Not true. Of course it's a mere vernal sin to call people by one name when they've asked to be called by another. Nonetheless, kind, well-mannered people won't do it. You don't "have to" -- but it's rude not to. — Ecurb

No, you need to clarify why its rude, not merely declare it. It is not rude to not give consent to lying, duplicity, or pretend games because it makes another person feel good. This is the same line selfish men and women use when they hit on someone and there's rejection. Yes, rejection can make another person feel bad, but when that rejection is about consent, the person who is rejected needs to behave like a proper adult, not take it personally, and respect that the other person had no obligation to agree to the request.

The same is true for titles. If someone asks to be called Ms. Jones instead of Mrs. Jones, it's rude not to comply. Why should pronouns be so different? — Ecurb

Fair question. Titles are indicators of both sex and marriage status. Ms. is marriage status neutral, while Mrs. is not. If someone is not married and tells me to call them Mrs. anyway because they hate feeling like they aren't married, they're asking me to lie for their emotional benefit. That's a consent request. I am not obligated to, it is not polite to, or moral to say yes. That is my personal choice.

Pronouns for most people represent sex indicators, not gender. Meaning if I see that you're a female acting like a male, I'm still accurate and truthful in labeling you 'her'. That's not rude. That's not impolite. If someone is personally bothered by a normal interaction, that is for them to deal with, not anyone else. If they ask me to lie to them, or use pronouns in a way I wouldn't normally, that's fine. But its a consent request again, not an obligation, a moral certitude, or even polite. I have full choice to accept or reject without any wrongdoing on my part either way.

Is it so important to recognize a genetic or biological truth in a pronoun? Doesn't finding that important indicate prejudice? And if it isn't important, why not act in the interest of kindness and comply with the person's wishes? — Ecurb

All good questions again.

1. Many of us like to use language to convey what we believe and see about the world. It is important for many of us not to lie where possible. Some people don't mind. Others do. That's why its a consent request.

2. A prejudice is a 'pre-judgement' about some thing. So if I looked at a woman and thought, "Women should wear dresses all the time," that's a prejudice. My noting that a woman is a woman, and me being right about that (woman meaning 'adult human female') is the exact denial of prejudice. There is no pre-judgement anymore, there is simply the fact of the matter.

3. Because you have not demonstrated why it is kind to lie. Or why it is kind to request that another person lie for your personal benefit. I do not find it kind it most situations. If someone is walking around saying they're a man when they're clearly not, its not kind to lie to them for their feelings. I respect people's intellect and maturity. If I think you can't handle being told basic facts or truths, its because I think you're an inferior person to me. Should I treat trans gender people like they're inferior to me, mentally incapable of handling the fact that I see their natal sex? Or should I treat them like they're an adult and can handle it? I think the later is kindness and respect, the former is pity and patronizing.

Your seeming obsession with the topic is bizarre. — Ecurb

Why is it an obsession? I've written many different philosophical discussions, and only two on trans gender issues over two months. I would hardly call that an obsession. Obviously its a current event topic that lots of people feel the need to talk about. Isn't talking about things good? We're both communicating our side and treating each other like adults who can handle each other's differences.

Let's just try to get along, and when people ask us the favor of referring to them by a particular name or pronoun (which may be different from their birth assignment) why get all hoity-toity about it? — Ecurb

Because I am allowed the respect of my consent. And you don't get to disparage me for deciding what I do, and do not consent to in my life. Trans gender people do not have anything special about them over myself. Just as I would not expect that its moral to violate their consent either.

Wouldn't it be kinder and easier just to do them that small favor? — Ecurb

No as I've mentioned above. Philosophically, instead of asserting that this is moral, make a case that it is. Why are their feelings more important than my consent? Why is it kind to tell them something we both know isn't true?

You and I both hold that there are things independent of our own context.

It’s not about the different ways that people can come to recognize the independence of reality, or the temperamental and development differences that lead them to engage with reality in different ways. It’s about what commitments are implicitly presupposed in the act of inquiry itself. — Esse Quam Videri

Let me ask you this in response. If there was nothing to inquire, would inquiry exist? At a more tangible level, if an intelligence didn't invent cell phones, would they exist? No. Meaning that inquiry must necessarily involve some thing doing the inquiry. That is why it varies from person to person. There is nothing necessary in an inquirer. Some people ask a question rhetorically. Some inquire and seek personal validation in their predetermined conclusion.

The only thing I can give is that there is a way that we can inquire which logically leads to the truth rationally if what we are looking at is true. The other method of inquiry, induction, can also be categorized cogently. Meaning if someone decided to inquire using plausibility, "There's a magic unicorn in the forest," I can return with, "Magic isn't possible, its never been shown to exist" and dismiss their induction as less cogent than mine. I can create a system of inquiry that rationally, leads to the correct outcome based on rational justification instead of belief or guess work.

In other words, there is a logic and a set of commitments that are implicitly presupposed in the act of asking a question. To say that these things are “presupposed” is to say that the act of asking a question would be incoherent without them; they are constitutive of what it means to ask a question. — Esse Quam Videri

I don't think we can find a universal implicitness that impacts all inquirers. I think we can establish a means of inquiry that is most rational, identify means of inquiry that are less rational, but I don't think there is a universal implicit expectation from every inquirer when they ask a question.

So what I am arguing is that robust notions of truth, error and reality are implicitly presupposed within inquiry as norms governing correctness, and that these are not reducible to weaker notions such as endorsement, misuse or coherence without loss. — Esse Quam Videri

Perhaps if we added an adjective like 'rational inquiry', this could be narrowed down a bit more? At that point we can use the theory to demonstrate what a rational inquiry is, and this would be rational for all discrete experiencers who can comprehend contradictions. Beyond this, I'm not sure what else to add.

When we engage in inquiry we are intrinsically oriented toward a reality that is determinate independently of our beliefs. If we weren’t, notions like truth, error and reality would lose their meaning and inquiry would become unrecognizable in comparison to what we actually do and say in practice. — Esse Quam Videri

If we say "Rational inquiry", I think I can agree. Inquiry in general has no such requirements.

If this is still unclear, no worries. I have really enjoyed our conversation. It has given me plenty to think about, and I hope it has for you as well. — Esse Quam Videri

Same! I too have enjoyed your writing, your questions, and your genuine points. Whether we agree or not at this point, you are a credit to these boards, and I hope to have more discussions with you on other topics in the future. Thank you for lending your view point to this.

Who cares what bathroom people use? — Ecurb

Generally the people of a particular sex for the bathrooms. There are clearly signs marked men and women right? So obviously a lot of people care. But that's not an argument or the point of the discussion.

OK -- ideally, we would get rid of prejudice. Even if we did, though, some trans people would prefer others using their new pronouns. — Ecurb

No objection at all, they are free to do so.

Out of kindness and good manners, we should all comply. — Ecurb

Why? How have you reasoned this is good? This seems to me that you've been told this is good. Have you questioned it? Feel free to explain it to me.

If someone changes his or her name, do you insist on calling him or her by their birth name (many names are gendered)? — Ecurb

If its a legal name change, no. If its not a legal name change, I'm under no obligation to call them a name they've made up for themselves. Can I call them that? Yes. Do I have to or is it considered good manners? Not at all. That's up to the each individual to decide. Its called consent. When you ask someone to lie or do something that isn't a legal qualifier, that person needs to give consent. You don't get to guilt, shame, or mark a person who does not give consent as immoral. If a woman turned down a man's sexual advances, should the woman be shamed? The man who wanted the advances returned might, but we've learned that's the real shameful behavior.

Back to your earlier point, asking someone to call you the sex that you aren't, is an act of asking consent. Not politeness, obligation, moral certainty, or anything equaling good. Its a social request, and one everyone is free to turn down. That is what is moral, good, and polite. Asking consent, and accepting the answer given no matter if its affirmative or negative.

Why insist on their birth gender? — Ecurb

There is no birth gender. Gender is a prejudice about a person's sex. There is only birth sex. Everyone's prejudices about the sexes is different, and prejudice should never be held as something we should uphold in any capacity.

At work, and among close acquaintances most people would presumably know that the trans person was trans. It's still good manners to use their preferred pronouns — Ecurb

No, because most people use pronouns for sex, not gender. You're asking a person to use pronouns in a prejudicial way instead of a biological way. Politeness is asking for consent and accepting when a person says no. I for one do not like to participate in sexism. I don't think the way a man or woman looks or dresses changes who they are by sex, and I think 'gender' is just prejudice that I don't want to partake in. Wouldn't I be the person with the higher moral standards here? If not, why not?

Which is more important socially? Biology, or kindness, respect for identity, and honoring the wishes of others? In a social situation, shouldn't social reality trump biological reality? — Ecurb

Instead of asking me, I want to hear your viewpoint. What do you think? This isn't a trap or anything, I genuinely want to know where your thought process is so I can better speak with you.

In addition, it is incorrect to say the "people treat them (people of different genders) just like anyone else". WE all have been enculturated to treat women different from men. OF course, it may be true that this involves prejudice. — Ecurb

The important part that we agree on here is that gender is prejudice. To be clear, we need to separate gender from sex expectation which involves biological reality. For example, most women bleed once a month. Should we allow facilities in the bathroom for this particular issue? Yes. But that's not gender, that's objective biological reality. There may be a confusion that conflates gender with sex. They are not the same at all. Gender is "I think women shouldn't wear top hats." That's it. Its a subjective opinion that can be shared among a culture in how a man or woman should act in society that has nothing to do with their objective biological reality.

If we know that men are taller on average than women, and we are making a shelf height in a place that primarily caters to women, making the shelf height to the average of female heights is not gender or prejudice, its simply adjusting to expected sex differences. All of this is fine.

The chivalry of "women and children first to the lifeboats" is great for women, except that it compares them to helpless children. — Ecurb

Yes, and isn't the real issue that we need to get rid of this prejudice? Not avoid the issue with equally poor behavior? If you lie to listen to it, you're tacitly agreeing with it. That doesn't change things or make a better world.

It remains the case that gender influence social interactions, possibly due to prejudice, possibly due to differing training and upbringings. — Ecurb

And do you think that's good or that we should accept that? I don't. Is that a problem?

