I would say you could be fairly certain you had a mystical experience or not by comparing it to the quite substantial literature documenting reports of experiences which are classed as such. What I don't think anyone can be at all certain about is as to what could be the metaphysical implications of such experiences.

I've had quite a few such experiences, some of them under the influence of psychedelics, and some while meditating and some while listening to or playing music, painting or writing, and some while in wild surroundings. I don't interpret them to mean anything beyond themselves―of course for me they hold a great deal of emotional force and meaning in themselves, but that meaning is not discursive. If those experiences can be given voice at all, it would be via the allusive language of poetry.

I think it should have been obvious that I didn't mean to say the dog called it a wallaby―by "we" I meant to refer to English speakers. I'll grant the sentence on an immediate glance appears to be saying something absurd. The fact that it is absurd I think should have alerted you to look for alternative interpretations. That said, I acknowledge I should have been more careful with the wording.

You make it sound like my wording is generally obscure, but I think if it be compared with Kant's or even your own, I doubt it could be judged to be any more obscure, and if anything would probably be judged to be less obscure.

Anyway it's rare on these forums that anyone complains that they cannot understand what I've been saying.

I don't know if you're missing the point―which was just that the dog and I both see a wallaby, and judging by the dogs behavior towards it, he sees it as something to be eaten. I don't see wallabies as to be eaten but as to be preserved, but I have hit and killed one with my car ( on the road, not on the property I dwell on), which I subsequently ate (not my car, the wallaby, just in case I've been obscure again).

Unargued dismissal by labelling, pure and simple.

If you attained a radically altered state and felt absolutely convinced that you had insight into the true nature and meaning of "life, the universe and everything", you would no doubt think that was objective knowledge.

But when you tried to put it into words it would become just another culturally conditioned interpretation, an interpretation which could never capture, or be adequately true to, the wordless feeling of your insight.

But I'm not denying that there is an external world. What I'm denying is that knowledge of that world is purely objective, that we can see it as it is or as it would be absent any observer. — Wayfarer

The I have no idea what we have been disagreeing about, because it is true by mere definition that we cannot see the world as it would be absent any observer.

I had thought you took issue with the idea that we can speculate about what existed prior to humans, which just consists in imagining what we would have seen had we been there. The other point is that I don't accept the idea that things cannot exist outside of any perspective, and I'm pretty sure you disagree with that.

My point all along has been that there is no use in arguing about that because there can be no way of determining the truth regarding that. Of course take issue with any dogmatic assertions about it given that no one could know for certain.

So, I am not dogmatically asserting that things definitely existed prior to any percipients, or definitely exist absent any perception of them, but I do think that is the most plausible conclusion, most consistent and coherent with human experience and understanding of the world.

We designate it as truly existent, irrespective of and outside any knowledge of it. This gives rise to a kind of cognitive disorientation which underlies many current philosophical conundrums. — Wayfarer

I don't know what conundrums you are referring to. I see more potential for conundrums in denying that things can exist absent percipients.

Well, I think both Wayfarer and myself, in our different ways, are positing a non-mental self, a self that not only thinks but animates and, perhaps, connects with something larger. You're right about the cultural baggage, but as philosophers we can try to see beyond that. @Wayfarer is good at reminding us of the deeper, more thoughtful traditions of spirituality that were there long before some religions tried to codify and moralize spiritual experience. The words "spirit" or "soul" may not be helpful for a particular individual, but let's not rule out this aspect of being alive and human. — J

I have no argument with spiritual practices and faiths―I just don't like to see people interpreting such beliefs as objective knowledge, for that way lies dogma and fundamentalism. At their best, I see them as techniques for attaining altered states, even transforming the way of life.

If life were in truth "about something" which given its apparent nature seems highly unlikely, it remains that none of us know what that "something" could be.

We can believe or speculate that there have been sages who enjoyed such knowledge, but we don't know that. Those we think of as sages might have been deluding themselves for all we know, just as we might delude ourselves if we think that what might seem like profound insights are telling us anything real about anything real.

What I’m saying is that the frameworks through which we recognize “yellow, blue, green, red” are already the product of shared cognitive, biological, and cultural conditions. That explains the convergence without appealing to a “mind at large.” — Wayfarer

You are still missing the point. Due to the general structural and functional characteristics of the human eye most of us see the same range of colours. Humans don't see ultraviolet or infra-red. Dogs apparently only see in tones of blue and yellow. That has nothing to do with cultural conditioning. How we categorize and names the more than a million distinct colours we can detect is a function of both cultural conditioning and the similarities between the different hues and tones.

