Oftentimes the overbearing weight of what is good creates bad. A certain tyranny and oppressiveness is formed out of its axioms in a sort of choking sense. — DifferentiatingEgg

That's why we're careful here in our definitions. Is good what should be, and is bad what shouldn't be at its very basic? Do you feel we've reached an assessment of the definitions which allows you to continue on with the rest of the OP?

They exist together or not at all is my point. — DifferentiatingEgg

And we agree!

And what's good for me may be bad for you. — DifferentiatingEgg

True. A subjective morality is merely opinion though while and objective morality would be a reasoned fact. If you're starving without alternative, its good to steal food. If I'm not starving and have money, its bad for me to steal food.

Perhaps you mean, what is good should be what we manifest into reality? — DifferentiatingEgg

Good is what should be. "Be" is exist.

Cause Good and Bad are concepts behind actions. — DifferentiatingEgg

That would be a moral decision. So for example, I might have the intent at an outcome, but fail. So I may intend to do good by donating to an organization, but it turns out that organization was corrupt. I may have had the intent to do good, but the money ended up not being used the way I intended. What should be is that I donate money to an organization and they use it as promised. What is bad is the organization not using the money as promised. My intentions, or moral action, was good, but the outcome was not good because the organization lied.

An objective morality would be a reasoned methodology that allows an assessment of what is good and bad beyond subjective emotional experience. With a subjective morality, we can never reasonably state that an organization scamming a person's donations is bad. With an objective morality we can.

If there is a first cause, F, then it would be outside of the set of causality. — Bob Ross

Considering the first cause would be the first part of causality, A -> B, isn't A part of the set of causality?

If you were to say something like “why F has no reason for its existence: it is necessary”, then you would be correct; and there’s nothing about it that is similar to an infinite regress: a regress would entail that there is an infinite series of sufficient explanations. — Bob Ross

But what I'm doing is looking at the entire set. In the case of U1, the first cause is the first part of the set. So when I ask, "What caused U1?", the answer is that the first cause existed without prior causation, then caused other things. In the second case there is no first cause, but there is still the question of "What caused U2?" The answer is that its entire infinitely regressive existence exists without prior causation.

I think you think such an infinite series of sufficient explanations doesn’t have a sufficient explanation because you are invalidly abstracting out the entire series and treating it like an object. — Bob Ross

Lets focus on this part then. How is my abstraction invalid? If I'm expanding the scope of the universal evaluation to include everything, don't the U1 and U2 examples each capture this accurately?

The whole error of the OP is in your definition of "good." — DifferentiatingEgg

It's merely an occasion sentence.
Further morality also measures what is bad too.
And what is bad is often overcome in specific circumstances and labeled as Good.[/quote]

Ok, I appreciate this critique. First, what is an 'occasion' sentence? Second, the evaluation of what is good by consequence includes the evaluation of what is bad. If good is what should be, bad is what should not be. Third, if good is what should be, then what should be must involve the context of the situation. So for example, if a person is starving and will die, the objective morality I ultimately conclude here would say stealing food to live is good. In the case of a person who can buy food and just doesn't want to, it would be bad. An objective evaluation requires careful evaluation.

Fact is you have yet to make an argument where the premises are true such that the conclusion necessarily follows. — DifferentiatingEgg

This is a fantastic argument, and I'm glad we've started here. Without an agreement on the definitions, there's no point in moving to the next steps.

P1:All concepts of evaluation require contrast between opposites.

P2:Good and bad are opposites that define each other

C:Therefore, all evaluations should be based on good and bad and can not exist as "good" alone. Thus, good is not what should be, but rather good and bad. — DifferentiatingEgg

I agree with points 1 and 2. But wouldn't the conclusion be that good is what should be and bad is what shouldn't be? That is what I conclude here.

Your logic in the Op was based on the assumption that objective morality exists. I'm showing that morality that is the product of a random existence cannot be objective; it's logically impossible. If you want to assume there are objective moral values then you need to drop the assumption that they are a "random addition". — Relativist

The problem with this statement is that you haven't just declared that an objective morality cannot exist. This statement declares that nothing objective can ever exist. Its the same thing as saying, "An objective evaluation of light waves can never occur because its completely random that light waves were made."

Your central argument here is you think how something came to be as the same as its possibility to be. That's false. Morality as I've noted, does not come from an intelligent being. It doesn't come from outside of what exists. It is found within existence. So whether that existence formed is random or not is irrelevant to its existence. Same with a wavelength of light. My point is that if existence is, there is a rational initial proposal to objective morality that we can reasonably look at and explore.

Are you willing to move on Relativist? This doesn't mean you admit that I'm right. But for the last time, I will ask that I would like someone as keen as yourself to look at the next steps that I'm proposing. I think it would help you understand a bit more what I'm talking about overall, where I'm going with this, and possibly give you the ammunition you need to point out issues with it that I'm not seeing as I move along with this. You may have an underlying point that you're not quite able to communicate because you're coming from a stance that from my viewpoint, is limited in understanding what I mean by a non-entity pushed objective morality. I look forward to it as I think you're one of the few people who can understand and evaluate what I'm doing.

A moral imperative that is a "random addition" is not an objective moral value, it's a random value whose converse could have instead come to exist. In effect, the universe flipped a coin, and "do not kill" won. — Relativist

No, I don't think so. If I'm right in the logic put forth, in at least any universe we can imagine, 'existence should be' is the necessary base answer to any objective morality. Second, all objective conclusions are within the universe that exists. This 'arbitrary' argument is pointless, which I've noted several times now. You still think morality comes from something else. I'm noting its a property/consequence of existence itself. It doesn't matter how that existence formed.

Now we've gone around on this point for a couple of posts, and I've noted that if you want a better understanding, its best you read the second post linked in the OP. I'm not sure there's anything to add either way from what's been noted in the OP at this point. If you're willing to think on something new and explore, I think you'll enjoy it, for the novelty at least. If you're here only to insist I can't do what I'm doing, you really don't have the understanding you need to convince me at this point. Not that I can't be convinced in later arguments, I'm quite willing to admit I'm wrong and adapt where needed. But I feel we've reached the limits within this particular post.

How do you get a relevant* moral imperative from an undesigned universe composed of matter and energy and evolving deterministically? — Relativist

Everything comes from an undesigned universe that evolves 'debatably' deterministically. I don't want to sidetrack too much, but if an undesigned universe can incept without prior cause, what's to stop other things from also happening later in the timeline? Such things would be completely unpredictable. Again, not a design intent, just random additions.

So if everything comes from this, what do you mean by relevant? Everything is relevant to that. As I've been noting, from the logic I've established above I hypothesize that morality at its base is the result of matter that has existed without cessation for 13.8 billion years. It is this unexplainable continued existence that is the base of all morality. Its not that there is a want, or desire, or conscious impetus. Just like there is no want or conscious impetus behind atoms grouping into molecules, molecules grouping into DNA, and ultimately creating life. I believe it is simply a consequence of 'eternal' matter. This is of course completely my musing after exploring the topic more fully and I genuinely wonder what you'll think after looking at the whole thing as well.

One major problem at this point is you're trying to figure out everything from my one little post noting that at its base IF there is an objective morality, existence is good. I've just told you 1+1=2 and you're asking me how its possible calculus can come from that. You're not really going to understand until you go through the rest. I'm not trying to trick you or do some, "Gotcha!" at the end. I'm genuinely exploring an idea that no one has ever had before. And I need other people to give it a genuine look. Your criticism has been understandable and the questions good, but you'll probably do better if you keep reading. For all I know my continued reasoning from this point is like most philosophers, "A solid start that loses steam midway through".

You're not confessing I'm right by moving on. I hope these explanations give you a 'good enough to explore it more' vibe and keep going. So if you don't mind, would you read the next section and point your criticism there? I'm not sure there's much to explore in this post at this point, and I would love it if someone with a keen mind took a look at where I go from here.

