins in his pocket at least once, depending on the context, Smith could say it was possible that Jones had 5 coins, or did not have 5 coins in his pocket.

Most of the time we don't have that kind of oddly specific knowledge, therefore potentiality was born: it is a less strong form of possibility. — Bob Ross

Once again, this is describing speculation/plausibility. I'm still not seeing "potentiality" used any differently.

To sum it up, I think we need to clearly and concisely define "context", "possibility", "impossibility", and "potentiality". If I can make up whatever I want for "context", I could be so literally specific that there is no such thing as a repetitive context, or I could be so ambiguous that everything is possible. Then we are relying on "meaningfulness", or some other principle not described in your epistemology, to deter them from this. If so, then why not include it clearly in the epistemology? — Bob Ross

No disagreement in formulating what contexts would be useful, and not be useful to individuals and societies. The purpose of the original paper was simply to establish how knowledge worked. Now that we have this, we can definitely refine it. Since you have your own ideas on proposals for contexts that work, lets start with that.

Which leads me to my next question: when you say "unable to apply", what do you mean? — Bob Ross

When you think of something in your head that you distinctively know is not able to be applied. For example, if I invent a unicorn that is not a material being. The definition has been formulated in such a manner that it can never be applied, because we can never interact with it.

For example, let us say that a man uses a stick and shadows to determine the Earth is round, and calculate the approximate circumference. The only way to applicably know, is to travel the world and measure your journey.

I disagree. — Bob Ross

In your opinion you do, but can you disagree in application? Based purely on this experiment, its plausible that the Earth is round, and its plausible that the distance calculated is the size of the Earth. The actual reality of the diameter of the Earth must be measured to applicably know it. You have to applicably show how the experiment shows the Earth is round and that exact size. The experiment was close, but it was not the actual size of the Earth once it was measured.

I think one of the issues you might have with speculations, is that they are less cogent than the other inductions. That does not make them useless, or irrational. Recall that it is a hierarchy of induction. In the case of measuring the Earth with the experiment, at that that time, that was all they had to work with. While it was a speculation, it was the most reasonable induction that a person could work with at the time.

Perhaps one issue you have with the epistemology, is it puts humans into situations where they are powerless to know. That is an uncomfortable reality, but one that I cannot mitigate if I am to be consistent. We like to imagine we have a reasonable assessment of reality, and that we are reasonable people. We really aren't unless we train to be. Even then, there are limits.

However, I do have my worries, like you, about even calling them "speculations": a lot of enormously backed scientific theories would be a "credible speculative potential", which seems to undermine it quite significantly. — Bob Ross

It only undermines them if there are other alternatives in the hierarchy. If for example a scientific experiment speculates something that is not possible, it is more rational to continue to hold what is possible. That doesn't mean you can't explore the speculation to see if it does revoke what is currently known to be possible. It just means until you've seen the speculation through to its end, holding to the inductions of what is possible is more rational.

I believe irrational inductions should remain a contradiction with what is applicably known

I disagree, if what you mean by "application" is empirical evidence. I am claiming potentiality is applicably known (always). I can applicably know, in the abstract, that a logically unobtainable idea is irrational to hold. For example, take an undetectable unicorn: — Bob Ross

No, you can distinctively know that a logically unobtainable idea is irrational to hold. A logic puzzle must be reasoned before it can be distinctively known. Only applying the rules in a logical manner gets you a result. While we could invent a result in our heads to be anything, it fails when the rules of the logic puzzle are applied. Perhaps we're missing an identity, and this is where abstraction comes in. You'll recall that context was defined both distinctively, and applicably. Distinctive contexts could be called abstractions. To have distinctive knowledge, one must hold ideas that are non-contradictory within a particular context. Logic, is a context. So within the abstraction (distinctive context) of logic, we can conclude a correct and incorrect solution to a puzzle.

For a color blind person, I think they will be more than happy to accept that what is objective for them, isn't objective for other people. — Bob Ross

On the notion of objective, a color blind person would hold it to be objective would also be consistent within another color blind person. The subjective difference would be seeing the world color blind, versus with color. This is applicable context. What one can applicably know is based off of what one is applicably capable of. Applicable context can be subjective, or by a group of people. While I agree we cannot define "objective" as "true", I think it needs to remain in the realm of "Remaining uncontradicted by most contexts".

For me, "rationality" is a inter-subjectively defined concept. Therefore, we are not all rational beings (like Kant thought), but we are all reasoning beings. My goal, in terms of epistemology, is to attempt to make the arguments based off of reasoning, so as to make it virtually impossible for someone to deny it (if they have the capacity to understand the arguments). I agree that people don't have to be rational, but they are "reasonable" (just meaning "reasoning"). — Bob Ross

Can I clarify that I agree, but people have the capacity to reason with varying levels? Some people aren't very good at reasoning. Some people can reason, but follow emotions or whims more. The epistemology I've presented here is formed with reason. It can convince a person who uses reason. But it cannot convince a person who does not want to reason, or is swayed by emotion. All I am stating is you can't force a person to use reason, or be persuaded by reason if they don't want to be. I think on this you and I might agree.

Another good round of conversation! I will try to respond again this Saturday morning, but I will be gone for the rest of the weekend after.

The proposition is not a categorical one regarding behavior, there is no argument being made that humans always use their reason. — Garrett Travers

Then you agree with my point, and I've said nothing wrong.

The proposition is that humans survive using the application of reason, and reason is that means of survival.

but they also don't have to.
— Philosophim

In what way can you use anything else for survival? Keep the argument here, this is what you need to demonstrate. — Garrett Travers

Here you are now recanting what you just said earlier. You are saying humans MUST use reason to survive. But we've already both agreed that humans don't always have to be reasonable, and you can survive when you don't make reasonable choices.

We've already mentioned a few. I can overeat and be a few pounds overweight, even though I know its not reasonable to do so. It won't kill me. Lets go from the aspect of ignorance as well. Lets say I really like eating vegetables, but I don't know that they're healthy for me. It wasn't reason that makes me eat vegetables, its that they taste good.

I can have a hammer, yet use a screwdriver to bang on a nail.
— Philosophim

You just used reason to determine those tools could be used in a like manner, that's conceptualization. This is not a case of not employing reason. — Garrett Travers

You're arguing that if I have a hammer in front of me, using a screwdriver to beat a nail into the wall is reasonable? There is nothing reasonable about it. That's just an emotional whim. If you think that picking a screwdriver over a hammer is reasonable, please clarify how. Are you saying that reason is just creating concepts, but not their effective use?

Wrong. A grenade lands at your feet with 20 good people nearby. You have just enough time to cover your body over it and save the 19 other people around you.
— Philosophim

Non sequitur. This has nothing to do with the human's basic tool for survival. The introduction of force against reason is a violator of reason. This is irrelevant. — Garrett Travers

What? If reason cannot withstand force, then how do we survive when faced with force? If reason must be used to survive, then whenever someone uses force on a human being, do they just die? You are avoiding the point, and it is silly.

You aren't using reason correctly, this is making a bit more sense. Here's what reason is: think, understand, and form judgments by a process of logic.

None of this faculty is afforded to people who have grendades thrown at them, one will be forced to make a snap decision, reason has nothing to do with the equation, nor does this scenario address the proposition. — Garrett Travers

You are changing what reason is on a whim. First, my using a screwdriver instead of a hammer is somehow reasonable. You're saying I concluded I could use a screwdriver over the hammer by thinking, understanding, and forming judgements by logic. Yet there is no one reasonable in the world would think it is reasonable to use a screwdriver over a hammer.

I'm not asking you to make a snap decision. We're considering this now, so that when a time of judgement is needed, they've already used reason to determine what they will do. Soldiers consider this in places across the world. It is more reasonable in this situation to save the lives of 20 others. That means it is reasonable for you to lose your life.

And yet, that results in the loss of your basic survival. Meaning we have a very clear case of a situation in which we can reasonable conclude something that results in our death. We cease to survive, which has everything to do with the premise. Reason can lead to our survival, but does not necessarily lead to our survival.

Do animals need reason to survive?
— Philosophim

Animals have other evolutionary advantages for survival. We have evolved our reason. We do not have speed, senses, fangs, venom, claws, wings, talons, or any other advantage they have that has allowed them to survive in their respective environments. We only have reason as a means of survival. We barely have instinctual inclinations in any comparable way because of this evolutionary adaptation. — Garrett Travers

Again, if you're stating that we only have reason for survival, then we MUST use reason for survival. We have many instinctual inclinations, watch a few babies. Blow on their face and they hold their breath. Put something to suckle when they're hungry, and they do. It is not reason that makes a baby survive, it is the care and sacrifice of the involved parents. They put their own survival at risk for the child. But so do many other animals that lack reason.

If reason is: "

Here's what reason is: think, understand, and form judgments by a process of logic. — Garrett Travers

", and also implying that animals lack reason, then you need to show human actions apart from basic functions that animals do to survive, like eat, hunt, and defend themselves, are absolutely necessary.

It is not that reason is not invaluable, but it is a cherry on the cake. Survival does not require reason, if we are equating reason as something that other animals do not have.

Hey man, if you're not going to address the proposition, then take a hike. I'm not going around with you. This is not a categorical proposition describing behavior. That's the last time I'm addressing this before dismissing your arguments entirel. Either address the truth values of the propositions, or find another thing to discuss.[/quote]

I addressed your proposition clearly. Show me how I am wrong. Have you read your proposition clearly? Don't get mad at me. If I'm wrong, easily point out where I am misunderstanding the first proposition. You said humans use reason for their survival. I clearly pointed out they do not always use reason for their survival. They can use reason for survival, but they also don't have to. Where am I wrong? I can have a hammer, yet use a screwdriver to bang on a nail. Its not very effective, but I can. Do you understand?

If your first premise is simply, "Humans can reason," then my same arguments apply. This isn't hard to understand. I'm clearly addressing your points, stop avoiding them.

No, no it is not. Plenty of people are not reasonable in many day to day actions of their lives.
— Philosophim

Nobody performs actions that extenuate their lives that are unreasonable at base value. You'll actually have to provide an example of one for this assertion to be true. — Garrett Travers

Wrong. A grenade lands at your feet with 20 good people nearby. You have just enough time to cover your body over it and save the 19 other people around you. Or, you could quickly jump behind another person who is close by that did not notice the grenade, save yourself, and the grenade goes off killing almost everyone else. Isn't it reasonable to save the other 19 people? Saving my life would be unreasonable in this situation would it not? If it is not, then what value am I holding? That the deaths of 19 other people are worth my life?

Don't get vaccinated.
— Philosophim

That's a conclusion drawn through the application of reason. — Garrett Travers

While it could be, it can be made through ignorance and fear. My point again, not every decision is made through reason.

People overeat
— Philosophim

Eating is reasonable, overeating is damaging. The proposition is about how people survive. You're making my case for me. — Garrett Travers

No, I used this as an example to show you that people do not always make reasonable choices. You can have the capability to reason, but not use it.

React in anger or other emotions.
— Philosophim

This is not reason, this is the opposite. — Garrett Travers

That is my point. I think you understand my point now.

Reason, or rational thinking, is one aspect of humanity that it does not use exclusively.
— Philosophim

Humans must use it to survive. Again, not a categorical proposition. — Garrett Travers

100% incorrect. Do animals need reason to survive? Of course not. We are animals. We can survive through unreasonable, less effective, and sometimes outright dumb means. My point has been "we MUST reason" is incorrect. Demonstrate to me how we cannot survive in any way shape or form if we do not use reason.

Everything exists through natural processes, that's irrelevant. We have reason that we can use to survive, but we don't always use reason.
— Philosophim

Truth is the only thing that is relevant to any proposition, and whether or not one chooses to not use reason is itself a non sequitur. The premise must be addressed from the point of truth, or non-truth. You are choosing to not do so. — Garrett Travers

This told me nothing. Is it true that we don't always use reason in our day to day actions? Of course it is.

The premise states that humans developed reason through natural processes, and that reason is the human's means of survival. It is not a categorical proposition that describes what some, or all humans do with that reason. — Garrett Travers

Remove natural processes, because its irrelevant, and you have, "Reason is the human's means of survival." No, no it is not. Plenty of people are not reasonable in many day to day actions of their lives. People overeat. Don't get vaccinated. React in anger or other emotions. Rationalize behavior. Reason, or rational thinking, is one aspect of humanity that it does not use exclusively.

And no, she is not saying what people who use reason, necessarily do with it. That's fine. I'm simply pointing out that because she does not say what people must necessarily conclude with reason, that I can see situations in which reason would conclude in evil being committed against another person.

