I don't know what you think you are getting out of this line. Your initial premise has been reduced to well-known conservation laws — SophistiCat

The thought experiments refute your claim that the principle 'no effect can be greater than the sum of its causes' fails in the example of water boiling. As such, the principle still stands. I have apparently failed to convince you of it, but it has yet to be refuted. I can provide more supporting examples upon request.

No, I am saying that it's more complicated than you suppose and can't be adequately summed up by a simple aphorism. — SophistiCat

I am not sure if you are saying yes or no. Either the law of conservation of mass and energy applies in the case of the big bang, or it does not. If it does, then the big bang necessarily possessed all the mass and energy found in the universe today. If not, then not. While the laws of physics may change, logic does not.

These assumptions seem to be completely unjustified — SophistiCat

You are correct that the argument is founded on these assumptions, but they also seem rather common sensical. As such, they are the prima facie and the onus of proof is on the other side.
Regarding assumption 2: We don't need to know what is outside of the universe. We can just use logic: either the process is random or it is not. If random, then it results in the existence of our configuration to be highly improbable, therefore making the 'random' hypothesis highly improbable in return. If not, then the process is deterministic or designed, which in turn points to a designer.

, how do you validate your beliefs and ideas? In validating them aren't you turning them from being subjective to objective? Isn't that what "validating your beliefs and ideas" implies?

You make a good point that empiricism is classified as an epistemology, whereas materialism is classified as a metaphysics, and so they are not synonymous. — Samuel Lacrampe

I like this summation; it’s pithy. Far better than my ramblings. Sometimes, though, it takes time to edit concepts into more pithy statements (see below). :-}

Back to the original question, I wonder if all things that fit under the umbrella of natural science must be material. — Samuel Lacrampe

What makes this question so hard for me to appraise is the underlying supposition of what is and what is not material. This, though, gets into philosophy of mind … of which materialism is only one formal stance.

[...] The statement "studies show that those who live in this particular way tend to be more happy" is a valid scientific statement, and does not necessarily lead to materialism. — Samuel Lacrampe

As to science and its evidencing of materialism, I’ll offer my own perspective, right or wrong as it may be.

First as a general background, science can either be interpreted as A) “knowledge gained through study or practice”, which I take to then have derivative meanings such as “a particular discipline or branch of learning” or, else, B) “the collective discipline of study or learning acquired through the scientific method”. [These three quoted definitions are taken verbatim from Wiktionary; although other specific meanings for science can also be found there, I take these two to be the most pertinent].

As to denotation A and its derivatives: to me this sense of science may or may not hold personal value … Compare “the science of farting silently in public” (yes, this usage fully conforms to denotation A) to “the science of mathematics” … which also only pertains to denotation A: Mathematics (as with logics) is neither studied nor learned through the scientific method—i.e., (in my own attempt at pithy summation) i) falsifiable hypothesis on that which can be observationally scrutinized by all, ii) reproducible experiment (itself experiential) with no significant confounding variables which holds the potential to conclusively falsify the hypothesis, and iii) inferred conclusions of the experiment.

Then there’s the much touted and too often little understood “empirical sciences” category which pertains to denotation B. It is not mathematics, nor technology, nor logics… though it of course integrates all three in the process of empirically/experinetially/synthetically discovering new, observationally, and universally, verifiable knowledge. [e.g., gravity is a theory, but it is empirically scientific because no verifiable observation has ever been made of gravity not being the case—though just one such verifiable observation (thereby evidencing that the observation is not a willful lie, a hallucination, etc.) would be enough to conclusively falsify the theory]. In sense B of science, scientific knowledge in all cases is, again, empirical—and, hence, a posteriori—knowledge. [But notice that now stating “empirical” becomes disassociated with the branch of philosophy termed empiricism—which, again, claims that all (or, else, “nearly all”, according to Wikipedia) knowledge is a posteriori, i.e. gained after experience of that which it regards.]

While I’m certain that others will disagree with at least some aspects of this just stated appraisal regarding science, I’m again offering it as my own perspective—here, nothing more—and have only provided it to better contextualize the following opinion:

IMO: With one singular, possible exception, there is absolutely nothing of scientific knowledge (in sense B) that “necessarily leads to materialism”.