You refer to "shoulds" - which sounds to me like a moral imperative. Correct me if this is not what you mean. — Relativist

Right, this is the logic. Morality is what should be. If there is an objective morality, then we boil every moral question down to what should be implicitly answered first. "Should there be existence?" And by existence we mean, "Something vs nothing". So not any one particular set of existences, only existence vs nothing at all. The OP concludes that if there is an objective morality, the only answer which would logically make sense is "There should be existence".

I used the word "arbitrary" to highlight the fact there is no reason for these cosmic morals to be what they are. There can't be a reason unless there is some intent behind them- and intentionality entails a mind. — Relativist

Does a red wavelength of light have intent behind it? No. Is a red wavelength an objective entity? Yes. My intent is to find a morality that exists like a wave of light. We may subjectively interpret it in different ways, but its something underlying that we're all observing.

This is relevant to your question about the implications of there being objective morals. If objective morality is rooted in a mind, it would have different implications than if there is no mind. — Relativist

I've mentioned this a few times, and will do one more time in case you have any fears I'm going to recant later on. There is no mind that intends morality. There is no God. This is not my opinion or way to shape you into doing what I want. This is an objective exploration into the nature of morality as existence itself. You may note that my positions may be incoherent in the next post and you might be right. As I've noted, I need other people to look at it besides myself. But I feel its fairly clear hear that it is not.

Arguments from brute facts in cosmology are almost always extremely ad hoc. Yours is no exception. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Normally I would agree with you. It is an exception here because we're talking about a rational limit to causality. If I'm wrong, point out where in the argument my point fails please.

No doubt, if Penrose's hypothesis for why the entropy of the early universe was so low, or any of the others, was borne out by more evidence and became the consensus opinion of cosmologists, it would not make sense to rebut the new theory by stating: "no, it's just is. No explanation is possible." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I understand your concern, but that's not what I'm trying to do here. This is not an attempt to shut down further examination into why things work the way they do in our universe. This is not to shut down the causality that exists. Learning these things can only be helpful and should be encouraged. My point is 'the limit'. One day we may, or may not find the limit. But logically, we can determine there is one. Ultimately that limit is something that is uncaused by something else.

Knowing this we can determine that any proposal to a necessary universal origin without evidence is 100% wrong. If the limit is something uncaused, then necessarily anything could be the limit in an ontological theory. This doesn't mean it actually is anything we can imagine, only that without knowing the origin, we know this at least must be true. Thus we are left without any other means of discovering the actual origin besides science, research, and evidence.

Consider: if new stars appeared across the sky tonight that clearly spelled out "Allah is the greatest," would that be evidence of a creator? Well, on the brute fact view the emergence of the new stars, and the timing of their light reaching Earth, is all just the result of brute fact laws and initial conditions. If the advocates of such a view are consistent, they will declare: "We cannot assume that this happening is any more or less probable than anything else, since the laws and initial conditions just are, for no reason at all." — Count Timothy von Icarus

No. Within existence we have causality. There would be a reason why the stars aligned that way. Anyone who said, "It can't be Allah" should be dismissed. Same with anyone who said, "Maybe its aliens or a government trick." The only way to determine the truth would be through evidence. My point is not that 'everything is arbitratry', my point is that the origin of the universe is ultimately uncaused. That doesn't mean things within aren't caused by other things within it.

Do you not see how "well other people might not have logic and reason on their side, because people sometimes have irrational beliefs," is not a good response to: "We reject the premise of the univocity of being." — Count Timothy von Icarus

My point was only intended to criticize the notion that a unity of people believing something leads any credence to the accuracy of that belief. It is not intended to convey anymore than that.

A. Cosmologists are in no way unanimous that the universe even has a begining. Cyclical theories are still posited. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And my conclusion determines this is a viable possibility, as is anything.

Space and time do not exist prior to creation. God is not in space or time. God is not a being. — Count Timothy von Icarus

God is an uncaused being. But I've noted that if something can be uncaused, there is no limit as to what could be uncaused as an origin. Meaning rocks being uncaused is just as possible as a God being uncaused. My point does note that a God is a possibility, but it is only one of an infinite amount of options, and not logically necessary.

Sure, you are correct. Provided that we accept that "it just is, for no reason at all," is as good an explanation of things as any other, this would indeed render any other explanation "unnecessary," and imply that there "[should] be no more debate or consideration." After all, such an explanation can be proffered for literally anything we might inquire about. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The grass is green because light bounces off grass at a particular wavelength that we interpret as green. It is not, "Just because". Again, my argument is talking about the very specific scenario that the ultimate cause of our universe is uncaused. Everything else within it follows from the causality of its integrated existence. So not only am I not specifically saying this argument can be applied to everything, I'm pointing out it would be wrong to.

Your argument in your OP you said is arguing that there is no cause for the totality of causal things and that a first cause would be in that totality; but this contradicts what you just said above.

No contradiction. Let me see if this helps.

U1 = A -> B -> C
U2 = infinite regress -> C

What caused U? In both cases the answer is, "Nothing". There is no prior cause for U1 or U2. But the causality within U1 and U2 are true. U1 has a first cause, A. U2 does not. U2 simply exists like A simply exists in U1.

If nothing caused U1, and nothing caused U2, then there is nothing which would prevent their formation either. Since there is an equal weight for both for or against the U's existing, both U1 and U2 have an equal chance of being or not being.

We are talking about if they are in space—not if you feel them in space. — Bob Ross

If I feel them in space, aren't they in that space? When I prick my finger, I feel the pain locally to the wound, not in my foot. Its not some other dimension. The most simple way of understanding that is that pain is tied to places in time and space.

Ok, then you are using the term ‘interaction’ much more strictly than I was. E.g., the gravitational pull of the sun on the earth is an interaction (in a looser sense) without there being touch. — Bob Ross

Good point actually, I hadn't considered that! My understanding though is that gravity is a bending of space from matter. So there is some interaction at the touch point of matter that spreads out. We still don't know how it all works though, so this is a pretty good approach to the idea of indirect touch. Still, gravity originates at a point in time and space, so we still don't have a good example of something outside of time and space.

Yes, that is true; and I am saying you haven’t demonstrated why it is incoherent to believe that something outside of space and time cannot have some connection with things which are spatiotemporal. — Bob Ross

Can you give an example of how a being outside of time and space creating existence would work? We can invent any combination of words and concepts we desire. The only way to know if these words and concepts can exist outside of our imagination is to show them being applied accurately to reality. This is the point of the unicorn mention. There is nothing that proves the concept of a unicorn is incoherent. A magical horse with a horn that cannot be sensed in anyway passes as a logical amalgamation in the mind. But its impossible to demonstrate it exists in reality, therefore its not a sound concept to use when talking about reality.

The same with an entity that does not exist in time and space. If I were to say a unicorn uses its magic to keep the world rotating, this is again not necessarily incoherent, there's just no way to show this exists. The same with saying a being outside of time and space interacted with and created time and space. You've invented a being that cannot be shown to exist that did something which violated the currently known laws of time and space or 'magic'.

Material implication does not create a biconditional: A → B just means that when A is true, then B is true as well—it does not mean that when B is true A must be true. — Bob Ross

True, but we're talking about causation. You're telling me an A exists and creates a B by essentially magic. You haven't shown that A must necessarily exist for B to exist, so you need something more to show that A can exist and must exist.

If there is a first cause, then it has no prior causation for its being; so, by your own logic, it resides outside of the totality of causal things (viz., outside of causality). — Bob Ross

Correct, its formation would be outside of causality. However, what it caused next would be within causality. The issue here is not that the being you describe is impossible. The point here is that once such a being formed, how do we reconcile that the universe necessarily came from this being? At that point we need causality, and we need some explanation for how A caused B. This is of course if we're trying to prove that A is a necessary existence for B to be. If we're just saying, "Its an option", I have no qualm with this as anything imaginable and beyond could be an option.