That we agree when I point to one particular coloured particle out of hundreds as to which colour it is is not at all a function of cultural conditioning. I point at a green one say, and that you also see me pointing at a green one shows that there must be something independent of both of us that explains that, provided we accept that our perceptual organs and minds are in no hidden way connected. This is my final attempt to explain it to you―if you still don't get it, then that's pretty incredible but just too bad.

Judgements about what is observed are interpretive and of course may differ―what is observed is not a matter of interpretation.
— Janus

The first is correct, the second is the contradiction of it, which makes it false. That there is a thing observed is not a matter of interpretation, corrects the contradiction.

You’re correct….or, I agree….that you and the dog see the same thing, whatever it may be. Of the two, only you represent the thing seen with a particular concept, but you would readily admit that you haven’t a clue what the dog’s doing with his perception, but you can be sure he isn’t representing it to himself with the same conceptual reference as you. — Mww

It is not merely that there is a thing observed, but that the fact that there is a particular kind of thing observed is also not a matter of subjective interpretation. We both see the dog there and we both class the thing as being a dog, so what you seem to be thinking of as the interpretation only relates to the classing, and the classing is not a subjective interpretation, but a shared practice of naming. If there was a cat or any other other object there neither of us would see a dog.

The dog and I both see something we call a wallaby. I know he sees an animal there and not a runaway trail bike, because if he catches what he sees, he may start to eat it. So, then I know he sees, just as I do, something suitable to be eaten.

I confess I don't understand what you or the quoted passage from Kant is attempting to convey. Can you explain?

The difference between the action of gravity on our experience and the action of a universal mind, for example, may be that one appears in the external world of appearances where we measure things and the other doesn’t. — Punshhh

I agree, and for me this means that gravity is a definite part of our experience whereas a universal mind is not―the latter is purely speculative.

I have an affinity with these concepts as I am concerned with realising our limitations and developing ways to view our limitations in the context of our lives (living a life), for example. — Punshhh

I have no argument with that―we each have affinities for different ideas.

You will agree with me as to whether it is yellow, blue, green or red, undoubtedly. Can you explain how your "common set of cognitve, cultural and linguistic practices" can account for that agreement? — Janus

Don't worry about the original post or QM, just answer the straightforward question above if you can. What is at issue is the explanatory power of your idealist thesis absent the inclusion of 'mind at large', collective mind, universal mind, God.

I just can't believe you don't see the problem.

It goes directly against your contention that every observer sees the same thing when the observations show they don’t. — Wayfarer

Are you saying that the fact that there are different conceptual interpretations of the experimental results goes against my claim that every observer sees the same thing? Well, it doesn't― just as it is possible that people can pass different judgements about anything that is seen doesn't entail that what has been seen is different.

It is not that different things are observed, but that the class that what has been observed should be placed in, or the explanation for what is observed, may differ from person to person. Judgements about what is observed are interpretive and of course may differ―what is observed is not a matter of interpretation.

As to that I meant that when the 'two slit experiment' is carried out every observer sees the inference pattern, and when they pass light through one slit every observer sees the accumulation of points on the photographic plate.

I don't think 'material cause' and 'formal cause' are particularly interesting, but I do think there is a valid distinction between proximate and global cause. I prefer to think of the latter as conditions rather than causes, as I said.

I think logical structure, linguistic and semantic relations, normative and evaluative judgements and so on all come into how our explanations are structured. However, I still think that when it comes to explaining any natural event, efficient cause and general conditions form the backbone that carries the flesh of "structure, linguistic and semantic relations".

Also I am addressing only explanations of natural non-living phenomena― I acknowledge that explanations of animal and human behavior may be given in terms of reasons instead of causes. The overall set of conditions under which actions are taken by animals and humans will also obviously come into play in any explanation. Reasons as well as causes are constrained by global conditions.

It's not dogmatic; it is a phenomenological reflection on our everyday experience. Our everyday experience shows us clearly that we live in a shared world. It can even be seen as an empirical fact, as it can be demonstrated so easily.

What you are gleaning from physics is just one interpretation―the one you resonate with―there is no solid consensus that your interpretation is the correct one. Also you are not an expert in that field, by any means, which gives you even less warrant to cite it.

