So the relevant discussion concerns whether or not platonism about truthbearers is correct, or if we should adopt a non-platonistic interpretation that allows for a distinction between truths in a world and truths at a world, and I am firmly in favour of the latter. — Michael

It seems to me your thinking is too black and white. If there are countless prime numbers which no one will ever identify, then we can write down extremely large numbers and for any number we write down it will be true or false that it is prime, even if we don't know the answer. If the truth about the primeness of those countless numbers precedes their being enunciated, then what is it that determines that truth or falsity. It's a different case than with concrete particulars because the latter can be observed in order to find out whether what we thought about them prior to knowing the answer is true or false.

This is a difficulty for the idea that truth is simply a property of propositions, but it doesn't follow that Platonism is the answer. Maybe the question cannot be answered, but even so that doesn't remove the difficulty..

I had hoped for some specifics. If what consciousness seems to be is an illusion, what is it really? What is the explanation for the existence of the illusion? How do the physical properties of matter and laws of physics give rise to the subjective experience of the physical processes that they are obviously acting out, as opposed to those physical processes taking place without the subjective experience (as Chalmers says, "in the dark")? — Patterner

I think it's probably a knot which cannot be untied. Taking sight as an example, we see things just as animals do. But we are reflexively self-aware that we see things. So we conceive of ourselves as "having experience". Do non-symbolic animals have this reflexive self-awareness or is it just an artefact of language?

The idea of things going on "in the dark" may be an incoherent idea. Do things go on in the dark for animals if they cannot be self-reflectively aware? Are we really self-reflectively aware ort are we just playing with language? How can we answer these questions? If there is a way to answer them what could that be but science?

So maybe there is really no subjective experience at all and it is all just an artefact of language—a kind of confabulation or fiction. Or if there is some spiritual, non-material, non-physical element in play and our intuitions tells us that (which has seemed to be the case historically) then maybe those intuitions are right, but we have no way of demonstrating that and must just have faith in them and stop trying to prove or disprove it. In other words, just accept our feelings and intuitions and enjoy their enrichment without trying to come to any ontological conclusions because to do so is an impossible project.

We don't and can't know why we are here or where we are headed, or even whether there is any reason we are here, or whether we are headed anywhere at all, but there's no harm in exercising our imaginations and enjoying the ride while it lasts. Anyway, that's pretty much where I'm at for what it's worth—I like to think about these questions but I'm content with uncertainty, with the thought that these questions cannot be definitively answered.

Cheers. I guess the basic reason for my tendency to think of consciousness as a natural physical process is that I can't imagine what any non-physical element of it could be, and no one has ever offered an explanation as to what a purported non-physical element could be other than the old idea of a separate mental substance or else some kind of unfathomable panpsychism. Anyway, I think I've explained my position about as well as i can, and I certainly don't expect you to agree with me, so I'm not sure there's much else to be said by me on this topic.

Thanks for the conversation.

Right...a very similar point. And yet @Michael remains oblivious it seems...or willfully blind.

I'll try one last time If you won't address what I actually write, there is no point continuing. I haven't uttered any proposition; I've just nominated some extremely large number and asked the question about its primeness. Do you deny that the truth regarding the number's primness is prior to my proposing anything about it, and in fact prior to my even nominating it, or not. If not, why?

What do you mean by "considering the current state of science"? There are any number of examples throughout history of the most plausible explanation for something, according to that time's current state of science, being as wrong as can be. What is it about our current state that convinces you that, despite the fact that it doesn't seem to be a physical process or function, not even to you, it is? — Patterner

It is irrelevant that past scientific theories have been shown to be wrong, or at least not as adequate as some later theory. That fact does not guarantee that any present theories will be proven wrong. Also, that is all we have to work with.

I haven't said consciousness doesn't seem to be a physical process per se. From a neuroscientific perspective it does seem to be a physical process. From the naive intuitive point of view, it may seem not to be physical to some. From my perspective it seems neither determinably physical (in the sense that it is not a physical object, but an activity) nor non-physical. It certainly doesn't seem otherworldly to me and this world definitely seems physical through and through.

