Yep, I guess it could be.

It is my understanding that an asteroid hitting earth about 65 million years ago caused the extinction of many species of animals, including the dinosaurs. If that hadn't happened, it is likely that humans never would have evolved. If that's true, did that asteroid impact cause our existence? — T Clark

There are efficient causes and then there are overall conditions. Perhaps the overall conditions for the evolution of humans would not have obtained if the asteroid had not hit. Some seem to consider overall conditions to be equivalent to final causation not efficient causation.

in fact in the case of metaphysics I would say there can be no certainty at all, that it all comes down to plausibility, because we are dealing with the non-cognitive.
— Janus
If metaphysics is about the non-cognitive (which needs a bit more fleshing out), are we sure that certainty and plausibility even apply? — Ludwig V

That's an interesting question. If everything we cognize is counted as "physical", then would not metaphysics, thought of being what is beyond the scope of physics, or any other science, be thus taken to be dealing with the non-cognitive?

Why do we need to talk in terms of 'knowledge that' when nothing is lost by talking instead of 'justifiably believing that'?
— Janus
Well, if there were something to be gained, it might be a change worth making. But so long as we distinguish between true beliefs and false ones, the issues remain. — Ludwig V

I want to note that I'm not saying we don't know anything—I'm saying that in those cases where we can be said to know something, we know (again, radical skepticism aside) that what we know is true. It seems to me if we do not know that, then it doesn't count as knowledge but as belief. It could be justified belief, and then it would that its truth is highly plausible, but that still falls short of knowing it is true.

It seems to me that your meteorite example with the conclusion that you should "take your cue from society" and ignore the mere possibility just counts as an example of a justified belief—you don't know that a meteorite is not going to strike you on the head, but you could be said to know that the chance of its happening is miniscule, so knowing that it is highly unlikely means that believing it would be to believe in an extremely implausible event.

If it is wrong to believe something that might not be the case, then, presumably, it is equally wrong not to believe something that is the case. The more cautious you are in avoiding false beliefs, the more you risk not accepting true beliefs. — Ludwig V

I don't know...perhaps you are misunderstanding me—I'm not talking at all about being cautious in trying to avoid false beliefs. but about avoiding thinking and saying that I know something if I cannot be certain about it.

We can only pretend something that is possible. So if something is possibly false and we can pretend to know it, then it must be possible to actually know it. — Ludwig V

I'm not certain what you are saying here, but the question that comes to mind is whether it is possible to know something without knowing that know it. The very idea just seems wrong to me. JTB does seem to make this possible, and for me that is to its detriment.

The Matrix Hypothesis I think is absurd, because it posits that there is a real world in which the virtual world we inhabit is sustained, and this means the need for explanation is just pushed one step further back.
— Janus

But Descartes' doubt isn't about explanation. He believes it's possible to doubt whether my experiences are veridical -- that is, of the things they appear to be of. He's not questioning experience in general. The Matrix hypothesis would represent such a doubt. — J

I'm not saying that Descartes considered the Matrix hypothesis at all—I don't think he did— because as I said I think the Evil Demon scenario is really very different, apart form the idea of being radically deceived in both scenarios.

In the Matrix scenario there is no skepticism about the real world—in fact that is what those who see through the virtual illusion are trying to get back to. If Descartes considered this he would still be faced with the question of being able to doubt the purported real world just as much as he can doubt the virtual world of the Matrix.

By introducing "explanation" I meant to refer to the question as to how we could be certain of the reality of anything. We can doubt the virtual world, but how can we be certain of the reality of the world within which the Matrix is sustained?

.

He wants the grand prize -- absolute certainty, beyond even the possibility of doubt. I personally feel that we don't need that in order to do metaphysics and epistemology; Descartes disagreed, hence his Method. But we really shouldn't see him as raising "philosophers' doubts" for the sake of skepticism. He detested skepticism and believed he had refuted it. (And we have a perfectly good modern version of the Evil Demon: the "Matrix hypothesis.") — J

I think absolute certainty is as impossible as radical doubt. You simply cannot doubt everything—some things need to be taken for granted in order to doubt. I agree with you that we don't need absolute certainty in order to pursue metaphysics and epistemology—in fact in the case of metaphysics I would say there can be no certainty at all, that it all comes down to plausibility, because we are dealing with the non-cognitive.