So again:

A. People do not use reason in all of their decisions.
B. Even if people use reason in a decision, the conclusion of that reason may result in evil.

Therefore the final premise: The only moral system of society is one in which each human is free to pursue their own values to live and achieve their own goals,

fails because people will often times do irrational things, which can result in immoral actions, or conclude values that are immoral to others in society. You're going to really have to rebuff what is stated here. No more statements about "What I'm not doing". If you want to play, its time to get in there and demonstrate why the above reasoning is wrong.

This first premise is simply untrue. Humans have the capability of using logic and rationality, but often times choose not to do so, or simply make logical and rational mistakes.
— Philosophim

So, what part is untrue? Not employing reason, does not negate the fact that we exist through natural processes, and have developed reason, as opposed to fangs, to survive. — Garrett Travers

Everything exists through natural processes, that's irrelevant. We have reason that we can use to survive, but we don't always use reason. Her other premises are built on the idea that we are all reasonable human being who will always do what is reasonable. We're not. Not everyone uses reason to survive in every day to day case.

P2. and if it is only through this conceptual faculty of reason that humans are capable of living a life according to the values he/she develops with said faculty

Simplifying this, you've stated, "It is only through reason that we can live our lives with values we have developed through reason."

Meaning if you don't act reasonably, you cannot obtain those values you've concluded with reason. Since many people are not reasonable, or do not always reason on every decision, many decisions by people do not meet these values. Further, I will note again, that someone can conclude values with reason that would require the murder, theft, or other harmful things to other people.

C. then the only moral system of society is one in which each human is free to pursue their own values to live and achieve their own goals[/quote]

1. If people do not always act reasonably, then the free pursuit of what they want (not necessarily values) will not be rational, and not be able to meet their values. Should people be free to do irrational things, like murder someone in anger?

2. If we go by the fact that we assume everyone is free to rationally pursue the values they have concluded from their rationality, it still leaves the problem that I can define my own values, and I can create values that are immoral and harmful to other people.

I'll play Garrett.

P1. if humans are generated by natural processes with reason (logic, rationality, conceptual faculty) being their means of survival. — Garrett Travers

This first premise is simply untrue. Humans have the capability of using logic and rationality, but often times choose not to do so, or simply make logical and rational mistakes.

Barring that, one can come to the logical conclusion that eliminating their neighbors would result in a boost in wealth or power.

With premise one invalidated, 2 and 3 fall.

You're doing that Internet trolling thing. — Joe Mello

No, I'm not, I'm trying to be kind and invite you to discuss.

Since you are not accepting the invitation today, we'll leave it for another time.

Perhaps you don't understand what the philosophy boards are about, which is fine. We're here to discuss claims beyond the general, beyond our every day experience. We ask each other to examine our assumptions and logic closely, trying to find flaws as well as new insights.

The person who has figured everything out, cannot do philosophy. No one can grant them greater insight, and no one can learn from them. That is because to communicate with another person, you must be willing to learn how another person thinks and see the world. It is letting a window into another aspect of the world, something only that person can provide. Sometimes seeing into that window provides nothing, but many times, in places you wouldn't expect, you find something new you've never seen before. Only a mind that realizes they have not figured everything out can do that.

If you want praise for your accomplishments as a painter, I will grant it! It is wonderful that you have worked hard on something your entire life and mastered it. But painting in itself is not philosophy. Many of the people you are reading from have accomplished great things elsewhere in their lives. It is irrelevant. Their background does not matter, only their logic and arguments.

If you would like to start a thread commenting on your life in a monastery, feel free. People here would not ask about you in your thread about your philosophical claim, because that would be considered rude. We are not here to talk about your background, we are here to talk about your philosophical claims.

There are a few masters on here who have devoted their lives to philosophy and discussion. Surely you as a painter understand that the mastery of one painting technique does not make you a master at one you've never done before? Your background with a religious view of philosophy might be well learned, but there are many aspects you have not likely encountered.

Come with humbleness, and listen as well as contribute. There is much to learn from others, as well as I'm sure much to learn from you.

And atoms and molecules are made of the same stuff. There is nothing in a molecule that is an extra element from an atom, like ice cubes are not greater than water, just frozen water.

But the first ancient bacteria was greater than the dead primordial soup it was swimming in because it possessed the quality of being a living being, which is not simply a more complex dead object. — Joe Mello

Aren't these two statements contradictory? Living things are made out of atoms and molecules. We are made up out of a complex interaction of "dead" objects. Atoms, molecules, cells, etc.

First, one must have in his or her mind an integral understanding of what makes up a thing -- its elements. And I don't mean its atomic number.

A living thing and a material object both have matter and take up space. But a living thing has an extra element, and not simply a quantitatively extra element but a qualitatively extra element. A living thing is alive. So, when we place a living thing and a material object before us, and as the only spokespersons for reality, we can proclaim with absolute certitude that a living thing is greater than a material object. — Joe Mello

All you've provided for the definition of elements is a descriptor. Elements are often thought to be fundamentals. But according to your original statement:

No combination of lesser things can create a greater thing without something greater than the greater thing added to the lesser things. — Joe Mello

So my guess is that life is the greater thing, but needs to be added to the lesser elements to create itself? I'm not stating that life is not greater than non-life, but how do you know this? This is important, because this will, I assume, take the premise that God is greater than life, and life needs God to exist. But how do we know God is greater? And is there something that is greater than God that is needed to create God?

I apologize for being "vague" about lesser and greater things. But I was so because I took for granted that people on a philosophy forum had learned and incorporated into his or her thinking this basic tenet of philosophy. — Joe Mello

I would work to avoid such language. It is tempting to believe we are intellectually superior to others for our own satisfaction. But that is all it is for, our own satisfaction. If that becomes the goal instead of a conversation about truth and discovery, truth and discovery will always take a back seat.

You have to put yourself in people's shoes. There are hundreds of people who post ideas monthly. Each has their own background and meaning for words. We need you to define what you personally mean before we can properly assess. In your case, you're going for a "classical" sense of greatness, but in many other posts, it could mean many different things.

People here will not rag on you if you keep an open mind, listen to their thoughts, and address them politely. Well, some people still will, but they aren't worth spending any time on. :D

Hello Joe, and welcome to the forums!

No combination of lesser things can create a greater thing without something greater than the greater thing added to the lesser things. — Joe Mello

This is a conclusion, but where are your premises? I don't think you have to write a massively long text, but how can we conclude this ourselves? What are lesser things? What is a greater thing?

Off the top of my head, I have a few counters to that counters to that conclusion. Isn't a molecule made up of atoms? But molecules do not make up atoms. Isn't a society made up of people? But a society does not create people.

Likewise, I thoroughly enjoy our conversations! I have a lot of respect for how well thought out your positions are! I don't think enough people on this forum give you enough credit where it is due! I just wanted to make sure that you are just as intrigued by this conversation as me (: — Bob Ross

Thank you! And yes, I am enjoying the conversation greatly.

Just as a quick example, in the abstract, I can legitimately determine essential properties X, Y, Z and (distinctly different) essential properties A and B to the same term. So when I refer to that term, it could be in relation to either one of those two essential property sets (so to speak), and there is no contradiction here to be found: ambiguity is not a contradiction (in the form of A is A and not A). — Bob Ross

The solution to this is to use contexts. If you recall my example of the word tree. One of my friends views a bush as a tree, while the other who has some knowledge of botany, considers that the essential properties of the "tree" do not match what he defines as a "bush". Yet, if the friend does not want to use the context of botany, there is nothing in reality that forces them to do so besides possible social ostracization and shame.

Although I think we both agree that the definitions that provide the most clarity should prevail, my dilemma is: "what justification do I have for that?". What in the epistemology restricts the other person from simply disagreeing? I found nothing stopping them from doing so. That is a worry for me, as it seems like, if I follow the trajectory of the epistemology in this manner, we end up with incomprehensible amounts of deadlocks (stalemates). — Bob Ross

I think your proof is great, I really have no disagreements with it. But there is a core assumption that we're making. That the person decides to be rational. You can never force a person to be rational. You can persuade them, pressure them, and give them the opportunity to be, but you can never force them to be. Knowledge is a tool. Someone can always decide not to use a tool. I could tell a person why they should use a screw driver to take the screws out instead of using pliers. But if someone wants to use pliers, even though its more difficult and less rational, that is their choice.

Likewise, I was wondering: "couldn't the other person just reject possibility (or some other induction hierarchy) as more cogent than plausibility (or some other induction)?". I think, as is, although you argue just fine for it, they could. They could utilize the most basic discrete and applicable knowledge principles in your epistemology to reject the hierarchy without contradiction. — Bob Ross

Again, this is true. I don't think its a problem for the epistemology, that a person can choose not to use it. I think the problem with the epistemology, is that it reveals that humans do not have to be rational. That is an uncomfortable notion. It not only reveals that about others, but about ourselves as well. How often have we rejected rationality in the pursuit of our own desires and biases? The idea of knowledge as some type of objective truth that forces us to follow reality is appealing. But at the end of the day, there is nothing that forces us to do so.

That being said, I wanted to point out a slight issue with your proof for the hierarchy. If you recall, I use math based on the distance from deductive certainty. Knowledge is 1, and any induction based off of that is less than one. Something like speculation is a culmination of knowledge and possibilities. So 1 * x (probability) * y (created speculation. I don't use the term "immediateness" because it isn't a clear and provable term. One could "immediately" conclude a speculation, but that doesn't make it more cogent then a long ago concluded probability.

The second idea I have been thinking of, to state it briefly, is what I can "axiomatic contracts". What I mean is that, in the case that something isn't strictly (rigidly) pon anchored, two subjects could still anchor it to pon with respect to an agreed upon axiom. For example, although my previous argument is much stronger (I would say), we could also legitimately ban ambiguity IFF the other subject agrees to the axiom that they want to convey their meaning to me. With that axiom in mind, thereby signing an "axiomatic contract", they would be obligated to provide as much clarity as possible, otherwise they would be violating that "axiomatic contract" by means of violating the pon. — Bob Ross

Nothing wrong with this either. The issue once again is, "its their choice". Its so nice to think that we could find an epistemology that is irrefutably rational, and everyone would line up to use it. The reality is, people are not motivated entirely by rationality. Even with the perfect epistemology, not everyone would be capable of, or willing to use it. But is this a problem with the epistemology I've proposed? No, I think this is just a reality of human kind, and a problem that any epistemology will run into.

Good morning Bob! My week was busy, but now I have time to reply with a cup of coffee in my hand. :)

Let me address your second post first. Your example in how to view essential and non-essential properties is 100% spot on.

I can understand your dislike with the term "plausibility". I came up with the term when I was first trying to separate that which had been applicably known, versus what was not applicably known. one of the considerations was tone. The initial inclination can be to dismiss plausibilities as lower level thinking. But the reality is, it is how we are able to discover anything new. I didn't want there to be an implicit suggestion that thinking in terms of plausibilities was innately wrong, its just when a person has a better alternative, it might be wiser to use a possibility or probability instead. And of course, any induction has an air of uncertainty until its applied to reality. Holding and using a possibility does not mean you are correct, even if it is more rational to do so.

The second point of using the word was to find something more fundamental. One word descriptions are easier to think on, and if you have to add qualifiers to it later, you only have to qualify one word. But, I can agree after our conversation that the word doesn't accurately convey what was intended in a simple or fundamental way. The idea of a something being plausible is purely in our minds; an abstract wish that we can seek out in reality.

So you are right. But with the above considerations, let me suggest some slight adjustments. I think the fundamental concept of 'speculation' is extremely good. A speculation conveys that it is an invention of the mind that you would seek to discover in application. I would not necessarily use the word "potential". Potential seems to me something reserved for probability and possibility, because we've applicably known them to exist at least once. If something is unknown to exist, does that mean it has potential? It seems too strong for speculation.

Speculation though seems to convey the attitude of what I was trying to define with "applicable plausibility". Sherlock Holmes speculates, and his reason is to find out the reality to the mystery. Speculation seems to confer the intelligence behind "applicable plausibilities", and that when other modes of reasoning are exhausted, we sally forth into the unknown seeking reality.

But of course, that leaves the lovely and incredibly useful word "potential" out in the cold again. I understand your draw to it, it defines many concepts conveniently. The problem is, "potential" is a word defined before I defined a split in knowledge between distinctive and applicable. While it is convenient, it has the same problem the old "knowledge" did. It is being implicitly used differently in many situations, and opens it up to confusing misuse and misinterpretation.

