So, you were exposed and you are not willing to correct your arguments or your vague language! I understand that acknowledging your mistakes in public is very difficult and I don't expect anything more than "I am the author and you don't understand" type of come backs. — Nickolasgaspar

And even after I asked you to take the argument to the other publicly available topic that I could continue this exact discussion with you on, you insist on posting some straw man

All supernaturalist religion is pseudo-philosophy. — Nickolasgaspar

when I've clearly told you I don't claim any supernaturalism in the OP.

I didn't expect anything more. Take care and good luck as well.

-The problem is that you don't understand the critique....
You just chose this trick to avoid challenging your misconceptions. — Nickolasgaspar

Ok, I've been nice, but you just seem interested in your own topic. As the author, I've informed you that you don't understand the topic. You are not entirely off base, but you're off base enough that you keep making straw men arguments. If you were honest, after I informed you that you did not understand, you would have read the other topic. Its obvious you did not. Further, I've asked you politely that if you didn't agree with the assessment that a first cause was logically necessary, to take your reply to that linked topic so we could discuss the evidence.

Your refusal to listen means this conversation is pointless. I'm not going to take the time and effort needed to reply again to someone who doesn't seem like they're listening, and seems more interested in their own voice than a conversation. If you want to have that conversation, then take what you've written and go to the other topic so this one is not derailed further. If not, we're done.

But Plato & Aristotle were reasoning to the conclusion that there must be a Necessary Being in order to explain the existence of all contingent & dependent beings. It was a Logical argument, not a scientific demonstration. — Gnomon

Understood, but my argument counters that. If a first cause is logically necessary, it is not necessary that it be a God, because a first cause is not bound by any prior rules of causality for its existence.

First cause is not a logical necessity. — A Realist

If you believe that, please go here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1 and point out why the OP there is wrong. This topic assumes agreement with the former topic.

I fully understand the argument and I stress out why it is a pseudo philosophical one. — Nickolasgaspar

I'm the author. No, you don't. I welcome critique, but when the author informs you that you do not understand the argument and you are making false assumptions, listen. This is not your time for your ego or sense of self-superiority. If you're here for that, leave. If you want to discuss the issues in a respectable manner, then seek to understand as you critique please.

-This is exactly what I pointed out in your first comment....you can not state that non existence is a state of being because its the lack of being. — Nickolasgaspar

I am not asserting non-existence is a state of being. If this is all about the semantics, I'm saying non-existence is a concept of reality, and we quantify that in relation to things that do exist.

"Space" is not assumed. Its is a quantifiable phenomenon in reality. — Nickolasgaspar

This is fine and is not in disagreement with what I'm saying.

Well god is a supernatural "first cause". But again for first cause to be a logical necessity, it needs the facts to make it necessary. As far as we can tell, its unnecessary since a state of being is the only state that it can "be". — Nickolasgaspar

What caused "state of being" to "be"? Why is there something instead of nothing? This does not avoid the logical point of the first cause. Again, if you are going to argue that a first cause is not necessary, please go to the argument I've linked and show why there.

-I asked you how can you prove these claims and you point me to a topic with the condition that I need to accept what you need to prove!!!!
Its not reasonable to demand from others to assume what you NEED to demonstrate objectively to be true. That's circular reasoning.... — Nickolasgaspar

Please read more carefully before reacting. I noted that the argument, the evidence you asked for, is in the other topic. This topic assumes you agree with the previous topic. If you do not, go there and prove it wrong. I'm not going to re-write the previous topic again. Again, I am not stating you need to accept that the previous topic is true, I'm stating that THIS topic assumes that you've accepted the previous topic as true.

And yes to both. If a cosmic field always existed, what caused it to always exist? The answer is, "It just is". It is a first cause, and needs no prior causality for the explanation of its existence.
— Philosophim
-The answer is We don't know and we can not assume or draw an conclusions from something we can not investigate. If something exists for ever, (a quantum noise with fluctuations) it doesn't demand a first cause. — Nickolasgaspar

Yes it does. I just noted that in the quote. If something exists forever, then it IS the first cause. That is because there is no prior causality that determines its existence. The rest of the argument I make in the OP follows from this.

Correct an eternal energetic cosmos needs no first cause to exist. It isn't a first cause...its the cause of existence in general. — Nickolasgaspar

No, it is the first cause. Taken entirely up the causal chain, we arrive at the point where we realize something has existed forever. There is no prior causality to this. Meaning the reason for its existence is not bound by prior laws, it just "is". If this confuses you, read the link to the first topic.

-" I am not claiming a first cause is existentially necessary, but logically necessary."
-Sure and I point out to you that our current scientific facts render that claim illogical since an eternal cosmos solves the problem created by the statement " non existence existing before existence" plus it is in agreement with what we measure in the cosmic background. — Nickolasgaspar

Incorrect. Current scientific fact does not negate my claim at all. You just haven't understood what a first cause was. Also, an "Eternal cosmos" is not a deduced conclusion, just one possibility. I'm not stating its wrong, but you shouldn't state that its ascertained knowledge either. My point in the original topic, is that it doesn't matter if the universe is finite or infinite, a first cause is a logical necessity in the chain of causality.

-I am not sure you understand what it means for a claim to be falsifiable. You need to present a way that we can test and objectively falsify your metaphysical claim on first cause — Nickolasgaspar

Ok, if you want to bring it up to that level that's fine. But then I'm going to ask you the same thing. How do you falsify the idea that the universe has been eternal? We can't very well travel back to the infinite past can we? In fact, infinity is something we've never encountered in reality. We have a logical concept of it, but have never verified it exists.

-"Stop lecturing."
-I will answer ...No, I will try to see the huge problem in your reasoning and why an unnecessary artifacts is not logically necessary — Nickolasgaspar

I don't care if you point out the flaws in my argument. I encourage that. Remove the attitude is all. We must discuss without ego or self-superiority if we are to ascertain the truth. If ego is the focus, then the argument will be to determine that instead of the argument at hand.

You are dodging the most important critique of your arguments and this is why your reply was so problematic. I hope this points help you understand the gaps in your reasoning and why this is NOT a philosophical topic. — Nickolasgaspar

No, I pointed out you misunderstood what the OP and its previous proof were, that there was no point in addressing it until you understood better.

At this point, if you agree that a first cause is logically necessary, we can continue the conversation here. If you believe a first cause is not logically necessary, then please post in the linked topic that addresses all the proofs and arguments for that. At this point, I don't want to derail this topic any further. Feel free to quote my response here in that other topic as well.

As I pointed out, you don't have enough data to assume non existence. — Nickolasgaspar

Agreed, but you don't have enough data to assume that non-existence cannot be either. Space is assumed in everything we measure. What you're proposing is an ether, which has not been proven either.

After all Non existence is not a state of being so it is irrational to even assume it in your effort to introduce the supernatural. — Nickolasgaspar

No, non-existence would be a lack of being. The opposite of the state of being. I am not introducing the supernatural here, other people are. If you believe a first cause is supernatural, I'm noting it is a natural logical necessity.

