The statement "A does not exist, period" is contradictory. A must exist in some way, because a person is making a statement about it. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

The issue you're raising right here is known as the problem of "vacuous singular terms," that is, expressions that look like they refer to a real object, that are constructed just like expressions that do refer to real objects, but do not. Your interpretation, that they exist in some special way, is not the only interpretation available. I see the whole thing as a quirk of our language. Okay, maybe more than a quirk, but at any rate I do not feel compelled at all to say that whatever I talk about exists.

The question is if it is possible for something to in no way, shape, form, constitution, state, etc. exist. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

I took this to mean, is there something that not only does not but cannot exist, and of course the answer for me will be, sure.

But for you, if anything you talk about or imagine, or whatever, exists in some fashion, then your question is more like this: could there be anything that cannot even be talked about or imagined? And that is a conundrum. If you know that to be true of something, you'd have thought of it, and there you are, it now exists. On the other hand, if there is something no one can imagine, then no one will. That seems to mean that if there is such a thing, you cannot possibly know that there is such a thing.

EDIT: Hmmm. The phrase "thing I cannot possibly know no one can think of" looks like it refers to something.

It might help if you could sketch the case against reductionism-- I remember finding Fodor's argument pretty convincing in that paper about special sciences, but it's been way too long since I read it.

"Contradicts" has a weird ring to it in this context. Some of the differences here aren't really much like the calculus/statistics distinction.

Some systems, like intuitionistic logic, set tighter restrictions on how you get from A to B. There's a sense in which it "gets along" with classical logic, but some of the things you can't do in intuitionistic logic are things people are pretty attached to.

Using more than the usual two truth-values is obviously more of a game-changer.

Logic can be treated as, in essence, of branch of mathematics, the investigation of structures for their own sake, but many are interested in logic primarily for its usefulness in formalizing reasoning. The standard classical logic was invented expressly for the purpose of formalizing mathematical argument. Some non-standard logics are of the mathematical sort, but many are attempts at remedying perceived shortcomings in classical logic as a tool for reasoning.

You could say something similar I suppose about axiomatic set theory: in some cases, it's just pure investigation, but in some cases the goal is providing a foundation for the rest of mathematics. That means at least one question that naturally arises is just how much of the existing superstructure of mathematics can be built on a given proposed foundation.

That may be a common human experience, and one that I would take you at your word when you say that you've had it.

Interpreting it as God might be understandable, but that doesn't make it any less "crazy" in my sense — Sapientia

And no, if I have had such an experience, I haven't jumped to the conclusion that it was God - I'm not crazy. — Sapientia

This is the part I'm curious about.

Is it your position that (a) one cannot have an experience of God, or (b) one cannot know that one has had an experience of God? You seem to accept that there is something reliable about a person's description of their own experience; but there is also something you describe as interpreting that experience, and this part requires justification.

I'd like to understand how you see this distinction.

We categorically deny that you were ever a member of the Church of the Invisible Pink Unicorn. It's all lies! Lies and falsehoods! And innuendoes! Icky ones, with little thingies growing on them.

You sure you want to go down this road? I can dispatch a team before you get your agent on the phone.

I saw the edit. Your new IPU is make-believe and you know it. Admit your failing, pay the indulgence, and we'll take you back. Oh, there's also a lecture tour where you tell the story of your fall and redemption. And maybe a book. Yes, we will require a book. But that's all.

You can edit your own post, but I will require some consideration to edit mine that documents your weakness.

I am eternally damned! What did I do? — Marchesk

I tried to help you.

Invisible Pink Uniform — Marchesk

infidel

Autocorrect or heretic?

"If A does not exist, how are you able to talk about A?" — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Here is a hypothesis:

(1) If something does not exist, then we cannot talk about it.

It has a contrapositive:

(2) If you can talk about something, then it exists.

I believe (2) can easily be shown to be false, and I believe I have done so in this thread. Therefore (1) is false as well.

If something categorically does not exist, how are we able to talk about it? — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Here is a different hypothesis:

(3) if something is impossible, then we cannot talk about it.

Its contrapositive would be:

(4) If we can talk about something, then it is possible.

