Comments

  • Idealism in Context
    We know that such an intuition has been with humanity since there were civilizations, and no doubt before. Whether it's true or not, isn't really about one's predisposition to believe or disbelieve, wouldn't you agree?J

    The problem is that the truth (or falsity) of such intuitions is not in any way definitively decidable. We can explain the universality of such intuitions in the moral context, as I said, as stemming from a demand that there should be perfection and justice. We can explain it in the epistemological context as being due to not having scientific explanations for phenomena. And we can explain it in the existential context as being on account of a universal fear of death.
  • The Mind-Created World
    There are all kinds of things which are commonly referred to as 'things', and not all of them objects of the senses. A thing is simply something which stands out for us.
  • Idealism in Context
    Yes, my comments about certainty were meant to cover both the occurrence of the experience and the interpretation of it. So I'd call it highly likely, but by no means certain, that such experiences are "genuine" in that they do give access to a divine reality. Even using such a phrase, of course, takes us outside of philosophy entirely, in my opinion, though I know Wayfarer thinks we can expand our understanding of what philosophy is and does so as to include it.J

    Would you say that it is likely, if someone believes that certain kinds of altered states of consciousness give us access to a divine reality, that they were already inclined, most likely by cultural influences during their upbringing, to believe in a divine reality, and that others who do not have such an enculturated belief might interpret the experience as being a function of brain chemistry?

    In other words, is not this world marvelous enough, if seen through fresh eyes? Wherefore the intuition of another world? Is it not more likely on account of a demand for perfection, and the surcease of all suffering and injustice and the introjection of cultural tropes that seem to promise those, than it is an unmediated intuition?
  • On emergence and consciousness
    My general idea is that it we shouldn't be surprised if our physical science can't examine something that does not have physical properties. So examine consciousness with tools that do not have physical properties. Ideally, with tools that have the same properties consciousness has. But there is often disagreement over what those properties are.Patterner

    You assume that consciousness does not have physical properties. Is consciousness something different than being conscious?

    If yes, then what is the difference?

    If no, does not being conscious have physical properties, and is it not those physical properties that allow us to tell that consciousness is present?

    Yes to both. But we cannot hook them up to anything kind off detector and see the consciousness that their behavior suggests is present. We can see the physical correlates of consciousness, but not there consciousness.Patterner

    That might indicate that the idea of consciousness as something undetectable is a kind of reification, as distinct from simply being conscious, which is a detectable condition.
  • What is right and what is wrong and how do we know?
    Veganism prevents harm and promotes the well-being of trillions of sentient organisms. Yet, more than 99% of the humans currently alive (8.24 billion) are not yet vegan. Non-vegans kill 80 billion land organisms and 1 to 3 trillion aquatic organisms per year. Why isn't veganism legally mandatory in all countries?Truth Seeker

    What, despite the vast habitat destruction necessary to install the huge acreages of monoculture sustained with petrochemical based fertilizers and toxic insecticides, weedicides and fungicides necessary to feed the human population with grains, fruits, nuts and vegetables?
  • The Mind-Created World
    To say that what exists must be subject to a perspective is not to deny its existence; it’s to say that “existence” is only ever intelligible to us under the conditions of possible experience.Wayfarer

    On one way of reading this: that 'existence' is only ever intelligible to us under the conditions of immediate experience, what you are saying is, firstly, a dogmatic statement, since you are only entitled to say what is intelligible to you.

    Secondly saying that the idea of existence is unintelligible under said conditions just is to deny that anything can exist that is not presently subject to a perspective, or that it cannot be said to exist outside of that perspective.

    It's true that we cannot think the existence of something, in the sense of thinking what the existence is like, without applying a perspective to it, that is to say we cannot imagine what a totally perspective-less existence could be like.

    But that is not to say that we cannot coherently imagine that things can and do exist absent any perspective―that they can and do exist completely independently of us and our imaginings. It's all about nuance.

    Another possible reading is more sensible: you could be saying that we cannot say that anything exists or has existed which in principle we could not possibly experience or perceive. If that is all you are saying then I don't think I disagree, although I might need to think some more on that. Dark matter and energy come to mind, although admittedly their existence is speculative, even if supported by the physics.
  • Idealism in Context
    A tendentious "just-so" story if there ever was one! What you outline is merely one perspective of what happened historically among many others. Of course the dogmatist thinks their version is the one true account. :roll:
  • The Mind-Created World
    Vacuous question!