The commonalities of our sensory organs and cognitve, cultural and linguistic practices cannot on their own explain the fact that we all see the same things at the same times and places. At most it can only explain what might tend to stand out for us, or the general form our perceptions take―for example in regard to the part of the electromagnetic spectrum we can detect, or the limitations on the acoustic frequencies we can detect―as well as the names we give to the things we encounter, and the we have conceptions of them, such as their purpose, place in human life and so on.

Even if it could explain how it is that humans see the same world, it cannot explain the fact that our observations show that our dogs see the same things we do, for example. I live on a fifteen acre property and there are many wallabies. When I walk the dogs I will often catch sight of a wallaby, and the dogs will also, and if I don't restrain them they will be off chasing it. Now the wallaby may look different to dogs than it does to us on account of the fact, among others, that when it comes to colours, they can apparently only see in blue and yellow, but it is undeniable that they see what I call "the wallaby".

I have asked you to explain how "a common set of cognitve, cultural and linguistic practices" could determine our seeing precisely the same things. Say, for example you and I have in front of us a white A4 sheet of paper covered with "hundreds and thousands" (I'm sure you are familiar with those little coloured sweet grains). I take a very sharp pencil and point precisely to just one of the hundreds of grains, and ask you what colour it is. You will agree with me as to whether it is yellow, blue, green or red, undoubtedly. Can you explain how your "common set of cognitve, cultural and linguistic practices" can account for that agreement?

Good comments. The key point is ‘participatory’ - not being a bystander. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure what you mean by "bystander". By "participatory" perhaps you mean something like "present"―that is, not "off in your head" all consumed by the "internal dialogue"? The alternative to being in the head would seem to be inhabiting the body, as aware as possible of all the sensory inputs and the spontaneous feelings they generate. Philosophy, on the other hand, is a cerebral activity.

↪Wayfarer ↪Ludwig V ↪Janus Didn't Aristotle say that the mind resided in the heart? — J

I seem to dimly remember reading something like that. Julian Jaynes has an interesting theory that Greek people in Homerian times did not identify thoughts as being their own, but as being the voices of the gods. (This is a simple characterization―I read his book decades ago). Presumably they would have assumed their sensations and emotions belonged to them.

I find that fascinating because, as y'all have pointed out, it seems irresistible to me to locate my self or "I" within my head. Or perhaps a better way to say it is: I can't help locating the part of consciousness which thinks, perceives, and imagines as being within my head; but that leaves open the possibility that spirit or soul should be identified with breath, heart, or guts. So a deeper or more cosmic "I" is not necessarily conceived as mental.

But then there's the Third Eye, which opens in . . . the head. — J

As I said earlier, I share your affliction. Jesper Hoffmeyer in Biosemiotics makes a case for locating the self in the skin, as it is by far the body's largest and most sensitive organ and is our primary interface with the world.

I don't know about "spirit" and "soul"―it seems very difficult to think in terms of those without carrying all the unacceptable cultural baggage that comes with them.

A speculative "cosmic" "self" such as Brahma or God is not necessarily thought as either mental or physical. In fact a universal cosmic being is not necessairly thought of even as a "self"―for example Spinoza conceives God as being synonymous with Nature, and the mental and the physical as being just two of its infinite attributes.

Madhyamaka philosophers say that ālaya-vijñāna risks reifying consciousness into a hidden essence or foundational mind. — Wayfarer

I guess I would agree with the Madhyamika philosophers. Because on the other hand without such a reification, it becomes merely an idea, and thus seems to lose all explanatory power.

I always comes back to this basic problem―experience shows us that we all see the same things at the same times and places is unquestionable that we live in a shared world. On the other hand there is no evidence that our minds are connected in any way such as to be able to explain that shared experience. The default assumption is that things we encounter are real existents that don't depend for their existence on our encountering them. So that model explain why we would experience a shared world. The idealist alternative would be to assume a hidden collective mind or consciousness, or a universal mind of which we are all manifestations, and that could be the Abrahamic God, Brahma, or some creator deity.

I don't see gravity as a good analogy because its effects are measurable. I believe that the idea of independently existing things makes sense―others see problems with it, but it seems those problems stem form assumptions that I don't share.

The idea of a shared or collective mind is not logically contradictory, so it makes sense in that sense, but I think the idea is extremely underdetermined by our everyday experience.

CPR, B311 — Paine

That's an interesting passage from Kant―I don't remember encountering it before. It seems to undercut any move towards dualism.

Some say that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible and that it has nothing to do with sense experience, but they seem to forget that Kant's categories were discovered by him by reflecting on perceptual experience and abstracting its general and necessary characteristics.