As one extreme example of this—though I disagree with Berkley’s metaphysics in multiple ways—Berkley’s metaphysics when taken in its complete, mature form (thereby including the omni-perceiving Berkleian God) is fully compatible with all scientific knowledge (of the sense-B type) of today—again, with the one exception I’ve previously alluded to. (And kicking a rock about is not going to refute this claim.) … In saying this, however, one ought to be careful to distinguish inferences drawn from scientific knowledge (e.g., quantum physics’ multiple worlds) from the scientific knowledge itself (e.g. particles have been observed to predictably behave in certain ways).

So, that one exception I’ve so far alluded to is simply this: the mainstream paradigm in most fields of empirical science contains the inference that awareness has developed from out of a perfectly non-aware universe (such as in, life having developed from nonlife) … thereby implying the metaphysical primacy of matter, i.e. the metaphysics of materialism. [However, certain metaphysical suppositions, such as panpsychism as one often mentioned example, can remain noncontradictory to all scientific knowledge without relying upon this just mentioned inference … thereby having the potential of both holding on to scientific knowledge without in any way “leading to materialism”.]

It’s a very tangled philosophical subject … this issue regarding the relation between scientific knowledge and the metaphysical subject specified by the philosophy of mind (again, of which materialism/physicalism is only one variant of).

I think your definition A is the old definition prior to an established 'scientific method', back when the words 'science' and 'philosophy' were interchangeable. B sounds like the modern use of the word, and I agree with the three points as being the necessary ingredients. I would also add 'quantifiable' as an ingredient, but it may not be necessary.

With one singular, possible exception, there is absolutely nothing of scientific knowledge (in sense B) that “necessarily leads to materialism”. — javra

I agree, and I think it can be proven: If a non-materialist philosophy is about things that are not observable, and science deals only with things that are observable, then science could never prove or disprove such a philosophy, as the things in question stand outside of the data set of science.

the mainstream paradigm in most fields of empirical science contains the inference that awareness has developed from out of a perfectly non-aware universe (such as in, life having developed from nonlife)… thereby implying [...] the metaphysics of materialism — javra

Science could indeed prove that life (at least simple living things) is material, if it can create life out of non-life in a test; but this would not prove or even suggest that everything is material. For this to be a valid inference, science would have to prove through testing that all things we can think of can be created out of material things.

The thought experiments refute your claim that the principle 'no effect can be greater than the sum of its causes' fails in the example of water boiling. As such, the principle still stands. I have apparently failed to convince you of it, but it has yet to be refuted. I can provide more supporting examples upon request.

I am not sure if you are saying yes or no. Either the law of conservation of mass and energy applies in the case of the big bang, or it does not. If it does, then the big bang necessarily possessed all the mass and energy found in the universe today. If not, then not. While the laws of physics may change, logic does not. — Samuel Lacrampe

You can always rescue a vague premise by retreating to less controversial, though usually less interesting positions, and this is what you've done by reducing what sounded like a universal and far-reaching metaphysical principle to some particular references to popular physics. I think we have explored this avenue as far as it would go.

If I were to give my most generous summary, it would be something like the principle of causal closure: The universe evolved from its earlier states according to some constant (though not necessarily deterministic) laws. Any earlier state of the universe had the potential to evolve into its present state, with no outside influx or interference, nothing other than its instantaneous state and the timeless laws. And we can trace this process to the earliest times that are open to empirical investigation, beyond which we can only speculate. That early post-Big Bang universe, that undifferentiated "particle soup," was already energized with potential to bring about the present world, complete with stars, planets, cellphones and Donald Trump.

But this potential cannot be located in any one attribute, such as energy (which, as I tried to explain, is difficult to apply beyond local interactions, to the universe as a whole). Already from classical thermodynamics we know that no amount of energy is sufficient to bring about change: there also has to be a disequilibrium. And even then the change is not guaranteed to result in anything interesting (from our subjective, biocentric point of view): as you must have read somewhere, if, for instance, fundamental constants were different, we could have ended up with a universe full of nothing but black holes, or a universe with no complex chemistry.