Perhaps trans people want to be treated (and act) in accordance with their new gender. — Ecurb

I would tell anyone that wants to double down on prejudice or sexism not to. I would also tell a person that they shouldn't live their life by how they want people to look at them, as that's also a fool's errand. People are going to have their own judgements about you no matter what you do. Its best to just live your life for you, and live despite other people's expectations of you.

The flaw is obvious.
If prejudice and discrimination of trans people didn't exist, you might have a point. — Ecurb

There is discrimination and prejudice against almost everyone. Its part of life. The goal should be to make sure other people aren't discriminatory right and sexist right? You avoided the argument and straw manned into something else which I will address momentarily. But first the short person. The short person is in the wrong because they are lying. Instead of growing past their insecurities, they put their insecurities on everyone else to adapt to. That's wrong.

Second, wearing stilts doesn't actually make them tall. I shouldn't have to explain why a man running around in stilts in the NBA isn't allowed. Same with men in women's spaces and vice versa.

Ok, now to your other point.

Suppose a black person (maybe one of Thonmas Jefferson's children) -- back in the days of slavery -- wanted to pass as white. If he were seen as black he could have been sold into slavery, he could have been convicted of miscegenation (if he had a white wife), and he could have been the victim of more general prejudice. — Ecurb

Isn't the more important thing to get rid of slavery and prejudice? "Lets fix a wrong with a wrong" is not a solution in an advanced culture. This is also a gross exaggeration of what transitioned people have to do through in the West. You can show up transitioned at work, everyone knows you're a trans person, and harassment and mistreatment isn't tolerated. So, lets assume that a transitioned person can go to work, has to use their natal sex bathroom, does not get called pronouns by gender, but their natal sex, and people treat them just like anyone else otherwise. You now have zero cause. Meaning your cause was never the right cause, only a poor compensation to handle a bigger cause.

It's not irrelevant to trans people. Perhaps they'd prefer not to be discriminated against, and if "passing" for a gender different from their birth sex helps them do this, I don't see the problem. — Ecurb

Yes, it is irrelevant to any person of any type. If a person is short, they're going to be seen as short. Does it mean you don't point it out as a fact when its pertinent? No. Does it mean they should receive abuse because they're short? No. A transitioned person is not special or should have any exceptions in how they are treated as a person.

If a short person goes around walking on stilts in their spare time its fine. If they start demanding they be called a tall person, they're wrong. If they start demanding to be put on the basketball team because they're tall, they're also mistaken. Saying, "I need to be on the basketball team to avoid discrimination" doesn't make any sense. Am I wrong? I don't think so, but see if you can point out where you see a flaw.

Of course people's prejudices shouldn't be elevated -- but they probably would be. — Ecurb

That's irrelevant. People are going to elevate prejudices whether you intone a separate identity or not. You can't use language to stop people from seeing differences. You can only teach people to not be prejudiced or sexist.

Oh no! Out of politeness, we practice some minor ambiguity! Horrors! — Ecurb

I'm glad you agree with the OP. My point was not a judgement about whether it was polite or not. Only pointing out its flaw as a phrase.

To return to the OP, assigning gendered roles is not "sexist" in the normal use of the word. Sexism suggests that some gender-based roles are more valuable than others, those assigned them are thus more valuable than others. — Ecurb

That is definitely sexism also, but that does not invalidate that sexism is also when you elevate a gendered role over the person. For example, if a little boy came to me and said, "I was called a girl because I like dolls," I would explain to him that how you act, do, and like has nothing to do with the fact you're a boy. Same as if a boy didn't like football, being aggressive, or any other prejudices associated with being male.

Division of labor based on sex (gender?) is traditional in all human societies. Women gathered; men hunted. Women nursed the children (I admit that trans women may not be able to) and gathering plant-based food allowed them to carry the babies with them. This division became "sexist" when hunting and warfare were seen as more honorable and valuable than gathering. — Ecurb

If it was based on the most efficient use of physical capability, it would not be sexist. If a woman who was best capable to hunt was forced into housework, that's sexist.

If "sexism" is a form of discrimination that harms or devalues some people, wouldn't having unique terms for trans men or trans women be MORE likely to lead to such prejudice and discrimination? — Ecurb

No. The recognition of difference does not imply that people's prejudices about those differences should be elevated above the reality of them.

We should accept people's desired gender identification whether of or not it is innate. It's simply good manners -- like accepting people changing their names. We should accept homosexuality whether or not it is innate. — Ecurb

The OP is not a question of accepting or not accepting trans individuals, and being gay has nothing to do with being trans. Its pointing out that the phrase used to communicate a certain concept is linguistically ambiguous at best, and is most logically read as something they do not want to claim. "Trans men are men" is not meant to imply that a trans man is an adult human male. But linguistically, that is the most rational way to read the phrase. As such they need to stop using it, or amend it to fully communicate as one example "Trans men are adult human females who act in male gendered ways."

"Sex assigned at birth" is an inaccurate expression. It should be "Sex inferred at birth". — Throng

Of course.

Gender is not a valid concept because it is an identity feature. Identity seems to be a perfect, simple identity (which in itself has no features), that possesses features such as a 'gender'. I seriously doubt that is a true story. I have a sex, an age, a height, a certain ancestry etc. - that's a true story - but if I say 'I'm a man'... I have no idea what that means. — Throng

Gender is an identity based on prejudices. A 'man' by gender has nothing to do with their actual body or sex, but how a person thinks a person of that body and sex should act in public. A scalpel is given to remove that sociological expectation from that sex, and place it onto another. Thus I could be an adult human female but have the gender of a man, or "Act in ways in society in ways that I think only adult human men should act.' And of course, if you elevate gender over your sex, you've fallen into sexism.

And this post is an attempt to get away from that.

My argument is, you can't. This isn't a position which only seems political on the surface, but underneath it is making a good faith sincere general point about language. The reality is: this is politics all the way down, with nothing underneath but more politics. The politics of the trans movement is doing aren't there to serve their preferences about language as a goal: their preferences about langauge are only a means to their overtly political ends. — BenMcLean

And I would argue that while you might be right for some people, for others they deem it to be a real sociological discovery. There are people who believe that an adult human male can take on the gender of an adult human female. And the phraseology in question is an attempt to describe this compactly. My point is that linguistically this is slang, and does not accurately convey the intention of the phrase. For some, they definitely view the phrase as political. An insistence on a phrase for political purposes is what idiots do, and they aren't worth talking to anyway.

This is for people who are really trying to dissect the phrase and think about it in non-political way. Is there credence to the phrase in good language? Do we understand it? Can we improve it? The conclusion is clear that its a poor phrase that needs more clarity, and as is, will not logically be read by most people unfamiliar with the culture of trans as what is intended which is "Trans men are adult human women who act socially in ways people associate with adult human men."

Put differently: contradiction doesn’t create objectivity; it reveals a failure relative to an objectivity that judgment already presupposes. Even in cases where no contradiction ever shows up, we still take our judgments to be answerable to how things really are, not merely to what has survived so far. — Esse Quam Videri

I don't have a definite answer at this point, but its something to think on. Do we by default take our judgements as answerable to how things really are, or do you think most people simply assume their judgements are the way things are?

Put another way, I think there may be a personality difference here. There are some people who are constantly questioning whether their judgements are concurrent with reality, and those who are constantly surprised when its not. Some people get angry that their judgements are not being respected by reality, and others who are flexible and respectful of the outside forces that impinge on their judgements.

What I'm describing is the factual way I see people form knowledge. What I can't describe is the feeling a person has while doing it. I can describe that water is di-hydrogen monoxide. I can't describe what its like to feel it on your skin as you swim through it. A person could feel like they are pushing the water out of their way as they swim, or feel that the water is propelling them as they push against it. A person can feel hot, or 'not as cold'.

There are people who feel that the loch ness monster is real because of a few pictures. "See? That's all the proof we need." Their lives are in the affirmative of their judgements as being real, and reality is there to affirm them. Others will say, "Is that really enough evidence to claim that its real?" Those 'Debbie Downers" to the believers seem to lack wonder or 'openness' to the wonder and imagination of the world.

I’d just want to say that the possibility of contradiction has its significance only because judgment is already oriented toward a reality that is determinate independently of our beliefs, not merely because we sometimes get corrected by experience. — Esse Quam Videri

I think this is a personality difference. I think many of us have a will towards our own judgments first, then learn about an independent world because life contradicts us. Perhaps studying babies and kids would help us see this more. Kids aren't born with the notion of object permanence. Its only around 4-7 months of living that kids finally start to realize that things can exist outside of their immediate perception.

A large point about judgement is to recognize the world for action. When you go up to a door, do you carefully examine its hinges and structure to make sure its a door, or do you make a snap judgement to open it and move about your day? What if the door actually contained spy equipment that monitored your every action, but you would need to take it to a special lab to find out? We cannot go about our day constantly fearful that the next step we take will send us through to a hidden dimension where we will never return. So while when we're carefully thinking about something logically we might look for contradictions, in general this is a halting and inactive viewpoint as a person tries to reason through everything they can possibly think of.

Is the glass half-full, half-empty, or 'in the middle'? This is a feeling about the fact that the glasses' volume is divided equally between compact air and water. As I mentioned earlier, a person can view the universe as having no God with despair, or retain their curiosity and wonder about it. I feel the same about the knowledge theory here. I can only conclude at this point that we affirm the reality of our own experiences, and logically are only aware of there being something outside of them by contradictions. Some might be more inclined to feel we're lead more by affirmatives about the world instead of contradictions. But does that change the underlying logic of how inquiry and rationality works? I don't think so.

But what do you think? Is it more than a feeling?

It requires only that judgments be answerable to how things are, independently of whether we ever fully grasp them. When we say that a claim about the world is wrong (not merely incomplete or misapplied) we are presupposing that there is a determinate way things are that the claim fails to answer to. — Esse Quam Videri

That would be what a contradiction is. A contradiction is the world telling us, "Our idea about reality is wrong." We cannot will a contradiction away. If I jump out of an airplane without a parachute, no matter how I perceive the world or will it, I will fall to my death. Contradictions are proof that there are things outside of ourself and our own willpower.

