It is not that denial of an external world, or solipsism, is logically contradictory, or else those views would long since have been put paid to. The question, as @Banno has indicated, concerns plausibility.

So, when everything we ordinarily think, do and say flies in the face of those views, then holding to them by mere lip would be a performative contradiction, not a logical contradiction.

Well, the circularity of your "metaphysical belief", sir, begs the question. Besides, Christians mostly do not "actually live" Christ-like or miraculous "lives" even though 'Christ & miracles' are explicit "metaphysical beliefs" (e.g. Thomism, Calvinism) just as atheist materialists mostly do not "actually live" purposeless "lives" even though 'the purposelessness of material existence' is an explicit "metaphysical belief (e.g. nihilism, absurdism). Under existential-pragmatic scrutiny, sir, your espousal of Collingwood's absolute idealism does not hold up. — 180 Proof

:100: That most people probably just pay lip service in the actual living of their lives to their basic assumptions about the nature of reality is a telling point. And this goes for scientists' practice too: as far as I know there is quite a range of different metaphysical worldviews among scientists, as you mention, Christians and atheists, and no doubt Buddhists, Hindus and Muslims and other more personal worldviews. I don't believe these worldviews generally interfere with, or significantly impact the quality of, the practice of science at all.

I read Maxwell years ago and found myself disagreeing with his thesis that science is neurotic because it fails to acknowledge its metaphysical assumptions, The way I see it science consists in observation, imagining possible explanations for what is observed and then further observations to see whether what is predicted by the explanatory hypotheses obtain. No assumptions about the metaphysical nature of reality are needed. Some say causation is a metaphysical assumption; I disagree with that, since I see causation (understood in the broadest sense not merely as efficient causation, but also global relational conditions) as being the only way that events can be understood by us at all.

Science makes metaphysical assumptions, within which it does its thing. — Pantagruel

It seems more accurate to say that science makes pragmatic, that is methodologically determined, assumptions.

What facts or metaphysical truths can it guarantee? If you think there are such facts or truths, how does it guarantee them?
— Janus

Perhaps the challenge is knowing in the face of uncertainty, in other words, belief. For me, the notion of spirituality aligns precisely with the noumenon-phenomenon (mind-body) problem and is to that extent "de-mystified", although it is still mysterious. Yes, we can have some certainties of the material world, which are in a sense trivial. These form the framework of our human existence, the stage whereupon we live our lives. And those human truths are not so easily acquired or proven. And of course, when human knowledge has reached a high level of sophistication, we begin to discover that the so-called simple truths of the material world are not themselves straightforward, when we finally reach the horizons of the quantum and the cosmic.

In the human body, muscles work in opposing pairs. And the ultimate strength of any muscle is always limited by the weakness of its antagonist partner. I conceive the mind (spirit) matter dyad to be like that. Indeed, all knowledge. Hence the power of dialectic.

Such understanding ranges from the comprehension of the babblings of children to Hamlet or the Critique of Pure Reason. From stones and marble, musical notes, gestures, words and letters, from actions, economic decrees and constitutions, the same human spirit addresses us and demands interpretation. (Dilthey, The Rise of Hermeneutics) — Pantagruel

I missed this response of yours earlier.

In your first sentence you seem to suggest that belief is, or at least can be, knowledge. I can see a sense in which belief might be thought to be a kind of knowledge: our beliefs constitute lenses through which we experience and understand, that is, know, the world. But that is the knowing of acquaintance, familiarity, not the kind of propositional knowing I had in mind when I asked the question.

It's not clear to me on what basis you think the noumenon-phenomenon "problem" is equivalent to the "mind/ body problem". For me the former just represents the limits of our knowledge and as such is not a problem, but a demarcation or delimitation.

The absolute nature of things is an intractable mystery in one sense, but in another it can simply be seen to be closed to us as a matter of definition: that is that we cannot by mere definition see beyond our perceptions, experience and the judgements that evolve out of those. Anything that we project into that "absolute" space must be confabulation.

"The simple truths of the material world" and "the quantum and the cosmic" are all of them firmly in the domain of the empirical and the logical; they cannot transport us beyond the realm of our own experience and imagination.

Of course we can, via imagination and dialectical reasoning, conceive of matter and spirit in various ways, but none of that constitutes intersubjectively decidable knowledge.