I wasn't saying Descartes raised doubts for the sake of skepticism. Quite the opposite—he was after a degree of certainty which I think is impossible. The Matrix Hypothesis I think is absurd, because it posits that there is a real world in which the virtual world we inhabit is sustained, and this means the need for explanation is just pushed one step further back.

The problem that I have with the idea of knowledge being defeasible is that if it isn't true it isn't knowledge, so if what I think I know is possibly false, then I don't really know it—so I say instead that I believe it and that it is belief, not knowledge, which is defeasible.
— Janus
I think one defeats a claim to knowledge if it is false. Possibly false is far too strong and leads to us abandoning swathes of what we know quite unnecessarily. "possible" does not imply "actual". — Ludwig V

I would say that it we determine that something is possibly false then we don't at all need to "abandon it" but merely to abandon the pretense that we know it to be so, for the more modest claim that we believe it to be so. Why do we need to talk in terms of 'knowledge that' when nothing is lost by talking instead of 'justifiably believing that'?

:lol: They're not real sunglasses and it's not a real sun in Matrixland.

OK, that seems like a good way to look at it, with perhaps the caveat that it's reasonable also to ask, "Why are you certain?" or "What makes you rely on this experience?" (similarity to previous ones, presumably). — J

Cheers, that's a fair question—and I hope I can answer it to your satisfaction. I take it that possession of knowledge obtains when there can be no doubt. For example, when I am looking at something there can be no doubt that I am looking at that thing. When I am doing something there can be no doubt that I am doing that thing. Same with feeling and thinking.

The problem that I have with the idea of knowledge being defeasible is that if it isn't true it isn't knowledge, so if what I think I know is possibly false, then I don't really know it—so I say instead that I believe it and that it is belief, not knowledge, which is defeasible.

As to Descartes, I understand his skepticism to be methodological—an attempt to determine what it is possible for him to doubt. The problem I have is that he doubts things on the mere logical possibility that he might be deceived by an Evil Demon. I think such doubt is absurd. I agree with Peirce:
"Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts" .

Agreed. I think we're speaking of self-justification here. Can you justify to yourself that "I am thinking X" is necessarily true? — J

When I think X or feel a sensation, there can be no doubt about it. So, I see no need for justification. Justification is only for beliefs, not for those things known with certainty. (Note: I leave out of consideration the kind of radical skepticism that Descartes feigned, simply because I think it is always a matter of feigning.

Ah, the sound of intellectual impotence. It's uninteresting. It's unimportant. It's irrelevant. Why in the name of John Locke should I be concerned about what you find to be uninteresting? — frank

You don't have to find the same things I do uninteresting. In fact I didn't say those merely logic possibilities are uninteresting anyway, so you are putting words in my mouth. I said they are vacuous, meaning they possess no content which could inform us, so for the purposes of metaphysical speculation, they are best ignored (unless it can be shown that they yield any material that should be taken into consideration.

In fact it is you attempting to impose your values on me, with the slur "intellectual impotence" just because you think I don't find the same things interesting that you do. Why should I be concerned about what you find interesting, especially if you cannot demonstrate that it contains anything worth taking seriously because it is something the truth of which might actually be determined?

Still, it could be a collective dream. It really could be. We don't know. :grin: — frank

That's one of those vacuous merely logical possibilities that are best ignored, because even in the unlikely event that it were true (which we could never know) it would be a difference that makes no difference.