Your paradigm assumes there are moral values existing external to humans that were caused to exist by undirected natural forces. You have not explained how these moral values are non-arbitrary. — Relativist

My point is that noting the natural world is 'arbitrary' doesn't make any point. We both agree that the universe is uncaused, meaning we cannot look outside of the universe for explanation. We can only look within it. The term 'arbitrary', if you are to use it against morality, would apply to everything in the universe at its core. You could just use the word 'random', but arbitrary adds an unneeded emotional element of dismissal to it.

As I pointed out earlier, the subjective experiences we have are based on underlying objective reality. Like a wavelength of light that we classify as red allows us to subjectively experience the color red. Of course, we could also say that the wavelength is arbitrary, the subjective experience is arbitrary, and people are arbitrary too. After all, its all ultimately the result of an uncaused event. This is of course nihilism, which I don't think you agree with either.

Further, I'll mention again that I believe morality is a consequence of existence that 'just won't quit'. We are made out of this existence, and this property of continued existence repeats across what is. While it may have been random that some existence formed that doesn't quit, vs possible existence that formed and did quit, the existence we have today at its base, is resilient in its continued existence.

After establishing here the base idea that if there is an objective morality, then the rational base of any objective morality would be, "There should be existence", I expand logically from there. In the second post I go through and think, "If this is a base level of goodness, what can we build from that?" I would actually love your thoughts on that there, as I am not 100% convinced I'm doing that part right and actually want some decent criticism to refine or abandon it for another approach.

In the second post I find some rules and patterns for existence as 'existences', or identified differences within the whole of everything. Are there certain interactions or setups that create more overall existences within existence than others? As a basic example, a universe with the same mass as ours that is only full of hydrogen atoms vs ours with 100+ elements.

After establishing some of those base patterns in existence, I move up to life and demonstrate these patterns repeat. Finally I get to human morality and show these patterns continue in personal and societal evaluations as well. If you're interested in exploring that, there are only a few things we need to settle here.

1. You believing in exploring a potential objective morality.
2. You believe that the argument given in this OP is rational enough to view as a starting base to continue with the next post.

And that's really it. If you're interested, read the next post and post your criticism there. As I mentioned, I do not think I 'nailed it', and I need other people to really hammer into it. So if the two above conditions have been satisfied for you, I'll take further questions and points there. If you still have questions on the first two points, then address them here.

It boils down to an initial, uncaused state of affairs. What that might be is unknown, but whatever it is, it exists for no reason. This is because to have reason would require there to be something existing ontologically prior to it, which is logically impossible. — Relativist

We're in complete agreement here.

But if what is good is feelings, then the only reason we can conclude is whatever we feel is right, and whoever has might gets to assert what they feel is right.
— Philosophim
That is categorically false. Self preservation, extended through empathy to the preservation of life in general, is the strongest mutual feeling that we have. — Relativist

You declared it to be false, but your admittance that its 'the strongest mutual feeling we have' means its true. You essentially said, "Its not only feelings, but the majority of us have a strong feeling". In other words, might makes right. As long as the majority have that feeling and can enforce that feeling, that's morality.

Indeed we have other feelings/urges that we often act on that are inconsistent with our moral feelings, but we still make moral judgements of those actions - and never claim it's OK because we "felt like it". — Relativist

Then what you're saying is morality is not based on our feelings alone. This is the problem again with subjective morality. The only answer is, "Whatever I feel, whatever I enforce." No one likes that, so there is an attempt to sneak 'other reasons' in. What are those other reasons if not feelings? In which case we have a morality that does not rely on feelings alone.

We've gone around this a few times now, and I feel this probably won't alter your point. If there's anything new to add feel free, but I think we're probably at odds for now.

You side-stepped my objection. Moral values that exist due to the blind forces of nature would be completely random. — Relativist

No, they would be consequences of that nature. Because again, the argument of, "completely random" would apply to everything even apart from morals and is a dead end.

This is the Euthyphro dilemma, but it doesn't apply to my model of intersubjective moral values. In my model, good=directed positively toward life (preserving life and helping it flourish). It's fundamental basis is a properly basic belief- one that is innate and incorrigible. — Relativist

So based on an 'arbitrary' feeling. Of course it applies to you. If everything is arbitrarily made, so are your feelings. You like preserving life only because you feel it. You can't give me an actual reason why life is positive beyond that. Its fundamental basis is purely emotional and nothing more.

Within the scope of humanity, no moral value is arbitrary because it is necessarily consistent with this this properly basic belief. — Relativist

But it is arbitrary to say the scope of humanity matters at all. That humans should exist at all. Of course I don't believe that, but we need more than feelings to explain that.

But our scope of interest is humanity: our basic moral value is an intrinsic part of being human. As a properly basic belief, a moral value is right because we all believe it to be right, and it is a belief that has no defeaters. — Relativist

Its not intrinsic, and we don't all believe it. It is no more than a feeling, and is easily defeated by any other feelings and basic logic. If I can find one person who disagree with what is moral then you, then you're wrong. I disagree, therefore you're wrong.

So my foundation of morality is epistemic. — Relativist

No its not, its a belief based on a feeling. An assertion no more foundational than belief in a God.

There are, BTW, theistic arguments that deal with the Euthyphro dilemma. You can google them if you like, but you'll find they won't fit your paradigm. You're on your own. — Relativist

That was a criticism of your point, not mine.

Our survival IS arbitrary in a cosmic sense, but it is NOT arbitrary in the only sense that's relevant to humanity. — Relativist

Only because you feel that way. I feel there is morality that is not relevant to humanity, and would exist even if we were gone. And since you believe morality is subjective based on feelings, I guess I'm right eh?

The paradigm I have presented is the OP and a note that a subjective morality does not serve any rational purpose, but is just a surface level feeling that fails upon close inspection. Feel free to go back to the OP at this point if you're interested. If not, I'm not sure there's anything more that you can add, and I'm not sure I can either.

You may be interested in reading this then. There's a summary the next post down to help. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

Basically you're noting a difference between knowledge and truth. Truth is what is. Knowledge is what we can logically ascertain that does is not contradicted by the truth.

Per general relativity, mass and energy are interchangeable. — Relativist

Correct, which is why I just used the term matter and instead of "Matter and energy". They're the same thing. Just giving a concrete to the abstract of existence as an example.

Under the right conditions, energy can be converted to matter and vice versa. Those conditions are the cause. — Relativist

What caused the energy to exist, which is matter? As you noted, all causality at the end boils down to an uncaused reason for existence.

I'll set aside the objections raised above, and just consider your sentence, ""If an objective morality exists, what must be true?" The answer depends on what objective morality IS. This was another of my questions. Is it a set of moral values (e.g. murder is wrong; altruism is good), or something else? — Relativist

That is exactly what the OP walks through and concludes. I'm not intending to be short, I just don't have a lot of time to re-summarize tonight.

Reason gets involved no matter what the basis is:moral questions can be complex, and evaluating them can be complex. — Relativist

Of course. But if what is good is feelings, then the only reason we can conclude is whatever we feel is right, and whoever has might gets to assert what they feel is right. Anything else that does not involve feelings must be dropped. My proposal lets us consider things other than feelings. Subjective moralities conclusion is ironically at odds with our feelings and practice, as well as the many other reasoned approaches we make towards morality.

You're proposing that morality exists without a God. I agree that is logically possible, but it has a fatal implication: they exist by chance, so they are arbitrary. — Relativist

Everything exists by chance. "Arbitrary" would apply to everything then and is a pointless criticism to morality in general. Of course its not arbitrary, or you would have hung up on this discussion long ago. Further, if a God formed, it too would be an arbitrary formation, and we're stuck with the same pointless argument.

that's why I inferred the presence of intersubjective moral values. They aren't arbitrary - they are consistent with survival — Relativist

Why is your survival not arbitrary? Why are your feelings not arbitrary? By reason, how is a subjective morality not arbitrary? As you can see the arbitrary argument leads nowhere.

What I am saying is that they are not in space like objects: if you cut open your arm, you will not find this feeling that is spread throughout your body. You are right that feelings can have spatial references to them, but they are not in space; for you would be able to find them in space like your neurons if that were the case. — Bob Ross

But you feel them in space. You feel them in a place. You might experience red, but that's due to the red wavelength of light being interpreted by your brain. Just because I can't open up the brain and see redness doesn't mean the objective form of redness doesn't exist through neurons. Same with feelings.

