Creativity is the ability to come up with ideas that few if any other people come up with. Positive creativity results in a new idea that other people like or benefit from. You can be creative, but it doesn't mean your idea will resonate with others or contribute beyond the fact that its original.

This is certainly true, but lack of reason is not the same thing as disrespect for reason or arguing that it is involved in justification for some claims. — Count Timothy von Icarus

To be clear, its not a lack of reason. Its rationalization. Its about constructing some reason to distrust those that would go against what you want. Using some political examples, the "liberal media". Because the liberal media is liberal, they are LIEberal and thus you cannot trust them. They are against conservatism, and sense they lie, you can't trust them so listen to Fox News.

You can explain to a conservative that buys into this why this is a false narrative. They aren't dumb. They just don't CARE. Conservatism is always correct and good, therefore anything which challenges that must be a trick and bad. Your "Rationality" is merely a liberal disguise to trick me into thinking conservatism is wrong.

Rationalizing people will often say they are being rational. They aren't rejecting rationality in their view. My 'common sense' is more rational than the experts. They are rejecting the source as being incapable of being rational, while holding up those who hold conservative ideology as being 'the real rational people'. Reject the source and the facts, and you can win the argument every time.

In short, it is a rationalizing argument to reject rational arguments, because it preserves the intelligence and 'rationality' of one's own argument. Its evil, yes, but it feels good.

One thing to remember is that people are not inherently rational. It takes effort, oftentimes training, and a willingness to be wrong. Most people are rationalizing. In other words, they have an outcome they want to see and create justifications that support the conclusion they want, while only critically critiquing to reject anything which goes against what they want.

Pragmatism and politization are simply avenues where rationalization is more prevalent and accepted by others. I think misology can be a rationalization when what is rational rejects the conclusion that you want. But ultimately what is behind it all is that most people want what they want, and are inclined to reject points that deny that what they want is rational or correct.

What do you mean by directional sense? — MoK

Imagine a grain of sand. Outside is nothing. "Outside" is the direction.

This doesn't make any sense. Infinity means 'uncountable', or 'without end'. How can something be larger than something without end?
— Philosophim
Georg Cantor showed that there is an infinity of infinities. — MoK

I think you need to go into the specifics of how Cantor's theorem applies to the argument. This doesn't explain anything by itself.

I apologize for the belated response! I have not found the time to respond adequately until now. — Bob Ross

Not a worry Bob! I was away this weekend myself.

It is manageability combined with relevant accuracy. I noted a while back that when we use a staging level as a base, what is reasonably relevant is one step up, or one step down.

Ok, so, correct me if I am wrong, you seem to be going for calculating ‘more existence’ in terms of the nearest scientific measuring unit of a thing: is that correct? — Bob Ross

Scientific measurement is a fine way to represent identities at times. When removing the human element and its identities it can bring to paper, we are left with the molecular to consider. The question of 'what is a meaningful identity' is based on when the combination of more than one existence creates an identity which could not exist if the two were separated.

The degree of this can be described by the change in expressions. A large puddle of water vs a small puddle of water is still just a conglomeration of water molecules. The identity of 'water' does not change. But if an animal drinks water and that water combines with tree pulp and chemicals to become paper, its now become a part of new identity, and thus more potential expressions, then it could as water alone.

For our purposes, because neither of us are chemists, we're trying to process and develop an overall general measurements of existence that is comprehensible, and attempt to observe patterns which we can build upon. If the there is something to this as a general theory, perhaps 'molecular morality' would be a sub genre to explore. For our purposes, I'm simply trying to demonstrate that identities are different ways of existential expression, and that the marriage of potential and actual interaction between different types of identities allows new identities which can form which would not otherwise.

Paper is just a combination of molecules one step down (unless there's another name for a 'particle' of paper)

Unless I am correct above, then I don’t see why you would choose to use molecules rather than pieces of paper; nor mass of the paper. It isn’t always clear what “one step down” really is. — Bob Ross

'Paper' without any context of its use, is just a conglomeration of paper molecules into a mostly flat shape. When you split a piece of paper, you are dividing its molecular make up. That's the 'one step down' in this context. As such, dividing a piece of paper in two in this context only has its molecular makeup in consideration.

For example, take water. I could say that 2 Liters of water is more existence than 1; or I could equally say 100 molecules of water is more existence than 50. There’s no clear “one step down” here. — Bob Ross

Yes, in this isolated context considering nothing else, 2 liters of water is more existence than 1. The one step down from the liters of water, would be the molecules. One step down from the molecules of water would be atoms. Until we find the material foundation I spoke about, there's always one step down.

Ok, a piece of paper doesn’t qualify then; but, it really doesn’t take away from my point: cutting a piece of paper cleanly into two pieces retains the molecule count and (total) mass. So it is an morally indifferent action under your view? — Bob Ross

It seems to be. Within this context, as long as the actual and potential are there to recombine, there doesn't seem to be any real gain or loss. And within the context of a humane doing it? The molecular separation level is completely irrelevant.

If so, then you need to clarify (I think) better in the OP what you mean by “more existence is better”, because it clearly isn’t “more → better”. — Bob Ross

More existence is based on the foundation of "More material, more expressions of the material, more potential expressions from the material, and this pattern through the combination of expressions.

The act of a bunch of paper molecules losing bonds to be separated doesn't seem like much of a difference, at least with the last calculation I made. The context of the dividing of a substance alone gives us very little existential change, and seems meaningless. I never considered it to be morally meaningful myself, and I think looking at it closer after your example hasn't really changed that.

I do think fundamental entities are an important part of the overall theory for certain invented scenarios

The problem is that it is all-too conjectural. Neither of us know the nature of fundamental entities other than they are the smallest parcel of reality: they may not even be analogous to atoms combining; and, on top of that, it serves no legitimate purpose to your calculations. — Bob Ross

Since it is irrelevant for yourself, then its not necessary to discuss. I know there will be someone who would think its relevant, so it needs to be included in the theory for consistency. But currently our exploration of this is not going down those paths, so no need to address it. It changes nothing for where we are in the discussion at the moment.

While atoms may combine with molecules, they also have the potential of unbonding and becoming just atoms again. That is overall more existence then if such bonds were permanent

I don’t see how this creates more existence; because, again, I don’t know exactly how you calculating this: it is also very vague so far. — Bob Ross

An atom can express itself in particular ways. However, once it joins as a molecule, it loses certain potential expressions as an individual atom as long as it remains a part of that molecule. As a simple example, we cannot breath water right? We would drown despite there being oxygen in water. It is only when oxygen is in its separated state that we gain the interaction of being able to breathe it.

If everything joined into one giant blob, the loss of potential existence would be tremendous. My point is that when an atom can combine, but also has the potential to uncombine, this creates more potential existence then a combination which can never break apart again.

How do you calculate the comparison between expressions and potentials? — Bob Ross

Expressions are what is, potentials are what could be. They are a necessary addition when considering any future change. For example, at any moment a life has the potential to die. That's an important consideration when planning what that life should do in the next moment. The universe in theory has the potential to separate into complete entropy. Could a universe such as that every come together again? There are potentials which if made actual, eliminate other potentials permanently. If a person dies, they can't just be reassembled together. Perhaps the potential is there in theory, but not practically.

The potential vs actual is a struggle for myself as well. Beyond the general use for it, it can quickly grow in complexity depending on the context we create. The goal here is to see if the established vocabulary and patterns can make sense in a manageable general sense where it is most relevant to people's moral questions. Specific and isolated contexts deserve their own study. If what I'm proposing is viable, this is a field of study, something which cannot be easily covered in an introductory conversation.

