Where in his works does Kant clearly and convincingly explain precisely how the "nature" of a given empirical object of everyday a posteriori experience can be generated by human sensibility and understanding simply applying space, time, and the categories to what he calls the given manifold of sensation? Kant needs more than just a given manifold of sensation. — charles ferraro

Our everyday experience consists of images, sensations and impressions, which we model as a world of empirical objects. Do we say that modeling is a part of our experience or our judgement? The "nature" of those objects, as far as we can know, is given by their observed attributes and relations, including their differences from and similarities to other objects.

Kant acknowledges that we cannot know how our experience of a world of objects is engendered by a given manifold of sensation. What we are precognitively affected by, including what we precognitively are, is simply not available to consciousness. This is what is denoted by noumena and the ding an sich.

I submit that Kant's epistemological theory is incomplete precisely because he neglected to address this important matter and how it would fit into his theory. — charles ferraro

Why do you say that? Kant allowed for empirical knowledge; justifying scientific knowledge was one of his major concerns.

Yes, it has always seemed to me that the 'cave' metaphor in Plato is better read as the contrast between unthinking acceptance of the shadows on the wall as being the Real, and the philosophical attitude of questioning the reality of those shadows, and not as a contrast between ignorance and enlightenment; a matter of coming to know, not the truth, but that the truth you thought you knew is not the truth; Socrates' wisdom of knowing that you do not know.

That's about the opposite of what I stated. — Wayfarer

Right, what I should have said is "your argument that there is no conceptual space for the idea that things exist for us in different ways", that we moderns generally think that different things exist in the same way. That is a strawman of the dominant view I would say.

Don’t make me go back and copy the hundred thousand times you’ve claimed that we all learn abstract concepts through experience. — Wayfarer

We do learn abstract concepts via experience; how else would we learn them, if we are not born with them? Anyway, that is a red herring: why don't you try to deal with the fact that your argument that things all exist for us in the same way is refuted, and actually attempt to engage in some discussion, rather than trying to deflect via dismissal by labelling?

There is huge controversy over their reality and whether number is invented or discovered and so on. Empiricist philosophers like yourself generally reject the notion that they have any reality apart from as the product of the mind (read 'brain'.) — Wayfarer

Firstly, I am not an Empiricist philosopher and secondly, I am not making any claim about any "ultimate" explanation for the existence of anything. Numbers exist for us, trees exist for us, emotions exist for us, sensations exist for us, the world is full of many things which exist, and they all exist for us in different ways, a fact which refutes your claim that different things do not exist in different ways.

Consequently, there is no conceptual space for the idea that there are different levels or domains of reality - to us, things either exist or do not exist, they do not exist 'in different ways'. — Wayfarer

This is patently false: objects exist for us in a different way than sensations, thoughts or emotions. Inanimate objects exist for us in a different way than animals. Humans exist for us in a different way than animals. Concepts and numbers exist for us in a different way than concrete objects, and so on.

This all seems fine on a cursory reading. So, I won't respond further until I find time to think on it some more.

So the claim is just not true on it's face. People do take contradictory arguments seriously and many find them useful - presumably. — Isaac

I would say that is true only when it is not realized that the arguments are contradictory, unless you can offer a counterexample.

If it is only true in cases where the contradictoriness of the argument is not recognized, then it has no bearing on what I've been arguing.

Remember, these are models of the quantum realm, models that have a very high degree of predictive value, but models just the same. In Einstein's quote, he doesn't say that reality is contradictory but that we have contradictory pictures of reality. This makes a world of difference in what is affirmed by him. — javra

Right, I get that, but I still don't see why something manifesting as both particle and wave is logically contradictory. The laws of nature changing every few seconds would not be logically contradictory. If we think that light manifesting as a wave is equivalent to it not possibly being at the same a particle, then that would make it seem contradictory, but I don't see how it would logically follow that something manifesting a wave entails that it cannot also be a particle. The thinking seems to be that it cannot be both, that it must be one of the other, but its being both is not logically contradictory or impossible. Is it physically impossible (which would be a different thing to its being logically impossible)? I don't see any reason to think that something could be logically possible and yet physically impossible. Could the obverse obtain?