It is annoying to me that I can't find a good fit for the word, as it is to you. Its a perfectly darn good word, but how to fit it in without leaving ambiguity or confusion? The best I can think of right now is the use of the word to separate cogent inductions versus non-cogent inductions. As we've noted, probabilities, possibilities, and speculations all have potential, by the fact that they aren't contradicted in the mind. But is that enough? I don't think so. That is because potential is also used to convey what is applicable. For example, if it is possible that a person who wakes up every day at 8 am could potentially wake up tomorrow at 8 am, that's a distinctive potential. But if unknown to us, they died five minutes prior to our prediction, there is no applicable potential anymore.

Of course, that doesn't seem to make things any clearer. In the later case of applicable potential, I am addressing a reality that I have no knowledge of. Aren't all inductions prior to application in the same situation? Applicable potential seems to be a term when there is another party with knowledge, or in reference to the past. "I thought he would potentially wake up at 8 am today, but it turns out they had died last night". Or referencing the Gettier problem. "Smith thinks Jones potentially has 5 coins in his pocket, but we the audience knows, that he does not (thus this is not an applicable potential).

So does potentiality describe cogent inductions within one's context? Because in one context, its a plausibility might have distinctive potential, while in another, it does not. In a way, the word potential has been subsumed into cogency. Any speculation has distinctive potential, as if it did not, it would be an irrational induction then.

And that is my problem with the word potential. It seems to have been swallowed up by other terms. I can't find a unique and distinctive use of the word that serves a clear purpose anymore. Not that you should stop trying. I am merely conveying the difficulties using the word carries.

I still think "inapplicable plausibilities" is useful, but should take a refinement from my original declaration as you have noted. I had inapplicable plausibility defined as "that which we are unable to apply to reality at this time." For example, let us say that a man uses a stick and shadows to determine the Earth is round, and calculate the approximate circumference. The only way to applicably know, is to travel the world and measure your journey. But at the time you do this in ancient Greece, it is outside of you or societies capability to test such a claim.

Labeling such a speculation as irrational seems incorrect here. Think of many inventions such as the submarine thought of long before the technology was available to make it happen. I believe irrational inductions should remain a contradiction with what is applicably known. It serves a clear and distinct purpose with less ambiguity.

But, what of inapplicable plausibilities that can never be applied? For example, a unicorn that cannot be sensed? This does seem irrational. Or perhaps, lacks potential? Have we finally stumbled up on a use for the word? A speculation with potential, versus a speculation without potential? This seems to fit in with your subcategories earlier. If so, then perhaps we can state that what is potential is distinctive knowledge which is constructed in such a way as it has a clear of measure of how it can be applied to reality. Perhaps this is what you were trying to say, and I think this could "potentially" be useful.

I am still not sure if I am right in trying to logically tie the subject down to avoid deadlocks (as discussed in the previous post), but I have thought a starter point. Firstly, in order to be a "societal context", there must be some sort of inter-subjective or inter-objective agreement. If not, then it is not a "societal context"--and thereby is a "personal context". This cannot be contradicted as it is a deduced term. Secondly, the subject can hold a subjective claim and it's inter-subjective converse without contradiction. Likewise, the subject can hold an objective claim and it's inter-objective converse without contradiction. — Bob Ross

100% correct.

In regards to inter-objectivity and objectivity, this is what I tried to communicate with distinctive and applicable contexts. An applicable context refers to what someone can applicably discover. A blind person will never applicably know what it is like to see, and thus in communicating with someone who can see, there is this applicable context to consider. Distinctive context is when we essentially have different applied knowledge and inductions based on what we've formed in our own heads.

One great example is our discussion of the word "potential". You have a view of the word, and I have a view of the word. We are trying to discuss a use of the word that can satisfy both of our world outlooks. The issue is not that we are unable to attempt to apply the word as discussed, but what the meaning of the word should be between us and any others who would come along.

I have tried to avoid using the word "objective" within contextual differences, because I think there is something core to the idea of "objective" being something apart from the subject, or in this case, subjects. As you have noticed, there is a dissatisfaction if a person re-appropriates a word that is too far from our common vernacular. I believe a way to avoid this is to try to find the essential properties of the word that society has, and avoid adjusting those too much. In this case, I think objective should avoid anything that deals with the subject, as I believe that counters one of the essential properties that society considers in its current use of the word.

Fantastic thoughts, and please continue at it. I will address your first post shortly.

Ok, I am glad we've figured out each other's points! I have no objection to you noting the order in which we assessed the theory. Yes, thoughts were used to create the pon, to create the term discrete experience. My point, is that out of all the things I could know first, and build all other knowledge off of, discrete experience was fit the fundamental I needed.

From there, I can then then show that the logic of discrete experience justified pon. That is because I cannot discretely experience something that is both 100% one thing, and 100% a different thing. I can then use discrete experience as a base to know thoughts. And so on.

But at this point, this may just be a matter of difference that we understand, and have to accept with each other. There is nothing wrong with that. I have the highest respect for your thinking, and it is the different outlook of every person that sees the world in their own viewpoint that adds our understanding. We also may be cutting hairs as well. I've already noted that you absolutely must be able to think to figure out that you discretely experience. I think we're just having a disagreement over "fundamental", and that's pretty insignificant at this juncture.

I do want you to address your other problems with the theory. How do you define meaningfulness? To your point, you can define anything however you want within distinctive knowledge. But when you apply that to reality, it must be able to persist without reality contradicting it. So, there is that limiting factor.

And yes, you can create the same word and apply two separate concepts to it. There is nothing in reality that prevents you from doing so. Here is an example of a famous Chinese poem that has 94 characters that all sound the same. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lion-Eating_Poet_in_the_Stone_Den#:~:text=%22Lion%2DEating%20Poet%20in%20the,Standard%20Mandarin%2C%20with%20only%20the

However, I would argue this isn't the best practice in most cases, and should be minimized. That is because the only way to tell the difference between the identical symbols, is the context that they are used in. Contextual word choice is already slippery enough within cultural context, so having formal definitions that should hold within most contexts can help with consistency of thought and application.

So these are things I've thought about, and there is a strength to them that you might not be aware of. As such, I want to hear from your thoughts first. Taking the theory as I've noted it, please note your issues. Don't worry, I am enjoying myself in these conversations. That being said, if you tire of them, feel free to let me know without any guilt or worry. I would like you to enjoy them as well, and not feel forced or pressured to continue.

I think this helps a little. Here is what I am saying.

A subject is a discrete experiencer. I am a discrete experiencer. They are one and the same for the most primitive of knowledge. You cannot ask the question, what am "I" without realizing there is a separation of "yourself" from "something else". You cannot discretely experience, if you do not exist. You cannot exist, if you do not discretely experience. You are not a lens, you are a discrete experiencer.

When breaking down the fundamentals of knowledge, what is it that must be known first? An I? Or discrete experience? The answer is discrete experience. While you cannot discretely experience if you are not first an "I", you cannot even comprehend what an "I" is, without discretely experiencing. To have the most primitive notion of "I", you must divide your experience into "I", and "Not I". "This" and "that".

I can doubt what "I" am without the knowledge of discrete experience. I could say I was a conscious being that transcends physical existence. Or a brain. Or "I" am someone one second, and a few seconds later, "I" am someone else. It is nebulous and unknowable.

If I realize I discretely experience, that is the one thing I can claim clearly, and without contradiction. "I" am a discrete experiencer. From that, "I" have a foundation to build knowledge from. If I am a discrete experiencer, then logically, what is the best way to discretely experience? And thus the theory goes.

The question is, "Can you come up with something more fundamental that you can distinctively and applicably know, prior to being able to discretely experience?"

I think this is missing my point, as it is framed in a way where it is impossible for me to do so: "distinctively and applicably know" is within the discrete experience "framework", so to speak. And, as far as I am understanding you, this coincides quite nicely with your view of discrete experience being something of which I cannot possibly counter with a more fundamental. — Bob Ross

If that is the case, then that means I have created a fundamenal claim for the theory. Of course, my logic from that fundamental may be flawed. It has seemed to me you are questioning that fundamental, which is what I've been trying to defend. But if this fundamental is not being challenged, where and what does the theory fail at obtaining?

This is why I think we are deriving in two completely different senses of the term. This is the challenge: you are not starting with a "discrete experience", you are starting with a "thought". The "thought" which states that thoughts itself are "discrete experiences", etc. — Bob Ross

How do I know what a thought is, if I do not first discretely experience? Using a higher level concept to discover a lower level concept does not mean the higher level concept is more fundamental than the lower level concept. We only discovered atoms because of science that was not based upon upon understanding atoms. Does that mean that the science that discovered atoms, is more fundamental than the atoms themselves? No.

If I had to guess, because you've been noting chronological use and chicken and egg scenarios, I think you are going in another direction from what I mean by fundamental. I do not mean a fundamental as a means of chronological use. I mean its smallest constituent parts. When I break down what I can know without challenge or contradiction, I find nebulous and unprovable assertions. But there is one assertion which cannot be countered. There is discrete experience. I am a discrete experiencer. Come all the details of an "I", or the types of discrete experiences, this is a fundamental which I know.

It doesn't matter why I discretely experience. It doesn't matter that I used thoughts, language, and my brain to discover that I discretely experience. That doesn't change the fact is a fundamental of knowledge that I discovered. Is this what you've been trying to tell me? That if I use language to put discrete experience as a comprehensible sign, that language is more fundamental than the ability to discretely experience?

I'll take your thoughts from here Bob.

Thanks for your reply Bob! Lets see if we can get this figured out between us.

Now imagine that everything you do, thoughts, feelings, light, sound, etc, are the light that streams in from a lens. You don't comprehend anything but the light. The sea of existence. But then, you do. You are able to separate that "light" into sound and sight.

I am understanding this as what is scientifically typically considered "sensations". Am I correct? — Bob Ross

I don't want to use the term sensations, as its not a very clear term. Some people think it means "from the senses". Some people think it means thoughts. I want you to imagine a camera taking in light. Then I want you to imagine the first step that you do with that light. Why are you able to see color differences? Why are you able to see a sheep in a field? When you hear a breeze, why is it that the color and sound don't blend together? How can you see something within everything you're experiencing, when an inanimate object does not. How we do, is for science to understand. But for knowledge, all we need to know, is that we do.

You live in a sea of existence, and you can part and parcel it. That's anything you do. Anything. Any "thing" you do. Does this make sense now? You are a "thing" that can experience other "things" instead of an amorphous wave of existence within the sea that does not know where it is, what it is, what things are, simply subsumed by the sea it will never realize it is part of.

I am going to short circuit your mail analogy here to show you what I am saying. Imagine there is nothing (which is really everything, but you can't discretely experience). Now you have an envelope in your hand. Suddenly, there is some "thing". That's all a basic discrete experience is.

Anything that comes after that is subsumed in the theory I've put forward. That's manifestation, differentiation, and conceptualization, as I defined it previously. The envelope manifests. You differentiate its parts. You conceptualize the letter inside as you read it.

You don't have to read the envelope. You don't have to have certainty. But you experience the envelope appearing in your hand. You could be certain about it, or doubt it, that's your choice. The point I'm trying to make, is that you aren't going prior, or deeper than where I've started. Whatever you're envisioning beyond the point of the envelope appearing in your hand, requires you to have discretely experienced the envelope in the first place. That is the thing you have no choice in. If you start with any "thing", then you are starting with a discrete experience, and you cannot escape it. As for "certainty", what is certainty in your mind? Does that mean I know? That I believe strongly? It seems the word "certainty" cannot exist without belief or knowledge, in which case we are entering the step of deciding whether I have a belief, or distinctive knowledge. But this does not negate the fact that you could not have certainty about any thing, without having the ability to discretely experience.

Regardless, the envelope is the start, not the reading or the the feeling of certainty. To counter that discrete experience is the first fundamental that I can know, you must show something that comes prior to discrete experience that I can know as a fundamental. And Bob, you can't, because it requires that you have discrete experience as a fundamental, to debate that discrete experience is a fundamental. There is the ability to not have discrete experience, in which you are merely a lens, an object. Then there is the ability to have discrete experience. There is nothing in my mind more fundamental to know, then discrete experience.

My point is that, although you are right in everything you have said, this is all obtained knowledge pertaining to how you derived yourself (or how you, thereafter, derived someone else in relation to themselves). — Bob Ross

Yes! If we understand each other correctly, knowledge is derived from our base ability to discretely experience. I've never stated anything else.

