Good comments. The key point is ‘participatory’ - not being a bystander. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure what you mean by "bystander". By "participatory" perhaps you mean something like "present"―that is, not "off in your head" all consumed by the "internal dialogue"? The alternative to being in the head would seem to be inhabiting the body, as aware as possible of all the sensory inputs and the spontaneous feelings they generate. Philosophy, on the other hand, is a cerebral activity.

↪Wayfarer ↪Ludwig V ↪Janus Didn't Aristotle say that the mind resided in the heart? — J

I seem to dimly remember reading something like that. Julian Jaynes has an interesting theory that Greek people in Homerian times did not identify thoughts as being their own, but as being the voices of the gods. (This is a simple characterization―I read his book decades ago). Presumably they would have assumed their sensations and emotions belonged to them.

I find that fascinating because, as y'all have pointed out, it seems irresistible to me to locate my self or "I" within my head. Or perhaps a better way to say it is: I can't help locating the part of consciousness which thinks, perceives, and imagines as being within my head; but that leaves open the possibility that spirit or soul should be identified with breath, heart, or guts. So a deeper or more cosmic "I" is not necessarily conceived as mental.

But then there's the Third Eye, which opens in . . . the head. — J

As I said earlier, I share your affliction. Jesper Hoffmeyer in Biosemiotics makes a case for locating the self in the skin, as it is by far the body's largest and most sensitive organ and is our primary interface with the world.

I don't know about "spirit" and "soul"―it seems very difficult to think in terms of those without carrying all the unacceptable cultural baggage that comes with them.

A speculative "cosmic" "self" such as Brahma or God is not necessarily thought as either mental or physical. In fact a universal cosmic being is not necessairly thought of even as a "self"―for example Spinoza conceives God as being synonymous with Nature, and the mental and the physical as being just two of its infinite attributes.

Madhyamaka philosophers say that ālaya-vijñāna risks reifying consciousness into a hidden essence or foundational mind. — Wayfarer

I guess I would agree with the Madhyamika philosophers. Because on the other hand without such a reification, it becomes merely an idea, and thus seems to lose all explanatory power.

I always comes back to this basic problem―experience shows us that we all see the same things at the same times and places is unquestionable that we live in a shared world. On the other hand there is no evidence that our minds are connected in any way such as to be able to explain that shared experience. The default assumption is that things we encounter are real existents that don't depend for their existence on our encountering them. So that model explain why we would experience a shared world. The idealist alternative would be to assume a hidden collective mind or consciousness, or a universal mind of which we are all manifestations, and that could be the Abrahamic God, Brahma, or some creator deity.

I don't see gravity as a good analogy because its effects are measurable. I believe that the idea of independently existing things makes sense―others see problems with it, but it seems those problems stem form assumptions that I don't share.

The idea of a shared or collective mind is not logically contradictory, so it makes sense in that sense, but I think the idea is extremely underdetermined by our everyday experience.

CPR, B311 — Paine

That's an interesting passage from Kant―I don't remember encountering it before. It seems to undercut any move towards dualism.

Some say that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible and that it has nothing to do with sense experience, but they seem to forget that Kant's categories were discovered by him by reflecting on perceptual experience and abstracting its general and necessary characteristics.

True, although it may be that there are elements of efficient causation in all those contexts, but that it is far from being the whole story.

OK. It's just that causal explanation, along with the metaphor of the machine, has been such an icon of what science is about that I find it hard to grasp the alternatives (apart from statistical explanations). — Ludwig V

That seems right. Efficient or proximal causation is the basis of mechanistic modeling. That kind of modeling tends to isolate the subject from its environment. For any event or change to occur there is presumably a whole network of conditions that constrain the ways in which that event or change can unfold. The most universal global condition seems to be entropy.

:up: Whenever you're ready...

I'm pretty sure that our phenomenological perspective on mental phenomena is heavily conditioned by our culture. For example, it is very difficult to answer the question where (in the body) the mind is to be found in ancient greek (or roman) culture. There are good grounds for answering that it is a distinct entity - a ghost - that survives death. There are also grounds for saying that it is the breath - an interesting choice, since it isn't quite clear where the breath is. I think the best answer is that the question where the mind is was not even formulated in that culture. It requires, I would say, a culture that has already problematized mental/physical relations, as happened in Western Europe in the 17th century or so. — Ludwig V

You make a good point. I was addressing just the 'thinking' aspect of mind. When I think, whether in language or images, the activity seems to be located in my head. Of course when it comes to emotions, they seem more closely located around the heart, and if sensations are thought to be activities of the mind they extend throughout the body. When it comes to seeing the awareness seems to be "out there' in the surrounding environment. Hearing mostly, but also to a lesser extent smelling and tasting seem to be a bit more ambiguous, for me at least.

Our organs of sight, hearing, smelling and tasting are all located in the head, and that may contribute to making it seem as though the mind is located there.

Perhaps the ancients were not as much "in their heads" and language oriented as we are today.

I was using the digestion analogy more to point to the idea that activities in general are not strictly objects of the senses, not to address the issue of whether the brain generates thought. And yes, 'being' is explicitly a verb, and seeing it that way instead of as a noun renders it as an activity not as any kind of object (except in the very general sense that thinking of it makes it an object of thought), Being or existing would be thought of the master or umbrella activity under which all other activities find their place.

Regarding the Ālaya-Vijñāna there is also a Theosophical idea designated the "Akashic Records", which I think bears some resemblance to the Buddhist idea. It seems that idealist thinkers have long recognized the explanatory need for some kind of collective consciousness as a substitute for the independent actuality of physical existents.

Do you have anything to say about my contention that the idea of storehouse consciousness is an idea of a collective consciousness or mind?

I address this in another Medium essay, Is there Mind at Large? This essay interogates Kastrup's expression and compares it with Berkeleyian idealism. But then it draws on Yogācāra Buddhism, the school colloquially known as 'mind-only', to argue that it is not necessary to posit any kind of super-mind or cosmic mind.

Although I also concede that if Kastrup simply means 'some mind' or 'mind in general', then I am in complete agreement with him. Why? I think the reification trap is associated with the tendency towards objectification, to try and consider anything real in terms of it being an object or an other. This is where Heidegger's criticism of onto-theology rings true. — Wayfarer

I read your essay, and I thought it was well-constructed and clearly expressed. However I remain unconvinced about the idea of a collective or universal mind being explanatorily unnecessary for an idealist thesis concerning the nature of the world and its relationship with human and animal experience.