Which brings me to your fine-tuning argument:

You are correct that the argument is founded on these assumptions, but they also seem rather common sensical. As such, they are the prima facie and the onus of proof is on the other side. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, what may be regarded as "commonsensical" is the original statement: that the (putative) initial configuration of the universe was extremely improbable. That seems like a very common idea. I cannot tell now whether it ever seemed commonsensical to me, because I have since given it a closer look and went beyond common sense - which is what a philosopher is supposed to do, you know. And when I deconstructed the implicit assumptions, they turned out to be quite arbitrary and contrived. I do not accept the burden of disproving them, because I cannot see any reason to hold them true in the first place.

Regarding assumption 2: We don't need to know what is outside of the universe. We can just use logic: either the process is random or it is not. If random, then it results in the existence of our configuration to be highly improbable, therefore making the 'random' hypothesis highly improbable in return. If not, then the process is deterministic or designed, which in turn points to a designer. — Samuel Lacrampe

You are assuming that there was a process, which is the assumption that I challenge. If we are talking about the physical universe as all there is that is physical, then there could not be any physical process that brought it about. To assume a process is to beg the question, because such process could only be supernatural (and yet somehow having physical effects).

If not, then the process is deterministic or designed, which in turn points to a designer. — Samuel Lacrampe

You are kidding, right?

You can always rescue a vague premise by retreating to less controversial, though usually less interesting positions, and this is what you've done by reducing what sounded like a universal and far-reaching metaphysical principle to some particular references to popular physics. — SophistiCat

You keep saying that the principle has been reduced to the laws of physics. When in our conversation has it been reduced? Here is an example that uses the principle without it being reduced to the laws of physics: knowledge and information. If I give you info, you gain the info, and I don't lose it; thus this causal relation does not follow the law of conservation of mass and energy. And yet, it follows the principle that 'no effect can be greater than its causes', because you can gain the exact amount of info I give, or less (by not listening or forgetting), but cannot gain more from me than what I give. This is also implied in Hume's work when he claims that 'each simple idea is derived from a simple impression, so that all our ideas are ultimately derived from experience'.

I suggest we drop the big bang conversation because it was always just a thought experiment on my end to see what conclusion to draw if only the laws of physics exist; which I don't believe to be the case.

You are assuming that there was a process, which is the assumption that I challenge.

If there is a cause to the existence of the universe, then there is a 'process' from the cause to the effect. If not, then not. I suppose this brings us back to the original disagreement on the 'Nothing comes from nothing' principle. Do you really believe this principle to be false? If so, then we should focus on this fundamental point before anything else.

You are kidding, right?

Too soon?

You keep saying that the principle has been reduced to the laws of physics. When in our conversation has it been reduced? — Samuel Lacrampe

Granted, you never did commit to it being a physical principle. But then you never did commit to any systemic explanation. Rather, for some specific examples you found a specific property that fits, be it energy or material or information. Meanwhile, it seems that when we look at any causal process, most of the properties involved do not fit into the scheme of being handed down from the cause in a diminished form, for various reasons. Which is why I remain of the opinion that this principle is an ill-fitting and unhelpful metaphor.

If there is a cause to the existence of the universe, then there is a 'process' from the cause to the effect. If not, then not. I suppose this brings us back to the original disagreement on the 'Nothing comes from nothing' principle. Do you really believe this principle to be false? If so, then we should focus on this fundamental point before anything else. — Samuel Lacrampe

Rather than saying that I deny the "nothing comes from nothing" principle, I would say that I find it unclear and unhelpful. The principle that I would be comfortable with is the principle of causal closure that I outlined above. I wouldn't say that causal closure is necessarily the case, but it is something I am comfortable accepting as a working assumption, seeing that it fits well with experience and that without it any empirical conclusion would be on shaky ground.

However, the causal closure principle characterizes the physical world and its states or events in relation to each other. Any cause in this context would necessarily be of this world. Which is why it would be incoherent to talk about the cause of the universe. If you have something else in mind, some other rending of the "nothing comes from nothing" principle, then you would have to explain it and motivate its acceptance.

Returning to the 'process' that is responsible for the shape of the universe, perhaps I was too dogmatic in arguing that it is necessarily non-physical. I can imagine a cosmological model in which the universe has a beginning in time, and in which some of its attributes are randomly selected at T=0. If this model of the beginning is continuous with the model of the evolution of the universe, then it could be viable. But it would need to be argued for, it's not something we should all assume as a default.