I've always had trouble understanding this position. The way the mind seems to itself... The mind is an illusion being fooled by itself. Illusions fool the viewer. The audience. But, in this case, that upon which everything else is built, the viewer and the illusion are the same thing. — Patterner

You continue to misinterpret what I'm saying. I haven't said the mind is an illusion, I've said that what it may seem to us may be an illusion.

While many people say such things, I doubt many people mean them. It seems to me that people are far more sure of themselves, far more certain than you make allowance for. — baker

It doesn't matter whether people acknowledge that what they believe about matters which are not either logically or empirically determinable, is determined by what they think most plausible, which in turn is determined by which starting assumptions they are making.

It is also possible that in some, perhaps many, cases people believe what they want to believe.

I haven't failed to make allowance for people feeling certain at all. But there is a clear distinction between being certain (which is only possible in cases where what is believed is empirically or logically verifiable) and feeling certain, which is possible in all kinds of cases, including self-delusion.

You appear to be assuming mathematical platonism? — Michael

No, I'm not assuming mathematical Platonism or anything else.

The proposition "X is a prime number" is assessed as accurate/true when uttered. — Michael

As I said I'm not proposing anything. I just write down a number and ask the question as to its primeness. I know the truth regarding its primeness is prior to even writing the number down and certainly prior to my discovering it. And of course I will have to discover it, most especially in the case of extremely large numbers.

But "a truth" means "a true proposition", and so you are saying "there is a true proposition about whether or not that number is prime; no proposition required". — Michael

You are simply asserting, without supporting argument, that truth is only a property of some propositions. If you open your mind and think about it you will see that my example of prime numbers throws that assumption into question—makes it look like the partial, not the whole truth.

Also, accuracy is not a precisely d;eterminable quality.
— Janus

Then neither is the truth of the proposition "the painting is accurate — Michael

I agree, but it is irrelevant to the question about prime numbers.

Why?

If I paint a red ball accurately then is the accuracy of that painting "pre-determined", and so evidence that painting-accuracy is not exclusively a property of painted paintings? — Michael

I'm talking about prime numbers and you change the subject to paintings. Why? It's not an apt analogy. For a start paintings do not enjoy pre-existence prioir to their being painted, and thought as pre-existents they are not determinate objects like prime numbers are. Also, it is an observable object—the painting—which will be assessed for accuracy once it exists. What exactly is it that will be assessed for primeness?

I don't have to propose anything I can simply present some number: say 579,836,642,549,743,762,649 and there is a truth about whether or not that number is prime. No proposition required. In the case of the painting, it is an existent particular—the painting—that determines the truth regarding whether it is accurate.

Also, accuracy is not a precisely determinable quality. What is it in the case of the number whose primeness is yet to be identified, which determines the truth about its primeness; a truth which is precisely determinable?

Let's say there are many prime numbers which have never been identified. If I utter a proposition that says that some X is a prime number the truth or falsity of that proposition is pre-determined. That seems to throw a spanner in the works for the idea that truth is exclsueively a property of uttered propositions.

You don't believe it could just on account of the fact that it seems to be inexplicable?
— Janus
You believe it could just on account of the fact that it seems to be inexplicable? My point being, it supports my position more than yours. What supports your position? — Patterner

My position is that, considering the current state of science, as far as I am familiar with it, it seems most plausible that mind evolved in a physical world. I don't imagine that mind came from anywhere else, and the panpsychist idea seems unintelligible.

Naively, we think about things in intuitive ways. Hence animism was common to early forager societies. Likewise it is natural for us to naively think that the mind and body are different. After all, one observes the other. And I don't deny they are different. I see mind as a function of the body. It is obviously not an object of the senses as the body is. As I said earlier energy is not an object of the senses either and nor is causation.

So I believe the mind is, despite how it might seem, a physical process or function, and I don't believe that because the way the mind seems to us intuitively is not explicable in terms of physics. On the contrary I think it is more likely that the way the mind seems to us is a kind of illusion.