In any case all of this is kind of a red herring given the subject of discussion was concerning self-contradictory argumentation.

My impression is that we are talking about entirely different things. For what it's worth I don't think philosophical argumentation wherein people pit their worldviews against one another is a particularly useful part of philosophy. All I'm addressing is,if you want to engage in such debates, then your argument better not contradict itself, or it won't be taken seriously or be of any use to anyone.

I can imagine arguing that contradictions get weeded out because they're inherently useless, being necessarily false, but I doubt even that's right. We often have good reason to believe both sides of a story, so we keep our options open, and for a while they live side by side. So what? — Srap Tasmaner

But you are also saying that you cannot imagine arguing that contradictions get weeded out because they are inherently useful, being necessarily true, and that you doubt that even that's right. And you are also saying that we never have good reason to believe both sides of a story, so we don't keep our options open, and they never live side by side, right?

So what?

TMK, a particle is localized thing with volume, density, and mass. Whereas a wave function is not. So a wave function is not a particle. And hence the term "wave-particle duality". Am I missing out on something? — javra

No, a wave function is not a particle, but light can (supposedly) be both wave and particle, and if that is correct it cannot be a contradiction, because it is not a proposition but an actuality. In any case it is not analytically contradictory to say that light or an electron can manifest as both wave and particle. It would be a contradiction to say that a wave is a particle, but that is not what is being claimed AFAIK.

In short, I don't agree with Einstein's assessment because if it is true that light really is both a wave and a particle, then the difficulty is not that that is a contradiction, but that due to our lack of some relevant understanding it is merely the case that it might appear to be a contradiction.

If reality could be logically contradictory, then it would be so much the worse for logic and all of our purported knowledge.

This, I think, will depend on what significance one imports into the terms "particle" and "wave". If the LNC does hold, however, then one can not have a photon be both a particle (A) and not a particle (~A) at the same time and in the same respect.

For example, it might be that the unobserved photon is neither spatially localized (particle) nor disperse fluctuations (wave) but something else that can account for both observations.

That said, as to our imagination likely not being up to par, as I tried to previously express, I agree. — javra

I will just point out that a photon being a wave and a particle is not logically equivalent to a photon both being and not being a particle, because it being a wave does not logically rule out its also being a particle.

People are frequently inconsistent, and philosophers know that better than most, not least because they accuse each other of it all the time. — Srap Tasmaner

That's probably true, but if inconsistencies in your position, which you were unaware of, are pointed out to you, would it not be intellectually dishonest to refuse to acknowledge that? And if your position is self-contradictory would that not amount to being no position at all?

BTW, I'm not advocating that people should take up a position; I actually prefer to avoid holding views about anything at all as much as possible.

I doubt the LNC is even useful as an ideal to strive for. If our mental faculties are primarily geared toward making useful predictions, and those predictions are probabilistic, I don't see what the LNC even brings to the table. — Srap Tasmaner

I can relate to that, but what if you added "I don't doubt the LNC is useful as an ideal to strive for. I think our mental faculties are not primarily geared towards making useful predictions, and that those predictions are not probabilistic, so I can see the usefulness of the LNC.

You would then be contradicting yourself, and in that case how would I know what you were arguing for?

An interesting post, and on first reading I find nothing to disagree with, which bodes not well for discussion. That said, I'm a bit time-restricted right now, so when I find time for subsequent readings, I may find something I missed to respond to.

Do you often say two things simultaneously? — Srap Tasmaner

Obviously two things cannot be said strictly simultaneously. What I meant was that within the presentation of an argument self-contradiction would make it unclear what position was being asserted, or even mean that no position is being asserted.

So this kind of thing

Our beliefs one moment are never consistent with the last, by design and a good thing too, else how would we learn about the world. — Srap Tasmaner

I agree with and has really nothing to do with what I've been arguing. I would never deny that we can learn something new and/ or change our minds.

I agree with what you say except for this

On the other hand, if it weren’t for this law, or universal principle, then there’d be no biggie to comprehending particle-wave duality in QM. But no one can intuit that X is both a particle and not a particle at the same time and in the same way. Hence the incomprehensibility of much of QM as its currently interpreted. — javra

To say that something could be simultaneously wave and particle does not constitute a logical contradiction as far as I can tell. We might think there is an incompatibility between the two states, but maybe our understanding or imagination is just not up to the task, If it is a fact that something can be both wave and particle, then it is a fact, pure and simple.