Again this is not a Philosophical Topic. This is a theological one. — Nickolasgaspar

No, it is not a theological one. This is the philosophical topic of what we can logically conclude if at least one first cause is a necessary logical requirement. Origin stories are often tied in with a philosophical God, of which I use here. This is in no way theological, as I am not attributing to any one theology in this discussion.

a. A first cause is an uncaused existence, that then enters into causality.
— Philosophim
-Can you demonstrate the possibility of such an existence?
-Can you demonstrate that an always existing Cosmic field needs such a concept? — Nickolasgaspar

See here for the proof. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1 This topic assumes you agree with the proof. If you do not agree with the proof, feel free to put your response there and I'll discuss. This topic is intended with the idea that you accept a first cause is logically necessary.

And yes to both. If a cosmic field always existed, what caused it to always exist? The answer is, "It just is". It is a first cause, and needs no prior causality for the explanation of its existence.

Once a thing exists, it can interact with whatever is around it, and follows the rules of its own existence.
— Philosophim
-Correct but Since our current indications (Cosmic quantum fluctuations) and logic (non existence not being a state) point to something existing eternally...why making up a first cause? — Nickolasgaspar

If something exists eternally, then it is not caused by anything prior. That itself would be a first cause. And again, your denial of non-existence is not logical, only a belief.

b. There are no limitations or rules that necessitate what a first cause must be.
— Philosophim
-Yes that is a common characteristic among explanations invoking "magic". No data...no limitations.
Its like Phlogiston, MIasma, Philosopher's Stone, Orgone Energy ...all over again.
As I said this is NOT a topic for a philosophical discussion.
Its more of having people pointing out to you your fallacies and gaps in reasoning. — Nickolasgaspar

Did you read and understand the entire OP? I think your thinking I'm making a claim that I'm not. This is a common problem among atheists who think I'm making an argument for God. Please do not let your emotions prevent you from reading and understanding the entire topic. Read the referenced topic if you believe it is illogical for me to conclude a first cause is logically necessary.

What can we conclude about reality if a first cause is logically necessary?
— Philosophim
-Nothing, because Necessity NEEDS to be demonstrated objectively, not assumed logically. Logic is not an adequate way to argue for Necessary and Sufficient of metaphysical mechanisms of reality (ontology). We have made so many many mistakes in the past but some of us insist in the same tactics. — Nickolasgaspar

Logical necessity is demonstrated with abstract logic. Existential necessity is demonstrated objectively. I am not claiming a first cause is existentially necessary, but logically necessary. What we logically conclude may not exist when tested, I think that is a given all can agree on. If you want to understand why I conclude a first cause is logically necessary, again, reference the OP where I go over that logic.

You need to explain why my poi

a. While it is possible only one first cause happened, there is no reason that there should be any limitation on the number of first causes, or that first causes cannot happen today.
— Philosophim
If we ignore all the fallacies and problems, there is one reason to limit adding up things in a "magical" cause...and that is Parsimony. — Nickolasgaspar

The idea I presented is the most simple and necessary explanation. You can't just claim I'm not using Occum's Razor here, please explain why you believe there cannot be more than one first cause under the logic I presented?

This necessarily follows from the rule that there are no limitations as to what a first cause can be.
— Philosophim
-Correct, as I said Unfalsifiable claims can not be tested as possible or impossible mainly because they carry no limitations. Vague concepts have zero characteristic to evaluate. They are absolute declarations posing as Panacea for all mysteries.
Again this is not philosophy. — Nickolasgaspar

The falsifiability of any one thing that is claimed as a first cause, is that it has something prior that caused it. The falsifiability of a thing that is claimed to have a prior cause, is that it does not. All I noted is that while there are falsifiable states, for some, it may be impossible to test. That is not due to a lack of falsifiability, it is due to a lack of information and testing capability. Concluding our limitations in the ability to test something is a fine and valid point in logic and science.

-If you design an answer without limitations then....there aren't any. Now we know particles pop in and out of existence all the time and we can observe them by viewing the affect they have on the particles of our universe.
When you use scientific knowledge to argue about your cosmology (particle with velocity) I suggest to accept all the epistemology and avoid cherry picking aspects that suit a specific narrative. Facts are facts and should be respected as a whole. — Nickolasgaspar

This argument was not done with scientific knowledge. This was simply the logical consequence of examining what a first cause would entail. Stop lecturing. You are making a lot of assumptions and mistakes by not understanding the argument. Seek to understand first please, then feel free to critique.

The rest of your points irrelevant, because you are making points without understanding the argument. Once you examine the referenced OP (and possibly comment there) and demonstrate that you also understand the OP of this argument, then we'll see if the rest of your points even need to be addressed.

Thermodynamic time is a different time as the time setting it off. — Haglund

Again, it doesn't matter. If Y is what we're looking at, and its explained by a X, Y is not a first cause. A first cause is when a Y is not explained by a prior X. And the only answer as to why the Y exists, is "It just is".

A cyclic time, say. Before real particles were realized ( the emergence of TD time) there were only virtual ones, as TD time had not taken off yet. Virtual particles oscillate in time (TD time wasn't there yet, so this was an inherent fluctuation). This is an eternal fluctuation, also happening in vacuum. — Haglund

All of this is irrelevant. Is all of this explained by something prior, or is it a first cause?

But how can this have gotten into existence? Just "not being there and then being there"? — Haglund

There is no prior reason why it gained existence. The reason why it exists, is because it does. If 2 seconds prior nothing was there, and then something appeared into existence without a prior cause, then it would be. As a first cause is logically necessary, this is what happens. No matter the desire that there be something prior, there is not. And because there is nothing prior, there are no rules or restrictions that state Y must, or could not be a particular thing. Of course, once Y exists, it has its own rules, but there are no rules or limitations that state Y must, or must not have been.

But how can thermodynamic time emerge? There gotta be a different kind of time kicking it of. — Haglund

Then there would need to be a different kind of time kicking THAT off. Then we would need a different... you get it.

A first cause needs nothing prior. The reason for its existence is, "It is." There's no other reason. Inevitably in any chain of causality you will arrive at a first cause. There will be no prior reason for its being. There will be no limitations prior to its being. It simply happened. There does not have to be anything prior, and in fact, logically cannot.

What if the chain is infinitely long or closed? Ìf all prior causes are endogenous? — Haglund

Finite or infinite is irrelevant. In the case of an infinite chain of causality (if this is possible) there is still the question of why there is an infinite chain of causality versus finite. The end result is the same. "It is, because this is how it exists". There is nothing prior to explain its existence.

If a logical necessity cannot be derived via philosophical argument, how else could such a conclusion be reached : by fantasy? — Gnomon

Yes. The point is that I see no philosophical argument at this time that can argue for God's logical necessity anymore. Feel free to try, but for the one's I am familiar with, they are all negated by the argument I've made.

The OP definitively omits all non-empirical evidence, such as logical inference. So, "case closed" by definition. — Gnomon

If you would like to logically infer God, that is fine. But I cannot think of a philosophical argument that can necessitate God's existence any longer. Meaning we can state, "If a God existed, perhaps X would happen." But one cannot philosophically claim God is a necessary existence for creation to exist.

PS___The Cause (impetus) of an ongoing chain-of-causation is necessarily prior-to & external-to the chain, yes? Hence, the First Cause question entails an Exogenous (originating from outside) Force, no? — Gnomon

No. The first cause requires no external prior-to. It is explained by its own existence, and nothing prior. If a first cause required an external prior causality, it wouldn't be a first cause. Feel free to refer to the link in the OP for the original argument for the proof.