I have said it doesn't matter anyway, but the reason I engage in this discussion is that I think the fact it doesn't matter does itself matter. If we are attached to the idea of the mind being this way or that it will cloud our judgement because confirmation bias will have taken hold.

I believe it only matters to those who think physicalism destroys any hope of there being more to our beings than just this life. I don't see anything wrong with believing that provided it is acknowledged to be an article of faith. When people start imagining that it is an objective truth, then fundamentalist thinking looms, and I think that is most dangerous to societal well-being.

I also object to the idea that physicalism is self-evidently false, because that conclusion is always based on a strawman model of physicalism. I don't say that idealism is self-evidently false just that it seems to me to be the more plausible of the options. I don't object to others thinking idealism is the more plausible, and I'm happy to leave it at that—agree to disagree, even though I think that conclusion is most likely wrong.

I don't think we are disagreeing. I did say " no reason to think that we must be able to...". not "there is no reason to think it is possible that we might ...".

Yes, definitely true; but I guess the exact ways people say the microworld is strange depense on their interpretation of quantun mechanics. — Apustimelogist

I agree, but I think all interpretations are, in their different ways, attempts to imagine what is observed in terms of our macro world understandings of phenomena. Of course we have nothing else to work with, but for me the point is that there is no reason to think that we must be able to make the microworld phenomena intelligible to us in ways we can visualize.

And I think the implications of that for philosophy are pretty much nothing beyond the realization that we cannot expect to be able to visualize the behavior of microworld phenomena in ways that make intuitive sense to us. So, "shut up and calculate" is a good sense attitude, it seems to me. Although I also think there is some value in the kinds of speculation QM brings up in a creative imagination sense. It might be a fertile ground for fiction for example.

I mean the counter-intuitive, puzzling nature of QM phenomena should be no surprise given that our expectations regarding how things should behave have been conditioned by our experience of macro phenomena.

The kind of non-realism Gnomon expresses about position and momentum is the same kind of non-realism as in the non-realism / non-locality issue. — Apustimelogist

Why should we think that the microworld must be real in the same sense, that is behave in the same way, as the macroworld?

And "I am projecting", this because you say so. — javra

No, you are projecting because you are imputing motivations to what I said which were not there. It seems obvious you cannot carry on challenging conversations without becoming offended. That's why I said it's best to stop. I have no desire to hurt your feelings.

If life sooner or later necessarily result in nothingness, what is its point in its occurrence to begin with? Its not an issue of opinion but of logic. Something with a point has a purpose. (Unless we play footloose with terms again). The point of life is ... ? — javra

I haven't claimed there is an overall point to life. In fact quite the opposite—it is up to each of us to decide what the point of our lives is. Or else simply live your life, enjoy it and follow your interests and passions; I suppose that would be a point in itself.

Simply because your question directly insinuates that my reply was pompous charlatanry - thereby taking a serious jab at my character. And in this, I stand by my right to feel insulted. Only human, don't you know. There a difference between being thick-skinned and being thick. — javra

You are projecting—my question insinuated nothing, I was simply trying to get a clear answer from you. Anyway, if you are going to take exchanges of ideas on a philosophy forum personally, then I think it's best to stop.

OK. I have no more questions for you.

In virtue of Buddhism being a soteriological school of thought. — javra

So the meaning of life lies in an afterlife or in nirvana (is it eternal life or extinction?).

No. Because it is a can of worms. Why do you respond this way? Other than to insult. — javra

Why are you so ready to feel insulted. The aim is to question and challnege not to insult. Are you not comfortable with your ideas being questioned and challenged?

The notion of energy stems from Aristotle. Energy/work without purpose/telos as concept is thoroughly modern, utterly physicalist/materialist, and it need not be. But then to you energy would then be one of those transcendental issues that wouldn't be natural. And so forth. — javra

I'm not concerning myself with ancient conceptions of energy. Energy is what does work, work that might be either purposeful or purposeless. In science we have the four fundamental forces (energies). I see energy as entirely immanent; in fact, I can make no sense of the idea of transcendental energy.

