quote="Janus;813294"]I would say that subjective consciousness may not be what we naively or intuitively think it is, and that. maybe (I'd have to think further on this) there is no substantive distinction between objective and subjective consciousness, but that the distinction is an artefact of our dualistic mode of thinking.[/quote]

We agree that there is no substantive difference between the objective and subjective. They are merely different aspects of the same reality. The objective is the reality of another beings consciousness that we can objectively know. The subjective is the reality of the conscious thing from its perspective that no one else can know. One does not negate the other.

I'm wondering if our experience of perception of the spectrum is different from the electric eye's. — Patterner

Its interesting isn't it? We don't even have to go to the electric eye, we can go to a fly's eyes. Flies have numerous eyes without pupils. This allows them to see the world in a near 360 viewpoint. Birds have eyes on the side of their head and cannot see directly in front of them because of it. How do they process that way of sight? What would it be like to experience that? From a physical standpoint, the experience is most certainly different from ours.

I don't think it's merely a matter of semantics. I'm not claiming that you can see the world from my perspective. I'm saying that we don't experience our subjectivity; rather 'subjectivity' is how seeing the world from a perspective is defined, so subjectivity is thought post hoc, not experienced. Thinking that subjectivity is experienced is a kind of reification, and I think the same goes for qualia. This reification of the self as substantive entity is the source of much confusion, Descartes being a notable example. — Janus

I think this is ok. How would you apply this in relation to the OP's point?

Does the electric eye that distinguishes frequencies of the spectrum that we perceive with our eyes have the same subjective experience of colors that we have? Does it have a different subjective experience of colors than we have? Is light hitting its sensor, and its circuits distinguishing one frequency from another, a subjective experience? — Patterner

The point is we cannot know what it experiences. However, I should make something implicit explicit now. When I speak of the ability to identify this includes the capability to create identity. An electric eye that records and shunts light off to pre-programmed areas isn't conscious. An eye which can observe, then create identify within what it observes (this combination of beams of light represents something new , like a cloud) would be conscious. Of course, conscious of only that.

But beliefs about something are not objective, therefore they do not belong in objective analysis or discussion

Beliefs are behavioral attitudes towards things which are objective and, as such, absolutely pertain to objective inquiry. I don’t think you can name a single field of study which isn’t predicated on beliefs—not even science. — Bob Ross

Let me clarify. Its not that we cannot start with beliefs. But beliefs must become hypotheses and be tested. Everything has a cause is known, because anytime we've tried to prove something doesn't have a cause, we fail. Its plausible that one day we will encounter something that doesn't have a prior cause, but it is currently something that we have never encountered before, so its not in the realm of possibility.

This isn’t true: you can’t account for qualia, which you do know exists because you have it, by looking at the quantitative processes of the brain. We can account for a camera simply by its quantitative processes and parts that produce those quantified measurements. I don’t see any contradiction here. — Bob Ross

I can account for that. But only me. In brain surgery they keep you conscious. They'll stimulate certain portions of your brain and ask you to respond. In this case, they'll ask you what you're feeling, or your qualia. Now can the surgeon know what its like when you say, "I'm thinking of a tree"? Of course not. There's no way to objectively measure that you are seeing a tree, or what that tree looks like exactly. They have to believe that you're giving them a close enough picture to what you're experiencing. But if they stimulate that brain state, they can cause you to think and feel things that you had no intent of thinking or feeling.

But lets go even simpler, alcohol or anesthesia. We know that when these chemicals enter your blood stream and hit your brain, your consciousness diminishes and can be blacked out entirely. Do I know the exact qualia of someone else getting blacked out? No. But I know my own.

If it is the case that we can use quantitative processes to change our own qualia, then the argument I made stands and you're still holding a contradiction.

Fair enough! Let me re-phrase it: it is important if you are claiming that there is a mind-independent world which has mind-independent brains that produce qualia. — Bob Ross

From my point of view there is a mind independent world, but I do not believe brains are fully independent from our minds. Our minds are a portion of our brain, and the part of the brain that is conscious.

The idea that a dog has qualia is logically consistent and concurs with reality; but yet you said we cannot ‘prove’ it: why? The belief that a dog has qualia is a reasonable, cogent, and evidence based claim which meets your definition of proof. — Bob Ross

Where is the evidence of qualia? If I operate on a dog and open up the brain, do I see the image and smell the smells the dog is experiencing? No. Thus we run into the philosophical zombie example.

"A philosophical zombie (or "p-zombie") is a being in a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that is physically identical to a normal person but does not have conscious experience.[1]

For example, if a philosophical zombie were poked with a sharp object, it would not feel any pain, but it would behave exactly the way any conscious human would."
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

Some debate has been done over the meaning of this, but I am keen to observe one fact we can all agree on: No one can prove that a philosophical zombie can't exist. In fact, there's evidence for it in a well diagnosed issue with some animals: Blindsight.

I'm citing Luke's post here which then sights a post on Blindsight. I think its a fascinating read. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14286/a-potential-solution-to-the-hard-problem/p1

Here's an excerpt:
"In the blind area, DB himself maintained that he had no visual awareness. Nonetheless, Weiskrantz asked him to guess the location and shape of an object that lay in this area. To everyone’s surprise, he consistently guessed correctly. To DB himself, his success in guessing seemed quite unreasonable. So far as he was concerned, he wasn’t the source of his perceptual judgments, his sight had nothing to do with him. Weiskrantz named this capacity ‘blindsight’: visual perception in the absence of any felt visual sensations."
https://aeon.co/essays/how-blindsight-answers-the-hard-problem-of-consciousness

So here we have a being that is objectively conscious, but does not have subjective qualia to experience the location and shape he's obviously observing and identifying. We could say, "Well maybe he's lying." That's true, perhaps he's a very convincing liar. We can't know, because we can't experience consciousness from that person's subjective viewpoint. We can't prove that they have it, and we can't prove that they don't have it.

Now I do want to throw a caveat out there. It is not that we cannot come to a cogent set of beliefs that work consistently well enough for communication or evaluation in tandem with objective assessment. But it is only that, cogent beliefs. I can objectively state that when anesthesia is applied to a person, they black out. But I cannot objectively state what is it like for that person to black out.

That subjective experience is what they have, which is undeniable.

Under your view, how is this undeniable? I thought you are claiming that we can’t know. — Bob Ross

My apologies, that was me being unclear. My own subjective experience is what I have, and is undeniable. Whether a something beyond myself does, or does not have a subjective experience is undeniable from its own viewpoint. What is a belief and not knowledge, is that I can claim what that subjective experience from the view point of that being is like, or even that it has, or does not have any all.

Although you are correct that “I like the color blue” is subjective, it doesn’t follow that no one can invalidate that claim. If it turns out, unbeknownst to you, that you don’t like the color blue, then your proclamation of “I like the color blue” is in fact false. A proposition being subjective just means that the truthity is indexical (i.e., relative to the subject at hand), not that the subject is 100% correct pertaining thereto. — Bob Ross

Agreed! What we can claim though is that when you claimed that you liked the color blue, you saw the color blue and you identified it as a color you liked at that moment. Its not whether something is a fact which is qualia, it is the experience of observing and identifying. Whether that is correct, or incorrect does not deny the subjective experience of that action itself.

Fantastic viewpoints as always Bob!

Further to that would be to say that the subject does not experience subjectivity or being a subject. — Janus

What if I said that the viewpoint of the subject is thought, not experienced? The subject perceives (experiences) things from some perspective (viewpoint) but does not experience the viewpoint itself. Further to that would be to say that the subject does not experience subjectivity or being a subject.

I think subjective experience is often conflated with and counted as the experience of subjectivity. — Janus

I think we might be talking semantics here. How do you subjectively view the world? I can't know. You do. Go with that. That is your subjective consciousness.