This is contrary to “just chronological precedence”, which maybe we could call this simply "that which is deriving or that which is required for the consideration in the first place". The chicken derives that it came from an egg: that derivation requires it in the first place. It could very well be, even given that it makes the most logical sense (or may even be considered necessary) that the chicken came from the egg, this is all formulations of that chicken. What if this "truth", that it must come from the egg, is simply that which is a product of cognition? — Bob Ross

If you want to use chronological precedence, that is fine. But I'm not using that term. I'm not sure why chronological precedence is important here. You need atoms to exist, but you don't have to talk about atoms to look at your watch and tell time. You just need to know the signs of time, and then see if your watch matches those signs. If the watch existed before you learned about it, I don't see that being important to whether you applicably know watches exist later on, unless I'm missing something you're trying to convey.

I've noticed you've been using the word truth. I've never claimed knowledge is truth. Its merely a rational means of applying our discrete experience in such a way, that we are the least likely to be in contradiction with reality. "Truth" is defined within my theory of knowledge as being the combination of all possible contexts, and their applications to reality without contradiction. It is something plausibly unobtainable.

I want to be clear, you can applicably know things in one context, that would not be knowledge in another context. I might look at a pear and an apple, and define them both as an apple in my context without contradiction from reality. However, someone with the distinctive knowledge of both a pear and an apple could come along and state that I'm ignorant, and one is a pear, while the other is an apple. Both of us applicably know different things within our contexts.

Just look at science over the years. It is recorded with instances of people that applicably knew things that today, with our expanded distinctive knowledge and expanded tool set, applicably know as false. It doesn't mean that the scientists back then did not applicably know their own theories. They did within their context.

When we analyze a brain, it is an interpretation of a brain via a brain. Therefore, you will only know as much as is allowed via your brain's interpretation of that brain it is analyzing. — Bob Ross

Yes, you have it! Did you know there are certain people who cannot visualize within their mind? They can never applicably know what it is like to visualize in their mind. The limits of what we can applicably know are limited by our distinctive context. If you want, skim through part 3 again for a reminder. That which cannot be discretely experienced can never be applicably known.

Do you think it must necessarily be the case that it comes from the brain, or that it must necessarily be the case in relation to itself? — Bob Ross

No. All that I am stating that cannot logically or applicably be contradicted by reality, is that I discretely experience. Everything else is the act of logically applying that discrete experience in a way that gives me the best chance of not being contradicted by reality. If current science concludes that the brain is the physical source of our "being", then that is the applicable knowledge we have within our current context of history. But, its plausible we're wrong. Still, we'll take what we applicably know today and work with that, than what could plausibly be known tomorrow.

Back to your envelope argument. I found it mostly confusing and away from the point. I wanted to address certain points of the argument, but realized that as it was intertwined with a lot of premises that do not make sense, or have missed the point of what discrete experience is, that it would be best to reorient to the fundamental premise, and drop most of the envelope argument entirely.

The point I want to make, is at the part where you say "an envelope appears in my hand," then you've described a discrete experience. Anything else is simply details about discrete experience, like thoughts, concepts, etc. And at that point, you've accepted my initial premise of the knowledge theory. If you have, then the rest follows as its unfolded. Anything after the envelope is simply a refinement or debate about the details of how thoughts form, concepts interact, etc. But none of that counters the origin and logic of the theory I've put forward.

The question is, "Can you come up with something more fundamental that you can distinctively and applicably know, prior to being able to discretely experience?" If you can, then yes, you've challenged the theory. But if not, the theories initial premise from which everything is built off of, stands. Of course perhaps there is a problem in the next step of the theory. But to counter the initial premise of the theory, you have an incredibly high, and in my mind, impossible bar to challenge.

Regarding implicit knowledge:

So there's two aspects needing to be addressed here. One aspect, which was my initial intention for the term “implicit”, is simply the acknowledgment that we, once we say we "know" something, may induce that that thing we know now was occurring the whole time prior to us knowing it (in light of us knowing it). — Bob Ross

This is an induction. An induction, is not knowledge. An induction is a belief with a degree of cogency. Your second aspect used the envelope analogy again, which I believe accidently wandered away from what was being discussed. Perhaps what would help, is if you use the analogies I've already provided, so that way we're using a similar base. The analogies I provide come from my understanding of the theory, so you can be confident I will understand what you are trying to convey if you use them.

At this point, I am still not seeing that we can have implicit knowledge, as it seems you are describing either

1. Having discrete experience, which is something that we can ascertain with knowledge, is known in the act of experiencing it.
2. Beliefs, which are inductions of varying cogency.
3. Accidental knowledge, or conclusions that we have arrived at using the process of knowledge, without knowing that we actively used the process of knowledge.

I hope this focusses the points, and that I'm accurately pointing out the main contentions so far. Please let me know if I've missed anything. I am also sorry that I did not tackle a few of your points within the envelope arguments that I think had merit. It is just that in doing so, I think it would have presented confusion because of the flawed premises within the envelope argument they were tied with. Thanks again Bob, great discussion as always!

"Cancel Culture" is a term invented by people who don't want society to ever give them negative consequences for saying or doing certain things. In this instance, it is from a group that likes being selfish and self-centered. You can't justify being selfish and self-centered, so the strategy is to make people feel bad for being against their selfishness and self-centeredness.

One common thread through the history of philosophy will always reveal a trend for humanity to attempt to justify selfishness and self-centeredness in some way.

Thank you Bob. I think we are both struggling here to convey each other's intentions. I'm going to take another stab at describing discrete experiences once again, because I believe you are making it more complicated then I ever intended. On the flip side, it could be that what I am saying is too simple for your liking, and perhaps you understand it, but disagree that is what it could be because it does not cover certain complexities you see that I do not.

First, what do I mean by the sea of existence? Think of a camera lens. All a lens does, is take in light. It cannot section the light into different wavelengths. It cannot detail or zoom in on one part of the light over the other. It is the receiver.

Now imagine that everything you do, thoughts, feelings, light, sound, etc, are the light that streams in from a lens. You don't comprehend anything but the light. The sea of existence. But then, you do. You are able to separate that "light" into sound and sight. Technically, this is the brain. If you had no brain, all the pulses from your eardrums and the light hitting the back of your eyes would mean nothing. The brain takes that mess of light, and creates difference within it. Manifestation, differentiation, conceptualization, whatever you want. There is nothing more complicated to discrete experience, then the act of there being light through a lens, and then that something that can take it apart into individual identity. It is as basic as a camera sending a picture to an AI, and an AI can identify different parts of the picture.

With this, lets address your idea of manifestation. I realize I did not understand what you meant by it, and maybe still don't. Lets try using the theory. What are the essential properties of a manifestation? If its not a discrete experience, can you explain what makes it different?

For my part, I will attempt to convey how I have interpreted it. It seems when you speak of manifestation, it seems to be the act of awareness of an identity. Now when I say identity, I don't mean words that describe that identity. I mean the act of experiencing a "thing". If I saw a red squirrel, its not the identification of a red squirrel, or the comparison of that squirrel to other things. It is the blob of color, movement and action that makes it a "that".

To me, this is just the most basic form of discrete experience. It is the fact that I am currently discretely experiencing "that". The way I've been interpreting the rest is as such.

Differentiation - The discrete experience of comparison between two or more identities.
Conceptualization - The act of analysis on a discrete experience that defines it as something memorable (possibly the addition of a defintion or descriptive word)

So from my understanding, you are simply adding different degrees of discrete experience. But none of this changes the logic or the outcome of the theory. It only refines with additional identities, the levels of discrete experience that one can have. This is no different from my fundamental of identifying thoughts and sensations. Both are discrete experiences, just different identities.

You first have a manifestation, an interpretation, and then, only after, can it be concluded that one necessarily discretely experiences. — Bob Ross

If I my definitions are correct, then this makes sense to me. No quibbles at all! What I think you have been confused on, is that they are all discrete experiences, and are simply different identities that do not counter what I'm stating, but are refinements of what I'm stating. I'm stating A -> B. You're stating A -> a.1 -> a.2 -> B.

I don't think you can apply a tool of knowledge to that which is immediately known. I think you are attempting to acquire, holistically, all the knowledge you can claim to have via a tool: I don't think it makes sense to claim you can "know" something via a tool, yet you "do not know" the manifestations that were required for the tool of knowledge in the first place. — Bob Ross

What I am claiming is that knowledge is a process that we can use to logically determine that which is most likely to not be contradicted by reality. You can use the process without being aware of it. If you are aware of the process of knowledge, and you use that process of knowledge, you can determine what you know. If my definition of your three definitions works for you, I conclude that these types of discrete experiences are all distinctive knowledge. That is because when we apply the process of knowledge to them, we realize they are simply part of our ability to discretely experience, and are of our own design.

If I manifest a pink elephant (using my example with discrete experience), then there is nothing which contradicts the fact that I do in fact, manifest a pink elephant. With the process of knowledge, I can conclude this manifestation is something I know. Without understanding the process of knowledge, I could of course doubt that what I am manifesting, is what I am manifesting. And without the understanding the process of knowledge, I could also NOT doubt that what I am manifesting, is what I am manifesting. But I need a logical process to make this more than a belief. One can believe in something that is not contradicted by reality. But what makes it knowledge, is the process one follows to arrive at that conclusion.

Looking at a manifestation, a basic discrete experience, we can logically conclude that what we manifest, is something we know we manifest. The manifestation itself is not contradicted by reality. Thus this is part of distinctive knowledge. I can also differentiate the pink elephant manifestation from a grey elephant manifestation. "This" is not "that". Finally, I can start conceptualizing that I will call both "elephants" and one is "pink" while the other is "grey".

All of this is what my theory covers. This is not a counter to what I'm stating, it is in fact, what I am stating. I just never subdivided the process of discrete experience to your level, which I think is well done! But your introduction of more identities does not introduce the idea of "implicit knowledge". One cannot have knowledge, without following the process of knowledge. If one follows the process of knowledge without knowing they are, that is accidental knowledge, not implicit.

I'll define what I see "implicit" as meaning. "Implicit" seems to me that it is implied or natural. Knowledge can never be implied or natural, because it is a clearly defined process. It doesn't mean we can't conclude that others accidently know things. I can conclude that an ant knows the manifestation of dirt and sugar, and also claim that it does not know the words "dirt" and "sugar" that could be conceptualized about that manifestation. Perhaps the ant follows a process with its manifestations to know that sugar is edible, while dirt is not. And perhaps that process, is the process of knowledge put forth. But can the ant "know that it has knowledge"? With our current understanding of ant intellect, no.

How do you know its knowledge?

My point is that you are immediately given, granted, the knowledge that you "know" that you are questioning how you know its knowledge. I am in agreement with you that a tool would be required to evaluate the truth of the content, so to speak, of the question itself, but not the question as immediately manifested. — Bob Ross

How do you know that what is manifested is knowledge? Without a process of knowledge, you don't. Without knowing what the process of knowledge is, you cannot know that you know anything. A manifestation is nothing but a discrete experience. How we evaluate that logically is either a belief, or knowledge. Again, you could use the process of knowledge to know it, without knowing the process of knowledge. You would know it, from our outside perspective, but you yourself would not know that you know it. Again, this is accidental knowledge, not implicit. We are not born with an innate understanding of knowledge, most of us are born with the capability to use the process of knowledge.

Again, to determine the truth in terms of the content, or proposition, of a belief, it requires a tool. But you immediately know that you are having a belief as it was immediately manifested as such. In other words, the belief that there is a red squirrel in my room would require a tool of knowledge to obtain whether it is true or false, but the belief itself (as a belief) is necessarily known immediately — Bob Ross

To clarify. I do not immediately know I am having a belief. I have to determine that. And yes, with the process of knowledge, I can determine that what I manifest, what I differentiate, and what I conceptualize are all forms of distinctive knowledge.

I believe this is essentially what you are trying to say. You believe that manifestations are implicitly known, while I am stating manifestations are the act of discrete experience, and by using the logical process of knowledge proposed here, we can determine that manifestations, differentiations, and conceptualizations, are all acts of discrete experience. And the act of discretely experiencing "I discretely experience" is something which cannot be contradicted by reality. As such, we know that we discretely experience, and we can label what we discretely experience as "distinctive knowledge".

My challenge to you, is for you to demonstrate how you implicitly know that you manifest without first showing the process of what knowledge is. Clearly define the word, and apply it to reality without contradiction. As it is now, I cannot agree that there is innate knowledge within humanity. We are innately capable of knowing, but we are not innately capable of knowing what knowledge is, and thus are incapable of innately claiming we know things without the knowledge of that process.

One final mention, as I believe the rest is just repetition over this subject.

As I mentioned before, we cannot discretely experience a contradiction. Because experiencing a contradiction, in the very real sense of experiencing something as 100% identical and both 100% not identical to another concept is something we cannot experience.