You never posed a friggin question. You affirmed a truth, and this as though it were incontrovertible. As per the quote above.

As to how do I know that I as a transcendental ego am more that a mere idea: I am a subject of awareness that can hold awareness of, for example, ideas - farts as another example - thereby making my being as subject of awareness more than an idea. — javra

I did not affirm a truth, I posed the question as to how we could ever know that the transcendental ego is more than merely an idea. When I said that it merely an idea, I meant that it cannot be anything more than an idea for us because there is no imaginable way to test whether it is more than an idea. There is no need to get angry or offended. we are just here discussing ideas, so what's the problem?

I don't understand your answer above. It just sounds stipulative rather than being any kind of means to knowledge.

I don't think I understand you. It looks to me like this says the inability to explain it in physical terms is not important to the question of whether or not it can be explained in physical terms. — Patterner

No, it says that the inability to explain something in terms of physics does not entail that the thing to be explained is non-physical.

I don't imagine the mental is completely independent of the physical. I don't think we can remove mass or charge from particles, and I don't think we can remove proto-consciousness from them, either. — Patterner

Mass and charge are detectable in particles. Proto-consciousness in particles is purely speculative ,and in fact we don't really have any idea what it could look like.

I don't think physical properties can account for consciousness, so there must be something else at work. — Patterner

You don't think consciousness could evolve in a merely physical world? You don't believe it could just on account of the fact that it seems to be inexplicable? Have you considered the possibility that it is not mind and matter itself which are incompatible, but just our conceptions of mind and matter which seem incompatible,

As you acknowledge there is no way to test the idea that they are not compatible anyway. Even if you could somehow confirm that mind could not possibly have evolved from physical matter, what difference would that knowledge make to your life as lived?

As with most versions of Buddhism for example, I strongly disagree. — javra

So you think Buddhism gives life meaning? In virtue of what? Rebirth? Karma? Even if those, what guarantors their universality? Merely learning to let go of attachments cannot be an overarching meaning to life itself, since there are very good personal reasons for attempting to do this.

Playing footloose with what the term "nihilism" signifies. For my part, I've already specified what I intended it to mean in this context. Basically, that of existential nihilism: the interpretation of life being inherently pointless. — javra

Pointless according to who? Is not the idea that life is basically pointless not merely a subjective opinion? What about such things as enjoyment, interest, creativity and even survival? Is there no point to any of those just because life is thought to be a merely physical phenomenon? And even if life were basically mind (whatever that could mean) rather than basically matter or energy, how would that fact alone give it more point? These are the same questions I already asked that you did not even attempt to answer.

A can of worms that, so I'll leave it be. — javra

Why? Because you cannot come up with a response?

We can have no way of discerning the difference between a) the self/ego which knows (aka the transcendental ego) and b) the self/ego which is known by (a) (aka the empirical ego)? And this even in principle? — javra

Of course we can and do make conceptual distinctions between empirical and transcendental notions of the self or ego. My question was as to how we could possibly know that the transcendental ego is anything more than an idea.

Whereas "my body is tall (therefore I am tall)" can be cogent, "my awareness/mind is tall (therefore I am tall)" can't. Or is this something we could have no way to know about as well. — javra

I don't see how that argument, which merely gives an example of a category error, show us anything. It would be a category error to say that my farts are tall, or my breath is tall, or my digestion is tall. I'm sure there are plenty of other examples.

For instance, the idea of a world where there is nothing after death, where limitations are imposed by natural laws, and where there is no transformative reconciliation with the ground of being, may feel ugly to some people - much the way a painting by Francis Bacon might unsettle or alarm some. — Tom Storm

I find some cathedrals (for example Chartres) beautiful and many others merely impressive. St Peters I found to be a mixture of beauty and impressiveness (due to the sheer scale) .Perhaps when it comes to the natural world it's the vision of dissolution and death that disturbs some people.