Probably everything above is nonsense and I look forward to being told why — AmadeusD

Said the flypaper to the fly.

You must take us to be fools! :rofl:

If I don't have certainty of my own experience I can't very well have certainty about anything else, since anything else will always be an aspect of that experience. — Pantagruel

It depends on what you mean by "being certain of my own experience". Perhaps there is no absolute certainty anywhere to be found, but you can be certain as you can be that you are looking at a tree if you are looking at a tree, or that 2+2=4, and a plethora of things that are usually classed as "general knowledge:".

As far as being "reliably trained," you oversimplify. Not everyone can be reliably trained, it requires at least some aptitude — Pantagruel

I assumed that it would be taken as read that aptitude would be required.

Conversely, for people with the appropriate aptitude, the contention is that they are being educated with spiritual knowledge, whose broadened awareness is the practical result. Knowledge of the human spirit evolves right along with civilization. Some people even think that is what civilization is. Hegel, to name one. As well as the hordes who have tried to follow in his footsteps. — Pantagruel

What is spiritual knowledge though, beyond being in an altered state of conscious or "broadened awareness"? What facts or metaphysical truths can it guarantee? If you think there are such facts or truths, how does it guarantee them? That "some people" think or "Hegel" thinks something is no guarantee of its truth, is it? How could it be?

Sure, things that are trivially true are usually trivially evident. But some things are not trivially evident. And to people who lack the ability to comprehend the basis of organic chemistry, for example, there is a whole lot of determinate knowledge that is not clear. — Pantagruel

People can be reliably trained in chemistry and other scientific disciplines, such that things will be evident to them. This is not so in music, art, poetry or mysticism: people cannot be reliably trained to be able to alter their consciousness to achieve excellence in these fields. They can be reliably trained to understand the techniques involved in any discipline, but this does not guarantee success, even in mathematics and science there is a creative aspect that cannot be taught but is down to personal talent.

I assume that you are classifying privileged internal mental states as empirical observations then, since I know and experience the truth of my own experiences. — Pantagruel

You may or may not know "the truth of your own experiences" whatever that might mean. Assuming for the sake of argument that you do know, the point is that you are the only one, so such knowledge can never be intersubjectively corroborated.

Tell me this is not a factor in these discussions. :lol: — Wayfarer

You obviously think it is a factor. This is one of the quotes you regularly post. I don't agree with that passage: I am not afraid of religion. I would not want there to be a god of the kind present in the OT. I am not afraid of eternal life; an eternal life of bliss and constant learning would be great as far as I am concerned. I am not afraid of heaven; reuniting with my loved ones in eternity would also be great. Obviously, I don't long for Hell, but I am not afraid of it because I have no reason to believe it is real. So, it is not a factor for me, at least, and I am not going to do a Nagel and speak for others.

Nagel doesn't specify what kind of God he does not want to exist. And he is unwarrantedly projecting his own psychology to others.

purpose, meaning, and design as fundamental features of the world. — Thomas Nagel

How can they be fundamental features of the world when there is no evidence that they are? Christians think there is a fundamental purpose, meaning and design, Buddhists not so much, as far as I understand it. People can for sure believe there is a fundamental purpose, but this is, as the name suggests, fundamentalism, one of the greatest curses humankind has brought upon itself or had brought upon it by authorities wishing to control the masses.

Of course, both human and animal life are replete with purpose meaning and design, but these purposes, meanings and designs are as diverse as the animals and humans who have and exemplify them.

Do not agree. If you replace 'assumption' with 'inference' then, yes, that is where i stand. I think this is where science actually stands. I do not think 'evidence for evolution' is the factual, undebatable schema it is claimed to be outside its competition with other theories — AmadeusD

I am not aware of any competing theories. And as I have already acknowledged scientific theories are never proven; it is always the case that they may be wrong.

I'll repeat this once more because I don't think you have grasped it: the distinction between the things in themselves and phenomenal objects is not meant to be a claim that there are two worlds: the world for us and the world in itself.

If we are affected by things via the senses, then in that connection we have access to them. We know how they appear to us. The dialectical development of that realization is to say that while we know, that is have access, to things as they appear to us, we do not know, and do not have access to what and how they are in themselves. It's really not that hard to understand.