1. Is it better to have two pieces of paper of equal mass or 1? — Bob Ross

2, in this context. This is not necessarily the same context when we introduce other variables.

2. is it better to divide a mass of paper into two smaller pieces than not to? — Bob Ross

In this context I would say it is mostly meaningless. Depending on how its cut and organized, my intuition is that we could find instances in which some expressions end up creating slightly more or less existence, but not meaningful enough beyond an isolated thought experiment.

3. Is it better to combine two pieces of paper into one big piece of paper than not to? — Bob Ross

Same answer as point 2.

I still think it is perfectly reasonable to analyze it in terms of non-scientific units (e.g., is better for there to be one potato or two?); but let’s go with that for now. — Bob Ross

It is, depending on the context. If you've created a context in which the molecular composition as well as small variations of mass are irrelevant, then yes. For example, we're talking about shipping millions of potatoes to Ukraine to feed people. If you create a scenario in which those things are relevant, than no. This would be talking about splitting a potato into two parts.

I hope this helps a little! I'm happy the conversation has transitioned to this line of thinking as this lets us really explore the foundations of theory first.

I appreciate your insight, thanks!

My apologies for initially missing this Gnomon!

But one sticking point seems to be confusing a logical First Cause (of some resulting chain of events) with an objective Thing or God operating in space-time. — Gnomon

Correct. People seem to think I'm using this to claim the existence of some specific first cause like the Big Bang, God, etc. I am not, and note that doing so would be an extremely difficult burden of proof.

That's simply a philosophical/mathematical concept, as contrasted with a physical/material object. — Gnomon

Also correct!

And a mereological distinction is that the hypothetical Cause is not a part of the system of secondary causes & effects. The analogy I like to use is a pool-shooter, who stands outside the table and bouncing balls. :smile: — Gnomon

I'm only going to tweak this a bit for clarification. You may not be implying this, I just want to be clear that a first cause as proven here is not outside of our universe, but a necessary existent within our universe. The balls on the pool table are not separate from the pool shooter. The entirety of the interaction is part of the universe.

Finally, I think I did indeed deduce this from the propositions put forward here. So I wouldn't call it a first principle. Then again, I think everything needs to be deduced or proven in some way.

Hey Mok, been away a few days. :)

I don't agree with you that space is synonymous with nothing but for the sake of argument, we can assume that space is a substance. — MoK

As long as we're identifying space as 'something', that's fine by me for this argument.

Well, this we discussed it. Nothing has no geometry nor can occupy a room therefore nothing cannot surround a thing. — MoK

Lets make sure we're not making 'vocabulary reality', a common thing we can do in philosophy. Vocabulary is used to describe reality, it does not create reality.

Nothing does not 'surround' anything in a substantive sense. But if there is a limit to something, does nothing surround it in a directional sense? Yes. Its just words to describe the idea that beyond something, there is nothing. The only way this cannot be is if the entire universe is a thing without limits. This is what we're trying to prove by your philosophy, so it cannot be part of the premises.

I also do not understand this. Are you saying that the whole is infinite?
— Philosophim
The whole is larger than any infinity that you can imagine. — MoK

This doesn't make any sense. Infinity means 'uncountable', or 'without end'. How can something be larger than something without end?

That seems to be the conclusion, so once again we're begging the question.
— Philosophim
It is not the begging the question. If the whole has an outside then there is something outside of it therefore what we consider as the whole with an outside is not the whole. — MoK

No, if the whole has an outside, that outside can be something, or it can be nothing. I get the feeling what you really want to prove here is "Nothing is impossible". Maybe that would be a better tactic?

Well, that is a matter of definition of things. Could we please agree that the condition in which there is no thing, namely no space, no material objects,.... is nothing? — MoK

As long as you view space as a substance, this is fine. This is why it is not irrelevant. If space is not a substance, it is usually synonymous with 'nothing'.

The question which is relevant then is what is beyond the edge if the whole is open. What is beyond the edge cannot be nothing as we discussed so it is something. This means that what we call the whole is not whole but something else. — MoK

I still don't see why there cannot be nothing beyond the edge of something. I get that you want to define the whole as bounded by something else, but you've given no reason why that necessarily must be. Try to disprove the scenario I'm going to put in front of you. Referring earlier, I have a grain of sand with nothing else in the universe existing around it. Why is that a contradiction under your viewpoint?

The whole does not have an outside. — MoK

I also do not understand this. Are you saying that the whole is infinite? That seems to be the conclusion, so once again we're begging the question. I think what would really help to flesh out your definition of the 'whole' is to give an example of what that would be.

Time doesn't exist somewhere on a hard drive. The universe is in a state at one moment, then another state in the next. The reason why the universe is in one state is because of the forces and matter in the previous state. Meaning that if we could reshape the forces and matter to what it was 1000 years ago, we would be in the state of the universe 1000 years ago. But we can't go back. There is only now, and what was before.

Philosophy in the general sense can be. Philosophy as a discussion of rigorous proofs, logic, and proposals is not. Since we are in online forums open to the public, many people approach philosophy as opinions, ways of life, or even religion. Get in a conversation with a good philosopher though and they'll push you into clearly defining your terms, demonstrating your logical steps, and requiring your conclusion to be sound.

Wouldn't a continuous area that is unoccupied be 'nothing' though?
— Philosophim
No, nothing is the absence of space, physical objects, etc. — MoK

You need to redefine space as being something then. An 'unoccupied' area is seen as 'nothing'. Things occupy. Nothing does not.

I am ok with the idea of simply stating, "space is a substance" as a start.
— Philosophim
That is alright. Saying that space is a substance does not resolve any issue here nor it helps us to prove the argument. — MoK

Its fairly important here because most people see space as 'nothing'. There is an old term for the idea that there really is no emptiness, and that all of space, or nothingness, is filled by a substance called "Aether". Aether was eventually debunked by science, but for your purposes the idea of space being 'something' instead of nothing, can be helpful here.

That is what I am trying to show in OP. is either limited or limitless. W1
is either limited or limitless. If it is limitless then we reach the conclusion otherwise it is surrounded by something else, B1. Then the whole is W2 =W1+B1. W2 again is either limited or limitless. Etc. — MoK

Oh, I see what you're doing here now! Clever! The only problem is you have necessitated that something always be bounded by something else, when it is commonly known that things are not bound by other substances, but the mass of their own matter. So while clever if things were bound by other things, its just not the case that they are. Further, that's not really the definition of "the whole" but really, 'a thing'. The whole is generally considered 'everything' which of course is bound by the entirety of its internal parts, and can have no other thing outside of itself.

I mean if space is open is limitless otherwise it is closed which means that it is limited. — MoK

No disagreement here, you just have to demonstrate that space is limitless or limited.

Ok, I see. So if I have your idea right, you believe that space is a thing.
— Philosophim
If by "space is a thing" you mean that space is a substance then that is still the subject of debate. If by space you mean a continuous area that is unoccupied then we are into business. — MoK

Wouldn't a continuous area that is unoccupied be 'nothing' though? I am ok with the idea of simply stating, "space is a substance" as a start.

Once again, wouldn't the bounds of space be the internal limitations of space itself?
— Philosophim
Space in principle could be limitless. A section of it is however limited. — MoK

In principle, perhaps. But the entire point you're trying to make is that the whole is limitless. If space is the whole, we have to prove that, not declare it. If I'm trying to prove that cheese is a moon rock, I can't just say, "Cheese is a moonrock" as one of the arguments. This is a 'begging the question' fallacy.

In this case, the space is limited but it is surrounded by something else, let's call it hyperspace. — MoK

Alright, lets look at hyperspace then. Doesn't he same question about space and the grain of sand apply here as well? Isn't hyperspace bound by its own self?