    Anything that appears presumably exists somehow independently of appearing. You contradict yourself when you say that you don't deny the existence of the external world, and then claim that anything that exists must be subject to a perspective. That is to conflate perception of something with its actual existence.

    If you want to get away from bare phenomenalism― the idea that all that exists are perceptions ―then you must allow that there is something, not generated by the percipient, that appears, whether it is actual existents or ideas in God's mind. Either way when it is not appearing it cannot be subject to any perspective unless in the "God's mind' scenario, God is held to have a perspective.

    Your anthropomorphism lacks credulity.
  • The Mind-Created World
    Okely dokely...well done, medium, medium rare or rare?
  • Idealism in Context
    I would say you could be fairly certain you had a mystical experience or not by comparing it to the quite substantial literature documenting reports of experiences which are classed as such. What I don't think anyone can be at all certain about is as to what could be the metaphysical implications of such experiences.

    I've had quite a few such experiences, some of them under the influence of psychedelics, and some while meditating and some while listening to or playing music, painting or writing, and some while in wild surroundings. I don't interpret them to mean anything beyond themselves―of course for me they hold a great deal of emotional force and meaning in themselves, but that meaning is not discursive. If those experiences can be given voice at all, it would be via the allusive language of poetry.
  • The Mind-Created World
    I think it should have been obvious that I didn't mean to say the dog called it a wallaby―by "we" I meant to refer to English speakers. I'll grant the sentence on an immediate glance appears to be saying something absurd. The fact that it is absurd I think should have alerted you to look for alternative interpretations. That said, I acknowledge I should have been more careful with the wording.

    You make it sound like my wording is generally obscure, but I think if it be compared with Kant's or even your own, I doubt it could be judged to be any more obscure, and if anything would probably be judged to be less obscure.

    Anyway it's rare on these forums that anyone complains that they cannot understand what I've been saying.

    I don't know if you're missing the point―which was just that the dog and I both see a wallaby, and judging by the dogs behavior towards it, he sees it as something to be eaten. I don't see wallabies as to be eaten but as to be preserved, but I have hit and killed one with my car ( on the road, not on the property I dwell on), which I subsequently ate (not my car, the wallaby, just in case I've been obscure again).
  • Idealism in Context
    Unargued dismissal by labelling, pure and simple.

    If you attained a radically altered state and felt absolutely convinced that you had insight into the true nature and meaning of "life, the universe and everything", you would no doubt think that was objective knowledge.

    But when you tried to put it into words it would become just another culturally conditioned interpretation, an interpretation which could never capture, or be adequately true to, the wordless feeling of your insight.
  • The Mind-Created World
    But I'm not denying that there is an external world. What I'm denying is that knowledge of that world is purely objective, that we can see it as it is or as it would be absent any observer.Wayfarer

    The I have no idea what we have been disagreeing about, because it is true by mere definition that we cannot see the world as it would be absent any observer.

    I had thought you took issue with the idea that we can speculate about what existed prior to humans, which just consists in imagining what we would have seen had we been there. The other point is that I don't accept the idea that things cannot exist outside of any perspective, and I'm pretty sure you disagree with that.

    My point all along has been that there is no use in arguing about that because there can be no way of determining the truth regarding that. Of course take issue with any dogmatic assertions about it given that no one could know for certain.

    So, I am not dogmatically asserting that things definitely existed prior to any percipients, or definitely exist absent any perception of them, but I do think that is the most plausible conclusion, most consistent and coherent with human experience and understanding of the world.

    We designate it as truly existent, irrespective of and outside any knowledge of it. This gives rise to a kind of cognitive disorientation which underlies many current philosophical conundrums.Wayfarer

    I don't know what conundrums you are referring to. I see more potential for conundrums in denying that things can exist absent percipients.
  • Idealism in Context
    Well, I think both Wayfarer and myself, in our different ways, are positing a non-mental self, a self that not only thinks but animates and, perhaps, connects with something larger. You're right about the cultural baggage, but as philosophers we can try to see beyond that. @Wayfarer is good at reminding us of the deeper, more thoughtful traditions of spirituality that were there long before some religions tried to codify and moralize spiritual experience. The words "spirit" or "soul" may not be helpful for a particular individual, but let's not rule out this aspect of being alive and human.J

    I have no argument with spiritual practices and faiths―I just don't like to see people interpreting such beliefs as objective knowledge, for that way lies dogma and fundamentalism. At their best, I see them as techniques for attaining altered states, even transforming the way of life.