In all humility, I think this accounts for a lot of the outrage I provoke in the advocacy of philosophical idealism. — Wayfarer

Humility or no humility, you really are deluded it seems; in that you apparently can't but interpret mere disagreement as outrage.

Exactly where that line gets drawn that you call "determinate knowledge" is a function of innate ability, expertise, and experience. — Pantagruel

I think it is fairly clear what is determinate knowledge and what is not. Scientific hypotheses or theories in general are never definitively proven or certainly known to be true, the observed phenomena they predict that may warrant their veracity can certainly be confirmed or disconfirmed. Only basic empirical observations and mathematical and logical truths are known to be true.

Is String Theory a scientific theory or a metaphysical speculation? That is a different question, and I don't know the answer to that. Apparently, String Theory is woven out of some very elegant mathematics; whereas what we usually term 'metaphysical speculations" are not, so does that tell us anything about ST? Maybe, I'm not mathematician, so I don't have an opinion about it.

The same goes for DM and DE. Current astrophysical theory suggest that they exist, but of course it could be wrong due to some factor(s) that are not currently known. Science doesn't yield absolute truths, and nor does it purport to; it is always and only ever a work in progress.

Experiencing altered or heightened states of consciousness is of course possible, and I know that from my own ample stock of such experiences. The point about these states is that they do not yield determinate knowledge of anything, unlike empirical investigations and logic/ mathematics.

The ability to bring about such states is akin to expertise in music, art or poetry, and what is known is akin to aesthetics, not science or logic. So, to go back to previous examples I have given, the existence of God, karma, immortality, heaven and hell and so on cannot be demonstrated in any way analogous to how scientific knowledge and mathematical truths can. Similarly, aesthetic quality, beauty and sublimity cannot be demonstrated, they can only be felt or not.

Getting this clear is important because failing to understand the difference between determinable knowledge and intuitive feelings and faith leads to the possibility of fundamentalism and abuses of the gullible by those who seek to deceive for gain, or those who deceive themselves into believing they have some kind of special access to transcendent absolute truths or ultimate knowledge to offer.

I'd be surprised if most scientists did not believe that the universe existed before humans appeared on the scene.

Convenient cop out...why did you bother to respond to my post in the first place if that's the way you feel? I think you are either trying to deceive me or deceiving yourself, because you are loath to admit that you have no argument, but it's not my problem anyway, so...

one as consciousness does not perceive owns own consciousness. — javra

"One as consciousness"? One is not consciousness; one is either conscious or not, and one can indeed perceive that one is conscious when one is conscious. I know I can, although I suppose I cannot speak for you.

You sound victimized. Let's refresh. — javra

More projection—I don't feel victimized at all because I am not subject to your prescriptions or proscriptions, even though it seems you would have me be so. You were erroneously making out that I am seeking to dictate what others should think, rather than recognizing that I am merely exercising my right to question and critique what others are asserting and asking for arguments to back up those assertions. If you don't want to play you don't have to—I don't mind either way.

You view this as "an argument for what you believe" whereas to me it is nothing more and nothing less than an emotively expressed authoritarian assertion: one which wants to disallow me from thinking freely. — javra

That's nonsense—I don't care what you think, but if you present thoughts on here, then I think it is fair to ask for justification of those thoughts. So, if you think we can know something about whatever lies beyond being, then explain how we might do that. I'm asking because I can't see any way to do that, and if you can't explain how you could do that then I will continue to believe that you are either bluffing or simply deceiving yourself if you continue to assert that such a thing is possible..

What I quoted was not an argument, but an angry denunciation. — Wayfarer

Bullshit, more projection, I felt no anger when I wrote it—it simply presented my thoughts on the matter.

Again, you're just singing from the positivist playbook — Wayfarer

:lol: It would be laughable if it wasn't so lame—instead of argument you seek to dismiss what I say by characterizing it as being representative of one of your bogeymen. I don't agree with the positivists regarding verification, nor do I think that speculative metaphysics is worthless.

Even if what I've been arguing was an example of positivist thinking, so what? If you disagree with it you still need to provide some argument for your disagreement if you want what you are doing here to be more than merely expressing your opinion or presenting your favorite passages which are themselves nothing more than mere assertions. When are you finally going to come up with an actual argument?