Therefore, a physical god as defined in the OP is indeed subject to empirical testing. Yet, the monotheistic definition of God can only be evaluated via logical philosophical argument. — Gnomon

Which is fine. But it cannot be concluded via philosophical argument that such a God is logically necessary any more.

The current cosmological model implies that our world is not eternal or self-existent, so it's not its own Cause. — Gnomon

The OP that I site I prove that at least one first cause is logically necessary. As such, that means our universe is ultimately explained by those first causes. Regardless of what science postulates, this claim still stands.

Causality......first cause......science versus god. — universeness

Causality doesn't have to result in origin debates. I honestly posted this because I was seeing some people on this board have issues understanding what causality was.

How in the world did this become a theology debate?

Well most people understand God to be by very definition an omniscient entity beyond all conception, etc., etc., but here you are trying to apply the same logic to God as to other things. So are you trying to redefine God as having equals? — chiknsld

A God can't be entirely beyond conception, otherwise you couldn't conceive of a God right? If we're referring to the idea that something can exist without prior cause, but is able to interact with the universe, then why does this have to be God? If something has no prior cause for its existence, then there is no cause that necessitates it exist. I created another thread here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12847/if-a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary-what-does-that-entail-for-the-universes-origins that may explain it better.

You've easily accepted that a God existed without prior explanation. Is it not a simple step to apply that to something that is not a God?
— Philosophim

Why do you treat God as anything else? — chiknsld

I'm still confused chiknsld. Can you expand on your point a bit more?

Why do you treat God as anything else? — chiknsld

What do you mean?

What does it mean to be a "first cause"?
— Philosophim
"A first cause" is merely an imaginary construct. — 180 Proof

No, I don't think so. Mind demonstrating why it is? That's in the other post. This OP assumes a person has accepted the conclusions of the original post I referenced.

What can we conclude about reality if a first cause is logically necessary?
One might conclude that reality – its physical laws – do not prohibit a system of logic which entails "a first cause". — 180 Proof

Correct. And if reality cannot prove that system of logic incorrect, then it is concurrent with reality.

Where does this leave the idea of a God?
Depends on the type of "god". Mostly, "the idea" is fictional (or merely a logical construct) like "first cause". — 180 Proof

This is just addressing the general philosophical idea of a God as a creator of rest of reality. All that would be noted is that there could be being that formed without prior cause which had the power to do so. There are no implications to any specific religion, morality, or any capabilities of this being beyond this basic defintion.

Does this argument deny that God can exist?
One seems to have nothing to do with other. — 180 Proof

I'll post it again then.

No. All the current philosophical arguments for there necessarily being a God can no longer stand. This does not mean a God is not a logical impossibility. While we likely cannot find what the first causes are in our universe, we can prove causes exist. If a God exists, and interacts with humanity today, there should be evidence for it, like the evidence of any other causality. — Philosophim

So what would it take to prove a God exists now?
Define "God" and then provide or indicate unique evidences (e.g. changes only it causes to the natural world) which are entailed by it's predicates. — 180 Proof

That's what I conclude, I think we're in agreement. The point here is, the argument I've presented eliminates the alternative philosophical arguments for God as a necessary existence that I am aware of.

it's extremly difficult to conceive anything else. moreover it difficult to define it or to describe it somehow. — SpaceDweller

The inability or difficulty to comprehend reality does not mean reality does not exist. You've easily accepted that a God existed without prior explanation. Is it not a simple step to apply that to something that is not a God?

But gods are wise. They have creation power. Particles don't.

The particles can be eternal and still created by gods. I think. — Haglund

I never said particles necessarily had creation power. I'm just noting that a first cause can logically be anything.

If something is eternal, meaning its always been around, by definition it can't be created right? That would entail that it one point it wasn't around, which would mean its not actually eternal.

if there is possibility for multiple first causes, and possibility for them to happen even today, that doesn't get rid of question, which of these first causes was very first. — SpaceDweller

I don't think that's a question we can answer. And it may not have an answer. It could have been one or several first causes happened at the same time. It could be that multiple first causes had causal chains that blended into each other.

I think it's important to know very first cause because that's what matters for universe coming into existence.
there may be first causes happening all the time, but what caused creation, it must have been only one cause. — SpaceDweller

No, logically it does not only need one first cause. You can prove this to yourself. Answer why it is necessary that only one first cause created the universe. Whatever you come up with, I'm going to say, "But a first cause has no limitations on what it can be, you've put a limitation on what it can be. Therefore its not a first cause."

you said "We may very well believe it is another existence that caused the velocity of the particle, when the reality is it was uncaused"
if it's another existence then within another existence must have been first cause, and if it was then what is that another existence and what was first cause of it.
it may be yet another existence, and so on... leads to infinity — SpaceDweller

No, I mean there is an actual end. There is a point in which there is no prior causality. We may misinterpret that there is, but there actually isn't if we're examining the logic of what a first cause would entail.

I think of supernatural as something that does not exist in this reality, ie. it can't be touched, seen, smelled or observed.
it exists in another reality to which we have no access. — SpaceDweller

Then it could not cause this universe. To cause something, there must be an interaction of some sort. Even then, it still doesn't change the point. Lets say that the first cause of our universe was supernatural. It doesn't mean it has to be a God. We could have supernatural particles that created the universe, then exited it. Possibility does not mean logical necessity. To prove logical necessity, you'll need evidence.

So for example, a particle could appear right now, then wink out of existence.
— Philosophim

That can't happen. That's why the universe is eternal. — Haglund

But if you believe a God could just happen, then logically, this could happen as well. If you state it can't happen, then you state a God can't just happen either. I don't think that's what you want.

Even if you state the universe is eternal, there's the question of what caused it be eternal. If it the answer is, "It simply is", then the universe also simply just happened to exist eternally without any prior cause. Meaning you've described another situation in which is God is not necessary to explain the universe's origins.

Dead matter needs a creation. Eternal intelligence doesn't. — Haglund

You did not address the point I made. If you want a discussion, or to have your point be taken seriously, address the point I made please. If you don't understand the point I made, feel free to ask.

Ok, but that doesn't negate my point. That would mean something made God.
— Philosophim

What can make God? — chiknsld

That's not what I proposed, that's what you proposed. I stated if there was some prior causality for God, then something made God.

And if you believe God had no prior reason for its existence, then I'll post the original point I was referring to again.

When something has no prior reason for its existence, there are no rules limiting how or what could exist. — SpaceDweller

If anything could have been a first cause, then it is not logically necessary that this first cause be a God.

It appears you base this upon virtual particles, because there are "gazilions" of virtual particles in the universe one may think there are gazilions first causes happening all the time. — SpaceDweller

I actually don't. Its interesting that virtual particles aligns with the logic, but I made this philosophical argument based on the premises, not on the outcome.

Otherwise multiple first causes make no sense to me, isn't "first" cause suppose to mean literary "first" rather than one of many. — SpaceDweller

A first cause is something which has no prior cause for its existence. So for example, a particle could appear right now, then wink out of existence. After all, there's nothing to entail a first cause would continue to exist for any length of time either. You can't say, "That's can't happen," because that would entail there is some prior causality that would prevent this from happening.