Why? What’s the argument for that? Do you think everything, or at least everything that can interact with ordinary objects, is in space and time then? What kind of metaphysics of time and space are you working with here? — Bob Ross

The definition of interaction is a touch from one thing to another. To my mind I know no other definition.

The problem I’m having is that you are not contending with the argument in the OP, but instead are asserting that non-spatiotemporal beings cannot interact with spatiotemporal ones—what’s the argument for that? — Bob Ross

Again, I don't know of any definition of interaction that is not some connection and imparting between two things. If you say the universe comes from a God, then in some way that God must have imparted upon space and time. To say it cannot have any space or time, then say it can interact with space and time, is either a contradiction, or something that has never been discovered before like a unicorn.

So this is the same as saying that if it is possible for something to be necessary, then anything is possible. — Bob Ross

No, something being necessary has to be clearly defined here. A -> B, A is necessary for B to exist. But that doesn't mean that it was necessary that A exist. Anytime you get to a point in which there is something which has no prior causation for its being, then it is outside of causality. Once you introduce the concept of something that can exist outside of causality, you introduce the fact that anything could have, or will, happen. That is because something outside of causality has no reason for its being, and no reason that it should not be either. Thus all things are equally possible.

Well, that’s a huge difference! An argument that the totality of what exists has no cause is true (trivially) because any cause—be itself caused or not—would be included in such totality; however, that the totality of caused things has no cause does not follow these lines of thinking—for an uncaused thing would be outside of that totality. — Bob Ross

No, the uncaused thing would be the limit inside of that totality.

Either way, nothing is equally probable in the sense you described; for either the ultimate cause explains itself (viz., is contingent upon itself) or there is an infinite series of sufficient explanations. — Bob Ross

There would still be the scope of, "What caused there to be an infinite series of sufficient explanations?" And this would be uncaused.

The set itself of contingent members is just a bunch of contingencies abstracted into a set: the set is not a necessary being. — Bob Ross

No, its not a necessary being, only uncaused. Feel free to look at it again with the limit being inside of the totality.

So it appears you have some sort of hypothesis that goodness is some sort of existing entity that we perceive, or perhaps that its a physical property of...something (what?) Clarify exactly what you're proposing exists, and what facts this hypothesis is supposed to explain. — Relativist

Certainly, that's the focus of the OP. I believe goodness is the physical property of continued existence. Let me see if I can explain. Its amazing that we have a reality in which there is a law which states, "Matter can neither be created or destroyed." Except that philosophically we know that one part of this is false. As you noted, logically the ultimate origin of existence must not have a prior cause. Meaning, matter was 'created', 'incepted', or whatever you want to note. Read here if you're unsure what I'm talking about. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15722/the-logic-of-a-universal-origin-and-meaning/p1

Scientifically, we also know the second part of this law is also theoretically false. The math that we understand at this point in history demonstrates that there should be a lot more matter left over after the big bang. One proposal to this is that there were nearly equal parts anti-matter which bound with the matter that existed, cancelling the matter out. By this, its been casually admitted that matter can be destroyed. But if we take the conclusions of matter formation we realize something that is logically possible. Matter does not have to form that cannot be destroyed.

Just as matter could be incepted without prior cause, it could also break down or simply cease to exist. Now it wouldn't be the same type of matter we have today, as this is the type of matter that doesn't break down, at least for this long. But what if some matter did break down? That it wasn't antimatter, just the properties of that particularly formed matter that did not continue?

If that is the case, what we have today is matter, or existence, which has as its core the resiliency to continue to exist in the face even extreme energy concentrations. Everything that exists is built out of this. This resiliency is the core of morality. The logic of the OP is to say, "If an objective morality exists, what must be true?" And what must be true if there is an objective morality is that "Existence should be."

I see no reason to believe there is an objective foundation. You haven't provided one. I await your clarifying your hypothesis, and its factual basis. — Relativist

The reason to believe there is an objective basis is the patterns I've been noting. The fact that a subjective morality based entirely on emotions breaks down to where even you admit 'reason' gets involved. In other words, there is no concrete proof that morality is only purely subjective emotions. Do I have proof of an objective morality? Absolutely not, that's never been the goal of this paper. My point here is to say, "If one exists, what must be its base?" So the question we are debating is not whether one exists, its whether you think its possible for one to exist, and if so, does the logic I've put forth put forward a reasonable base to start from.

Clarify what you mean by "existence". For example, are you referring to the fact that something exists? — Relativist

In the OP, it is a question of, "At least some existence" vs "Non-existence". That's as far as the OP starts.

Also: on what basis is this system optimized? E.g. prolonging the system's existence? Enlarging its scope (like having more children)? — Relativist

That's what I explore after establishing the base. That starts in the next post linked in the OP. Of course its moot if you don't at least agree that the OP is worth consideration.

I agree, and I tried to address this when I clarified that the fundamental basis could be as simple as: the true meanings of good/bad entailing the feelings they invoke with respect to some very simple situations: the vicarious feeling we get when considering someone suffering in some way (i.e. empathy). — Relativist

No, that's just a subjective experience. Let me use another example I gave another reader. You and I have a subjective experience of seeing red. But there is an objective wavelength of light underneath it that is what allows us to see red at all. If I'm color blind, that wavelength of red still exists. If I'm dead, that wavelength of red still exists. It is irrelevant whether there is something there to observe it or not, that wavelength of light persists. What will not exist is the subjective experience of red, but the objective reality of a red wavelength will still exist.

Feelings are simply subjective experiences of reality. My point is that we may have different subjective feelings as to what is good, but there is an objective reality to good underneath it. Just like the experience of a red wavelength is not the same as the dry analysis of what is objectively red, the experience of an objective morality is not the same as our subjective experience of it.

A computer couldn't understand it as we do, because they lack emotions. — Relativist

Correct. But if there is an objective morality, it won't need emotions. Whatever AI's subjective experience of an objective morality would be, it would still have an understanding of that underlying objective conclusion.

I also discussed the fact that we also apply learnings (what we teach your children and what our society teaches us) and reasoning when making moral judgements - so it's certainly much more than feelings. — Relativist

As I've noted before, if we supply reason beyond emotion, then we are asserting an objectivity to morality beyond feelings. If I have a son or daughter that cannot feel empathy, I can teach them how to behave in social situations regardless. But I have to give them more than, "You have to behave this way because I feel its good, or others feel its good." Why should I listen otherwise? Most other people's feelings are irrelevant to me, and in many situations, should be. If moralities base is on feelings only, then the only reason to shape or follow any moral code is feelings. That's not how societies work. That's not how people work.

You asked me to explain why I suggested it ("This in no way suggests deism or theism, and I would need to see some reasoning why you think that is"). I did just that: I showed that your unsupported assertion (that reason or whim must be involved) entails a God. I provided my analysis so you can identify a flaw in it. Instead, you're just complaining that I said it. — Relativist

I simply don't understand the point then. Emotions and reason's don't require a deity, and I still don't see why you think this does.

How can that be? How can objective morality exist without minds? — Relativist

Did the wavelength of red exist prior to human beings observing it? Yes. If there is an objective morality there is no need for beings to observe it for it to exist. This is not to be confused with labeling it, understanding it, or having the subjective experience of it. All of those require an observer. What is being observed does not depend on us.

As I've tried to explain, it appears to me that human morality is entirely a human thing: it relates to human actions, and it entails human judgement. If you think it's more than that, then explain how that can be. Explain how bank fraud or murder is wrong even if there are no humans. — Relativist

That is because you are still only thinking in terms of subjective experience instead of looking for an objective foundation. The OP only introduces the ground floor of morality which is answering the first and most basic question, "Should there be existence?" I do eventually build up to human morality and I start that in the second post linked at the end of this one. I get it, you want to dance in the human subjective experience, but to get there we have to build to it. I would try to explain more here, but that's why I wrote a few other posts. :) The point of this particular OP is, "If there is an objective morality, then its fundamental question, "Should there be existence," is "Yes". From there we can build, and I start doing so in the next post.