You cite as an alternative the Ālaya-Vijñāna or storehouse consciousness of Yogācāra Buddhism, an idea I am fairly well acquainted with from my studies of Eastern philosophies and religions. I always thought of it as a kind of collective karmic storehouse, and it is explicitly doctrinally classed as a form of consciousness. So I'm not seeing how it is not an idea of collective consciousness or mind.

If the thought is that our individual minds are separate then what is posited, in the absence of also positing a collective mind that connects and/or coordinates them, is that, as far as minds go, it is only individual minds that exist. I don't see a "reification trap' in the sense of a 'tendency towards objectification' because neither individual minds nor collective minds are being posited as objects of the senses. I see mind as an activity of the body/brain, not as an object of the senses. It's maybe not the best analogy, but digestion is also an activity of the body, not an object of the senses.

:up:

:up: Foolish practice makes perfect foolishness? Would perfect foolishness be wisdom? (there was also a tradition of fools being wise as shown in KIng Lear).

Maybe it's more along the lines of not being afraid to make mistakes, being playful and learning to see your foolishness, what it consists in. If I become afraid of others seeing my foolishness and hide it, then I will have less of an opportunity to see it myself.

Wittgenstein said something similar: "Don't for heaven's sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay attention to your nonsense."

Simpletons are something else, but I agree there is innocence in foolishness, and simpletons are also, like animals and (some) children innocent.

I wonder if it is possible to become wise by learning from the foolish? After all, with discernment, watching a fool and what happens to them can be very instructive in learning what not to do. — Tom Storm

"If the fool would persist in his folly he would become wise" William Blake

:up: :up:

I meant as opposed to ideal. That said. I do think the materialism/ idealism dichotomy is ultimately wrongheaded, but there is a deeply entrenched distinction between the ideas of things and the things the ideas are about. Symbolic language seems to be inherently dualistic in orientation. It doesn't seem plausible that nature or reality itself could be anything but non-dual, so when we try to understand it in dualistic terms, we are always already "up against it".

The fact of the dualism of thought and language aside, if I think of phenomena as being the very same things as noumena, just thought about in different ways according to a natural distinction that arises in a dualistically oriented mind, then I am undercutting any substantive "bifurcation".

If I propose that the things are ideas, then I must imagine an unseen, unknowable entity―a "mind at large" to quote Kastrup, and that seems to bring in the inevitable ontological dualism involved in thinking there is a transcendent realm or reality over and above the one we know.

And I wonder whether that isn't a "figment" generated by the dualistic nature of language―a reification or hypostatization. As I like to say "choose your poison" and it seems that people usually do, especially on philosophy forums.

You’re both looking down different ends of the telescope. That’s why it looks different. — Punshhh

I thought this comment referred to a conversation we were having in the other 'idealism' thread. I'm not so sure what it refers to in this thread.

The noumena aren't necessarily esoteric, just as if they are in a room we can't access, so its not as 'mysterious' as one might think. But we can at least securely infer that they are there, or we'd not perceive anything. — AmadeusD

Yes, that's why I referred earlier to "bifurcation". If the things that appear have their own existence in some way (whether actual physical existents or ideas in a universal mind) they are nonetheless what lies behind our experience of phenomena. And about their nature as unperceived things we can only infer, which means that that nature is, in Kantian terms, ideal or noumenal for us.

That said, I have my own preference for thinking that they are actual, not ideal, existents―the 'god hypothesis' I don't find so compelling.

The idea of an "ultimate nature" seems to have troubled humanity from ancient times, and not only in the West.

Better to know we don’t know, than to think we know something we don’t. — Wayfarer

I can't argue with that, although in practice I think we generally all do cleave to one preferred hypothesis or another. That said I've always been attracted to the kind of suspension of judgement of the Pyrrhonian Skeptics― ataraxia has its definite attractions.

I've heard of Noe and that book, but never looked into it. I agree that “consciousness is an achievement of the whole animal in its environmental context”. As Timothy pointed out, the environment must be such as to be able to support life, and the brain body must be, to a sufficient degree, a healthily functioning one.

On the other hand it does seem as though the brain generates consciousness, given that it is injuries to that organ, and not to other parts of the body (barring death of course) that are sufficient to curtail consciousness.

'within' is an interesting concept in this context. It's a spatial metaphor in which brain/body is a container and the mind is something inside it. But from another perspective, the body exists 'within awareness'. — Wayfarer

I get that; it is possible to reverse perspectives. That said from a phenomenological perspective, it does seem to me that my thoughts are going on inside my head, not in my torso, arms or legs or even neck. I mean it just feels that way. So while we cannot be directly aware of neuronal activity, that activity seems to generate sensations that make it seem like thought is in the head (to me anyway).

It's also interesting because, while the body is a locus of activity, it is not sufficient to generate a mind. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, what you go on to say about the body being unable to survive in unsuitable environments just indicates that a healthy living body is usually sufficient to generate consciousness. I say "usually" because there are phases of deep sleep wherein consciousness doesn't seem to be present.

You haven't said anything I didn't already know. Anything about which we can know nothing is noumenal. "Know" here means 'have cognitive access to'. If the ultimate nature of a physical existent is unknowable, then it is noumenal. If there are unknowable aspects of physical existents then those aspects are noumenal.

It is meaningless to say "noumena are not nothing, they are less than nothing". That's just philosobabble.

Corrections require cogent argument and explanation. "No" is a useless comment.

Totally useless comments.

OK, that makes sense. The only thing I wonder about is whether Kant's noumena are logically required. To explain the fact that we all see the same things and inhabit a common world it would seem that something beyond mere individual perceptions, something beyond the perceptual in general, is required. So phenomenalism seems highly implausible and it has no explanatory power at all.

I guess strictly speaking, even if what that "something beyond" is is just a world of physical existents, it can be said that they are noumenal to us. On the other hand we perceive objects, so the objects are not unknown to us even though there may be things about them we don't or even cannot, know. For example it seems we could never be certain about the ultimate or most basic constitution of physical things.

In that case it would not be a case of there being noumenal things, but noumenal aspects of things. If things are ideas in the mind of God, we might know all about the things because God makes everything about them to be discoverable, and there is nothing unknowable left over about them at all. But we still
wouldn't know that that was the case.

I'd like to be Sam, but I won't insist. — Wayfarer

I'm happy enough with being Ralph.

:lol: Which one are you?