Here is my attempt to demonstrate that the principle 'Nothing comes from nothing' is necessary:

Let nothing=0. Let something=x, where x>0.
Mathematically, 0≠x, and 0+0≠x
Therefore x cannot result out of 0; otherwise 0=x, or 0+0=x would be possible.
Therefore nothing can come from nothing.

This is just an analogy for what you wish to demonstrate. An analogy can illustrate an argument, but it cannot stand for an argument.

The analogy is not even a good one. A mathematical 0 is not nothing - it is an entity with its arithmetic properties. Your analogy suggests that prior to the universe there was something, some kind of an empty state - a vacuum, a void? And that void was transformed into the universe as we know it. That sounds like some of our religious creation stories, but this would not be consistent with the universe, the totality of all physical being, having a beginning. Because, just like zero is a mathematical entity with properties, that void, that primordial state that was transformed into the universe-as-we-know-it is a state of something, and therefore it should still be considered as belonging to the universe-at-large.

As it happens, the astrophysicist Laurence M. Krauss wrote a popular book provocatively titled A Universe from Nothing, in which he, to the annoyance of some philosophers, draws on that same ex nihilo dictum to outline some actual, though still speculative, cosmological proposals, in one of which the Big Bang universe arises from a kind of primordial void state. Except, as critics were quick to point out, that "nothing" is very much a something, characterized by physical properties (the laws of relativistic quantum mechanics), even though it lacks many of the attributes that we conventionally associate with physicality, such as spacial extension.

The moral is that if you are going to make something out of the "nothing comes from nothing" principle, you cannot take it too literally, on the pain of self-contradiction.

I disagree with your claim that 0 is only analogous to nothing, and I claim they represent the same concept. 'Nothing' means 'no things', means 'zero things' means 'zero'. 0x = 0y = 0z = 0, and this is true for whatever x, y, or z may be, including properties.

I will grant you that at least one thing remains: the laws of logic; since I rely on mathematics (logic of numbers) to demonstrate that 'nothing comes from nothing' is true. But I trust you agree that logic transcends the physical world, as opposed to being dependent on it.

0! = 1, and most mathematicians most of the time would say 0⁰ = 1. This is not a profitable avenue for you to stroll down.

I believe we are scraping the bottom of the barrel here.

0! = 1 — Srap Tasmaner

Yes; that is because there is 1 way to arrange 0 objects. But then it is also true that there is 1 way to arrange nothingness, and so this does not prove that 0 and nothingness are not the same thing.

most mathematicians most of the time would say 00 = 1 — Srap Tasmaner

Wow. I had no idea some people thought that. Who knew that arguing about math would be so hard. I guess Descartes was over-optimistic when he claimed that math was the one field without any ambiguity.


Possibly. Let me try one last attempt from a different approach: If you believe that the principle 'nothing comes from nothing' is not always true, then does it follow that you would not be surprised, when putting one apple and another apple in an empty bag, to sometimes find three apples later?

Wow. I had no idea some people thought that. Who knew that arguing about math would be so hard. I guess Descartes was over-optimistic when he claimed that math was the one field without any ambiguity. — Samuel Lacrampe

It's worse than you think. Math is fairly unambiguous once you lay down all the rules, but the rules are completely up to you. There is no the logic of numbers: you are free to make up any logic; you are even free to define what numbers are. Math is a pure play of imagination. And that is why you are never going to get any empirical or metaphysical argument out of math alone. We make up mathematical axioms and construct mathematical models, but their application to reality is an extra-mathematical, extra-logical step. Arithmetical operations with zero do not inherently represent anything other than the mechanics of a formal system. If you want to say that they stand for some metaphysical idea, you have to argue metaphysics, not math.

Let me try one last attempt from a different approach: If you believe that the principle 'nothing comes from nothing' is not always true, then does it follow that you would not be surprised, when putting one apple and another apple in an empty bag, to sometimes find three apples later? — Samuel Lacrampe

Of course not. Why would you ever think otherwise? I expect the familiar world to be orderly and to function in certain ways, and the situation that you describe would not be compatible with my expectations. That's not to say that there is something logically wrong with that scenario, but nomologically I would not expect it to happen.

And you have once again locked yourself into this faulty analogy in which nothing is like an empty bag. But if there is a bag, then there already is something, and the only something that we know is our physical world that seems to operate according to certain rules, such as conservation laws.