Space is bounded by its own volume which is limitless if it is flat otherwise it is limited. Space then is surrounded by something else in the second case so-called hyperspace. — MoK

This is a contradiction though. Something cannot be both limitless and limited.

First, you need a space as large as the size of the sand to embed the sand within. Now, the question of what is outside of the space is valid. — MoK

Ok, I see. So if I have your idea right, you believe that space is a thing. If this is the case, and space is an actual thing, then just replace my example of 'a grain of sand' with 'a section of space'. Once again, wouldn't the bounds of space be the internal limitations of space itself? I agree with you that nothing cannot bind space, but if space is limited, how is it bound by something outside of itself then? How is the limitation of space not bound by its own internal volume?

If philosophy ever gets around to proving an objective morality, then it would become science. The great mysteries that philosophy has yet to solve are: Morality, knowledge, and (my opinion) art. Perhaps there are others, but those are the big three.
— Philosophim

But don't you think progress has been made in ethics, even though it's not a science? I think John Rawls and J.J. Thomson have done important work. — RogueAI

I'll clarify as I wrote this all quickly. Philosophy can generally be seen as protoscience. In some ways I personally view it as logically derived hypotheses that then need to be tested. In some cases, I believe philosophy is needed before a science can form. Two of these cases are Morality and Knowledge.

Before you can test morality, you must have a logical idea of what it is. If I say, "The survival of society is moral," then my tests will all be done towards this. If I say, "Human individuality is moral", then my tests will be done with this definition. While we can make tests and come to conclusions, we can see before we begin that there will be a conflict at some point between the two ideas of morality. The tests will not reveal to us which is correct, as what is 'correct' will be different based on the definition of morality being used. As we can see, its important that we have a logically established definition of morality that is prepared to handle conflicts that we can see tests running into.

Knowledge runs into a similar problem. How do we test and discover what we can know about knowledge, before we have a clear definition of what knowledge is? Thus these are viable fields of study within philosophy that are needed.

As we do not have an established morality that can be called a science as of yet, philosophy is all we have to go on. Which in my opinion, is a terrible and primitive way of handling something so important. So can ethical philosophers contribute to areas other than science right now? Yes, because there's no alternative. This is why religion's influence is also so strong within moral discussions and policies. We do not have an objective alternative to turn to yet, and in my opinion, that's a terrible problem.

If philosophy ever gets around to proving an objective morality, then it would become science. The great mysteries that philosophy has yet to solve are: Morality, knowledge, and (my opinion) art. Perhaps there are others, but those are the big three.
— Philosophim

I'm curious - you don't think reality is one of these - or do you have a presupposition about the nature of reality which informs the others? — Tom Storm

I'm currently working on one right now. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14834/a-measurable-morality/p1 Been having a good discussion with it with Bob Ross. When we're done I'll likely rewrite it up with all the things we've been discussing.

As for knowledge, I've finished it here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 Not only does it work for knowledge, it introduces a hierarchy of inductions, also giving a starter solution to the problem of handling inductions claims as well.

Wouldn’t a ‘successful’ philosophy also be integrated into art, literature, politics , education and business? Is science the supreme arbiter of the truth of philosophy? — Joshs

Very good question. Let me think.

Art and literature are for entertainment? Sure.

Politics, education, and business? If its because the philosophy is popular or the motivation behind ideologies, I would be careful here. There are a lot of poor political, education, and business decisions driven by reasons. Philosophy would not be my first choice here unless the philosophy was agreed on as the most viable solution by rational and knowledgeable people.

Is science the supreme arbiter of the truth of philosophy? — Joshs

Yes.

↪Philosophim How would ethical theories become science? — RogueAI

If philosophy ever gets around to proving an objective morality, then it would become science. The great mysteries that philosophy has yet to solve are: Morality, knowledge, and (my opinion) art. Perhaps there are others, but those are the big three.

To be fair, if the philosophy has been around for more than a few decades and isn't integrated into science in some way by now, its likely a failed or highly controversial philosophy. Its true: most philosophy is poor. Since any successful philosophy becomes science, all we have remaining to study is its failures.

Hello again MoK!

Let me take your abstract into a thought example for a minute. Lets say that in the universe, only a single grain of sand exists. Now we claim that is the whole, but what is the definition of the whole? Usually 'the whole' is seen as 'everything'. But then you add in something outside of the whole as binding the whole. I'm confused here. What is outside of the grain of sand that is binding the sand?
It would seem that the bind to me is the internal limitation of the sand's matter.

But let me explore your other line of thinking and be charitable where possible. Lets say that the grain of sand is actually bound by 'nothing'. You then note that this binding plus the original whole creates a secondary whole. This doesn't quite work in your variable setup, as W1 and W2 are clearly different concepts here. While a whole indicates 'totality', these are obviously different totalities. So how do I see fixing this?

Perhaps what would make more sense is that some 'thing' is bounded and has limitations where there is 'nothing'. 'Nothing' may bind 'something', but 'nothing' has no limits. Is that more along the line of what you were thinking of?

And to measure morality, or existence, we need to follow the same pattern of manageability.

In that case, I think your original counter to my paper analogy is invalid: using ‘pieces’ as opposed ‘molecules’ of paper is more manageable, and thusly my conclusion still holds. — Bob Ross

It is manageability combined with relevant accuracy. I noted a while back that when we use a staging level as a base, what is reasonably relevant is one step up, or one step down. Paper is just a combination of molecules one step down (unless there's another name for a 'particle' of paper). In this particular context, we are also dividing a piece of paper, which makes its composition very relevant.

As noted, we are not creating 'two pieces of paper' we are 'splitting a conglomeration of paper molecules apart'. We can't let the fact that we can casually call it, "Two pieces of paper" override the fact that its really splitting one piece of paper into two smaller pieces of paper. Not including the fact that these are smaller mass is leaving out a huge component of the equation.

I think you should use an example that uses ‘atoms’ as a selected, base expression entity; and demonstrate how, from there, one ends up with the particular conclusion you are looking for. This sidesteps any epistemic concerns about ‘material entities’ and demonstrates exactly what you are doing when determining these general patterns. — Bob Ross

I appreciate the feedback, and on thinking about it, I agree. I do think fundamental entities are an important part of the overall theory for certain invented scenarios, but I don't want that to detract from the overall point of measuring expressions. It is a complete change in thinking as it is about morality, so the less confusion at the start the better!

I think you need to clarify the terminology first. By my lights, you were using ‘fundamental’ in the sense of ‘material’ this whole time and not a contextual base: it may be worth it to semantically call them different things, or slap a different adjective on one of them, to avoid ambiguity. — Bob Ross

Yes, this is true. I probably should stop calling them something special and just 'identities'. Why I feel like their needs to be an adjective there is to separate it from a purely subjective identity. 'Identity' in this case is when the combination can potentially express itself in a manner that the combination could not have expressed alone. I suppose I'm trying to find a way of expressing a difference between a new chemical bond and a mixture (as per chemistry). They are both identities, but a mixture generally keeps the same underlying expression of its components with mass being the main difference. When I'm thinking of a 'foundational' identity, I'm thinking of a chemical change. H20 becoming water vs hydrogen and oxygen mushed together as gasses somewhere.

I would also suggest explaining what, ideally, the contextual base should be for one who is abiding by this ethical theory; so far it is not clear what that is. — Bob Ross

That is at the context of human morality. The context of calculation will be determined by the context of the people involved. We'll get there, but lets satisfy where we're at first.

Hmmm...I would like to explore this more; because I am not seeing it. I am assuming by ‘fundamental identities’ you are no longer referring to ‘material identities’.