However, when that particle appears, if it impacts something else that already exists, the first cause particle is the reason why the other particle acted a particular way. Essentially go up the chain of any examined causality, and you will eventually get to the point where a first cause is involved. That does not mean other chains of causality cannot exist separately from each other. A first cause on Pluto will not likely affect a first cause on Earth.

another existence, leads to infinity. — SpaceDweller

I did not understand what you meant by this, could you explain?

If God is supernatural being, then how is it possible to present any kind of evidence to non supernatural beings?
Only if God is not supernatural it makes sense to search for evidence. — SpaceDweller

If a God created the universe as it is today, then that means a God can interact with the world. The term "supernatural" is a descriptor when we don't know how the God did it. If a God created it, then it interacted and caused it. Therefore there should be evidence.

If you disagree with this, please clearly define what you mean by supernatural.

If we are talking about God as supernatural being, (non material being or thing) then even if there is prior reason there is no way for us to know it because it's outside anything we can see or measure. — SpaceDweller

Ok, but that doesn't negate my point. That would mean something made God.

When something has no prior reason for its existence, there are no rules limiting how or what could exist. So anything you can imagine.
— Philosophim
but there is reason for God's existence, while anything that you can imagine requires reason and first cause. — SpaceDweller

Is there a prior reason for God's existence? Note the word "prior". If there is a prior reason for God's existence, then God is not the first cause of reality. And if there is no prior reason for God's existence, then my point stands.

What do you call that Philosophim? Logical atheism? — chiknsld

Interestingly enough, its not atheism. I'm not denying the possibility that there could be a God. Logically, a God is possible. Of course, logically, a God is also not necessary. To claim a God's existence, one would need some type of evidence of that existence. The fact that there is existence, is not an argument for there being a God.

can you please name few alternatives to God? — SpaceDweller

Certainly. With the proof that there must be at least one first cause, we realize that a first cause could be anything. When something has no prior reason for its existence, there are no rules limiting how or what could exist. So anything you can imagine.

Several particles could have popped into existence. A big bang. Several universes. There is absolutely zero necessity for a God, or a reason for why there is existence. The conclusion is, "There simply is."

Sounds like science. Proper science attempts to disprove the hypothesis, not affirm it. If you cannot disprove the hypothesis despite your best efforts, then it stands. Another way to view it is an attempt to make an induction a deduction. An induction has premises that do not necessarily lead to a conclusion. One way to refine an induction is go through all the possible conclusions that induction could lead to, and eliminate all possibilities but the one remaining.

I go into a little proof here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1

To sum it up, there is existence without prior explanation. This is not a possibility, this is a logical certainty. This means there could have been nothing, then something without any cause or explanation. A God, while a statistical possibility, is only one out of an infinite possible number of alternatives and is in no way necessary.

I think you are seeing it as symmetrical, whereas I see it more asymmetrical. — Bob Ross

I would not say it is symmetrical, I just think there is a similar situation to consider. Inductions and deductions are like atoms, and their chain of reasoning is like molecules. How they combine creates a new identity to consider.

We may have a fundamental disagreement as to whether an induction can be deductively concluded. Perhaps its my language. Let me make it simple first. "Applicable knowledge is the conclusion of an induction". Add in "Deductive conclusion" because it is possible to believe the conclusion to an induction is another induction.

I could have just as easily, in the case of the latter, not posited a belief and flipped the penny from my pocket and it turns up tails (which would thereby no longer be applicable, yet I obtained the exact same knowledge distinctively). — Bob Ross

Yes, you could have. But that does not negate the situation in which there is an induction that you are actively trying to discover the end result.

I can, therefore, have a belief prior to my deductively ascertained knowledge that it flipped tails, but that has no bearing on how I obtained that knowledge. I could equally have not posited a belief and obtained the exact same result, which indexically refers to something relationally beyond my abstract consideration. — Bob Ross

Let me break down the indexical (or context) of the flip itself.

I can flip a penny, look at the result, and create the identity of "I'll call that heads". That is not applicable, but distinctive knowledge.

I can also flip a penny, look at the result and see a symbol that seems familiar. I then try to match the symbol to what is considered "heads" in my mind, and I do without contradiction. This is applicable knowledge.

The induction in this case is the belief that what I am observing matches a previous identity I have created. Does this side of the penny match heads? That is "the question". The result, "Yes it does, "if deduced, is "the answer".

If I had believed that the penny would result in heads, then the answer is the resolution to the induction. Identifying an induction that has not yet resolved, versus an induction that has a resolution in our chain of thinking is incredibly important! I could come up with an entirely fool proof deductive point about Gandolf in the Lord of the Rings. Isolated, no one would care. But if at the very beginning of my deduction I started with, "I believe Gandolf is a real person," that puts the entire "deduction" in a different light!

Knowledge is about a chain of thinking. We make claims all the time in the world, and people find their results very pertinent. When people make a bet on what horse will win the race, there is active incentive to find out what the actual result of the race is. We don't want to answer with, "Maybe your horse won the race." People also don't want to hear, "Oh, Buttercup lost? Well I'm going to redefine my bet that when I bet on Princess, I really bet on Buttercup". People want a definitive, or deduced answer to that question because there is a lot on the line.

For the most part, I agree with the underlying meaning I think you are trying to convey (i.e. recognizing our limitations), but I think your "distinctive" vs "applicable" isn't a true representation thereof. What I think you are really trying to get at is that "knowledge" is always indexical. — Bob Ross

Contextual, yes. Specifically distinctive and applicably contextual. We could view it as distinctive and applicably indexical if you wish. Although I may need to refine the meaning of those terms within contexts now that I've tweaked the meaning of applicable. Distinctive context is the set distinctive knowledge a person is working with. "A horse has X essential properties. The definition of winning a race has Y essential properties. Applicable context is the limitations of what can be used to find the result of the induction. "I'm blind, so I can't confirm essential properties that require sight".

Firstly, I don't think "uncertainty" directly entails that one has to formulate an induction: I can be neutrally uncertain of the outcome of flipping a non-imaginary coin without ever asserting an induction. So when I previously stated that inductions and abductions only provide the uncertainty, I was slightly wrong: we can deductively know that we do not deductively know something and, therefore, we are uncertain of it (to some degree). — Bob Ross

Agreed within the correct context. If I distinctively know "I do not know something", then I'm not making an induction. It is when I make a belief that X matches Y definition in my head that I am making an induction, and need to go through the steps to deduce that this is true. At the point the coin is flipped, the induction happens when I attempt to match the result to my distinctive knowledge. The implicit induction is, "I believe the result could match to what I distinctively know." One could also implicitly induce that the result will not match what one distinctively knows, and not even bother trying. A deduction after the result happens will determine which induction was correct.

Secondly, yes, we would, without uncertainty, know everything. However, where are you drawing that line? I think you are trying to draw it at "distinctive" vs "applicable", but I don't think those definitions work properly. As previously discussed, the non-abstract flipping of a coin could be either form and still be obtaining knowledge pertaining to something uncertain. — Bob Ross

I hope the above points have answered this. Let me know if they have not!