    If life were in truth "about something" which given its apparent nature seems highly unlikely, it remains that none of us know what that "something" could be.

    We can believe or speculate that there have been sages who enjoyed such knowledge, but we don't know that. Those we think of as sages might have been deluding themselves for all we know, just as we might delude ourselves if we think that what might seem like profound insights are telling us anything real about anything real.
  • The Mind-Created World
    What I’m saying is that the frameworks through which we recognize “yellow, blue, green, red” are already the product of shared cognitive, biological, and cultural conditions. That explains the convergence without appealing to a “mind at large.”Wayfarer

    You are still missing the point. Due to the general structural and functional characteristics of the human eye most of us see the same range of colours. Humans don't see ultraviolet or infra-red. Dogs apparently only see in tones of blue and yellow. That has nothing to do with cultural conditioning. How we categorize and names the more than a million distinct colours we can detect is a function of both cultural conditioning and the similarities between the different hues and tones.

    That we agree when I point to one particular coloured particle out of hundreds as to which colour it is is not at all a function of cultural conditioning. I point at a green one say, and that you also see me pointing at a green one shows that there must be something independent of both of us that explains that, provided we accept that our perceptual organs and minds are in no hidden way connected. This is my final attempt to explain it to you―if you still don't get it, then that's pretty incredible but just too bad.

    Judgements about what is observed are interpretive and of course may differ―what is observed is not a matter of interpretation.
    — Janus

    The first is correct, the second is the contradiction of it, which makes it false. That there is a thing observed is not a matter of interpretation, corrects the contradiction.

    You’re correct….or, I agree….that you and the dog see the same thing, whatever it may be. Of the two, only you represent the thing seen with a particular concept, but you would readily admit that you haven’t a clue what the dog’s doing with his perception, but you can be sure he isn’t representing it to himself with the same conceptual reference as you.
    Mww

    It is not merely that there is a thing observed, but that the fact that there is a particular kind of thing observed is also not a matter of subjective interpretation. We both see the dog there and we both class the thing as being a dog, so what you seem to be thinking of as the interpretation only relates to the classing, and the classing is not a subjective interpretation, but a shared practice of naming. If there was a cat or any other other object there neither of us would see a dog.

    The dog and I both see something we call a wallaby. I know he sees an animal there and not a runaway trail bike, because if he catches what he sees, he may start to eat it. So, then I know he sees, just as I do, something suitable to be eaten.

    I confess I don't understand what you or the quoted passage from Kant is attempting to convey. Can you explain?

    The difference between the action of gravity on our experience and the action of a universal mind, for example, may be that one appears in the external world of appearances where we measure things and the other doesn’t.Punshhh

    I agree, and for me this means that gravity is a definite part of our experience whereas a universal mind is not―the latter is purely speculative.

    I have an affinity with these concepts as I am concerned with realising our limitations and developing ways to view our limitations in the context of our lives (living a life), for example.Punshhh

    I have no argument with that―we each have affinities for different ideas.
  • The Mind-Created World
    You will agree with me as to whether it is yellow, blue, green or red, undoubtedly. Can you explain how your "common set of cognitve, cultural and linguistic practices" can account for that agreement?Janus

    Don't worry about the original post or QM, just answer the straightforward question above if you can. What is at issue is the explanatory power of your idealist thesis absent the inclusion of 'mind at large', collective mind, universal mind, God.

    I just can't believe you don't see the problem.

    It goes directly against your contention that every observer sees the same thing when the observations show they don’t.Wayfarer

    Are you saying that the fact that there are different conceptual interpretations of the experimental results goes against my claim that every observer sees the same thing? Well, it doesn't― just as it is possible that people can pass different judgements about anything that is seen doesn't entail that what has been seen is different.

    It is not that different things are observed, but that the class that what has been observed should be placed in, or the explanation for what is observed, may differ from person to person. Judgements about what is observed are interpretive and of course may differ―what is observed is not a matter of interpretation.