The issue I here responded to was of a difference that makes a difference between physicalism and non-physicalism. Nothing of your statements dispels the apparent reality that physicalism entails nihilism whereas non-physicalism does not. And to most people out there, this logical difference between the two is both sharp and substantial ... as well as bearing some weight on the issue of how one ought to best live one's life. — javra

I think you are talking about theism because even if the world were simply non-physical and/ or held in some universal mind, that does not on its own lend it an overarching meaning. You need to add a God that cares for us, has a purpose for us, and the promise of a better life to come and personal immortality to give that overarching universal meaning.

Also I don't agree that physicalism leads to nihilism. Ironically I think it is religion that leads to nihilism by positing one meaning for all and thus nihilating the creative possibility that people have to find their own meanings by which to direct their lives.

If nature consists of that which is visible and measurable in quantifiable ways, then is the mind and, more specifically, that which we address as I-ness which is aware of its own mind and its many aspects (thoughts, ideas, intentions, emotions, etc.) not natural? For the latter is neither visible nor measurable in quantifiable ways. Hence notions such as that of the transcendental ego. — javra

Energy itself is not measurable except by gauging its effects. If you accept the idea that consciousness is not anything over and above neural activity, then its effects are measurable. The transcendental ego is arguably merely an idea. Even if it were more than merely an idea we could have no way to tell.

I have often thought that one of the reasons people are attracted to superphysical ideas is their aesthetic appeal. It perhaps seems more harmonious to imagine that there is a transcendent realm, something grander and more meaningful beyond the physical world. I have noticed how often advocates of the transcendent describe the physicalist position as an ugly worldview - stunted, disenchanted, devoid of mystery, limiting. — Tom Storm

I think this is right. The aesthetic appeal is important. I'm reminded of the sublime aesthetics of the great cathedrals and Christian rituals.

I don't view the physical world as ugly, disenchanted or devoid of mystery, though. I think it is beautiful and enchanting in its diversity and complexity of form, and full of mystery. And when you think about it the beauty of the cathedrals and rituals are themselves physical beauty. It's a beauty that seems to point beyond itself. to be sure, but I think all beauty does that, insofar as we don't really know why or how it is that things can be beautiful. I wonder some animals experience beauty. The ritual nest-making and extraordinary plumage of some birds seems to suggest that they do.

Nice saying! I think we are all here on account of the magnitude (apart from the sciences, and even there) of human ignorance. Hopefully we are all here to learn and change our ideas when we encounter ideas that explore deeper and make more sense than what we might presently believe.

Idealism or Deism would make no material difference in your life. But it might make a philosophical difference. What difference does your participation in a philosophical forum make in how you live your life? Personally, I have no ambition to change the world, just myself . . . . to change my mind, and the meaning of my life. :smile: — Gnomon

To me the only different participating in a philosophical forum could make would be to sharpen and clarify my ideas and also lead me to be more open to alternatives to my own thinking. I have changed my mind on metaphysical matters several times since first participating on philosophy forums, when I have encountered ideas that seem to go deeper and be more plausible.

I find it interesting that some secular philosophers, like AC Grayling, have left behind the word physicalism these days and use the term naturalism. Any thoughts on this word? The problem for me is that how do we draw a distinction between a natural and a supernatural world if physicalism isn't a distinguishing factor? If idealism is true than this is part of naturalism? — Tom Storm

How to make a distinction between natural and supernatural—it seems to come down to the idea that over and above the natural visible world is an invisible spiritual world. I have long wondered whether the latter is imagined on account of dreams. The standard story seems to be that the invisible world of the supernatural (gods, demons, spirits and other immaterial entities) is imagined as an explanation for what would have seemed to the early humans to be invisible forces, and that idea seems reasonably plausible too.

If the supernatural is an invisible world, then it seems to follow that it can be accessed (although modern thinking would say peopled) only by the imagination. Being imagined as an invisible world would seem to lead to the idea of immateriality as well. So I think you are right. The association between a natural visible world and physicalism, and the association between a supernatural invisible world and ant-physicalism both seem natural.