Kant’s point is that principles like “every change in velocity has a cause” are synthetic a priori: they enable prediction, but also hold necessarily for all possible experience. That’s what allows physics to be both law-governed and universally valid. — Wayfarer

We don't know if physics is law-governed and universally valid. It's universal validity is merely an assumption and the laws may have evolved as habit (pace Peirce). Same with causation―we can only explain changes in terms of causation, and it doesn't necessarily follow that all changes are caused. Imputing causation is an inveterate habit of thought―even some animals do it.

Firstly it is science that posits the existence of dark matter and energy on the basis of observations. So, they are considered to be a part of the Universe as understood by science.

You are now saying science is not a guide, but you said this earlier:

Therefore the guide must include evidence from the empirical sciences, but not be restricted to those principles, thereby employing a method which extends beyond them. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the guide includes evidence from the empirical sciences then the empirical sciences are guiding metaphysical speculation. Intuition is always itself guided by the current state of knowledge or scientific paradigm. Intuition in unconstrained speculative free play can come up with anything that isn't a logical contradiction, so by itself is not a reliable guide at all. I don't prefer referring to it as intuition anyway, but rather as imagination―creative imagination invents hypotheses designed to explain what is observed―it's known as abduction.

That argument was, you have wildly divergent views of what quantum physics means (realist, idealist, anti-realist etc), so how can you appeal to physics for a metaphysical thesis, when these foundational issues are still a matter of controversy. — Wayfarer

The divergence merely reflects that fact that the experimental results are counter-intuitive, which leaves it open for physicists themselves, who are not immune fomr having their own metaphysical preferences, to expound those preferences.

In any case science is not confined to physics, and I would also include everyday unbiased observation under the umbrella of science, since it is the basis upon which all conjecture and hypothesizing are founded.

They're known as 'citations'. — Wayfarer

Nothing wrong with citing actual arguments, but presenting bare statements made by experts certainly seems like an appeal to authority.

But if you allow that "universe" extends to all those aspects of reality which are hidden from the empirical sciences (a very large part of reality as Wayfarer has proven), then your claim that "we have no more reliable, or even any other reliable, guide, to 'how the universe truly is" than science', must be blatantly false. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you give an example of what the concept <universe> might be extended to in order to include things
other than what is either observable or the effect of something observable?

Therefore the guide must include evidence from the empirical sciences, but not be restricted to those principles, thereby employing a method which extends beyond them. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you acknowledge that science is a guide to metaphysical speculation. Can you cite another?

A priori means “prior to experience.” If you tell me you have seven beers in the fridge and I bring to another five to give you, I can know you have twelve beers without opening the fridge door. That’s a trivial example, but it illustrates the point: the truth of 7+5=12 doesn’t depend on checking the fridge. — Wayfarer

No, it's true by definition that if he has seven plus five beers he has twelve beers, and to know that seven plus five equals twelve it's either through having remembered the addition tables, counting mentally or on your fingers or whatever. In no way is your knowing prior to experience, other than in its analytic aspect, and even analytic definitions are learned.

Or we might conclude that "directly observing" and "having" are two ways of saying the same thing, so no actual reason has been offered. Then, if "I am having thought X" needs a justification, we'd have to look elsewhere. — J

If I am conscious of entertaining some thought or other, then I cannot be wrong about that awareness. So, I can say that I know I am thinking X, when I am aware that I am thinking X. I cannot justify that I have that knowledge to you, if you believe me you take it on faith.

He asserts instead that it is a matter of our enmeshment in a “form of life”, a hinge on the basis of which to organize facts rather than the ascertainment of those empirical facts by themselves. — Joshs

We can only organize facts, or even generate the concept of a fact because we have symbolic language. On the other hand we and the other animals observe many things without necessarily self-consciously or reflectively conceptualizing those observations, and of course it is only we (as far as we know)m that can verbalize facts as statements.

Kant in no way denied the fundamental role of language, I don’t think that would have ever occurred to him.

The ‘empirical doctrine of mathematics’ is associated with John Stuart Mill, although as I understand it, very much a minority view. — Wayfarer

Of course he wouldn't deny the role of language―he presents his ideas in language after all. But he didn't acknowledge or emphasize that language enables the elaborations of rules constructed on the foundation of what is perceptually recognized. (By "perception" I includes what is cognized just on the sheer basis of embodiment, I.e., proprioception and interoceptions of bodily sensations.