I think you are likely correct to see it as a matter of recognition. I was discussing my ideas on that with Srap here. — wonderer1

:cool:

If the LNC is something we recognize it does not follow that it is nothing but a recognition. In fact, it couldn't be: something must exist first in order to be recognized.

Consider that if I assert A, and you convince me of ~A, then when I join you in proclaiming ~A, am I contradicting myself? — Srap Tasmaner

Of course not, you would merely be changing your mind. To contradict oneself is to simultaneously claim two contradictory things. In other words if you contrdict yourself in the sense I am addressing, then you would have no position to defend.

I'm not convinced civilization would collapse if people were inconsistent and contradicted themselves, because I think they are and they do, consistently. — Srap Tasmaner

I agree and I haven't anywhere said anything about civilization collapsing: I was only addressing what is required in order to have a sensible discussion, I wasn't claiming that the world is replete with sensible discussions.

Whitman is a poet, not an rational arguer, and in any case would you say he does actually contradict himself there?

So are you of the belief that those who have not experienced the recognition are therefore not making use of the principle of non-contradiction? — Leontiskos

No, I haven't said or suggested that. I said that discussions are usually coherent and consistent, just because if they were not, they would not be sensible discussions at all. So, people who are involved in discussions don't usually contradict themselves (because if they did, they would be presenting no clear position) or speak incoherently (because if they did, they would not be saying anything).

I haven't said or suggested that the LNC is a "relatively superficial linguistic tool" either; on the contrary it is the very basis of discursive or propositional thinking. How could you believe or propose anything if you contradicted yourself? If I said to you " It is raining at some specific location and it is not raining at that location", when would there be to respond to, what to say except "you are contradicting yourself"?

The Republic begins with Thrasymachus saying that justice is merely the order of those who presently have power. There is a lot of evidence to support this view. The argument against this is an appeal to see life in a different way.

So, what is that set of evidence against what it would bring into question? — Paine

Are you asking what arguments there could be for an ideal of justice that is not grounded on power?

If so, I would ask whether there is any rational argument to support the idea that some people should be priveleged over others. I mean we already know that, in keeping with Thrasymachus' claim that justice is merely the order of those presently in power, some people are priveleged over others, so Thrasymachus has it right perhaps that justice in its actuality does commonly serve power. The question is then whether this should even be counted as justice, if there is no rational justification for treating people differently before the law.

The principle of non-contradiction is more than a linguistic tool or even meta-tool. It is an indispensable presupposition which is in play whether you recognize it or not. — Leontiskos

Paine was right to point to the principle of non-contradiction in response to this claim. Are you of the opinion that the principle of non-contradiction might change over time? — Leontiskos

As I said I see it not as being a presupposition, but as a recognition of something necessary to thought and discussion.

So, of course, it will not change over time unless people become content to babble at each other incoherently and self-contradictorily.

The kinds of presuppositions I had in mind that could change are things like the earth being flat and at the centre of the solar system, or that there must be a first cause or that there is a God who would not deceive us, or that universals must exist independently of us and so on.

I am not sure either. Both Plato and Aristotle argued against the 'relativity' of Protagoras. From that point of view, the matter is something that needs to be hammered out rather than treated as an uncontestable condition.

But as an appeal to a condition, the argument is about evidence. — Paine

How would you hammer it out, though, unless you were thinking coherently and consistently? I don't understand your last sentence; could you explain?

Biggest issue I suppose, is the fact he doesn’t show how the pure conceptions come about, other than to posit that they reside transcendentally….make of that as you will….. in understanding, to serve as rules for the reduction of the diversity of representations in intuition to that which ties them all together under a conception. — Mww

Right, using the categories of understanding without making them explicit seems to obviously come before reflecting on our experience and judgement and recognizing and making explicit the categories we do use.

So, the question of the origin of the categories would be transcendental in the sense that it cannot be empirically established, but I don't see that it follows that the origin is transcendental in the sense of its coming from a transcendent "realm". I had always thought that is precisely the traditional kind of metaphysical thinking Kant is ruling out.