    As to that I meant that when the 'two slit experiment' is carried out every observer sees the inference pattern, and when they pass light through one slit every observer sees the accumulation of points on the photographic plate.
  • Arguments From Underdetermination and the Realist Response
    I don't think 'material cause' and 'formal cause' are particularly interesting, but I do think there is a valid distinction between proximate and global cause. I prefer to think of the latter as conditions rather than causes, as I said.

    I think logical structure, linguistic and semantic relations, normative and evaluative judgements and so on all come into how our explanations are structured. However, I still think that when it comes to explaining any natural event, efficient cause and general conditions form the backbone that carries the flesh of "structure, linguistic and semantic relations".

    Also I am addressing only explanations of natural non-living phenomena― I acknowledge that explanations of animal and human behavior may be given in terms of reasons instead of causes. The overall set of conditions under which actions are taken by animals and humans will also obviously come into play in any explanation. Reasons as well as causes are constrained by global conditions.
  • The Mind-Created World
    It's not dogmatic; it is a phenomenological reflection on our everyday experience. Our everyday experience shows us clearly that we live in a shared world. It can even be seen as an empirical fact, as it can be demonstrated so easily.

    What you are gleaning from physics is just one interpretation―the one you resonate with―there is no solid consensus that your interpretation is the correct one. Also you are not an expert in that field, by any means, which gives you even less warrant to cite it.

    The commonalities of our sensory organs and cognitve, cultural and linguistic practices cannot on their own explain the fact that we all see the same things at the same times and places. At most it can only explain what might tend to stand out for us, or the general form our perceptions take―for example in regard to the part of the electromagnetic spectrum we can detect, or the limitations on the acoustic frequencies we can detect―as well as the names we give to the things we encounter, and the we have conceptions of them, such as their purpose, place in human life and so on.

    Even if it could explain how it is that humans see the same world, it cannot explain the fact that our observations show that our dogs see the same things we do, for example. I live on a fifteen acre property and there are many wallabies. When I walk the dogs I will often catch sight of a wallaby, and the dogs will also, and if I don't restrain them they will be off chasing it. Now the wallaby may look different to dogs than it does to us on account of the fact, among others, that when it comes to colours, they can apparently only see in blue and yellow, but it is undeniable that they see what I call "the wallaby".

    I have asked you to explain how "a common set of cognitve, cultural and linguistic practices" could determine our seeing precisely the same things. Say, for example you and I have in front of us a white A4 sheet of paper covered with "hundreds and thousands" (I'm sure you are familiar with those little coloured sweet grains). I take a very sharp pencil and point precisely to just one of the hundreds of grains, and ask you what colour it is. You will agree with me as to whether it is yellow, blue, green or red, undoubtedly. Can you explain how your "common set of cognitve, cultural and linguistic practices" can account for that agreement?
  • Idealism in Context
    Good comments. The key point is ‘participatory’ - not being a bystander.Wayfarer

    I'm not sure what you mean by "bystander". By "participatory" perhaps you mean something like "present"―that is, not "off in your head" all consumed by the "internal dialogue"? The alternative to being in the head would seem to be inhabiting the body, as aware as possible of all the sensory inputs and the spontaneous feelings they generate. Philosophy, on the other hand, is a cerebral activity.

    ↪Wayfarer ↪Ludwig V ↪Janus Didn't Aristotle say that the mind resided in the heart?J

    I seem to dimly remember reading something like that. Julian Jaynes has an interesting theory that Greek people in Homerian times did not identify thoughts as being their own, but as being the voices of the gods. (This is a simple characterization―I read his book decades ago). Presumably they would have assumed their sensations and emotions belonged to them.

    I find that fascinating because, as y'all have pointed out, it seems irresistible to me to locate my self or "I" within my head. Or perhaps a better way to say it is: I can't help locating the part of consciousness which thinks, perceives, and imagines as being within my head; but that leaves open the possibility that spirit or soul should be identified with breath, heart, or guts. So a deeper or more cosmic "I" is not necessarily conceived as mental.

    But then there's the Third Eye, which opens in . . . the head.
    J

    As I said earlier, I share your affliction. Jesper Hoffmeyer in Biosemiotics makes a case for locating the self in the skin, as it is by far the body's largest and most sensitive organ and is our primary interface with the world.