I'm not sure what you are saying, and I can't think of an example of what I think you might be saying. Can you give an example for clarification.

Please don't take this personally, but the reason I often don't respond to your posts is that it seems as though your interpretation of what I've said that you're disagreeing with seems to me so far from what I intended that I find it difficult to get enough purchase on what you are saying to respond.

That presupposes that our minds and reality exist in the same space. Since our minds are not physical objects, that cannot be the case. — Ludwig V

Does the mind, as an activity say rather than an object, not reside within the brain/body?

Right we make "secure" (or not so secure) inferences. But they are not determinations of truth. For example, I get accused of scientism, and yet I don't believe that scientific theories are strictly determinations of truth. Any theory may be falsified.

:up: I think we've reached some consensus, so I'm happy to leave it there if you are.

Isn’t that exactly what the OP was about? The point of the transcendental argument is that there are truths not determined by observation or logic, but by clarifying the conditions that make either possible. — Wayfarer

How do we determine the conditions that make either possible if not by observation and logic? We can reflect on our experience, that is we can do phenomenology, in order to try to determine the essential characteristics of all experiences. Such reflections are not directly testable observations, so there may be disagreement about their findings, but I think that given good will substantial agreement can be reached.

That all perceptions of objects must be spatiotemporal and that embodiment is spatiotemporal are two uncontroversial examples of such phenomenological reflection of the character of experience. I would count phenomenological investigations as a species of observation, and of course logic plays its part in all our judgements.

Other more controversial results such as that consciousness is non-physical because it doesn't seem to us to be depend on the framing. What exactly is meant by "non-ohysical"? Does it mean "not an object of the senses" or "not a function of, and completely independent of, any physical substrate".

Do you have anything to add to that?

I say the OP stands on its own two feet. You can continue to say whatever you like, but unless you can come up with an actual criticism, I will feel no obligation to respond. — Wayfarer

I have asked questions and posed counterpoints which you have no even attempted to address. Here are two:

Your argument is something like:

We derived our idea of existence from our cognitive experience, therefore nothing can exist apart from its being cognized.

The conclusion does not follow logically from the premise, so it is not a deductively valid argument.
— Janus

That’s a very simplified gloss, and not my argument. I’m not claiming that “nothing exists apart from cognition.” I’m saying that any concept of existence only makes sense within the conditions of possible experience. (I'm not bound by Kant's argument, but I am trying to stay in his lane, so to speak.) — Wayfarer

You say that you are not saying that nothing can exist apart from its being cognized, and yet that is what saying that any concept of existence only makes sense within the conditions of possible experience amounts to. If we accept a framing that says we cannot possibly experience things-in-themselves, then it follows that things that cannot possibly be experienced cannot exist. This must follow because if they can exist, then it cannot be incoherent to say that they can exist.

Of course I don't accept that framing because I don't accept the notion of "things-in-themselves" I think there are just things that we perceive, and that there is no logical contradiction in saying that those things might (or might not) exist independently of being perceived, and that there may be some things about them that we cannot perceive, given the limitations of our perceptual organs.

Can you give me an example of any truth which is determinable in any way other than by observation or logic, and also explain just how that truth can be determined?
— Janus — Janus

On reading your response below which apparently occurred while I was editing and adding to my post, I see that you have agreed that phenomenology may be thought of as a species of observation, so I guess we are in agreement there unless you have any further examples of ways of determining truth.

Right - that's what you're doing. You fall back on the 'it can't be determined, therefore a matter of opinion.'

This is becoming very repetitive, you've been making the same objections, and I'm giving the same responses. If you honestly can't see the point of the OP, maybe find another one to comment on. — Wayfarer

It looks to me like you are out of answers. You claim that there are ways, other than by observation or logic, to determine truth, but when pressed by questions such as this:

Can you give me an example of any truth which is determinable in any way other than by observation or logic, and also explain just how that truth can be determined? — Janus

You don't even attempt to back up your claim.

Surely I am free to raise objections to any OP, or am I allowed, according to you, to comment only on those I agree with?

All of your statements about the 'already existing objects' and 'previously existing universe' rely on that implied perspective which you're bringing to bear on it, without noticing that you're doing it. — Wayfarer

All my statements are expressions of my perspective―so what, that's trivially true. Of course I'm aware of it. I also acknowledge that my perspective is not the reality―you know, "the map (or model) is not the territory".

'It is empirically true that the Universe [and 'the object'] exists independently of any particular mind. But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective. It is not solely constituted by objects and their relations. Reality has an inextricably mental aspect, which itself is never revealed in empirical analysis.' — Wayfarer

If the existence of the Universe is independent of any particular mind, whether human or animal, how does it not follow that it is independent of all individual minds? Of course there is a perspective involved in saying that the Universe is or is not independent of minds, but it doesn't follow that it is impossible that the universe be either independent or dependent on minds―we just don't know and may only speculate about it.

I'm not going to try to address any purported implications of quantum mechanical experiments and results because I don't have the expertise, and I don't believe you do either. It is arguable that even the experts understand only the math, not what metaphysical implications might be suggested by QM. Wasn't it Feynman who said: "I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics"?

This requires an exercise in looking at your spectacles, instead of simply through them. — Wayfarer

You can't look at your spectacles without looking through them.

"Not determinable” in what sense? If you mean not determinable by science, then of course — but that doesn’t reduce it to mere opinion. If you mean not determinable in principle, then I disagree: there is a fact of the matter about whether categories like “existence” or “mind-independence” are meaningful outside the bounds of cognition. That’s the point of the argument: It’s not about my opinion versus yours. Your implication always seems to be: can't be 'determined scientifically' therefore it's a matter of opinion. — Wayfarer

I didn't address this as thoroughly as I meant to. The claim is that truth is determinable only by observation or logic, and otherwise we can have only beliefs about what is true. A radical skeptic would say that we cannot be certain of the truth even of what is observed or logically self-evident. Can you give me an example of any truth which is determinable in any way other than by observation or logic, and also explain just how that truth can be determined?

It’s in the link I shared in the OP. Did you read it? — Bob Ross

Can't you just tell me?

If you mean not determinable in principle, then I disagree: there is a fact of the matter about whether categories like “existence” or “mind-independence” are meaningful outside the bounds of cognition. — Wayfarer

What do you mean by "meaningful outside the bounds of cognition"? Let's say for the sake of argument nothing for human discourse is outside the bounds of cognition, are you saying categories like 'existence' and 'mind-independence' can only apply to the objects we perceive?