If you lived in a culture, such as India or China, where reincarnation was part of the culture, you might have a different view of that. And I suggest you're not interested in any 'coherent philosophical investigation' of such matters because you're pre-disposed to reject consideration of them. Hence your self-appointed role as secular thought police, which we see on display here with tiresome regulariy. — Wayfarer

Thought police! A nice case of projection! What a joke; it is you who are saying I am not allowed to argue for what I believe to be the case, so who's the thought policeman? :roll:

The truth of spiritual ideas cannot be either empirically or logically demonstrated and hence cannot be rationally argued for. The arguments are always in the form of authority, the idea that there is some special hidden knowledge available only to the elect.

If you have an actual argument that could demonstrate the contrary, I'm all ears; but you always run away when I challenge you, which makes it plain that you have no such argument. Your modus operandi is to act as the pedagogue quoting the same tedious passages over and over as If they are somehow authoritative. Your whole mode of thinking seems to be mired in notions of authority.

I have been thinking about these issues since I was about sixteen, and for some time I thought as you do, until I found that I could see no cogent ground for such thinking to stand upon. That religious thinking has no ground is my honest, considered opinion after a very long time of reading and thinking about these kinds of issues. And here you are trying to cast me as a thought policeman instead of engaging in any actual discussion of what I actually say. It seems to be a typical reaction of the defensive, of those who feel they have a position to protect but lack the means to rationally justify it. I'm happy to be proven wrong, so go ahead and do so, if you can.

So, again, please demonstrate how, as you claim, 'the established facts of evolution and cosmology are as "equally compatible" with idealism (i.e. antirealism) as with physicalism'. — 180 Proof

:up: Don't hold your breath: Wayfarer seems to be here to issue dispensations of authority, and confirm his own biases, not to question and subject his beliefs to the rigors of argument.

:up: I have no issue with philosophical poetry; insights do not always come in the form of rational arguments. I think those kinds of poetic philosophical insights speak more to the human condition, to the limitations of human knowledge than to anything determinate or transcendent.

Those who believe in esoteric or hidden knowledge don't want to accept this limitation. I see all attempts to argue for substantive gnosis as being stillborn from the start, as being examples of the human tendency to confabulate on the basis of what is wished for. I think the spiritual leader or guru phenomenon has been with humans all along, and that it consists in charismatic individuals convincing themselves and others that they have some special knowledge of the unknowable.

That said I have no doubt there have been good teachers of techniques designed to help in loosening the bonds of the ego and the miseries attendant upon clinging to ideas of the importance of the self, but those teachings are entirely pragmatic, this-worldly, more to do with ethics than with metaphysics.

This is not to say that certain metaphysical ideas have not gone along with such self-transformative schools and practices, but they are merely aids to practice, and do not ever constitute any determinate knowledge of any transcendent truth. Such ideas vary enormously from school to school, and I guess these differences reflect the dominant cultural worldviews in different eras and societies.

As just one example among many, consciousness is "something outside the range of human perception". Yet to proscribe philosophical investigations of consciousness seems a bit authoritarian. — javra

I don't think consciousness is outside the range of human perception; you perceive yourself to be conscious, no? Note, I count proprioception, somatosensory awareness and self-reflection as forms of perception...what else could they be?

What then do you make of value theory in general? Ought it not be philosophically investigated? Meaningful tests regarding, for example, the very validity of dichotomizing intrinsic and extrinsic value are certainly not yet available, if ever possible. Does this, according to you, make the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value something that "cannot coherently function as a claim"? — javra

Humans have values; there is no conceivable way of determining the existence of value outside of the human realm. The closest we could come to that would be understanding purpose in animals. Human valuing is intrinsic to humans, or rather I would say the pragmatic necessities that drive value-forming are intrinsic (in the sense of being necessary) to human social life.

Sure, we can investigate philosophically the human phenomenon of value-formation; this would be an aspect of phenomenological and/ pr anthropological inquiry.

Critique regarding what should and should not be philosophically investigated — javra

Am I not allowed to argue for what I believe can and cannot be coherently philosophically investigated? I don't believe things like God, karma, rebirth, heaven and hell can be coherently philosophically investigated on account of the fact that I have never encountered any coherent philosophical investigation of such matters, I have only encountered dogma regarding those and like subjects. And believe me, I have looked long and hard. I am not alone in this assessment: "that whereof we cannot speak,,,"

That said of course the human phenomenology of belief in such things can also be investigated, but this is not the same as investigating the things believed in.