True, although it may be that there are elements of efficient causation in all those contexts, but that it is far from being the whole story.

OK. It's just that causal explanation, along with the metaphor of the machine, has been such an icon of what science is about that I find it hard to grasp the alternatives (apart from statistical explanations). — Ludwig V

That seems right. Efficient or proximal causation is the basis of mechanistic modeling. That kind of modeling tends to isolate the subject from its environment. For any event or change to occur there is presumably a whole network of conditions that constrain the ways in which that event or change can unfold. The most universal global condition seems to be entropy.

:up: Whenever you're ready...

I'm pretty sure that our phenomenological perspective on mental phenomena is heavily conditioned by our culture. For example, it is very difficult to answer the question where (in the body) the mind is to be found in ancient greek (or roman) culture. There are good grounds for answering that it is a distinct entity - a ghost - that survives death. There are also grounds for saying that it is the breath - an interesting choice, since it isn't quite clear where the breath is. I think the best answer is that the question where the mind is was not even formulated in that culture. It requires, I would say, a culture that has already problematized mental/physical relations, as happened in Western Europe in the 17th century or so. — Ludwig V

You make a good point. I was addressing just the 'thinking' aspect of mind. When I think, whether in language or images, the activity seems to be located in my head. Of course when it comes to emotions, they seem more closely located around the heart, and if sensations are thought to be activities of the mind they extend throughout the body. When it comes to seeing the awareness seems to be "out there' in the surrounding environment. Hearing mostly, but also to a lesser extent smelling and tasting seem to be a bit more ambiguous, for me at least.

Our organs of sight, hearing, smelling and tasting are all located in the head, and that may contribute to making it seem as though the mind is located there.

Perhaps the ancients were not as much "in their heads" and language oriented as we are today.

I was using the digestion analogy more to point to the idea that activities in general are not strictly objects of the senses, not to address the issue of whether the brain generates thought. And yes, 'being' is explicitly a verb, and seeing it that way instead of as a noun renders it as an activity not as any kind of object (except in the very general sense that thinking of it makes it an object of thought), Being or existing would be thought of the master or umbrella activity under which all other activities find their place.

Regarding the Ālaya-Vijñāna there is also a Theosophical idea designated the "Akashic Records", which I think bears some resemblance to the Buddhist idea. It seems that idealist thinkers have long recognized the explanatory need for some kind of collective consciousness as a substitute for the independent actuality of physical existents.

Do you have anything to say about my contention that the idea of storehouse consciousness is an idea of a collective consciousness or mind?

I address this in another Medium essay, Is there Mind at Large? This essay interogates Kastrup's expression and compares it with Berkeleyian idealism. But then it draws on Yogācāra Buddhism, the school colloquially known as 'mind-only', to argue that it is not necessary to posit any kind of super-mind or cosmic mind.

Although I also concede that if Kastrup simply means 'some mind' or 'mind in general', then I am in complete agreement with him. Why? I think the reification trap is associated with the tendency towards objectification, to try and consider anything real in terms of it being an object or an other. This is where Heidegger's criticism of onto-theology rings true. — Wayfarer

I read your essay, and I thought it was well-constructed and clearly expressed. However I remain unconvinced about the idea of a collective or universal mind being explanatorily unnecessary for an idealist thesis concerning the nature of the world and its relationship with human and animal experience.

You cite as an alternative the Ālaya-Vijñāna or storehouse consciousness of Yogācāra Buddhism, an idea I am fairly well acquainted with from my studies of Eastern philosophies and religions. I always thought of it as a kind of collective karmic storehouse, and it is explicitly doctrinally classed as a form of consciousness. So I'm not seeing how it is not an idea of collective consciousness or mind.

If the thought is that our individual minds are separate then what is posited, in the absence of also positing a collective mind that connects and/or coordinates them, is that, as far as minds go, it is only individual minds that exist. I don't see a "reification trap' in the sense of a 'tendency towards objectification' because neither individual minds nor collective minds are being posited as objects of the senses. I see mind as an activity of the body/brain, not as an object of the senses. It's maybe not the best analogy, but digestion is also an activity of the body, not an object of the senses.

:up:

:up: Foolish practice makes perfect foolishness? Would perfect foolishness be wisdom? (there was also a tradition of fools being wise as shown in KIng Lear).