Yes, science does claim to "find the result" after a test, but the "result" has no relation to the induction (hypothesis) itself: that was merely posited as the best educated guess one could make prior to any knowledge deductively obtain after/during the test. — Bob Ross

Perhaps this is unimportant after the previous notes, but I felt I needed to address this. The hypothesis is absolutely key. Science does not seek to prove a hypothesis, it seeks to invalidate a hypothesis. A hypothesis must be falsifiable. There needs to be a hypothetical state in which the hypothesis could be false. Science attempts to prove a hypothesis false, and if it cannot, then we have something.

Science has been very aware that you can craft an experiment to easily prove a hypothesis correct, and that this is often faulty. Just as I've noted earlier in our conversations, we can craft distinctive knowledge in such a way that they avoid inductions. "I believe a magical unicorn exists that cannot be sensed in any way." This is something that is non-falsifiable. When it rains, I could say, "Yep, that's the magic unicorn using its powers to cause the rain." When someone tries to explain the water cycle to me, I simply respond with, "Well yes, that's how the unicorn works its magic."

The hypothesis is the key to the experiment. The main focus of the experiment is trying to prove the hypothesis wrong. Upon peer review, scientists will attempt to see if the experiment properly tested what could falsify the hypothesis, or if the results were baked for a positive outcome. You and I are discussing a theory of epistemology. It is important that we try to prove it false, to attack it, and put it to the test. While there may be instances both of us can see positives that would make the theory useful, what matters more is whether the theory holds up in logical consistency. We are not trying to prove the theory right by its positives alone, we are trying to prove the theory right by the fact that attempts at negating it do not work.

I think we are in agreement then! My question for you is: do you find it a meaningful distinction (categorical vs hypothetical), and what terminology would you translate that to in your epistemology? — Bob Ross

I think there is a meaningful distinction here. Categorical deductions involve no potential inductions. Hypothetical distinctions take a potential induction, and conclude a deduction based on a hypothetical outcome of the induction. I think that is very important in evaluating the risk and about how much we should care about the induction.

If I have to find an item at the store, I'm in a rush, and it could be in aisle 1 or 2, I can evaluate the outcomes if I pick correctly vs. incorrectly. Because the aisles aren't that big, I decide not to ask a member of the store where the item is, and quickly run through both aisles. Of course, if I'm in a rush and I don't know where the item is among 25 aisles, in evaluating the hypothetical outcomes, its much quicker on average to ask the person at the store next to me where the item in question is then potentially find the item on the 25th aisle I explored. Perhaps the hypothetical deduction might give a better way to evaluate which inductions are worth pursuing beyond the cogency hierarchy; something I know you've been interested in.

Testing in my mind in terms of my imagination, for example, does not automatically hold for that same "label" in non-abstract considerations. So I wouldn't say that "avoiding an induction" is a mistake, it is "avoiding the indexical consideration" that is the mistake. — Bob Ross

I did not intend to note that "avoiding an induction" is a mistake. I think it is a reasonable tactic at times to be efficient. But yes, you can call it "avoiding an induction" or "creating a different context that does not contain an induction" and that is fine.

If I look down and see a "red" "card", then I just deductively ascertained (without an induction) that non-abstractly there exists a "red card". — Bob Ross

Any time you attempt to match your identity of "red" to something else, you are making an implicit induction. Only until after you confirm the essential properties that it is "red" do you have the deduced conclusion. This can be done very quickly, but you do not look at the "red" card and create an identity called "red" for the first time. You are looking at the "red" card, and matching it to the belief that it is "red", the identity you created when you saw "red" for the first time.

In the second case where I state, "The next cat I will see will be green", I am putting something testable out there

But that belief has no bearing on uncertainty. You can have easily have simply deductively noted that you have no clue what the next cat will be, and then saw it was green (and you would know that you have no clue deductively). If you do submit such a belief (as you did), then yes we can deductively ascertain how aligned your induction was with real knowledge, but it never becomes knowledge. Even if you guessed right, you didn't know. — Bob Ross

I want to make sure you didn't misunderstand me here. I am not saying that an induction becomes knowledge. I am stating the deduced result of the induction becomes knowledge. If I believe the next cat I see will be green, that is an induction, not a deduction. If the next cat I see is deductively confirmed to be green, then my induction was correct, but it does not change the fact it was an induction. The induction itself is not knowledge, only the deductively concluded result is knowledge.
If I state, "I have no clue what color the next cat I see will be", the induction is when you see a cat, whether you believe that cat's color has a match to your distinctive knowledge of colors. That result is the deductive conclusion.

I could distinctively know that society does not define something a certain way.

This is where you sort of lost me. If by "distinctively know" you mean that you can categorically define "society" in a way that necessitates that they don't hold that definition of "cat", then I agree. — Bob Ross

Correct.

But I cannot applicably know that society defines something a certain way, when the result of that claim would show that they deductively do not.

I would agree insofar as the distinction being made is that my deduced abstract consideration of what a "society" or "cat" is has no indexical relation to non-abstract considerations, but I am failing to see how this has anything to do with necessarily positing an induction prior to deducing. — Bob Ross

I am not stating there is necessary induction prior to creating further deductions. I am simply noting that when one decides to induce, applicable knowledge is the deduced resolution to that induction.

Someone can look a table, and then say they didn't just look at a table, but they did (and I think you are agreeing with me on this). It is an essential property of "human being" that they are a reasoning being, but I think how you are using "reasonableness", they don't have to have it. But they nevertheless abide by certain rules, which is their reason, even in the most insane of circumstances, which is apart of the definition of being human. — Bob Ross

Using reason in the most basic way we have defined it so far, yes. Reasonable would be a human being who uses societally agreed upon logic over emotions and desires. In the case of our very basic definition of reason, yes, that is an essential property of I think all living beings. But having reasonableness, or agreeing to make decisions based on logic over emotions and desires, is not an essential property of being human.

I don't think any of this proves that I was in control of anything. What discerns actual accordance from coincidental repetition?

We do, colloquially, make distinctions between something like "intention" and what the body actually is capable of, but ultimately I fail to see how we truly control any objects (which includes all concepts, so thoughts, imagination, the body, etc). What proof is there that you are not along for the ride? — Bob Ross

What proof is there that we do not have control over certain things? My proof is I have control over certain things. I can will my arm to move, and it does. I can will against my emotions to do something more important. Are you saying that you have control over nothing Bob? I don't think you're intending that, but I think I need clarification here. And if you are intending that we can control nothing, it would be helpful if you could present some evidence as to why this is.

Do you think that you sometimes can control your "dream world" within your imagination, or all time? Or never? — Bob Ross

Sometimes.

When you say "outside of our mental control", this leads me to believe that you think that you control your mental, or abstract considerations, but I do not think you do. There is no point at which, in reference to any object, where we "know" that we controlled it. It is an induction at best. — Bob Ross

Again I'm confused here. I'll need this broken down more.

Upon further reflection, I don't think we deduce the hierarchy holistically (either as distinctive or applicable--either way they are both considered deductions). Nothing about the premises necessitates the conclusion that "possibility" is more cogent than "speculations". — Bob Ross

It was a while back, but I believe I did cover this. It had to do with chains of inductions away from the induction. A probability is one step from a deduction, a possibility is a less focused induction that probability, because it cannot assess the likelihood of it happening. A speculation is an induction introduces not only a possibility, but the induction that something that has never been confirmed to exist before, can exist. And then you remember irrational inductions.