So it’s not a question of whether the results of inquiry are always provisional or contextually-scoped in practice, but whether the act of inquiry (especially in acts of judgement) itself presupposes that reality is unconditionally determinate independent of our provisional conclusions about it, thereby preserving robust notions of truth and error. — Esse Quam Videri

Because at any time we could be contradicted, we are reminded of a potential unconditional independent of our conclusions about it. The truth is that you will be contradicted, and that contradiction to your idea of the world is an undeniable error in your judgement.

Does that cover it? I'm not sure what else you would be looking for at this point, but please continue if there is.

This is not the same as saying merely that we are finite and fallible, or that inquiry is ongoing. It implies something much stronger - namely, that there is no fact of the matter that could ever settle a judgment as finally correct, because any purported settlement is always relative to a context, stage or set of conditions that could always, in principle, be revised. — Esse Quam Videri

This is a valid concern. Forgive me if you're already replying to my last post. I figured this would be a good summary.

1. That we discretely experience is an actual truth. The act itself, not what we think about it. Factually, there is nothing more that can ever be discovered that would undermine it.
2. There is always a question about our application using discrete experience. Its unavoidable as we are applying one experience and truth we directly have, to something else that we do not have full control or potential comprehension over.
3. In theory, one could arrive at the truth of everything if one had full context. So if we could sense it all from a bird's eye view, and be able to perceive and sense everything that was possible to perceive and sense, what is deductive and what is reasonably inductive would be true, but it would still be within the context of a perceiver.

So, the only context of truth which we are privy to discover is that we discretely experience. Everything else is built on this, and the fact that our application of them can be contradicted. Thus full knowledge is a blend of a true foundation, and rational approaches to attempting to understand the world outside of that true foundation. This would not change given more information or findings, this is also a truth. One way to think of it is, "I can be me. But I can never be anything else. And to know something else in itself fully, I must actually be that thing fully."

I don't think there's any possible way to know what is true outside of ourselves, but it is true to know our own experiences in themselves. I hope that summarizes the point I was trying to make in my last post.

The movement is very, very overtly political and always has been. — BenMcLean

And this post is an attempt to get away from that. Its about putting the knives down on both sides and asking some rational questions just about language. Linguistically, the phrase, "Trans men are men," is not detailed enough to truly communicate what it intends, "Trans men are women who take on the gender of a man." If people want to debate the meaning of the later, that's fine. But the point here is that the original phrase is ambiguous and does not clearly convey its message in broader communication apart from its very limited cultural context.

If you wish to post something of your own on the political philosophy of trans ideology, feel free. But its not really what this thread is about, and staying someone on topic is good etiquete and practice.

When it comes to gaytrans, language is the battlefield, not held in common at all.

If you go listing your preferred pronouns, then that act is the most definite public signal of your entire political platform that you can make. — BenMcLean

Another thing I do is not make political statements. I'm very apolitical in philosophy and life. I think it distorts actual thought. Politics is often times not about thinking, its about winning. Philosophical discussions should be able to be considered by anyone regardless of political background. They should be just as critical of itself as it should of the topic its pointed at.

And that assumption that society is arbitrarily constructed and that human nature is not fixed comes from their ideological grounding in Marxism. — BenMcLean

This is overly political and I see no evidence of this. No offence, but I'm interested in talking about the topic of the OP, and this is veering off.

Gender (or sex, which is in fact synonymous no matter what anyone says) is more than a social role. — BenMcLean

For the purposes of this discussion, gender is not sex. It is the social belief in how a sex should act in society. They really are different.

The rest is really off topic Ben. I mean this friendly, so don't misunderstand. Philosophy is not about griping about people. Its not about 'a group'. Its about universal concepts, about trying to construct a logical framework in whatever subject you're looking at. That takes careful building from basic premises to a conclusion. What you're doing here is taking a lot of things you personally believe about a group of people, then asserting things you believe this leads to. That's an opinion, not philosophy.

If you would like to practice philosophy with me, feel free to read the OP again and make comments about it. I've also written quite a few other philosophical papers and OPs, so you can get a feel for what philosophy is and isn't. Check out a few other posts if you're interested in learning what its about. But avoid the trolls. You know who they are. :)

I've been enjoying our exchange very much, so let's continue on. — Esse Quam Videri

I as well! Continue as long or as little as you want.

My sense is that, given all that you’ve said so far, you would be willing to say that normativity is reducible to instrumental success. Assuming this is an accurate portrayal of your position, the consequence is that it places a substantive restriction on what your theory can accomplish. Specifically, it cannot now function as a standpoint from which to make claims about the structure of inquiry as it really is. — Esse Quam Videri

I don't think its simply about instrumental success. What if I told you this knowledge theory shows the structure of inquiry as it really is? Recall that in the beginning there is one thing that we could absolutely know, and that is discrete experience. Only you can experience discrete experience. Its the one thing that there is nothing behind it as it really is. Discrete experience, as you experience, is truth. To be clear, not our interpretations of it. Not our application of it. The experience itself is 'what is'.

The nature of inquiry is to take a discrete experiencer and try to see if we can discover the truth of something. We are able to conclude the truth of our own discrete experience. But can we know if there is truth outside of our immediate experience? Or is it that we interpret our discrete experience in a way that allows us to accurately capture the world?

Logically and by application, we can never know anything 'behind' discrete experience Can we ever know what a rock on the ground is apart from our discrete experience of it? No. Does that mean the rock doesn't exist if we don't discretely experience it? No to this as well. We know there are things beyond our will to discretely experience, because despite the desire for our interpretations to hold or to apply, we keep having something that interferes with them called contradictions. If that rock hits me in the back without me first being aware of it, it will still harm my body. Do we know what that is in itself? We can't. Just like I can't know what its like for you in particular to discretely experience in itself. Nothing can. Only you can.

But can this theory of knowledge make claims about the discrete experience as it is in itself? Yes. In fact, it has to. Knowledge as a whole cannot be gained without first having a discrete experience of something like an experience, feeling, or identity. That is what it is in itself. And inquiry simply is taking our discrete experiences and seeing if its application or interpretation is contradicted by something outside of itself. It explains all the fundamentals. There is not any need for anything more, as there is nothing that can be gleaned from outside of the context of a discrete experiencer.

This, in turn, has the effect of deflating its normative authority over competing epistemological theories, even those that make use of thicker accounts of normativity, truth and grounding. — Esse Quam Videri

Since the theory is laid on the foundation of an actual truth, your personal discrete experience, its actually the strongest theory of knowledge that I know of. There is an epistemological ground, the 'assumption' that one can start with, and prove without contradiction or circularity. Feel free to post any theory of knowledge you wish, and I'll almost certainly be able to point out its fatal flaw. I won't say this one is 'the' theory, but it is a vast improvement over all other theories of knowledge and should be a standard comparative measure upon which new theories are founded.

The idea that there are limits in knowledge is not a criticism against it, only a note that we should be aware of those limits and not attempt to assert what we cannot. Knowledge is a tool, and all tools have effective, ineffective, and limited use. Lets go back to probability for a second. Every good induction is a prediction of the unknown with as much basis on what is known as possible. To know the probability of a coin landing heads or tails, you need to know what a coin is, a flip, and what each side is. What we know, is that we can not know what the forces of each flip will be to predict the landing. That knowledge of limitations allows us to create a probability that, given enough flips over time, is remarkably accurate.

It is not that my knowledge theory has no answer to 'what is something in itself'. The answer is we can only know a discrete experience in itself. Logically then, we can not know something outside of the ability to discretely experience. It is both a logical and applicable assertion. Try not to discretely experience and know some (a/one) 'thing'. See the contradiction?

When you say we cannot know anything apart from the scope of discrete experiencers, you’re (presumably) not offering that as one more application that might be contradicted tomorrow, but as a reflective insight into the intrinsic structure of knowledge as such; one that you expect me to grasp as unconditionally valid, not merely as your particular contextual commitment. — Esse Quam Videri

Correct. Do you see above as a discrete experiencer why that is now?

But if that's right, then you're already operating in a register your framework doesn't officially acknowledge; what is typically called transcendental reflection, or reflection on the conditions that make any knowledge possible at all. — Esse Quam Videri

I think the knowledge framework allows reflection on itself perfectly. But please, feel free to disagree and point out if I'm missing something.

Knowledge does not capture the truth, but is a tool to arrive at the most reasonable assessment of reality for survival and desired goals.
— Philosophim

Which is the target of Nagel’s criticism. But I guess if you don’t see that, there’s no point repeating it. — Wayfarer

I acknowledged that already. Not a worry if you're not interested in diving in.

And the "etc" pretty obviously includes a maximal dogmatic presumption that any challenge to left wing orthodoxy on any questions of social issues whatsoever is clearly disallowed, no matter how civil, no matter how educated. That is what this rule as written means and any disagreement with me on that point concerning what this text from the forum's rules in fact says is frankly dishonest, because words mean things. — BenMcLean

The moderators on this forum I feel are usually fair. Is what you're discussing a genuine thing to consider and possibly be wrong about, or is it full of unwarranted presumptions with a clear bent towards an unsavory outcome instead of fostering rational discussion? This was a topic that needed to be discussed and I feel many people got an opportunity to explore it with a rational mindset instead of ideological stand point.

The trans movement is fundamentally anti-philosophical and dogmatic. Dissent is not tolerated and even attempting to define the boundaries of orthodoxy so as not to stray from them is against the whole spirit of that community because what's valued there is a vibe, not an idea. — BenMcLean

As we can find in any religion. But this is a broad stroke against a trans 'movement'. This is an assertion, and if it were to be a topic it would need rational backing beyond that assertion.

But anyway, about the rules of the forum: this raises the question of why the trans question is being allowed at all. You're not allowed to question feminism or the gay movement, but you are allowed to question the trans movement? Why? What possible combination of philosophy and political theory allows for drawing the line at such a completely abitrary place? — BenMcLean

Because this is a question of linguistics, and not an attack on any individual. I'm simply noting common language, and what is most rational for any English speaker to conclude based on the sentence structure. I am not denying that trans gender people exist, accusing them of being less than others, or insisting that gender does not exist. The question is mostly pointing out that the phrase in ambiguous without further clarification, and the most rational conclusion is to assume 'woman' not modified by any adjective, means 'adult human female'.