"Should there be any evolution at all?"
— Philosophim
Do you agree that a "should" question entails a judgement? — Relativist

No. Should entails what is optimum for a system. In this case the system is "existence".

A whim is also a product of a mind - we would not describe the random result of a quantum collapse as a "whim". So both your options entail a mind. You seemed to imply that whatever happens has been caused or influenced by reasons/whims, and this would entail one or more supernatural actors. — Relativist

Either we're really not on the same page anymore, or you're purposefully avoiding the point. Emotions are not the same as reasons. Having an emotion, "I feel good, so its moral," is not the same as, "We should do this because this outcome is better than that outcome no matter how I feel."

I am not including a God in this discussion, I have told you a God is not part of this discussion, and you keep insisting that one belongs in this discussion. I respect your beliefs, and this is not an attack on them. But for the discussion of the OP, a God is not part of the equation and does not address my points.

Non-sequitur. "Should" implies there being a reason, something other than a physical account of causation. So again, you're implying a mind. — Relativist

Except I've told you I'm looking for something apart from mind. Something core to existence itself. I don't mind if you introduce a mind or think it cannot exist without a mind, but I myself am not implying an objective morality necessitates a mind.

But independently of this. if something exists necessarily, no reason is needed to explain it other than the necessity of its existence, it can't NOT exist. — Relativist

Correct. Again, this is the conclusion of the OP. So we are in agreement here.

Why should any species continue?
— Philosophim
No, not really- there's no purpose behind evolution that is directing it (intelligent design notwithstanding - unless you believe in a god) — Relativist

I still think you're not fully understanding the question. I'm not asking, "How does evolution work." I'm not asking, "Why does evolution work?" I'm asking, "Should there be any evolution at all?" If existence has the moral objective at its base that, "Existence is good," then evolution which entails greater existence would seem to be a good thing, while evolution that entails less existence would seem to be a bad thing. For example a creature that forms that created matter, vs a creature that formed that would inevitably destroy all matter it could.

We all want to live, and most of us would like humanity to live on after our own deaths. I see no reason to think that this common desire exists independently of humans, and that's much of what I've been arguing. — Relativist

Once again, that's not the question I'm pointing out. Why is the desire to live good? Why is life good? Why is existence itself good? I'm not asking for feelings, but objective answers.

Because if there is no logic reason, there is nothing besides whim.
— Philosophim
Both "reasons" and "whims" are products of minds, so this suggests deism or theism. — Relativist

A feeling and a reason are two different products of the mind. A feeling is an impetus or summary that compels a person to action. A reason is the result of an analyzed situation that one can decide to act on.
This in no way suggests deism or theism, and I would need to see some reasoning why you think that is.

Then you should agree your question, "Should there be existence?" is inapplicable, and certainly has nothing to do with morality. — Relativist

No, then you should agree with my conclusion that "There should be existence" is the logically necessary base of an objective morality. You'll need to give greater detail why this isn't the case.

The behavior (having the feeling that induces the actions) has a survival value for the species, so that could account for its presence — Relativist

Right, the underlying value for having that feeling is the species survival. But should the species survive? If there was a cat that was born with the compulsion to kill all other baby cats, should that cat exist over a cat that has a compulsion to nurture newborns? This is a question that asks a rational response, and not an emotional answer.

Other species evolve differently; example: some produce so many offspring that there's high probability some will survive to reproduce. — Relativist

Right, the particulars may change, but isn't the underlying objective purpose to ensure the species continues? Why should any species continue?

I'm not suggesting that feelings fully account for all morality, just that they are at the core. From there, we then think abstractly, apply reasoning, and we learn things (including the morality further developed by others). — Relativist

The feelings of morality are how we first subjectively experience morality. Just like the pleasant warmth of a sunbeam is how we experience the confirmation of objective health of vitamin D and temperature. The benefits to a sunbeam would be no matter how you felt about it however. As soon as you bring reason and learning into the mixture, you're talking about objectivity. And that's what I'm trying to pin down in the OP. The beginnings of any rational discussion of morality must conclude that given the options of existence vs complete non-existence, existence is better, and therefore the base of any good reason.

Why must there be reasons? — Relativist

Because if there is no logic reason, there is nothing besides whim.

Your question can only be meaningful if existence itself is contingent. I don't think it can be contingent, because contingency entails a source of contingency. That source of contingency would have to exist. If that is contingent, it needs a source...ad infinitum - a vicious infinite regress. Therefore existence is metaphysically necessary. — Relativist

That is, (minus the infinite regress) essentially what the OP proves. Therefore we may be in agreement conceptually, just not semantically.

There are reports of mother cats entering burning buildings to rescue their kittens, getting themselves hurt in the process. I suggest it "feels right" to them to do so. — Relativist

Of course, but that doesn't mean there is an objective underlying reason why that feeling exists. We get hungry because we need to eat to survive. But if we only followed our feelings of hunger, we would eat ourselves to obesity or think, "That antifreeze tastes pretty good." Feelings are subjective digests, deeper thought and understanding is objective details. The idea that feelings alone are all we have to go on in morals and there can be no objective details does not pan out in any other feelings we have, why in your mind are moral feelings an exception?

What feels right instinctually IS right and good. — Relativist

No one objectively agrees to that. There are plenty of times that good feelings lead to bad outcomes. To be extreme, the joy of murder for some people. If you've ever helped raise a kid, sometime they think things are fun that shouldn't be done. I took my young nephew outdoors years ago and we found some pill bugs. He delightfully started harrasing and stomping on them. I had to teach him that we don't kill or bother creatures unless its necessary. He didn't have an innate instinct that killing innocent bugs for fun was wrong. His feelings lead him to do wrong, but a lesson fixed the issue.

You minimize the "feeling like it". It's a strong feeling. We don't want others to commit suicide because we fear death for ourselves, and we empathetically extend this to others. — Relativist

I do minimize the feeling of it. Whether its a strong or weak feeling, its still just a feeling and not anything reasoned through. We don't feel through engineering. We don't merely feel disgust at our significant other in the morning because their breath smells and divorce them. We don't cheat on our significant other because it would feel good. There are countless examples of good feelings that you can think of practically in your own life that compel you to do things that you know you shouldn't do. We shouldn't even be entertaining the notion that, "Whatever I feel is good, is good."

As for suicide, many years ago when I was younger that was an appealing option. I was not afraid. Fortunately, I thought about the consequences of it and decided it was wrong despite its allure. As for dogs, its best we don't attribute what they feel when we could never know ourselves.

I get the strong feeling that you want there to be meaning to existence - perhaps you actually need it to be the case. — Relativist

Another example of feelings being wrong. I find meaning in my own existence for myself. I do not need a God or something else to give me meaning in life. What I want to have is a rational standard of right and wrong that can help me approach choices in life that result in better outcomes for myself and everything else. I would be a fool to think my own emotional whims are the answer.

They may not entail theism, but objective morals just existing untethered to anything seems ad hoc - logically possible, but lacking any good reason to think they exist. Of course, this is just as far as I can tell. I'm open to hearing why one might be more open to their existence. — Relativist

Sure. There are a few things that make me think there is an objective morality.

1. We are not magical creatures. We are made of the atoms of this Earth like everything else. Boil a person down to chemistry and you realize that life is the build up of unlife into a self-replicating and self-maintaining combination. It seems odd that morality just 'suddenly' appears when life comes about. I've always had a suspicion that the underlying aspects of life have something to them that we build on.

2. Even animals show aspects of morality. Not sophisticated like a human intelligence, but there are plenty examples of wild animals acting altruistic with no discernable personal benefit, even cross species. One example is a wild bear observed a crow drowning in a river flopping about. It went over, picked it up with its mouth, and plopped it on the river bed before walking on.