That's a fair response!

What is the difference between "conclusions are generally based on presuppositions" and the attempt to establish first principles in the fashion of Aristotle?

I agree with your judgement regarding non-contradiction. Should that sort of thing be counted as self-evident? — Paine

I'm not sure there is a difference...do you think there is?

Is it self-evident that sensible discussion would be impossible if people routinely contradicted themselves? It seems obvious that would be the case, but I'm not sure if that is exactly the same thing as it being self-evident.

But the further corollary is that anyone who believes themselves to be coherent and consistent is presupposing the principle of non-contradiction. That is, they are presupposing that the principle of non-contradiction is true.

One can attempt to bracket the question of coherence and consistency, but when one is already writing arguments in a natural language on a philosophy forum the bracketing is merely academic. They have already accepted the onus of coherence and consistency. — Leontiskos

As I said before I don't think it is so much a matter of the principle of non-contradiction being true as it is a matter of it being necessary for sensible discussion to be achieved. And i would see it more as a recognition than a presupposition.

You seem to be saying that everyone who posts on a philosophy forum has accepted that their arguments must be coherent and consistent—maybe, but does it follow that everyone's arguments are coherent and consistent, or that if they are not and this is pointed out to them, that they will consequently modify their views?

Is that how we think: starting with conclusions and then working backwards to find the prinicples they are based upon? I'd say that kind of reflection can make explicit what had been implicit, but I don't think that changes the fact that our conclusions are generally based on presuppositions, whether explicit or implicit, which themselves are based on nothing "further back".

Non-contradiction is simply a necessary condition for coherent and consistent thought; we cannot be coherent and consistent if we contradict ourselves.

This isn't a testable claim, we can't go back to 1986 and, while Daryl Strawberry and Kieth Hernandez were great, I doubt the have championship baseball skills we can verify. — Count Timothy von Icarus

None of history is directly testable, but there are documents we presume to have been based on empirical observations.

In any case the subject is not historical claims, but phenomenological, psychological or metaphysical claims or questions, with which we apparently cannot do more than frame them in different ways depending on the presuppositions we start with.

The other thing is that: "the best way to ensure true future beliefs is to subscribe to verificationism," isn't a claim that can be verified by verificationism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Are you claiming that unverified beliefs about empirical matters could be more likely to be true than those we have verified. Say I believe it is raining somewhere without checking the weather reports for that region, or even if possible, going there to see for myself?

Or say I can hear something that sounds kind of like rain and then believe it is raining outside; would you claim that that belief could be as likely to be true as a belief based on having gone outside to look?

That's one way of framing it, with its own set of basic presuppositions, but is it any more than that. Is there no other way it can be framed?

A) Which are the “first principles” Aristotle is referring to?
B) If they are not need to be proven... their premises are universal affirmative? (According to Aristotle's syllogisms) — javi2541997

I don't see first principles as being capable of proof, or as being self-evident. I think they represent the presuppositions we must make in order to even begin thinking about anything. There is nothing to say those presuppositions cannot change over time; we find new ways of thinking based on new presuppositions, which may even contradict those held previously.

Nature is the boss, no doubt, and our experience is governed by it, which has never been contested. We still wish to understand what it is to experience, what may be the conditions by which it is possible for us, which puts us in somewhat of a jam, insofar as we ourselves determine those conditions, but whatever we come up with cannot be in contradiction with Nature. — Mww

But are we not natural beings, with a natural capacity to reflect on experience and arrive at generalized ideas about the nature of that experience and the judgements we make about it?

For example, is there significant controversy over Kant's categories of judgement?

So Kant's categories are divided into four sets of three: (1) quantity: unity, plurality, totality;
(2) quality: reality, negation, limitation; (3) relation: substance- and- accident, cause- and- effect, reciprocity; (4) modality: possibility, existence, necessity.

Can we think of any other sets or extra members of the four sets, or can we argue that some do not belong?

Not really, I see the problem of consciousness as being either a scientific question, which is not strictly relevant to the ethical, aesthetical and spiritual, or else as being immaterial to the questions of ethics, aesthetics and spirituality; simply because the latter are pragmatic, "living" questions, whereas the non-scientific question of consciousness is slippery and even incapable of being coherently framed.