There is nothing wrong with addressing aspects of feminism as long as you have a good argument. Same with questioning policies that some gay people might want. The question is, is it an actual rational post, or a rationalization to attack other people? There must be a clearly identified problem, there must be an explanation for why its a problem we should consider, and a solution should be presented that can be discussed rationally without assertion. Most people are not good at this, and their motivation for opening up discussions is not to have a rational discussion, but assert their own bias in a way that rarely involves deep and self-critical thinking.

As far as I'm concerned, trans is just gay with extra steps. — BenMcLean

Its not. Trans can be due to trauma, trying to escape a sexist environment, heterosexual inversion (straight men who get sexual and romantic feelings from taking on femininity), and more. To your earlier point, that would be a poor topic lead. Philosophy is not about debating current science, but if the process of science works. Philosophy is not about debating whether trans people are all gay or not, but debating the nature of gender and if it is a reasonable basis for identity. It is about debating the underlying logic they may lead to certain topics, but is not a debate about the topic itself.

This place is not reddit, and as long as people understand what philosophy is supposed to explore, you can dive into any philosophical concept about any topic.

What must happen for a person to begin to re-evaluate their Level 2 ideas in line with reality (Level 3 facts)? Maybe the bear should bite the bearer of the idea or someone close to them? In real life, things can be more complicated. — Astorre

This I never got an answer to. I have a feeling its a variable scale. There's likely a mean and median, but not anything universal. I believe that's for psychology to discover.

It seems to me that Philosophim's analysis is implicitly Darwinian in character in assuming that the grounds for the faculty of reason is successful adaptation to the environment. — Wayfarer

Not only our environment, but our personal reality. You might be interested in reading the theory for yourself. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

I believe I also adequately answer this part:

The epistemological buck must stop somewhere. By this I mean not that there must be some premises that are forever unrevisable but, rather, that in any process of reasoning or argument there must be some thoughts that one simply thinks from the inside--rather than thinking of them as biologically programmed dispositions. — Thomas Nagel

But I'll leave you to judge after reading if you think this is the case.

But my question has been about something slightly different: why incoherence counts as error rather than merely inconvenience, even when nothing practical is at stake.

To put the point as cleanly as I can: suppose a discrete experiencer knowingly affirms a contradiction in a case where there is no survival cost, no practical downside, and no motivational penalty whatsoever. Is the judgment simply impractical, or is it incorrect? — Esse Quam Videri

Fantastic, I think we've explored down to the nub at this point. Again, thank you for your pointed questions and follow ups. Let me pose another question to you: What is the definition of incorrect that can be applied without contradiction? Since the term "incorrect" is a definition, it is formed by a discrete experience, and then must be applied outside of itself without contradiction.

We've defined intelligibility within the context of a discrete experiencer not being contradicted by the application of their discrete experience. Therefor a correct application is one that passes this, while an incorrect application does not.

To put the point as cleanly as I can: suppose a discrete experiencer knowingly affirms a contradiction in a case where there is no survival cost, no practical downside, and no motivational penalty whatsoever. Is the judgment simply impractical, or is it incorrect? — Esse Quam Videri

It is incorrect in terms discrete experience application. The failure state for being incorrect might not be punishing in this particular instance, but the person still did not correctly create applicable knowledge.

But the issue was never whether intelligibility is universally instantiated; it is whether, when intelligibility is operative at all, its norms are contingent products relative to particular forms of life, or universally undeniable constraints built into intelligibility as such. — Esse Quam Videri

We don't have the context of all forms of life to see. We do not have the context of universal experience. We only have the context of us as discrete experiences. And for any discrete experiencer with the intelligence to allow intelligibility, a correct or incorrect application of knowledge would be the same given the knowledge process is followed.

If you are asking if there is some universal apart from the discrete experiencer and contradiction of one's actions by reality, I don't know. Such a question is very like asking if we are a brain in a vat. You can only know what is within the scope of knowledge, not anything outside of it. Perhaps there is some other intelligent life that does not have discrete experiences, but a state unlike we could imagine. Within that state, intelligibility might or might not be possible. Perhaps it is an intelligence that morphs and changes instead of being contradicted by whatever it encounters. Our version of intelligibility would necessarily be different.

We cannot claim a universal apart from context. If we could extend our context out to observe and understand everything, then we could probably establish universal laws. But it would still be within the context of a being that discretely experiences and is looking to not contradict itself.

If we differ there, then I think we’ve probably reached a genuine and irreducible philosophical divide; not about induction, causality, or even necessity in the abstract, but about what reason is and what ultimately obliges assent. I’m happy to leave it there, with much appreciation for the care you’ve brought to the exchange, unless there’s anything further you’d like us to address with respect to these topics. I'm content either way. — Esse Quam Videri

Same. Fantastic conversation. I'm always grateful to have encounters like this where its just about the subject material and both parties are being reasonable. Thank you again for an excellent discussion.

Let me begin by saying that I continue to be impressed by the care and effort you’ve put into your essays. You’ve clearly thought through your position in a systematic way, and I don’t think our disagreement is due to vagueness or oversight. Rather, I think your essay on knowledge and induction brings even more clearly into view where our philosophical commitments genuinely diverge, especially with respect to grounding and necessary existence. — Esse Quam Videri

Thank you, it is always humbling to have someone read a piece of work I've written and enjoy it. I suspected this might be the source of our differences in this thread, and I'm glad that was confirmed.

That said, I also want to apologize for the length of what follows. I’ve really done my best to try to understand your perspective and, in the process, have probably spent more time on this than I should have :smile: . — Esse Quam Videri

No apology necessary, I do not mind a good post from a thoughtful person.

First, your summary is spot on. I'll go into your concerns now.

My original concern was not simply whether we can justify claims about necessity in practice, nor whether science or everyday reasoning can proceed without positing something that exists necessarily. It was whether intelligibility itself - the fact that there is a stable, law-like, and explanatory order at all - can be ultimate yet ungrounded without remainder. — Esse Quam Videri

I hope I've put forth enough reasons why the first portion is still reasonable to hold. If that is so, I will focus on trying to answer the latter part, which I feel is the crux of your concern.

Your framework repeatedly appeals to the idea that beliefs must submit to contradiction by reality. But the authority of contradiction is not itself explained in instrumental terms. To say that belief ought to yield to reality is already to invoke a norm that is not merely convenient, but binding. — Esse Quam Videri

Correct. In the interests of the focus on the paper's length and scope, I dropped an analysis at the end which explored this very question. The reason is because this ends up exploring a moral notion of knowledge or, "How should we use it". If of course a person does not first understand how knowledge works within the paper, in the past introducing such questions can complicate the initial understanding and can lead to confusion. You have an appropriate grasp on the fundamentals, so this should not be a problem to explore.

Starting within the the self-context, why should we care about contradictions in our beliefs?

Your account presupposes an ongoing drive to refine distinctions, improve applicability, and prefer explanations that are more coherent and comprehensive. This dynamism is difficult to understand if intelligibility is merely accidental. It suggests that inquiry is oriented toward something more than survival or local success, but toward understanding as such.

If that orientation is legitimate at all, then the question of whether intelligibility has an ultimate ground reasserts itself. — Esse Quam Videri

I'll start with what I will conclude and explain why this is so. Knowledge as a tool at its base is about giving a person the best chance for survival. Knowledge as a tool is also the best way of finding out the truth through inquiry. Like a master survivalist with a multi-tool, precise and careful use can get a result that cannot be easily gotten without it. But holding a multi-tool does not make one a survivalist, nor mean the person has any motivation to master the tool if they are not in a situation where every aspect is demanded. The base of intelligibility is applying discrete experiences without contradiction for survival, but it can be used for far more than that.

What is truth? What 'is'. This is what exists despite our applications of discrete experiences. This is the first ultimate grounding of intelligibility. This starts from a very young age of figuring out what will kill you and what won't. If you eat a rotten apple, you'll get sick. Eat a delicious one, you don't. As such its beneficial to survival to construct an identity of food, an apple, and whether that apple is safe to eat or not.

The second ground of intelligibility is the ability to discretely experience. If you noticed while reading, its the foundation of math. Our ability to create a discrete, the mental establishment of 'one'. Math is the logic of discrete experiences combined with the notion of what contradicts them. 1 = 1. 1 does not = 2 because one discrete experience is not the same as two discrete experiences. This can be applied in blades of grass. I have 1 blade of grass, and the application of one blade of grass twice is 2 blades of grass. They cannot be equal, as reality contradicts the fact that one discrete experience is the equal in contextual quantity to the other.

These two things, discrete experiences and not being contradicted by reality are the necessary foundations of intelligibility. If a person could not discretely experience, I doubt they would be able to comprehend the world. Existence would be a sea of unfathomable separation. Having seen reports on acid trips where everything seems to become 'one', intelligibility begins to vanish with the final grouping of everything into one discrete.

But does a base of intelligibility require us as people to use it to its utmost potential? Not at all. Once basic survival is obtained, the incentive to spend time and energy on refining or furthering knowledge to discoveries outside of immediate practical use requires some other drive or goal. I believe it is an artifact of survival and later the adaptations to the complexities of being social creatures. Some of us are pushed further in our energy and attention in understanding our world beyond basic needs which has lead the the discoveries we have in modern day society.

But I am veering off from your points, so let me return to those.

You emphasize that the selection of essential properties and identities is up to the subject, and that distinctive contexts are not dictated by reality itself. Yet the success of application, the hierarchy of induction, and the very notion of “better” or “worse” reasoning presuppose a stable background structure that constrains which distinctions work and which fail. — Esse Quam Videri

I hope my point above leads to what this 'better' and 'worse' is. Since we have shown where math comes from, we can use math to see why.

First, lets start with deduction. Deduction relies on only what we can know (when I say 'know' it combines the distinctive and applicable together), and cannot rely on what we do not or cannot know. One important reason for this is that we have all encountered situations in which there was something outside of our personal knowledge that contradicted what we expected. Yet this can also happen with induction. Does that mean deduction is useless?

Lets say that I am aware of everything needed for a proper conclusion about reality. My discrete experiences have covered everything that is needed in truth to come to a conclusion without contradiction. If reality is concurrent with this, then I have made the right judgement. To put it another way, if I have all the information to apply to an object and say its a sheep, and it is a sheep, I will have been correct through careful reason that lead me to only one outcome being correct.