Firstly, ‘results in more existence’ is, again, ambiguous. According to your view, it is equally true that existence cannot be created or destroyed which prima facie contradicts your claim here. — Bob Ross

Correct, I am really referring to identities. And for the initial pass at the theory, new chemical identities. Mixtures generally don't have an overall change in potential expression.

Secondly, depending on what you mean by ‘more existence’, I can get on board with materially bumping < expressions; but it entirely depends on what you mean specifically as opposed to notionally. — Bob Ross

This would be an interaction that does not result in a chemical bond.

Thirdly, it seems like a false dilemma to compare “one big thing” (exclusively) against the ability to recombine: it seems perfectly plausible (to me) that a thing is comprised of smaller things, and that larger, united thing contains, thusly, smaller things that can recombine. I don’t see why I need to choose one or the other. — Bob Ross

Let me clarify what I meant by this, as I referenced this incredibly briefly way back that you would not remember. Real quick, it is fun when sharing a philosophy with another person for the first time to see what they consider important and relevant, vs what you think they'll consider important and relevant. When I first wrote the knowledge paper, it was an over 200 page monster that covered all sorts of small scenarios that I found people just never thought of or didn't care about. :) I find the same situation here.

Recall that potential existence is the possibility of an identities expression. While atoms may combine with molecules, they also have the potential of unbonding and becoming just atoms again. That is overall more existence then if such bonds were permanent. So atoms can combine, uncombine, recombine, etc. They are not permanently locked in thus losing potential existence.

Ok, so I don’t think 6 demonstrates that life > non-life; and 7 (here) doesn’t entail intelligent life > unintelligent life. Perhaps this is what you are going for; not sure. — Bob Ross

In the most simple terms, imagine baking soda and vinegar. When combined, we have a very excitable chemical reaction. But eventually the vinegar and baking soda all combine and the reaction is finished. Its a short burst of identities forming over time, then a cessation of combinations. A life is baking soda and vinegar that seeks to renew itself indefinitely. Even if a life will perish, it simply creates a new one to take its place. Chemical reactions will always run out, thus there is a shelf life on its existence over time. Life, if given the chance, will never end. Thus this is a higher concentration of reactions and identities localized over indefinite time.

Life vs intelligent life is another step up because life at its simplest is still very reactionary. Intelligence allows life to be more proactive then reactive. Intelligence allows the creation of self-awareness, and a comprehension of the universe. It is existence which can recognize that it is existence. It can envision and plan for complex constructions, ideas, and impacts within the universe beyond what an unintelligent life can do. Not only is this ability to plan a unique existence of its own, the enactment of the plans of intelligent life is something which cannot happen in any other way. Thus the potential existence of intelligent life is incredible.

Using pieces of paper with the calculation has nothing to do with whether or not a human being is the one that tears the paper. — Bob Ross

Ok, I'm glad you understand that.

E.g., I could ask “is it, all else being equal, better to have two or one pieces of paper” and, within this context, you could choose a plethora of different types of entities as the ‘base entity’ (e.g., atoms, molecules, paper, etc.); so I am not entirely sure what you are going for here. — Bob Ross

You just need clarification. "Is it better to have two pieces of paper of equal mass or 1" is different from, "is it better to divide a mass of paper into two smaller pieces".

You did it again: chose to use molecules instead of the paper. Just like you can say cutting paper is molecular separation, I can say it is really atomic separation. This gets us nowhere. — Bob Ross

I am hoping you'll understand the point that dividing a paper's mass is not the same as creating two pieces of paper of equal mass.

No objection there. :D I had considered the very same thing before hitting the post button.

Most people do not understand that the English description of quantum mechanics is not the same as the mathematic description of quantum mechanics. Unless you are a scientist yourself and have a fundamental understanding of the math, and what this really means, you really have no business using it in any philosophy.

In sum, quantum mechanics is a math based on limitations in measurements and probability. As you noted a "field" or "wave" is a mathematical entity that is often confused with a physical reality. Its a metaphor in English. When examining the ocean, we don't calculate every single molecule of water. Its unnecessary. Does that mean that ocean waves are not made up of molecules? No. But for what we're calculating, its easier. This is the same thing as measuring light as a wave vs as a particle. For some experiments and circumstances, its better to calculate light as particles than waves. Are waves of life comprised of particles? Of course. But in those circumstances in math, its just better to calculate it as a wave.

If fundamental entities are morally relevant to calculations, then one must have knowledge of the specific ones at play within the context being morally evaluated; or if fundamental entities are not morally relevant to the calculations, then they are useless for making moral calculations. — Bob Ross

The later is true. Fundamental material reality cannot be created by us, so its not like we can create more. As such, all the pieces are in play outside of our control. It is more how those fundamental pieces express themselves that is important. You must have a fundamental to express, but we already have all of those and in current theories of science, they cannot be created or destroyed (at least by us).

In discussing with you and realizing I've been dong staging without thinking about it, my real approach should be to use the fundamental as an example, but then introduce staging to demonstrate how we can evaluate starter points, or origins of calculations depending on our needs.

To be charitable, I think what you are trying to convey is that what is morally relevant for moral calculations is expressions of fundamental entities but not the fundamental entities themselves. In other words, moral calculations are always about expressions, and not fundamental entities. If this is the case, then we are in agreement; and you have chosen the second line of thinking (above)(i.e., that they are useless themselves for moral calculations, since you need to know nothing about them to make the calculations). — Bob Ross

Your are correct Bob! Well said.

It is not at all clear to me within a ‘staging’ (i.e., a context) that calculating, for example, it in terms of molecules is better than calculating in terms of atoms; and it seems like which one a person chooses will have a huge impact on the results of those calculations. — Bob Ross

Context, scope, rounding, etc. are the only ways we are able to process the world in quantities. If you've ever had to calculate chemical compounds in a beaker you use moles for molecules. But if its factory processing you may be combining kiloliters where moles are a non-factor. Calculus does not evaluate infinity, it evaluates "the limit" in which an infinite calculation will always get smaller as time goes on but never pass a particular number. Even when stating, "I have three peppermints in front of me", each peppermint is not identical in size, weight, taste, or shape at when measured in detail. But its not needed depending on what we're doing.

And to measure morality, or existence, we need to follow the same pattern of manageability. Now, if the theory works at a general level, could someone sit down and measure the exact total existence of a particular combinatorial setup? Sure. Would that take a lot of time and math? Yes. We have to find a way to walk before we can run. Debating whether an exact chemical makeup is more moral than another in a very narrow and particular scope is only worth it as a stepping stone to patterns and higher moral issues. Is it worth pursing in some scenarios? Maybe. But for us in the nascent building of a theory? No.

We're primarily concerned about creating a blueprint for a way to take the idea "Existence should be," and find a way to reasonably measure and rationally demonstrate "This scenario in this context seems more moral than the other scenario." It should fit our general sensibilities of morality without compromising its core tenants, and if it does contradict them, it should be able to rationally demonstrate why. But, to establish patterns and a methodology at the level of humanity, we have to establish patterns and a methodology at the base existential level first. We are doing a bottom up approach, not a top down. This is where this differs from every other moral proposal that I know of currently.

This unique approach is why its also difficult to have discussions with other people on this as such a formulative level. People have a top down approach ingrained in them. Changing this thought process is difficult, and people generally shy away from difficult thinking. Not you though Bob, for which I am happy. :)

So, if I were to summarize the theory in a more palatable way at this point, I would write something like this to a person first thinking about the idea.

1. Material existence is the building block of existence. How they interact in relation to other existences is an expression, or how it exists. The addition of all possible expressions is potential existence. This is the sum total of any one fundamental existence.