It is about about an inborn perceptual-affective schema of organizing sensory experience. I have in mind in particular the example of a gay man who was born with a ‘ feminine’ perceptual-affective style that they had no control over. — Joshs

The problem is you're first attributing that behavior to what a woman does. And yet many women do not act "feminine". Does this mean they aren't women? Is a woman who acts masculine a man? The point of the dog article was to show that in non-sexual behaviors, it can be difficult to really tell what sex a dog is. Same with humans.

I've known plenty of men who speak "feminine" like, yet are straight. They are men, not women. There are plenty of gay men who do not exhibit "feminine" (or a cultural stereotype of a woman) behavior. This is because there is nothing inherent in being the male that necessitates that you lift weights and strut around in a room. You can have a very pretty, agile and soft spoken male, and they are still men.

It’s ok if you don’t want to call this inborn style of perceptual
organization ‘gender’. I’m more interested in whether you accept that people are born with such global organizing structures that dictate feminine or masculine behavior that form a large constellation of features all belonging to a single causal pattern. — Joshs

No, its not gender. Its just personality differences. The problem is you're assuming your version of "feminine" is some objective measure. But that measure is based on your culture and background, not biological fact.

I'll give you an example. I taught in inner city schools with mostly blacks and latinos. I'm white. Let me preface this by saying I found no difference between races besides over all culture. You have your jocks, your nerds, and everything in an American white school. TV and movies paint a different picture, and its false. Yet I'm sure some people believe that being black entails that you act or dress a particular way. Its just like gender. Its a subjective stereotype.

One thing I did notice was that young black males at one of my schools tended to act more like stereotypical American women. Black girls tended to be more aggressive and get in far more physical fights than black boys. Why? Culture. A surprising amount of young blacks in that area did not have father's in their lives. So the women ended up having to be the bread winner and fight for success. Being demure was not an option. On the flip side, boys patterned their speech and gestures after the main parent who gave them everything in life, their mother.

Now are these young men and women suddenly different sexes because they don't fit into the stereotypical middle or upper class American view of how a man and woman should act? No. The problem is your idea of "feminine" vs "masculine" is cultural. Your gay friend was compelled to act and express themself a particular way, so they should have done so without reprisal. They are a man by sex, no question, that simply acted differently.

I'm not denying that people want to act and dress the way they want to act and dress. My point is that it is irrelevant to what sex you are, and thus irrelevant in cases of sexual separation in society. If a male suddenly starts behaving in a stereotypically feminine way in Texas, they do not suddenly become a woman and have access to female bathrooms or sports.

In terms of the distinction in epistemic access, I am understanding you to be claiming that we can only “know” of “objective aspects of consciousness”, where “knowledge” is perhaps restricted to what is empirically verifiable? Is that correct? — Bob Ross

Yes, with an addition just to be sure. A subjective consciousness can know its own qualia, no one else can.

I don’t think it matters if a being is actively displaying high-level bodily motions (i.e., actions). Maybe we can agree on that. — Bob Ross

Activity is not needed for subjective consciousness. It is just that activity is needed to objectively conclude that another being is conscious. Now, it may be the case that we can scan a brain and ascertain that the person is conscious, but unable to act. For an intro, this side exception seemed unneeded to ensure the initial idea was not overly complex.

Observing identifying and acting are objective measures of consciousness that can be known from monitoring a thing

I take you to mean that observing, identifying, and acting are pragmatically useful for determining if one has receptivity, sensibility, and some knowledge of its environment: is that correct? — Bob Ross

No, I very purposefully excluded anything that had to do with perception as a requirement for consciousness. Perception is often associated with the five senses. Observation does not preclude perception, but it does not necessitate it. If you are thinking about an image in your mind, you are observing something. When you identify that image, feeling, thought, etc, you are identifying. You can also observe perceptions, have sensibility, and know your environment while being conscious, but those can all be bundled under variations of observation and identity.

Qualitative experience would be the experience of observing and identifying from the subject observing and identifying.

This is where I get a bit confused: are you saying that the exact same “observing” and “identifying” is occurring objectively and the only subjective aspect is the viewpoint of the subject which is objectively “observing” and “identifying”? Because then it sounds like you might be saying qualia are not subjective, but merely the viewpoint of a subject that is having them is. — Bob Ross

The viewpoint of the subject is what I mean by "subjective". It is formed by the viewer, and can only be experienced by the viewer. That subjective experience is what they have, which is undeniable. Subjective does not mean unreasonable, illogical, or unprovable. Subjective merely means that it is an experience that can only be known to the entity having it.

For example, I like the color blue. Its my favorite color. No one else can say objectively that its my favorite color, because there's no way of proving it. I could be lying. Only I know if blue is my favorite color. The fact that blue is my favorite color also does not objectively make blue the best color for everyone. The subjective conscious is simply the personal experience of being conscious, or qualia.

To me, your example argues a different point than your original claim (in that paragraph): the example is already conceding that “there is something to be like me” but that you can’t know what that is like, — Bob Ross

To clarify, the "something like me" would be the objectively observable nature of being a conscious being. I cannot say "subjectively like me". But I can observe a being and determine it is conscious by the actions in commits, because only a conscious being can observe, identify, and act on that combination.

Think about a fly. A fly can observe the smell of trash, then decide to land on it. Do we know if it thinks about it morally? If the fly wonders at its own existence? No. But what we can know is it scans the environment, identifies, and acts upon it. Do we need to know the flies experience of being a fly to objectively conclude it has a basic consciousness? No. Its beyond our knowledge, so we simply exclude it when evaluating what we can know.

Firstly, I just want to note that I do not think I need certainty to “know” things. Yes, I think that I can “know” you have qualitative experience insofar as it would be special pleading of me to think of myself as the only human being who has it. No I am not certain of it. — Bob Ross

You believe I have qualitative experience. Certainty does not give knowledge, logically correct identification from our observations do. You know that I'm conscious because of the actions I've done here. The words that I've written cannot be done without observation and identification. Do you know the feelings I had when I wrote them? No. Do you know all of the other thoughts whirling in my head that are not necessarily conveyed by the words that I wrote? No. Is it important that we know that I have a subjective qualia, or what that subjective qualia is for you to conclude I'm objectively conscious? Not at all.

Objectivity assumes a logic that stands despite subjective challenges to it. We cannot objectively note that everyone sees green as everyone else, but we can objectively note that if someone is observing the wavelength of green, they are at least perceiving a color we can all agree is green. So if you cannot objectively prove that I experience qualia, its not a matter of belief, its a matter of something you cannot know.

Secondly, I am be confident enough to say that a camera and an AI do not have qualitative experience because I can know what they are made of and there is no room for qualitative anything: it is all mechanical, quantitative operations. — Bob Ross

And yet that's not logical. I can look at a brain, know what it is made of and see that there is no room for qualitative anything: it is all chemical, quantitative operations. So according to your argument, you could confidently say that you know no human being has qualitative experience, including yourself. This is a contradiction, so we know it to be wrong.

I would like to note that it is very necessary to prove it if one is a reductive physicalist: the entire metaphysical theory is riding on it. — Bob Ross

Bob, I don't care about philosophical identities. They're useful as a digest to get into particular thoughts, but the identity itself is unimportant. What's important to me is whether arguments have consistent, logical applications that allow us to function in the world optimally. If my points blow through some type of philosophical ideology but meet the criteria I value, so be it.

Also, it seems like ‘proof’ to you implies certainty: is that correct? — Bob Ross

No, proof would be a logically consistent belief that is concurrent with reality, (or "what is") and not denied by it. We can have incredible certainty in beliefs that are wrong. Its been a while, but just think back along the lines of my knowledge paper if you need details.

If I remember correctly, then the vast majority of your “knowledge” is cogency (i.e., inductions and abductions), right? — Bob Ross

No, the vast majority of what we hold are beliefs, and if we're logical, we attempt to hold onto the most cogent beliefs we can when we are unable to know whether that belief is right. It seems a cogent belief that other beings can experience qualia, but it cannot be known what that qualia is like for them. We can objectively know whether something has consciousness or not, regardless of what we personally believe.