Let compare this to induction.

Induction like probability is an educated guess based on known knowledge deficiencies. When a person flips a coin by hand without trying to get it to land with any particular side, its not that there isn't a set of forces which will necessarily lead to it landing heads or tails. Its that we are unable to measure and know those forces prior to it landing. Meaning when we take everything into consideration, we deducae at best there's only a 50% chance that we can predict the correct landing side of the coin. Yet even with this deduced guess, the person is still in the same risky situation as the person using pure deduction. There can always be a missing experience or something outside of our knowledge that could reveal our cogent inductive claim is not going to have the outcome we predict.

Lets call this common uncertainty 'Doubt'. There is always Doubt in any claim, deductive or inductive, that the context has properly captured a complete enough understanding of reality that would not be contradicted if that full understanding were complete. Now lets look at comparing the two with doubt involved.

If a deduction removes doubt, it has a certain outcome of 1. In the most cogent induction, probability of the outcome not being contradicted by reality is always less than 1, as a probability of 100% is essentially a deduction. Since Doubt is equivalent in both the deductive and inductive case, when comparing the two for what is 'better' (to have a more reliably accurate outcome), we can remove Doubt as the common 'x' on both sides. 1 > Anything less than one.

Thus if one has the time and energy, it is more reasonable to favor deductions than inductions if you want the most consistently accurate outcome. A stable conclusion backed by the stable foundations of the ability to discretely experience. This is necessarily true no matter the viewpoint of the discrete experiencer.

By treating deduction as “what cannot be contradicted given current distinctions,” necessity becomes a local epistemic status rather than a metaphysical one. But that redefinition does not show that there is nothing that exists necessarily; it shows only that necessity cannot be established by the methods you allow.

That is an important result, but it does not settle the ontological question. It changes the standards of admissibility rather than answering the original demand. — Esse Quam Videri

Looking at this now with the analysis above, is this a metaphysical conclusion of necessity? That a deduction, given the elimination of doubt, will necessarily be superior to an induction with the same given knowledge and removal of doubt?

Is it a necessity apart from discrete experiencers like us? No. There is no necessity for intelligibility apart from how perceive and exist in reality. Intelligibility is born of the necessity to survive in a world by using our ability to discretely experience most accurately in regards to its application beyond itself. it also turns out its our best tool at understanding and mastering the world with the greatest chance of accuracy.

Think about a bacterium. Its a purely reactionary chemical construct. It does not think intelligibly. Its an enclosed chemical reaction reacting to the environment around it. Intelligibility is not necessary to itself or most of life in general. It is only important and useful to us because we have the capacity to use it to understand and live the way we want to most successfully.

But again I might be getting off point.

Your account presupposes an ongoing drive to refine distinctions, improve applicability, and prefer explanations that are more coherent and comprehensive. This dynamism is difficult to understand if intelligibility is merely accidental. It suggests that inquiry is oriented toward something more than survival or local success, but toward understanding as such.

If that orientation is legitimate at all, then the question of whether intelligibility has an ultimate ground reasserts itself. — Esse Quam Videri

I hope I have explained the ultimate ground of intelligibility, and what could be considered necessary in such a system. The final point which I have briefly touched is motivations beyond survival. If one is surviving comfortably with their world view, for most people there is little incentive to change it. Yet despite this, I believe there is a variability in what people consider a 'comfortable' level of distinctive and applicable knowledge. The social interactions of the species can produce a peer pressure to pursue goals beyond survival. "Yes, life is nice now, but what if it could be better?" Beyond survival comes convenience, entertainment, and the desire for a more comfortable life style. In any case, once a person desires something more than basic survival, the tool of knowledge is still their best recourse to success in understanding and acting in reality to get what they want.

The problem is that if one has no motivation beyond survival, there is little use for knowledge as a tool beyond sustaining that. Not every person who uses a screw driver becomes a mechanic. It might be nice to have to pull the tool out in certain situations, but if one's life is set in a way where the inductions one has to make are basic and low risk, there is little need to spend time and energy for accuracy. This is how ideologies like religions can thrive. While the ideology itself isn't rational when examined closely, the benefits to the individual often outweigh the risk of being wrong. People tend to leave a religion not because of the fact that it is an inductive enterprise that is low on the inductive hierarchy, but usually leave when the religion becomes more of a burden than a benefit, both personally and socially.

A necessary judgment, as I am using the term, is not reached by adding premises or narrowing context. It arises when reflection shows that denying a certain conclusion undermines the very norms one relies on in inquiry. The issue is not whether necessary existence can be applied without contradiction, but whether treating intelligibility as wholly contingent is coherent given the binding role intelligibility plays in reasoning. — Esse Quam Videri

Now to bring it back to your main point. Have I successfully shown you necessary judgements that can be reached within the knowledge theory? Is intelligibility coherent within this system? In all possible worlds in which discrete experiencers exist, are the requirements for intelligibility the same? Is a deduction necessarily the more reasonable action to take over induction in one wants accuracy? I leave that for you to consider.

If it is the case that I have sufficiently answered your points, then I feel my point here about the necessity of existence ultimately being uncaused is a distinctive conclusion, and not one of application. It is at best, a plausible outcome, but one that I do not find is reasonably countered by any other inductions of the same or higher hierarchy. I believe this does not rule out intelligibility itself, only the conclusion upon which intelligibility is grounded on.

I hope I've addressed your points adequately. Please point out if you think I've missed anything or have not fully answered the questions you had. Also, if the discussion on the knowledge theory goes much longer I suggest we port this over to that thread in particular. I don't want to derail the OPs original point over a separate thread.

So the real question may be this: are the norms implicit in inquiry (coherence, adequacy, explanatory sufficiency) themselves intelligible and binding, or are they contingent products of practice with no further warrant? — Esse Quam Videri

With this question I highly encourage you to read my paper on knowledge that I linked prior. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

As I keep saying: both :) The norms in intelligent inquiry are intelligible and binding because they are contingent products of practice.

Perhaps without the concept of nothing, we could not think about fluctuations of the quantum vacuum? Perhaps zero, as a concept of nothing, is necessary to our modern thinking process. — Athena

Potentially. I responded to Esse in the post above going over that idea.

In particular, appeals to probability, infinity, or randomness all presuppose a stable framework within which those notions apply. Infinity can explain why something occurs given a space of possibilities, but it doesn’t explain why there is a persisting possibility space, or why law-like regularity rather than total non-repeatability is instantiated at all. Treating that framework as brute is consistent, but it is exactly the move I’m questioning. — Esse Quam Videri

First, I do see your viewpoint and think its a very fair question. It may be that this is a misalignment of philosophical comfort, and I understand that well. I personally don't like Hume's problem of induction. I accept it, but begrudgingly as I'm sure many do. Combined with my own viewpoints on knowledge, I begrudgingly accept the viewpoint I've posted here as well. If it helps, I was not happy with its conclusion. :) I'm so deep into it at this point however, that I personally can see no way out. As you noted, the disagreement at this point is not going to be whether the idea is coherent, but whether its an idea that helps further humanities progress or restricts it.

There are some people who see a universe without ultimate guidance and think, "Nothing matters. I don't matter. Why search, why question, why do anything?" Then there are people who think. "Nothing matters. That's why we have to find meaning. We should explore to make the limited time we have here better. Lets try to conquer the universe and see what can come of it!"

If my proposal caused the majority of humanity to lean toward the former, I would scrap it. I am a firm believer that our viewpoint about what we know, and how it leads us into the next steps of our lives, is just as important as the knowledge itself. If the conclusion destroyed real intelligibility, it would be useless. After all, its how we arrived at the conclusion to begin with, and its how people function daily. Any philosophical conclusion which invalidates the current realities of the world is circumspect and likely wrong.

So I think the disagreement now turns on the following question: is intelligibility something that can be ultimate yet ungrounded, or does its very presence place a demand for a non-derivative explanation? You’re comfortable saying the former; I’m not persuaded that doing so leaves intelligibility fully intact rather than merely assumed. — Esse Quam Videri

I will again cheat and say the answer is both. :) It is ultimate and grounded in the logic of what 'existence can be without prior cause'. This is a shift from, "existence must always have a prior cause'. To my mind, it is the only conclusion we can reach, but surprisingly for almost cases, the latter still applies.

The reason is that the above conclusion I've made is logical. It is not proven by application. We have never yet observed and proven something appearing from nothing. We have never provably found a 'smallest particle'. The existence of the conclusion of ultimate non-causality doesn't absolve anyone of proving that they have discovered something uncaused in reality, because the burden or proof is practically impossible to meet.

If it is the case that there is an infinite chain of prior causality, then logically, we'll never realize it. Does that mean that we stop trying to figure things out? No. As long as we exist, we live and must make sense and shape of our surroundings. In the case that someone purports to find something that appeared without prior cause, they would need to demonstrate that there was no prior or outside force which caused that thing to be. This is also virtually impossible.

1. There is always the question, "Was it uncaused, or did I not detect something?" How do you prove that you didn't detect something?
2. If there was something that appeared uncaused within existence that is caused, we would attempt to explain it in terms of the forces around it. As we should. We would have to eliminate that every single force which could impact that lone uncaused existence, had no hand in its existence.
3. If something did appear from nothing, how do you test or prepare for that? I'm quite confident that if one does the math on it, its likely an unfathomably low chance of happening. Have we been able to create a space that is a pure vacuum? Can we set up something that eliminates all outside forces? Its impossible.

So what use is it? At this point, the conclusion does not change how we would conduct science, and the addition of this as a new variable is practically impossible to use in application. As Hume noted, we cannot prove that what has happened prior will happen again, but we also cannot function without induction.

Ultimately the fear of undermining what we have should not be a motivator in an ideas discouragement. It should be that we explore it to its fullest, and realize that if it does undermine what we know, its because its what can best be known. Generally such an undermining benefits us as a species because its a more accurate look at reality. People were afraid that denying a God would cause humanity to descend into wanton murder and destruction. It turns out that viewpoint was limiting us in many ways, ways we didn't realize until we let go.