The idea that number is perceptually encountered is not exclusive to Mill, and I doubt that it is a minority view. Do you have statistics to back that claim up? In any case, even if if it were a minority view, so what? What matters is whether it is plausibly in accordance with experience.

If number is inherent to existence, which it seems it must be if more than one thing exists, then it seems plausible to think that its effectiveness is on account of its ontologically inherent and immanent nature

That shows arithmetic is not just “distilled” from perception, but depends on something prior in our cognitive framework — the capacity to represent number as such, and to apply operations universally and necessarily. — Wayfarer

I don't think it shows that arithmetic is not distilled from perception at all. Of course to have arithmetic, as a systems procedures and rules and you also need symbolic language.

So I don't agree with this:

But in Kant's terms, the idea of the 'synthetic a priori' is basic to the entire project of the Critique, and without it the possibility of mathematics and natural science as objective knowledge would be left unexplained. — Wayfarer

At least if "But in Kant's terms" is left out. I don't know what that phrase is doing there, unless it is meant to indicate something like "this is what Kant thought". But again, we don't have to agree with Kant unless his arguments are convincing; which I think in light of developments in philosophy since Kant, they are not. In my view, he makes too little of what can be derived from experience in combination with symbolic language. We don't need an "agent intellect" whatever that could even be―the ability to perceive patterns gives us the capacity to recognize regularities and generalities in Nature, and symbolic language gives us the capacity to reflect further on those and abstract out generalities and generalize laws.

Instead of thinking of the subject as a kind of dimensionless point of consciousness, I prefer to think of the subject as processually embodied in a world of other bodies and processes which present us with number, pattern and invariance, such that we could hardly fail to recognize them.

Oddly enough I didn't notice you had mentioned the Quine paper. Have you read it?

Such as the claim that 'It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how Nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about Nature'. How would you respond to that? — Wayfarer

I'd say that is a claim, not an argument. (Wasn't it Niels Bohr who said that, and why should we not see your use of it as an appeal to authority?) Can you provide an argument that supports it.

I think you are affording Kant less ambiguity than his actual writings display. In the SEP article Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics is this:

"The central thesis of Kant’s account of the uniqueness of mathematical reasoning is his claim that mathematical cognition derives from the “construction” of its concepts: “to construct a concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition corresponding to it” (A713/B741) "

What Kant seems to gloss over is that this kind of a priori reasoning is distilled from perceptual experience, so it counts as a kind of a posteriori insight regarding not particulars but generalities. "7+5=12" is tautological just as 'all bachelors are married" by virtue of the meanings of the words "7+5" "equals" and "12".

You should read Quine's 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism" where he, among other interesting critiques, questions the very distinction between the synthetic and the analytic.

I'm not attacking a strawman - you’re treating “the facts of science” as if they were metaphysically transparent, a window to 'how the universe truly is', when they are plainly not. — Wayfarer

This is a strawman simply because we have no more reliable, or even any other reliable, guide, to "how the universe truly is" than science.

Who are you showing this to? Yourself? Me? If it's me, then it's only worth my time if you are trying to convince me, rather than just "witnessing" it to me (like the Jehovah's witness tells me, when I answer the door). Otherwise we're just stating our positions and reacting to what the other person says- a waste of our time. — Relativist

If you are waiting for Wayfarer to provide an actual argument you'll be waiting a long time, perhaps forever. I have never seen a genuine argument form him―all I've seen is dogma and cut and paste passages from supposed authorities.

That last category was Kant’s unique insight. Mathematics is built around it — “7+5=12” is not analytic, because “12” isn’t contained in “7+5,” but it’s still a priori. — Wayfarer

It may be said to be analytic because 7+5 is one of the 6 ways that 12 can be divided up into two groups. Just as 'bachelor' is a name for an unmarried man, so '7+5' is one of the seven 'paired' ways of defining '12' (if you don't count 12+0). Or it may be said that it is a posteriori, because if you have twelve pebbles you can divide them up into all the possible pairs. It comes down to different possible ways of looking at things, so there is no absolute fact of the matter as to whether mathematics is analytic or
synthetic.

