So they are doing it for the sake of something good, being that it is in accordance with their nature to gain well-being through the suffering of other species, but must aim at bad things to achieve it. So your counter here seems to miss the mark, don’t you think? — Bob Ross

You are describing humanity.

Except that on the scale we now inflict suffering, degradation of environments, extinctions of other species and so on is not rational at all, because even from the point of view of a "selfish rationality" what we are doing will not be to our ultimate benefit.

Also, there is really no "selfish rationality" because from a purely rational perspective one's flourishing or suffering are no more or less important than the flourishing or suffering of others.

Is justification the same as reason, apology, exculpation, defense, plea, rationale, rationalization, pretext, excuse - or something else? — Vera Mont

Justification consists in giving reasons. There would seem to be an ineliminable normativity inherent in the very idea of giving reasons, whether to oneself or to others.

What criteria do you use when judging someone's justification for a policy or a course of action? Is it different from the criteria you apply to justifications for an isolated act? — Vera Mont

As I see it a policy or a course of action should be judged not just on moral grounds but in consideration of its likely effectiveness in achieving its aims. An isolated act would analogously be judged in terms of its consequences.

When justifying your own actions or statements, according to what factors do you formulate your argument? — Vera Mont

The central criteria here would be intention, honesty and good will with regard to statements, as well as consequences in relation to actions. Consequences may also be salient criteria in the case of statements, but it depends on context.

On what grounds do you decide whether a justification is appropriate and valid? — Vera Mont

On the grounds of relevance, coherency and consistency.

Cheers. I'm similarly insufficiently tutored, so I cannot understand all the subtleties of formal logic, unless they are clearly enunciated in natural language. It seems to me, since formal logic is only an adjunct, a helpmate, to natural language, that anything that cannot be translated back into natural language such as to make intuitive logical sense, is useless (for philosophy if not tout court).

One of the problems in this thread has been that the OP was not couched in formal logical terms, and just what was meant by 'notB' was not explained.

Some A's have a plurality of implications. If A implies both, B and C, then "A implies B" and "A implies not B" is better understood as "A implies B and C". C is not B. — creativesoul

Same point I made earlier about alternative readings.

1. You ought do this
2. You should do this
3. You must do this
4. You are obliged to do this
5. You have an obligation to do this
6. You have a duty to do this — Michael

I said that when you make a promise, if you are being honest, you are obligating yourself, barring unforeseen circumstance that prevent you, to do what you have promised. Note the caveat "if you are being honest'.

The social mores do not differ too much in substance if not form from culture to culture. This reflects the fact that people naturally generally want to be able to trust and feel safe with their fellow citizens, friends and family.

As @Mww points out you are looking on mores merely as kinds of impositional commands The salient question is 'what do you expect from yourself'? Would you be comfortable making promises to others that you had no intention of keeping?

People are giving you answers that reflect a perspective that is participatory, whereas you are ignoring what they are telling you, looking at yourself as an isolated individual and complaining about not knowing what the obvious means.

If you do what's right because you're trying to satisfy others, that's a lesser form of morality. If you do what's right because otherwise you'd let yourself down, that's the higher form. — frank

I see the two as integrally connected, entangled, unless "satisfying others" for you means purely a matter of appearances, like wishing to merely seem honest, compassionate or whatever as opposed to actually being those virtuous things.

We all want basically the same things which I outlined in my reply to Michael above. So from the point of view of actually caring about others, satisfying others and being satisfied with yourself are not two different things.

Why is it clearly not the case? Because we use the sentence "you ought not kill"? I think it's far simpler to just interpret this as the phrase "don't kill". You haven't actually explained what makes the former any different, you just reassert the claim that we ought (not) do things. — Michael

"You ought not kill" is a counsel, whereas "don't kill" is a command; that's the difference between the two.

When you sincerely promise to do something, you intend to place yourself under an obligation to do that thing, you understand yourself to be under an obligation, on account of your sincere promise, to do what was promised.

That it is possible that you could change your mind only entails that you cannot be forced to do what you promised. An obligation does not consist in some external force, but in internal consistency. If you want to say that obligations cease if and when people change, then the recognition of that should forestall you from making promises. It is dishonest to make a promise that you do not believe you will be able to keep.