Currently, the idea I've put forth would only practically be useful in the domain of math and probability. I would be curious what a mathematician who understood cardinality would come up with on the likelihoods of existence appearing or ceasing to exist without cause. To your point earlier about "Persisting probability spaces", the conclusion is that is existence can happen without prior reason, that is the one consistent probability space. It means on a naive level that 'anything can happen'. But I'm curious on a more refined mathematical level if that means that some things are more likely to happen than others given relative cardinality.

As for law-like regularity, we take the same line of possibilities as time. Its quite possible that something without law like regularity can appear, but equally as likely that something with regularity can appear. It may very well be that there are instances of law-like irregularity that come and go in such small areas or spurts of time that they have negligible impact. Also consider that matter and energy is moving at an incredibly rapid pace through space. If something appeared, it would also have to match the velocity of the things contained in the galaxy to be something we would even register. More of a side note there, but the point is that there is nothing in the conclusion here that makes our current situation impossible. The question is more about the probability of what this means going forward. And intuitively I feel that someone with the match skills to properly explore this idea would find something interesting.

So in sum:

1. The conclusion is only logical, and the standard of proof for asserting that any one thing in practical application is uncaused, is practically impossible to meet. To be rational must first still treat the universe as "Everyting has a prior cause" and can only conclude something is without cause with almost impossible effort.
2. As such this idea is most practically used as theory, and likely needs advanced cardinality to fully explore its consequences.

I do understand and respect your disagreement with this viewpoint, but I hope this at least explains why I am ultimately comfortable with and hold it.

If you're interested in these issues right now, I suggest you read my first major work on ontology, one chapter of which I posted on this forum.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/16103/language-of-philosophy-the-problem-of-understanding-being — Astorre

Fantastic exploration of how language shapes thinking. Very well written. :)

I spent several lunches explaining Popper's approach, and they even absorbed the material. However, within a few days, they discarded this tool for assessing scientific validity as unsuitable for them, preferring astrology.

Well, then. I wasn't upset, but apparently falsifiability isn't a standard criterion for evaluating a statement for the average person. — Astorre

Interesting but not unexpected. I too have found explaining falsifiability to be 'clunky'. It may be that the approach to explaining it is the issue, not the underlying concept itself. If we changed how we explained it if it would go better. Something to the effect of, "We're testing to see if its not real. If it is real, then we won't be able to find that it isn't real." I'm not sure myself. The real question is whether your rules as is can break away people from poor ideas and concepts without including this in some way. You'll find that out through application I'm sure.

In fact, what interests me most is the "dynamics of ideas": how they leap from one level to another, what needs to be done to achieve this, what conditions must be met. And most importantly, how ideas accumulate "ontological debt," which ultimately leads to their collapse. — Astorre

I agree, this is interesting to me as well. Often times an idea is not motivated by rational thinking, but emotional, cultural, or personal benefit.

Of course, until a more or less coherent mathematical model is attached to the model, my thoughts will seem like the ramblings of a madman. — Astorre

That's always how it begins. I think you have a great idea here with good motivations. Feel free to share with us here as you move along.

At the same time, thank you so much for your feedback and your approach, which I really liked! — Astorre

Very much the same back! Its always a delight to find other passionate and creative people. I wish you the best in your explorations and work!

↪Philosophim Another excellent post, thank you. I don’t think you’re being naive, but I do think there is still a gap that hasn’t been closed. — Esse Quam Videri

Likewise! Also, I have to compliment your mastery of the written word. Your use of higher level vocabulary in intelligible and clear in ways beyond my crafting capability, and its both impressive and fun to read.

You’re proposing a two-level view:

(1) Existence as such is accidental — there is no reason why anything exists.
(2) Once something exists, it has determinate properties and behaves intelligibly. — Esse Quam Videri

Correct.

Probability only makes sense relative to a stable sample space and enduring rules of combination. But on your view, there is no reason for the sample space itself to persist, or for its rules to remain fixed from moment to moment.

So the question isn’t “why do oxygen atoms behave consistently once they exist?” The question is “why is there a reality in which consistency itself is instantiated rather than not?” Saying that we are adaptations to a rare pocket of stability explains our survival, not the intelligibility of the pocket itself. Anthropic reasoning explains selection, not grounding. — Esse Quam Videri

I think you've summarized your issue clearly. Let me see if I can return the favor.

First, some background. How I view knowledge is by anthropic reasoning, not grounding on an outside law. If you would like to read, here is a link with a follow up summary from the next poster down that did an excellent job. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

Of course its an optional read, but it may indicate what motivates my thought process and why I ultimately lean in this direction. None of us are free of bias, and I feel its important to have that on the table in case its a blinder on myself.

Second, your remarks on probability lead back to the classic problem of induction by Hume. The basic summary is that we cannot rationally justify why we infer that an outcome in the past will repeat or stay the same in the future. I won't go into too much detail as I assume you know of Hume. If not, I'll cover it.

My inability to prove that the universe will continue to be stable does not demonstrate the conclusion is irrational. On the contrary, I run into the same problem Hume does. Not only do I coincide with Hume's conclusion, I seem to add weight to its truth. It doesn't mean the conclusion I've wrought here is wrong, its that its uncomfortable. But perhaps with a few more examples I can remove this discomfort.

I agree that probability relies on stable rules, but its use is in relating those stable rules to variable ones. Analyzing probability in infinity is not very intuitive, can be easily misunderstood (I do not pretend to be immune to this) and literally an infinite number of variables. For higher level infinite comparison, we likely need cardinality, a mathematical subject beyond me. But we can simplify some of the approaches to see the reason why it is very possible that we can randomly have a universe with consistent laws over billions of years.

The first step is to isolate our certainties. If anything is possible, then if something forms it could persist as it is anywhere from the shortest perceivable time measurement to being an immortal object. Since this is true randomness without limits, any 'point' on the line can be picked and be as equally likely as the other to be picked. While, "lasts several billion years" seems impressive from our end, on a truly infinite scale its no more or less impressive then a googolplex number of years and beyond. Considering the amount of numbers that extend past 1 billion vs the amount of numbers after1 billion, its not inconceivable at all that things would form with stable structures as long as ours.

And that is the worry: can intelligibility be ultimately grounded in what is itself unintelligible without undermining intelligibility altogether? — Esse Quam Videri

But is the idea that there is no prior cause for the scope of caused existence unintelligible? Its a new concept for sure, but I believe its simple enough to understand once explored. As I've shown above, I see no harm to the intelligibility of what we know now vs what we knew before we realized. We still had the problem of induction. We still understood that at any minute life could end unexpectedly. We just now have that on a much larger scale. But if we start looking at that scale we realize that everything we have is still possible and explained.

To challenge the conclusion is to fall into reducto ad absurdum. Can we have an intelligible universe in which there is an underlying reason why the entire causal chain exists? Its impossible. In the case of a finite chain of causality, its obvious. The infinite chain is less so, so I'll give another example. Sorry if this is unneeded as I might be repeating myself.

If it is the case that we discovered some underlying reason why existence persisted, there would still be the question of, "What is causing that underlying reason to persist?" In other words, can you propose a situation that does not end up falling into this same question? If the conclusion I've written is the same within a finite chain of causality as an infinite chain of causality, what other possible alternative is there? In my mind, the only intelligible solution that avoids this trap is if there is no underlying reason for existence to be and is simply random. As I've noted above though, if you start to explore the idea of true randomness, you see our universe is not at all implausible, but just as likely to have been as any other thing that could exist.

However, and this often happens in life, people are willing to calmly face death, even when the probability of death is 90% or higher. And absolutely free of charge. It is only necessary to have certain prejudices (beliefs, ideas, identities) — Astorre

I tend to be more rational now as I've trained myself, but it was not always so. Early on in life I ran by intuition. If I can go from that in early college to someone who is known by my friends and job as a logical person to go to when hard problems need solving, anyone can. I believe anyone with the will and the knowledge how to be rational, can become more rational in their life with effort.

I believe in your project. One of the most important things to me is giving the general person the tools to be better. Academia is often a lock and key of social class. Most people are trying to scrape together money for next month's rent. It doesn't mean they're stupid, inferior, or lack passion for a greater understanding of their world. Words that can capture concepts succinctly and effectively are very useful for clear thought.

Looking at your model, I personally would change your Cognitive Deductions to be more like applicable knowledge. A deduction not empirically tested in some manner can often be wrong, and experience, or empirical evaluation is that test.

So Number 2 should be the marriage of empirics and deduction, and models should include deductions. Finally, I would also include that axioms are also empirically tested. Other than that I think its good!

As for your first 3, I would add one more: Testability. We often easily come up with concepts that are fine constructs of logic and deduction, yet utterly untestable. Testability includes 'falsification', which is not, "That its false," but that we can test it against a state in which it would be false, yet prove that its still true. For example, "This shirt is green." Its falsifiable by it either not being a shirt, or another color besides green. A unicorn which cannot be sensed due to magic is not falsifiable. Since we cannot sense it, there can be no testable scenario in which the existence of a unicorn is falsifiable.

What is this? The influence of ideas, God, biology, evolution? Or perhaps aliens =)? — Astorre

I believe its evolution. I wrote another paper on a proposal for what 'good' is at an objective level. And by this I literally mean objects themselves. As we are composed of matter and energy, I wanted to see if there was a fundamental moral underpinning to base existence that would eventually apply to humanity. As I said, its not a simple topic but here it is if you're interested. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15203/in-any-objective-morality-existence-is-inherently-good/p1

Now I'm just guessing, not deducing logically: most likely, the ineffective tool needs to be discarded quickly (not everyone will experience this behavior; some will become stupefied and frustrated). It's also necessary to quickly find a new assessment tool. Another prejudice immediately pops up: "An animal that runs at you and growls is aggressive" (this isn't necessarily true, it's just an example). — Astorre

Agreed. This is more the morality of knowledge and inductions. Whereas the hierarchy of inductions is a rational evaluation, the 'morality' of what should be used in a particular context can be swayed by other potential outcomes such as death.

So, you've encountered a conflict of prejudices. It would be great if you had all these prejudices sorted out in advance, according to scales in the depths of your mind. Let's say, according to the three scales I suggested. Then the prejudice about bears being kind would be at level 4 (consistent with fairy tales), and the prejudice about animals being aggressive would be at level 3 (an empirical fact). If you acted like an AI, no conflict would arise: the lower-level prejudice is instantly discarded, and you process information at a more basic level.

