Suffering is presence-in-the-world, while material substance altogether lacks presence, yet the latter rules modern ontology. Patently absurd. No, the real belongs to value, greater or lesser, it is the very foundation of meaning. — Constance
Of course there would not be pain without awareness of it. We live to some extent at least, conscious lives. It is very difficult to consciously eliminate intense physical pain from consciousness; we need physical intervention to achieve that. We need analgesics and anesthetics to eliminate pain.I agree. The point is, what IS it? — Constance
The world has to be first defined. — Constance
But go a step further into Kant, where Hegel got it. The universal is part of the structure of language's logic. — Constance
Just because you cannot imagine it, does not make it impossible right? — Philosophim
So it is imaginable then. And an eternal existence can still be empirical, so then it seems logical there could be one. — Philosophim
The essential attributes of the idea of a guarantor of objective moral good must be universality, eternality and thus transcendence.
— Janus
Why? Can you prove that then more than your opinion? — Philosophim
So you can see the standards your arguments need to be raised to to counter the OP. — Philosophim
Where is your proof that an objective moral good could not possibly be an empirical existent? — Philosophim
Finally, it doesn't matter whether the existence is transcendent, empirical, etc. If it exists, it exists. — Philosophim
But so far, you have not presented anything pertinent against the actual argument, just an opinion. — Philosophim
So then we're back to the point where my points remain unchallenged. — Philosophim
Given his "fundamental question", maybe Constance has not considered (e.g.) Spinoza's conatus. — 180 Proof
But ask a more fundamental question: why do we "care"? — Constance
this passes by a very important primordiality of our existence which is at the root of ethics and religion: caring. — Constance
Caring's existential counterpart, the experience itself of the elation, the sad disappointment, the humiliation you mention above, it is this Wittgenstein could not find "in the world". — Constance
I mean, horrible pain is momentous existentially! — Constance
Lets say there's another form of existence that's not empirical. It exists right? — Philosophim
I.e. "existence is" a sentence fragment. — 180 Proof
I'm still considering it, but if I no longer respond, it's not out of defensiveness, it's out of a feeling you have no idea what I'm trying to convey. — Wayfarer
I think It’s essential that you learn to feel what you cannot know. Coming to think of it, this is a large part of what 'mindfulness meditation' comprises - learning that the verbal or discursive element of your being is only one facet of a much greater whole. — Wayfarer
Its not an opinion. You didn't address the arguments of the OP. No citation of the steps, nor refutation of the specific reasoning given. — Philosophim
But, I'll try a different tack (which amounts to the same thing):
d. Assume the answer is no.
e. If it is the case that there is something objective which concludes there should be no existence, that objectivity must exist.
f. But if it exists, then according to itself, it shouldn't exist.
g. If it shouldn't exist, then the answer "No" objectively shouldn't exist thus contradicting itself. — Janus
You've given a personal opinion, but not a refutation of the OP. Its ok, I know not everyone reads and understands the OP. — Philosophim
They would have to be, or they aren’t propositions at all. That’s the mistake you keep making: you think there are types of propositions. — Bob Ross
You can't or won't say what kind of imaginable truth makers apart from people believing them there could be for the former
I already did: I said it would be what is morally good (which is not dependent on beliefs). — Bob Ross
It can be known to be true, if what the proposition refers to corresponds to reality. — Bob Ross
Then, that is not truth, nor are they normatively binding (in the strict, traditional sense). You cannot have the cake and eat it too (; — Bob Ross
Because moral statements are not truth-apt
Then they don’t have the “form of a proposition”. — Bob Ross
Then, you don’t think they are propositions; and should abandon your view that beliefs make moral propositions true or false. You can’t just ad hoc change what a proposition is because you don’t believe moral statements fit the standard description. — Bob Ross
I have never invoked any moral beliefs, feelings, or thoughts that are propositions; but, yes, a statement can be one...that’s just the nature of propositions 101: a proposition is a truth-apt statement. — Bob Ross
They would have to be, or they aren’t propositions at all. That’s the mistake you keep making: you think there are types of propositions. — Bob Ross
You can't or won't say what kind of imaginable truth makers apart from people believing them there could be for the former
I already did: I said it would be what is morally good (which is not dependent on beliefs). — Bob Ross
It can be known to be true, if what the proposition refers to corresponds to reality. — Bob Ross
Then, that is not truth, nor are they normatively binding (in the strict, traditional sense). You cannot have the cake and eat it too (; — Bob Ross
Because moral statements are not truth-apt
Then they don’t have the “form of a proposition”. — Bob Ross
Then, you don’t think they are propositions; and should abandon your view that beliefs make moral propositions true or false. You can’t just ad hoc change what a proposition is because you don’t believe moral statements fit the standard description. — Bob Ross
I have never invoked any moral beliefs, feelings, or thoughts that are propositions; but, yes, a statement can be one...that’s just the nature of propositions 101: a proposition is a truth-apt statement. — Bob Ross
Did you understand the logic that lead to the answer being "Yes"? — Philosophim
d. Assume the answer is no.