If so, then it seems obvious that they don't only apply to the objects we perceive when they are being perceived. In my view all our experience, both ordinary everyday observations and science, informs us that there are human-independent things in the Universe now and that
there were before humans existed.

As said a number of times already, 'there is no need for me to deny that the Universe is real independently of your mind or mine, or of any specific, individual mind.' — Wayfarer

It follows then that it must be real independently of all minds unless you posit a hidden collective mind. Is that what you believe?

In the double-slit experiment, whether you get an interference pattern or not depends on whether an observation is made. — Wayfarer

Regarding any individual experiment, all observers see the same result, though. The fact that the behavior of microphysical particles seems counter-intuitive, even paradoxical, shouldn't surprise us given that we have evolved in a macroworld, and our expectations as to the behavior of entities has been conditioned by our experiences of macro-objects.

There is also no clear consensus among the physics community as to the implications of those observed weird results. In any case why deny what science tells us, and then appeal to it when it suits you?

I don't believe you have any real doubt that the everyday objects we encounter constantly have their own existence, which does not rely on our perceiving them. As Peirce said: "Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts".

I’ve got a pretty decent telescope, and when I look here, and look there, the space between is full of stuff I don’t perceive without it. — Mww

Right, I haven't claimed there are any truly empty spaces. But then when it comes to spaces that look empty that just speaks to the fact that there are things there we cannot see with the naked eye. It's kind of irrelevant anyway, because all I'm saying is that we can perceive extension, distance, and that counts in my view as perceiving space. You are free to frame it differently.

If you agree all perceptions have a sensation belonging to them…..what sensation does one receive from the perception of space? What is it about your perception which distinguishes the space you perceive from empty space you do not? — Mww

The sensation is one of extension, or distance as a said above. I'm not sure what you are driving at here.

But it still needs to be known the necessary conditions for mass, form and size of a thing, and even more importantly, the necessary conditions by which differences in mass, form and size of different things are related. — Mww

I don't know what you mean―the necessary conditions for the perception of mass, form and size are that they are there to be perceived. The overall form of an object is not dependent on perspective, although of course how it looks from any angle will be if it is not a sphere. Size is relative, and if one object is larger than another, that would not seem to be dependent on perspective either. Same with mass.

But I get the point: the material of my existence is no different from the material of any other existence. What do you intend to be gleaned from such analytical truths? — Mww

Clarity?

That’s a very simplified gloss, and not my argument. I’m not claiming that “nothing exists apart from cognition.” I’m saying that any concept of existence only makes sense within the conditions of possible experience. — Wayfarer

So, you're saying that something might exist apart from cognition, but that it makes no sense to say that? In any case the concept of existence outside of cognition makes sense to me. You can say it makes no sense to you, but that is all you are entitled to say. There is no determinable fact of the matter that that can be used to ascertain what makes sense and what doesn't as a universal rule.

You're saying, there must be a reality outside any consciousness of it. — Wayfarer

No I'm not; I'm saying it seems most plausible to me that there is a reality outside any consciousness of it.

But that’s precisely the point: your criterion itself — “only what can be determined by observation or logic counts” — is not itself established by observation or logic. — Wayfarer

It is established by observing that no other way of determining truth is to be found. If there is another way, then tell us what that way is, and how it works.

But this “real world” you posit beyond appearances is itself nothing but conjecture. You say “all the evidence points to it,” but by definition the evidence only ever belongs to the realm of appearances. — Wayfarer

I don't believe that's true. It is an undeniable aspect of experience that people see the same things at the same time and place down to the smallest detail. It's easy to test. That is what is to be explained and I think the inference to a world of mind-independent existence is the best explanation. You don't have to think that―but since it cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed by observation or logic it becomes a matter of what each person finds most plausible. That's the way I see it.

Anything we say about things which cannot be decided by observation or logic is a matter of conjecture―I've never denied that.

Your argument is something like:

We derived our idea of existence from our cognitive experience, therefore nothing can exist apart from its being cognized.

The conclusion does not follow logically from the premise, so it is not a deductively valid argument.

What you are offering is a certain perspective on the situation―a certain way of framing it. There are other ways of thinking about it. There is no determinable truth of the matter; so really comes down what seems most plausible as to what you will believe. In other words it is a matter of opinion, or preference, or taste or whatever you want to call it.

If you think otherwise then explain how you think your view could be established to be correct.

But there is not space between objects, only more objects, that's why you said you do not perceive empty space. — Metaphysician Undercover

We perceive the extendedness of objects; that is what space is. It is not an empty container. If you think we cannot perceive space as an empty container, well of course that is true, but irrelevant.

Basically you're saying that it's subjective, a matter of opinion. 'It's OK if you see it that way, but I see it a different way'. It's not 'determinable' because it can't be validated empirically. Whatever is not determinable by science is a matter of personal preference. — Wayfarer

No, whatever cannot be determined by observation or logic is a matter of opinion. You tell me how it might otherwise be determined.

But you're still positing a real world beyond what appears, as if that is the criterion of realness, when it is the very point at issue. — Wayfarer

Yes, I'm positing a real world beyond what appears, because I think all the evidence points to that. You are positing that there is not a real world beyond what appears because (apparently) you think all the evidence indicates that to be the case. Neither of us can demonstrate that we are right, so it is a matter of opinion. That's plain to see, but you apparently cannot accept that.

BTW, I'd rather just discuss this with you―there is little point quoting entries about Husserl or other philosophers I am well enough familiar with to know that I disagree with them and why. Invoking authority figures just doesn't cut it for me.

The truth concerning what is neither empirically nor logically demonstrable is not strictly decidable and so is a matter of what each of us finds most plausible or in other words a matter of opinion...call it what you like. And of course a dogmatist won't want to accept that.

This is going nowhere so I'm going to leave you to it.

Got it...Cheers.

The separation of objects just is the space between them.

Our space and time is not perceptual, meaning our senses do not perceive them, for that would be the same as space and time being appearances. — Mww

That's one way of describing the situation. On the other hand I can say I perceive the space between objects, albeit usually more or less filled up with other objects. I do perceive space but I don't perceive empty space.