The very proposition of "there both a) is a self and b) is no self" has (a) and (b) addressing the exact same thing - irrespective of how the term "self" might be defined or understood as a concept, the exact same identity is addressed — javra

The point is that if there is no determinate entity that 'the self' refers to, if there is only the concept, and if there is no actual entity, then saying that we are speaking about the same thing is incoherent. On the other hand, if you stipulate that the self is, for example, the body, then what would A be in the proposition (A implies B) where B is 'there is a self' ? Let's say that A is 'the perception of the body': this would be 'the perception of the body implies that there is a self". 'The perception of the body implies that there is no self' would then be a contradiction to that.

"the presence of water implies the presences of oxygen"

is not an "if then" statement, since 'the presence of water' and 'the presence of oxygen' are noun phrases, not propositions. — TonesInDeepFreeze

An alternative way of putting it would be 'if water then oxygen'. 'If water then no oxygen' contradicts 'if water then oxygen' according to the logic of everyday parlance.

My point earlier with taking an alternative interpretation, that is with the 'notB' not being interpreted as 'not oxygen' but rather as signifying something other than oxygen, say hydrogen, then the two statements would not contradict one another.

As in the concept/meaning of self as "that which is purple and square" vs. "that which is orange and circular" or any some such? And this in relation to "there both is and is not a self"? — javra

This makes no sense to me.

Again, one perspective being the mundane physical world of maya/illusion/magic-trick and the other being that of the ultimate, or else the only genuine, reality to be had: that of literal nondualistic being. — javra

The notion of a self from the perspective of "the mundane physical world of maya/illusion/magic-trick" is not the same as the notion of a self from the perspective of "literal non-dualistic being", so you are not talking about one thing.

That said, the self has no definitive definition, so introducing such a thing in the context of discussing whether anything could be the same in different contexts or thought under different perspectives seems incoherent from the get-go.

Consider the following substitutions which do not suffer from such ambiguities: Render (A implies B) as "the presence of water implies the presences of oxygen" and (A implies notB) as " the presence of water implies the absence of oxygen": do the two statements not contradict one another?

No, as per my previously given example, they are (or at least can be) speaking about, or else referencing, the exact same thing via the term "self" - but from two different perspectives and, hence, in two different respects (both of these nevertheless occurring at the same time). — javra

No, "two different perspectives and, hence, in two different respects" just is two different interpretations of the concept or meaning of 'self'.

Consider: the metaphysical understanding of reality, R, entails both that a) there is a self and b) there is no self. — javra

Firstly, which metaphysical understanding of reality are you referring to? Those different entailments rely on different interpretations of what is meant by"self' so they are not speaking about the same things.

I think your basic intuition is correct. It resists the crucial methodological error of "trusting the logic machine to the extent that we have no way of knowing when it is working and when it is not" (↪Leontiskos). We need to be able and willing to question the logic tools that we have built. If the tools do not fit reality, that's a problem with the tools, not with reality (↪Janus). — Leontiskos

I agree, and if formal logic contradicts the logic inherent in our ordinary ways of speaking and making claims about things, I can't see the fault laying with ordinary parlance.

However, reading (A implies notB) as "something other than B (caveat: also) follows from A". would be consistent with "B follows from A", because it would not deny that B also follows from A.
— Janus

Yeah that's a good explanation for why it intuitively makes sense that they're a contradiction. — flannel jesus

Actually I had thought that it was an explanation for why, on that interpretation, it makes sense that they are not a contradiction, while maintaining that on the other reading it seems to makes no sense to claim that they are not a contradiction.

Consider this as an intuitive explanation for why they aren't a contradiction:

A implies B can be rephrased as (not A or B)
A implies not B can be rephrased as (not A or not B)

Do you think (not A or B) and (not A or not B) contradict?

I read 'A implies B' as (if A then B) or (not (A and notB)). It's a fair while since I studied predicate logic, though.

Only if (A entails B) and (A entails notB) occur in the exact same respect (and, obviously, at the same time), which I find is most often the case. — javra

Is it not a given that we should understand A and B to refer to the same things in both?

I was referring to real physical systems which are not conceptual, I was not referring to mathematical systems, which are conceptual. It makes no sense to say that the Universe, a real physical system, is incomplete, but of course our understanding of the universe is incomplete, and always will be. So, the future is not comprehensively predictable, but it does not follow that it is incomplete or in possession of free will.