Nothing about experiencing something once deductively necessitates that it is more likely to happen again over something that hasn't been experienced (and isn't an irrational induction). — Bob Ross

Correct. The hierarchy cannot determine which induction is more likely to be. It can only determine which induction is more cogent, or least removed from what is known. Cogency has typically been defined as a strong inductive argument with true premises. Here cogency is measured by the length and degree of its inductive chain away from what has been deduced.

Great conversation again Bob!

if the bounce is true and the big bang happened within the space of a previous Universe then the need for a 'first cause' or god, would either be not needed at all or be so far back in time eons that it has no significance at all to the Universe we exist in. THIS Universe would therefore be a result of the bounce effect and not a creation of god(s). — universeness

It doesn't matter what explanation you propose. It never will. Someone will always just move the needle back and say, "But what caused that?" Ironically, this needle also applies to a God. "What caused a God to exist?"

People will also just change the meaning of God. "Science just discovered how God made the universe". Science will never solve the God issue, because God really isn't about science. It is the need for there to be some intelligent design as the first cause, over accepting that a first cause could also lack intelligence entirely.

The only real conclusion you can ascertain is there is at least one first cause in a chain of events. (Proven here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1) But, due to the nature of a first cause, it could be a simple particle appearing.

The point is: Don't get excited and think this will change theist's minds. Theism is about far more than science and logic.

Great post Wayfarer! Lets look at a few things.

Hume recognized that there are two categories of knowledge: empirical and mathematical/logical. He called the former “Matters of Fact” and the latter “Relations of Ideas.”

First, I would state Hume was unable to prove this separation. Isn't a matter of fact a deduced relation of ideas? I do not hold to this definition.

Cause and effect in science is really a constant juxtaposition of events. We observe A followed by B. If this happens uniformly through Custom we infer causation, but we have no reason to justify this

Here is where I believe Hume made a valid point. The idea of cause and effect is that it will necessarily happen again. I calculate gravity, drop an apple, and record the speed. Then I assume if I drop the apple in the same conditions, it will happen again. Why? Why should it be that the laws of physics will be the same 2 seconds from now?

This cannot be deduced, only inferred by "habit" as Hume notes. We're used to things working consistently, so we assume they will continue to do so. We assume there are laws that will not change, so we make judgements according to those laws.

Of course, what Hume forgot to think about was, "What cause do we have to believe things will NOT be consistent in the future?" And it turns out, that's an inference too! I believe what we do is choose the most reasonable inference. Looking at history, the rules of physics have not really changed. If people stop breathing, they stop living. Until people can stop breathing and continue to live, it seems more reasonable to assume that breathing is necessary to live. This is Hume's "habit" explained. We walk around with what we have concluded until we are shown otherwise.

Science takes the same approach. Science never "proves" anything. What it does is try to disprove something. If after trying to disprove something in every single way we can think of, it still stands, then we have "proven" something. The same applies to causality. You can't disprove the notion of causality, period. They computer example is perfect proof. I would love to see someone come along and prove that you didn't cause the keys to be pressed on your keyboard to type your responses.

So, I have a deep confusion about why philosophy sees this disconnection between logical necessity and physical causation. — Wayfarer

I think a way to explain this is "abstract logic". 1+1=2. Now we know that 1 represents an identity, and 2 represents the recognition of 2 identities together. But what are those identities? How far spaced apart are they? Its not an object, a location, or a thing with weight. Its simply the concept of identities. Bananas, oranges, people, "things". As a logical necessity, 1 identity added with another make 2 identities. Does that mean we'll be able to add a banana from Honduras to a banana from America by bringing them to the same location? We need cause and effect there.

Now is cause and effect also logical? Yes. But just like all tigers are cats, not all cats are tigers. Cause and effect is not the entirety of logic, but cause and effect is entirely logical.

Another fantastic set of posts Bob! Lets get into your points.

Firstly, I think we need to revisit the "distinctive" vs "applicable" knowledge distinction holistically because I am still not understanding why it is important. — Bob Ross

This is fair, I really didn't go into it last post as I had initially intended. Deductions are knowledge, period. However, if there's one thing I think we can conclude from the epistemology, its the reasoning and path we take to get there that matters as well. This is why there is a hierarchy for inductions. This being the case, I see an identifiably different type of knowledge when we deduce the end result of an induction.

Likewise, I don't think "applicable knowledge", in the sense of a deduced conclusion pertaining to an induction, has any actual relations to the induction. The induction and deduction are completely separate: mutually exclusive. — Bob Ross

Applicable knowledge is the deductive result of an induction. It is not a deduction that follows an induction.

I believe the next penny flip will be heads. (Induction) ->
I have a penny in my pocket. (Deduction)

In this case, yes, though a deduction followed an induction in terms of the thought process, they are not connected. A connected deduction is the result of the induction.

I believe the next penny flip will be heads. (Induction) ->
I flip a penny I found in my pocket and it turns up tails. (Deduction)

It is not the deduction alone which is applicable. It is the combination of the induction, and its result. The deduction, by itself, would be distinctive. We are not analyzing the deduction itself, we are analyzing the steps it took to get there.

So why is this an important/needed distinction? Because it can help us realize our limitations. I noted earlier that one can create a fully deductive abstract in one's head. I could create an entire world with its own rules, laws, math, and it be a purely deduced achievement. A set of knowledge which has no inductions with deduced resolutions in its chain of reasoning is circumspect. The reality is we face uncertainty constantly. Our deductions which are reasonable at the time, may be countered in the face of new information. Part of reality is uncertainty, and our reasoning should reflect that. Arguably, the uncertainty of life is why we have the concept of knowledge at all. If there was no uncertainty in whatever we concluded, wouldn't we already know everything?

Lets look at science. Science is not a success because it has carefully crafted deductions. It is a success because it has concluded carefully crafted deductions to inductive situations. Science seeks not to deduce, but to induce and then find the result. Science's conclusions are essentially applicable knowledge.

So this is tricky. If by "doubt everything" you mean that everything is technically falsifiable, then yes I agree. — Bob Ross

I meant it as purely the emotional sense of doubt. You can doubt anything, whether its reasonable or unreasonable to do so. Yes, we are in agreement that despite having doubts, one can reasonably conclude that one's doubt is unfounded or incorrect. So to clarify, I was not talking about a reasonable doubt, which is limited, but the emotional non-reasonable doubt. In this epistemology, reasonableness is not a requirement of any person, it is always a choice. However, their unreasonable choices cannot counter a reasonable argument for those who are reasonable.

In regards to hypothetical deductions, I believe we are in agreement! It just seems we had some slight misinterpretations of what each meant.

1. IF an essential property of cats is they are green. — Bob Ross

It depends on how this is read. If we are reading this as "if this is true", then yes, this is simply an abstract premise and a deduction. If however this was read with the intention that we do not know the resolution, "An essential property of cats is they could, or could not be green", then it is an induction.

Basically the IF alone is ambiguous to the user's intent. Does IF mean, "I don't know the essential property" or, "Assume an essential property is X". In the former, if we are to apply it to actual cats, then we must decide what the essential versus accidental properties of a cat are. If not, then we have an induction. In the latter, we have a deduction because we have concluded the essential property of a cat is X, and if we discover something that has all the other properties but X, we will say that creature is not a cat.

From your answers, I think we are in agreement here on this breakdown. Please let me know if I'm incorrect here.