What Kant writes here can be interpreted to support the idea that mathematics is analytic:

In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought (if I only consider affirmative judgments, since the application to negative ones is easy) this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies entirely outside the concept A, though to be sure it stands in connection with it. In the first case, I call the judgment analytic, in the second synthetic. (1787 [1998], B10)

the predicate concept '7+5' certainly seems to be (covertly) contained in the concept '12'.

Nowadays, there is debate over whether there really are laws of nature — Wayfarer

There are obviously invariances in nature. The "laws of nature" simply codify the observable invariances. Also, as per Peirce, what look like invariances to us, whose horizons of observation, both temporally and spatially speaking, are so tiny, may not be timeless and fixed, but evolved habits.

I'm good with all that. Just wanted to make the case that almost anything we claim to be true requires some (potential) justification. — J

I agree that when it comes to claims of knowledge, justification is required. On the other hand I know many things with certainty that require no justification simply because they are directly known―in these cases justification just doesn't enter the picture.

the truth of things which are true by definition and logical self-evidence is simply obvious, and just needs to be pointed out to be established in conscious understanding.
— Janus
It is obvious to us. But we have learnt how to do reasoning as part of learning language and interacting with people. — Ludwig V

Right of course, but I think it is also the case that some things that are self-evident are already so before their self-evidence becomes reflectively conscious. In other words I think there are basic logics inherent in perception itself that forms the primordial basis for reasoning, and can be seen in the kind of basic reasoning revealed in animal behavior.

So, if we know p could be false, then we don't know that it's true, but we may well believe that it's true.
— Janus

Then on the premise that we know that every p (epistemological truth) could be false, we cannot know any p. — Leontiskos

Strictly, allowing for radical skepticism (Brain-in-vat, might-be-a-dream, Evil Demon) I think that is true, and we should not speak of knowledge (except in the know-how sense) but, more modestly, of belief―so not 'knowing that' but 'believing that'.

But I also think that is too strong and that we do know some things with certainty, because I don't think skepticism based on the bare logic possibility of error should be taken seriously.

The ideal situation is where both sides of the bargain feel the deal being struck is fair. A win-win. I get to do anything I can imagine wanting to do ... to the degree that I can also rely on everyone else being there to bail me out when I stuff up. And everyone else says I'm free to stuff up as much as I like, but there is a limit to the bail-out that the community is willing to provide. In the long run, my free action has to be judged as being a positive contribution to the community. — apokrisis

Yes, the problem is that the power elites and the financial elites tend to make their own rules, the comfortable-enough turn a complacent or blind eye, and even the disadvantaged mostly don't seem to see the big picture well enough not to support the right of the exploiters to exploit at will.

Nice elaboration on the cycle of life. No one wants to die or to lose those close companions of course, but unfortunately there are still many who cannot face the hard reality, and cling to the hope of eternal life or personal salvation in some form or other. Not that I'm advocating the abolition of organized religion, but as psychologically necessary as it might be to many, it does seem to be overall a detriment to human flourishing in general.

psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (trying to pronounce that name might produce a flow state.)) — Wayfarer

Verbal diarrhoea?

But all three of these things -- truth by definition, logical self-evidence, and the reliability of direct observation -- are ways of demonstrating justification. To understand this, imagine explaining any one of them to an intelligent child. They all involve steps, cogitation, judgment, insight. We don't simply see why they are true, or at least not usually. In fact, as you know, the reliability of direct observation can be challenged, and the challenge is precisely for a justification as to how such observations lead to truth. — J

I think life itself teaches us to trust our observations―animals do, so why shouldn't we? You are right that understanding definitions and logical self-evidence are taught, but all such teachings rely on the capacity of the student to "get it", which I think shows that the truth of things which are true by definition and logical self-evidence is simply obvious, and just needs to be pointed out to be established in conscious understanding.