But you're not an AI; your ideas aren't balanced. Something aggressive is rushing at you, and you don't know which prejudice to choose. You become paralyzed. — Astorre

Yes, this can definitely happen. I think in addition to a hierarchy of inductions, there is a hierarchy of risk. This is essentially the morality of knowledge or "How should I use knowledge and inductions." Lets say in my hierarchy I know there is a high probability, 90%, that a bear running at me won't eat me. But I know its possible the bear would. Even though a probability is higher in the inductive hierarchy, and its a much lower chance that the bear will eat me than not, the risk of that 10% is so catastrophic to life that its not worth the risk in most cases.

The reason why the morality of knowledge is so hard to peg down is because we have to determine value. In most situations, the value of your own life would be of a higher worth than risks for little reward. But what is a 'little' reward. If I had a 90% chance of not being eaten by a bear, and someone said they would pay me 10 million dollars, is it worth the risk? 100 million? 1 billion? What's the value of your life in that instance?

The problem again is that we do not yet have an objective morality established. I attempted to start one, but it is based off of a reducto ad absurdum argument at best, and likely both too complicated and mundane to work through to get to human evaluation. At best, one can craft guidelines that likely work in most contexts. The problem of course is someone will insist inevitably that these guidelines work for all contexts, and you run into absolutism problems, or someone will discounter a general morality as 'too subjective' and dismiss it outright because they personally don't like it.

Hopefully, the advantage of the theory to you is that you do not have to work on separating the rational from the moral. When the two are tied together, that just adds complexity. But to your point about the turtles, this is also compounded by the independent context of everyone's instinct and outlooks. While we can train an objective outlook, everyone's individual risk assessment and tolerance of the unknown is going to differ. Is there a 'best' scenario that applies in all cases? Probably not considering the variety of responses people and animals have to the same situation. Can we once again make guidlines for general applicaiton? Perhaps.

In your work, you say: "In calm conditions," this is how the mind works. And I really like your model, especially since I've even started using it myself.
My model suggests that it would be extremely effective to also bring order to your mind. — Astorre

Thank you, I'm glad you've found it useful! I agree that calm conditions allow an individual time to think through the possibilities before needing to come to a conclusion. Pure deduction often takes time and energy. The more detailed you want to go, the more it takes. There is always a pull between how deep a person wants to analyze something before making a judgement call about it. I think a calm and trained mind can help a person work efficiently and not have to weigh the specter of potential loss if one does not make a decision immediately. The less time and more pressure we have to make a decision quickly, the more difficult its going to be to think about it rationally.

Thanks for the chatGPT link, its neat to see a summary of how the LLMs work internally. Yes, its nice they haven't learned to rewrite themselves yet, but its probably only a matter of time. :)

↪Philosophim
Hmm. — Banno

Banno, I have an 8 year old nephew that I've helped raise. Now he's an excitable little fella and sometimes doesn't understand social graces in public. One of the things we're working on is saying please and thank you to waiters. He gets two warnings from me before I get serious with him. I've asked you two times to politely not derail this person's OP with a debate about my paper, and go to that topic to discuss. You have not.

I don't debate with rude 8 year olds. If you want to straighten up, stop being rude, and post that in the paper's thread to debate what I'm saying in the paper, I'll respond happily. But you're being rude to the OP at this point and I will not be part of it. I've given you my response as the author, and that is all I need to give in another person's thread.

You might want to read the paper that I linked in this instance.
— Philosophim
That paper relies on treating necessity as causation. — Banno

No, it notes that we can draw a necessary conclusion by examining causation. I wrote it Banno, so if you want to dispute it lets go there. Again, if you have issues with what I'm saying about the paper, lets not bog down another person's OP on it here.

Sorry, I think the point was missed again. I would distinguishing modal/metaphysical necessity (what must be the case) from causal dependence (what brings something about). — Banno

As am I. You might want to read the paper that I linked in this instance.

You appear to treat necessity as something derived from examining causal chains, sliding back into the old mistake: equating necessity with the inevitability of causal sequences. — Banno

No, that's not what I'm stating. I stated that if we examine the entirety of the causal chains we arrive at a necessary conclusion that there can be nothing outside of it all that caused the entirety of the causal chain.

The fact that you can trace a causal chain for some contingent phenomenon does not make the phenomenon itself necessary. — Banno

I agree, and that's not what I'm saying.

I don't want to derail this thread from the OP about my paper. If you wish to further discuss the conclusions of the paper, it might be better to take it there to reference it directly. Then once we figure it out, we can come back here if you would like.

Necessity is not causation. — Banno

No, causation ultimately leads to a necessary conclusion. My ultimate point is not to claim causation was necessary. In fact the opposite. It is necessary that if we examine the full chain in the scope of causality that ultimately we will arrive at the necessary conclusion that it cannot be caused by anything else.

Kripke restored metaphysical necessity using the structure of possible worlds. Something is necessary if it occurs in every possible world, possible if it occurs in at least one world, impossible if it occurs in none, and contingent if it occurs in some but not all. — Banno

This is fair. Kripke would agree with my conclusion then. It is true for all possible worlds.

The absence of a reason for why anything exists at all does not entail the absence of intelligible constraints within existence. You are moving from “no ultimate explanation” to “no internal intelligibility,” but I'm not sure that follows. — Esse Quam Videri

I think I see your issue now. To be clear, my conclusion does not violate the intelligibility of what exists. My conclusion is only noting the full scope. While yes, anything could exist, once it exists it is what it is.

What do I mean by this? An oxygen atom is an oxygen atom because of its composition. An oxygen atom is not a hydrogen atom because its composition is different. When something exists, it by nature has properties that react in particular ways to other properties. Our observation of how 'the atom' is composed, and how 'one oxygen atom' interacts with 'one hydrogen atom' are simple observation of stable structures.

You might say, "If anything can happen, how can we have a stable atom?" Its one of many things that could happen. And if we think about it, atoms can break down and reform, combing with other properties and resulting in new substances.

In fact, the model you propose depends on there being constraints. You introduced theoretical constructs such as an infinite plane, spatial dimensions, time units, probability distributions, etc. But these aren't neutral, they already presuppose a highly structured and law-governed reality. — Esse Quam Videri

The irony is that if anything could start to exist, then there are still limitations given. There must be infinite space, or there would be a constraint. Spatial dimensions we know can exist because we are witness to them. Could there be higher or lower dimensions? Why not? Seems they would be possible. Time is also the relativistic tracking of change between two or more things, not an actual 'force' or 'thing' per say. Finally, while anything could exist without prior cause, we have the universe around us to see what actually appeared and ended up as. All of this lets us establish probabilities that I've noted without issue.

To be clear, the addition that anything can exist without explanation does not necessarily invalidate what has happened with explanation.

My worry is that if existence were genuinely unconstrained in the way you suggest, then there would literally be no reason for persistency over time, stable entities, probabilistic regularities rather than total chaos, or even the continued existence of the probability space you are modeling. — Esse Quam Videri

No, there's not if we are considering all possibilities prior to one happening. But once it happens, it happens. Just as its likely that unstable entities could appear, then cease to exist after 10 seconds, existence could appear for 10 trillion years, then vanish, or even longer. When we encompass actual infinity, its quite possible that our universe that we know of has been what it is for billions of years, and will be what it is billions of years longer. The point to understand that existence can happen without a prior reason is only pertinent if something has not yet existed, or something will unexpectedly cease to exist. In both cases, neither are predictable and would be extremely hard to identify or test for, so for most things it is practical not to consider it.

So the issue isn’t whether inquiry continues, I agree that it does. The issue is whether intelligibility itself is ultimately grounded or ultimately accidental. And if intelligibility is accidental, then the success of explanation becomes a coincidence — which undermines the very probabilistic and mathematical reasoning your proposal relies on (and on which science itself is based). — Esse Quam Videri

Is it cheating if I say both? :) Existence is ultimately accidental, but what exists and co-exists with what does exist is grounded in those experiences. Thus if you have a situation in which a planet forms with all sorts of chemical interactions happening over time, life just happens to emerge from these repeated firings. The miracle of life seems impossible, and even more so its evolution into intelligent beings that can be aware of the universe itself lives in. Yet here we are.

We rely on the stability of the existence around us to continue. Life is in a constant state of trying to exist despite its constant crumbling. It learned to move around and sustain itself. It learned to think and talk using the atmosphere and the other things that formed around it like plants and other animals. Without this stable planet, it cannot exist. Step out into space and entropy takes us. We are an adaptability within a closed macro system with constantly changing microsystems.

Is there any other planet any human could live natively on? There are certain areas of our own planet we cannot live like deep under the ocean. We are a very specific adaptation to our very specific location and the existence which has stayed stable around us. The fact that there is no reason why this planet and everything ultimately existed is irrelevant for this.

Could at all end anytime? Possibly. But is that really that much different from life's daily struggle? Does that stop us from exploring and further trying to understand and adapt to the existence that we are and is around us? No. Maybe it will help us if we do discover a limit. Maybe the speculation on what is possible with math could glean possibilities we had not thought of. And maybe the possibility of endless possibilities, while terrifying, can also be wonderful. I do not see it as an end to discovery, but an opening up of a new avenue to explore.

To state my worry more cleanly: can we ground the intelligibility of being in a radically unintelligible foundation without undermining intelligibility itself? — Esse Quam Videri

I believe we can. But please let me know if I'm being naive and missing something.

↪Philosophim Would you say that absent a necessary being, the universe is a result of either an infinite series of causes or a series terminating in an uncaused cause? — RogueAI

Its impossible to know with our current understanding. What I can claim with 100% confidence is that logically, either way, there is no cause which explains why the universe exists at all.

You propose a foundation—"Discrete Experience"—a single capacity that cannot be denied without self-refutation. This is quite succinct, given other approaches by rationalist epistemologists of different eras. If you allow me, I'll give my own definition, as I understand it: This is the act of arbitrarily selecting and creating identities (separate "objects" in experience). — Astorre

One minor suggestion to your own definition. I would remove the term 'arbitrarily'. It may be arbitrary, but it might not. Other than that, I think that's great.

Identity acquired through this mechanism is an elementary particle of knowledge, according to your model. — Astorre

In its original and quantitative form, it can be perceived as this. That being said, we can further discretely experience this identity into parts. Thus what is elementary can also become a composition.