Maybe it's more along the lines of not being afraid to make mistakes, being playful and learning to see your foolishness, what it consists in. If I become afraid of others seeing my foolishness and hide it, then I will have less of an opportunity to see it myself.

Wittgenstein said something similar: "Don't for heaven's sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay attention to your nonsense."

Simpletons are something else, but I agree there is innocence in foolishness, and simpletons are also, like animals and (some) children innocent.

I wonder if it is possible to become wise by learning from the foolish? After all, with discernment, watching a fool and what happens to them can be very instructive in learning what not to do. — Tom Storm

"If the fool would persist in his folly he would become wise" William Blake

:up: :up:

I meant as opposed to ideal. That said. I do think the materialism/ idealism dichotomy is ultimately wrongheaded, but there is a deeply entrenched distinction between the ideas of things and the things the ideas are about. Symbolic language seems to be inherently dualistic in orientation. It doesn't seem plausible that nature or reality itself could be anything but non-dual, so when we try to understand it in dualistic terms, we are always already "up against it".

The fact of the dualism of thought and language aside, if I think of phenomena as being the very same things as noumena, just thought about in different ways according to a natural distinction that arises in a dualistically oriented mind, then I am undercutting any substantive "bifurcation".

If I propose that the things are ideas, then I must imagine an unseen, unknowable entity―a "mind at large" to quote Kastrup, and that seems to bring in the inevitable ontological dualism involved in thinking there is a transcendent realm or reality over and above the one we know.

And I wonder whether that isn't a "figment" generated by the dualistic nature of language―a reification or hypostatization. As I like to say "choose your poison" and it seems that people usually do, especially on philosophy forums.

You’re both looking down different ends of the telescope. That’s why it looks different. — Punshhh

I thought this comment referred to a conversation we were having in the other 'idealism' thread. I'm not so sure what it refers to in this thread.

The noumena aren't necessarily esoteric, just as if they are in a room we can't access, so its not as 'mysterious' as one might think. But we can at least securely infer that they are there, or we'd not perceive anything. — AmadeusD

Yes, that's why I referred earlier to "bifurcation". If the things that appear have their own existence in some way (whether actual physical existents or ideas in a universal mind) they are nonetheless what lies behind our experience of phenomena. And about their nature as unperceived things we can only infer, which means that that nature is, in Kantian terms, ideal or noumenal for us.

That said, I have my own preference for thinking that they are actual, not ideal, existents―the 'god hypothesis' I don't find so compelling.

The idea of an "ultimate nature" seems to have troubled humanity from ancient times, and not only in the West.

Better to know we don’t know, than to think we know something we don’t. — Wayfarer

I can't argue with that, although in practice I think we generally all do cleave to one preferred hypothesis or another. That said I've always been attracted to the kind of suspension of judgement of the Pyrrhonian Skeptics― ataraxia has its definite attractions.

I've heard of Noe and that book, but never looked into it. I agree that “consciousness is an achievement of the whole animal in its environmental context”. As Timothy pointed out, the environment must be such as to be able to support life, and the brain body must be, to a sufficient degree, a healthily functioning one.

On the other hand it does seem as though the brain generates consciousness, given that it is injuries to that organ, and not to other parts of the body (barring death of course) that are sufficient to curtail consciousness.

'within' is an interesting concept in this context. It's a spatial metaphor in which brain/body is a container and the mind is something inside it. But from another perspective, the body exists 'within awareness'. — Wayfarer

I get that; it is possible to reverse perspectives. That said from a phenomenological perspective, it does seem to me that my thoughts are going on inside my head, not in my torso, arms or legs or even neck. I mean it just feels that way. So while we cannot be directly aware of neuronal activity, that activity seems to generate sensations that make it seem like thought is in the head (to me anyway).

It's also interesting because, while the body is a locus of activity, it is not sufficient to generate a mind. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, what you go on to say about the body being unable to survive in unsuitable environments just indicates that a healthy living body is usually sufficient to generate consciousness. I say "usually" because there are phases of deep sleep wherein consciousness doesn't seem to be present.

You haven't said anything I didn't already know. Anything about which we can know nothing is noumenal. "Know" here means 'have cognitive access to'. If the ultimate nature of a physical existent is unknowable, then it is noumenal. If there are unknowable aspects of physical existents then those aspects are noumenal.

It is meaningless to say "noumena are not nothing, they are less than nothing". That's just philosobabble.

Corrections require cogent argument and explanation. "No" is a useless comment.

Totally useless comments.