It may very well be that the current consensus among philosophers is that (4) is true, because possible world semantics. I'm not in love with PWS, and lean toward (4) being false. "There's no ball of ice at the center of the Sun," feels to me like a statement that cannot possibly be false. Does anything turn on whether that statement is about the non-existent ball of ice?

EDIT: This is silly. Obviously people who make regular use of PWS talk about impossibility too. It just annoys me for some reason. Unnecessary aspersions on the character of PWS hereby retracted.

If you can't communicate like you're having a conversation rather than someone with some sort of logorrheic disorder there is something wrong with you. — Terrapin Station

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Yeah, and it runs pretty deep. There are certain sorts of things people say, certain words they use together, and so on. In chess there are automatic moves. I could analogize here forever. I guess we'll have to give Wittgenstein some credit here, because it also comes back to a shared way of living, not just talking.

I'm proud to say the astrology reference didn't even occur to me.

As far as pure mathematics and logic are concerned, their plurality is not even controversial. — SophistiCat

This is certainly true, and with logic there can even be controversy about different systems because there's already controversy about what the systems are for. Is the same thing true in mathematics? I've just never gotten that sense, but maybe I missed the really juicy controversies. For example, it's my impression that Bayesians and frequentists never end up accusing each other of not really doing mathematics.

For my knowledge, could you give an example of an axiom that would change the classic logic? — Samuel Lacrampe

You could start here.

Nah, "constellation" has this static feel to it. Maybe "convergence" is best if we're wedded to "influences."

(That second sentence is strangely poetic.)

Since we were talking of communication, it might be worth noting how redundancy carried the con-versation my son and I were having-- I knew exactly what he was trying to say, what he meant, despite his extravagantly erroneous word choice.

Yeah I tried to think of all sorts of "con-" words! People even use "constellation" in related ways.

My teenage son once described an album to me as resulting from a "conflagration of influences." I convinced him that was not the word he wanted, though it has a certain metaphorical charm. The problem is "confluence of influences" is hideous, so maybe his brain just refused to let him say that.

I guess I still haven't exactly addressed the question of whether you could be said to be really using a word if you don't understand it. As I tried to indicate earlier, whether you individually use a word, or use it correctly, isn't even directly relevant for theory. It's how the word is used that matters there.

But for you, beyond the training and learning stuff, there's a little that you already do know that entitles you to use the word: you know it's the name of a medical condition, and you know how to use expressions in that class; you know it's something someone with a life like yours could have (it's not like malaria, say); you might know some of the symptoms if that's why you were taking to the doc. And I think the person you talk to would get all that too.

So you're not quite in the position of the congenitally blind person with color-words.

Act as if ye had understanding, and understanding will be given ye, or something. Fake it till you make it.

Except that "Schnarrglop's" is actually the right word. Think about teaching someone to play chess or to use a tool, teaching them any kind of skill. Their first attempts will be tentative and uncertain. "Is this right?" "Yes, that's how the knight moves." (Ain't it funny how the knight moves?) Their understanding is limited, but the training includes them doing something barely right at first. Similarly for the guy you tell you have S. syndrome. If he googles it, he'll have that statement you made to connect his new knowledge to.

Thinking more about what you and @Michael said, there is still this oddity about what use you can possibly be making of a word, or even an entire sentence, that you don't understand.

I do think, as I said before, that this is something you'll often see with people learning a new word. And I think there are obvious limits to how far this can go.

But the other thing to note, following on what @Michael said, is that the meaningfulness of a word or a sentence is not dependent on whether you understand it, even if you're the one speaking.

And that's why "meaning is use" and related doctrines are usually expressed in the passive voice, so to speak. The user that matters for theory is not really you the individual speaker, but a fictive omni-competent speaker.

But it's your particular uses that language is put to, that make using language useful. It's as if you ask yourself, what would the ideal speaker say if she wanted to say what I want to say the way I want to say it?

Surely I'm saying something meaningful, even though I don't understand it. — Michael

Looking back, I don't think I ever said I agree with this.

I think I get what you're saying.