Though we disagree in some respects, ↪Fooloso4 beat me to it in the example he provided to the contrary. — javra

I read what @Fooloso4 wrote and did not interpret what he said as being contrary to my position on this.

BTW, if you tack on questions to me after you've made a post, I might not see them. But maybe you already knew this? — javra

I don't understand what you are saying here. My questions were in the post. As to the quote from Plato, It is fragmented and out of context (from Wikipedia) so I don't want to comment on it.

And how are any of the examples you've given "beyond human judgement"? Plenty of people judge these notions all the time. Some favoring these notions and others opposing their validity. — javra

"Beyond human judgement", as I use it, means beyond decidable judgement. Of course, people may have opinions, but those opinions cannot be informed opinions if what they are about is something outside the range of human perception.

Many who will uphold religions and essoterica will of course disagree with the dogma that they are "arbitrary imaginings". You seem to have some superior knowledge to the contrary. Care to share? — javra

As implied above, I count them as arbitrary imaginings if they do not refer to anything intersubjectively corroborable. So, it is not dogma, but presents a valid distinction between what can be tested and what cannot. And no, I have not said that ideas that cannot be tested have no value, but that they cannot coherently function as claims if there is no way to for the unbiased to assess their veracity.

I'm against any proscription of thought regarding reality. Hope that's blunt enough. The thought-police ought not prevent others from thinking freely as they will. As far as I see things, the ideas which result thereof can then be in part judged by natural selection. — javra

Where are the thought police? All I'm seeing is critique, not suppression.

Yea. Any suppression of free thought regarding any existential topic will serve as an example of "unjustifiabley proscriptive". Scary to me to think otherwise. But repressive regimes are not unheard of. — javra

Again, where is the "suppression" you speak of? Is disagreement and critique not allowed in your ideal world?

Dude, knowledge of what a sublimely aesthetic experience is felt to be shall often enough be ineffable ... other than by saying something like "the beauty of that there is beyond words".

But that aside, why should attempts at effing the heretofore ineffable be off limits? — javra

"Effing the ineffable" is the job of art and poetry, not rigorous philosophical discussion. Poetry may be evocative, but it presents no arguments. That which cannot be tested empirically or justified logically is outside the scope of rational argument. That doesn't mean it has no value, so don't mistake me for saying that.

I agree and very well said.

:up:

Given an example of such "necessary ignorance" which should remain off limits to investigation? — javra

Anything that is beyond human perception and judgement...that is anything purportedly "beyond being" or transcendent...God, rebirth, karma, heaven, hell...need I go on.

Ha. Scientific hypothesis are "made up shit in the face of the unknown" which can be empirically tested for. — javra

Scientific hypotheses are not arbitrary imaginings but are abductive inferences as to what, consistent with the overall body of canonical human experience and judgement, might be the explanation for this or that observed phenomenon. This is an entirely different kettle of fish to religious dogma or esoterica.

See my first question. If we are necessarily ignorant of X than there is an implicitly affirmed proscription of thought, debate, and investigation as pertains to X. — javra

OK, now you seem to be speaking as though that proscription is a right and good thing. I had thought you were railing against it. So, which is it?

Funny. All I have are opinions of various strengths, some of which pass a threshold beyond which I term these opinions fallible knowledge — javra

I meant an example of someone being unjustifiably proscriptive as to what others are allowed to think.

Where have I affirmed "ineffable knowledge" in any of this debate? — javra

I haven't said you affirmed any ineffable knowledge...I mean, how could you? But some do affirm that those who are thought (by themselves and others) to be enlightened are capable of ineffable knowledge. So, I am trying to understand whether you are one of those who affirm such things. The other question, even if you do affirm such a possibility, is whether you think it can be part of philosophical discussion.

The esoterica of the gaps.... — Tom Storm

I like it!

We seem to either be suffering from an absence of mirrors in which to see our own selves and conducts on this forum or else from a self-righteous arrogance of somehow being beyond foolishness. Or maybe both.

Because science and its paradigms does not seek to accomplish the exact same feat? Or any other field of human knowledge?

The proscription of thought, debate, and investigation on a philosophy forum by some is telling. — javra

If there are areas in regard to which humans are necessarily ignorant (which I believe is unarguably true) and there is an inveterate human tendency to find this unacceptable, then the filling of this space of mystery with dogma is inevitable.