Should we follow our intuitions, our natural imaginative inclinations in deciding what is a valid and/ or plausible ontology? Or should we apply critical thought and the correctives of logical and empirical knowledge to our pre-critical inclinations? That is the question, and the further question is ' does it matter?'.

When people take their own ideas, what seems self-evident to them, too seriously it seems that culture wars are looming. For some on both sides this is can become a moral crusade. To my way of thinking that is definitely a negative—it is social consequences that matter, and divisive thinking is that last thing needed toady IMO.

What if Mind, not Matter, is the explanation for everything in the world? :smile: — Gnomon

Leaving aside the possibility that such a mind is an omniscient, omnipotent God who will judge us and accordingly determine the nature of our life after this one, what difference do you think it would make to how we live our lives?

Nothing about the physical properties and laws of physics suggests subjective experience. — Patterner

I agree. But why should anything about physical properties and the laws of physics suggest subjective experience? They are different areas of investigation. I don't believe physics or neuroscience will ever be able to explain how the physical gives rise to experience, because experience cannot be rigorously observed together with observing neural processes. We cannot observe neural processes in vivo, we can only measure their effects via fMRI and EEG technologies etc.

To me the lack of explainability of experience in physical terms is not a central criterion in deciding whether experience and consciousness of that experience is just a manifestation of physical processes . QM shows us physical phenomena which are not explainable in terms of our macro physical concepts, and it just isn't the right tool for explaining something like consciousness beyond underpinning neuroscientific investigations of the physical properties and functions of the brain.

The real question is as to what else consciousness could be if not physical. You can say it's mental, but then does not the mental as far as we know supervene on the physical? We can imagine the logical possibility that the mental is somehow completely independent, but that is just a logical possibility we seem to have no evidence to believe in. And that logical possibility seems vacuous unless mind is posited as another substance, and then we have dualism.

If we posit one (neutral) substance that manifests both physical and mental attributes that might make more sense. But to assert that mind is ubiquitously inherent in or alongside matter from the beginning doesn't eliminate the problem of imagining what that mind looks like. It could not be anything like the intuitive introspectively derived notion we have of our own minds. The problem I've always had with panpsychism (such as Strawson postulates) is that I can get no idea of what it looks like.

I think you are right here: the firefighter’s duty would be to help put out fires and help people vacant the premises—not necessarily to save everyone. — Bob Ross

If the firefighter can save everyone then s/he has a duty to do that. You cannot have a duty to do the impossible, so it follows that if it is impossible to save everyone, then the firefighter cannot have a duty to do that.

Calling the view you disagree with 'naive "folk" understanding' and 'vague intuition' is not arguing against that attitude. It literally is that attitude. — Patterner

It's no different than referring to commonsense realism as "naive realism". I think naive realism is the default pre-critical attitude which we all have to the world. At the same time, I think naive idealism ( in the sense of anti-physicalism) is the default pre-critical attitude we all have towards the nature of mind and consciousness. Probably people are pre-critically naive dualists in that they hold to naive realism about the world and naive idealism about the mind. It is only once critical thought is brought to bear on that unexamined dualism that the "interaction problem" gives us pause.

Whatever the true nature of what we call the physical is, my point is that there has never been any suggestion that consciousness has any of its characteristics. — Patterner

This is only so as long as you hold to the naive understanding of consciousness. Once you admit, even though consciousness does not intuitively seem to be a physical phenomenon, the possibility that it might nonetheless really be nothing more than that, then you open your mind to possibilities other than what simply seems intuitively obvious.

All that said, the real problem is that we have no way of testing any metaphysical hypothesis, whether that be physicalism or idealism or whatever. We have no way of determining whether any of our hypotheses have any real bearing on the ultimate nature of reality, or even whether the very idea of questioning the ultimate nature of reality is coherent given that a determinable answer seems to be impossible in principle.