If a deterministic system is incomplete, its future is not predetermined. — Tarskian

It's not systems that are "incomplete": the idea makes no sense at all, but our understanding of systems.

Cheers. I have posted what I think will be my final contribution to that thread.

Some interesting points from both of you, so for me not "six pages too many".

Do (A implies B) and (A implies notB) contradict each other? — flannel jesus

I woke in the middle of the night and realized there is an alternative interpretation of the above in natural language. I remain convinced that reading the two propositions as "B follows from A" and "B does not follow from A" means that they contradict one another.

However, reading (A implies notB) as "something other than B (caveat: also) follows from A". would be consistent with "B follows from A", because it would not deny that B also follows from A.

That's my kindergarten contribution for what it's worth.

Thanks, you have shown yourself to be of honest and generous spirit, and in my book that is what is most important.

Because even informally, the statements don't entail a both statement and its negation. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I'm not sure what you mean: I was considering the two statements separately and it still seems to me, that regardless of the soundness or relevance of their content, that, taken informally as statements, they contradict one another.

"if lizards are purple, then they would be smarter" and "if lizards are purple, then they would not be smarter" is not a contradiction. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I see those two statements as saying contradictory things about what lizards being purple would entail.

"if lizards are purple, then they would be smarter" and "if lizards are purple, then they would not be smarter" and "lizards are purple" does imply a contradiction. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I see two of those statements, as above, as being contradictory and the third as being unsound. And I see the two contradictory statements as saying nothing about whether lizards are purple. I mean, I think it's fair to say that both of the conditional statements are untrue, because being or not being smarter has no logical connection with being purple. Or I could say that the two statements are nonsensical because the antecedent has no relevance to the consequent. However, I cannot but see them as contradictory.

What about these two statements: 'if I was more educated in logic, I would be able to see that those two statements are contradictory" and "if I was more educated in logic I would not be able to see that those two statements are contradictory"—do those two statements contradict one another?

Or what about 'if I was more educated in logic, I would be able to see that those two statements are contradictory" and "if I was more educated in logic I would be able to see that those two statements are not contradictory"?

I'm not sure, but maybe you want to check whether you are conflating "not intuitive" with "contradictory". — TonesInDeepFreeze

I don't believe I am conflating "not intuitive" with "contradictory", but of course I admit I could be wrong. Do I understand what 'contradictory' means? I think so.

What about "the present king of France is bald" and "the present king of France is not bald" do they contradict one another?

That's incorrect, formally or informally. I explained why it's not correct. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Why is it incorrect informally?

I sense that it is not logical connection you have in mind, but rather, what is called in logic, 'relevance'. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Yes, relevance is another way of saying logical connection in the context.

How are they nonsensical? — TonesInDeepFreeze

I asked you if any were nonsensical, I didn't say they were. In informal language if the antecendent has no relevance to the consequent then I would say that counts as nonsensicality.

The way you would usually use it in any sort natural language statement would be to say: "Look, A implies both B and not-B, so clearly A cannot be true." You don't have a contradiction if you reject A, only if you affirm it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It seems to me that saying you don't have a contradiction is one way of interpreting it; that is, I don't think there is any fact of the matter. Consider "If lizards were all purple then they'd be a hell of a lot smarter" and "if lizards were all purple, they would not be a hell of a lot smarter": you don't see those two sentences as contradicting one another despite the fact that lizards are not all purple?

The original question regarded '->', which ordinarily is taken as the material conditional. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Thanks, you obviously know much more about formal logic than I do. However I was not thinking in terms of formal logic, since the original question contains no symbols from formal logic

Do (A implies B) and (A implies notB) contradict each other? — flannel jesus

My point was that if you have two sentences 'if A then B' and 'if A then notB' they simply contradict one another regardless of whether A obtains. Of course we don't know what A is. If the two sentences were 'if monkeys had wings, then they could fly to the moon' and 'if monkeys had wings, they could not fly to the moon' the two sentences contradict one another regardless of whether it is true that monkeys have wings or whether it is true that if they had wings they either could or could not fly to the moon.