    I don't know about "spirit" and "soul"―it seems very difficult to think in terms of those without carrying all the unacceptable cultural baggage that comes with them.

    A speculative "cosmic" "self" such as Brahma or God is not necessarily thought as either mental or physical. In fact a universal cosmic being is not necessairly thought of even as a "self"―for example Spinoza conceives God as being synonymous with Nature, and the mental and the physical as being just two of its infinite attributes.
  • The Mind-Created World
    Madhyamaka philosophers say that ālaya-vijñāna risks reifying consciousness into a hidden essence or foundational mind.Wayfarer

    I guess I would agree with the Madhyamika philosophers. Because on the other hand without such a reification, it becomes merely an idea, and thus seems to lose all explanatory power.

    I always comes back to this basic problem―experience shows us that we all see the same things at the same times and places is unquestionable that we live in a shared world. On the other hand there is no evidence that our minds are connected in any way such as to be able to explain that shared experience. The default assumption is that things we encounter are real existents that don't depend for their existence on our encountering them. So that model explain why we would experience a shared world. The idealist alternative would be to assume a hidden collective mind or consciousness, or a universal mind of which we are all manifestations, and that could be the Abrahamic God, Brahma, or some creator deity.

    I don't see gravity as a good analogy because its effects are measurable. I believe that the idea of independently existing things makes sense―others see problems with it, but it seems those problems stem form assumptions that I don't share.

    The idea of a shared or collective mind is not logically contradictory, so it makes sense in that sense, but I think the idea is extremely underdetermined by our everyday experience.

    CPR, B311Paine

    That's an interesting passage from Kant―I don't remember encountering it before. It seems to undercut any move towards dualism.

    Some say that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible and that it has nothing to do with sense experience, but they seem to forget that Kant's categories were discovered by him by reflecting on perceptual experience and abstracting its general and necessary characteristics.
  • Arguments From Underdetermination and the Realist Response
    True, although it may be that there are elements of efficient causation in all those contexts, but that it is far from being the whole story.
  • Arguments From Underdetermination and the Realist Response
    OK. It's just that causal explanation, along with the metaphor of the machine, has been such an icon of what science is about that I find it hard to grasp the alternatives (apart from statistical explanations).Ludwig V


    That seems right. Efficient or proximal causation is the basis of mechanistic modeling. That kind of modeling tends to isolate the subject from its environment. For any event or change to occur there is presumably a whole network of conditions that constrain the ways in which that event or change can unfold. The most universal global condition seems to be entropy.
  • The Mind-Created World
    :up: Whenever you're ready...
  • Idealism in Context
    I'm pretty sure that our phenomenological perspective on mental phenomena is heavily conditioned by our culture. For example, it is very difficult to answer the question where (in the body) the mind is to be found in ancient greek (or roman) culture. There are good grounds for answering that it is a distinct entity - a ghost - that survives death. There are also grounds for saying that it is the breath - an interesting choice, since it isn't quite clear where the breath is. I think the best answer is that the question where the mind is was not even formulated in that culture. It requires, I would say, a culture that has already problematized mental/physical relations, as happened in Western Europe in the 17th century or so.Ludwig V

    You make a good point. I was addressing just the 'thinking' aspect of mind. When I think, whether in language or images, the activity seems to be located in my head. Of course when it comes to emotions, they seem more closely located around the heart, and if sensations are thought to be activities of the mind they extend throughout the body. When it comes to seeing the awareness seems to be "out there' in the surrounding environment. Hearing mostly, but also to a lesser extent smelling and tasting seem to be a bit more ambiguous, for me at least.

    Our organs of sight, hearing, smelling and tasting are all located in the head, and that may contribute to making it seem as though the mind is located there.

    Perhaps the ancients were not as much "in their heads" and language oriented as we are today.
  • The Mind-Created World
    I was using the digestion analogy more to point to the idea that activities in general are not strictly objects of the senses, not to address the issue of whether the brain generates thought. And yes, 'being' is explicitly a verb, and seeing it that way instead of as a noun renders it as an activity not as any kind of object (except in the very general sense that thinking of it makes it an object of thought), Being or existing would be thought of the master or umbrella activity under which all other activities find their place.