2. I would then demonstrate the fundamental combination using Aristotelian atoms. I still think this is a good and relatable introduction, feel free to disagree if you think its not.

3. I would then explain how the creation of new identities acts like a new fundamental existence with its own expressions of existence which come about only in combination. These fundamental existences create new actual and potential expressions that their parts alone cannot do.

4. We establish the pattern that creating new fundamental identities results in more existence than base material 'bumping' and existing in isolation alone. We establish the pattern that the ability to combine and uncombine creates more potential existence than only combining into one big thing.

5. At that point we go one level higher into chemical reactions. Demonstrate that this changes the scope. When we're at the chemical reaction layer, the calculation of other atoms is not as much of a concentration of existence as the molecules. Thus we can start to establish staging, or steps of fundamental identities as contextual focus.

6. Demonstrate that life is a series of self-sustaining chemical reactions. Chemical reactions eventually burn out with the material there, but life seeks out its own homeostasis. In theory, effective life will extend its chemical reactions indefinitely which, molecule for molecule, will outlast any regular chemical reactions that are destined to burn out. This elevates life's existence into a whole other section of staging.

7. Finally introduce how intelligent life creates the most potential and actual expressions of existence out of individual lives, and introduce societies. At this point, we have the established building blocks and general patterns of existence to apply to the scope of humanity and society.

Implicit in my notion of identities is grouping. Every atom, even of the same element is different from another atom in some very small way. But I can't very well be looking over the minute individual make up, where each proton and neutron is located as well as the exact place of each electron in orbit can I? And for general discussion and physics, we don't. Hydrogen atoms in a general sense work a particular way. This is a change of staging. There is a limit down that we go in each stating to make calculations when we're talking about atoms in particular.

That’s why I went with pieces of paper, but you resorted to a much harder, smaller entity to calculate—namely, molecules. — Bob Ross

That is to make sure the scope did not involve the implicit human use for paper. That's what has you. You have to get rid of that to ensure we're on the very particular scope of, "Should the same type of molecules clumped into a group be divided? Does this create more existence?" That's just molecular separation, no more. If you want to talk about the scope of humanity, a question of molecular separation is completely out of scope. At that point its a much greater existence calculation as to what the person is doing, then the molecules themselves.

This becomes a new foundation, though not a material foundation, but a foundational identity. Now that I've worked through it, perhaps it needs to be pointed out with some name. So: Material foundation, expressions, material foundation combinations into new identities, and these new identities follow the pattern of material foundation by being foundational identities.

By ‘foundational identity’, are you referring here to just the smallest ‘building block’ one is willing to consider within the context? Otherwise, I didn’t really follow this part: a foundational entity is a material entity under your previous definitions. — Bob Ross

Yes, using a 'foundational identity' is a poor choice of words. I think a 'scope's origin', 'staging origin' etc. would be a much better way to describe it. I wanted to use a calculation of the foundation to establish a pattern of scope and origin, so these are much better words that describe what we're doing here. What do you think?

I'm not really favoring the molecules over the paper.

Yes, you absolutely are! You refuse to calculate it with pieces of paper; instead, you insist on using molecules. If you used pieces of paper, then my conclusion would inevitably follow. — Bob Ross

I'll clarify. If you had 10 sheets of equal sized paper, and you were wondering whether to destroy one sheet or add one sheet to it, that's a different scope. When you divide a sheet of paper in two, you are simply doing molecular separation. Same as if we could merge all ten sheets of paper into 1 large sheet. That's molecular bonding. And as noted, its the combination and separation of molecules at this scope.

All the things we can do with paper are out of the scope. "Paper" can simply be replaced with "Abstract molecule combination and bond breaking." We can replace "paper" with "water" for example as well. The separation and recombination of molecules in general is part of the potential expressions of existence, and should be allowed. When you split a piece of paper into two, what you're doing is dividing the molecular bonds in two. Meaning that now we have 20 molecules separated from 20 molecules where there used to be 40 bonded together. Taken alone in this scope, this is in essence the only meaning to "drop of water" or "piece of paper". Its basically, "Splitting the joining of the same types of molecules into different locations". A 40 bonded entity is not the same as two 20 bonded entities, but you seem to intend that a paper cut in half is the same identity of 'paper' as when its 40 molecules bonded together. They are not.

Hope that answers some points Bob!

I think that, when the dust settles, goodness does boil down to the two categories described in the OP. I think the 'highly contextual' aspect you are noting is really just due to people's hazy notions of what is good, and what goodness is, rather than a property of goodness itself. — Bob Ross

Fair enough, just my feedback. :)

I think the problem you might be running into here Bob is the fact that "good" is a broad word that is highly contextual. Its kind of like debating "tree". Good has multiple contextual meanings like: Happy, positive, perfection, not bad, moral connotations, etc. Perhaps a better focus to the thread would be harmony and unity. How are harmony and unity moral goals, and what is the difference between the ideal and real for example.

Agreed, nothing cannot create anything. Nothing is nothing. It is not a 'thing'. There is a question of whether something can be uncaused, a topic I cover here if you're interested. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1

Firstly, we have no knowledge of fundamental entities; and stipulating something which is clearly not a fundamental entity, such as an atom, can help clarify what you would do to make moral calculations ideally but does not clarify how you are making the calculation in actuality. — Bob Ross

First, it is unnecessary to know specifically what a fundamental entity is, only that it is. Second, we know that fundamental entities must combine to make something more. Numbers are merely representatives of entities. Third, the existence of fundamentals is mostly as a concept to contrast with expression. To understand that molecules may form and break apart but atoms may remain.

We're more concerned with establishing a pattern of basic math in existence then ascertaining what any one particular fundamental is. This is a math of estimation and generality, not scientific precision. The idea is to see if a math of generality and estimation can result in overall patterns that are helpful, fit within our intuitions about morality while adding greater understanding. If it doesn't, then there should be a good reason why. As well, since this is exploratory and the first foray into this, I don't have all the answers. The question is whether the brain storming and propositions have something to them worth exploring, or are they completely off base? So it is good that you're coming up with examples, but understand that from my viewpoint, some have been incomplete.

To be honest, my understanding so far is that you are not using, in actuality (as opposed to ideally), fundamentaly entities to arrive at these general patterns because, by you own admission, you can’t. So, then, you are only using expression and potential entities—and, consequently, fundamental entities are useless for moral calculation in actuality. — Bob Ross

Fundamental entities are used for the initial understanding of the patterns and staging. What is staging? Its what I'm calling the reasonable scope of identities for a general calculation of existence. I touched on this last time to warrant its own word. Staging is the idea of setting up a scope of what is morally being calculated to simplify the situation for general moral inquiry.

Recall last time I noted that when smaller entities combine into a new type of identity, that typically results in a far greater amount of existence then if they stay the same entities and just move around. This is a new factor of existence, and to keep the scope manageable for our general purposes, we examine at maximum one stage higher and lower than our origin. We do this, because this should work for general purposes. Exceptions will of course happen, but we don't have the time, skill, or patience to calculate for 2 factors down. Its something to do once the basic theory is established, but too much to ask for now.

To be honest, my understanding so far is that you are not using, in actuality (as opposed to ideally), fundamentaly entities to arrive at these general patterns because, by you own admission, you can’t. So, then, you are only using expression and potential entities—and, consequently, fundamental entities are useless for moral calculation in actuality. — Bob Ross

They're a starting point, and an important part of the overall theory. Destroying expressions does not destroy the fundamental underneath it (so we assume). So destruction of expressions doesn't necessarily destroy the fundamental existence, and all of its potentials at that time. Whereas the destruction of a fundamental is one of the largest destructions of existence as this destroys all of its future expressions and potential. Generally the destruction of an identity does not destroy the key foundations of that identity, so such destruction is more palatable.

