We know that such an intuition has been with humanity since there were civilizations, and no doubt before. Whether it's true or not, isn't really about one's predisposition to believe or disbelieve, wouldn't you agree? — J
Yes, my comments about certainty were meant to cover both the occurrence of the experience and the interpretation of it. So I'd call it highly likely, but by no means certain, that such experiences are "genuine" in that they do give access to a divine reality. Even using such a phrase, of course, takes us outside of philosophy entirely, in my opinion, though I know Wayfarer thinks we can expand our understanding of what philosophy is and does so as to include it. — J
My general idea is that it we shouldn't be surprised if our physical science can't examine something that does not have physical properties. So examine consciousness with tools that do not have physical properties. Ideally, with tools that have the same properties consciousness has. But there is often disagreement over what those properties are. — Patterner
Yes to both. But we cannot hook them up to anything kind off detector and see the consciousness that their behavior suggests is present. We can see the physical correlates of consciousness, but not there consciousness. — Patterner
Veganism prevents harm and promotes the well-being of trillions of sentient organisms. Yet, more than 99% of the humans currently alive (8.24 billion) are not yet vegan. Non-vegans kill 80 billion land organisms and 1 to 3 trillion aquatic organisms per year. Why isn't veganism legally mandatory in all countries? — Truth Seeker
To say that what exists must be subject to a perspective is not to deny its existence; it’s to say that “existence” is only ever intelligible to us under the conditions of possible experience. — Wayfarer
But I'm not denying that there is an external world. What I'm denying is that knowledge of that world is purely objective, that we can see it as it is or as it would be absent any observer. — Wayfarer
We designate it as truly existent, irrespective of and outside any knowledge of it. This gives rise to a kind of cognitive disorientation which underlies many current philosophical conundrums. — Wayfarer
Well, I think both Wayfarer and myself, in our different ways, are positing a non-mental self, a self that not only thinks but animates and, perhaps, connects with something larger. You're right about the cultural baggage, but as philosophers we can try to see beyond that. @Wayfarer is good at reminding us of the deeper, more thoughtful traditions of spirituality that were there long before some religions tried to codify and moralize spiritual experience. The words "spirit" or "soul" may not be helpful for a particular individual, but let's not rule out this aspect of being alive and human. — J
What I’m saying is that the frameworks through which we recognize “yellow, blue, green, red” are already the product of shared cognitive, biological, and cultural conditions. That explains the convergence without appealing to a “mind at large.” — Wayfarer
Judgements about what is observed are interpretive and of course may differ―what is observed is not a matter of interpretation.
— Janus
The first is correct, the second is the contradiction of it, which makes it false. That there is a thing observed is not a matter of interpretation, corrects the contradiction.
You’re correct….or, I agree….that you and the dog see the same thing, whatever it may be. Of the two, only you represent the thing seen with a particular concept, but you would readily admit that you haven’t a clue what the dog’s doing with his perception, but you can be sure he isn’t representing it to himself with the same conceptual reference as you. — Mww
The difference between the action of gravity on our experience and the action of a universal mind, for example, may be that one appears in the external world of appearances where we measure things and the other doesn’t. — Punshhh
I have an affinity with these concepts as I am concerned with realising our limitations and developing ways to view our limitations in the context of our lives (living a life), for example. — Punshhh
You will agree with me as to whether it is yellow, blue, green or red, undoubtedly. Can you explain how your "common set of cognitve, cultural and linguistic practices" can account for that agreement? — Janus
It goes directly against your contention that every observer sees the same thing when the observations show they don’t. — Wayfarer
Good comments. The key point is ‘participatory’ - not being a bystander. — Wayfarer
↪Wayfarer ↪Ludwig V ↪Janus Didn't Aristotle say that the mind resided in the heart? — J
I find that fascinating because, as y'all have pointed out, it seems irresistible to me to locate my self or "I" within my head. Or perhaps a better way to say it is: I can't help locating the part of consciousness which thinks, perceives, and imagines as being within my head; but that leaves open the possibility that spirit or soul should be identified with breath, heart, or guts. So a deeper or more cosmic "I" is not necessarily conceived as mental.
But then there's the Third Eye, which opens in . . . the head. — J
Madhyamaka philosophers say that ālaya-vijñāna risks reifying consciousness into a hidden essence or foundational mind. — Wayfarer
CPR, B311 — Paine
OK. It's just that causal explanation, along with the metaphor of the machine, has been such an icon of what science is about that I find it hard to grasp the alternatives (apart from statistical explanations). — Ludwig V
I'm pretty sure that our phenomenological perspective on mental phenomena is heavily conditioned by our culture. For example, it is very difficult to answer the question where (in the body) the mind is to be found in ancient greek (or roman) culture. There are good grounds for answering that it is a distinct entity - a ghost - that survives death. There are also grounds for saying that it is the breath - an interesting choice, since it isn't quite clear where the breath is. I think the best answer is that the question where the mind is was not even formulated in that culture. It requires, I would say, a culture that has already problematized mental/physical relations, as happened in Western Europe in the 17th century or so. — Ludwig V
I address this in another Medium essay, Is there Mind at Large? This essay interogates Kastrup's expression and compares it with Berkeleyian idealism. But then it draws on Yogācāra Buddhism, the school colloquially known as 'mind-only', to argue that it is not necessary to posit any kind of super-mind or cosmic mind.
Although I also concede that if Kastrup simply means 'some mind' or 'mind in general', then I am in complete agreement with him. Why? I think the reification trap is associated with the tendency towards objectification, to try and consider anything real in terms of it being an object or an other. This is where Heidegger's criticism of onto-theology rings true. — Wayfarer
I wonder if it is possible to become wise by learning from the foolish? After all, with discernment, watching a fool and what happens to them can be very instructive in learning what not to do. — Tom Storm
You’re both looking down different ends of the telescope. That’s why it looks different. — Punshhh
The noumena aren't necessarily esoteric, just as if they are in a room we can't access, so its not as 'mysterious' as one might think. But we can at least securely infer that they are there, or we'd not perceive anything. — AmadeusD
Better to know we don’t know, than to think we know something we don’t. — Wayfarer
'within' is an interesting concept in this context. It's a spatial metaphor in which brain/body is a container and the mind is something inside it. But from another perspective, the body exists 'within awareness'. — Wayfarer
It's also interesting because, while the body is a locus of activity, it is not sufficient to generate a mind. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I'd like to be Sam, but I won't insist. — Wayfarer
That presupposes that our minds and reality exist in the same space. Since our minds are not physical objects, that cannot be the case. — Ludwig V