Regarding math: I wouldn't disconnect it from reality. Engineers design planes to stay in the air using math. Furthermore, it seems to me that 2+2=4 is a necessary truth, as I cannot imagine it to be otherwise. For my knowledge, could you give an example of an axiom that would change the classic logic? I have heard that claim before but never saw an example of it.

That's not to say that there is something logically wrong with that scenario, but nomologically I would not expect it to happen. — SophistiCat

Very well, but if you expect things in the universe to behave that way, (i.e. apples don't just appear by themselves) then why not expect it for the universe as a whole? The universe is just the sum of its parts.

And you have once again locked yourself into this faulty analogy in which nothing is like an empty bag. — SophistiCat

This is a misunderstanding. I was merely using the empty bag to represent a closed system. The nothingness is represented by the non-existence of the third apple, before it coming to existence by itself; and this non-existence state is independent of the bag.

Regarding math: I wouldn't disconnect it from reality. Engineers design planes to stay in the air using math. Furthermore, it seems to me that 2+2=4 is a necessary truth, as I cannot imagine it to be otherwise. For my knowledge, could you give an example of an axiom that would change the classic logic? I have heard that claim before but never saw an example of it. — Samuel Lacrampe

As far as pure mathematics and logic are concerned, their plurality is not even controversial. A mathematical or logical system is given by its axioms and definitions, and those can certainly be varied. Indeed, mathematicians have explored numerous mathematics and logics - either for their utility to solving problems, or just for their interesting features and possibilities.

Of course, when we use mathematics to construct empirical models, we have less freedom, since presumably there is only one way in which the world is, and not every model will be equally suitable for describing it. There also are quite definite ways in which we structure our thought and discourse, though here we also confront the question of normativity.

These constraints still leave us with a considerable choice of mathematics and logics of varying utility, but my point is that there is nothing necessary about the constraints themselves (leaving out normativity of logic, as that opens another can of worms).

Very well, but if you expect things in the universe to behave that way, (i.e. apples don't just appear by themselves) then why not expect it for the universe as a whole? The universe is just the sum of its parts. — Samuel Lacrampe

My expectations with regard to apples and other things in the universe are justified in the context of my expectation of the universe's regular, lawful constitution. But what would be the context for the universe as a whole? It doesn't emerge from summing up the parts; all you get are boundary conditions.

A mathematical or logical system is given by its axioms and definitions, and those can certainly be varied. — SophistiCat

Is it possible to change the math axioms such that 1+1=3 is mathematically possible? If not, then the scenario of 3 apples resulting from 2 apples is logically impossible. [Note: this is a lot like the argument 0≠x above, except here we don't need to agree about what 0 really is. I trust that numbers 1, 2 and 3 are much less ambiguous.]

But what would be the context for the universe as a whole? — SophistiCat

Maybe I was not clear. Let me rephrase what I meant in a syllogism:
- The prima facie for all things in the universe is to expect that things don't come from nothing.
- The universe is just the sum of all things in it. (Just like the ocean is just the sum of all water drops in it).
- Therefore, the prima facie for the universe is to expect that things don't come from nothings.

For my knowledge, could you give an example of an axiom that would change the classic logic? — Samuel Lacrampe

You could start here.

As far as pure mathematics and logic are concerned, their plurality is not even controversial. — SophistiCat

This is certainly true, and with logic there can even be controversy about different systems because there's already controversy about what the systems are for. Is the same thing true in mathematics? I've just never gotten that sense, but maybe I missed the really juicy controversies. For example, it's my impression that Bayesians and frequentists never end up accusing each other of not really doing mathematics.

Is it possible to change the math axioms such that 1+1=3 is mathematically possible? — Samuel Lacrampe

Well, 6 + 6 = 10 in the duodecimal system.

So it does. But this is merely changing the symbols of numbers, not the concepts the symbols represent. The number 4 can be symbolized as 4, four, IV, or really anything as long as we are clear and consistent. But its actual concept, which we can approximate as "IIII" does not change. (Note: the real concept is not necessarily made of bars, but we've got to write it down somehow.) Thus whether we write 6+6=12 in decimal system, or 6+6=10 in duodecimal system, we still mean "IIIIII"+"IIIIII"="IIIIIIIIIIII" when simplified to its concept.