To me, it seems as though you are claiming sometimes that we can’t know that other people have qualitative experience (viz., that there is something to be like them: they have qualia) and other times you are conceding that point, like the above paragraph, and saying just can’t know what it would be like to be like them. — Bob Ross

We cannot know, but we believe that others have qualia. But beliefs about something are not objective, therefore they do not belong in objective analysis or discussion. It is not that we cannot speak or have further beliefs about subjective consciousness, it is simply a recognition that such discussions can at most only be beliefs, and not objective certainties.

Can you prove it otherwise? Can you demonstrate with full knowledge that I have subjective qualitative experience?

Why would I need to prove it with full knowledge (and am assuming full certainty) for it to be worth believing (or claiming to know)? — Bob Ross

You can find worth in believing that I have qualia. But you cannot know it. Once again, this inability to know does not mean we cannot reasonably use cogency to think about the possibilities of qualia. Its just that we have to understand that such discussions can never be objective discussions. There will always be an uncertain belief. There is nothing wrong with this, as there are many many things that we cannot truly know yet we reasonably plan and work with. I don't know what tomorrow will bring or if I will even be alive, but I still plan with a general prediction of what will happen. Same with subjective consciousness.

Great post Joshs!

I view individual gender as a mixture of inborn and cultural features. — Joshs

But that is not what gender is. Gender is the expectation that a sex act or express themselves in a particular way. What you are noting is people wanting to act or express themselves a particular way. So if a man is born who wants to wear a dress, then he does. This is not gender. The expectation that a man should NOT wear a dress is gender. The expectation that a woman SHOULD wear a dress is gender. Can a man want to wear a dress and a woman not want to wear one? Of course. That desire does not change their actual sex of being male or female.

When it is no longer invisible to us , due to a sharp enough difference in our gendered behavior with respect to our same-sex peers, we are given an opportunity to notice the way that gender sweepingly affects human behavior in general. — Joshs

Yes, gender is essentially sexism. Men shouldn't cry and women are expected to be emotionally weak and scatterbrained. Does a man crying mean he isn't biologically a man? No. Does an emotionally strong women with a mind as sharp as a tack mean she's biologically a woman? No. Just because societies or individuals expect a sex to act a particular way, does not mean that they are not that sex if they don't. Same as if they act in stereotypical ways to the opposite sex. It does not make them the opposite sex either.

My second claim has to do with the embodied nature of physical sexual features. Embodied approaches within psychology reveal that such anatomical
manifestations of biological sexual expression such as genitalia can’t be understood in isolation from how they are used, how they are performed and enacted. — Joshs

This is not pyschological gender, but sexual orientation. Now people may have a gendered viewt of sexual orientation. "You're a man and you want to sleep with another man? Well you must not be a man then." Of course you're still a man, your biology hasn't changed. You just don't fit into what that particular society stereotypes or wants to force a man to act like.

Saying tv at our biological sexual parts are embodied and enacted via gender is quite a distance from talking about capability of pregnancy. — Joshs

So to clarify here, who you sleep with has nothing to do with your gender, which is simply a stereotype of what society or you believe a sex should act like. Sexual orientation is not gender.

Let us clear something up first. Most people with AIS have XY chromosomes. If you send their genome to a geneticist, he would tell you they are male, not that they have chromosomes different from men and women. Because according to genetic definitions of sex, they are male. Thus if we accept your objective scientific definition, people of biological male sex can have vaginas and give (surrogate) births.

Do we agree so far? — Jabberwock

First, I again ask you on your next reply to answer my questions to you. Is it fair that I'm the only one being asked questions in a discussion while mine go ignored and unanswered? No. That's not a discussion. What we're trying to do here is have a discussion between two people trying to figure out what makes logical sense in matters of sex and gender. Carving out only what you want to discuss when the other person takes their time to address everything you've asked is not a discussion, its a one sided attack. I don't think you're intentionally doing it as you seem like a bright individual, and I've really enjoyed your points so far. But please, take the time to answer my questions as well if I have spent the time and effort to answer yours.

Those with AIS are not able to birth kids or get other people pregnant. https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/androgen-insensitivity-syndrome/

Regardless, such a person is still a man, but with the caveat that they have a disorder that they are insensitive to androgens. Once puberty hits, the syndrome is first found when secondary sex characteristics begin to happen.

Lets say for fun however that male's could give birth. They would still be males. Male seahorses for example give birth. By sex, they are still males. Once again, having an exception to the norm does not change the norm, nor has your example shown me that sex is not objective.

Alright, with that please answer my previous points and questions before asking more of your own Jabberwock. I look forward to your answers!

I am currently addressing this here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14370/subjective-and-objective-consciousness if you want to join in. I don't want to spread the same topic to multiple threads out of respect to the forum.

Thank you Josh's fantastic contribution. I'm going to link some research on sex differences and behavior in dogs.

"Ethological studies also underline many behavioral sex differences in other animals [18]. Prominent observations related to reproductive behaviors, such as parental care, mating strategies, and courtship displays, are almost exclusively expressed by only one of the sexes. These traits have been tagged as real “sexual dimorphism” [19] or “qualitative differences” [18]. However, differences in behaviors not exclusive to reproduction are less obvious and may differ in magnitude between the sexes. Odor detection and stress responses, for example, fall in this category and are simply considered “sex differences” [19] or “quantitative differences” [18].

In some cases, both sexes appear to exhibit the same behavior; however, the underlying neural substrate differs between them such that, under particular conditions, one sex might display a different behavior (sex convergence and divergence, [19]). For example, Lighthall et al. [20] reported there were no significant sex differences in a human decision-making task; however, under the influence of a cold pressor stress, men showed a faster reward-related decision-making speed than females, thus indicating a clear sexual divergence in behavior. This effect was attributed to differential brain functions in the dorsal striatum and anterior insula, with an increased activation in men compared to women after the stress event. Finally, there may also be “population differences” in behavior, which indicates that the frequency of display varies between the sexes, although the pattern is consistent [18]. For example, in most social mammals, males tend to disperse more than females [21]."
-Behavioral and Perceptual Differences between Sexes in Dogs: An Overview
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6162565/

To sum up those weighty paragraphs, there are clear differences in behavior between the sexes in regards to sexual behavior, at least in the norm. After all there are gay dogs. But to drill down even further, obviously a female brain would need to handle menstruation, while a male brain would handle the male sex organ for procreation.

But what is important is while there can be a general sense of non-sexual behavior differences between the animals, its less obvious. Thus an agressive dog can be assumed to be male more often than not, but being aggressive does not make a dog male, nor is it limited to only males being aggressive.

This is a similar point in humans. In general, expected behavior in non-sexual interactions from a particular sex is gender. And gender expectations are not objective evaluations of how an actual sex should or must act. I've made the point further up to Jabberwock in a very good discussion that our current division by sex, is due to physical sex differences. To add to this, a consideration is the sexual behaviors between the sexes as well. Male sexual aggression is a strong consideration for why women have women's shelters and separate bathrooms.

What is not considered in these sexual separations are non-sexual actions that someone may assume a sex would have. In other words, gender is not a reason for the separation. Males may be seen as more aggressive, but an aggressive woman is not forced to use a male bathroom because she does not fit her gender role. My point is that even if there are non-sexual brain differences between men and women due to biological sex, it has not been, nor should be, a consideration in situations that are divided by sex.

Is “qualitative experience” (i.e., qualia) different to you than observing, identifying, and acting (or are they the same)? — Bob Ross

They are slightly different. Qualitative experience is the subjective act of observing and identifying. You can act as well, its just not required to subjectively be conscious. Think about someone in a coma that was unresponsive, but later comes out of it and is able to repeat conversations they heard while unresponsive. They were conscious, just unable to act.

Observing identifying and acting are objective measures of consciousness that can be known from monitoring a thing. Put a puzzle in front of a person, and they'll observe, attempt to identify, and make an action based on that identity.

Is “awareness” different than “qualitative experience”? Is it the same as observing, identifying, and acting? — Bob Ross

Awareness is a combination of two main factors: Observation and identification. — Philosophim

Qualitative experience would be the experience of observing and identifying from the subject observing and identifying.