It follows that Kant’s proof of the non-existence of things-in-themselves in space and time is predicated on the tenets of his theory, which states, insofar as they are strictly transcendental human constructs, space and time cannot be the conditions for existence of things, but only the conditions for the possibility of representing things that exist. — Mww

So, to refer to things-in-themselves as "strictly transcendental human constructs" is again a particular way of framing, not an expression of any determinable fact of the matter. If things are human-independent existents that have mass, form and size then space and time would be the condition for their existence, just as they are the conditions, not just for our cognition, but for our very existence. In our material existence we are not different than other things.

“….To think an object and to cognize an object are by no means the same thing….” — Mww

Of course I cannot disagree with that. Since it is true by definition. On the other hand, some might say that for God to think an object and to cognize an object are one and the same.

As already stated, I am not disputing the scientific account, but attempting to reveal an underlying assumption that gives rise to a distorted view of what this means. What I’m calling attention to is the tendency totake for granted the reality of the world as it appears to us, without taking into account the role the mind plays in its constitution. This oversight imbues the phenomenal world — the world as it appears to us — with a kind of inherent reality that it doesn’t possess. This in turn leads to the over-valuation of objectivity as the sole criterion for truth.
— Wayfarer

It's this taken-for-grantedness that is the main target. — Wayfarer

I don't understand why you keep repeating this when I have long acknowledged that the world as perceived is (you might even say by very definition) mediated by the nature of bodily organs and processes. Science can study this and even model what the world might look like to different animals given the different ways the perceptual organs of individual kinds of animals are constituted.

Maybe this is more toward the restrictive version Wayfarer has made sure I stick to. That meaning, what i've said relates to the fact that for humans the "world" is irrelevant, but our perceptions are. So in "our world" our perception differentiates to create entities. — AmadeusD

The issue is as to whether it is more plausible to think that we carve nature "at the joints", so to speak or arbitrarily. If it were arbitrary we would not all perceive the same things. Our bodies with their perceptual organs, or minds if you prefer to frame it that way, cannot be the sole determinants of how we differentiate nature or we would not all see the same things. So differentiation is down to real patterns and regularities that are independent of us in nature or some kind of collective or universal mind. Choose your poison.

But the whole point of the essay is what we know of what exists. When I say the world “relies on an implicit perspective,” I mean the world-as-known. To speak of what lies entirely outside that perspective is already speculative. Better to call it “purported” or “imagined” existence. — Wayfarer

I was editing as you were responding apparently. Anyway I'm sayin that we can sensibly say that the things we perceive have their own existence independently of us, period. You say we cannot sensibly say that except within the empirical context. Then I respond that everything we say is from within the empirical context. So, what are we disagreeing about?

To call it “something” already applies a category it doesn’t yet have. That’s why I said: it is not some-thing. But I'm also not saying it is simply non-existent. This is what you keep insisting is 'nonsensical', but when the context is understood, it is really quite straightforward: it is neither a “thing” nor “nothing,” but precisely what lies beyond the scope of those categories. — Wayfarer

You are again confusing what we say with the things we are talking about. The things we talk about only "have categories" insofar as they are talked about―it doesn't follow that they are such that they cannot be thought to be fit or not to be included whatever category we are thinking of. You are thinking in simplistic terms here. You say it lies beyond the scope of the categories―if we haven't perceived it yet, it may or it may not. Say there is a cat behind a tree―you haven't seen it yet, but you imagine it is a dog. Then you go around behind the tree and find it is a cat. If you had thought it was a cat, then it would have fitted that category before you perceived it, but it didn't fit that category because you mistakenly thought it was a cat.

There is no division between the empirical and the world as it is in itself. The world known by empiricism is simply the universe as it appears to us. To speak of “the world in itself” is not to posit a separate domain, but to point to the condition that makes the empirical world possible in the first place. — Wayfarer

The world known by us is simply the world―there is no other world for us. We know the world, but we do not know it completely, obviously. There is always more to learn. There could not be more to learn if there was not more there, presently unknown, to be experienced and to be learned about via that experience. We think there might be things we could never know about the things we know―we can't know for sure, but one thing we do know is that even if we reached the end of knowledge, if we knew everything it is possible to know, we could have no way of knowing that we had reached that point.

Ours — the limits of human cognition. — Wayfarer

The limits of human cognition does not define or determine the limits of what exists.

What has never entered your mind is not anything, obviously. And when it has entered your mind, it has done so via the senses, and has been interpreted by your intellect. What is outside that, neither exists nor does not exist. It is not yet anything, but that doesn't mean it's nothing. This is not dogma. — Wayfarer

You can talk about the situation that way, but there are of course alternatives ways of framing it. So I would say it is something before it "enters the mind" otherwise there would be nothing there to be perceived.

It is not a 'bifurcation'. That term is usually associated with A N Whitehead and is a different matter. In fact, the division is between the world as known to us, and what you think it must be, beyond that. — Wayfarer

'Bifurcation' is a synonym for 'division'. The bifurcation is yours―between the empirical and the transcendental. If all we know is the empirical world, and everything that has evolved out of that experience, and attempting to understand that experience―maths, geometry, science, music, poetry, literature―then we can say nothing about the transcendental other than that it is an idea of the possibility of something beyond.

You bare the one saying what the transcendental must be like―that it cannot exist in space and time, be differentiated and so on. I am saying that the transcendental is just an idea of the possibility of something beyond the empirical world. It's an idea that's been around for a very long time, and for which there can be, on your very own argument, no evidence. You say all we know, all our concepts, mathematics, geometry, science, music, poetry, literature and so on find their sense in the empirical world, so we cannot coherently speak about anything beyond that. because we have no cognition beyond that to give sense to whatever we say.

You admit that we can coherently say, within the empirical context that the world existed prior to humans. I say that is right, and that is where we stop our saying, and don't pretend that there is another context in which it makes no sense to say that. There is your bifurcation. By the way I didn't have Whitehead's "bifurcation of nature" (although I studied Whitehead's ideas quite extensively quite a few years ago) specifically in mind. He was more concerned with bypassing the division of nature into primary and secondary qualities, and of course that is a related issue, but let's not go down that rabbit hole.

I’m pointing out that when we use concepts like “existence” or “independence,” we are already relying on the framework of experience that gives those concepts their sense. That isn’t dogma — it’s analysis. To ignore that is not to be “freer” in one’s thinking, but simply to overlook the conditions that make thought coherent in the first place. — Wayfarer

The terms "existence" and 'independence" are common coin that get used in various contexts. To repeat, you say yourself that we can perfectly sensibly talk about the existence of the world prior to humans with the caveat that it makes sense only within the empirical context. I say there is no other context―so it looks like we are actually agreeing. I say there is no other context in which we can say anything at all, because we don't know any other context

A lot of this makes more sense form a phenomenological perspective (which is how I originally approached academic philosophy). Consciousness is 'of something' (the intentional), so if you follow that line of thinking further down the track you presume a grounding function.