    Regarding the Ālaya-Vijñāna there is also a Theosophical idea designated the "Akashic Records", which I think bears some resemblance to the Buddhist idea. It seems that idealist thinkers have long recognized the explanatory need for some kind of collective consciousness as a substitute for the independent actuality of physical existents.

    Do you have anything to say about my contention that the idea of storehouse consciousness is an idea of a collective consciousness or mind?
  • The Mind-Created World
    I address this in another Medium essay, Is there Mind at Large? This essay interogates Kastrup's expression and compares it with Berkeleyian idealism. But then it draws on Yogācāra Buddhism, the school colloquially known as 'mind-only', to argue that it is not necessary to posit any kind of super-mind or cosmic mind.

    Although I also concede that if Kastrup simply means 'some mind' or 'mind in general', then I am in complete agreement with him. Why? I think the reification trap is associated with the tendency towards objectification, to try and consider anything real in terms of it being an object or an other. This is where Heidegger's criticism of onto-theology rings true.
    Wayfarer

    I read your essay, and I thought it was well-constructed and clearly expressed. However I remain unconvinced about the idea of a collective or universal mind being explanatorily unnecessary for an idealist thesis concerning the nature of the world and its relationship with human and animal experience.

    You cite as an alternative the Ālaya-Vijñāna or storehouse consciousness of Yogācāra Buddhism, an idea I am fairly well acquainted with from my studies of Eastern philosophies and religions. I always thought of it as a kind of collective karmic storehouse, and it is explicitly doctrinally classed as a form of consciousness. So I'm not seeing how it is not an idea of collective consciousness or mind.

    If the thought is that our individual minds are separate then what is posited, in the absence of also positing a collective mind that connects and/or coordinates them, is that, as far as minds go, it is only individual minds that exist. I don't see a "reification trap' in the sense of a 'tendency towards objectification' because neither individual minds nor collective minds are being posited as objects of the senses. I see mind as an activity of the body/brain, not as an object of the senses. It's maybe not the best analogy, but digestion is also an activity of the body, not an object of the senses.
  • Wisdom: Cultivation, Context, and Challenges
    :up: Foolish practice makes perfect foolishness? Would perfect foolishness be wisdom? (there was also a tradition of fools being wise as shown in KIng Lear).

    Maybe it's more along the lines of not being afraid to make mistakes, being playful and learning to see your foolishness, what it consists in. If I become afraid of others seeing my foolishness and hide it, then I will have less of an opportunity to see it myself.

    Wittgenstein said something similar: "Don't for heaven's sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay attention to your nonsense."

    Simpletons are something else, but I agree there is innocence in foolishness, and simpletons are also, like animals and (some) children innocent.
  • Wisdom: Cultivation, Context, and Challenges
    I wonder if it is possible to become wise by learning from the foolish? After all, with discernment, watching a fool and what happens to them can be very instructive in learning what not to do.Tom Storm

    "If the fool would persist in his folly he would become wise" William Blake
  • The Mind-Created World
    I meant as opposed to ideal. That said. I do think the materialism/ idealism dichotomy is ultimately wrongheaded, but there is a deeply entrenched distinction between the ideas of things and the things the ideas are about. Symbolic language seems to be inherently dualistic in orientation. It doesn't seem plausible that nature or reality itself could be anything but non-dual, so when we try to understand it in dualistic terms, we are always already "up against it".

    The fact of the dualism of thought and language aside, if I think of phenomena as being the very same things as noumena, just thought about in different ways according to a natural distinction that arises in a dualistically oriented mind, then I am undercutting any substantive "bifurcation".

    If I propose that the things are ideas, then I must imagine an unseen, unknowable entity―a "mind at large" to quote Kastrup, and that seems to bring in the inevitable ontological dualism involved in thinking there is a transcendent realm or reality over and above the one we know.

    And I wonder whether that isn't a "figment" generated by the dualistic nature of language―a reification or hypostatization. As I like to say "choose your poison" and it seems that people usually do, especially on philosophy forums.
  • The Mind-Created World
    You’re both looking down different ends of the telescope. That’s why it looks different.Punshhh

    I thought this comment referred to a conversation we were having in the other 'idealism' thread. I'm not so sure what it refers to in this thread.