3. The failure of any meaningful or rational subjective system of morality to rise above "Might makes right".

4. The age old question if there was a God: "Is what God says moral because God says it, or because God is following what is objectively moral?" If morality only has teeth because God says it, then God could say murdering your neighbors while laughing madly is good. Again, just a devolution of might makes right which no one but psychos actively practice.

"not provably false" is not a justification for believing something — Relativist

True, but then that is equally not a justification for not believing something or rationally arguing against something either.

This question assumes an objective rule exists. Sure, the advantage is an objective one: empathy for others helps motivate behavior that has a positive impact toward survival of the species. Moral values, as we know them, arise from verbalizing our inherent instincts. — Relativist

My point is there is seemingly an objective reason beyond, "I feel its good." Subjective morality is the morality of a spoiled child. "I do what I want because I want to." An objective morality states, "You should do X because it will likely result in Y which is better than the alternative of Z." Then you can explain why Y is better than Z, not not simply, "Because I like it more."

So if we begin to say, "Its good that the species survive," we can ask, "Why?" "Because I feel like it." Then why do we bother saving people who want to commit suicide? The species will continue. Why not murder anyone who gets in our way? The species will continue, and I'll have more resources for me. Its a bit more than, "I want, gimme, I feel, gimme, I'm happy to do all sorts of atrocities for my feelings, gimme."

Life exists because the environment was suitable for abiogenesis to occur. Humans exist because of the series of accidents associated with our evolutionary history. — Relativist

Those are reasons why something exists. They are not reasons that it should exist. If a bacteria was able to be invented that wiped out 80% of all life besides human beings, and humans would still be able to live healthy lives, should we? Should we kill all the whales for fun if it amuses us? Enslave other people who are weaker than us? I can explain how all these things could happen, but it doesn't answer the question, "Should it be?"

At the end, even that boils down to the prime question, "Should there be existence at all?" Its irrelevant why there is existence. Should there be existence? And if there is an objective morality the OP notes that the only rational conclusion to be made is, "Yes".

Without a God, how can there exist objective morality? — Relativist

I'm going to follow that up with, "Why do you need a God to exist for there to be an objective morality?" I see an objective morality as a rule of existence.

"All moral questions boil down to one fundamental question that must be answered first, "Should there be existence?""
This is nonsense if, as I explained, morality is not objective in a transcendent sense of existing independently of humans. — Relativist

"Nonsense" is not an argument. Explain to me where I'm wrong in demonstrating that all moral questions boil down to this fundamental question. Have you also proven that an objective morality cannot be separated from humans? Not yet. Feel free to provide examples.

If morality is entirely intersubjective among humans, moral judgements apply to things that relate to humans and are contingent upon the human perspective. — Relativist

But you have not proven that, nor disproven the point of the OP yet. You've declared it, that's not the same as giving a rational argument which necessarily demonstrates your declaration is true. This is not a discussion of opinions.

We have our moral intuitions because they provided an evolutionary advantage, and these intuitions manifest as instinct and emotion. — Relativist

But this is not a subjective advantage. You have a subjective experience of this advantage, but what is the objective underlying moral rule? Why should humans even exist? Why should life exist? Why should anything exist?

This is the basis for the argument for God's based on the assumed existence of objective moral values (OMVs).
At minimum, objective morals entails physicalism being false. — Relativist

The OP does not argue for, nor need a God to argue for an objective morality.

I may misunderstand, but you seem to be dismissing the role of our moral intuitions- because these manifest as feelings. — Relativist

No, I'm not. What I'm trying to find is a base for an objective morality that builds up to something which better explains why we have the moral intuitions that we do, and a guide to understand beyond instinct and emotion.

The existence of intersubjective moral values makes the most sense to me: nearly all of us have a common set of moral intuitions (exception: sociopaths, who may have a genetic defect). This shared set of values seems a reasonable basis for morality, one that is independent of metaphysical implications. — Relativist

Yes, this is a more common approach to the issue. But have you read the OP? I'm trying to establish what at minimum, must exist in any objective morality.

Sorry, missed this reply initially.

Now, phenomenally, you are right that a feeling can be represented as linked to something in space (e.g., the pain in my arm); but the feeling is not itself in space. — Bob Ross

Isn't it though? When I feel a pain in my arm, isn't it there? When I feel happy, doesn't it spread through my body? If I feel, I don't feel in the other room, I have feelings where I am. Using the term phenomenal does not deny that feelings are located in our body and not outside of them.

Once something is in space and time, even if it has no parts can we zoom in on it and say it has a front, back, and side?

That is impossible; for something outside of space has no sides. A side is an inherently spatial concept—no? — Bob Ross

True, but if something non-spatial is to interact with something spatial, it must at that moment of interaction become spatial. A purely non-spatial being cannot interact with space. Saying it can is the same as saying a unicorn exists. Maybe one does, but I can't see how we can logically prove it does and can be dismissed as a valid possibility.

A5-5. In order for a composed being to exist, it must be grounded in something capable of existing itself. — Bob Ross

I believe we're discussing this in the other thread now, but once you introduce the possibility of something capable of existing itself, you open the doors open to anything being possible.

I also believe that to fairly judge an action, one must set aside the circumstances and intent and evaluate the act itself. — ZisKnow

I think this misses a gap between 'acting on knowledge' and 'result'. Lets say that I know that if I donate to a charity that the money will be spent to save kids lives. I donate a large sum to the charity. The director who had been honest with the money up until now, sees the large sum and instead of donating most of us, gives into greed and finds a way to funnel it to their bank account. If I had not donated such a large sum, the director never would have given into greed and the charity would have continued uncorrupted. Did I do wrong?

We generally evaluate an action as moral based on what a person knew at the time. If the charity had a reputation of honest and efficient use of the money, the action has moral intent. A moral action is always a prediction of the future however. The future that we predict does not always come to pass. Thus we don't morally judge a person based on an outcome that they could not know for certain, but an action based on what seemed to be the most reasonable and predictable outcome at the time.

We can also mirror this. A person could intend to shoot up a school that day. As they're about to open fire on the school playground outside, they trip, their gun fires accidently, and it kills a serial killer who would have never been caught, stopping their murderous rampage forever. The would be kid killer is arrested before they can kill anyone else. This was a 'good outcome' but the action of the person was not moral. They'll be tried for attempted murder and possibly convicted.

You might be giving Berkeley a little more credit here than he deserves. "When Berkeley (1685-1753) was questioned as to how objects could continue to be when no-one was perceiving them, he claimed they were still in the mind of God." Berkely still requires that something 'observe' what exists for it to exist. Which of course runs into major problems when you ask, "So uh...how does God exist?" A common fallacy of, "Everything must follow the rule except this one exception that I need to make the rule work"

He points out that these are not available to conscious perception and raises the question of how they continue to exist "unperceived," as it were. All well and good—but need they be consciously perceived in Berkeley’s view? — Wayfarer

Conscious or unconscious I don't think is relevant as long as they are held within a mind. I think Berkeley is clear about that. It doesn't have to be perceived by us per say, but something like God. Thus humanity could be completely ignorant of any science and it still exist.

Similarly, when we analyze the body's systems, we don’t directly access 'the body as it is' but only the intelligible structure as it appears through layers of interpretation. In this way, both the stone and Johnson’s body remain phenomena structured and experienced within the bounds of perception and thought. — Wayfarer

This is a fantastic analysis of knowledge vs truth. But is Berkeley really saying that? Perhaps Berkeley flirted with this a bit like so many do, but ultimately didn't fully realize it as he had to rely on God for his philosophy to work. This is of course based on the information presented here and in the article. If you can find a part of Berkeley's work where he doesn't ultimately rely on God when a human cannot perceive what exists, feel free to post it.

The more I think about it, I think you are right that this argument—if I am understanding it correctly—is an a priori style argument; for you are noting that reason dictates that irregardless of if there is a first cause, infinite causality, etc. that the totality of what is real must be uncaused. — Bob Ross

Yes, that's what I intended to convey.