Direct observation is challenged only by what I think of as trivial and ridiculous "mind in a vat", Evil Demon" or "you might be dreaming" scenarios, and I don't think those are to be taken seriously. That's why I say that what we know we know certainly, but only within contexts, not absolutely certainly.

Logical possibility allows any knowledge whatsoever to be subjected to radical skepticism, but I don't see a need to concern ourselves with such vacuous considerations.

But liberalism says questions of the human good are, for the most part, private matters. Public ethics must be built around liberal dogmas re pluralism and the unknowability of the human good. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I disagree―since liberalism advocates both democracy and individual rights it does not accord any notion of my rights being any more important than yours. So, essentially the idea consists in saying that you are free to do whatever you want as long as what you do does not infringe on the rights of others.

The "Golden Rule' sums it up. Although I think it would be better formulated as "Do unto others as they would want you to do unto them". Individual flourishing is important and so is community flourishing. If you flourish at the expense of others then you harm the flourishing of the community.

You say liberalism entails or is built upon "the unknowability of the human good". This is false in my view. There is just one human good, and that is flourishing, but we must think of flourishing as having two poles―the individual and the communal.

You seem to be doing that black and white thinking. I haven't said that exclusive or even primary focus on accumulating wealth would be a good thing. It wouldn't because it leads to egregious exploitation of other humans, animals and environments.
— Janus

That post was written in response to your comment about practical philosophies that were "all about" the acquisition of wealth, hence my response. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here is the passage you were responding to again.

Self-help teachings and practices, if they are effective, should help people to live better lives. Of course I realize some of them are all about how to achieve financial success, but is that really such a bad aim for someone if it doesn't degenerate into acquisitive greed, especially if they aspire to be a householder and parent? — Janus

Note that in that passage I said " if it doesn't degenerate into acquisitive greed". I was talking about practical self-help teachings and practices, not overarching moral philosophies that preach making money for making money's sake. Teaching people about how to make and manage money does not need to involve, should not involve, teaching people that all that is important is making money. All or nothing thinking again!

More desirable for whom? Certainly not for people who want to radically reshape the society, or for those who profit from or enjoy conflict. — Count Timothy von Icarus

More desirable for the majority―we are speaking about democratic principles after all. That there may be sociopaths is inevitable and lamentable. No society is perfect. people who want to radically reshape societies are ideologues who are usually quite prepared to impose their wills on others, and that is never a good thing.

Man as the political animal cuts both ways. Man might be naturally social and compassionate, but man also has a strong tendency towards overwrought thymotic passions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think most people naturally social and compassionate, and I acknowledge that there will always be a sociopathic minority who will tend to indulge "overwrought thymotic passions". If they indulge such passions and harm others in the process, they go against the flourishing of the community.

Natural selection needs random variety so it can continue to optimise a living and mindful structure of habit.
— apokrisis

"Optimize" how? This is a value-laden term, just like your earlier invocation of "Darwinian success." Now if there is no end being sought, and whatever is "adaptive" is just whatever just so happens to end up happening, all these value terms are simply equivocations. Indeed, "pragmatism" is itself an equivocation if there is no real end involved. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The end is survival and flourishing. Adaptive evolution does not have a prescribed end, but species that overuse resources will eventually pay the price. The balance is always restored, except in the case of us super-clever and adaptable apes that have been able to live almost everywhere. If the resources in one area are used up, affected animals can move to another area if possible, or if not their population will decline, allowing the resources to build up again. Since we have covered the Earth, if resources are depleted everywhere there will be nowhere left to go.

I meant to say it isn’t the conceptions themselves that earn the title, but the relation of them to each other. For those conceptions that don’t relate the title is lost, that’s all. — Mww

Right so one idea cannot on its own be tautologous, but rather a statement is tautologous that redundantly states something about two ideas that both share the same salient content.

