It is impossible for human reason to understand the essence of God. — Arcane Sandwich

Are you assuming that God exists? Because if God is merely a human idea, something imaginary, it seems strange to say that it is impossible to understand it.

Thanks for your interesting reply. I'm not all that familiar with the various interpretations of and theses about the nature of the quantum realm. Asa I understand it they are all compatible with observed results, which makes me wonder how we might assess their various plausibilities.

The other issue is that they all seem to be attempts to understand the observed behavior of the microworld using concepts derived from our experience of the familiar macroworld, and I see little reason to expect that is an entirely coherent endeavor. That said, I understand that we cannot help pursuing it.

Then perhaps you'll be surprised to know that Bunge suggests that the Big Bang didn't happen. In other words, Bunge himself denies premise FTI10: the Big Bang did not happen, precisely because (in Bunge's view), creatio ex nihilo is impossible. He says that as a physicist. He thinks that the Universe is somehow eternal in an Aristotelian sense. — Arcane Sandwich

Did Bunge say the Big Bang did not happen? I haven't encountered such a statement in my readings of Bunge. I doubt that many physicists consider the Big Bang to be "creation ex nihilo", that is creation out of absolutely nothing. The Big Bag is compatible with a Universe that cycles form Big Bang to Big Crunch for example (I am aware that current evidence is considered to tell against this thesis). It is also consistent with the multiverse thesis.

Even if we want to say that God created the Universe out of nothing, this is not really out of nothing because God, if it exists, is not nothing (even if it might be no-thing).

The answer depends on whether or not the Universe is comprehensively and rigidly deterministic . Current scientific understanding says it is not. But then the question is whether (assuming that our current understanding is correct) randomness on the quantum level produces a fully deterministic macro world.

I don't know the answer to that, and I doubt whether the question is even decidable in principle, because regardless of whether the macroworld is subject to randomness to a sufficient degree to make randomness operative at the macro level, knowing the answer would seem to depend on us experiencing a counterfactual reality, which is impossible in principle since anything we experience cannot rightly be thought to be a counterfactual.

Or maybe the younger Namatjira simply prefers a less polished, grittier style.

Are you sure about that? It sounds like it's true, but don't want to rush to any conclusions here. — Arcane Sandwich

As far as I know in all monotheistic traditions God is considered to be an eternal, infinite being that depends on nothing else for its existence. I think that is what is meant by "necessary". The point is that if such a being exists then it would necessarily exist. Of course I'm open to counterexamples.

Jesus' being God is not necessary
— Janus

Are you sure about that? — Arcane Sandwich

Why would it be necessary that God, assuming that it necessarily exists, should incarnate as a man, let alone as one and one only man?

it is only in one tradition that, in the doctrines of its some sects, it is claimed that Jesus is God.
— Janus

Again, are you sure about that? — Arcane Sandwich

As far as I know it is only in Christianity that God is believed to have incarnated as one and one only individual, namely Jesus. I also know that some sects of Christianity do not accept Jesus as the unique human incarnation of Goid.

Again, I am open to refutation. If you can show evidence that other religions held that Jesus was God or that every Christian sect held that Jesus was God incarnate.

I find it odd that Christian philosophers only offer arguments for the conclusion that God exists, while not offering any arguments for the conclusion that Jesus is God. Why would you resort to logic in the former case but not the latter? Is there any reason that warrants this differential treatment? — Arcane Sandwich

In all monotheistic traditions God is considered to be a necessary being. Jesus' being God is not necessary, and it is only in one tradition that, in the doctrines of its some sects, it is claimed that Jesus is God.

By 'ineffable' I mean our experience cannot be adequately described. Every experience is unique, and giving word to it only generalizes something which is profoundly particular. It is the particularity of experience which is ineffable.

It seems to me that language enables much more than mere "species' reproduction"—language is not even really needed for that, although of course humans use it for that purpose.

The major survival boon, and curse, of language, most potently in its written form, is that it enables collective learning, which in turn makes us the most adaptable of species. With the accumulated knowledge enabled by writing we have become able to inhabit virtually every environmental niche.

When we have exhausted the resources in one niche, we can go somewhere else, and our population is thus not automatically trimmed by famine when we have been feasting too hard for our habitats to sustain. This will work for us until we have nowhere left to go, when we have exhausted all resources everywhere and undermined the viability of every habitat.