I want to use the example of logical 'if' conditionals to demonstrate the reason why I separate the two knowledges. I can craft distinctive knowledge that avoids an induction. So I can state, "Assume that the essential property of a cat is that its green." I'm putting a hypothetical outcome to an induction, not a deduced outcome of an induction. The hypothetical property can be a part of a deduction, but it is a deduction that has avoided the test of induction.

In the second case where I state, "The next cat I will see will be green", I am putting something testable out there. Hypotheticals are possible deduced solutions to that test. So I could deduce the conclusion that I would be correct if I found the next cat was green, and I could deduce a conclusion if it was the case that the cat is not green. But neither of those deductions are the resolution to the induction itself. They are deductions about what is possible to conclude from an induction, but they are not the deduced result of the induction itself. I find this distinction key to avoid ambiguity when someone claims they "know" something.

Finally, this is important to note when someone changes their definitions. If I claimed, "The penny will flip heads" and the result was that it was tails, the deduction from that conclusion is that the penny landed on tails. Afterward, if I decided to flip the meaning of heads and tails in my head, that would be new distinctive knowledge. The applicable knowledge still stands. "When my definition of heads was this state, the resolution was it landed on tails. After, I changed the definition of heads and tails."

Without first resolving the induction based on one's distinctive knowledge claims one had when they made the induction, then someone could attempt to claim, "Since I changed my definition of heads to tails, my induction was correct." But, the induction was not correct based on the distinctive knowledge at the time. In this, applicable knowledge acts as a historical marker of one's chain of thoughts.

If however, we pull another person into the equation, a society with written rules, then we have an evolution. I cannot conclude whatever I want. I must make an induction, a belief about what society will decide. The answer to that, is applicable knowledge. Even then, the abstracts of society that it creates, that I must test my beliefs against, are its distinctive context, not applicable context.

The same critique you made of solo contexts applies to societal contexts: I can deny whatever society throws at me, just like I can deny whatever I throw at myself. Ultimately I have to decide what to accept and what not to. If someone else came up with:

1. IF an essential property of cats is that they are green
2. IF an essential property of bob is that they are a cat
3. THEN bob is green

We are still in the same dilemma. I don't think the process is as different as you may think. — Bob Ross

You are correct in that we can decide to reject societies' definitions. But what we cannot do is claim applicable knowledge of, "Society doesn't actually believe that the color of a cat is non-essential" I can distinctively know my own definitions. I can distinctively reject societies definitions. I could distinctively know that society does not define something a certain way. But I cannot applicably know that society defines something a certain way, when the result of that claim would show that they deductively do not.

You could decide to never be convinced of anything

This is true in the sense that I can be convinced that I am not convinced of anything, however I am definitively wrong because I am thereby convinced of something. The danger of the mind is that it can fail to grasp things, not that it can do whatever it wants. Reason is not relative, it is absolute in relation to the subject at hand. I can utter and be convinced that "pon is false", but thereby it is true. — Bob Ross

Correct, if you decide to use reason, then you cannot reasonably be convinced that you are not convinced of anything. If you decide not to use reason, then you can. Its like a person who states, "Everything is absolute". Its completely unreasonable, but there are some who forego reasonableness, even when it is pointed out, and insist on their belief. Fortunately, we can use reasonableness, but this does not deny the fact that a person can reject all that in favor of what we might call insanity.

I suppose what I'm getting at in these "A person can feel or do X" is that there is nothing as an essential property of a person that requires them to be reasonable. There are unreasonable people that we still label as people. Holding reasonable positions is non-essential, meaning if a human is biologically or willingly an unreasonable person, there is nothing we can do to make them. A reasonable person will likely live a much better life, but may find the revocation of reasonableness in certain situations to be more profitable to what they desire.

I would also like to note very briefly that we have been kind of ignoring our friend "abductions", which is not an "induction" nor a "deduction". I'm not sure where you have that fit into this equation: is it simply merged with inductions? — Bob Ross

I think so. My understanding of abductions is that it is an induction that is the most reasonable one a person can hold given a situation. From the Stanford Encyclopedia, "You may have observed many gray elephants and no non-gray ones, and infer from this that all elephants are gray, because that would provide the best explanation for why you have observed so many gray elephants and no non-gray ones. This would be an instance of an abductive inference."
-https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abduction/#DedIndAbd

With the inductive hierarchy, an abduction would simply be choosing the most cogent induction in a situation. If you considered the color of the elephant non-essential, this would be an induction. This could also be considered simply distinctive knowledge. If you consider the color of the elephant essential, then upon discovery of a pink elephant, you would call it something else from an elephant, or amend the definition to make the color of an elephant non-essential. It is our chain of reasoning to conclude what we are stating that determines its classification.

I think where we disagree fundamentally is that you seem to be positing that we control reason (or our thoughts or something) in the abstract, but we do not. I do not decide to part and parcel in a particular way, it just manifests. There are rules to abstract though (again, pon). I can linguistically deny it, but nevertheless my reason is grounded in it. I cannot literally conjure whatever I want, because conjuring follows a set of rules in itself. — Bob Ross

Yes, there are aspects about ourselves that we may not have control over. I did not want to state that because we have the power to part and parcel existence, that it is something we always have control over. For example, there are people who are unable to recognize faces. People who are unable to visualize in their mind. This is the applicable context from which we are limited or given the gift of creating distinctive knowledge. Being reasonable is not a fundamental of being human. If it is, I have not been able to prove it so far.

Despite cases in which you cannot easily decide to part and parcel, there are other instances in which you can. Look at one of your keys on your keyboard. Now look at the letter. Now look at any space next to the letter. Draw a circle in your mind around that space. You could if you wish mark a circle, and have created a new identity on that key. You can look at my writing. The page. The screen. The computer system. The room. You can focus and unfocus, and create new identities distinctively as you wish.

There must be something outside of our own power and agency that creates a conclusion that does not necessarily follow from the premises we've created.

It seems like you are arguing you do have power over your thoughts (and potentially imagination): I do not think you do. They are all objects and reason is the connections, synthetic and analytical, of those objects. — Bob Ross

No, I am noting that while we have an incredible amount of power within our own agency, there are things outside of our control. I cannot fly with my mind alone, no matter how much I imagine I can. I cannot bend my limbs past a certain point. But I can imagine that I am able to. I have a world I can create, a logic I can form, and conclusions that will never apply to reality, but be valid in my mind.

Moreover, if I have a deduction, and it is sound, then nothing "outside of my power" (whatever that entails) cannot reject it (in the sense that "reality" rejects what "I want", or what have you). The deduction is true as absolutely as the term "absolute" can possibly mean. Inductions (and abductions) are the only domains of reasoning that can be rejected. — Bob Ross

True, and that is because we have defined it as such. We are being reasonable, constructing definitions, and holding to them to create a logic. But, someone could create entirely different definitions for deductions and inductions. Still, according to the epistemology, we could hold them to a rational standard that results from those amended identities. It is why epistemology is so important. It is a rational standard for which we can debate about what we can know and not know, when the human race by nature, has no standards besides what they themselves or a contextual group would hold them to. We are trying to create a standard that can elevate itself beyond individuals or groups, but can also note what those individuals and groups distinctly and applicably know. Does it meet this standard? Perhaps, but it is an ongoing test and challenge.