Reducing the symbols to their concepts, I'll ask again:
Is it possible to change the math axioms such that I+I=III is mathematically possible? If all that is meant by 'changing axioms' is things like changing the decimal system, then I am leaning towards no.

Thanks. I have ventured in that weird place before. I am no expert at this non-classical logic thing, but my understanding is that, although different, no system of logic contradicts any other system. Rather, they each have their unique strength suitable to different applications; much like calculus is different than statistics while not contradicting each other. That said, I wonder if "changing axioms of mathematics" means something different.

"Contradicts" has a weird ring to it in this context. Some of the differences here aren't really much like the calculus/statistics distinction.

Some systems, like intuitionistic logic, set tighter restrictions on how you get from A to B. There's a sense in which it "gets along" with classical logic, but some of the things you can't do in intuitionistic logic are things people are pretty attached to.

Using more than the usual two truth-values is obviously more of a game-changer.

Logic can be treated as, in essence, of branch of mathematics, the investigation of structures for their own sake, but many are interested in logic primarily for its usefulness in formalizing reasoning. The standard classical logic was invented expressly for the purpose of formalizing mathematical argument. Some non-standard logics are of the mathematical sort, but many are attempts at remedying perceived shortcomings in classical logic as a tool for reasoning.

You could say something similar I suppose about axiomatic set theory: in some cases, it's just pure investigation, but in some cases the goal is providing a foundation for the rest of mathematics. That means at least one question that naturally arises is just how much of the existing superstructure of mathematics can be built on a given proposed foundation.

Maybe I was not clear. Let me rephrase what I meant in a syllogism:
- The prima facie for all things in the universe is to expect that things don't come from nothing.
- The universe is just the sum of all things in it. (Just like the ocean is just the sum of all water drops in it).
- Therefore, the prima facie for the universe is to expect that things don't come from nothings. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, you were clearer before, and going back to vague expressions like "things don't come from nothing" or "just the sum of all things in it" is not helping.

All things in the universe are part of one causal structure - not necessarily so, but I am willing to accept this as a premise. This is the only sense of "things don't come from nothing" that I understand and am willing to accept. But this premise doesn't scale up to the universe as a whole. The universe is not a part of any structure, assuming the universe is all there is.

Is it possible to change the math axioms such that 1+1=3 is mathematically possible? — Samuel Lacrampe

Not possible if what you are trying to model is intuitive arithmetics. Otherwise, of course, you can redefine any of the symbols and introduce different axioms. We invent mathematics, but we often invent it for particular ends - for ordering and measuring, for instance, for which we have invented numbers. In that sense numbers and arithmetics cannot be much different than what they are, since we know in advance what they are supposed to be like.

The position I propose to defend is weak naturalism. Conforming broadly to the standard of scientific inquiry known as methodological naturalism, it can be distinguished from the stronger position of philosophical naturalism, which claims categorically that the natural world is all there is. — Hugh Harris

If "natural" means "not man-made", then Naturalism is obviously incorrect, because there are many man-made things.

If "natural" doesn't mean "man-made", then what does it mean??

What would then be an example of something unnatural?

I suggest that the unstated definition of "Natural" is "Physical". Naturalists are evidently using an unstated assumption that what's natural consists only of what's Physical. ...meaning the physical world is the Ground of All Being, and the fundamentally existent and primary thing. ...the thing that is metaphysically prior to everything else (if there is anything else).

That's implied merely by the use of "Natural" to mean "Physical".

I suggest that, as has been suggested elsewhere, "Naturalism" is being used as a currently-more-popular word for "Physicalism". ...more vague in meaning, but that vagueness makes it less criticizable (To criticize a position, you first have to pin-down what its proponents mean.)

Also, if Naturalists can succeed with establishing, in the conversation, the assumption (presumably so obvious that it needn't be stated :D ) that all that's natural consists of what's physical, then their (however-labeled) Physicalism is sold without explicit labeling of it.

As nearly as I can guess, then, "Natural" means "Physical", and "Supernatural" means "not Physical".

So, just by definition, then, anything that doesn't agree with Physicalism is a belief in the Supernatural :D

And that's literally true, by the definitions (in the paragraph before last) of "Natural" and "Supernatural".