Anyway, I'm veering into another topic, so I'll leave it there.

:up:

I think we are always already back there—and that's the ineffable part of our experience our words cannot capture. Poetry, literature, perhaps come closest.

I agree that what stands out for humans as well as other animals is probably largely what affords a use. We don't know whether things also stand out for animals because they are spectacular or beautiful (as we might reasonably think so for humans), but it seems reasonable to think the threatening aspects of the environment would be gestalted.

I agree, definitely there is interplay, but I give some priority to world over word. After all things first had to stand out for the human in order for language to begin. And judging from their behavior it seems obvious that things stand out for prelinguistic beings such as children and animals.

Recondite! Closer to home it could be expanded to be Apastimeologist, but I guess we all fall into that category.

:up: Me neither.

I personally think "what is useful determines what is true," is a fairly disastrous way to do science and philosophy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Just the kind of pragmatism that Peirce wished to distance himself from!

"What counts as an insect" is much the same question as "How should we use the word insect". — Banno

How we should use the word "insect" is not constrained by what seems to count as being an insect?

I'm curious about it, since it sounds like a real word. — Arcane Sandwich

It always seemed obvious to me that it is a play on "epistemologist". I also wondered whether the "pus" bit was of any significance.

:up:

What's interesting is that if you start with Russell's (bad) theory, it is very hard to extricate yourself. You end up compulsively concerned with the question concerning a verifiable "definite description." — Leontiskos

Yes, the salient difference between descriptions and "a verifiable definite description".

I don't see what to make of this except as saying that there is stuff. So, yes. And folk want to say more, but as soon as they do, there are all sorts of problems. — Banno

I actually agree with you on that. I was just trying to unpack the logic employed by Spinoza regarding necessity and contingency.

But we do know who the question refers to... Socrates. Yes, there is more that one can learn about Socrates, but that is still about Socrates. Kripke's point, that we do not need a definite description at hand in order for a propper name to function correctly, stand... no? — Banno

I can't see how we could know who the name refers to if we didn't know at least one of the following that Socrates is purported to be; that is 'the teacher of Plato', 'the agora gadfly' 'the man charged with corrupting the youth of Athens and condemned to drink hemlock' and so on.

Of course if someone is familiar with those descriptions the proper name 'Socrates' "functions correctly", but for someone who doesn't I can't see how it functions at all.

The big picture as I see it is that what has been for decades happening more covertly and to a lesser extent is now beginning to happen more overtly and to a greater extent. This is exactly what should be expected. Desperate times lead to desperate measures. Trump has a mandate from the US electorate and so far seems to be doing exactly what he said he would.

The biggest problem with democracy is that the majority of electors are stupid, gullible, don't really understand the issues or don't really care about anything much beyond improving or preserving their living conditions, of which the most important elements apart form food, shelter and clothing are entertainment, comfort and convenience.

I have trouble seeing a connection between dependency and modality. — Banno

Spinoza has modes, but they are conceptually different to modality in modern logic, as I understand it. The simple point is that Spinoza sees necessity in terms of dependence. A necessary being does not depend on anything for its existence, whereas contingent beings do. So, contingent temporal beings that come into and go out of existence depend on Nature or God (Deus siva Natura) for their existence, Nature or God is eternal, does not come into or go out of existence and depends on nothing.

Yes, it is. SO the question is clear, and the referent fixed - the question is about Socrates. It would be odd to answer "But since you don't know who Socrates is, I don't understand your question". — Banno

It's not a matter of not understanding the meaning of some reference to Socrates when one has no idea who the name 'Socrates' refers to, but of not knowing who or what is being referred to. Descriptions will be necessary to provide that information.

Well, in S5 that would lead to everything being necessary. Much as Spinoza concluded. But that's not a theistic god. It seems pantheism is more logical than theism... :wink: — Banno

Yes, Spinoza was a determinist so in one sense for him everything was necessary, but he also made a distinction between a being (God or Nature) that is necessary in the sense of depending on nothing else, for its existence and beings that are contingent in that they depend on other conditions and beings for their existence.