Notice that "If snow is green then Emmanuel Macron is an American" and "If snow is green then Emmanuel Macron is not an American" is not of that form and together they don't imply the contradiction "Emmanuel Macron is an American" and "Emmanuel Macron is not an American". They only imply that contraction along with the statement "Snow is green". — TonesInDeepFreeze

I think that is one way of interpreting it, separating the obviously false, or disconnected conditional "if snow if green" from the two contradicting statements about Macron, but assuming that there would be some logical connection between the conditional and the implications (and why would we even bother thinking about statements where there is no such logical connection) then the two statements do contradict one another.

For example, the computer you're using now is based on logic paths in which "if then" is the material conditional. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Right, I do have some familiarity with logic gates. Are any of those useful logic paths nonsensical? Genuine question...

I can't think of any examples in natural language where "if A then B" and "if A then not B" do not contradict one another.If "proofs" do not accord with this fact, then so much the worse for the "proofs", given that formal logic is designed to illuminate natural language, not replace it.

But they aren't perfect translations because all sorts of shit that sounds very dumb in natural language flies in symbolic logic. E.g. "if Trump won the 2020 election then we would have colonized Mars by now."

Anything follows from a false antecedent, so anything would be "true" following the claim that Trump won the 2020 election, since he didn't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, I came across such things when studying logic as an undergraduate. I will just say that "if Trump won the 2020 election, then we would have colonized Mars by now" is neither true nor false (or at least cannot be determined to be true or false).

So I don't think it is true that "anything would be true following the claim that Trump won the 2020 election, since he didn't", because it could equally be said that "anything would be false following the claim that Trump won the 2020 election, since he didn't".

Does (A implies B) mean that 'if A then B'? Does (A implies notB) mean that 'if A then not B'? If the answer is 'yes' to both, then they contradict one another.

I grasp the basic distinction between "sins of commission" and "sins of omission". "Negligence" in the context of ethics and moral philosophy is a multi-faceted issue. If you want to claim I don't understand the notion of negligence, then you should be able to say what it is I don't understand about it, or just how what I've said displays my purported lack of understanding.

If you don't see that it was you who starting with the personal attacks via insinuation, deflecting by attempting to paint my understanding in a poor light, instead of actually addressing the points I made, then I can only hope that for your own sake you wake up to yourself.

The impression I am forming of you is that of a self-deluded, condescending fool who cannot bear losing an argument. I'll be happy to ignore you in the future. May you gain some much-needed self-knowledge...

Right, and it seems arguable that becoming preoccupied with the propositional aspects of philosophy in general, as though it could be an empirically determined subject that can deliver testable truths, would be a move away from the examined life

You seem like someone who just hasn't thought or read about this topics much at all, to the extent that in order to discuss them on a philosophy forum you would need to do some homework first. I'm happy to talk after you do some homework. If you don't want to, that's your call. — Leontiskos

:roll: Cut the bullshit—trying to dismiss others by insinuation is not a substitute for cogent argument. You have no idea how much or how little I've thought or read about this. If you are incapable of sustaining an argument in your own words, be man enough to admit it.

Consider people who get involved in cults? — wonderer1

Could they not learn from that experience? Perhaps in some cases to go down for a while is the only way to continue on the way up.

Seems to me that one's disposition is important here. I've never been drawn to philosophy (by this I mean deep reading/studying) But I am interested enough to want an overview of key themes and directions. And I certainly understand that we are all the product of philosophical presuppositions, but so what? — Tom Storm

I think studying philosophers excessively is a scholarly, and not so much a philosophical exercise. I mean I want to get an understanding of the whole tradition, and that task is enough to occupy considerable time, so I don't see much value in going down the Kantian or Hegelian rabbit-holes. With Plato and Aristotle, I think it is a bit different since they are doing "first philosophy" not elaborate system-building.

Anyway, the import of philosophy is only insofar as thinking about philosophical issues and the self0critiuqe that might enable, helps you to live better. Otherwise, it would just be a nerdy interest to pass your time with.

In interacting on here I am most interested in those who present their own ideas in their own words and not so much those who post lengthy excerpts from their favorite philosophers or who direct you to read some philosophical work or other.