If you have literally no interest in phenomenology then I can see how none of the above would serve any purpose nor inspire you to look further. — I like sushi

Phenomenology intentionally brackets the question of the existence of an external world, and concerns itself with understanding the nature of human experience. Phenomenology can tell us nothing about metaphysics, as it is not in the business of speculation. As Husserl declared: "to the things themselves"( the "things" here being 'things as we experience them'. It is the accumulation of scientific knowledge that places us in a better position to make plausible metaphysical inferences to the best explanation.

When Kant says we cannot know noumena or how things exist in themselves as opposed to how they exist for us, he is basing that on a consideration of only what we can via reflection on perceptual experience, establish that we can have direct cognitive access to. And yet he acknowledges, in order to escape Berkelyan idealism or Humean phenomenalism, that in order for there to be appearances there must be "something" that appears. It is the nature of that "something" which concerned traditional speculative metaphysics, which relied on the idea that intellectual intuition as to the nature of things is possible. Kant debunked this idea, and yet still wished to say what could not be the case with things in themselves or noumena.

If we have no cognitive access to that "something" are we nonetheless able to coherently speculate as to the nature of its existence? Of course we are. But what will be the best guide to such speculation? Intuition? Imagination? Common sense? Everyday experience? Science? I would say common sense, everyday experience and science are the best guides as to what metaphysical speculations are most plausible. It remains, though, that metaphysical questions are not strictly decidable, since any proposed thesis is neither logically provable or empirically demonstrable.

Then we can speculate that things in themselves may exist in their own space and time, which cannot be proven but which seems most plausible…
— Janus

Agreed, given the conditions which make that speculation plausible. It just isn’t a Kantian speculation and to which I only object because I think it is being made to look like it. In this particular speculation, while Kant also cannot prove things-in-themselves may exist in their own space and time, he only has to prove they cannot, in order for his entire metaphysical thesis with respect to human knowledge, to have an empirical limit. And he does exactly that, by proving….transcendentally….that space and time belong to the cognizing subject himself, which makes the existence of things in them, impossible. — Mww

I wasn't attempting to make it look like a Kantian speculation. On the other hand, I think there are inconsistencies in Kant. "Things in themselves" is the idea that there is more than just one thing that appears to us as the stupendous diversity of phenomena. Schopenhauer took him to task on this very point ( not saying I agree with Schopenhauer's "solution"). The point is that we cannot make sense of a single something appearing to us as a diversity of commonly perceived phenomena.

You say that Kant "proves" that things-in-themselves cannot exist in space and time, when all he can prove if anything is that they don't exist (and that proof by mere definition) in our perceptual space and time.

All of which is quite beside the point, insofar as all which concerns us as knowing subjects, is any of that which is entirely dependent on the mind. — Mww

I agree that as knowing subjects that is all that concerns us. But we can also know what seems most plausible to us when it comes to questions concerning speculative matters which are strictly both logically and empirically undecidable, since such speculating and weighing of what seems most plausible is also entirely a function of the mind. I say "function of the mind" rather than "entirely dependent on the mind", because the latter formulation may mislead into forgetting of experience.

See above.

I recognize nothing that hints you have considered, so I shall assume you’re not so inclined. Or you have and kept it to yourself. Which is fine; just thought you’d be interested. — Mww

Remember? “…I can think what I please, provided only that I do not contradict myself…”, which is precisely what understanding is doing, when empirical conceptions of possible objects arise from it alone, the empirical representation of which, from intuition, is entirely lacking. — Mww

I did not have the time to address that at the time. I say that speculative conceptions of the kind of bare bones in-themselves nature of the objects that appear to us as phenomena is not at all contradictory. That is just an interpretation-dependent stipulative judgement that I don't accept. It's all about what can make sense to talk about. Juts as I can sensibly talk about the things I perceive having an existence of their own, I can sensibly speculate about what the idea of such things seems to logically entail. "Things" implies differentiation and form, and differentiation implies space and time. If we are going to talk about things at all, then we should be consistent with what logic is implicit in thinking in terms of things. Of course thinking about things is based on concepts formed on account of the actual cognition of things. Then if we posit things beyond cognition we are in speculative territory. But if all such speculation is incoherent, or worse, contradictory, then forget about things in themselves altogether and go with absolute idealism or phenomenalism.

:up:

But the distinction isn’t a matter of “thought-police prescriptions.” It’s a matter of recognizing limits. — Wayfarer

Whose limits, and justified by appealing to what exactly?

When you say “of course things exist independently of any mind,” you’re already employing the categories of existence and independence. The transcendental point is simply: those categories have meaning only in relation to a subject. It’s not dogma, but an analysis of how thought works. — Wayfarer

No, it's a simple truism being unsupportedly amplified into a purported stricture. You simply have no warrant to pontificate on what may or may not have meaning to others. It's dogma, pure and simple, but I can't make you see that, you have to come to that realization yourself.

You even agree that it makes sense to say that things existed prior to humans. Then you go on to say it makes sense in an empirical context, but not in a transcendental context. I don't accept that bifurcation. "transcendental sense" is an artificial construct, which is neither logically nor empirically supported. So what is it supported by? If you say phenomenology I won't agree, because the whole remit of phenomenology consists in reflection the nature of experience. Science consists in investigation and analysis of the nature of the phenomena we experience. Phenomenology='What is the nature of experience ' and science= 'what is the nature of the things we experience'.

So you’re right that there’s no empirical way to confirm or disconfirm claims about noumena—that’s precisely why Kant warns against treating them as if they were positive objects. — Wayfarer

We need not talk about them at all except that it seems obvious, even to Kant, that if there are appearances there must be something that appears. What is the nature of that something about which we only know how it appears? It's not directly subject to investigation. But if there is something that appears we know how it appears.

And we know that the idea of something completely amorphous appearing as a world of diversity seems mighty implausible, actually makes no sense at all. If we want to speculate then I say that's the place to start. But I acknowledge we cannot say much, even about what seems most plausible. I also acknowledge that it doesn't really matter, it changes nothing about how we live our lives.