You'll be familiar with the examples. Who is the question "I've never heard of Socrates, when did he live and what did he do?" about? I suggest it is about Socrates, despite the speaker perhaps not having anything available with which to fix the referent. It's not that there are no definite descriptions, but that they are not needed in order for reference to work perfectly well. — Banno

Right, logically the question is about Socrates, but for someone who does not know who Socrates is said to have been, descriptions will be needed for reference to work.

For consistency god must have created the world of necessity. In modal logic (S5) if there is a necessary being then everything in every possible world is necessary. — Banno

Is there any logical reason why there could not be just one necessary being?

But now, given the ubiquity of the use of the name, there is a widespread agreement as to the referent of "Socrates" such that it is not dependent on that particular act. — Banno

But does the widespread agreement not come about due to many descriptions that form part of the causal chain? This would seem to be inevitable if there were more than oine Socrates and question like 'Which Socrates are you referring to?" or 'I've never heard of Socrates, when did he live and what did he do?'.

I agree that for those who already know who the name refers to descriptions need not be at hand. :cool:

Likewise, God recalling all of creation history from outside time does not affect the freedom of creatures in time. Boethius decisive innovation was to make it clear they being located at one moment in time is as limiting as being located in one space. To be at just one moment of time is to be separated from oneself, and not to fully possess all of oneself. God was already thought to be most truly One, so God's existence in time also runs into the problem of dividing God from Himself. — Count Timothy von Icarus

An interesting addition to the argument!

What do we make of this? If god sees what we have done, and so cannot change it, then there is something god cannot do. Or god does not know what we will choose, in which case there is stuff he doesn't know. — Banno

I think the eternalist view enables God to know what we have done. what we have chosen. On that view there is no past, present and future. Could God change the past? Would that not change all of reality?

In any case is God compelled to fix our mistakes? This comes back to the obvious fact that he has no created a perfect world, not if a world, to be perfect involves no suffering for any creature.

Also, there is the question as to whether God can do things that defy logic. Is God bound by logic? If so, then He cannot be omnipotent. So many questions about God!

Did you see the argument, from a recent Philosophy Now paper, proposing that this was the perfect world, but not for us?

The Best Possible World, But Not For Us — Banno

Doesn't sound too promising but I'll have a look.

Kripke’s entire argument in Naming and Necessity is that names refer via causal chains, not definite descriptions. — Banno

I never got this. Naming and Necessity was the text we studied in one of my undergraduate units at Sydney Uni. I could not then and still cannot see how the causal chains would not necessarily have involved description, and that because names may refer to more than one individual, and because pointing in the case of remote individuals would not be possible.

If I recall correctly Augustine dealt with that argument by pointing out that God who is not in time but in eternity sees all of the past present and future, so it is not a matter of him knowing what one will do, but what one has done.

For me a far more telling argument would be that God should be able to create a perfect world but hasn't. That throws in doubt either omnibenevolence, omniscience or omnipotence. On that point it seems that the latter two must go together, or at least if Gord were omnipotent he must be omniscient, but neither require omnibenevolence.

OK, I've probably misspoken in the sense of failing to flesh out what I meant and poorly expressing what I did say.

I said: "Yes, viewed through the lens of the human notion of goodness and justice an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent creator seems to be an oxymoron."

I should have written the last words of the sentnece differently and added something like the underlined: "Looking at the actual conditions in, and nature of, our world and viewed through the lens of the human notion of goodness and justice an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent creator seems to be untenable".

I don't agree that the notions of omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence are logically incompatible per se.

:up:

The dog doesn't know that the blue ball has anything in common with their blue collar or with the blue cabinet in the living room, for instance, unless its being trained and rewarded with food when it point to blue objects, in which case the salient affordance isn't the blueness, but the promise of food. — Pierre-Normand

Of course all of that may well be true. But I see no reason to think the blueness of the ball is not perceptually present even if the dog has no conscious awareness of its presence, just as we most often aren't consciously aware of what we are perceiving. The ability to detect blue is simply a matter of physiology.

Anyway, the original point at issue was whether the world is always already interpreted for dogs (and other animals), and the idea of affordances seems to suggest that it is.

Yes, viewed through the lens of the human notion of goodness and justice an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent creator seems to be an oxymoron.

They don't see the ball as blue, since this abstract feature of the ball never is salient to them. — Pierre-Normand

I agree they probably don't see the ball as blue if that means they consciously conceive of it as such. Nonetheless I see no reason to think they don't see the blue ball, that it doesn't appear blue to them. Much of our own perceptual experience is like that—we don't see the red or green light as red or green we simply respond appropriately.