Ok, let’s start with expression entities: you seem to use molecules to represent this type, but how are you determining which expression entity to factor into the moral calculation? You seem to just arbitrarily pick one for the sake of example. — Bob Ross

I do. This is me figuring things out Bob. I'm glad we're finally at the point we can have this discussion as I've wanted to bounce it off of someone else who understands the basics of what's going on here. The goal was to find some way of measuring existence. The key for me is "What is an identity"? And I think its having attributes that have unique results when interacting with another existence.

Implicit in my notion of identities is grouping. Every atom, even of the same element is different from another atom in some very small way. But I can't very well be looking over the minute individual make up, where each proton and neutron is located as well as the exact place of each electron in orbit can I? And for general discussion and physics, we don't. Hydrogen atoms in a general sense work a particular way. This is a change of staging. There is a limit down that we go in each stating to make calculations when we're talking about atoms in particular.

So the same approach is brought here with measurements of existence. What then is a fundamental stage change for an existence? When the combination of two or more items results in something that is different than what their parts alone would express. The easiest example of this is atoms combining into molecules. Hydrogen and oxygen atoms are a gas at room temperature. Combined they become a liquid that is necessary for almost all life.

This becomes a new foundation, though not a material foundation, but a foundational identity. Now that I've worked through it, perhaps it needs to be pointed out with some name. So: Material foundation, expressions, material foundation combinations into new identities, and these new identities follow the pattern of material foundation by being foundational identities.

A new foundational identity (the name for now) is a new staging of existence in which an entirely new set of expressions has come out of the combination of other expressions. Can there be degrees? Yes. Two molecules of the same type combining together doesn't really generate that many extra potential expressions as a bond then becoming an entirely new substance.

Let’s take the paper example to illustrate the problem: a piece of paper and a molecule are both expression entities. By your own admission, anything comprised of, that originates out of, fundamental entities is an expression entity; so, by your own lights, the piece of paper is an expression entity, comprised of a bunch of smaller expression entities—namely molecules. You seem to arbitrarily favor the molecule over the paper itself; but the paper is an expression of molecules, among probably other expression entities, thusly making it also an expression entity. — Bob Ross

I'm not really favoring the molecules over the paper. Paper is the result of several molecules of the same type grouping into a bond. The overall foundational identity change is very small, as in considering only this scope, the behavior is very similar to the molecules that make it up. Its not enough to make an appreciable staging step. Now, if you introduce the human element into it, it enters into the human staging section only within regards to how humans use the paper. But the molecular size of the paper is irrelevant compared to the staging of what that human will do with that piece of paper. Per my previous example, if they need confetti, cut it. If they need to make functional paper airplanes, don't.

Hopefully it is clear that, as you have defined it, a piece of paper is an expression entity: it is comprised of, something that arises out of, fundamental entities: it is an expression of fundamental entities. A molecule is also just like it in that sense: the paper arises out of, is an emergent property of, the molecules. — Bob Ross

I hope this clears up the thought process a bit, explaining why a grouping of molecules isn't quite the foundational identity shift as a combination of molecules that react and produce an entirely different foundational identity with its own unique expressions that cannot be formed by the underlying molecules when alone.

A first cause is an uncaused existence, that then enters into causality.
— Philosophim

Is instantiation into existence instantaneous, or does the process necessitate elapsing of time? — ucarr

Hi ucarr, instantiation of a first cause is the moment of inception.

Hopefully that helps clarify, as I think we have derailed a bit into our differences in use of the term ‘thing-in-itself’. — Bob Ross

Yes, well done Bob! As I noted from the beginning, I did not have any real issue with the arguments, just the use of thing-in-itself.

All good!

So, you see, the conceptual framework that we apply to reality makes a difference to what reality we grasp. (I don't say it makes a difference to what is real. By definition, it doesn't.) — Ludwig V

Right. I'm not claiming that whether we can identify a first cause or not, it would still exist.

I didn't know about that. I'm not surprised. I have never believed that the Big Bang was the end of the story. It doesn't make any difference to our problem, does it? But it does confirm my view that the first cause is a moving target, not a fixed point. — Ludwig V

What we believe is a first cause is likely a moving target. If we can prove any one particular thing is a first cause, then it would be no more of a moving target than anything else we prove.

Well, of course it is a truth. By definition. But you have also specified conditions for its discovery that seem to exclude the possibility of ever discovering it, except as a temporary phenomenon of whatever theory we devise. — Ludwig V

No, not a temporary phenomenon, but a hard proof. The bar to reach this is of course, extremely high. In many cases of first causes, its impossible to prove. I do not view this as a bad thing.

I wonder if its been lost in the discussion, but I am not once claiming, "This X is a first cause." I'm just noting that it is logically necessary that at least one first cause exist.

Here's the summary of the argument again. If we don't know whether our universe has finite or infinite chains of causality A -> B -> C etc...

Lets say there's a finite chain of causality. What caused a finite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is.

Lets say there's an infinite chain of causality. What caused an infinite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is.

If anything is possible, then could some things be more possible than another?
— Philosophim

Yes. You're invoking probability. — ucarr

No. That was the entire point. You even thumbed up Lucas's quote which agreed with mine.

I realized I could imagine any situation with odds, and realize that all odds had the same chance of happening when anything can happen.
— Philosophim

I'll sound a note of doubt about this on the premise all odds on all things having equal chance of occurrence assumes unlimited time. — ucarr

Lets clarify a difference here. Given infinite time, all things that are possible WILL happen. That's not what I'm stating. I'm stating that there is no way to predict at any any particular moment in time if a first cause will incept, and what it will be.

True randomness' is uncaused.
— Philosophim

This implies randomness can be contemporary with the first of all first causes, and thus prior to all first causes subsequent to the first of all first causes. The effect of randomness being uncaused is that there are no first causes. — ucarr

This implies no such thing. I've mentioned several times randomness is not a cause. Its a descriptor to understand the inception of first causes entails. I feel like we're back sliding here. :) Remember, nothing causes a first cause. If you think I'm saying anything prior causes a first cause, know that I am not.

Also, if true randomness uncaused, as you claim, supports the prediction of certain outcomes, then it is -- your denials notwithstanding -- logical. — ucarr

Again, you're attributing randomness as some cause. Its not a cause. Its not a thing. Its a descriptor. Its a logical conclusion that we realize once we understand a first cause cannot be caused by anything prior.

Firstly, when you're propounding your conclusion -- that first cause is possible and logically necessary -- you demand it be understood: unexplainable nothing must be accepted prima facie. — ucarr

I don't demand it be accepted prima facie. I have an argument that leads to a conclusion. Go find the summary if you need. If you want to critique the argument, critique the argument. Please don't throw accusations without addressing the argument.

So far, your arguments beg the question: How is there not a chain of causation from nothing to something? — ucarr

There is no question begging. If we label an egg as "The first dinosaur egg", and it is true, can there be a dinosaur egg that exists prior to the first dinosaur egg? No. This is not begging the question, this is just a logical consequence of the term "first".

If its true that something is a first cause in a causation chain, then no prior cause can come before it. Nothing does not cause something, because nothing is...nothing. Its just a state prior to the first causes inception.

The point of disjunction happens when the causal chain reaches its last position prior to the location of first cause and the location of first cause. — ucarr

I don't understand this. Can you try a second pass on it?

The gap stands between first cause on one side of the disjunction and second cause on the other side of the disjunction. First cause is not connected to the causal chain you claim it causes. The gap separating the leader from its followers is the gap between no-physics and physics. — ucarr

I don't understand this either. Use the example I gave earlier. A -> B -> C. A is the first cause in the causal chain. Everything flows after. What is lacking in this example?