You keep calling it “dogma,” but it seems to me the real issue is that you’re not willing to admit that our knowledge has limits. — Wayfarer

If you think that it shows you don't read my posts closely. Of course I admit that our knowledge has limits, but I'm not a fan of pre-determining those limits. Of course we can talk about limits in tautologous way―once we conceive of objects as being "appearances for us" and "things in themselves" it is true by mere definition that if we define 'in itself' as what lies beyond 'how it appears' then we cannot have cognitive access to the in itself. But it doesn't follow logically that speculative talk about what it might be is meaningless.

And I suspect the reason you push back so strongly is that you have an instinctive aversion to the very word transcendental—for you it smacks of “God talk,” which is why you keep insisting it must be dogmatic. But that’s really just your pre-existing conception of the question, not what’s actually at stake. — Wayfarer

Here we go again with the psychological explanations! I don't so much object to the word 'transcendental' because we can only really reflect on what we experience and on what we can imagine. "The idea of transcendence just indicates that we must recognize that we don't know everything, and that we are bound to think that there must be something beyond what we experience and imagine. We inevitably imagine a transcendental world or aspect of the world that exists somehow apart from and independently of our world of cognitively apprehended objects.

The natural attitude, based on the fact of everyday experience that we all experience the same objects at the same times and places, is that those objects exist independently of our perception of them. That's really it. We don't know what that independent exist is like, we don't even know that there really is an independent existence. But phenomenalism explains nothing, so we are bound to think of an independent existence in some form or other.

Anything we think about it is more or less underdetermined. What thoughts are more determined and what less is the salient question. As Kant says, and @Mww quoted recently: "we can think whatever we like provided we don't contradict ourselves'. The thought that there is a god in whose mind all the objects we encounter exist is not logically contradictory, and nor is the idea of a mind-independent spatiotemporal world of real existents. Choose your poison. I know which I find the more plausible. But to repeat―it doesn't really matter, what matters is how well we live the lives we know we have.

I don't see myself as one of the thought police on this forum. That honour goes to all of those who squeal every time the word 'transcendent' is so much as mentioned. — Wayfarer

Of course you wouldn't see yourself as one of the thought-police. I have no argument with the idea of the transcendental per se. It's the way that some use it to push their dogma, and try to impose what I see as bullshit limits on what others can or should think that spurs me to respond.

I am asserting that there are people who misunderstand the difference between 'things-in-themselves' and 'noumena'. — I like sushi

What is the difference between noumena and things in themselves according to you?

I am also asserting -- having read Kant quite thoroughly -- that it makes no sense to talk of a 'bifurcation of nature' between 'phenomena and noumena'. That is very much a gross misunderstanding, but a very common one. — I like sushi

A bare assertion is not sufficient. Why does it make no sense to talk of a bifurcation of nature between phenomena and noumena? You say to think that is a common misunderstanding―do you mean among the population of amateur philosophers or do you mean among Kant scholars. Are you a Kant scholar?

If a 'two worlds' reading of Kant in regards to things as experienced and things in themselves is a coherent and consistent interpretation of Kant's philosophy, then as far as I can that would entail a bifurcation of nature.

I don't care so much about the fine points of Kantian terminology, I am more interested in the substance of his arguments. If a world of things in themselves gives rise to a world of things as they appear to us, then that would seem to posit two very different worlds―one we cannot have access to at all, and one we do access. If the world we inhabit (the empirical world) is an "idea" or "representation" as Schopenhauer reckons is the logical conclusion of Kant's system even though Kant may not have explicitly said so, and the world we have no access to is the objectively real world in itself, then which is the real world and which the ideal. I always thought Kant had this backwards, and I have also read a considerable amount of, and about, Kant.

If we want to say that the world of appearances just is nature (for us at least) then we do find a bifurcation even in the 'two aspect' interpretation, or so it seems to me. I say this because, unless we opt for sheer phenomenalism or Hegelian absolute idealism, we are positing that nature is for us divided into what we have access to and what we don't, and this is still a kind of dualism for all intents and purposes.

I don't know. I'm wracking my brain. — Patterner

You said the discursive intellect might be a better approach. I presumed you meant the discursive intellect alone. But does it ever work alone? Can it generate its own material to analyze or are experiences and empirical data not required to provide the material?

It is not measurable or detectable in any way. — Patterner

Perhaps not measurable, but not detectable....? Can we not tell when people are conscious of something by observing their behavior or asking them? Can we not make a person conscious of something by drawing their attention to it?

What if? What if it's not? — Patterner

Well, it seems most plausible to me that it is, but of course one person's plausibility may be another's incredulity.

You say, "All explanations are given in causal terms," but you're thinking of a type of common physical/scientific explanation. Is the explanation of the Pythagorean theorem a causal one? Surely not. What about an explanation of how football is played? — J

Yes, I was referring specifically to scientific and physical explanation. If course we have explanations of behavior couched in terms of reasons, and as to geometry and football, in terms of rules. I guess what I meant is that all explanations are reductive in the they tell one story, where others might also be told, analyze things in terms of their components (causal processes, reasons or rules) and none of them go anywhere near to capturing the whole picture or covering all the bases.

A reductive explanation of consciousness would not only show how it comes to occur, but also why it is identical, in some significant sense, to its physical components, just as water reduces to H2O. I'm suggesting that explaining consciousness may not fit this model. — J

I cannot imagine what any other non-reductive kind of explanation could possibly look like. Could not a reductive explanation of consciousness possibly show why (if such were the case) it is not identical to its physical components. For that matter are there any explanations at all which are not given in terms of components? Would understanding consciousness even conceivably be possible if it could not be analyzed in terms of components?

Consciousness is not trying to explain itself―it is reason, the discursive intellect, that is trying to explain consciousness.
— Janus

That's an interesting move. Again, it seems to hinge on what the activity of explanation consists of. — J

If we are undertaking an investigation into consciousness, what could we be doing if not looking at behavior and neural activity (anything else you can think of?) using observation and reasoned analysis? I say consciousness, while obviously involved in observation and reasoned analysis, is not identical with those processes. Consciousness is an umbrella under which many different processes can be possible that arguably would not otherwise be possible.

In a way, it is that simple -- for now — J

I think it is generally understood that we are conscious during REM sleep. We may remember dreams, which suggests that they have entered conscious attention, while at the end of a day, we may be able to recall only those things which have impressed us sufficiently to become part of memory.