So, perhaps we are reduced to just trying to address what is the most useful or interesting way to talk about things. How do you imagine we might go about finding out whether consciousness is non-physical or not? Do you believe there is some fact of the matter we might one day discover?

Makes sense to me.

It should be obvious to you that I'm asking if you think it follows.

1. If "the King of France is bald" is true then "the King of France exists" is true — Michael

What about 'If "the king of France is bald" is false then " the King of France exists" is true?

He doesn't say that "physicalism is inconsistent" as a scientific approach. But that it is incomplete as a philosophical approach. — Gnomon

Non-reductive and/ or non-eliminative physicalism are not incomplete, any more than any metaphysical hypothesis is incomplete. The Churchlands argue consistently and extensively for eliminative physicalism, and they are professional philosophers, so it cannot be ruled out as a philosophical approach either. The reality is that we don't and can't know what the case is when it comes to metaphysics,

Yes, if the first even prime greater than 100 didn't exist, you couldn't be writing about it. — RussellA

He could have said "the first even prime number greater than 2". No such thing, 2 is the only even prime number because all other even numbers are divisible by 2.

So in our understanding of the Universe we should recognize the existence of something other than matter. We can call that something spirit, but if we do we should remember that in Buddhism, the word "spirit" is a figurative expression for value or meaning. We do not say that spirit exists in reality; we use the concept only figuratively. — Three Philosophies, One Reality

Right, but it is obvious that value and meaning are felt, in their various ways, by sentient beings. No one can sensibly deny that fact. We might be deterministic organisms, but we will never feel ourselves to be so, and it what we feel about ourselves and our lives that counts when it comes to quality of life.

Also we don't know and can never know the truth about whether or not we are deterministic beings, so the question is of little importance except perhaps in the moral domain. In that connection itt can be argued that the libertarian model of free will leads to unnecessary and unwarranted feelings of guilt and pride and blame and a desire for revenge against those who transgress moral codes

I wouldn't be so dismissive of people like Chalmers and Nagel. — Patterner

I'm not dismissive of them. I've read both years ago. I just don't find their arguments as compelling as I once did. Wayfarer wonders why I spend time arguing about things I say "don't matter". What I'm arguing against is the idea that the truth of idealism is obvious and that physicalism is inconsistent or incoherent. Such facile attempts to dismiss opponent's views and the lack of ability to recognize that others can be totally familiar with the same arguments as you are and yet disagree about what they demonstrate is what I argue against. And what often goes together with that attitude: the assumption that if the other disagrees then the other must not really understand the arguments, is also what I continually argue against.

Therefore, "if it cannot be directly observed and measured" I would say that the "activity" is immaterial, not non-physical. Hence, "neural activity" is a process-of-change in a material substrate, not a material object itself. — Gnomon

I wouldn't use that terminology, but I don't disagree with what I take to be the thrust of what you are saying.

When I say "use" I count interest, creativity and joy as uses. I was referring to accumulating factoids for the sake of impressing others or winning arguments. We don't have time in our lives to take in more than the tiniest fraction of the sum of human knowledge, so it's wise to be selective.

As to the question of the nature of consciousness—we have the scientific studies on one hand and the naive "folk" understanding on the other. As to which to rely on, I will choose the former because I don't think intuition is an especially reliable guide to understanding the nature of things. But that's just me—others will make up their own minds, hopefully being as free from confirmation bias as possible.

If others seek clarification about a point, why do not simply give an answer to clear it up? I feel no need to avoid interaction, as though there is some toxicity there that I need to avoid.

Is it your own mind, or someone else's mind which you posited?  How did you do that, if that operation had been done? — Corvus

I asked @Clearbury that same question and s/he got all huffy and claimed I didn't understand their version of solipsism. It seems that Clearbury is not at all clear on that point, so s/he wants to bury it so that others won't notice the central problem with the OP, namely the lack os a clear account of how s/he understands solipsism.