    The noumena aren't necessarily esoteric, just as if they are in a room we can't access, so its not as 'mysterious' as one might think. But we can at least securely infer that they are there, or we'd not perceive anything.AmadeusD

    Yes, that's why I referred earlier to "bifurcation". If the things that appear have their own existence in some way (whether actual physical existents or ideas in a universal mind) they are nonetheless what lies behind our experience of phenomena. And about their nature as unperceived things we can only infer, which means that that nature is, in Kantian terms, ideal or noumenal for us.

    That said, I have my own preference for thinking that they are actual, not ideal, existents―the 'god hypothesis' I don't find so compelling.

    The idea of an "ultimate nature" seems to have troubled humanity from ancient times, and not only in the West.

    Better to know we don’t know, than to think we know something we don’t.Wayfarer

    I can't argue with that, although in practice I think we generally all do cleave to one preferred hypothesis or another. That said I've always been attracted to the kind of suspension of judgement of the Pyrrhonian Skeptics― ataraxia has its definite attractions.
  • Idealism in Context
    I've heard of Noe and that book, but never looked into it. I agree that “consciousness is an achievement of the whole animal in its environmental context”. As Timothy pointed out, the environment must be such as to be able to support life, and the brain body must be, to a sufficient degree, a healthily functioning one.

    On the other hand it does seem as though the brain generates consciousness, given that it is injuries to that organ, and not to other parts of the body (barring death of course) that are sufficient to curtail consciousness.
  • Idealism in Context
    'within' is an interesting concept in this context. It's a spatial metaphor in which brain/body is a container and the mind is something inside it. But from another perspective, the body exists 'within awareness'.Wayfarer

    I get that; it is possible to reverse perspectives. That said from a phenomenological perspective, it does seem to me that my thoughts are going on inside my head, not in my torso, arms or legs or even neck. I mean it just feels that way. So while we cannot be directly aware of neuronal activity, that activity seems to generate sensations that make it seem like thought is in the head (to me anyway).

    It's also interesting because, while the body is a locus of activity, it is not sufficient to generate a mind.Count Timothy von Icarus

    Right, what you go on to say about the body being unable to survive in unsuitable environments just indicates that a healthy living body is usually sufficient to generate consciousness. I say "usually" because there are phases of deep sleep wherein consciousness doesn't seem to be present.
  • The Mind-Created World
    You haven't said anything I didn't already know. Anything about which we can know nothing is noumenal. "Know" here means 'have cognitive access to'. If the ultimate nature of a physical existent is unknowable, then it is noumenal. If there are unknowable aspects of physical existents then those aspects are noumenal.

    It is meaningless to say "noumena are not nothing, they are less than nothing". That's just philosobabble.
  • The Mind-Created World
    Corrections require cogent argument and explanation. "No" is a useless comment.
  • The Mind-Created World
    Totally useless comments.
  • The Mind-Created World
    OK, that makes sense. The only thing I wonder about is whether Kant's noumena are logically required. To explain the fact that we all see the same things and inhabit a common world it would seem that something beyond mere individual perceptions, something beyond the perceptual in general, is required. So phenomenalism seems highly implausible and it has no explanatory power at all.

    I guess strictly speaking, even if what that "something beyond" is is just a world of physical existents, it can be said that they are noumenal to us. On the other hand we perceive objects, so the objects are not unknown to us even though there may be things about them we don't or even cannot, know. For example it seems we could never be certain about the ultimate or most basic constitution of physical things.

    In that case it would not be a case of there being noumenal things, but noumenal aspects of things. If things are ideas in the mind of God, we might know all about the things because God makes everything about them to be discoverable, and there is nothing unknowable left over about them at all. But we still
    wouldn't know that that was the case.

    I'd like to be Sam, but I won't insist.Wayfarer

    I'm happy enough with being Ralph.
  • The Mind-Created World
    :lol: Which one are you?

    I'm not sure what you are saying, and I can't think of an example of what I think you might be saying. Can you give an example for clarification.

    Please don't take this personally, but the reason I often don't respond to your posts is that it seems as though your interpretation of what I've said that you're disagreeing with seems to me so far from what I intended that I find it difficult to get enough purchase on what you are saying to respond.
  • Idealism in Context
    That presupposes that our minds and reality exist in the same space. Since our minds are not physical objects, that cannot be the case.Ludwig V

    Does the mind, as an activity say rather than an object, not reside within the brain/body?