Why two straight lines cannot enclose a space, is no longer a mystery. Even if it isn’t the case, it is still a perfectly logical explanation. — Mww

I'm not sure what you mean by "even if it isn't the case".

:up:

Wouldn’t we have to be able to separate J, T or B from the others to think we know something when in fact what we know is missing J, T or B? Or are all three destroyed, along with K, when we are in error? — Fire Ologist

As I said earlier, knowing we are justified in believing that some purported piece of propositional knowledge is true, and that we can thus be said to know it is true, also involves knowing that are other things apart from the piece of purported propositional knowledge are true.

We know analytic statements are true.
— Janus

But do we know this apart from the right justifications? I don't see how. Even something as clear as modus ponens can and must be explained and justified; we don't say "I just know it." — J

If something is true by definition or if something is logically self-evident, or if the proposition concerns something being directly observed, then I would say we need no further justification.

:up:

No. I know the cat is on the chair but it could have been on the mat. Hence "the cat is on the chair" is true but could have been false. — Banno

Ah, I see the problem now, it seems we've been talking at cross purposes—"could have been false" is not equivalent to "could be false".

It just makes sense that two straight lines cannot enclose a space but no one ever thought about the rational mechanism by which two unrelated, non-empirical conceptions can be conjoined to construct its own evidence, since Nature is never going to provide the universality and absolute necessity required for its proof. — Mww

Think about the ancient shepherds—if they put in just two parallel fence lines, it would have been obvious that would not keep the sheep in or the wolves out. Or a building with just two walls and a roof and the ends open, or even three walls—it is immediately evident that the spaces have not been enclosed.

Usually a judgement is termed tautological insofar as it is true by definition irrespective of its conceptual content, whereas analytical merely indicates that the subject/predicate conceptions as the content in self-evident judgements belong to each other, or that one contains the other within it. — Mww

I don't see how a tautology could be independent of its conceptual content—can you give an example?

Neither do I; in themselves they don’t. They are the conditions necessary in the form of a judgement, for the certainty in the relations of the conceptions which are its content. They don’t yield, or produce, certainty, so much as make it possible. — Mww

Right, certainty certainly could not be possible with logical possibility and consistency.

Sorry for the delay. I got doin’ Her Satanic Majesty’s Request, if ya know what I mean. Flower beds, of all things. The kinda thing the average joe’s hardly likely to get right. — Mww

No need for an apology, we all have other commitments and there are many things more important than philosophy. Getting flower beds right is something I take for granted, given that my profession as landscape design and construction. I also know that the downsides of not yielding to the requests of "Her Satanic Majesty" can be great. 'Their Satanic Majesties Request' is also an underrated Stone's album, one of my early favorites.

If we think we know something and it turns out to be false, then we didn't know it. — Banno

That's right. So, if we know p could be false, then we don't know that it's true, but we may well believe that it's true. Thinking we know something is not the same as knowing something.

It's not a matter of feeling, as much as you would like to cast it in that light. On analysis I judge it to be unjustified because it simply doesn't logically follow.

If you indeed know that p, then p is true. — Banno

Right, and if p is true then it cannot be false, no? Likewise if you know that p is true then you cannot know that it could be false, or so it would seem.

I think the idea of qualia is misleading. The way I understand it when I see something I don't see a quale or the experiential quality of what I'm seeing. I can make a post hoc judgement about the quality of my experience and then reify that into entities collectively referred to as qualia.

So, I agree with your characterization "an illusion with a representational character". If all perception and thought is neural activity, then being reflectively conscious of what is being perceived (or perhaps more accurately what has just been perceived) and not being reflectively conscious of that would be two different kinds of neural activity, each with their own effects, and hence being conscious would not be epiphenomenal.

For me, to claim that there is a non-physical aspect of mind would be to claim that there is something at work which is completely independent of the whole embodied energy economy of the percipient in its environment, and that seems not only implausible but even incoherent.