Since you're talking about first cause causing a causal chain following after it, you have to bridge across first cause to second cause that bridges across to third cause, etc. — ucarr

A first cause does not follow anything. Again, if you ever find yourself thinking, "This caused the first cause" stop. Nothing does. I don't imply anything ever does. Thinking that something can cause a first cause is a complete contradiction.

For this reason, whenever you attempt to talk logically about first cause causing second cause and so on, you have to covertly bring in logical connectors linking first cause to second cause. — ucarr

How is A -> B -> C covert? I don't quite understand your point here.

In your attempt to assert a no-logic realm as the start of a logical realm, you encounter the gnarly problem of explaining logically the non-logical inception of logic. Its easy to claim a no-logic realm causes a logic realm if you keep the two realms separated in a dualistic reality. — ucarr

There is no other realm ucarr. There is no "randomness" realm. There is no dualism. The conclusion that there is nothing to influence how, what, or when a first cause will incept is simply a logical conclusion we can reach once we realize there is no prior cause to it.

Please try again ucarr. Stop putting something into nothing. :) There is no prior cause to a first cause.

I did want to note that the conclusion applies to reality, not our knowledge or understanding of reality.
— Philosophim
That's a complicated statement. I'm not at all sure that I understand it. — Ludwig V

If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, the air still vibrates with the fall. We don't need someone to hear the vibration of the air for the air to vibrate.

"First cause" does not mean, "The start of where we decide to look at the causal chain."
— Philosophim
Sometimes it means exactly that. When it doesn't, it means "the first cause so far as we can tell". — Ludwig V

No, a first cause is not an opinion. It is a truth. A first cause can have no prior cause for its existence. This is independent of whether we discover its existence or not. If we claim something is a first cause, it must be proven that there was no prior cause for its existence. It is not a belief. If for example we discovered something we had claimed was a first cause, did in fact have a prior cause, we would have been mistaken in calling it a first cause.

To know it is a first cause, we must prove that it is.
— Philosophim
Well, there's a scientific argument about that, so now the burden of proof is on you to prove that it isn't and to explain what would count as a proof. — Ludwig V

Sure. For something to be proven as a first cause, all other possible prior causality must be ruled out. One theory about the big bang is that prior to it, there existed the big crunch. Basically all matter was sucked into itself, then exploded out again. That possibility would need to be proven false to claim that the big bang was a first cause.

You need to assign a probability to all the "anythings" that you refer to in "if anything is possible". Unless you have a reason to assign different probabilities to different outcomes, you must assign the same probability to all outcomes. — Ludwig V

Correct. That's what I'm trying to say with the examples.

The actual causal chains that we formulate are constructed either in a practical context or in the context of a theory. They are limited in the first case by pragmatic considerations and in the second by the theories we have. So when we construct actual causal chains, there will always be a first cause and a last cause, and these will present themselves as brute facts - we discussed those a while ago. — Ludwig V

I did want to note that the conclusion applies to reality, not our knowledge or understanding of reality. "First cause" does not mean, "The start of where we decide to look at the causal chain." There is no human context. The big bang is not a known first cause, it is simply a proposed first cause. To know it is a first cause, we must prove that it is. So far, this has not been done. However, using the big bang as a 'fill in' first cause to get away from abstraction is very helpful and useful to do.

Fortunately for her, this is a very open ended question. Considering its only 1k words as well, this is more asking her to think through on the subject then generate any one right answer.

Considering its neuroscience, I would simply look at consciousness. We can perceive the brain's function, and even manipulate what the person is experiencing by stimulating certain areas of the brain. But do we know what its like to BE that consciousness? That is the unperceived. Good luck to her!

So this just depends on whether one believes one can have knowledge of the things-in-themselves or not; and I think we are basically saying the same thing—but our schemas are different. — Bob Ross

Things-in-themselves are not things-as-ascribed. As soon as you being to ascribe something to a thing-in-itself, it is now a thing-as-ascribed. The entire point about using the term thing-in-itself is to give an abstract of something as it exists apart from our ascription.

I would say we ascribe properties to the things-in-themselves conditionally [as conditioned by the human understanding]; whereas, you would say we ascribe properties to things and things-in-themselves are completely ineffable as a pure negative conception. — Bob Ross

This is true. I think your viewpoint is a mis-application of what a thing-in-itself is. We can never understand a thing-in-itself. If you think you can, then you're just using a thing-as-ascribed and losing the meaning of what a thing-in-itself is.

Let me tell you why this is an important distinction. What if all of reality is an illusion created by an evil demon Bob? As in, the thing itself which is unknowable. The illusion contradicts you when you deny space or time, but outside of the evil demon's illusions, space and time do not exist. A character in a 3D game will never know they are actually 2D, yet the rules of the world will make it think it is. A brain in a vat will never know that its a brain in a vat, yet the rules of the world will make it think its not. All the character has in each world is ascriptions. They are ascribing something, but what that something is, is forever unknowable.

And to clarify, these are examples of the abstract of, "That which can never be ascribed to." It is the forever unknowable underlying reality that exists in itself, not as any type of ascription or identity we can give it. We can interpret it through our perceptions and identities, but it will never capture the essence of what it is in itself, only as we ascribe it.

Either way, the OP is about whether or not space and time are properties of things or things-in-themselves (depending on which description you like best above) and what nature they would have. — Bob Ross

Right, space and time are properties of things. These are representations we view in reality that are not contradicted by the thing in itself, so it works for us. It is impossible to know if our representations capture the thing in itself, as that is something that is beyond ascription.

Its real because it affects us despite our perceptions. That's the 'drop a rock game' :D

There is nothing about space and time in terms of literal extension and temporality that affects you despite your perceptions: an object affects you despite your perceptions of it—not space nor time. — Bob Ross

Doesn't time have to pass for the rock to fall? Doesn't the rock have to have mass, and therefore space, to bonk me on the head? I'm not understanding your claim here.

You do not experience space and time: they are the forms of your experience. — Bob Ross

Since space and time are concepts that we create and experience, saying they are forms seems redundant. Otherwise you get into sentences like, "We experience this form of experience, which in this case is the form of space." Its much simpler to just note, "We experience space". Both say the same thing with a lot less unnecessary complication right?

at its core: there’s actual time and space that affect oneself (and one’s representative faculties are representing that) or one’s representative faculties represent things in space and time differently depending on what it is interpreting as there in reality). — Bob Ross

Right, space and time are not illusionary concepts. Despite our attempts to ascribe them as illusionary, they defy our beliefs by bonking us on the head. Does that mean we can every capture what the underlying 'thing in itself' that our ascription of space is allowed to coexist without contradiction? No.

Good. My only point is that that is incredibly counter-intuitive to predominant ethics: pretty much everyone who studies ethics will agree that trying to find a cure for cancer has more moral worth than working on model airplanes even if one is more productive at the latter than the former. — Bob Ross

Right, if you don't explicitly list out the examples I mentioned. As I've mentioned, morality is contextual. Without context you can create all sorts of unintuitive points. That's not using the theory, and not a knock against it. List out a contextual example like I did, and show that its unintuitive by its conclusion if you want to show something meaningful. I listed a few for you, and they are intuitive to ethics to me. Are they not to you? If not, let me know. :)

If our unit of measure is ‘a piece’ and ‘more pieces is better than less’, then two pieces of paper are better than two.