Am I correct in saying that, under your view, “objective” and “subjective” consciousness are both referring to qualitative experience? Awareness? Both? — Bob Ross

No, only subjective consciousness refers to qualitative experience. Its not that objective experience denies that subjective consciousness exist, it just knows that it cannot be known and as such cannot be determined by an objective evaluation.

Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems like you are saying that we can objectively know that other beings have qualitative experience and that there is something to be like that subject but we cannot know what it is like to be that subject: is that correct? — Bob Ross

No, we cannot actually know whether other beings qualitatively experience, we can only assume or make an induction that they do. As there is no way to objectively measure or comprehend what another's qualitative experience would be like, its outside of our ability to know. Its like this: Both of our eyes see the wavelength for the color green, but I can never know if what you subjectively experience as green is the same as what I subjectively experience as green.

They can have robotic consciousness.

Are you saying that there is something to be like a robot as a subject (but we just can’t know what that is like) and it has qualitative experience? — Bob Ross

We can assume that there is, but we cannot know that there is. Whether a robot has qualitative experience and what its like is outside of the realm of knowledge.

I don’t hold that a camera + a computerized interpreter (of the images) equates to a conscious being but I do agree that the camera is aware (as an observer) to some limited degree (in order to take in a photo of the environment). I just don’t hold consciousness and observation as the same thing, so can you elaborate on what you mean? — Bob Ross

Something aware can both observe and identify. A camera that receives light through the lens and then prints it onto a photo is a simple observer. It does not identify anything in the picture itself, it just observes and records. An identifier is something which can look at that picture and think, "That part of the picture is a cloud". Consciousness requires both observation and the ability to identify. Observation or the ability to identify alone do not make consciousness.

Is that not the qualitative experience?

No, I do not hold that there is something to be like a camera + computerized interpreter (of those images or what have you). I do not hold that the camera has qualitative experience: all that is occurring is quantitative measurements through-and-through. — Bob Ross

And you can't know that it has qualitative experience, anymore than you can know any other objectively conscious being has qualitative experience. Bob, can you prove that I have qualitative experience? Can you know it for certain? It is just as difficult to prove I have qualitative experience as it is to prove a dog has qualitative experience. Since we cannot, when talking about what we can know objectively, qualitative experience of beings or things other than ourselves is unnecessary.

e.g., the subjectively experienced redness of the truck can’t be accurately quantified, whereas the camera is capturing quantitatively what it thinks is there and displaying it quantitatively via pixels (in hex encoded colors or what have you), of which you qualitatively experience when you look at the image via the camera screen (after taking a picture). There’s nothing qualitative happening in terms of the internal processes of the camera nor is the camera subjectively experiencing anything (I would say). — Bob Ross

I'll refer back to seeing the wavelength green vs experiencing the qualitative color of what green is to you. Its not that there isn't anything qualitatively happening to other people. Its that its outside of our knowledge. Because we cannot prove it, it is unimportant for us what exact color we see when we see the wavelength green. Same with the qualitative experience of an ai observing and identifying objects in a picture. We can note it sees the wavelength of green, but we cannot know what that experience is for it. Since we cannot know if it does or does not have qualitative experience, its subjective consciousness is not considered in objective consciousness evaluation.

Objective consciousness is the observation and confirmation that there is consciousness apart from the subjective experience itself.

I don’t see how you can come to understand a thing as conscious but yet say you haven’t thereby posited it as subjectively experiencing: could you elaborate? — Bob Ross

Certainly. Consciousness is described as anything which can observe and identify. The only way we can objectively know if something is consciousness is by observing its actions. There are only certain actions one can take which determine consciousness. If I put iodine in a person's blood, it will show signs of hormones for your thyroid. What is the qualitative experience of having iodine in your blood? If someone put it into our blood stream, we would not observe it by feeling in our blood, nor be able to identify it. Therefore we are not conscious of it.

However, stick a needle in someone's skin to insert the iodine, and a person can identify the feel and sight of the needle, and identify that it is a needle, or at least something that causes pain. Thus the person is conscious of the needle. Do we know what they feel? No. That is the subjective consciousness of the person. Does it matter subjectively what they feel when evaluating objectively whether they are conscious or not? No.

By my lights, the whole point of saying something is conscious is to grant that it has subjective experience, and the outer, objective analysis of that looks like the an aware, organic entity. It sounds like, under your view, there could be a being which is conscious but doesn’t have any subjective experience but, to me, that’s like saying that we can determine something thinks while holding it may not have a thinker. — Bob Ross

I am going a step further. I'm saying its impossible to know if something else besides yourself has qualitative experience because its purely subjective. Can you prove it otherwise? Can you demonstrate with full knowledge that I have subjective qualitative experience?

Great points Bob, glad to see you thinking about it!

My entire argument is the entire argument. Please read it.
— Philosophim

I did and then you decided this all only applies to the limited context of "places divided by sex". I was trying to clarify your context. You said in public it doesn't matter at all. Seems Ad-hoc. — Cheshire

Its not ad-hoc at all. There are places that society divides people by sex. In public we do not divide people by sex, at least in America.

The whole discussion started with my objection to your claim that 'sex' is objective. If your claim now is that 'sex' is 'what we divide by' and we pick and choose the features for the division, then I guess it is a tacit acknowledgment that it is not. — Jabberwock

I have never said that we pick and choose the features of what counts as male and female. XY and XX for the norm. This is objective and unchanging. What I noted is that there are places we divide by sex and not gender. Point out exactly where I start to say sex itself is subjective and please answer the point I made in the quote.

We don't divide the sexes by brains, period. If you think we should, then please give a reason why. — Philosophim

Try to avoid accusing others of taccit denial of their own claims without very clearly pointing out the exact wording and the logical contradiction. It comes across as dishonest and is often done by those who are no longer able to answer the points of the argument. Combined with the fact you did not answer my request, its looking like you are unable to do so, and are now attacking straw men. I'm giving you the benefit of the doubt though! I could be wrong, it just needs to be clearly shown.

If it was subjective and arbitrary, why do transgender people want to be the other sex so much? If it was subjective and arbitrary, they wouldn't care. It is objective and not arbitrary by this alone.
— Philosophim

Because the society strongly acts and sometimes enforces that division. It does not really give you an option not to belong to any group, even though some of your features might not 'belong'. — Jabberwock

Societies expectations of how you should act as a man or woman are subjective and arbitrary. That's gender. Your sex is not subjective or arbitrary. This is why gender should not be considered in sex division. Even if your features do not match someone's gendered opinion of how a man should act, you're still objectively a man.

It seems that you decide that the person is 'the norm of their sex' based on several arbitrarily selected attributes. When I point out that there might be different attributes to be taken into consideration, you just dismiss them, based on 'what society thinks'. Not very objective, I would say. — Jabberwock

No, I've said clearly what the norm of sex is. XX and XY are female and male respectively with expected secondary sex characteristics. That is not arbitrary. If so, show me how please. I have not dismissed your attributes in any way. I have noted them as being either deviations from sexual norms, such as a XXY, or gender which is subjective. Please give a specific example of what I am ignoring or misaligning to the definitions I've given.

If 'being a woman entails' some behaviors, then they are ulitimately biologically conditioned. But your definition of 'gender' claims they are not. And as I wrote, sex of the brain does not depend on a single or some features - why would it? — Jabberwock

And what behaviors biologically entail you to be a woman? Wearing a dress? Beyond the biological differences that the brain would need to interface with to birth or procreate, what is objective behavior that solely belongs to a man or a woman? My point is that being a woman does not entail you to behaving or dressing a particular way. That's society stereotyping, not an objective assessment.

Again, is another question I've asked you here that you have not answered.