I also want to address something again. The idea of something "outside of my power". Basically there are things we cannot will. And you agree with me by stating there are things you cannot choose to part and parcel. Can it be granted at this point that we both believe there are things outside of our mental control?

For example, let's use your "Go Fish" example. Abstractly, I can determine that a game, which I will define as "Go Fish", is possible according to the rules I subject it to: thereby I "know" "GoFish" is possible in the abstract. However, as you noted, it is an entirely different claim to state that "Go Fish is possible non-abstractly" (as I conjured up "Go Fish" according to my rules) (e.g. it turns out a totalitarian regime burned all the playing cards, what a shame, or my rules do not conform to the laws of nature). I think, therefrom, you are intuitively discerning two forms of knowledge to make that meaningful distinction. — Bob Ross

I believe this is correct.

the claim of knowledge towards abstract "Go Fish", and more importantly the "cards" therein, is a completely different conception than "cards" being utilized when claiming "Go Fish is possible non-abstractly". The conflation between the two (what I define abstractly as "a card" along with its existence presupposed in reference to the abstract vs what coincides non-abstractly) is what I think you are trying to warn against. I may define "card" as "floating mid-air" and quickly realize that this is only possible in relation to "abstract cards" and not "non-abstract cards". — Bob Ross

Also correct!

Consequently, "distinctive" and "applicable" are the exact same. If I claim that "Go Fish is possible abstractly", I know this deductively. If I claim that "Go Fish is possible non-abstractly", I also know this deductively. — Bob Ross

Correct in that both are deductions. I hope I clarified here that the real distinction is the in the chain of reasoning.

Distinctive knowledge: Discrete experience or
A deduction that leads to a deduction.

Applicable knowledge:
An induction that leads to a deduced resolution

In other words, it is possible to ground an induction in knowledge (deductions), but not possible to ground a deduction in beliefs (inductions): the relation, therefore, is uni-directional. — Bob Ross

Correct. But we can obtain the actual outcome of the induction. When an induction resolves, we have the outcome.

This result in relation to the induction is the special category of applicable knowledge.

Furthermore, I now can explicate much more clearly what the hierarchy of inductions is grounded upon (assuming I am understanding correctly): the induction with (1) the most knowledge (deductions) as its grounds and (2) no dispensable entities is the most cogent within that context. — Bob Ross

The first part is part of the reason, but I did not understand what a "dispensable entity" was.

But an even deeper dilemma arises: the claim, and I would say key principle, underlying the hierarchy itself is an induction (to hold that the inductions that are more acquainted with, grounded in, knowledge is an induction, not a deductively concluded principle). Which inevitably undermines the hierarchy, since there is necessarily one induction (namely inductions grounded in more knowledge are more cogent) which is outside of the induction hierarchy (since it is itself contingent on it in the first place: we construct the hierarchy from this very induced principle). So, we do not "know" that the hierarchy of inductions is true, under your epistemology — Bob Ross

We distinctively know the hierarchy of inductions, we do not applicably know if the claim is true. That would require testing in a lab. I've given the arguments already for why the hierarchy exists. If we want to revisit it, we can, but this is enough to cover for now. Thanks again Bob, great points, and always feel free to post more if you have new thoughts and I haven't followed up yet!

Space, as you concede, is not nonexistent.

Space, or immaterial expanse, is not the same as nothing or nonexistence. — daniel j lavender

Just semantics at that point then. I think you're confusing our ability to create words and identities as if that makes them "things". If you're going the route of, "As long as one thing exists, then nothingness around it exists as well in relation to it," yes, that's fine. But its existence is an identity of nothingness we've created. Around that one thing, there is no actual existence.

I suppose the greater question for you is, what is your motivation that "nothing" not be possible? I think its the clear norm here, and easily proven. So why are you against it?

Rocks are neither good nor bad. Morality is about what we should do around others. Hence, your view is wrong. — Banno

I have not fully written out the morality I'm speaking of. It is a little more than "rocks make bad choices" :) I will likely write up a forum post on it once Bob Ross and I are done discussing knowledge. I only have time and energy right now for one serious topic, and currently, that's it. When I finally write it up, I look forward to your critiques.

Sounds like a decent set of ideals to be a woman as well. Introduce the concepts to him, and let him figure out which best fit him. Temper his weaknesses and encourage his strengths.

First, lets get word play out of the way. "Nothing" is the absence of some existence. Of course its defined in relation to things, because it is the negation of things. You cannot prove a definition of an identity does not exist by word play. Stating, "Nothingness is part of existence" is simply an invention of definition. Nothingness as identity is very clear. It is the absence of any other identity. What you have to prove is that this identity cannot exist in reality.

Space is part of the structure of existence. Space helps structure existence as spaces help structure sentences. Space allows for motion, transmission and dynamic interaction; it allows for things to integrate and disperse. — daniel j lavender

What you're describing is nothingness. Perhaps what you mean though is that space is an ether.
"ether or aether, in physics and astronomy, a hypothetical medium for transmitting light and heat (radiation), filling all unoccupied space; it is also called luminiferous ether."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aether_theories#Non-standard_interpretations_in_modern_physics

This is an old physics theory that fell out of favor years ago once the theory of relativity was created.

Your best bet is the Quantum Vacuum theory.
"Quantum mechanics can be used to describe spacetime as being non-empty at extremely small scales, fluctuating and generating particle pairs that appear and disappear incredibly quickly."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spacetime

Even then, note "appear and disappear incredibly quickly" At the moment of disappearance, there is "nothing". Now, it could be argued that there is something smaller or harder to detect, so perhaps we can't say for sure they really "disappeared", but this leaves another problem we've ignored until now, "space between other things".

While yes an atom is composed of neutrons, electrons, and protons, there is space between them. And yes, there are quarks floating in and around, but there is space between those as well. And when we get to the smallest particles appearing and disappearing, there is space there as well.

Meaning, we've never defined the world as not having a bit of "nothingness" in it. As I stated earlier, our definitions and word play of course mean nothing next to reality. But it seems that even at the smallest level of reality, we reach a point where "nothingness" exists, at least for a short time.

So I think until proven otherwise, the identify of "nothingness" does exist. Perhaps we are wrong. Perhaps there is an ether like substance flowing through everything, and the idea of "nothingness" is just an illusion we've constructed for a lack of information. But I don't think we have nearly enough to go on to declare that existence is eternal and infinite either. We have much more evidence for the existence of "nothing" at this point, then eternity.

Whether there is a smallest thing or not is rather inconsequential. Even if there were a smallest thing, a smallest object, a smallest particle, or a smallest pocket of space it would still be a thing, it would still be something, it would still be part of existence. A smallest thing would not create a gap of nonexistence. — daniel j lavender

I think we've seen here that it would. The only way for there not to be a gap is if it flowed and touched another of itself without any gap between them. We have yet to show such a thing exists.

A nice write up though! It is a neat idea that there is essentially an ether, and many great minds have wondered the same. The problem at this point is provability.

IQ is simply a constructed evaluation of what some people think it means to be intelligent. Considering we're still learning a massive amount about the brain, I'm quite sure in another 100 years we'll look back at IQ tests much like people looked at measuring the size of a person's skull for intelligence.

I believe morality applies to existence itself, not just human beings. Our own human morality comes from this.