OK, that makes sense. The only thing I wonder about is whether Kant's noumena are logically required. To explain the fact that we all see the same things and inhabit a common world it would seem that something beyond mere individual perceptions, something beyond the perceptual in general, is required. So phenomenalism seems highly implausible and it has no explanatory power at all.

I guess strictly speaking, even if what that "something beyond" is is just a world of physical existents, it can be said that they are noumenal to us. On the other hand we perceive objects, so the objects are not unknown to us even though there may be things about them we don't or even cannot, know. For example it seems we could never be certain about the ultimate or most basic constitution of physical things.

In that case it would not be a case of there being noumenal things, but noumenal aspects of things. If things are ideas in the mind of God, we might know all about the things because God makes everything about them to be discoverable, and there is nothing unknowable left over about them at all. But we still
wouldn't know that that was the case.

I'd like to be Sam, but I won't insist. — Wayfarer

I'm happy enough with being Ralph.

:lol: Which one are you?

I'm not sure what you are saying, and I can't think of an example of what I think you might be saying. Can you give an example for clarification.

Please don't take this personally, but the reason I often don't respond to your posts is that it seems as though your interpretation of what I've said that you're disagreeing with seems to me so far from what I intended that I find it difficult to get enough purchase on what you are saying to respond.

That presupposes that our minds and reality exist in the same space. Since our minds are not physical objects, that cannot be the case. — Ludwig V

Does the mind, as an activity say rather than an object, not reside within the brain/body?

Right we make "secure" (or not so secure) inferences. But they are not determinations of truth. For example, I get accused of scientism, and yet I don't believe that scientific theories are strictly determinations of truth. Any theory may be falsified.

:up: I think we've reached some consensus, so I'm happy to leave it there if you are.

Isn’t that exactly what the OP was about? The point of the transcendental argument is that there are truths not determined by observation or logic, but by clarifying the conditions that make either possible. — Wayfarer

How do we determine the conditions that make either possible if not by observation and logic? We can reflect on our experience, that is we can do phenomenology, in order to try to determine the essential characteristics of all experiences. Such reflections are not directly testable observations, so there may be disagreement about their findings, but I think that given good will substantial agreement can be reached.

That all perceptions of objects must be spatiotemporal and that embodiment is spatiotemporal are two uncontroversial examples of such phenomenological reflection of the character of experience. I would count phenomenological investigations as a species of observation, and of course logic plays its part in all our judgements.

Other more controversial results such as that consciousness is non-physical because it doesn't seem to us to be depend on the framing. What exactly is meant by "non-ohysical"? Does it mean "not an object of the senses" or "not a function of, and completely independent of, any physical substrate".

Do you have anything to add to that?

I say the OP stands on its own two feet. You can continue to say whatever you like, but unless you can come up with an actual criticism, I will feel no obligation to respond. — Wayfarer

I have asked questions and posed counterpoints which you have no even attempted to address. Here are two:

Your argument is something like:

We derived our idea of existence from our cognitive experience, therefore nothing can exist apart from its being cognized.

The conclusion does not follow logically from the premise, so it is not a deductively valid argument.
— Janus

That’s a very simplified gloss, and not my argument. I’m not claiming that “nothing exists apart from cognition.” I’m saying that any concept of existence only makes sense within the conditions of possible experience. (I'm not bound by Kant's argument, but I am trying to stay in his lane, so to speak.) — Wayfarer

You say that you are not saying that nothing can exist apart from its being cognized, and yet that is what saying that any concept of existence only makes sense within the conditions of possible experience amounts to. If we accept a framing that says we cannot possibly experience things-in-themselves, then it follows that things that cannot possibly be experienced cannot exist. This must follow because if they can exist, then it cannot be incoherent to say that they can exist.

Of course I don't accept that framing because I don't accept the notion of "things-in-themselves" I think there are just things that we perceive, and that there is no logical contradiction in saying that those things might (or might not) exist independently of being perceived, and that there may be some things about them that we cannot perceive, given the limitations of our perceptual organs.

Can you give me an example of any truth which is determinable in any way other than by observation or logic, and also explain just how that truth can be determined?
— Janus — Janus

On reading your response below which apparently occurred while I was editing and adding to my post, I see that you have agreed that phenomenology may be thought of as a species of observation, so I guess we are in agreement there unless you have any further examples of ways of determining truth.

Right - that's what you're doing. You fall back on the 'it can't be determined, therefore a matter of opinion.'