e. If it is the case that there is something objective which concludes there should be no existence, that objectivity must exist.
f. But if it exists, then according to itself, it shouldn't exist.
g. If it shouldn't exist, then the answer "No" objectively shouldn't exist thus contradicting itself. — Philosophim
'Apologists' being anyone who questions naive realism, right? — Wayfarer
Where in the OP do I go wrong when I show you what objective goodness must be? — Philosophim
I usually can't tell from their posts what most members like Wayfarer or @Constance intelligibly mean by either of these terms. — 180 Proof
This denial of our mortality has a more basic analysis, for the question is begged, why bother with this issue at all? Fear of death assumes there is something fearful about death. — Constance
An objective morality would be an analysis of what good is apart from culture, emotions, or subjectivity.
How do you define "The Good"? I'm not using that term here so I don't know what it means. — Philosophim
No, I mean the steps that I go through on the OP to reach the conclusion. If good is "what ought to be" and there is an objective morality, it must necessarily conclude "Yes" to the question of "Should there be existence?" — Philosophim
Good is "What should be"
I conclude that if there is an objective morality, it necessarily must answer the question, "Should there be existence?" with Yes. — Philosophim
I already did, and I will, at this point, refer you to the OP. You are still fundamentally claiming that propositions can be made true or false relative to beliefs about them which is quite obviously the issue I was expounding in the OP. — Bob Ross
You are confused about how moral propositions, beliefs, and truth work: if they are true, then they are binding irregardless if the subject-at-hand realizes it or is motivated by it. — Bob Ross
Janus, you don’t believe that there is a truth of the matter about moral judgments; so I don’t see how you are confused about this: the moral judgments you are advocating for are not even attempting to get at the truth because there is no truth of the matter. This plainly follows from what you are saying. — Bob Ross
It is patently incoherent to think that a statement can and cannot be propositional; which is what you just said (with word-salad). — Bob Ross
This is an entirely separate question: I am just trying to get you to see the implications of your moral anti-realism; because you don’t see it yet. — Bob Ross
You can be shown to be wrong about logical, mathematical and empirical claims. How could you go about showing that someone is wrong regarding a metaphysical, religious or aesthetic claim?If it's games and feelings of usefulness all the way down, no one can ever be wrong about anything — Count Timothy von Icarus
Whether or not you claim moral propositions are true or false relative to one or a several beliefs about them does not get around the issue expounded in the OP. Your moral “inter-subjectivism” falls prey to the same internal inconsistencies. — Bob Ross
There’s a difference between a proposition being binding, and people being forced to honor something: the former is binding purely in virtue of the truth-value of the proposition, whereas the latter is binding insofar as one wants to avoid the consequences of not obeying it. — Bob Ross
What you have described, is the irrational position that we should impose beliefs which do not even attempt, in principle, to correspond with the truth on other people. Do you see how irrational that is? — Bob Ross
(e.g., how can something be stated in “propositional form”, yet not be a valid proposition?). — Bob Ross
All you can say is that “you believe that torturing babies is wrong”; and this is not normatively binding nor is it a moral proposition. — Bob Ross
NO. You cannot deny that “torturing babies is wrong” can be evaluated as true or false (which can only be done objectively) and then turn around and say it can be if we just evaluate people’s beliefs about it. — Bob Ross
"I feel like murdering is abhorrent" (subjectivism) and "Boo murder!" (emotivism) are in no way binding on others, and they are arguably not even binding on oneself. — Leontiskos
How does commonality between humans work because of their shared DNA?
For the same reason that there is more commonality between humans who share 99.9% of their DNA than commonality between humans and chickens who only share 60% of their DNA — RussellA
But, there is a good argument to be made that these discrete things don't exist "outside minds," even if it is the case that minds do not create these identities ex nihilo or at all arbitrarily. To my mind, this should call into question the idea that "the view from nowhere/anywhere," should be the gold standard of knowledge. Rather, things most "are what they are," when known. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Saying Torturing babies is wrong" is really just shorthand for the former "I believe......"
— Janus
but my believing that does not make it so for them
— Janus — Leontiskos
Torturing babies is wrong
I believe torturing babies is wrong
The point is that (2) does not entail (1). — Leontiskos
The obligation towards a moral proposition, is its truth-binding nature. If you deny this, then you are saying that you can affirm that it is true that “you should not torture babies” without affirming that it is true that you should not torture babies. — Bob Ross