I have not seen a compelling reason for a transgender person who is the norm of their sex suddenly being allowed into a place divided by sex because they want to act or dress in a stererotypical belief of how a sex should behave or dress. Feel free to give one, and we can keep discussing this point. — Philosophim

As well, please do not just accuse an argument of contradicting itself or being arbitrary without evidence. Please copy the lines in question you think I contradicted myself at, then point out where the contradiction is. Its easy to get into your own head and definitions and see a contradiction where the OP has not because they are not agreeing to your definitions. Further, if you don't show me directly, I'm going to correctly conclude that you misunderstood, so its important for both of us. Its fine if you don't agree to my definitions, and some of the questions I've asked you are giving you a chance to challenge them, but we need to be on the same page so we're not talking past one another.

1. That is exactly my point. Your claim is that transgenderism is NOT a result of biological expression of sex difference - how can you be sure? — Jabberwock

Everything is biological. You are your brain, and it is biological. The point I'm making is that if we could actually identify sex differences in the brain, its irrelevant to why we divide the sexes to begin with. We don't divide the sexes by brains, period. If you think we should, then please give a reason why.

That is precisely because 'sex' is a subjective collective term for many features that typically are bundled together, but not always, so the division will always be arbitrary. — Jabberwock

If it was subjective and arbitrary, why do transgender people want to be the other sex so much? If it was subjective and arbitrary, they wouldn't care. It is objective and not arbitrary by this alone.

And again, and if we start repeating ourselves its probably time to agree to disagree, I've noted that exceptions do not change the rules that concern the norms. We make exceptions for those people. I have not seen a compelling reason for a transgender person who is the norm of their sex suddenly being allowed into a place divided by sex because they want to act or dress in a stererotypical belief of how a sex should behave or dress. Feel free to give one, and we can keep discussing this point. But without answering this question, there is no more to explore here.

Finally, the label of sex is settled by science around the world. Give a scientist a genome of any human being and they will identify XY as male and XX as female. This is not subjective.

That is precisely because 'sex' is a subjective collective term for many features that typically are bundled together, but not always — Jabberwock

To this point again, exceptions are not the norm. Exceptions do not change the rules for the norm unless a valid reason is given. An exception to one's chromosomes do not change the objective definition that an XY is a man while an XX is a woman.

Wanting to wear a dress doesn't make you feminine, but being feminine might make you want to wear a dress. — Jabberwock

They're actually the same statement. "Feminine" is a gender term. It implies that being a woman entails certain cultural expressions and behaviors that can be different across cultures. My sister does not wear dresses, does not paint her nails, and dissects dead bodies for a living. These would largely be considered masculine actions in some cultures. Does that mean my sister should suddenly be playing sports on a male team? That people should now call her a man? Of course not.

The second argument I think you need to make is why being masculine or feminine as expressed subjectively by cultures should logically lead to someone being identified as a male or female sex by law. I'm very open to hearing it!

Very glad to see you Bob! The reason I bowed out from your thread is I felt my points would deviate too much from your original intent. I felt that your thread was addressing those who were somewhat familiar with your topic, and agreed and understood basic points. My questions and critiques seemed too far out of place for your OP, and I did not want to derail your thread from others.

the former seemed to be the latter with just the redaction of “what it is to be like a subjective experiencing” or, as you put it, “the viewpoint of consciousness itself”. — Bob Ross

I think you have the right of it. Its really a separate evaluation. Objective and subjective consciousness are two aspects of "consciousness". My point was to take the original concept and divide it into clearer and more distinct notions to avoid potential problems when they are blended together.

If that is correct, then I don’t see how “They are entirely separate realms of discussion and analysis”: when one analyzes how an organism has conscious experience of something, that is still “tied” to the same “consciousness” as that organism that is subjectively experiencing. I fear that this distinction implies that there could possibly be a being which has consciousness but doesn’t subjectively experience, but the consciousness we are studying objectively (from the side of behavior) is the same thing as the qualitative experience that the subject itself is having: we just don’t have direct, private access to it like that subject does. — Bob Ross

My point is that it is irrelevant when studying objective consciousness that we have an objective evaluation of the subjective consciousness. This is mostly because subjective consciousness of other beings is outside of knowledge. It is something we simply cannot know. No human knows what its like to be subjectively conscious as a dog. But objectively, does a dog have consciousness? Yes, by its ability to observe, identify, and act.

A being can be “aware” in the sense of being capable (to some degree) of observing its environment and identifying different aspects of its observation without having qualitative experience: for example, even basic AIs today can observe their environment and identify things (such as cups, tables, chairs, etc.) and they do not have conscious, qualitative experience: — Bob Ross

My argument is that they do. Do they have human qualitative consciousness? No. They can have robotic consciousness. What is it like to experience from within the system the ability to observe, identify, then make an action? Its impossible to know. As such, its irrelevant in objective evaluation.

The problem is we're constantly trying to attribute subjective consciousness to situations that are impossible to do so. Objectively, consciousness does not require you to be human, can we both agree on that? Is a dog conscious? A bat? A crab? They all have brains, though much more primitive than human brains. Therefore their consciousness, in what they are able to observe, identify, and act on, is much more limited. Will we ever know what its like to have the qualitative experience of a dog? No. That still doesn't mean we can't work with what we have.

An allegory is quantum physics or even odds. Both of these evaluative fields work within the limitations they know. Qauntum physics has a limit where you cannot both know a particles velocity and location at the same time. So we construct a system around which one we decide to measure. A deck of 52 playing cards has an unknown order, but we know what all the cards are. Therefore we can construct odds. Objective consciousness is simply removing that which cannot be possibly known, the actual subjective experience.

are you talking about qualitative experience or just the ability to take in input and interpret the environment?--these are two very different things — Bob Ross

Are they? When a simple camera takes a picture, it simply processes the light. It cannot identify anything within that light. Only a consciousness can take in light, then form some identity out of it like a cloud, a sun, and grass. To observe, then identify, doesn't some "thing" have to observe, then match it to an identity? Is that not the qualitative experience? Some "thing" must maintain both the observation, and actively match an identity. We don't have to know what that's like for different observers and identifiers, but we can say the state of observing and identifying is consciousness at the most basic level.

If we attach a program to a camera that can identify things like clouds, a sun, and grass in the picture, then that is what it is conscious of. But that is ALL it is conscious of. It does not have feelings, or the ability to have the four other senses human's do. But there is something that retains an observation long enough to process through several identities, then match them.

Is “subjective” consciousness the qualitative experience and “objective” consciousness the mere awareness of the environment (plus the interpretation of it)? — Bob Ross

No, subjective consciousness is merely what it is like to be the thing which is conscious. Objective consciousness is the observation and confirmation that there is consciousness apart from the subjective experience itself. Thus if we can observe an entity that can observe, identify, and act, we can conclude it is conscious at least within what it can observe, identify, and act upon.

And yet you just did.
— Philosophim
You can't observe that you're not thinking a particular thought.

Not sure I understand the op either. It doesn't seem like you're discussing two kinds of consciousness. It seems like you're looking for a way to objectively identify another consciousness. — Patterner

You can't observe that you're not thinking a particular thought. — Patterner

Look, I don't care. Its irrelevant so believe what you want. The point is not that I'm trying to identify another consciousness, its that consciousness can be divided into subjective and objective parts. If there's something you don't understand about that, feel free to ask.

If I am making a reductio absurdum argument against materialism, it does not mean I believe in materialism. — RogueAI

Then please make such an argument. Refer back to my original points to you where I formed a logical argument, then asked you to clarify and explain your own.

We are talking about places that are divided by sex. My claim is that gender does not override sex division, because gender and sex are different.
— Philosophim

So, your entire argument is regarding the caveat moments such as dressing rooms and bathrooms? — Cheshire

My entire argument is the entire argument. Please read it.

Not if attraction to women is just one biological feature that aligns with features typically attributed to men and her other psychological features align with those of women. Again, psychology is also part of genetic expression and it might also be sexual, as there are biologically caused psychological differences typically attributed to sex. Thus it should be considered by you as 'secondary sex expression'. — Jabberwock

1. We do not know enough about the brain to determine this.
2. Separations by sex have NEVER involved brain differences. As such, a brain difference should not suddenly become a deciding factor. You think that a six foot 10 230 pound male should compete in women's sports because he has more grey matter in his brain than average?
3. What would be more feminine or masculine in the brain that isn't gender? Wanting to wear a dress doesn't make you feminine. There is nothing biological about being a woman that naturally compels one to wear a dress. Can you give some examples on your end?