Science seeks to coherently and consistently explain what is observed while all the time remaining cognizant of the defeasible nature of its theory and knowledge. This is not even remotely similar to the human tendency to simply "make shit up" in the face of the unknown. This is not to say that some scientists, being fallible humans, do not make shit up (falsify the data).

What "proscription of thought, debate and investigation" is going on here in your opinion? Perhaps you could offer an example which is not merely the expression of a different opinion. The other point is that once one starts to talk about "ineffable knowledge" one has entered a realm where argument simply cannot go. Do you think that can that be counted as "doing philosophy"?

You haven't been following the discussion too closely, then. Yes, Socrates/Plato stated that the Good as Form is beyond being. — javra

I haven't read the entire thread. Since Socrates and Plato are not participating in this discussion perhaps you could provide a quote from the latter which unambiguously states this.

Cheers, my fellow pyromaniac. Stay :cool:

The issue was how does one define, else understand, being - this, specifically, in terms of Plato's affirmations. — javra

I think the issue can be raised for many terms that we understand perfectly well until we try to pin down a definition. It is probably nothing more than a problem with language, with its inexactitudes, ambiguities.

I happen to agree. Hence my contention that there is something lost in translation in saying that "the Good is beyond being". This would entail that the Good is not. Which is contrary to Plato's works. — javra

Did someone say that the Good is beyond being? I would have thought that it is only beings or events which could be good or otherwise.

'Before' is a concept. — Wayfarer

Que?

But it's still a quite fuzzy distinction that, while it may suffice for everyday dealings, becomes more problematic as we think and analyze it with some depth. — Manuel

I think the distinction between inside and outside the skin is a useful and valid one. A basic principle of semiotics is the idea that life and experience is only possible once there is a separation between an 'inside' and an 'outside', most primordially realized by the cell membrane.

It's true that when we think about and analyze it we may become confused due to ambiguities of terms.

Sure, you can say external objects are real, but to go on to argue,

that our perceptions of them are real on account of the real affects they, along with environmental conditions, light, sound, molecules of scent and taste, and the nature of our bodies themselves, have on our perceptions.
— Janus

Raises a serious problem.

What about the objects' effects are we interacting with? As Descartes points out, the heat is not in the fire, and as almost everyone says, the orange and yellow colour is not in the fire either, and so on down the list of properties. — Manuel

I don't see that as a serious problem. Whatever is actual and external to the body can act on it to produce perception, and the nature of that perception depends on the actual nature of the body being acted upon. I see no reason to think that what is reliably and cross-sensorially perceived is not real in some sense. After all, that is generally what is meant by the word 'real'.

So, the colours and the heat are real phenomena that exist in the interaction of the body with fire and the light reflected off objects. You say the heat is not in the fire. but the fire can burn objects and even entirely consume them, even in the absence of anyone perceiving the fire.

Heat is defined by science as the agitation of molecules caused by friction or combustion, but of course heat defined as a felt phenomenon is only possible for a percipient.

My interpretation of 'beyond being' is that it means 'beyond the vicissitudes of existence', 'beyond coming-to-be and passing away'.
— Wayfarer

:100: And I'm in agreement with your post in general. — javra

We can know nothing whatsoever about whatever might be "beyond being". The idea is nothing more than the dialectical opposite of 'being'. Fools have always sought to fill the 'domains' of necessary human ignorance with their "knowing". How much misery this has caused humanity is incalculable.

You seem to be conflating change with difference. The image is static, not changing, but all points in the image are not the same as each other. This is almost always the case with the visual field. When I look at the visual field when nothing is moving, then nothing is changing, but there is difference across the whole field.

A big issue, to my mind, is what exactly is meant by external here? People often speaking about external and internal, as if that distinction is very clear, I don't think it is. It would be replied that this sofa I am seeing is external to me, that is, it is not in my mind, so it is external in that sense. — Manuel

This raises an interesting counterpoint. I said a couple posts back

On the assumption that we have no access to the external ('external' here meaning 'external to our bodies') world, what would constitute evidence for evolution? Just answer that one question and we might get somewhere. — Janus

I didn't want to say 'minds' because that would be to reduce us to a kind of "dimensionless point observer", but 'bodies' can't be quite right either since parts of them at least (and all of them if viewed in the mirror) can be external objects (at least visually speaking).