I am not trying to solve any mysteries of existence or engaged in a poetic quest for self-knowledge. — Tom Storm

You strike me as someone who is vitally interested in self-knowledge or self-understanding, as well as knowledge and understanding of others. I count that as doing philosophy, whether it be poetic, scholarly or not.

I don't think it is a one-way street though. — Fooloso4

Do you mean our knowledge and understanding could just as well degenerate as improve?

No, but I understand that "The Good" is nonbeing. — 180 Proof

Do you mean that the good is "extinction" in the early Buddhist sense of nirvana? Or do you mean that the Good is not a being, and is also not being itself? Or something else?

I understand the Good to be being in the sense of flourishing, actualizing potential, and also care for others. When I say I don't know what the Good is I mean I don't know what its universal definition could be—what is good, what constitutes flourishing, for me may not be so for another. But then there would presumably be some common elements in what is good for everyone, insofar as we are all human and thus social beings.

I know that if she's a mortal, then she cannot "know" ... — 180 Proof

:up: It's a tricky word indeed that "know"! But I think you point to something salient when you make the distinction between understanding and knowing—we all have our own understandings of what is good.

So you think negligence pertains to the legal order but not to the moral order? — Leontiskos

Depends on what is meant by 'negligence'. Failing to feed and look after those who depend on you, your children or animals, for example, I would not consider to be morally acceptable.

I don't think in terms of "moral order", but rather in terms of "moral compass". The morally important things are cared about, due to normal human feeling, by all who are not sociopathic, in my view. Morality is not "given from above" but issues from out of the depths of healthy human feeling and rationality.

:up:

Yes, "irrelevant" because we just can't answer the question regarding determinsim vs free will.

But Janus, morality may have no rational justification whether determinism is true or not. — NotAristotle

If determinism is not true and we are somehow radically free to choose then on that assumption morality would be rationally justified.

Regardless, as @Banno says

It remains that you must choose. — Banno

And so, the need to examine what we ought do, remains. — Banno

:100:

All you've shown is that if determinism is the case, if no one could ever have done otherwise than what they have done, because all events without exception are completely pre-determined by antecedent events, then there is no rational justification for morality. However, if humans are determined to have morality, then they will have morality, rational justification be damned.

But is determinism the case? How would we know? If humans are truly free, there is no guarantee that that freedom is analyzable. If freedom were analyzable in causal terms it would not be freedom.

Yes, all design is artifice. It doesn't follow that all purpose is artifice—I'm not claiming that design and purpose are one and the same, but of course they are closely connected.

You are conflating the legal with the moral. If someone drinks and drives they are being negligent. If their ability to focus on the task of driving safely and/ or being physically coordinated enough to do it, is sufficiently impaired by the alcohol and they are unlucky enough to kill someone, they will not be excused and will be prosecuted and punished to a far greater extent than if they had not killed someone.

From the point of view of the law concerning negligence, they have committed a greater crime than if they had merely driven without incident, but this doesn't seem right from a moral standpoint. Call this moral luck (or unluck).

Another example is that someone might have a sudden and uncontrollable sneezing fit when driving and fail to see the pedestrian on the crossing and run them over and kill them. They will still be punished even though it was not their fault in any moral sense.

Doesn’t address my question. — Wayfarer

I think it does: you seem to presume that under the assumption of naturalism we could never have become the kinds of self-reflective agents who can deliberately plan and design things for a purpose. If that is your objection, then what is your argument against that being impossible under the assumption of naturalism? If that is not your objection, then what is?

How do we reconcile this distinction with a naturalistic view that sees humans and their capabilities as entirely natural phenomena, while at the same time denying that nature herself displays or generates designs as such? — Wayfarer

It's easy: we understand ourselves self-reflectively to be capable of planning and deliberately designing things, and under the normal usage for there to be design implies an agent, such as ourselves, capable of planning and deliberately designing.

But I notice that nothing in your reply evidences the logical impossibility you so far assert – and logical impossibility is not a matter of mere opinion last I checked. At least not in realms of philosophy. — javra

Explain to me how the notion, not to mention the imputation, of purpose makes sense in the absence of an agent that purposes. The issue here is coherence not possibility. In other words, you need to be able to say what you mean by ascribing purpose to the cosmos as a whole before worrying about whether or not you can find an argument or evidence to support your ascription.