I agree that @Wayfarer seems to think that the inability of physical science to explain the felt quality of experience is a slam dunk refutation of physicalism, and to me that seems to be a completely unjustified conclusion.

If we know something is true we must know it is not false. That's not the same as that it cannot* be false. It's not knowledge that is defeasible, but belief. Everything we know is true - just like every fact is true. Some things we think we know, are false - and therefore we do not know them.

If we think we know it's true, but it turns out it is false, then we didn't know it was true in the first place.

See how it works?


*Are we going to look at modality again? Let's not. — Banno

You say that if we know something is true we must know it is not false. But is not knowing something is not false the same as knowing that it could not be false (aside from switching contexts or changes over time)? Was it something like the caveat in brackets that led to your mention of modality?

I agree that we know that we don't know in the case re alien species...There are also many truths we do know. The problem I see is that if we know something is true we must know it cannot be false, from which it seems to follow that knowledge is not defeasible.

↪Janus You prefer utility to truth? — Banno

No, I didn't mean that. I don't know how you got to that conclusion.

For example, we don't know whether there is sentient life on other planets, and it is good to know that we don't know that. The other day I was at a local market and one of the stalls selling aloe vera and other herbs displayed a Raëlian poster claiming that we need to prepare for the return of the Elohim. Raëlianism is the belief that humanity was created by an advanced extraterrestrial species known as the Elohim.

It is good to know that we don't know whether there are advanced extra-terrestrial species, but the actual truth or falsity regarding that is meaningless to us, since it cannot be (currently) determined.

The truth doesn't care about what is useful. — Banno

Actually the truth presumably doesn't care about anything.

which Banno has also picked up on, namely whether the T in JTB is doing any useful work.
— J

Of course it is doing useful work. — Banno

The distinction between something's being true and our knowing it to be true is of necessary and useful―it is useful to know whether we do know something is true or not― it's better than thinking we know something is true if we don't.

A question remains though― what use is something's being true if we don't know it.

When do I ever know something is true apart from having the right justifications? How can we make truth independent of justification -- make J and T genuinely separate criteria? — J

We know analytic statements are true. Given competence we know that mathematical proofs are true. We know that true propositions about directly observable states of affairs are true (if we observe them).

The problem with relying on justifications is that we would need to know the justifications are true in order to be valid as justifications, which would seem to introduce an infinite regress.

The world "spiritual" is not in the original quote. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I thought it was implied, that you were not addressing empirical truth.

Or, because this is unconvincing, you get anti-realism and an ethics of sentiment that collapses any distinction between what is currently desired and what is truly desirable.

This is precisely what absolutizes individual preference and privatizes any deeper notions of teleology. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It's really very simple, and no need for a law-giving God. There will always be a tension between individual preferences and societal desiderata. It seems obvious that in any community harmony is more desirable than conflict. Right there is the pragmatic basis for ethics.

You say "deeper notions of teleology": but there is no need to "muddy the waters to make them appear deep".

A focus on wealth (or career success as a proxy for status) as a primary aim seems to be a paradigmatic example of "putting second things first," no? Sure, wealth is useful. There are plenty of miserable wealthy people though. Wealth is only useful in parting with it; it's a proximate aim at best. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You seem to be doing that black and white thinking. I haven't said that exclusive or even primary focus on accumulating wealth would be a good thing. It wouldn't because it leads to egregious exploitation of other humans, animals and environments.

Exactly the sort of thing I had in mind. The "privatization" part of secularization makes it essentially impossible to have any public teaching of ethics per se. Of course, ethics is still taught, just not directly and reflectively. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I disagree. I see no reason to think that ethics could not be taught to children without incorporating the threat of divine punishment and promise of divine reward. I think humans become naturally empathetic and compassionate, once they are able to attain a balanced view of their kinship with others, an understanding that we are all in this together.

Of course there will always be some percentage of sociopaths―no society is ever going to be perfect. Teaching ethics would mean instilling an understanding of the balance between competition and cooperation. I think it is fair to say that competition is overemphasized in many modern societies.