On the other hand, we feel our bodies "from the inside" so to speak; I don't just look at my arm as an external object, but I feel the sensation within it, its movements, its straining and ease, and I feel its continuity with the rest of the body,

On the basis of this "internal sense" we differentiate our bodies from external objects, feeling them to be part and parcel with ourselves. I think we have good reason to think that external objects are real and that our perceptions of them are real on account of the real affects they, along with environmental conditions, light, sound, molecules of scent and taste, and the nature of our bodies themselves, have on our perceptions.

I think it fair and plausible to count this as "having access to external objects" although I go along with Kant in thinking that we have access only to their perceptible qualities as conditioned by the nature of our own bodies and organs of sense.

Correlation, I suppose, would be the only way. Do the things we're experiencing correlate with the expectations Evolutionary Theory posits?

But, I get the feeling I am committed to basically say "its an inference" and im fairly comfortable with that. — AmadeusD

The problem with what you say here as I see it is that the expectations Evolutionary Theory posits are based on the assumption that the evidence for evolution, the fossil record, Carbon dating, DNA testing and so on consists in accurate information about the external world, about the world before humanity even existed.

So, any correlation with those expectations would be baseless without that assumption. You say, "it's an inference", but inferences about the external world, the prehuman world, and the present world must all be based on the assumption that the data they are based upon is accurate, that is to say that we do have access to the external world, or else the inferences would be completely groundless. I don't see how this has anything to do with your subjective feelings of being comfortable; it is well-known that many people may be comfortable with contradicting themselves or making groundless claims.

The veracity of evolution itself is based on the assumption that we have access to external reality
— Janus

I am fairly sure understand your position and am not missing it(that is obviously possibly wrong)... But, my position is still no, it isn't, and that this is the one of the cruxes. — AmadeusD

On the assumption that we have no access to the external ('external' here meaning 'external to our bodies') world, what would constitute evidence for evolution? Just answer that one question and we might get somewhere.

Yeah, that is not what I or Ligotti was claiming in the sense of "meaninglessness". So that is a moot argument. — schopenhauer1

I haven't said you or Ligotti claimed "meaninglessness". I believe you both claim that life can be universally characterized as "suffering" which would mean as 'intrinsically negative', and that is what I have been arguing against.

How so? You said there is no intrinsic value. That is missing the point, that it is only beings that perceive value, and human beings that are self-aware they are perceiving value. And that is what matters, not what the universe is devoid of beings who have value. If that was the case, we wouldn't need to talk about anything. We just wouldn't "be". — schopenhauer1

I have said that value, meaning, purpose is only to be found in the volitions, cognitions and judgements of beings. The value of life as assessed by human beings, and arguably not other animals, may be either positive or negative, depending on the human being doing the assessing, so it seems obvious that there is no intrinsic, universally negative or positive value to life.

We have discussed this before, and I believe I have answered you before regarding this. — schopenhauer1

If you have something to say in response to the passage you quoted, then say it. Vague references to some previous answer you purport to have given are next to useless. If you want to bring in past discussions, then at least bother to cite particular statements.

The value is squarely on the being-in-the-world. It is rather about not the universe devoid of being, but the universe with a being that can feel, comprehend, and in the case of the human, self-reflect. — schopenhauer1

I haven't said that life has no value for living beings; I have said it has no intrinsic negative or positive value. The value or meaning or purpose life has for living beings is diverse just as are the living beings. Trying to dismiss (your version of) what I said as "surface-y" seems a rather desperate tactic.

I don't view "no purpose" as positive or negative either on its face. Rather, it is suffering that is paramount to the pessimist. Suffering can show itself in peculiar ways to the human animal. When doing something tedious, or in prolonged bouts of melancholy, one might see an immense worthlessness to it all. — schopenhauer1

Sure, some minority of people, not animals I would think, may feel something like this. It may be driven by brain chemistry, or it may be on account of trauma, or something else; but whatever its origin might be, it is a subjective emotional state, not a universal truth. Life involves suffering, but it also involves joy, and the proportions of each will vary from living being to living being: seeking to absolutize the characterization of life as suffering is a fool's errand.

Indeed, what better way to be motivated than some external, culturally derived and tested way? — schopenhauer1

Right and there are potentially as many ways to be motivated as there are individuals if you drop the "overarching".