Again, this isn't because we applied the principle of noncontradiction and found it not to contradict, therefore we obtained such knowledge, we simply "know" it because it is manifested necessarily that way. — Bob Ross

I am quite certain that someone out there could claim "I know the principle of noncontradiction is wrong innately". You would then ask, "How do you know"? And they would ask you, "How do YOU know the principle of noncontradiction is real?" Someone could very well believe and live with the idea that contradictory things exist. What about a God that is all good, all powerful, and all knowing? Or a being that exists outside of time? These are all contradictions that some people swear they know is true. It is not that people cannot follow the process of knowledge, it is that people do not innately know what knowledge is. Only after discovering what knowledge is, can a person identify what they know, versus what they do not know.

Has this clarified what each of us is trying to communicate to the other? I must also add that I think your division of manifestation, diffentiation, and concpetualization are fantastic, and wonderful additions to the theory (if I have the proper understanding of your intentions)!

There simply needs to be some logic that implies what that first and last character is.
— Philosophim
Re-read the questions. There are 3 questions, in order of appearance:

What is the third character (number, letter, or symbol) you will type to solve this?

How many different characters will you type to solve this?

What is the first character you will type to solve this? — L'éléphant

Later he posted the original question off of the website, and it was found to have some different wording. Also, the answer to all three were to be combined to be placed into a URL. Meaning there was only one answer. He was communicative up until the point we started questioning if the answer had anything to do with url functionality, like /2/ or #2# (as part of the question was how to get to the next page from the current page).

I think he took a look again at it, and realized he missed something important, because the questions as they are have no logic which shows what the first and last letter must be. I believe he was embarrassed and pulled the questions.

the middle number is 2, and the first and last must be the same character
— Philosophim

The puzzle doesn't stipulate that "how many" must be answered with a numeral. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I was going to double check the OP, but noticed he's removed it entirely. DavidJohnson, if there was an issue or a mistake in the post, no worry, it happens.

Thanks for the clarification. I'm going to assume it has nothing to do with url logic then. I think its pretty obvious at this point the middle number is 2, and the first and last must be the same character. There simply needs to be some logic that implies what that first and last character is.

If there is nothing dealing with the url, my final stab is that its some ambiguity with the phrase itself, such as "you will type to go to <3> from here" meaning litterally typing 'to go to <3> from here". Which I hope not, because that wouldn't be logical, just ambiguous. I really hope you're sitting on an answer that will be clear as the sun once its revealed, with no ambiguity or phrase interpretation needed.

The forward slash is already there so there's no reason to delete it and then re-type it. The previous answer wasn't "/r17h". It's just "r17h". — DavidJohnson

Just to be clear, I'm not stating to delete and retype the /. The .com/ is still there, as well as the r17h. Because it states "from here", I'm assuming nothing is deleted. Thus r17h/2/. But, you've noted there is no / in the answer, so that eliminates that.

That does mean that it will be r17hsomethingElseHere without a /. I'll think on it some more.

It can't have anything to do with URLs, because the original post, before it was edited, described the puzzle without mentioning URLs. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Unless of course the OP missed that point. They'll let me know soon enough.

Ok, I'll take a stab at it now. Knowing a little bit about how urls work, I would make this guess.

/2/

Why?

The previous url is still in there. It specifically states, "to go to <3> from HERE. The way a url structure works is every page has an address, and because this is an old website, we can conclude it is not a single page application. As such, each / divides the location.

So taking the previous answer of /r17h, your first character would need to be a /. Questions 1 and 3 necessitate they are the same character. That leaves 2 as the only answer for the number of distinct characters. The final url would then be /r17h/2/

Is this correct?

The website's no longer up but I've saved the original pages and translated these three questions as best as I can to work in a stand-alone setting. Maybe I should upload the previous pages/puzzles so people have more context and are better able to lock-in a solution. I doubt it will help but who knows. — DavidJohnson

It might. Its really appreciated that you want to give us a nice logic puzzle, I just think something is missing.

OP, a logic puzzle should only have one solution. The way you've typed this, there is more than one solution, period. This means it is not a logic puzzle. Go back and carefully re-read your problem. If you got it from somewhere else, then make sure its accurately reposted. If you made this up yourself, it is either not conveying accurately what is intended, or you made a mistake in your formulation.

Let me point out a few flawed specifics.

First, there are only 3 questions, not four. You say "the answer" would be abc. The answer to what? Clearly state what the fourth question is for this answer. Is the fourth question, "What is the non-spaced answer to all three questions?"

Next, the other three questions need clearer reference. What is "this"? Is this intended to be the answer to the fourth question? So if I typed 1 for the first question, its the first number I will type to answer question four? Or is "this" in refence to the question itself, in which case it would be any number I chose.

Please look at this again and amend it to be clear, and ensure there can only be one solution.

Absolutely spot on post Bob. I think we're on the same page here, and I have to compliment you greatly for trying to refine what I am stating.

My theory is what we'll call, elementary, and general. The point is to widely capture certain broad concepts, and show how they interact with each other. Discrete experience could be noted as a general word with very clear, but basic essential properties. Its as if I'm using the word "tree" to describe all plants that are made up of wood. You are coming along and noting, "Aren't trees tall and have on e trunk? What about this bush has a couple of trunks and is short?" You and I are not in any disagreement.

Essentially I am in an incredibly broad context, while you are trying to narrow and detail it. It is excellent. Let me address you're points and see if I can show how we're on the same page.

As you seem to be using "discrete experience" as something more fundamental than "differentiation", but, where the confusion lies, at the same time, you seem to be also attempting to use them synonymously. — Bob Ross

A pine tree and an oak tree are different trees. But they are still trees. Discrete experience is a tree. Differentiation an oak tree. Conceptualization is a pine tree. At the end of the day, they are both trees. For a certain context, identifying types of trees is not important. For example, when first introducing what a tree is. But then, a curious mind might say, "But isn't there a difference between an oak and a pine tree?" Yes. Yet both are still trees. And this is what I'm noting with differentiation and conceptualization. They are both still at their core, discrete experiences.

The reason I chose "concept" is that it is a purposely vague manifestation of an idea, which is (I think) the best term I could come up with for conveying a fundamental, rudimentary point of manifestation. It is like a "thought", but not completely analogous: it isn't truly thinking of itself, for that is a recursively obtained concept that one thinks--which is not necessary for a concept to manifest. Likewise, it isn't thinking in itself, because thinking of itself is required for such. Therefore, I call it "conceptualization": the act of manifesting a concept (or concepts). When I use the term "concept", I don't mean high-level discernment of things: all of it is a concept and concepts can be built off of one another. Everything is manifested as a concept, including "differentiation" itself. This may just be me using the term wrong, but I wanted to clarify my use of the term. — Bob Ross

If conceptualization is useful as a word, then simply follow the process. Discretely experience the word in your mind. Make it have essential properties that are non-synonymous, or distinct enough from another word as to be useful so that it is distinctive knowledge. Then, apply it to reality without contradiction. If you can do it once, then you have applicable knowledge that such a word is useful in reality.

It is not that I disagree with your attempt at proposing conceptualization. For my purposes, I have clear and broadly defined words that follow the process of knowledge. From discrete experience, I define thoughts, sensations, and memory. Then I apply them to reality. The issue with your current definition of conceptualization, is it isn't clear enough to show how it is separate enough from other useful words that can be applied to reality, and I'm not sure you've successfully applied it to reality yet without contradiction.

But, I understand the intuition. There does seem to be something different from the act of first identifying "this" from "that", then adding a concept to it. For my purposes, its just a definition. But perhaps "conceptualization" covers that which is not yet clear enough from the definitions used so far. In a way, it is not a discrete experience, but a fuzzy experience. It is not clearly cut out of the sea of existence, but a murky pair of binoculars that you are trying to focus into view. For my initial purposes, I did not dwell on this concept, because it did not help me get to the end. This was the refinement I thought others would introduce. So please do not take my notes as discouragement. Continue please. I just think the clarity isn't quite there yet on the definition, so lets keep trying!

I am fine with your definition of "discrete"; however, when you say "I was looking for a fundamental", are you implying a fundamental that we must conceptualize to deem it so, or the point of manifestation required for that conceptualization in the first place? — Bob Ross

No. I was looking for a fundamental to describe the reason why we are not like an eyeball or a camera. "Fundamental" in this case is trying to come up with a concept that does not depend or minimizes anything within its constituent parts to understand it. It is why I note we do not need to know why we discretely experience, it is simply an undeniable fundamental that we do. We are not beings that simply take in all existence at once without the capability of creating distinction within it. We are able to take that mess of sensation and thoughts, and create distinction. That is what I call discrete experience. Perhaps the word "discrete" is too strong to describe the different levels of distinction we can create. It is more like a fuzzy separation that we can continue to focus until we are at a comfortable enough level that it is useful to us. The attempt to describe this level of acceptable focus to an individual is "context".

I think this is a perfect segue into "knowledge". I don't think there are only either induced or deduced (or distinctive and applicable) knowledge: there is immediately acquired knowledge, mediated deductive knowledge, and mediated inductive knowledge. — Bob Ross

Immediately acquired knowledge - that which is directly manifested (as a concept, I would argue) and, thereby, is immediately known. — Bob Ross

This is simply a discrete experience as I describe it. "This" is not "that" is known by fact, because it is not contradicted. Of course, how do we know that a contradiction means it cannot be known? Because "This" cannot be separate from "That" if "This" is also identical to "That". It is a fundamental of discrete experience. To have a blend of something that you cannot discretely experience, means it is part of the sea of existence. Are the desk and keyboard in front of you both 100% separate and 100% not separate? If this were the case, you could not discretely experience them. At best, you can make a new word that describes both concepts together.

As I've noted earlier, math is the logic of discrete experience, which all starts with the identification of a "this" (1) the ability to group more than one "this" together (2), equality of discrete experience, and inequality of discrete experience.

(Immediately acquired knowledge continued) perception, thought, and emotion of manifestations of themselves — Bob Ross

All are discrete experiences. Or as mentioned earlier, "fuzzy experiences" that we can focus into greater clarity. We can create definitions to bring focus to those concepts, but the act of those concepts themselves does not require a definition to occur. If I am experiencing the emotion of happiness, one may question the degree or where it fits into my greater outlook on the world, but may not question the fact that currently, that is what I'm discretely experiencing itself.

and, more importantly, any conceptualizations of manifestations of themselves that may stem from any of the aforementioned. — Bob Ross

If you mean, "I experience "happiness" and now I'm going to create a new term called "happiness" to describe it," then yes.

Mediated deductive knowledge - that which is deduced based of off immediately acquired knowledge. — Bob Ross

For example, I have an immediately acquired knowledge of "emotion" in terms of manifestation of itself, but the conclusion of the concept of "emotion", holistically, required the use of the individual concepts of feeling (such as pain and pleasure) to deduce it (this is "emotion" from manifestation of itself--it is the deduced knowledge which was deduced by the of manifestations of itself). I call it mediated, because, although "emotion" of manifestation and from manifestation of itself are both conceptualized (manifested as a concept), one concept is clearly mediated by the immediate forms of knowledge while the other is, well, immediately known. — Bob Ross

I believe you've blended implicity knowledge and mediated knowledge here. I noted that I can create "distinctions about distinctions". I can see a sea of grass, a blade of grass, and a piece of grass. I can see happiness as great, average, and little. But let me see if I can address what you were intending to say. I can define and refine happiness in relation to other emotions. Lets say I have defined three emotions, pain, excitement, and happiness. I feel an emotion. It does not meet the standard for pain or excitement. If I am non-inventive and do not feel like creating another identity, it must logically be happiness. Of course, if it is nothing like any happiness I've experienced before, I must adjust my definition of happiness to now accommodate this state.

This level of thinking is distinctive knowledge. The question after you realize you discretely experience is, "How do I know I discretely experience?" You try to contradict it. And as I've noted before, you cannot. With this, you can discretely experience whatever you like as long as it follows a few rules. It must be a distinct discrete experience that is in some way different from other discrete experiences in your head to avoid being a synonym, and it must not be contradicted by other discrete experiences you hold in your head.

Applicable knowledge is merely an application of this rule. In essence, you can applicably know the distinctive knowledge in your head. The reason I've made a distinction, is applicable knowledge as a concept is useful in regards to reality, or "that which does not necessarily correlate with my discrete experiences". Distinctive knowledge is the world entirely in your own head. You can do whatever you want. But there is this situation of having things happen that are outside of the control or opinion of your head. Define a rotten apple as healthy, but you will still grow sick and possibly die.