There are lots of occasions where the distinction between what you literally say and what you mean, or what you communicate, matters. Logic is exclusively concerned with what is literally said. Libel law. And we manipulate the distinction in our daily lives by suggesting and insinuating and implying things we don't actually say.

Am I in the neighborhood of what you were asking?

Lol. I was confused.

Sorry, I'm really not getting what you're saying here.

I know what I am, and I'm glad I'm a man, and so's Lola.

the issue is whether the universe is designed or not. — TheMadFool

At this point, I'm not even sure there's a coherent question here. I'll try to get back to you on that. I am convinced that the approach taken by the argument from design is worse than useless, and I'm not giving it any more of time. (I learned some stuff arguing with you, so it's all good.)

I remember telling you a while back that you were looking at the universe through the wrong end of the telescope. At the time, I wasn't really sure why I said that. Now it makes sense.

intensional definitions — Mongrel

What are those?

Sure.

If that were the case then my claim that I have Schnarrglop's syndrome would be false if my doctor didn't tell me that I have Schnarrglop's syndrome. But of course that's wrong. My claim is false if I don't have Schnarrglop's syndrome. — Michael

That's a good point, and I agree.

There's the sentence you actually utter, and it can be true or false independent of how you're using it. Suppose the doc told you that you have Schnarrglop's syndrome, but he meant to say "Schnarrglob's syndrome," and then you misremember and tell someone you have Schnarrglob's syndrome. What you say is true, even though it's not what you meant to say, or what the doc meant to say.

The question then is whether my "elliptical sentence" idea is any good. I'm not sure. I'm trying to say that in the context, you're not even claiming to understand what you're asserting, that the context makes it clear that you're just trying to repeat what the doc said. So there's something like ellipsis here when you just baldly state, as if you know what you're talking about, that you have whatever syndrome.

Does that make sense?

Against psychologism, same as Frege. Husserl wages the same war on a different front.

Perhaps, but the dance itself is the movement, not the intention. Dances happen on the dance floor, not in your head.
— Michael
Wrong. You can dance anywhere you want - all you need is the intent. You can imagine you are dancing in your head. — Harry Hindu

Knowing how to write "cat" doesn't make the word appear on the paper. You also have to know how to move your hands and hold a pencil and then tell your hand to move in such a way in order to do it. — Harry Hindu

I don't get it.

To you? Or you mean to someone else? Because I've already explained it to someone else.

If my doctor tells me I have Schnarrglop's syndrome, but I don't know what that means, and then I tell someone I have Schnarrglop's syndrome, I think the second sentence is really elliptical for "My doctor told me I have Schnarrglop's syndrome." If the person you talk to says, "What's that?" it's coherent to answer, "I don't know. That's what the doc told me."

It looks like kind of a corner case of the use/mention distinction, but I think it's not. Think of it instead as the first baby step in learning to use the expression "Schnarrglop's syndrome." You've learned a little bit about how to use the expression, but not much. Your doctor knows a lot more about how to use the expression. Use starts with bare mention, but doesn't end there.

EDIT: Not even bare mention. Even the first use will be connected to circumstances that make it appropriate, even if you're not sure what that connection is.

Use vs. mention

Sure, if what you mean by "use" is to refer to a particular idea or thing or state-of-affairs that you intend to convey. Sure, if what you mean by "common usage" is the common idea, thing, or state-of-affairs that the word refers to. You can use words all day long, but if the other person doesn't know what the words refers to, then you can never understand it's use. Sure a congenitally blind person may copy someone's use of phrase, "The sky is blue". But do they really know what "blue" means? Knowing how to copy someone else's use of words doesn't entail that you know what the words mean - only how to use words. Would the congenitally blind person really understand what they are saying? Could the blind person then use the word, "blue" in a sentence that they have never heard? Could they then make their own sentence with the word, "blue" and it mean something? — Harry Hindu

Saying what someone else says just to say what they said rather than to mean what they meant is not use, it's mention. A congenitally blind person cannot learn how to use color-words, only how to mention them. It's really that simple. Using a word is not just saying it, it is using it, with other words, arranged in a particular way, to do something linguistically--make a statement, ask a question, give a command, etc.