After acquiring an "identity," a person, when confronted with similar images in life, constantly re-examines the validity (validity, not truth) of this identity. — Astorre

Yes, that's correct. To be clear, one can hold that remembered identity as distinctive knowledge. They can both re-examine the validity of the identity as something to hold as distinctive knowledge, or apply it and re-examine it as existing apart from the knowledge of the identity as distinctive, but as something which can be matched to reality without contradiction.

From this, as I understand it, it follows that the "usefulness" and "validity" of an identity are far more important than its "truth." — Astorre

To be clear, I do not arrive at a moral judgement (how we should use knowledge), but an observation of the formulation of knowledge and how a person most likely uses it in their self-context. I do not believe I comment in this paper, but I have explored and concluded that if one wanted to find the truth, this approach to knowledge would still be your best chance at finding it. Meaning a person can use knowledge to seek what is true, or they can use it only to the point of personal emotional benefit. Knowledge is a tool. And like any tool, it can be wielded extremely effectively or with minimal effort.

The model I propose does roughly the same thing: identity, distilled into a proposition (what I call an idea), is weighted not by hypothetical truth, but by three criteria: universality, precision, and productivity. (In later editions, I also added "intersubjectivity" as a multiplier.) — Astorre

I like this proposal. You'll have some work to do to prove it, but its a great start. In the paper you've read I only briefly touch on intersubjectivity, but I never published the follow up as people would first need to understand and be interested in the first part. Intersubjectivity cannot be first understood without the self-context being understood, so while you cannot exclude it entirely in the proposal for self-context, I think this is a wise approach to add in later.

So, in your work, you introduce that indivisible unit, developed through discrete experience—identity. All subsequent mental constructs begin with it. There is no "identity" in my model. Logically, it would be correct to place it below the level of "speculation." — Astorre

Correct. The initial formulation is indivisible, but there is no reason why we cannot further divide it into other discrete experiences. "A field of grass, a blade of grass, a piece of grass." You will likely need some type of identity reference when people start to dive deeper into your theory. A common issue in epistemology is the idea of what a definition actually entails. "When does a molehill become a mountain?" Discrete experience answers this nicely. Definitions within a self-context are contextual, as well as can be wordless. They can be incredibly detailed but also as simple as a memory of an overall impression. It is a theory that is not only limited to people, but can be applied to animals as well.

Next. According to your model, by comparing the "identity" "recorded" in the mind with reality (when they collide), a person constantly tests this "identity" for functionality. And this plasticity (rather than fossilization) of identities and the ease of their revision ensure the viability of the species. — Astorre

Correct. But like anything it comes at a cost. Plasticity is expended energy and time. If one is limited on expended energy and time, fossilization of ideas, especially if they are statistically correct most of the time, is more efficient and can allow an even quicker reaction time.

For example: if you've never seen a bear in real life, but know from fairy tales that bears are shaggy creatures with round ears, kindhearted and honey-loving, but then, upon encountering one in the forest, you discover the bear is running toward you and growling, the speed at which you revise your presets is directly linked to your survival. — Astorre

In this context, yes. If you could observe the bear in a zoo safely behind a cage, then you could take more time to truly explore the possibilities that the bear is everything the tales said they were, and (in another world) realize that the growl is actually a signal of affection and friendliness. In the case that growl meant what it does in our world, your quick judgement in the wild would save your life.

This is very important and suggests that when reality is lenient and doesn't challenge your identities, your life can unfold like a fairy tale. — Astorre

Ha ha! Yes, I think this is true. If there is no motivation to use knowledge effectively, it can be a tool of amusement for oneself.

And constantly challenging your presets teaches you to be more flexible. This conclusion, drawn directly from your model, is very useful to me. On the one hand, it explains developmental stagnation, and on the other, it suggests tools for encouraging the subject to reconsider their "identities." This also suggests that before suggesting an "idea" to someone else, it's best to test it yourself multiple times, otherwise it could lead to pain (from facing reality). — Astorre

All sound points. I'm glad to hear its useful to you!

Thanks for the additional clarification. Your additional comments do a great job of hammering in the logic behind your argument. — Esse Quam Videri

Thank you for the polite and well written inquiry! It is rare to not get angry pushback. Not that you have to agree with me as this continues, it is just nice to have a pleasant discussion.

Another way of framing the worry is that explaining each individual item within a contingent series by reference to its predecessor does not explain why there is a contingent series at all. The relations within the series can't be used to explain the existence of the series itself. The response "it just is" seems to arbitrarily terminate inquiry rather than satisfy it. I wouldn't argue that this is incoherent, but I might argue that it is unprincipled. — Esse Quam Videri

A very good approach. Lets imagine for a second that the logic is correct and it is the case that ultimately there is no cause for existence, and thus contingency itself. Does that shut down inquiry, or open new avenues for us to explore?

First, understanding this ultimate end result does not diminish our need to understand as much about the causal universe as possible. Understanding the universe allows us to make wiser choices, and potentially control outcomes favorable to the human race.

Second, proving, "This is the thing that has no causality for its existence," is nigh impossible from a practical standpoint. There is always the question whether we have arrived at 'the end' or simply the end of our capability to understand either through the limitations of knowledge, observation, or instrumentation.

So I do not see it as a discouragement to inquiry and exploration of understanding our universe as much as possible. If it is true that ultimately there is no cause for contingency itself, this would be a discovery of the truth, and therefore a further understanding of the universe. This allows us to push our exploration into realms we had not yet thought possible.

For example, if it is the case that there is no underlying reason for why existence is, besides the fact that it is, we can put forth new ideas that might help us as we continue to explore causal interactions. If there was no reason for existence to be, then there is no reason for any existence not to be. Meaning in the next second, something could appear in reality that wasn't there before. Or something that was there could disappear.

Further it seems that if something could appear in reality, it could be anything. After all, if there is no reason for existence, de facto there are no limitations as to what can exist. There would have to be something which would cause there to be a limitation.

Thus while the conclusion might appear limiting at first, it is actually one of the most freeing to give credence to infinite possibilities. Knowing this can let us look at the universe in a new light. Could we math out what 'anything being possible' would logically entail? I've done a few approaches myself as proposals.

For example, imagine that the universe is an infinite plane and anything could happen at any moment on that plane. We can break the plane down into a theoretical x/y/z. Then we can do a bit of cardinality comparison. If 1, is the smallest space and 'smallest' particle (of course smallest is a limitation, but just go with this for a second) then we have the highest growing infinite series.

First, we must assume that if anything is possible, everything has an equal chance of appearing, disappearing, or being as anything else. In one time unit, every x,y,z portion of the grid could have something happen, or not happen. What's the chance of there being something that is the same from piece to piece? Infintismaly small. But given infinite x,y,z, it will happen. But its likely not going to happen anywhere near another cluster of sameness. Further, even if something happens on this level, if it does affect something around it larger, its going to be imperceptible and nearly negligible. Essentially a random dice roll in the universe that introduces the concept that at a particular level of measurement there is a principle of uncertainty.

Let me stop here. I could continue on with more questions that this raises, but I want to give you a chance to think about this first and potentially come to them yourself.

Yeah slight typo but no I don't actually want to end it, it just seemed like the quickest way to deal with my problems at the time. But deep down I know I have no real desire to end my life barring some intense circumstance. — Darkneos

Fantastic to hear. I admit to some concern when this thread continued and you hadn't posted for a while. Glad you're in a better head space.

Yes, this makes sense, but I don't think it fully evades the original objection. The original objection wasn't that you hadn't traced the causal chain far enough, it was that even if you trace every causal explanation available within the universe, you have still not explained why there is any contingent reality at all. — Esse Quam Videri

My intention at that point is to note that there can be no logical reason for contingent reality. In the case where one reaches the end of the causal chain, there is nothing which explains the start. In the case in which one observes the entire causal chain as infinite, there is no reason why the chain exists either. Its not merely that I observed there to be no reason for the existence of a causal universe, it is that logically there can be no reason for a causal universe, and its existence is ultimately uncaused by anything else.

Causal explanation can explain one contingent entity by reference to another, but it can't explain contingent existence itself. Calling something "the limit of causality" does not show that it is self-explanatory, it only shows that a certain kind of explanation has run out. The objection is saying that there is still more to be explained even after taking all causal explanations into account. — Esse Quam Videri

I think I understand what you're saying, but let me repeat it from my viewpoint to make sure. Lets simplify with billiard balls. You're stating that Billiard Ball A can be explained by its current position because Billiard Ball B hit it 1 minute ago. But the existence of Billiard Bard B, independent of Billiard Ball A, cannot be explained by Billiard Ball A. Within that scope, you are correct.

But if we zoom in on Billiard Ball B, its existence is composed of many atoms. But of course, what composes those atoms? We zoom in further and find electrons and protons. So we continue to zoom in on the existence itself, finding that it is comprised of smaller and smaller things until either one of two things happen.

A. We find a 'smallest' thing. There is nothing smaller, no reason for its composition by outside forces or objects, no explanation for its existence besides the fact that it does.
B. We keep going infinitely. It turns out everything is always composed of something smaller.

The result is the same. In both cases, if the full chain or chains of causality are explored we arrive at a point in which there is no cause for the contingencies existence. In A, its because we've found something that provably has no other contingency for why it exists. In B, there is no contingency that explains the existence of the infinite contingencies all the way down. For if there were, it would be part of the infinite chain, and thus something outside of the chain of infinite causality cannot exist.

Thus there is no causal explanation ultimately for why there is existence. It simply is.

What else I noticed: these are essentially two facets of the same insight, which is becoming increasingly relevant in the era of post-truth, propaganda, and narrative manipulation.

Of course, your work is more substantiated, consistent, and logically sound, whereas I was setting myself somewhat more practical goals. — Astorre

My hope is it can help you with those practical goals. An idea, even if it is correct, is no good if it cannot be practically used.

The material is a bit difficult to digest, as I involuntarily, while reading what you wrote, mentally compare it with what I wrote myself. I think it will take me a couple of days to grasp your approach. — Astorre

Thank you for the kind words. If you have any questions on it or need clarity, don't hesitate to ask. Either here or in that post as you prefer.