And of course we've covered inductions in depth. The reason why I wanted to go over your definitions, is underlying those concepts, are my concepts. Lets not even say underlying. Concurrently is probably better. My context and definitions serve a particular purpose, while yours serve another. The question is, while your definitions can be distinctively know, can they be applicably known? I am not saying they cannot, they just haven't really been put to the test yet.

I think the question between us, and why you've proposed a different set of definitions is because you want something that the current definitions I've used, does not give you. It is not that the context I've provided is logically incorrect, it is I believe in your mind, logically inadequate. You want greater refinement and clarity to fuzzy distinctions you feel intuitively. And that is wonderful.

If I had to sum up what you are looking for, I think the real difference in our outlooks is that fundamental start. I don't think we disagree broadly, only in clarity and the necessity of new words in the specifics. As such, I will present some challenges to your terms that are not negations, but considerations.

Why did I separate the act of discrete experience from knowledge? Because as you agree, knowledge is a tool. A tool is an invention that we build from other things that allows us to manipulate and reason about the world in a better way. Discrete experience is a natural part of our existence. Knowledge is a tool built from that natural part of our existence. It is the fundamental which helps to explain what knowledge is.

When you use the term, "implicit knowledge", this overlaps with having discrete experiences. But this leaves you open to a question. How do you know its knowledge? Knowledge is now integrated into the description of a natural experience. It is no longer a tool, but the source itself. How then do I separate knowledge from a belief? If I can have knowledge that is a tool, and knowledge that is not a tool, isn't that an essential enough property for separating the concepts into two different concepts? Does the definition you use increase clarity, or cause confusion?

This of course, is a critique which can be applied to my own concepts. Is discrete experience as a broadly defined word a good term that has clear essential properties and does not muddle the water? Can we break it down into greater distinctions that will capture the overall goal of the knowledge theory, but makes it easy to comprehend and accessible to others? But I have to be careful. Too detailed, and it can quickly address unimportant details that aren't important to the overall concept. Too broad and it can be misapplied.

The goal here is to apply just the correct amount of logically consistent terms that are not too separate from our current way of speaking and understanding. It must have the right amount of detail to be applicable in daily life, but also open to refinement for deeper questions. What you are doing right now is seeking that refinement. But I do not think at this point that there is any disagreement with the overall structure. The basic methodology is still applied to the terms you propose. With that, continue to refine.

But the knowledge of atoms is entirely irrelevant to the invention and use of a ruler. So with knowledge.

This is true. But I would like to emphasize that even if it is necessarily the case that it is made up of atoms, this is all apart of extrapolated chronological precedence and not just chronological precedence. — Bob Ross

If I am understanding your terms of chronology correctly, I would argue that it is both. It is necessary that atoms exist for the ruler to exist, whether you know it or not. You can also extrapolate that atoms are necessary for the ruler to exist later. But does the existence of atoms, or the knowledge of atoms have any import into how you use a ruler? No.

So I would state that with respect to conceptualization, it necessarily follows that I am preceded by atoms. — Bob Ross

I believe this is a conclusion of applicable knowledge, not simply distinctive knowledge or merely discrete experience.

Basically, you are claiming (I think) that discrete experience cannot be contradicted because that contradiction also requires discrete experience. — Bob Ross

Yes! I think you have it.

If you agree with me here, then I would like to ask you how you or I derived this? I would say from a manifestation of a concept that is immediately known and is revealed, so to speak, as necessarily true absolutely. To be clear, I'm not asking you to explain why we discretely experience, only how you or I came up with that very claim. Did we just discretely experience it? — Bob Ross

A great question. Short answer? Yes. Long answer? It is the logic we derive from the ability to discretely experience. As I mentioned before, we cannot discretely experience a contradiction. Because experiencing a contradiction, in the very real sense of experiencing something as 100% identical and both 100% not identical to another concept is something we cannot experience. But lets say we could experience it. It would not be applicably known. It would not be distinctively known. It is beyond our ability to comprehend or experience as something knowable. It cannot be discretely experienced, but would be some other type of experience. Therefore it would be outside of the realm of comprehension and knowledge.

If you conceptualized (discretely experienced) a blue ball within your mind that had clear essential properties to you, then you would distinctively know the blue ball.

The essential properties themselves are concepts. When you have the belief that there is a blue ball, regardless of whether it is true or not, you know you have that belief. Moreover, if you want to take it a step deeper, if I want to determine whether I still hold a belief, then it will have to applied without contradiction; However, the concept of manifestation of the consideration of whether I still hold a particular belief is not induced nor deduced nor applied: it is immediately acquired. No process or tool of knowledge is required to know that. Likewise, if you are seeing a ball right in front of you, the belief aspect is the mediated deductive knowledge that it is a "blue ball" or mediated inductive knowledge of anything pertaining to the "blue ball", but the immediately acquired knowledge of the perception of the "blue ball" of manifestation of itself is not a belief (nor deduced nor induced). — Bob Ross

This touches on the issue I noted earlier with the idea of "implicit knowledge". You can discretely experience whatever you want. You know you can, because you have deduced it logically without contradiction. The tool of knowledge is the logic of concluding our distinctions are not contradicted by reality. We do not have to have knowledge to have distinctions that are not contradicted by reality. We do not have to know why we do what we do. But when we attempt to describe why, knowledge is the tool that gives us the best chance of determining whether our distinctions are not contradicted by reality. When you state that the act of having discrete experiences is the act of knowledge itself, the word knowledge becomes muddled and runs into issues.

Another thing to consider is your terms are causing you to construct sentences that are difficult to grasp their meaning (not that I am not guilty of this too!) "The concept of the manifestation of the consideration". This seems verbose and I'm having difficulty seeing the words as clearly defined identities that help me understand what is trying to be stated here. I can replace that entire sentence with, "However, the discrete experience of whether I hold a particular belief is not induced, nor deduced, nor applied, it is immediately acquired." It is something we simply do.

"You can't even claim to know something if you haven't, to some degree or another, conceptualized (my adjustment: discretely experienced) that something."

Yes, this is exactly the point I've been making.

If you are claiming "discrete experience" is the point of manifestation--not directly differentiation, then we agree. If not, then I don't think you can perform that substitution there. — Bob Ross

No, I am not using the terms manifestation or conceptualization. I'm not saying you can't. Those are your terms, and if you have contradictions or issues with them, it is for you to sort out. All I am saying is if a being can't part and parcel the sea of existence, it lacks a fundamental capability required to form knowledge.

Finally, let me address the proofs.

The bible proof doesn't quite capture circular logic. It is not 1 -> 1 Symbols in logic are meant to be 100% separate from other symbols conceptually. 1 is not the same as .999999 The bible and God are clearly distinct entities, and not equivalent.

So, we propose A
We say, If and only if A -> B
Then we say, If and only if B -> A.

So our only proof for God's existence is that the bible tells us, and the only proof for the bible's truth, is that God tells us. That is circular.

My argument is not a circular logic, but fundamental.

Lets compare this to a simple proof, the logic of a bachelor.

1. A bachelor is an unmarried man.
2. The possible contradiction to a person being a bachelor, is if they are not a man, or are not married.
3. Joe is both unmarried and a man.
4. Therefore he is a bachelor.

The above is not circular, it is a logical conclusion from the definitions proposed. Lets look at mine again.

1. Discrete experience is the ability to have distinct differences within the totality of your experience.
2. The contradiction to this, is if you cannot comprehend distinctions within the totality of your experience.
3. To read and comprehend these words, you must be able to comprehend distinctions within existence.
4. If you are reading and comprehending these words, then you have the ability to comprehend distinctions within existence.
4. Therefore you discretely experience.

Thanks again Bob, let me know what you think as always.

Great, I think I see where your issue is now, and perhaps I can address is properly.

Now, I think this leads me to a good point you made: the distinction between knowing something inherently and conceptualizing it. In other words, you don't need to conclude you discretely experience to discretely experience. — Bob Ross

I want to be careful with my words here to communicate this properly. There is no inherent knowledge. You can practice knowledge without knowing that you are doing it. You can have distinctive knowledge. You can even have applicable knowledge. But it is obtained because you are following the steps outlined in the epistemology. You can be blissfully unaware that it is what you are doing, and still have distinctive and applicable knowledge.

I think there are two different kinds of knowledge that need to be addressed here: implicit and explicit. For example, I can implicitly know that food is necessary for me to survive without explicitly knowing it at all. But once I conceptualize it to whatever degree, then it necessarily becomes explicit knowledge. — Bob Ross

I'm not sure there is implicit knowledge. Knowledge is a process that must be followed to have it. It is a tool. We can measure things as being centimeters long in our minds, but we need an actual measuring stick to say we've measured it. We might get very close with our estimates, but they are not the same as using the tool itself. The same with knowledge.

Its more like accidental vs explicit. I could find a ruler on the street and not know what cm means. But I do notice there are some lines. I measure something and say its 4 ruler lines. I can safely say within that context, that I have measured length with a ruler. But I don't know its a ruler, or how it was made, or what any of the other symbols and lines mean like inch. Within your first few paragraphs, if you replace "implicit" with "accidental" I think you'll see what I'm trying to point out.

Knowledge is like the process of measuring. If I am taught how to measure with a ruler, what the lines and symbols mean, and am trained how to line it up properly, or tips of mathematics, then I can explicitly measure with a ruler. The same with knowledge.

The reason I think this to be incredibly important is that I think you are arguing for discrete experience, at its most fundamental state, as implicit knowledge (that can or cannot be made explicit)(aka discrete experience in itself and not of itself, although the latter is a possibility, the former is a necessity). — Bob Ross

No, I am not. I am not even referring to discrete experience as accidental. You can discretely experience without a theory of knowledge. I am noting that to explicitly know what knowledge is, the first thing you must come to know, is discrete experience. With this, you can build a theory of knowledge. You don't have to know why you discretely experience. Just as I don't have to know the atomic make up of the ruler I am using. I just have to know what consistent spacing is. Of course, that doesn't mean there aren't atoms that make up that ruler. It also doesn't negate the fact that without atoms, there could be no ruler. But the knowledge of atoms is entirely irrelevant to the invention and use of a ruler. So with knowledge.

Basically, you are claiming (I think) that discrete experience cannot be contradicted because that contradiction also requires discrete experience. — Bob Ross

Yes! I think you have it.

— Bob Ross

I am claiming, although that is fine, it is an extrapolation that first had to be conceptualized (explicitly) to then, only thereafter, be considered implicitly true prior to its conceptualization. — Bob Ross

Absolutely correct. Except replace "implicitly" true with "accidently" true.

Therefore, the conceptualization is required first and foremost in order to ever claim anything ever was implicit previous to something explicitly being known. To know that you think requires that you conceptualized, to some degree, thought itself and then, therefrom, extrapolated you must have been thinking prior to this realization (i.e. implicitly)--my point is that without that explicit conceptualization, you would have never known that you think. — Bob Ross

Correct. (With implicit to accidental conversion). Think of a runner with natural form who has never been taught how to run properly. One day they are taught how to run properly, and it so happens, their natural form is exactly the optimal from needed to run quickly. They did not know what a form was prior to learning this, but once they did, they now realize it was something they did all along without realizing it.

However, you may still, even though you don't know you discretely experience, know things that stem from discrete experience. For example, if you conclude that you are seeing a blue ball, even if you don't know you discretely experience, you still know of the blue ball because you have conceptualized the blue ball. Moreover, you could then extrapolate that the blue ball was there prior to you conceptualizing it, but my point is that you wouldn't know that it was there unless you extrapolated it from your conceptualization of the blue ball. If you never would have explicitly known the blue ball, then you would never have known it in the first place. You can't even claim to know something if you haven't, to some degree or another, conceptualized that something. — Bob Ross

If you follow the steps of knowledge, it doesn't matter if you know that's what you did. If you conceptualized (discretely experienced) a blue ball within your mind that had clear essential properties to you, then you would distinctively know the blue ball. And I want to reemphases this:

"You can't even claim to know something if you haven't, to some degree or another, conceptualized (my adjustment: discretely experienced) that something."

Yes, this is exactly the point I've been making.

I agree, but in a slightly different way: the most fundamental in the sense of conceptualized to be the most fundamental is differentiation. — Bob Ross

Differentiation, is the act of discretely experiencing. Within the sea of your experience, you are able to say, "This" is not "that".

To even try to prove anything, including discrete experience, you must conceptualize it first (to some degree or another). I am trying to state that knowledge doesn't begin its manifestation with differentiation, it begins when it is conceptualized (made explicit). — Bob Ross

Once I am able to see "this" is different from "that", I can detail it. What is "this"? Maybe, I can make a word. I can use my memory. I can remember this state, and if I find a state that matches what I remember, I'll say its the same state. "This" is a "ball".