Do we think that a being which is omnipotent is greater than a being that is not? Because maybe someone would say, "If it is an evil being then the omnipotence would make it lesser, not greater." — Leontiskos

Yes, that's why I included "all other things being equal".

:ok:

I am not a mathematician, so no doubt there is something here I am not understanding. Apparently, Cantor has shown that infinities come in different sizes, and it seems logical to me that the set of whole numbers is greater than the set of even or odd numbers. Of course I could be mistaken. If you think I am, can you explain my mistake?

A misuse of the word "size". — jgill

So, you disagree with Cantor?

Just like Zeus, eh? Btw, do you stop to think about what omnipotent means and implies? Is omnipotence the greater thing?

Then there is the question of what, exactly, a thought object is, and if it is of a being than which & etc., then what do we know about the idea? And in particular how that idea, or any idea about the idea, becomes constitutive of anything "existing in reality"? — tim wood

Omnipotence is the greatest power. It doesn't follow it is the greatest good or knowledge. God is traditionally conceived as being the greatest everything, so all other things being equal and omnipotent God would be greater than a God whose powers were limited.

That said, I am an atheist, in the sense that I don't possess a belief in God and am only considering the logic of the ideas of degrees of goodness, power and knowledge.

I suppose there are those who think that because we can conceive of the ideas of God, eternity and infinity that they must actually exist. I think that is really the thrust of the Ontological Argument. I can't see how it could be a matter of logic—I think it must be counted as a matter of faith.

So, if a dog sees something as blue or yellow (apparently dogs lack red receptors) does that count as empirical content?

I'm pressed for time right now—I'll try to respond to your other posts when I have more time.

It's very simple to show that infinite sets are not atl the same size. The set of even numbers is infinite. The set of odd numbers is also infinite. The set of whole numbers contains both sets, so it must be larger. No counting is required.

And I think it's pretty clear that Anselm's God cannot meet these criteria. Nor, for that matter, do (I think) any of the original Christian thinkers think that He could or did. — tim wood

If God is "that than which nothing greater can be thought" then he is necessarily omnipotent, from which it would seem to follow that he can meet any criteria he likes.

But both stances seem to be consistent with the thesis apparently shared by Rouse and McDowell, that empirical content doesn't reside outside of the sphere of the conceptual. — Pierre-Normand

This leaves me wondering just what you mean by "empirical content"?

Since all imaginable characteristics of objects depend on the modes in which they are apprehended by perceiving subjects, then without at least tacitly assumed presuppositions relating to the former (subject) no sense can be given to terms purporting to denote the latter (object). In short, it is impossible to talk about material objects at all, and therefore even so much as to assert their existence, without the use of words the conditions of whose intelligibility derive from the experience of perceiving subjects. — Bryan Magee, Schopenhauer's Philosophy

This is a conflation between our ability to discern characteristics of things and the characteristics themselves.

I would not say that, when we like ice cream, we are free not to like it, anymore than, when we are sensitive to good reasons, we are free to disregard them. But in those cases, I follow Susan Wolf who, in Freedom Within Reason, argues that free will (or rational autonomy) doesn't consist in the ability to freely choose between a reasonable and an unreasonable option but rather in having acquired rational abilities through becoming (mainly by means of upbringing and acculturation) asymmetrically sensitive to good reasons. — Pierre-Normand

Since we don't create ourselves by fiat so to speak and given that we have no choice given who and what we are as to whether we are convinced by arguments or not. I'm not seeing much difference between the ideas of being convinced and being caused to be convinced.

I also want to reiterate that once we look at the world as always already interpreted, then I think the interpreted evidence of the senses, although obviously sometimes mistaken, does provide good evidence and hence rational justification for both animals and humans for at least the basic beliefs about what is observed. I think we've explicated our respective positions pretty thoroughly so I'm not sure there's much more to say at this point. Thanks for your efforts and polite participation, Pierre.

:up:

We give the name 'matter' to, and arguably derive the idea of matter from, that which we understand to constitute the things encountered by the senses. We also speak of "subject matter" and what "matters", and I think the underlying idea is one of substance and of what is substantive.