1. The totality of what exists could have a first cause, be self-caused, etc.
2. The totality of what exists, being such that nothing can exist outside of it, must be uncaused.
3. Therefore, whether or not the totality of what exists has a first cause, is self-caused, etc. are all equally probable. — Bob Ross

First, I'm not using the phrase, "The totality of what exists" in the argument. I'm saying the entire scope of causality.

Second, you're missing the step I introduced that leads to 3 as a conclusion.

And if it cannot have a prior cause itself, what does that logically lead to next? The realization that no origin is necessary for existence or can be impossible. If I say, "X origin cannot be possible," there is a reason prior why it would be impossible. Is there anything prior which could make it impossible, then of course it would mean there was a prior cause. A cause not only tells us what is possible, but also impossible. — Philosophim

If anything could happen, and there is no cause which would make any one thing be more likely than the other to happen, then they all had equal chance of happening.

1. Per se contingent beings lack the power to exist themselves.
2. An infinite series of contingent beings all lack the power to exist themselves.
3. Therefore, it is impossible for the cosmos to be an infinite series of contingent beings.
4. Therefore, there must be at least one necessary being. — Bob Ross

Premise two is incorrect. A contingent being lacks the the power to exist without another being existing which supports it, true. We can invent the concept of an infinite set of contingent beings. But that set is not contingent on anything else. Just like I can have a finite set of contingent beings, but that set is not contingent on anything else. You've already agreed with me on this. There would be no prior reason which causes a finite set of causality to occur, and there would be no prior reason for an infinite set of causality to occur. Therefore both are equally as likely to happen if we do not know what actually happened.

This would entail that science is philosophy at its core, but is a specific branch that expands on how to understand the nature of things; and so science vs. philosophy is a false dichotomy. — Bob Ross

My reference to philosophy and scientific separation are meant to be layman here. As for our discussion, if you wish to define philosophy in this particular way I have no objection. My point stands that there can be no conclusion to what necessarily must be the origin of the universe without finding direct evidence. It is not something which can be reasoned to, but factually concluded.

We still have up for grabs whether or not an infinite regress of causes is absurd; whether a first cause is arbitrary; whether a self-cause is incoherent; whether …. — Bob Ross

By reason, the OP proves that none of them are absurd or incoherent. No prior cause means no limitations. Anything is possible as an origin, possibility and impossibility can only be found within what already is.

the theist says there must be a first cause to explain the totality of these things which exist, and you come around and point out that God + those things is now the new totality which is uncaused—this is a mute point (by my lights). — Bob Ross

Its not moot at all because I demonstrate that their claim to God is no longer necessary, and that it has no more reason to be the origin then any other origin someone else can think of.

Ontology and metaphysics is largely not about a priori proofs; and so they have not been primarily about arguments from pure logic or reason. — Bob Ross

The conclusions I've put forward are from pure logic and reason. Can you demonstrate at what point my conclusions aren't?

No, your OP does not entail that an infinite regress vs. a first cause of composition is equally probable: it demonstrates that irregardless of which one we think is most probable because the whole of things we posit (which includes that regress or first cause) cannot have a cause itself. — Bob Ross

And if it cannot have a prior cause itself, what does that logically lead to next? The realization that no origin is necessary for existence or can be impossible. If I say, "X origin cannot be possible," there is a reason prior why it would be impossible. Is there anything prior which could make it impossible, then of course it would mean there was a prior cause. A cause not only tells us what is possible, but also impossible.

Meaning that only within the causality we have right now can we work our way up to the actual origin of our universe. That cannot be done with reason alone, but with actual discovery. Again, try it. Put something forward that demonstrates a necessary origin and refutes the conclusions of the OP.

1. Ceteris paribus, it is correct that two or more things are equally probable if those things equally have no explanation for their existence; however, the probability of one or the other changes given our understanding of the universe. — Bob Ross

Correct. This would be science or discovery of new facts.

2. Philosophy does not engage in merely pure reason; and so ontology and metaphysics certainly is engaging in reasoning based off of empirical evidence (to some large extent) and this is perfectly valid for it to. — Bob Ross

But there is no philosophical discovery at that point. There would be the discovery of whether there was a first cause, or infinite regress. I hesitate to include this point at this time as I want to make sure you understand this first, but it might be impossible to truly discover the origin scientifically if the OP is true. But for now, lets say it is. It would be measurements, recordings, and conclusions. Where does philosophy fit in?

Science can't determine if the universe is just an infinite relation of causality, has a first cause, etc. because in principle there is no scientific proof which can be afforded; — Bob Ross

Then the debate is truly finished. The only logical conclusion is that we cannot know.

The different is it requires evidence, reason, testing, and confirmation

This is true of the vast majority of philosophy. — Bob Ross

I do not find this to be true. Philosophy is more often then not the logical construction of concepts. Science is the test and application of those concepts. Does the reality of the situation match the philosophical conclusion? Then it is scientifically sound.

What do you mean by "philosophically necessary"? — Bob Ross

I mean that there is no logical construct which can ever be proven to be ontologically necessary as the origin of the universe. The only way we can discover it is by working up the chain of causality which is the hard work of science.

In my OP, e.g., I am considering actual impossibility as that modality relates to an infinite series of composition. — Bob Ross

If the OP is correct, then you cannot prove it to be impossible. If anything could have been, then nothing is impossible ontologically. It can only be proven to be impossible or possible from within the causal chains of existence that we have to work through step by step.

Are you saying if a first cause, infinite series of causes, etc. cannot be proven to be logically necessary then it must be outside the purview of philosophy? — Bob Ross

No, its a fun type of origin to think about. My point is there is no way to prove that any one of them is logically more likely to be than the other based on reason alone. The only way to discover what the actual origin is, is through science.

Ontology would be, "Why is there existence?" Morality is "Should there be existence?"
— Philosophim

Its not, though, because it has nothing to do with right action. It's a question about existence. You've accepted that Morality is the domain of right action. Your question has literally nothing whatsoever to do with right action. — AmadeusD

What is a right action except an action that should be? I'm faced with making two actions, one wrong, and one right. One action is what should be, while the other is what should not be. That's morality.

It is an ontological question about the origins of everything we could possibly know. "should" means something thinks about it. — AmadeusD

Not at all. If there is an objective reality to morality, then there is an optimal outcome to existence and its actions. Human thought wouldn't matter. Just like a wave of light does not depend upon us to experience it, an objective morality does not depend on upon us to experience it either.

Hmmm...I still can't grasp what you're getting at. You're making worth-hearing points there, but they have nothing to do with morality or how "should existence be?" is even comprehensible. — AmadeusD

The key to any good discussion is an agreement on the definitions we're using. If you don't agree with my definition of morality, then you definitely wouldn't understand where I'm going with it. So lets start with the definition. Do you think good is 'what should be'? And morality the method and understanding of what should be?

Why? I don't see how that follows from the OP. — Bob Ross

We're close. The point I'm making is the philosophical ontological argument is now complete. The only logical conclusion is that the entirety of existence has no prior reason for its existence, and therefore could have been anything. No philosophical proposal is necessary ontologically, therefore there is no more debate or consideration.

The scientific ontological argument is still on. Is it the big bang? A God that made a big bang? Etc. The different is it requires evidence, reason, testing, and confirmation. That is outside the realm of philosophy. Try it. Try to show that any particular origin is philosophically necessary if the OP is true and see if it works.

"Why should anything exist at all?"
— Philosophim

Isn't a moral question is it? I think this is the issue i'm seeing - they are clearly different arenas. The latter is actually ontology as best i can tell. — AmadeusD

Ontology would be, "Why is there existence?" Morality is "Should there be existence?"

I think this is the other issue i'm seeing. Prior to the human mind, where/how does this 'build up'? It doesn't seem there is any facility for it. — AmadeusD

Ask the same question to a truck driver who knows nothing of how their truck is made, and you'll get the same question. As I noted, I think it is a property of existence itself that slowly trickled up into sentience. If you don't understand it, that's fine. Its a novel way of looking at things. I go over how it builds up over the several posts, and you would honestly need to read those to see how it develops. I either haven't figured out a way to make it simple yet, or that's as simple as I can personally get it.