I'm an idealist. I've identified as such here for quite awhile. I was meeting you halfway for sake of argument earlier. Don't accuse me of trolling, please.

We're at first principles now. I want to know why, at the starting gate, I should adopt your materialistic view of reality because in actuality, I don't. — RogueAI

You aren't responding to my earlier points and now you want to change to a debate over materialism? I'm not playing this game. If you're not answering my points and just asking more questions, then you're not discussing. The subject was about the brain and consciousness. I've already put in effort to make some points and ask you to justify yourself. If you want to engage with me, first justify yourself. Explain to me why you don't believe brains are material reality instead of asking me. The onus is on you to respond and make an actual point before continuing on with your questioning. If you cannot do so, then lets end the conversation.

Then you are inconsistent in your definitions – you treat physical sex expression in genitals differently than physical sex expression in a brain. — Jabberwock

No, I'm not. I'm saying that expected behavior is gender. If your brain now determines your sex, that means a lesbian could be considered a man because their brain is attracted to a woman. Do we want to go down that path? No, we don't. Sex is simply chromosonal and secondary sex expression.

To a point I made earlier, we don't divide the sexes by their brains. Bathroom division is based on physical privacy and vulnerability. Sports are divided based on the fact that testosterone and male hormones create physically superior people per weight class. Women's shelter's are to protect sexually traumatized women from being around the sex that traumatized them. Your brain is irrelevant.

And you cannot be aware that you are not thinking a particular thought. That would be thinking, "I'm not thinking about crayons right now." — Patterner

And yet you just did. Honestly, this is an incredibly unimportant part of the OP. What about the subjective vs objective consciousness?

And how are you aware of yourself? Don't you need to observe something, then say, "I identify this as myself?"
— Philosophim
Do you have to observe anything to know that you exist, that you are awake? — Alkis Piskas

Yes. The state of wakefulness feels different from the state of sleeping. I'm pretty sure we're having a miscommunication on what "observation" is. The word is not important. My point is there are things that we encounter, and then we identify them. Simple as that.

Do you have to feel or think anything to know that you exist? That you are a person? That you are reading this message? — Alkis Piskas

Yes! I can't read a message without observing the message and identifying that they are words.

Knowing that "something". What is this something?
— Philosophim
Anything. Whatever. No some thing in particular. It could be e.g. just sitting on a chair. — Alkis Piskas

That's an observation combined with identification. Anything is observation. Identification is noting that anything is me sitting in a chair.

The feeling of the chair on your bottom does not determine the fact that you are sitting. — Alkis Piskas

The feeling is an observation. The identification is what determines whether I'm sitting.

You do not watch your legs and whole body move fast to be aware that you are running. You just know that you are running. — Alkis Piskas

Observe does not mean watch. Observation is feelings, thoughts, etc. Identification is noting that the combination of what you're observing can be identified as running.

But you can also be aware of the absence of thoughts! — Alkis Piskas

Yes, an observation that you're not thinking a particular thought can be identified as not having thoughts. You're taking observation to mean that we are ascertaining the existence of something. Observation is just your subjective experience without identity. Identity creates differences within that subjective experience.

That's a contradiction to what I've defined. I need to observe something and then identify that as a "thought". I need to observe something and identify it as a "body". The combination of the two is awareness.
— Philosophim
Yes I know that. Repeating it does not prove that I'm wrong! — Alkis Piskas

Pointing out its a contradiction does. Show that it is not a contradiction and you may have something.

Also, I wonder why do you chose to ignore all that I have said and shown in multiple ways about observation not being necessary for awareness to exist ... — Alkis Piskas

I'm not ignoring. I'm the OP who provided the definition and I'm trying to point out that you didn't understand what observation meant. Which is fine, no problem. But when responding you should attempt to understand the OP first right? We don't want straw man arguments.

Suppose that a person has a male body with male genitals, but due to some developmental occurrence this person's brain acquires features typically associated with women, therefore causing that person's strong identification with women. Would that person be transsexual or not? — Jabberwock

No, that person would be transgender according to the definitions I've provided. Gender is how we expect a sex to act or dress. That's what the brain controls. We could also call that subjective stereotyping, or sexism. I think its very important as a society that is trying to avoid discrimination that we don't go back to the old idea that women and men's gender should define who they are.

Do you run around tearing wigs off of bald people? Do you refuse to acknowledge that they appear to have hair? — Cheshire

No because I'm not in a situation where people are separated by having hair and not having hair. We are not talking about the general public. Your gender or sex is really no one else's business in public. We are talking about places that are divided by sex. My claim is that gender does not override sex division, because gender and sex are different.

Insisting someone is literally a different sex when it's intuitively a contradiction to a lot of the public has just made things worse. I more or less adopted the opinion of a surgeon that performs the procedures. In his words, the result is a feminized man or the inverse. — Cheshire

I think we agree. Gender presentation does not change your sex.

The alteration seems to help but no one thinks they have become a different sex. — Cheshire

Then they should have no problems with not being allowed into places based on sex division when they are not that sex.

Implicit in what you said is an assumption that there exist physical objects like brains. Why should I agree with your materialist/physicalist assumption? — RogueAI

RogueAI, I'll answer your questions if you're serious about replying to mine. First, you already agreed when we started discussing brains.

What you think is neural causation is neural correlation. It's the old, correlation is not causation. — Philosophim

You already agree there are neurons, and you claimed they correlated with mind, and didn't cause it. At this point retreating and saying, "Well maybe brains don't exist" is borderline trolling. I'm giving you the benefit of the doubt that you just made a mistake.

Also, please answer the rest of the points I made. Its going to need to take you more than a few sentences to reply adequately. Please take it seriously. If that is not what you are interested in, then again, no harm in bowing out of a conversation.

X amount of indefinite harm will occur for a future person who is not born yet. Some have argued that one is not "preventing harm" for anyone, as they don't exist yet. Is this just rhetorical hedging in order to hold a certain ethical belief, or do they have some ontological validity in the idea that the potential person is not actual and therefore nothing is being prevented to any actual thing. — schopenhauer1

I still don't understand what you mean in relation to conditionals. Get rid of all the fancy vocabulary. Don't worry about what "some" other people are saying. I want to hear what you think. Don't use X or X2. Remove all abstracts. Use an example like I did with the pregnant woman tempted by alcohol.

You seem so nervous to say what you want to say! Do not worry about being wrong so much that you lose your ability to be right! Worrying about being smart is one of the traps that inhibits true discussion. I've seen many "dumb" examples cut through to the heart of an issue faster than any abstract could. As it currently stands, I'm unable to clearly understand what you're trying to discuss.

At what point does a future person come into ethical consideration? Some have argued that because a person does not exist yet, that "that person" is an invalid category because it is en potential and not actual. — schopenhauer1

I don't understand. I just gave an example of a human that is about to be born. Give me an example of what you're thinking and your opinion on it. Don't worry about what others think.

Just looking at their body is not enough, if the person's brain or even some of its areas might express as woman's. I am not saying that it is always the case for transgender people, but there is some research that indicates that in some cases their brains might indeed be different. — Jabberwock

True. For example women in general have more grey matter in their brains than men do. But if a man has more grey matter than a few women, does that make him a woman? Of course not. Sex separations in society are also not based on brain differences. No one cares about your brain composition in sports, bathrooms, or women's shelters.

In such cases maybe it would be more productive to limit the divisions not to sex (as we agree that the expression might not be clear cut in some persons), but to particular features. — Jabberwock

Lets look at it this way. We make laws based on norms, then make exceptions for cases that do not fit the norm.