The only way for you to deny this, under your theory, is if you explicate clearly what unit of measure a person should be using to calculate “more existence is better”; and you have still as of yet to clarify it. — Bob Ross

Have I not listed the three unit types, fundamental, expression, and potential? I've also given quite a few examples of how to calculate them. I broke down the paper model for you as well. You haven't commented on it, so I assumed that meant it made sense.

"A piece" is not an accurate description of the existence. A piece is a generic summary which can vary in size and shape. Paper is an identity we give to a organized set of molecules that we use as a tool. Since we are removing the tool aspect, its just a conglomeration of molecules. So when you say we are taking a particular piece of paper, that's a set of existence. When we tear it, we are separating the molecules that bind it together.

My point was not that you need to calculate every minute detail: it was that, in principle, it is impossible for you to; and, thusly, your theory is useless if you insist on demanding these calculations to determine what is right or wrong. — Bob Ross

I have already done a few calculations through several examples. Feel free to point out where these examples are wrong. I assumed because you haven't addressed them so far, that they were acceptable. Lets go back there then as its a fundamental of the theory.

The second is: if the unit of measure is ‘material existence’ (which is whatever fundamental entities exist) and one cannot have knowledge of ‘material existences’ (which by your own concession in your conversation is true) and one needs to use those units to calculate what is right/wrong, then it is impossible for them to calculate what is right/wrong—full stop. — Bob Ross

First, the use of 'atoms' was as an Aristotelian abstract to demonstrate how it works. We don't need to know the exact form of a fundamental when math in this case, is a fundamental discrete identity. From there we build up complex models of expression and measure that. I feel like you completely missed this point from earlier, or have forgotten it.

Perhaps this entire discussion needs a summary again, as your latter points seem to wholly miss the mark. This is not normally like you, so I feel that the discussion needs a recentering if this is the case. Let me know.if this would be helpful! Oh, and if you have become disinterested in the conversation, that's perfectly fine as well. This does not reflect poorly on your points or you in anyway if this is the case. Sometimes we're just not interested in continuing a discussion, and I do not want you to feel obligated to do so if this is the case. :)

Please read my response to ucarr above as I go over 'true randomness' in more detail.

So, nothingness, and randomness join the list of excluded causal prior states. — ucarr

Correct.

I'm seeking clarification whether potential inhabits the list of the excluded. The simple answer is yes. However, your mentions of nothingness, randomness and now potential vaguely suggest they're subject to the gravitational pull of causal status due to our reasoning minds needing talking points to grasp nothing-then-something inception. — ucarr

Then that is not my intention. I was not aware it would come across like that. Thinking back to when I first fleshed it out, I haven't walked through my initial through process in concluding this, so let me do so now.

I remember at first thinking, "If anything is possible, then could some things be more possible than another? Not because of some prior cause, but because that's just the way the first cause played out?
(I know this doesn't make any sense, but just follow the example to see where I arrived in the end)

So I had a thought experiment. Lets say, if anything is possible, that there is a 40% chance of a universe forming from a big bang, and a 60% chance of a universe forming from a little whisper. I mean, its possible right? But what that also means is its equally possible that there's a 39% chance of a universe forming from a big bang, and a 61% of a big whisper. 38/62, 37/67...and so on.

In fact, I realized I could imagine any situation with odds, and realize that all odds had the same chance of happening when anything can happen. And if all odds for all possibilities are all possible...that means everything in the mathematical end has the same chance of happening.

That's one. I'll reiterate again another point I've made before as it was likely brushed over earlier. 'Randomness' as we know it is caused. 'True randomness' is uncaused. Randomness has limitations caused by other existential influences. We use randomness in situations where we have limits, but are missing some information that would lead us to predicting that absolutely necessary conclusion.

Again, I'll mention a die roll. The outcome of the die is predetermined by the forces that are already there. Unless a first cause happened to get in the way, a die roll will always land predetermined on a particular side. We'll say the one die. Your forces shaking the cup, gravity, friction, the surface of where it landed, and even the air resistance all cause the die to land on the one. We say, "It has a one out of six chance to land on the one," because we cannot measure it accurately ahead of time. But it was always going to land on the one.

When something has no prior cause for its existence, its actually truly unpredictable. Its inception is outside of determinism. There is nothing causing a big bang to form. There is nothing preventing a big bang from forming. There is nothing which would neither limit, cause, or incline a first cause to be. It simply is. And the logical consequence of this is that the inception of when, where, what, etc of a first cause is true randomness. Meaning anything is possible.

Your underlined fragment suggests randomness in the role of the trigger of the singularity's rapid expansion. — ucarr

No, that's not what I'm trying to suggest. I hope the above clarified, but I'll reiterate here. Randomness is not a role. It is a logical way to grasp that the inception of a first cause, what it is, where it forms, etc. are truly unpredictable, outside of determinism, and therefore truly random. Now, once its formed, it is no longer random in what it does. It is constrainted by what it is. But what it is, how it is, and why it is, is all truly random.

Another thought -- I know you've already addressed it -- is that the pre-big bang of no physics is an utterly different state not only from our world today, but utterly different from the start of the shortest time interval possible post-big bang. — ucarr

If there is something which caused the big bang, then the big bang is not a first cause. I'm only using the big bang as a hypothetical example of a first cause give a more concrete example to the abstract. My argument for "there must be a first cause" is the variable X. When I say, "a photon, the big bang, etc.", I'm just temporarily putting a number like 1 or 2 there so we don't have to keep talking in terms of X all the time. Sometimes this makes things more clear.

So its not relevant whether or not there is something that caused the big bang. We just keep working up the causal chain and will eventually arrive at a first cause. So to sum, the argument is not addressing any one particular first cause, it is addressing the logic of any first cause.

I'm still in arrears of understanding how randomness-into-big band is not a partitioning of reality into two utterly distinct states populating a dual reality. — ucarr

Because, and this is entirely understandable, you haven't let go of the need for prior causality. You haven't yet truly considered or understood the idea of what it means for there to be no prior cause. You keep inventing something that's a prior cause, and that's the wrong approach. And that's ok! :) Its a difficult shift. There is no prior cause, means no dualism, no God, no secret mechanism, no slot machine, no sub-quantum field that causes the quantum field, just...nothing. It just is.

You're speculating about reality having no boundary?
— ucarr

I'm just saying that the word 'reality' is really a word that represents all of 'what is'.
— Philosophim

You're not answering my question, please do so. I'm pressing this point because saying all of what exists equals reality allows for the logical inference reality so defined has no boundary. — ucarr

I'm not sure how this makes reality not have a boundary. Sum up everything that exists and that's the boundary.

Well, a reality with no boundary means the no-physics realm of nothing-then-something inhabits the same continuum inhabited by our everyday reality. — ucarr

I'll mention this again, but its not a 'no-physics' reality. Its not separate, its just a part of reality. If a first cause was empirically proven, it would simply become part of physics. Physics is an attempt to measure, predict, and understand how forces and matter impact each other. This would just be one extra rule added to it.

Nothing, then a change to space time, has spacetime.
— Philosophim
What do you mean? I believe something is missing in this statement. — MoK

Let me phrase it this way: Nothing to something involves spacetime. Spacetime is the result of nothing to something. Spacetime is there, so a change occurred. The only way I can see this not making sense if you want there to be spacetime before a change can happen. But that wasn't your premise. You can change it now if you would like, but then you have to prove that spacetime cannot come from nothing. And as I noted, I don't see either of us having any proof of this, and I think I put forward some decent logic why this doesn't fit with the rest of your premises either.

We have been through this. I disagree with C. — MoK

And that's fine. At this point you've made your points, I've made my counterpoints, and there is nothing left to add. Its been a nice discussion on this. :) But I think we've made up our own minds so all that's left is to agree to disagree. See you around elsewhere on the forums Mok!