What you are saying seems to amount to saying that in the absence of minds such as ours no truth claims can be made. When humanity is gone there will still be gold, but there will not be any claim that there is gold.

The question then seems to be will there be a truth that there is gold in the absence of the possibility of any truth claims? If you want to answer 'yes' then you must think that truth is something more than merely the property of true sentences.

If you think truth is dependent on minds rather than sentences, that is on judgements rather than just propositions, then in the absence of human minds some other mind must be posited. God, for example. I think this is what @Leontiskos thinks. But what if there is no God?

By "this" you mean consciousness? We don't even fully understand or definitely know what causation, or anything else, is. We have a "folk" understanding of what we think consciousness is. There is not only a naive realism, but also a naive idealism. How are we going to find out the truth of these matters? Even scientific theories are defeasible.

A book 'contains meaning' only insofar as it is read and understood by a subject capable of interpreting its content. Furthermore, different readers may interpret the same information in diverse ways, highlighting the subjective and contextual nature of meaning-making. — Wayfarer

Of course. Different neural networks will interact with books in different ways. Why would you expect it to be otherwise? Even different LLMs produce their own unique and unpredictable thoughts, and they are not even conscious in the way we naively think of ourselves as being conscious.

Neural activity is electrical and chemical signals moving along the neurons. That is consciousness? — Patterner

That is the question. It's not how we intuitively think of consciousness of course. Hence the conundrum. We know what consciousness feels like. But that is a different question than what it actually is. Probably cannot ever be definitively answered.

Energy is particles in motion. We know which particles move in which medium. We can measure how fast they move. It's all physical. — Patterner

We cannot see particles, we can only measure their effects. We don't even really know excatly what electrons are. Are they what constitutes fields or are they merely excitations of a field? How will we find out?

I have not heard an explanation for how consciousness reduces to physics. — Patterner

If consciousness is neural activity, then it reduces to physics or at least chemistry. How can we ever be sure about that? It doesn't seem possible, because there is no way to observe consciousness being reducible to physics. So we are left with inference. Much of science is like this. You no coubt know the well worn Humean point about causation itself being impossible to directly observe.

It's ironic that you think consciousness is entirely physical, but would like it to be otherwise in the hopes of an afterlife, while I think consciousness has a non-physical component, but don't want an afterlife. But, of course, you're right. What will be will be. — Patterner

I don't want an afterlife. I just want as much of life as I can get. I also think one measure of a good life is being able to die well. Clinging to anything is not a good idea. I don't cling to the idea of consciousness being physical, it just seems the most likely to me. Somone earlier mentioned Peirce's "matter is effete mind". He nonetheless believed that the universe existed prior to humans. He was basically a kind of panpsychist. I don't think that position is incompatible with thinking that consciousness is a physical phenomenon.

You ask this in a philosophy forum?? :grin: Knowledge for knowledge's sake is reason enough for most anything, imo. — Patterner

Philosophy is defined as love of wisdom. Is it wise to simply accumulate knowledge for its own sake? That almost sounds like accumulating money for its own sake. What is the point of knowledge you cannot use?

What you say is not true. We can measure neural activity. Of course, you will say that isn't consciousness, but that is just an assumption—assuming what is to be proved.

Or think of energy itself—it can only be measured in terms of its effects. If it cannot be directly observed and measured, will you say it is non-physical?

Some of us suggest the possibility that our physical sciences cannot answer every question about reality. — Patterner

I agree if by science you mean physics. I think there are many questions about for example human and animal behavior that cannot be answered by physics. Different paradigms. But questions about animal behavior can be answered by ethology and questions about human behavior can be answered by anthropology, sociology and psychology and even chemistry. Do you think of those as sciences?

Just as a matter of interest do you care whether consciousness is physical or not? Personally, I'd rather it wasn't physical because then there might be some hope that this life is not all we get. I've made my peace with the idea that this life is most probably all we get, but whatever the case is, I don't think it matters what I think about it. What will be will be.

Beyond those kinds of concerns do you think the answer to whether consciousness is physical or not could matter for any other reason?