So we have 95% of the population or more is a clear cut man or woman. Someone comes along and genetically does not fit. In that case we as a society can decide if their physical features are more important. Likely such a person would want to be in places where their expressed features more closely mirror the secondary affects of a particular sex, so society should probably accept that. I doubt anyone here has a problem with it.

Lets say though that a genetic woman has had some type of disruption in their development that they have the secondary sex characteristics of a man. Despite this, they choose to use the woman's restroom because they are in fact, a woman. I don't think anyone would have a problem with this either.

Now does that mean we suddenly change the rules for the norm? No. If you're a genotypical and phenotypical woman and you disguise yourself as a man, you don't suddenly get a right to walk into the men's restroom or play in men's sports. It doesn't matter that the exception can, they have something they can't change themselves.

Again, all of this is really talk of transexuals, which is not really an issue. Does a genotypical and phenotypical male get to dress up and talk like a stereotypical woman and suddenly get access to places restricted by sex? No, that doesn't make any sense at all.

If something does not exist in the future, but could exist in the future on certain known conditions, does that future state of affairs have any ethical worth to consider? Let us say a human exists in future point Y, but does not exist now in actual point X. Does future point Y have any ethical consideration since they don't exist yet in future point Y? — schopenhauer1

I think we're still a little abstract. I like to give a concrete example of any abstract I use so its clear to others.

Lets say I'm pregnant and I want to get drunk. There's a high probability or certainty it will cause fetal alcohol syndrome, impairing my child's brain in the future. I can choose to drink and enjoy myself, or emotionally suffer until the desire blows over so that my child doesn't receive brain damage.

I think its pretty clear that this is an ethical consideration. Schopoenhauer1, it sounds like you're trying to say something without saying something. Give your idea fully. What are you looking for here? Its a lot easier to get to the point instead of holding out on it until some abstracts have been established.

At the basis of all of them, is being aware of yourself. — Alkis Piskas

And how are you aware of yourself? Don't you need to observe something, then say, "I identify this as myself?"

Neither does being aware of your emotions, thinkng, etc. — Alkis Piskas

If you have no observation of emotions, thinking, etc, do you have a self? What are you if you have no emotions, thoughts, etc?

Awareness actually means knowing that something exists or is happening. — Alkis Piskas

Knowing that "something". What is this something? Isn't that something I observe? Notice that I pointed out that thoughts are part of observation. I'm not using perception or senses, I'm just noticing we need some type of "thing" to "assess".

Leaving concepts, descriptions, etc. aside, just sit back and experience that you are aware of your thoughts, your body, your movements. Do not observe anything. — Alkis Piskas

That's a contradiction to what I've defined. I need to observe something and then identify that as a "thought". I need to observe something and identify it as a "body". The combination of the two is awareness.

I have intervened at this point of your discussion because I think it has taken a wrong path — Alkis Piskas

Not a worry! Intervene wherever you think its incorrect.

It seems your main problem is with my definition of "observation". What I'm trying to get at is you need a "thing" that "you" experience. So perhaps it would be better if I used the words "experience and identity"?

Even if they don't ontologically exist, are they in some sense real in a different way, or simply how we use language? — schopenhauer1

Sounds like its how we use language. An intuition I've always followed is, "If language doesn't match up to what you know about reality, the problem is likely with language".

Language does not dictate reality. Language is a tool we use that when effective, matches reality. There is no guarantee that we are using language effectively, but reality is always guaranteed to override our ineffective language.

Here's a few snippets of vocabulary that could help:

Probability: We know several outcomes could occur with some initial premises. Its a 50% probability that the coin lands heads or tails (We're using generalities here, yes it could land on its side.)

Possibility: There is an outcome we have known at least one time, therefore we believe it could happen again. Someone has flipped a coin and it landed heads up. So its possible for a coin to land heads up.

Plausibility: There is an outcome that we believe could occur within the bounds of current knowledge, but has not been actually observed to occur. Its plausible that when I flip a coin, the laws of physics suddenly change and it never lands.

All of these definitions are observations about reality. They are not reality itself. All of these are inductions about the future based on our current deductions, and nothing more.

The tree is in X position now, but could be in X1 position or X2 position in the future, depending on conditions (conditional state of affairs I guess). What is X1 or X2 without defining it tautologically (that they are conditionals, or just explaining that in a longer definition). — schopenhauer1

X1 and X2 without definitions or context mean nothing. I could very simply say the conditional that if the tree and ground do not move or affected by outside forces, they'll stay in X spot.

Or I could say if the three is dug up, and moved, it will be in X2 in 1 hour. Variables always represent some value, Conditionals are a set of known rules that always generate an outcome. Are you asking what the probability of each conditional happening is? Are you asking if its possible for X and X2 to happen?

Nice definitions. But are these possible worlds in some way real? X is X. X could be X1 or X2. Is X1 or X2 a thing? What are these possibilities? Also, X could be X1 or X2, or even X3, but then they have likelihoods of being one or the other. But also there is a sense of necessity involved here. It is necessarily true perhaps, that X could not be Y in any possibility. — schopenhauer1

I think a lot of confusion arises because we don't use distinct vocabulary between conditionals, probabilities, possibilities, and plausabilities. Could you clarify what you mean by X is X but it could also be X2? Its a little too abstract for me to understand why X could be X or X2.

I am writing a lot today. :) Valid conditionals are based off of known facts. For example, if I heat up ice past a certain temperature, it will melt. So I take an ice cube out of the freezer, put it back and say, "If I had left this cube outside of the freezer, it would have melted."

All of this relies on knowledge of unchanging laws. If tomorrow ice did not melt at room temperature, then of course our conditionals would change. But what is required for valid conditionals, repeatable known rules and consistent outcomes, does not change.

Sometimes conditionals are also confused for possibilities. In the case of T Clark's example, we say its possible that the coin could have landed at either heads or tails. But the reality is it landed on tails, so that was always going to be the outcome of that flip. If we say, "If I flipped it in X way, then it would land on heads", we have a conditional.

Conditionals rely on known laws and outcomes. When the law happens, the outcome happens everytime. Possibilities rely on known outcomes, but do not know which outcome could come out based on the information we have in front of us. We could flip a coin, but since we don't know all of the forces involved, its possible it lands on either heads or tails.

Exceptions are important in demarcating the differences, if sex is supposed to be objective. — Jabberwock

Absolutely. But do the exceptions deny what a man and a woman are by DNA? No. A man is still an XY, and a woman is still an XX by default.

Let compare it to a tree. Lets say a tree grows is short like a bush. In fact, from a layperson's observation, it looks like a bush in its physical expression. According to biology is it a bush? No, its a tree, though an exception to the general definition of tree. Does this exception change the general definition of tree? No. Same here.

1. Sex is only determined genetically. That means that on the first day after the conception it can be identified and whatever happens phenotypically is irrelevant. By that account, people with androgen insensitivity syndrome are males, even though they have vaginas, everyone treats them as females and they themselves identify as females. — Jabberwock

Yes, if sex is determined genetically, then we have the definitions of male and female. But what if a person has an XXY chromosome? Well they are neither a man nor a woman in that case. Its not that the objectivity of sex has changed, its that we objectively have something that isn't a man or woman in the general definition, its an exception. It may be an exception enough that we invent a new term for it, or we simply say its "a woman that physically resembles a man". This would be more to your second argument.

The differences of secondary sex characteristics do not change the objective sex. In general, men are stronger than women. But a woman could appear that ends up being far stronger than most men. That doesn't change the fact that she's a woman by genetics. What we're really discussing is what we do with such individuals when we have situations in society that are divided by sex, but the overall secondary sex expression does not match the norm. Where do we fit a man that physically expresses as a woman? We would re-examine why we have the sex divide, and see if the physical sex expression is different enough that such a person could enter in both areas, or it would be better for everyone else if they entered only one.