This is becoming very repetitive, you've been making the same objections, and I'm giving the same responses. If you honestly can't see the point of the OP, maybe find another one to comment on. — Wayfarer

It looks to me like you are out of answers. You claim that there are ways, other than by observation or logic, to determine truth, but when pressed by questions such as this:

Can you give me an example of any truth which is determinable in any way other than by observation or logic, and also explain just how that truth can be determined? — Janus

You don't even attempt to back up your claim.

Surely I am free to raise objections to any OP, or am I allowed, according to you, to comment only on those I agree with?

All of your statements about the 'already existing objects' and 'previously existing universe' rely on that implied perspective which you're bringing to bear on it, without noticing that you're doing it. — Wayfarer

All my statements are expressions of my perspective―so what, that's trivially true. Of course I'm aware of it. I also acknowledge that my perspective is not the reality―you know, "the map (or model) is not the territory".

'It is empirically true that the Universe [and 'the object'] exists independently of any particular mind. But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective. It is not solely constituted by objects and their relations. Reality has an inextricably mental aspect, which itself is never revealed in empirical analysis.' — Wayfarer

If the existence of the Universe is independent of any particular mind, whether human or animal, how does it not follow that it is independent of all individual minds? Of course there is a perspective involved in saying that the Universe is or is not independent of minds, but it doesn't follow that it is impossible that the universe be either independent or dependent on minds―we just don't know and may only speculate about it.

I'm not going to try to address any purported implications of quantum mechanical experiments and results because I don't have the expertise, and I don't believe you do either. It is arguable that even the experts understand only the math, not what metaphysical implications might be suggested by QM. Wasn't it Feynman who said: "I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics"?

This requires an exercise in looking at your spectacles, instead of simply through them. — Wayfarer

You can't look at your spectacles without looking through them.

"Not determinable” in what sense? If you mean not determinable by science, then of course — but that doesn’t reduce it to mere opinion. If you mean not determinable in principle, then I disagree: there is a fact of the matter about whether categories like “existence” or “mind-independence” are meaningful outside the bounds of cognition. That’s the point of the argument: It’s not about my opinion versus yours. Your implication always seems to be: can't be 'determined scientifically' therefore it's a matter of opinion. — Wayfarer

I didn't address this as thoroughly as I meant to. The claim is that truth is determinable only by observation or logic, and otherwise we can have only beliefs about what is true. A radical skeptic would say that we cannot be certain of the truth even of what is observed or logically self-evident. Can you give me an example of any truth which is determinable in any way other than by observation or logic, and also explain just how that truth can be determined?

It’s in the link I shared in the OP. Did you read it? — Bob Ross

Can't you just tell me?

If you mean not determinable in principle, then I disagree: there is a fact of the matter about whether categories like “existence” or “mind-independence” are meaningful outside the bounds of cognition. — Wayfarer

What do you mean by "meaningful outside the bounds of cognition"? Let's say for the sake of argument nothing for human discourse is outside the bounds of cognition, are you saying categories like 'existence' and 'mind-independence' can only apply to the objects we perceive?

If so, then it seems obvious that they don't only apply to the objects we perceive when they are being perceived. In my view all our experience, both ordinary everyday observations and science, informs us that there are human-independent things in the Universe now and that
there were before humans existed.

As said a number of times already, 'there is no need for me to deny that the Universe is real independently of your mind or mine, or of any specific, individual mind.' — Wayfarer

It follows then that it must be real independently of all minds unless you posit a hidden collective mind. Is that what you believe?

In the double-slit experiment, whether you get an interference pattern or not depends on whether an observation is made. — Wayfarer

Regarding any individual experiment, all observers see the same result, though. The fact that the behavior of microphysical particles seems counter-intuitive, even paradoxical, shouldn't surprise us given that we have evolved in a macroworld, and our expectations as to the behavior of entities has been conditioned by our experiences of macro-objects.

There is also no clear consensus among the physics community as to the implications of those observed weird results. In any case why deny what science tells us, and then appeal to it when it suits you?

I don't believe you have any real doubt that the everyday objects we encounter constantly have their own existence, which does not rely on our perceiving them. As Peirce said: "Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts".

I’ve got a pretty decent telescope, and when I look here, and look there, the space between is full of stuff I don’t perceive without it. — Mww

Right, I haven't claimed there are any truly empty spaces. But then when it comes to spaces that look empty that just speaks to the fact that there are things there we cannot see with the naked eye. It's kind of irrelevant anyway, because all I'm saying is that we can perceive extension, distance, and that counts in my view as perceiving space. You are free to frame it differently.