Once again, I cannot conceptualize without first being able to tell a difference. Or maybe, they are one and the same. Perhaps differentiation at even the lowest level is some type of conceptualization. The point is, these are words that describe acts of discrete experience. Conceptualization about a discrete experience, is a discrete experience that describes another discrete experience. Discrete experience is a fundamental that underlies all of our capabilities to believe and know. Perhaps the use of conceptualization fleshed out will add greater detail and clarity. That is fine. I just wanted to point out that what you are describing, differentiation and conceptualization, are acts of discrete experience.

I think when you say something along the lines of "try to disprove your discrete experiences without using your discrete experiences", I would like to agree (firstly) and (secondly) append "try to disprove or prove discrete experience without ever first conceptualizing it". — Bob Ross

To me, this is still, "try to disprove or prove discrete experience without ever first conceptualizing it". Discrete experience is a cat. Conceptualization may be a tiger, but its still a cat.

I want to point out the definition of discrete, and why I chose it. "discrete - individually separate and distinct." I was looking for a fundamental. Something that could describe a situation as a base. I first thought of an eye. An eye does not discretely experience. Its iris opens, and light flood through. The eye cannot tell it sees. It is a tunnel, that has the total experience of its being, but never discerning anything.

The human brain has many tunnels to it. Eyes, ears, nose, etc. This is the sea of existence, the sea of experience. And yet, it is somehow able to find "things" in the light. It can see things as individually separate and distinct, where an eye cannot. It can distinctly experience sound as separate from light. How? Who knows? It is unimportant for what we are trying to do.

Let me leave it at this for now. I will come back to the viewpoint of knowledge being applied to non-humans after this part is digested.

An ant can discretely experience. Does it know what an "I" is? Does it know it can discretely experience? No, but it can know things, because it discretely experiences.

No, within reference to itself, it knows nothing. With reference to you, it knows things. This is because, it isn't about whether it knows it discretely experiences, it is about whether it conceptualizes to any degree. If it does, to contradict what I previously stated, then it knows. It if doesn't, then it doesn't know. But its knowledge has no direct relation to your knowledge of its knowledge. — Bob Ross

Yes, I have to be careful here. The only thing I can truly say is the ant has the "potential" for knowledge if it can discretely experience. It can know things, though it may not process it with intent. Further, its context will never be elevated to that of a human being. The point is, it applicably "knows" dirt shouldn't be eaten, while sugar should. If it did not, it would be constantly testing the dirt if it was hungry. Yet, it doesn't.

Eating dirt would be contradicted by its death, or its taste buds rejection. It is incredibly primitive, at the core of emotion/sensation, but there is something within the ant that can differentiate between dirt and sugar, and something that prevents it from continually testing dirt to see if it is edible.

Again, you conceptualized this and, therefrom, deemed that ant to know. This doesn't mean that it actually knows anything (maybe it does, maybe it doesn't). Just because it is the most rational position for you, as a being capable of conceptualizing, to hold with reference to the ant, namely that it knows to some degree or another, doesn't mean that in reference to itself that it knows anything at all. — Bob Ross

This is true. You are correct that I don't really applicably know this. I am making an induction based off of the possibility of my own experience. But is it cogent? I believe it is, and further, in relation to other inductions I can make, I believe it is the most cogent in the hierarchy. I would be in favor of exploring this scientifically, in an attempt to find applicable knowledge from this belief. But I do propose that this is a cogent and worthwhile belief to explore.

I think that the most rational conclusion is that there are other beings like me with reference my conceptualization of them, but that doesn't mean I've proved that they can conceptualize. — Bob Ross

This could also be true. First, lets try to nail down what conceptualization is at both a distinctive, and applicable level. For my part, if we're talking about the results of something which can discretely experience, have beliefs, and then have knowledge, I believe it is possible. Is there an alternative? We can invent plausibilities on how other creatures use discrete experience, but they are lower on the hierarchy. As such I believe it is more rational to examine the possibilities of how other creatures can know, opposed to the plausibilities of how they could know. Its not that I applicably know other creatures can have knowledge, its just that if they can discretely experience, its possible they could.

The simple proof I put forward is that to present any counter argument to discretely experiencing, to even understand what it is you are trying to counter, you must discretely experience

I think I can use that same argument to prove you are right and that that doesn't mean it is the point at which knowledge manifests. In order to even claim that I can't postulate a counter argument without differentiation, you must have a conceptualization (and same for me). I think that they are both deeply integrated into our existence, but one is the point of manifestation (conceptualization), the other is a product of that manifestation that is manifested as a necessity to all else (differentiation). However, although I think you are using A -> A still, I think that you are actually right: there is a point at which it is circular, and that is fine as long as it is the point of all other manifestation. I think that you think that point is differentiation, I think it is conceptualization. — Bob Ross

To sum up I think you are under the impression that differentiation and conceptualization are separate identities. I am not disagreeing that you can propose such differentiation. What I am noting is that they are subsumed by both being discrete experiences, and I am unsure where differentiation leaves off and conceptualization begins. Even if it is the case, you still need differentiation before conceptualization. One cannot conceptualize before one can differentiate.

As such, I still do not believe there is anything circular here. Differentiation does not lead to conceptualization, which leads to differentiation. The order of which we learn about things is also not circular. Saying that examining a ruler leads you to realize you need atoms for a ruler, is not a circular argument. A circular argument is A -> B -> A. What you are arguing with explicit, and what I think more accurately should be called accidental, is not a circular argument. Knowing knowledge is not required to accidentally practice knowledge. If you could try to present your argument that my proposal is circular with an A -> B -> A format, I think I could understand better where you're coming from, and we could settle that issue once and for all.

As always, fantastic writing. Thanks again and I look forward to hearing your responses!

Did you really need to use the slur "Jesus Freaks"? What if someone came along and used the slur "Atheist Freaks". I think you could have gotten the point across without the slur, and it will would have been an interesting topic.

My point is that your argument has a fundamental flaw: you are arguing that discrete experience is the most fundamental, but yet you are using thinking in itself to do that in the first place. — Bob Ross

I'm going to start here and work my way around the post. First, I do not think that discrete experience is the most fundamental thing that explains our existence. I think discrete experience is the most fundamental thing an existence must be able to do to know, and it is a fundamental that can first be defined clearly, and without contradiction. Remember that knowledge is essentially having a clear definition with essential properties that does not compete with any other. Second, when we apply that definition, it must not be contradicted.

I want to be very clear, I do not think there is nothing prior to discrete experience. I also do not think that something that is not a "being" can discretely experience. I believe it is fundamental that there be a "self". One cannot discretely experience without being something. But I find that I cannot define the "self" as a fundamental, without first defining discrete experience.

Now, I could be wrong. Perhaps you can prove this. Can you know something prior to discrete experience? Can you know what an "I" is before you are able to differentiate between the totality of experience? I know that you can believe such, but can you know it? Can you know what eyes are? A mind? The difference between your body and another thing? Conscious and unconscious? I can't reasonably see how this is possible without the ability to discretely experience, and further, without he understanding of discrete experience. Again, I do believe there is a "self", but I cannot define or even conceive of a self without first discretely experiencing.

I think that if you are trying to find one thing that you can "know", that this, in terms of derivation, it should be you. — Bob Ross

In a way, I do. "I" am the discrete experiencer. That is how I know what "I" am. But, the "I" is not necessary. I could not have a notion of "I" in my head, but still note there is the totality of experience, and there are different things within experience.

If you recall, I never identity an "I" beyond that. Because it is not necessary for the epistemology to occur. One thing we have not covered yet, is that my epistemology is not human centric. It can be applied to insects, plants, animals, and AI. Imagine a simple ant. An ant can discretely experience. Does it know what an "I" is? Does it know it can discretely experience? No, but it can know things, because it discretely experiences. It knows the sugar in front of it is good compared to the dirt that surrounds it. It is of course an extremely limited context, but it knows by taste that some things should be eaten, while others should not.

Can an AI know things? If it can discretely experience, yes. It is a limited context, but a roomba can map out my floor over time, and applicably know where to clean after several cycles. A roomba will never discretely experience the notion of an "I". Can a computer know things without fundamental building blocks that allow it to discretely experience? Of course not. But even if we wanted it to realize it had as self, it would be impossible for it to know it had a self without being able to discretely experience that "it" was different than "the world".

Discrete experience does not require language. It merely requires that you are able to discern separation within existence. That is the fundamental needed to start having knowledge. Then I can discretely experience that "I" am separate from "that other stuff". Can I realize that I am an "I" before I can discretely experience? No, its not possible. Therefore in my view, the most fundamental aspect that we can know, is discrete experience.

If you still have some doubts, think on the philosophy of solipsism. It is the idea that "I" is everything. I am the only consciousness in the world, and everything that happens, is due to the invention of my existence. There are people who consider and debate such a theory. Meaning that the "I" is not as fundamental as you think to knowledge. Further, without being able to discretely experience, one cannot have a debate about what I is. Did we not go back and forth in the beginning? What "I" is is not a fundamental, unquestionably proved thing.

If you can prove that the "I" is necessary to have knowledge, then feel free. Create the definition with essential properties, and apply it to reality without contradiction. That being, that an "I" is more fundamentally known then discrete experience. I am saying you must be able to discretely experience before there is the concept of an "I". You are saying there must be a concept of an "I" before I can have the concept of discrete experience. While "You" must exist to discretely experience, "You" existing does not give you the fundamentals of an epistemology, it is "You" that can discretely experience that does.

causes your argument to really be "I think (in itself), therefore I discrete experience. I discretely experience, therefore I think (in itself)" (this is no different than A -> B, B -> A, which really is A -> A, so I do think you are essentially saying "I discretely experience because I discretely experience--hence #1). — Bob Ross

I want to be very clear on the proof, because I believe there is still a fundamental misunderstanding of what is being proposed. I discretely experience, because any proposal that I do not discretely experience, is contradicted. The simple proof I put forward is that to present any counter argument to discretely experiencing, to even understand what it is you are trying to counter, you must discretely experience. This is not A -> A.

1. There is experience.
2. Knowledge is a deduction without contradiction.
3. Discrete experience is known = A.
4. A because !A is a contradiction.
5. A allows the description to divide all experience into different aspects and definitions.
6. A allows the idea of a "self/I". The most basic definition being, "I" am what discretely experiences.
7. A allows the idea of "thoughts".
8. 3 and 4 can can be applicably known if they are applied to reality without contradiction.

Understand that I agree there must be an "I" before "it" can discretely experience, but that I cannot define and know what an "I" is, unless I know something first. And the first thing I can truly know, and must know, is there is discrete experience. How am I to differentiate among existence what an "I" is without the ability to discretely experience first? I hope this cleared up what I'm trying to prove.

We don't know what the physical or mental are, so saying we're "physical" is a moot point. You can't possibly know what you mean by that, as you lack global perspective. — theRiddler

I'm pretty sure I do, but more importantly, what do you think they are?

There are a myriad of ways of survival of consciousness after death, but not if you're so myopic you can only see the small picture. — theRiddler

Feel free to list some. We're here to discuss and hear other's view points. If you can ease my ignorance, I'll have not issue with that.

Most probably you are talking about your experience and also the experence of millions of people. But, as I said, there is an equal --or maybe greater, if you consider the East too, but I'm not sure-- amount of people with a different experience on the subject. You just can't ignore it. — Alkis Piskas

True. My experience is from a Western bias.

Also, if Science has not proved it, it doesn't mean that life after death exists. Science has not proved anything about consciousness either. But most of us know that consciousness exists. (Some deny it ...) — Alkis Piskas

Science does not attempt to prove that life after death exists. Science is about falsification, about setting up a hypotheses, and trying to knock it down. Only if it withstands every attack, can we be confident we have something reasonable.

The evidence is as solid as the sun shines.
— Philosophim
What is this evidence? — Alkis Piskas

Your brain is you. This has been proven time and time again over decades. Damage the brain, you damage the person. Change the chemical balance of the brain, you change the person. Depression medication and anti-psychotics prove this. Alcoholism and drug use eat the brain like an evil smiling parasite, and the effects are plain for everyone to see.

You can read about all sorts of brain damage example. One man was brain damaged to no longer be able to process colors. His eyes were fine, but his brain interpreted everything in black and white. Why when he died would he suddenly see colors again? How could he process colors without light and eyes? Why would a brain, which is geared towards processing the physical world, suddenly "be" again after it is gone?

We are physical beings. Its like a modern day engine. I can't tell you exactly how it works, but if I take a hammer to it, it stops working correctly. There is absolutely zero evidence of some form of life and consciousness existing apart from the brain. Anyone who sees the evidence, cannot reasonably conclude otherwise. It is a belief in Santa despite seeing your parents put the presents out themselves.