But this doesn't enter onto moral ground. Morality has to do with actions towards other sentient beings, right? I don't think this element fits into morality at all — AmadeusD

This is a fair question and let me see if I can show you what I mean.

Morality has to do with actions that we should, or should not commit towards other beings. Perhaps someone answer with, "If you're nice to them, they'll be happy." Well why should they be happy? "Because it will brighten their day and they'll be healthier." Why should they be healthy? "Because they'll live longer." Why should they live? Because life is precious? "Why should life be?" Because there existence is positive. All the way down to, "Why should anything exist at all?"

There are a lot of implicit questions that we gloss over when operating with higher level moral questions. And this makes sense in anything we do. When I drive a car I just need to know how the steering wheel and pedals control the car. I don't need to know physics or why anything exists at all. Objectively, this complex composition of the car is needed for the car to drive, but my subjective experience of driving does not care for most circumstances. Only if it breaks down do I start to need to know something more, but for the most part we don't handle that part, only the fun part.

Subjective morality is the fun part. If there is an objective morality, it doesn't just suddenly appear when people enter the picture. There has to be something that builds up to that, like what builds your car for you to drive it.

I just get a distinct flavour from your reasoning that it must rely on some kind of ... I want to say miracle, but that's not really what i mean - some unmoved mover type of thing amounting to a moral code. — AmadeusD

No, I promise you there is nothing of the sort. There is no God or outside mover. This is about discovering what is within our universe, not a mystical push outside of it.

Its again possible I'm not groking you here - where else does morality exist? — AmadeusD

Wild life once captured a bear sauntering along a river where a crow was flailing about drowning. The bear grabbed it with its mouth, put it on the shore, then walked off. What is that? The bear gained no personal benefit, not even a meal. Here's a researcher who believes morality exists within animals (not sure if its dubious, just an example) https://www.livescience.com/24802-animals-have-morals-book.html

And if my theory holds, and existence should be, then there is a basic morality that can logically build up to intelligent morality. I think in a small way, any existence which follows this code, ends up being moral in the most primitive way. Matter cannot be created or destroyed. For if it did, it would not exist. We know in our current calculations, that there was much more matter in the beginning of the universe than now? How can that be? Anti-matter right? But what if there are certain things that came into existence...then stopped?

If you have life that is built out of things that are difficult to change and actively continue to exist despite the forces around it, then does that trickle up to life and the conscious mind? Remember, we are not people. We are a combination of atoms, molecules, and energy that actively seeks to extend the life of its composition, and has the amazing complexity to realize what it is. That is what makes us up like the atoms make your car.

I guess my question would be: how does this help resolve any of the debates about first causes, infinite causality, arbitrary causes, and the like? Is there something about this that I am missing? — Bob Ross

Yes. The result means that it is philosophically impossible to conclude that any of these ideas are necessarily existent or impossible. The discussion is in effect over for philosophy. The only way to discover if something was infinitely or finitely regressive is to actually discover this using science. Anything could have been possible, but what actually happened can only be discovered by looking at our universe and determining by fact how it did.

We like things because they make us feel good. — MoK

That's not what I asked MoK. I've tried twice, lets just let it drop then. :)

Good and evil to you are synonyms for right and wrong that I cannot disagree with them anymore. So why use good and evil at all and instead don't use right and wrong? Right is what it should be so we achieve the conclusion! — MoK

That's fine, we can conclude good and evil are synonyms with right and wrong and call it a good conversation.

Ok MoK, I've been trying to get you to think a little deeper about your statements, but I think you're stuck on statements and firm beliefs that just keep cycling over the same points we've made. One thing to understand is that you can believe anything you want in life. I've asked some pretty pointed questions and these one sentence answers show me you're not interested in exploring it further.

If you ever want to consider the topic seriously, private message me or open it up somewhere again. Until then, good luck with yourself and I'll chat with you another time. :)

Got it; but doesn’t this entail that you believe that there are existent things which exist outside of time and of which interact, to some degree, with temporal things; given that the death of a previous universe to “fuel” the big bang would require “moments” where there is no time? — Bob Ross

Its one of many possibilities, but not a necessity. Just as something can exist without prior cause, so can it eventually end and another thing later exist without prior cause.

To be honest, I didn’t follow this at all. Can you reword it? What do you mean (X → U) → (X → !U)? I am not following the relevance of that statement. — Bob Ross

Oh, no problem! There is no prior cause which leads to a universe existing, so there is no prior cause which would lead to a universe not existing either.

Yes there is under your view. The two options you have spelled out is that (1) the universe arbitrarily came into being (from nothing) or (2) the universe has always existed; and both entail that God cannot exist, since God is an unlimited being which creates the universe. — Bob Ross

No, there's nothing that entails that a God cannot exist. If a God exists, then it is part of the universe, but it could be that prior to the rest of the universe existing only a God existed. From there a God created the rest of the universe. But can a God be outside of the scope of everything? No. That's just a consequence of categories.

God would simply not be God since this being would be some sort of limited being within the universe (if we assume traditional theism, which is widely accepted as the standard of what God is in a mono-theistic sense). — Bob Ross

If you're describing a limited being as something that could create all the existence we are and experience, then what are we? =D A God would still be necessary in that universe for the rest of the universe to exist, as God would be part of the chain of causality. But even theists could never escape the question, "What created God then?" If you say, "There was nothing prior that created God, then you're in line with my point. The issue is that God is not separate from the scope of everything, and not necessary for the scope of everything to be, nothing is.

Just briefly relating this to my OP, if one finds arguments convincing that God is required to explain the universe — Bob Ross

Again, if a God is part of the causal necessity that explains the rest of existence, that's fine. But that has to be proven with facts and evidence, not philosophy. Because as I've noted here, a God is only one of limitless possibilities for the rest of existence. It could be a divine mortal being, or simply a big bang that appeared without prior cause.

Yes, in principle any being or series which is necessary and brute has equally no explanation for its existence; but the burden is on your OP to demonstrate why we should believe that the universe came into existence out of nothing or always existed. — Bob Ross

I am not arguing that the universe had a finite or infinite starting point. I'm noting that it doesn't matter. In either scenario, if you increase the scope out to everything that exists U = finite or U = infinite regress and ask, "What caused this to exist?" you cannot find a cause outside of itself. Meaning that there is ultimately no necessary cause that there is existence at all.

Any meaning or causality must be found within existence itself. There is no meaning or causality outside of existence that caused existence to be. That is the only logical conclusion we can philosophically conclude about the origin of all of existence.

Your argument in the OP seemed to be that we are just defining everything as in the universe; so there can’t be anything outside of it to cause it to exist. But this is just an equivocation: the universe usually refers to the natural world we live in and not the totality, per se, of existent things. — Bob Ross

Its not an equivocation, its a solid definition. Call it the capital U Universe or 'all of existence'. I felt I was pretty clear about expanding the scope to include everything, not just a part.

A theist could easily piggy-back off of your point and say that the ‘universe’ as you mean it is really ‘reality’ and reality, which includes God, has no reason for its existence but it is not a necessary being since it is just the abstract representation of the whole of God and God’s creation. — Bob Ross

A theist? I'm not a theist and I already did! Its also just as likely that the Universe has no God and exists as it is as well. In terms of philosophical ontology, there is no way to prove any particular origin of our universe once this argument is understood. At that point, the only way to prove something like a God exists is with evidence within the universe itself. That has standards, can be questioned, and ultimately must be proved instead of believed.

If this is what you mean by “the universe has no cause”—viz., reality has no cause—then that is true but trivially true and is detracts from any conversation about necessary beings. — Bob Ross

Its not trivial at all. It reveals there are no necessary beings for a universal origin.

Likewise, this would sidestep my objections above because God would not be limited by reality, since reality is just God’s infinite nature in addition to what God created (namely the universe). — Bob Ross

Sure, that is one out of an infinite number of possible origins. But its not philosophically necessary. That's the point. No origin can be philosophically proven as necessary, as it has just been proven that nothing is necessary.