If you agree all perceptions have a sensation belonging to them…..what sensation does one receive from the perception of space? What is it about your perception which distinguishes the space you perceive from empty space you do not? — Mww

The sensation is one of extension, or distance as a said above. I'm not sure what you are driving at here.

But it still needs to be known the necessary conditions for mass, form and size of a thing, and even more importantly, the necessary conditions by which differences in mass, form and size of different things are related. — Mww

I don't know what you mean―the necessary conditions for the perception of mass, form and size are that they are there to be perceived. The overall form of an object is not dependent on perspective, although of course how it looks from any angle will be if it is not a sphere. Size is relative, and if one object is larger than another, that would not seem to be dependent on perspective either. Same with mass.

But I get the point: the material of my existence is no different from the material of any other existence. What do you intend to be gleaned from such analytical truths? — Mww

Clarity?

That’s a very simplified gloss, and not my argument. I’m not claiming that “nothing exists apart from cognition.” I’m saying that any concept of existence only makes sense within the conditions of possible experience. — Wayfarer

So, you're saying that something might exist apart from cognition, but that it makes no sense to say that? In any case the concept of existence outside of cognition makes sense to me. You can say it makes no sense to you, but that is all you are entitled to say. There is no determinable fact of the matter that that can be used to ascertain what makes sense and what doesn't as a universal rule.

You're saying, there must be a reality outside any consciousness of it. — Wayfarer

No I'm not; I'm saying it seems most plausible to me that there is a reality outside any consciousness of it.

But that’s precisely the point: your criterion itself — “only what can be determined by observation or logic counts” — is not itself established by observation or logic. — Wayfarer

It is established by observing that no other way of determining truth is to be found. If there is another way, then tell us what that way is, and how it works.

But this “real world” you posit beyond appearances is itself nothing but conjecture. You say “all the evidence points to it,” but by definition the evidence only ever belongs to the realm of appearances. — Wayfarer

I don't believe that's true. It is an undeniable aspect of experience that people see the same things at the same time and place down to the smallest detail. It's easy to test. That is what is to be explained and I think the inference to a world of mind-independent existence is the best explanation. You don't have to think that―but since it cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed by observation or logic it becomes a matter of what each person finds most plausible. That's the way I see it.

Anything we say about things which cannot be decided by observation or logic is a matter of conjecture―I've never denied that.

Your argument is something like:

We derived our idea of existence from our cognitive experience, therefore nothing can exist apart from its being cognized.

The conclusion does not follow logically from the premise, so it is not a deductively valid argument.

What you are offering is a certain perspective on the situation―a certain way of framing it. There are other ways of thinking about it. There is no determinable truth of the matter; so really comes down what seems most plausible as to what you will believe. In other words it is a matter of opinion, or preference, or taste or whatever you want to call it.

If you think otherwise then explain how you think your view could be established to be correct.

But there is not space between objects, only more objects, that's why you said you do not perceive empty space. — Metaphysician Undercover

We perceive the extendedness of objects; that is what space is. It is not an empty container. If you think we cannot perceive space as an empty container, well of course that is true, but irrelevant.

Basically you're saying that it's subjective, a matter of opinion. 'It's OK if you see it that way, but I see it a different way'. It's not 'determinable' because it can't be validated empirically. Whatever is not determinable by science is a matter of personal preference. — Wayfarer

No, whatever cannot be determined by observation or logic is a matter of opinion. You tell me how it might otherwise be determined.

But you're still positing a real world beyond what appears, as if that is the criterion of realness, when it is the very point at issue. — Wayfarer

Yes, I'm positing a real world beyond what appears, because I think all the evidence points to that. You are positing that there is not a real world beyond what appears because (apparently) you think all the evidence indicates that to be the case. Neither of us can demonstrate that we are right, so it is a matter of opinion. That's plain to see, but you apparently cannot accept that.

BTW, I'd rather just discuss this with you―there is little point quoting entries about Husserl or other philosophers I am well enough familiar with to know that I disagree with them and why. Invoking authority figures just doesn't cut it for me.

The truth concerning what is neither empirically nor logically demonstrable is not strictly decidable and so is a matter of what each of us finds most plausible or in other words a matter of opinion...call it what you like. And of course a dogmatist won't want to accept that.

This is going nowhere so I'm going to leave you to it.

Got it...Cheers.

The separation of objects just is the space between them.