That's very nice. I also say that if the belief in God make someone more ethical, or just more happy, then let him believe in God. I will support him. But unfortunately, there are innumerable atrocities that have happened in the histery and are still happening in the name of God! And this makes me angry too! Because it's not anymore about beliefs but about hypocrisy. — Alkis Piskas

Funny enough, religion does not make me angry. I believe that for many majority of cases, people live their lives in a better way because of it. And I am with you that if the belief in God makes a person happy and more ethical, yes, let them continue that belief.

Religion fills a need in humanity for a community that pushes them to be better people. Sometimes this is misguided and abused, no question. But if they did not belong to a religion, they would likely belong to something else that would be misguided and abused, like politics for example. :)

What's "actual reality"? I don't think it exists such a thing. There's only personal reality (as you say) and "common reality", i.e, the reality of two or more persons. Reality has to do with agreement. If we agree on something, we can say that we have the same reality regarding that thing. — Alkis Piskas

Right now, I want you to try using the power of your mind to float 3 feet off the ground. Can't do it right? That is actual reality. The idea that your view of reality somehow shapes reality is an appeal to our vanity. Your view of reality does nothing to alter what is. The idea that two people can somehow shape reality from their viewpoints is also absurd. All we can do is recognize how reality works, then see if we can alter it to what we want within the limitations of what we have.

But much appreciated Tim!
— Philosophim
My name is Alkis. But thank you anyway! — Alkis Piskas

My apologies! Much appreciated again.

So the anger is about the people who put up with suffering and lower states of being, isn't it? — pfirefry

Can you offer a reason why anyone should care about how they live their life if nothing matters after they die? — pfirefry

Yes.

What about them makes you angry? Is it that they don't try hard enough? Yes

Do you despise people stuck in lower states of being? Yes.

What are the example of the "lower states of being" that make you angry?
Procrastination. Dismissal of other's suffering. Dismissal of your own suffering. It is a pretend solution to problems in life, so that one does not have to work on fixing the actual problems.

Are there examples of people who believe in life after death but don't use this as an excuse to put up with lower states of being?

I'm sure there are. But I have not found this to be the majority of cases. I was open to learning from others if they had the opposite experience.

Do these people make you angry? — pfirefry

No. I honestly have no opinion on the means someone uses to get to a better place in life, as long as it doesn't unnecessarily hurt themselves or others.

Why would people stop putting up with suffering and lower states of being if they didn't believe in life after death? Wouldn't it become another excuse? "I'll be dead anyways. Nothing that I do now will matter when I'm gone. I'll just do whatever feels good." Wouldn't you feel angry about the people that say this? — pfirefry

Yes, I would feel angry with people who say this, but I think there is an easier time convincing someone to not feel this way. Such a person is motivated by the here and now, and works to solve the problems that they encounter in life. Teaching a person that life can be richer than just pleasure is not a promise down the road, but something that can also be realized "today".

Can you offer a reason why anyone should care about how they live their life if nothing matters after they die? — pfirefry

Yes. Because such a person is motivated by their own life today. And caring about more than your own life, matters to their life today.

Further, I find the idea of life after death the ultimate in arrogance and hubris.
— Philosophim

I agree, it does seem uninformed and unsupported by evidence. But why being mad about it? — pfirefry

I don't get to choose my emotions. Emotions are usually the first thing we rely on when we have not thought about a subject in depth. Its our gut reaction. What I can choose is what I'll do with that emotion. I chose to come to these boards and share that with other people. Not as a rant, not as a claim that I am the arbiter of truth, but as someone who is expressing nascent thoughts, and wants to hear other view points and thoughts on the matter.

I appreciate your input.

It's interesting when you work alongside palliative care services, where people are dying, how many religious people no longer believe in anything at the end. — Tom Storm

Interesting experience, thanks for sharing.

I'm not sure I can see hubris or pride in this. Fear and denial, yes. People don't want the show to end and they hate the thought of those they love no longer being extant. An afterlife, reinforced by society and culture, is an effective way to manage grief and dread. But I agree with you that supernatural beliefs like this often cause great harm. — Tom Storm

Yes, I agree fear and denial can play a part just as equally.

What if mass shooters really believed that they would suffer in the afterlife as a consequence of their actions? As it is, I'm sure most of them believe that when they die there are no consequences. — Wayfarer

This is my problem. Studies show that the strength of the penalty passed a certain point does not deter crime. The death penalty for example, actually doesn't deter crime any more than locking up a person. This can indicate to us that broadly, people are not motivated by the degree of long term rewards or punishments for what they do. It may be that most people don't think about it.

Even then, another study shows that most people believe themselves to be better than average. Why would a person who believes they are better than average feel like they wouldn't get a nice afterlife? So even when people do think about it, I believe its mostly assumed they will live forever, and it will be nice.

Thanks for your input Wayfarer.

Therefore, i consider the statement "I discretely experience" an extrapolation which utilizes this fundamental motive, and subsequently the outlined rules that constraint it, to determine that that is true in the first place. I am trying to convey that it starts, at the most fundamental aspect, with motive, and consequently a set of rules, and not discrete experience. — Bob Ross

I read the entirety of your post, but I feel this sums it up nicely. The goal of the knowledge theory was to find just one thing that I could "know", and use that to go from there. I can know that I discretely experience, but I explicitly did not try to determine "why" I discretely experience. The reasons being was it was something I could not "know" as a foundation, and also that it wasn't important for what I was trying to accomplish.

That being said, do I believe that there is something which causes us to discretely experience? Absolutely. But I believe this is something beyond the conscious mind. This is neuroscience, the mechanisms by which we think. Do I think its fun to explore in a philosophical manner what it is that causes us to discretely experience? Yes! Philosophy is about trying to get answers to questions that give us new questions to explore.

For my part, I have no skin in that game, and have not considered it beyond a passing thought. Is it something we can applicably know? Maybe. But do I think its needed for the theory to be viable? At this point, no. My question for you is, is there something you feel 'motive' brings to the table that challenges or puts to question the formulation of the epistemology I've put forth so far? If yes, then we'll have to explore it in earnest. If not, then feel free to continue putting forth your idea, I would still like to see what you've come up with. For my part, I feel you are noting something which I feel has promise, and have no disagreements with on first thought.

Of course, so, in a nutshell, "chronological viability" is the attempt of the subject to derive the chronological order of what must come first before another thing. I call it "viability" because I see the derivation of things in terms of which order produces the necessary viability that I experience. — Bob Ross

So this is sort of a descriptive order of causality, or why we arrive at the point that we are in our thinking?

But once the motive is, whatever that may be, and consequently its rules, then it necessarily follows that anything I can possibly imagine requires discrete experience--including the attempted derivation of the motive itself and its rules. Does that make sense — Bob Ross

I believe so. It is not that discrete experience causes the motive to be, but we do need to discretely experience to know what the motive is. If I have that wrong, let me know! Thank you for fleshing that out.

It's not going to make a better or worse person of me. Is it that what makes you angry? That people believing in reincarnation forget to think about fellow people? Then you could transpone life every time to the next. Same as prolonging everything to tomorrow. I don't like that either. It's no excuse. — Dijkgraf

Yes, that is what makes me angry. I see it as rarely, if ever helping people to be a better person, and more often than not, an implicit excuse to settle for one's or other's unfortunate lot in life.

I haven't come across anyone who has said that they feel angry about people believing in life after death — Jack Cummins

Its why I made this post. It is an odd thing. I wanted to know why. I wanted to know if I was jutified, or (more likely) not justified. Hearing other people's input on the matter gives that view point to either ease the anger, or redirect it towards something better than an emotional discomfort.

Personally, I like the idea of rebirth because one life and one body seems a bit limiting and some have better circumstances than others. However, I try to not simply convince myself that reincarnation exists on that basis because it would seem like philosophical dishonesty. — Jack Cummins

I think you have it right. Wanting life after death is motivated by a sense of unfairness or disappointment of our limitations, and I'm sure other emotions. To me, those emotions are not meant to be buried with the "liquor of immortality", but should be used to motivate and direct us to go past our limitations, and work on fixing the world's unfairness. It is the only way the world improves for ourselves and others, Getting drunk on thoughts of a better life beyond this one is no better than getting drunk every evening after work.

Does the existence of God or a Supreme Being make you also angry?
Does the existence of ghosts make you also angry? — Alkis Piskas

Oddly, no. I think this is because they are concepts divorced enough from reality that I can understand why someone would believe them. When people are in the realm of no evidence, people will invent a reason or explanation to understand a mystery in some way. Life after death just seems counter to every single basic learned experience of life. The evidence is as solid as the sun shines. It seems immature to me to hold it, if of course you've looked at it reasonably.

Perhaps too if I saw more people motivated to be better people or do greater things in the world with a belief in their eternal existence, then I would be less angry. Honestly I'm not much against how someone reaches a point in the road, as long as they get there without harming themselves and others too much.

Most people's belief in life after death is real. It is their reality. — Alkis Piskas

All of our beliefs are our personal reality. It doesn't mean they match actual reality. And that's my point. This type of belief, in my eyes, does nothing to address or handle reality in a better way, but is most often used to avoid it. That to me is something that destroys a person's potential, and I do not like to see people's potential ruined.

But much appreciated Tim! I can definitely say YOU do not make me angry, and am glad for your presence on these boards. :smile:

Took me 15 years to come up with. It fits my belief exactly. It even inspired it. — Dijkgraf

And this is my point. Coming up with something that satisfies our emotional desires is stunting growth. It is imaginary. Does it help you be a better person to others? Does it help you make the world a better place? I just don't see it.

No worries! I always appreciate your responses because they are so well thought out! — Bob Ross

The same Bob!

Forgive me, but I am still contemplating it and, consequently refurbishing my ideas on the subject as I go on, so the terminology is not what I would prefer you to focus on (as I try to explicate it hereafter): it is the underlying meaning (because I freely admit that these terms I am about to use may not be the best ones, but, unfortunately, they are the best ones I can think of right now). — Bob Ross

I fully understand! It is a constant struggle for me as well. One of the reasons I respect you is you are a participant trying to understand what the underlying meaning of what I am saying is as well. I hope I have been as open and understanding back.

This is where, as you also rightly pointed out, a distinction needs to be made: thinking in itself and its own extrapolation of itself into a characterized process. The latter is not required, the former is. Furthermore, this is why I will be disregarding the latter, the characterized process, for now and focusing on the former because I am attempting the derivation of chronological viability of the subject (myself). — Bob Ross

Yes, I agree with this.

Now, in terms of the aforementioned question, I could legitimately answer myself with "differentiation must occur for my thoughts". This is 100% valid. However, now I can ask a further question: "how am I able to be convinced and why am I convinced that my answer satisfied it?". I think this reveals to the subject that the most fundamental thing, in terms of just chronological viability, is the fact that they are a motive. They are a perpetual motive towards logic, which any answer (any conclusion) that satisfies logic satisfies the subject. Now I think we are getting more fundamental than simply differentiation. — Bob Ross

I think you have something very clear with motive. Motive can be used to describe "Why I discretely experience" There is something that compels the mind to do so. What is that compulsion?

The issue I have is that this motive is logic. While a motive can be logic, it is unfortunately not the motive of everyone, nor necessarily a basic function of thought. Many thinking things are not motivated by logic. Survival and emotions seem to be the most basic of motives that compel us to discretely experience, and identify the world a particular way.

Logic can be done without training or thought, but it is often something learned. It is a higher order of thinking that one must learn by experience or be taught to consistently think and be motivated in such a manner. That is what the quest for knowledge is. How do I take the fact that I discretely experience, and use it in a logical way? For one's distinctive knowledge, it must not be contradicted. In application to reality, it must not be contradicted. And from there, the rest of the logic can build.

There is nothing to compel us to think logically, but a logical conclusion itself. A person who rejects logic entirely in favor of survival or emotions will not be able to discretely experience in terms of knowable outcomes, but in more of a selfish and basic survival satisfaction. This is part of "context". A person who does not think within the context of logic, cannot really know the world, they just react to it. How do you convince a person to think logically? How do you convince a person to reject their personal emotions, and sometimes "survival of self/personality" in favor of higher order thinking?

That is each person's choice. I do believe that thinking logically will benefit a person more in the long term. But my epistemology cannot convince a person to think logically. It can only convince a person that thinks logically, that it is a logical way to think.

You've used a term a couple of times here, "chronological viability". What does that mean to you? You've noted two types. Could you flesh them out for me? Thanks for the great input!