In my view, these are transexuals. In matters of transsex, discussions of sex division ARE relevant. How and why we divide people who do not fit in the norms are relevant. Personally, I see no issue with a trans sexed individual who physically matches the secondary sex characteristics of the other genome from using either sexed bathroom. But to be clear, being transsex is not the same as being transgendered. A transgendered individual is someone who identifies with a subjective view point of the way a sex is supposed to dress or act. So a fully chromosonal and secondary sex expressed man who wears a dress is transgendered. Their gender expression should have no sway in discussions about sex division. Things like bathrooms and sports are not divided by gender, but are divided by sex. Thus why transgendered individuals should not be able to cross into places divided by sex.

Fantastic points! You are definitely welcome here and thanks for engaging with the discussion!

I must disagree. While indeed most androgen insensitivy syndromes are genetically based, it does not mean that their genotype itself is not male or female: they have 46, XY karyotype, so geneticists would identify their genomes as male. — Jabberwock

Again, there is no problem in handling an exception. While they have an XY set of genetics, either there is some flaw within them, or an accident happened during birth that would change the phenotype. In this case again, the exception is the physical and objective difference, not a gendered difference. The difference is not subjective. In this case we can decide as a society how to best divide such a person based on these phenotypical differences outside of the person's control. But again, we are judging based on physical sex expression, not gender.

This is a far cry from a normal person. Societies sex division is based on the norm, not exceptions. And exceptions apply to exceptions. Exceptions do not override the norm. What you are talking about are transexuals. You can be a transgendered transexual, but being a transexual is not a matter of gender.

I think a start is to look at the costs to society for an individual with the disease. Autism at a lower spectrum could honestly just be considered a personality difference. But one can be autistic to the point of needing a constant care giver for basic needs. That's an immense cost to society where it takes two individuals to have the contribution of one.

Being born without basic functioning physical attributes creates unnecessary stress and cost to society. If one could prevent a child from being born blind, why not? A blind person is a higher cost which holds the full potential of an individual back.

Any time there is a defect of some sort, society bears the cost. Of course those with defects do their best to fit in and not be a burden on society, but its still a burden. It could be argued that people with these burden's can contribute to society in a unique way. Would Steven Hawking have been the brilliant man that he is without his impairment? Maybe, maybe not. All I know is there are lots of brilliant people walking around normally who didn't have to suffer like he did.

Sorry OP, sounds like you're going through a rough patch in life. And maybe that patch has so far been all of your life! :) I'm not smiling out of cruelty or mockery, but because I've felt that before. I had terrible acne most of my early life no matter what I did. Dermatologists could not fix it. You get cut off from society. Its a horror show of watching your face slowly rot away from infection and scarring. Not to mention I find I'm completely unable to feel anything from touching other people. Hugs, even from my own parents, don't affect me. Physical intimacy is possible, but no more emotionally satisfying to me then a trip to the bathroom.

I'm saying all of this purely so you know: You're not alone. There are lots of people in this world who undergo suffering and inescapable problems and agony. Some have it worse, some have it better. Did anything pick you out particularly and say, "You should have it worse?" No. That's just life. We are born who we are with the parents and circumstances we have. Some things are inescapable and inevitable.

Of course, does that help you? No. Its about what you do with what you have. I may not be an attractive person, but I still decide to put my foot out in the world and make friends. I have a few very close friends because of it. I don't decide to let suffering make me bitter and angry, but use it to empathize with others and help them suffer a little less as well. I decided to pursue the education that I wanted, and pursued philosophy and computer science. After years of work and struggle, I now live a very good life.

Will I always be scarred? Yes. Will I always receive looks of terror and disgust from people I first meet? Of course. But I've learned that after 15 minutes, no one really cares too much anymore. I do good things not because I expect to get rewarded for it, but because I want to ease suffering in the world. We are not owed anything in life, neither boons or banes. Look for the good where you can, be good where you can to help others not suffer like yourself, and find the joys and successes where you can without bitterness or jealousy that others have it better than yourself.

Oh, and one last thing. You'll find that those who have not truly suffered in life will not understand what you are going through. The temptation to hate them can be monumental. Do not do so. They are just ignorant, and if you had not greatly suffered, you would be just like them. Learn to be happy for them. They are not there in life with an obligation to understand you or give sympathy.

Hello Jabberwock! Welcome to the forums. Please, write your thoughts and feelings freely.

I would disagree with the OP claim that sex is objective. What is objective are biological features or properties. 'Sex' is a subjective term that is used to categorize beings based on those features, but it depends on the accepted definition, i.e. which features do we consider as essential for that category. — Jabberwock

For a first time post, this is a very good point to bring up. Yes, I am aware of genetic abnormalities that result in a lack of clear distinction between the sexes. But these are exceptions. Further, it doesn't change the definition of what a man or a woman is. In this case, these people fit neither fully into the category of man or woman.

In these cases, an abnormality or handicap asks us different questions. How does someone who is genetically not a man or a woman fit into sexually divided spaces? I think that should be considered based on the difference. But not we're not talking about gendered behavior, we're talking about placing someone with an objectively separate sex from a normal man and woman.

A subjective idea is an opinion. For example, lets say in one society men are not expected to wear dresses. In another society, they are. This is a societal expectation of how a sex should dress, but it is not an objective measure of how a sex should act. Objective measures of sex would be solid sex organ differences or clear genetic traits. It really doesn't matter what someone's opinion on the matter is, sex is a clearly defined term that has been studied and is known across all cultures and outlooks.

The subject is then focused on the norm, not the exceptions. While exceptions can be great to examine to make sure we aren't mistaken on the norm, I don't think that is the case here. No one is subjectively determining the sexual genetic normal for men and women. But I argue that gender, or the expectation of how men and women by sex should act, is a subjective stereotype, and does not override one's sex.

Great post again Jabberwock, and I hope you enjoy yourself here!

Are you talking about an origin of causality, all of the unknown steps that would lead to what we know today,
— Philosophim
Yes, my idea of an hypothesis that could be plausible is that we would be able to relate it to the current laws of nature and everything would fall in place like the pieces of a puzzle. — Skalidris

Lets go by your own definitions. You noted that what could be known is what can be observed. Can we observe that any one hypothesis is implausible? No, we can only test it to see if it matches reality. Lets examine what odds mean as well.

If I have a deck of 52 cards, the likelihood of a jack being pulled is 4/52, or 1/13. These odds only apply because we don't know which card will end up being pulled. Lets say we have a machine shuffle the deck and pull the top card. Since there is nothing in our knowledge which makes it more likely that any one card would be on top over another, we can safely claim those odds.

However, the shuffle is a real action. If we were to watch it, we would know with certainty which card was on top. Odds only work if you don't know certain aspects of reality and you want to make a reasonably inductive guess. Odds also only work if its reasonable to assume all situations have an equal chance of being.

In the case of hypothesis, you really don't have an underlying reason to state that any one hypothesis is plausible or less plausible than another. First of all, humanity can only know of a finite number of hypothesis, meaning the number of possible hypothesis is not infinite. Second, we need a method for demonstrating whether a hypothesis is true. Do we have any facts that demonstrate that any hypothesis we create has any greater chance of being true than another? No. Its not a chance that a hypothesis is true, its a chance that the hypothesis we pick can match correctly to reality.

In other words there are only a limited number of hypothesis which could be true. To simplify, lets say its one. So in a finite deck of cards, 1 out of that finite deck is true. Are we pulling hypothesis at random however? No. We can use reason and logic to rule out many potentials. When we do, do we know how many viable hypothesis are left? No, but its a finite number. So every hypothesis we test lowers the denominator by an unknown number as we discover more knowledge. Is the hypothesis we pick to explore next the right one? Now that's a clear 1/x chance. Meaning while the next hypothesis we pick to explore is most likely not going to be the one that matches reality, it definitely has a real chance to.

By this logic resulting from the premises you've put forth, we cannot conclude that any one hypothesis is more plausible or implausible than another merely looking at what has been left over after knowledge has eliminated the invalid ones. All we can do is pick the next hypothesis, explore it, and use that knowledge to further lower the denominator of possible hypotheses that humanity can create.

Was I close in the ball park of your flaw, or did you have another in mind?