As I’ve said, I think Chalmer’s expression of ‘what it is like to be…’ is simply a rather awkward way of referring to ‘being’. And as I’ve also said, that is not something which can be framed in scientific terms, because there’s no ‘epistemic cut’ here. We’re never outside of it or apart from it. A Wittgenstein aphorism comes to mind, ‘We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all.’

Cartesian doesn’t reign for that reason at all. It reigns as the implicit metaphysics of modern science (‘modern’ being the paradigm up until the 1927 Solvay conference.) — Wayfarer

But no one contests the question of being in the sense that the fact of our existence is not at issue. It is the nature of that existence which is at issue.

Science deals with what can be observed, measured, conjectured about and experimented with; that's it. It doesn't eliminate the subject because we, the subjects, are the ones doing the observing, measuring, conjecturing and experimenting. 'Hard' science doesn't deal with the subject, though; we are not observing, measuring, conjecturing about and experimenting with ourselves, other than in 'softer' sciences such as for example psychology, anthropology and sociology.

We cannot definitively answer the question as to whether perception gives us access to, in the sense of knowledge about, a "real" outside, because this can be framed in different ways, and the answer will depend on the framing.

I think the Wittgenstein quote refers to the fact that science cannot solve ethical, aesthetic or spiritual questions.

In general, I think that, if you agree with the logic being employed, accept the inference rules, etc., if the argument is valid, and if the premises are all true, the argument should generally be persuasive.
— Count Timothy von Icarus

But it just isn't. This whole site is clearly evidence of that. Scores (if not hundreds) of people failing to convince others of positions they believe have valid logic and true premises. so the interesting question is why doesn't it work? — Isaac

It doesn't work because, even if there could be a fact of the matter as to whether the premises of arguments not subject to empirical testing are true, in the absence of the possibility of such confirmation their truth remains a matter of opinion.

I don't see the question of the exclusion of the subject being addressed there, rather it is about whether or not qualia should be excluded from the conversation.

The argument between Dennett and Chalmers is just an argument over the reality of qualia. Whether or not one believes in the existence of qualia has no bearing on whether or not the subject is being eliminated as far as I can tell.

Let's say the subject is not real anyway, per Buddhism for example, and that the body is not real in any sense other than the empirical, meaning that what is real is defined as being only what enters, or could enter, awareness, where would that leave us?

I’m not seeing a mind’s eye in the brain images provided.
— javra

Really? What does one look like then? You said

No one can in any way see that aspect of themselves which visually perceives imagined phenomena via what is commonly termed “the mind’s eye”.
— javra

So presumably, at least, you've never seen one (you think no-one has). So how do you know the image I've posted isn't one? You seem to on the one hand want to say no one's ever seen one, but on the other you seem to know exactly what one should look like. — Isaac

This exchange seems quite absurd to me. @Javra argues that no one can see the mind's eye which, like the physical eye, cannot see itself in the act of seeing. So, he is claiming that the mind's eye does not look like anything because it is not visible, and here the analogy breaks down because the physical eye is visible.

This seems to depend on what is meant by 'seeing'. We can say the physical eye does not actually see anything, that it is the person who sees things. Or we might say that the seeing happens in the visual cortex. and the person who sees is a kind of illusion created by the reflexive awareness of that seeing.

So, Javra says that the mind's eye is not empirically observable but is real. So what does real mean here? Can the mind's eye be seen by the person who owns it? If the mind's eye imagines something, can the thing imagined be seen just as objects external to the body can be seen? Could that depend on the subject, that is can some people visualize "photographically" and others not? What could we have to go on other than individual reports?

Isaac seems to be arguing that if the mind's eye is not an empirical object, then obviously it cannot be seen, thereby agreeing with Javra. So, what exactly is the disagreement about? Is it about whether the mind's eye is real or a fiction? But if to be real is to be empirically observable, which both seem to agree the mind's eye is not, then it would seem the only possible point the argument could be over is the meaning of "real".