What's the point of that? Well, maybe that "the Supernatural" is usually taken to mean superstition, and contravention of physical law.

So, by (intended?) implication, when you call every Idealism a belief in the Supernatural, your audience is supposed to equate Idealism with the contravention of physical law, that takes place in the familiar movies about the Supernatural. ...you know, vampires, werewoleves...and anything other than Physicalism :D

So these two different meanings for "Supernatural" can serve to make it sound as if anything other than Physicalim is like Vampires, walking mummies, werewolves, witchcraft...etc.
.
I'll add that Physicalism (by any name, including "Naturalism") loses, by the Principle of Parsimony, to Skepticism, the metaphysics that I propose in my discussion-thread "A Uniquely Parsimonious and Skeptical Metaphysics", in the Metaphysics and Epistemology forum.





I'm also contending that naturalism is more probable than supernaturalism.

You said:

Weak naturalism: as far as we know, the natural world is all there is.

Well, taken literally, doesn't that mean that everyone is a Naturalist? I can say that I don't believe in anything that isn't natural (unless "natural" means not manmade).
.
It's just that "Naturalists" presume the authority to say what "natural" means.

I defend the claim that naturalism is more probable than supernaturalism, in my essay Naturalism versus Supernaturalism- the false dichotomy – I argue that the observance of the natural world along with its laws combined with the absence of any evidence of the supernatural, amounts to a strong prima facie case for naturalism

Yes, I agree that there are no vampires or werewolves.

But no, that doesn't support Physicalism, however labeled.

What there is "no evidence for" is the claim that the physical universe is the Ground of All Being, the reason for everything else, or maybe just all that there is. There's "no evidence for" the brute-fact of that fundamental, primary Existent that you regard this physical universe as.

, and its likelihood in comparison to the sans-evidence claims of supernaturalism.

Is Idealism "Supernaturalism" by your meaning?

The Idealist metaphysics that I propose in the post that I've referred you to (above) doesn't need or make any assumptions, or posit any brute-fact(s). ...unlike Physicalims, or "Naturalism" (regardless of whether or not there's some difference between the two).

Michael Ossipoff

I find this to be a tricky subject because the concept "nature" is not too clear and distinct on my view, as opposed to say, physicalism, which asserts that everything is in some way physical.

Can you offer up a tight definition of "nature" so that I can try to evaluate my thoughts on weak naturalism?

No, you were clearer before, and going back to vague expressions like "things don't come from nothing" or "just the sum of all things in it" is not helping. — SophistiCat

I will put this argument on hold to focus on the next one for now.

Not possible if what you are trying to model is intuitive arithmetics. Otherwise, of course, you can redefine any of the symbols and introduce different axioms. — SophistiCat

You can change the symbols (such as from decimal system to duodecimal system as discussed above) but the concept of the number remains the same. For simplicity, we can strip the symbol away from the number, and thus 1=I, 2=II, 3=III, 4=IIII as so on. Thus the question can phrased as:
Is it possible to change the math axioms such that I+I=III is mathematically possible?
I will go with no. Objections?

Some non-standard logics are of the mathematical sort, but many are attempts at remedying perceived shortcomings in classical logic as a tool for reasoning. — Srap Tasmaner

That is my thought as well. Non-classical systems are an addition to the classical system when classical logic has reached it limits, and not in opposition to it. What follows is that if one was able to logically prove a case using classical logic, then no non-classical systems would be able to disprove it.

Is it possible to change the math axioms such that I+I=III is mathematically possible?
I will go with no. Objections? — Samuel Lacrampe

Not possible if the numbers represent an already given concept of "counting numbers" (or similar). The concept then shapes the pattern, gives the requirements for the mathematical formalism.

Glad to see we can still find some solid ground in math. But now I see a possible contradiction with what you said earlier, regarding the apple scenario. I asked if, by denying the principle that 'nothing comes from nothing', you expected that 3 apples could result out of 2 apples; and you said it was logically possible:

That's not to say that there is something logically wrong with that scenario, but nomologically I would not expect it to happen. — SophistiCat

But if we agree that I+I=III is mathematically impossible, then it is impossible for 3 apples to result from 2 apples. We just need to replace the bars "I" with apples to see this.