That sounds right to me. I don't think reason and intellect are parts of consciousness, so it's not even a case of something examining itself. Which I don't think is impossible on principle, as J just noted. I think consciousness is not physical, so it's not going to be explained in physical terms. Reason, the discursive intellect might be a better approach. — Patterner

What evidence can the discursive intellect alone give us? What do you mean by saying that consciousness is not physical? What if discursive reasoning just is a certain kind of neural activity, and consciousness is also a kind of master neural process, a condition, that is necessary (or perhaps not?) in order that discursive reasoning be able to occur?

no objective, third person account of the workings of the mind capture the lived nature of experience. — Wayfarer

Can any account of anything capture the actuality of the thing?

Here you are assuming that space is mind-independent. There is no need to do that for a 'realist' IMO. — boundless

No that assumption is not necessarily entailed by what I said. I said the thing that calls for explanation is the undeniable fact that we see the same things in the same places and times, even down to the smallest details. The question is as to what is the most plausible explanation for that fact.

To make a crude analogy... think about the Matrix. Alice and Bob visit a city in the virtual reality of the Matrix. The buildings are not really there. — boundless

The you come up with―a fictional scenario, which it would not be implausible to think could not actually exist.

Ok. What are these laws and regularities in physical terms? — boundless

They consist in the patterns and behavior manifested in the things. What's the problem?

Not only that, however. When I, for instance, make a calculation I am not aware of any bodily processes. I am aware of a relation between concepts. — boundless

What, you are not writing down your calculation or being aware of thoughts within your body, manifesting as sentences or images?

Let's take again the Matrix example — boundless

Let's not―the Matrix is not a feasible scenario, and hence cannot serve as a relevant examples in my view. You would need to convince me that it warrants being taken seriously in order to interest me in it.

So, is the 'mind-independent reality' more or less the same to the 'phenomenal world'? We do not a way of know. And we can't neglect the fact that our mind has an active role in shaping the 'phenomenal world'. — boundless

Sure we and the other animals have somewhat different ways of perceiving the phenomenal world in accordance with the different structures of our sensory organs and bodies. But I think it most plausible to think it is one phenomenal world for all, even given different ways of perceiving due also to size differences, and animals' attention being directed at different things according to their needs.

Observing animal behavior shows us that they see the same thing in the environment, and any differences in ways of perceiving across the range of animals can be studied by science to gain a coherent and consistent understanding of those differences. We see dogs chasing balls, cats eating out of their bowls and climbing tress. We don't see animals or people trying to walk through walls.

I almost agree with this. But I am open to the possibility of things like 'revelations', 'insights via meditative experiences' and so on that can allow us, in principle, to get a 'higher knowledge'. I do recognize that there are good reasons to be skeptical of these things, however. — boundless

I see no problem in believing in such things, but they cannot serve as a foundation for clear and consistent rational discourse, since they are by general acknowledgement ineffable, and what people say about them is always interpretive, and generally interpreted in consonance within the cultural context in which people have been inducted into religious or spiritual ideas.

Whereas, if one assumes that some kind of 'fundamental mental aspect' or 'Divine Mind' etc is fundamental, it's easier to understand why these properties are present even in matter. — boundless

Okay, fair enough, but for me it is far more difficult to understand what a "fundamental mental aspect" or "divine mind" could be

This is a gross misunderstanding if you are referring to Kant. There is no bifurcation at all. — I like sushi

This is a gross, unargued bare assertion. Do an internet search on 'two worlds theory vs two aspects theory in Kant scholarship'. You might learn something.

I would like to offer, for your consideration, the idea, the interpretation, that Kant isn’t talking about noumena at all. He is talking about the faculty of understanding, and its proclivity for exceeding its warrant, such warrants having already been specified in preceding sections of his critical theory. — Mww

It is a tautology that we cannot know things in themselves if 'thing in itself' is defined as what we cannot know, which is the same as to say that all we can cognize are phenomena, and the idea of noumena represents the 'ultimate or true nature of things', which we cannot perceive, but can only speculate about.

So, no one in their right mind would claim that we can know what is defined as that which we cannot know. The thing is though that we can speculate, makes inferences, about the nature of things in themselves or noumena from what we know of phenomena.

So, Kant says that things in themselves cannot exist in space and time. It is true, again by definition, that things in themselves cannot exist in our perceptual space and time, if things in themselves are defined as whatever lies beyond the possibility of human cognition. On the other hand, we can think and speak in a different register and say that things in themselves (things which have their own mind-independent existence) just are what appear to us as phenomena. Interpreted the situation thus we can be said to know things in themselves but only as they appear to us, not as they are in themselves.

Then we are not struggling with an explicitly dualist view, because the things that appears to us are the same things that have their own existence apart from our perceptions of them, it is just that all we can know of them are their perceptible qualities.

Then we can speculate that things in themselves may exist in their own space and time, which cannot be proven but which seems most plausible since an undifferentiated thing in itself that purportedly gives rise to our experience of a spatiotemporal world seems far less plausible than things which have their own existence as different from all other things. For a start "giving rise" implies causation or at least "providing the conditions". How could something completely undifferentiated cause to exist, or provide the conditions for, anything differentiated. To me that idea makes no sense at all.

When it comes down to speculating about noumena or things in themselves there can be no discernible fact of the matter which could confirm or disconfirm any conjectures, so it comes down to what each of us might find to be the most useful and/or plausible way of thinking and talking about them.

My beef is with the dogmatic "thought police" prescriptions about what we can and cannot coherently think and talk about. For me it makes no sense to say "of course things have their own existence independent of any mind in the empirical sense, but not in the transcendental sense'. I see this prescription as dogmatic because there can be no strictly determinable transcendental sense.

If Kant is not positing that there is something which gives rise to phenomena then his position is no different than Phenomenalism.

. I don’t hold beliefs other than what beliefs are necessary to live a life. However I lead a life informed by what I have discovered or adopted as a practice for a period of time. — Punshhh

Without some criteria to determine what belongs in that category I could say that anything I believe is necessary to live a life. Strictly speaking, to live a life all I need to believe are things relating to the "necessities' of life, and spiritual growth is not one of them, certainly not for most people. Of course you can say it is necessary for you―but perhaps that is just because you have come to think it is necessary for you, that is you have come to believe it.

You say you have discovered things and/ or adapted things as a practice, but you wouldn't waste your time if you didn't believe in the truth of those discoveries, or the efficacy of those practices.

Belief is not that hard to define―anything you are committed to holding as being true is a belief.