Can anything be subjectively real? Say I am imagining a table right now, is the picture I have of the table real? How could I ever prove it is real if no one else can see it? Isn't that the basic problem with these kinds of arguments over qualia? I can't prove that the picture I have of the table is real, other than by appealing to others' experiences by saying something like, "don't you also visualize objects?".
If it is admitted that we do visualize objects, and then we go on to claim that this visualizing must entail the existence of a mind's eye analogous to how seeing involves the existence of a physical eye, is that a justifiable analogy?

Is it a justifiable analogy, given that seeing involves far more than just the physical eye, and that visualizing may just be pretty much the same kind of brain process, absent the involvement of the physical eyes and the optic nerves? If that were so it would just mean that the mind's eye is sometimes fed information via the physical eyes and other times not, and that we are always "visualizing" regardless of whether it is driven by external or internal input, or by extrenal as well as internal input, is we want to say that there is always internal input in any case?

The argument seems to come down to the contesting the reality of qualia, which in turn comes down to defining the term 'real'. It seems that such arguments always involve a shitload of talking past one another...and to what purpose?

But physical sciences don't exclude the first person as far as I can tell.
— wonderer1

There is the presumption that their findings are observer-independent i.e. replicable by anyone, They’re ‘third person’ in that sense. It’s an implicit assumption. — Wayfarer

Right, so the "anyone's" the findings are replicable by are not first persons? If they are first persons then please explain how they have been excluded.

So, are you saying that mathematics presents us with pure a priori understanding inasmuch as we can discover novel mathematical truths without any empirical input? Another of way of thinking about this would be to understand mathematics as being analytic, and all mathematical truths as being true by definition. That reminds me of the concept of validity in logic: that any argument is valid if its conclusion follows from the premises, and even if the premises are unsound.

Another way would be to say that the practice of going through the rule-based procedures of calculation is itself a form of empirical input.

Would you agree that thinking space and time as the "pure forms of intuition" and discovering the categories of judgement do both entail reflection on experience?

What else could you do? Same as everyone, right? — Mww

True that!

Pattern recognition in neural nets. Pretty simple to explain recognition of equality these days.

Of course Plato wasn't in a position to understand this, and fabricated his ideas without sufficient basis for knowing what he was talking about.

Sometimes philosophy looks a bit like ancestor worship. — wonderer1

:100: My sentiments exactly!

:up: Yes, we don't want to get too close to the one or the other of these "monstrous" views.

I’m not recognising the intellectual world you are quoiting Hands as describing — apokrisis

Fair enough. I can't argue with you about it because I have not been involved with cosmology at the institutional level; I can only go on what Hands describes.

I think this is a properly balanced view. It's not either all social construction or the sovereign individual, but somewhere in between.

There is a priori knowledge derived from extant experience, but in Kant, the stipulation is made that when he talks of a priori knowledge, he means absent any and all experience. — Mww

Far be it from me to think I am an expert Kant interpreter—I just interpret in terms of what makes sense to me. So, I cannot see how Kant could justify thinking there could be any knowledge at all prior to. or absent any previous, experience.

You said there was a priori knowledge which is pure and that which is impure—can you give an example of pure a priori knowledge and explain how it could be gained in the absence of any prior experience?

I'm beginning to think I may have interpreted Kant in ways which make sense to me, and I'm hoping not to have to discover that he advocated for ideas which are bound to seem absurd.

The knowledge is prior to the experience of those events, not to experience in general. — plaque flag

:up:

I remember various appreciators of Kant stressing his realization of how actively the mind projects hypotheses. Isn't the updated version basically the denial of the blank slate ? Without the absurd denial of the reality of brain, thankfully. — plaque flag

There would not seem to be many proponents of the blank slate these days. The salient question seems to be whether it is merely capacities or tendencies which are innate (like Chomsky's idea of a genetic capacity in humans to learn language) or whether there is also innate knowledge (along the lines of anamnesis, I guess).

Finding refuge in the Gettier problem? Sly dog. — apokrisis

Not getting the reference.

But you were talking about the "dogmatic" institutions – you know, the places that can house so many contradictory dogmas. — apokrisis

I was talking about the human tendency to dogmatize theories like Darwin's and the BB, according them the status of facts, of orthodoxy, and how that can make it difficult for competing theories to get heard.

.