Since we cannot refute this possibility on the basis of the nature of the concepts of existence and cause (as distinguished from the empirical fact that these things always seem to go together), we therefore cannot make the case that it is impossible for anything to come into existence without a cause – after all, anything is possible unless it is logically impossible. — expos4ever

It is fine to say that anything that is not logically contradictory is possible provided the provenance of that "possible" is understood to be confined to the epistemological. That is to say that as far as we can tell anything that is logically possible might be physically or actually possible. On the other hand, there may be things which are logically possible which are not physically or actually possible, even though we cannot determine what those things could be.

I agree, that evolution has done an incredibly good job of making us think this is the case... — AmadeusD

The veracity of evolution itself is based on the assumption that we have access to external reality, so your thinking here is in turn reliant on that assumption. That's what I've been trying to point out.

Fact is, our mind is in receipt of data only. The movie it puts together to play to our experiential faculties isn't actually relevant to that - its an illusion. — AmadeusD

How do you know that is the case? I don't deny that it might be an illusion, but I also think it might not be an illusion. How could we ever definitively tell, one way or the other? On the other hand, since we and the other animals seem to be very good at navigating and surviving in a complex and dangerous world, the evidence seems to point to our perceptions providing us with adequately reliable information about that world.

I'm sure i could find plenty of examples of thinkers relating experience to sense data (perhaps in other words) and carving out "actual objects", as it were, from the data. IN fact, that seems to be the entire thrust of Idealism (more specifically, Kant's Transcendental Idealism). — AmadeusD

Kant, as I read him, thinks that the objects of the senses are real things that are independent of human perception. How we see those things obviously is not independent of human perception, and that's why Kant talks about things in themselves. We have no access to the "in itself' nature of things, but of course we do have access to the 'for us' nature of things.

It isn't. It's derived from the very clear fact that my mind is not actually in touch with any objects, yet my mind is the arena of my experience — AmadeusD

The objects appear to you, how is that a case of "not being in touch with any objects"?

Hmm, point taken, but also I disgree.. but I think you're a step back from the level of analysis i'm at in this discussion.

Yes, that is, superficially, a reason to think those things are 'out there'. Our experiences converge, as it were. But I have already noted that I assume there are things out there. But it's an assumption that those people and their perceptions are also "real", so it's somewhat tautological to rest on that, imo. — AmadeusD

What you say here shows that your perspective converges on solipsism. Solipsism (like any other philosophical position) can neither be disproven nor proven, but its plausibility rating must be thought to be very close to zero.

You show by your action of posting on here with those who disagree with you that you don't believe in solipsism. As Peirce said “Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts.”

They are all part of the same whole. There is no "true level" of human misery and suffering that we can discover by "cutting through illusion." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Exactly! And it is arguable that pessimism and optimism are both basically dispositional, and as I said earlier, even that they are determined by brain chemistry, which varies from person to person.

Pessimism might better be called something like 'Life Disvalueism', where the basic idea is that life not only has no intrinsic positive value but actually has a negative intrinsic value. I would agree that life has no intrinsic positive value, but I also think it is nonsensical to claim that it has negative intrinsic value.

Some argue that if life has no overarching purpose that it follows that it has a negative intrinsic value, but I think it is arguable that having no overarching purpose is a positive thing, in that it allows us to be free to create our own purposes, rather than submitting to an imposed purpose or else suffer punishment, karmic consequences and so on.

Of course, even so-called overarching purposes are culturally imposed, since they are matters of faith, not something which could be obvious to any unbiased or free minded individual.

I know. And I have answered, many times, my friend: I have experience, and I cannot understand that I have experience, other than as a result of sense data, based on the empirical fact of my experience. — AmadeusD

The more immediate experience is that you sense things, not data. No one prior to the modern scientific era would have thought in terms of sense data, which means the idea is secondary and derivative. If your idea of sense data is derived from modern scientific understanding, the veracity of which in turn is based on the assumption that we have access to external objects, then your belief that you have access to sense data necessarily depends on the latter assumption.

As to your idea that there is no reason to believe the tree you can see is actually there: well, there obviously is, since other people with you will see the same tree and on questioning will confirm that they see the same unique details of the tree, and even animals present will show by their behavior that they also see the tree; e.g. the dog might pee on it and the cat climb it or the bird perch in it.