The VR-generated you puts the VR-generated cup back in the VR-generated cupboard; what's the problem?

:lol: :up:

Goldbach's conjecture was just an example. The point is that if there is any unknown truth (i.e., if we are not collectively omniscient), then there is also a related unknowable truth.
— Andrew M

I'm still not getting it from that angle — Janus


OK, though it's not clear to me what you are objecting to. — Andrew M

I'm not strictly objecting to anything. I'm just not seeing how it follows from there being unknown truths, that there are unknowable truths.

As I pointed out with my example we know that it is unknowable as to whether there are unknowable truths, because we can never be sure that there are not unknowable truths. But then I've just said that it it is knowable that it is unknowable as to whether there are unknowable truths, from which it seems to follow, paradoxically that we do know there are unknowable truths, or at least one, at any rate.

Minus seven last night, and the house just won't get warm. — Banno

Jesus, where do you live? I had thought you were in Sydney.

"Big mind" strikes me as a joke. The reality you have when you don't have a reality. It's a replacement for God, and so subject to the same problems as Joshs reply.

My objection is not to the content but the structure of that argument. The "supernatural" element, even if "immanent", is introduced using a fraught transcendental argument*. It is the transcendental argument that is objectionable. — Banno

Sure, but your personal feelings are irrelevant as to whether the imagined models (universal mind, God, collective mind or whatever) logically preclude the possibility of unknown truths; they don't and hence your objection is misplaced.

And yet the alternative is that you know all there is to know.

Are you willing to claim omniscience? — Banno

That's why I keep going back to the distinction based on truth, and maintaining that there are unknown truths. — Banno

Two excerpts from earlier posts in this thread where I have shown that the existence of unknown truths is not a problem for ( at least some prominent forms of) idealism, so not sure why you are still banging that drum.

Since according to idealism the world is a product of Big MInd, not your mind or mine, then on that position there may indeed be truths that are not known. Have you read Berkeley at all, or are you at least familiar with his philosophy via secondary sources? — Janus

The point is that in either model, materialist or idealist. there is no problem that there should be truths unknown to us; which tells against your apparent claim that there could be no such truths under the idealist model, no? Or were you objecting because there could not be truths unknown to the Big Mind? — Janus

What is the longterm result for a race which directly apprehends reality, versus a race that filters raw existence into reality as it appears? — Merkwurdichliebe

That, I couldn't say.

Goldbach's conjecture was just an example. The point is that if there is any unknown truth (i.e., if we are not collectively omniscient), then there is also a related unknowable truth. — Andrew M

I'm still not getting it from that angle but I think this shows that there is at least one unknowable truth:

Is the truth of the proposition that there are unknowable propositions itself unknowable? We might want to say that it is, because if there are unknowable propositions then we could never know there are, just because they are unknowable.

But then it would follow that there is at least one unknowable truth, that it is unknowable as to whether there are unknowable truths; and that is a contradiction, because it would also follow that we know that there is at least one unknowable truth.

But we can never know either to be true because that would be a contradiction. — Michael

Yes, I agree, but we do know that one of them is true, we just can't know which one without chaging the state of the game.

is the truth of the proposition that there are unknowable propositions itself unknowable? — Janus


No. Both a) and b) are known to be unknowable propositions. — Michael

Read again; I wasn't referring to a) or b).

For a short black? — Banno

Taboo!

But I don't use ta cups, I use coffee cups. — Banno

Coffee cups are no good; it has to be mugs.

Neither. There is an external reality, according to Pinter, but the way (or the sense) in which it exists is incomprehensible to us. — Wayfarer

I was presenting those as the coherently imaginable possibilities. For all we know one of those might be imagining "the way things really are" or something like it, or it might be the case that nothing we imagine could be anything like the real. But assuming the latter possibility to be true, then the question would be of no significance to us at all.

(What I find interesting about Pinter's book is his proposal that the 'bare bones' of material or physically-measurable objects don't have any intrinsic identity, but that identity is imposed upon them in the form of gestalts, meaningful wholes, which are the basic primitives of animal and human cognition.) — Wayfarer

Commonality of experience shows that the gestalts or meaningful wholes do not arise arbitrarily, not merely on account of the individual perceiver, taken in isolation. So the possibilities are that either real existents, including the objects perceived, the environmental conditions and the constitutions of the perceives all work together to determine the forms of perceptions. or else there is a universal or collective mind which determines the perceptions and their commonality.

How could we possibly know the answer to that question? Which seems more plausible? How do we choose between them? Does it not come down to personal presupposition and/ or preference? If so, then what could be the point in arguing over the question?

As I see it though the proposition is disjointed because we don't know 1) we are merely stipulating it or imagining it is the case. And there would be no contradiction unless we make the mistake of thinking that we are not merely stipulating 1) but knowing it.

What about this: is the truth of the proposition that there are unknowable propositions itself unknowable? We might want to say that it is, because if there are unknowable propositions then we could never know there are, just because they are unknowable.

But then it would follow that there is at least one unknowable truth, that it is unknowable as to whether there are unknowable truths; and that is a contradiction, because it would also follow that we know that there is at least one unknowable truth.

Because that's what the knowability principle says. If some proposition p is true then it is possible to know that proposition p is true, and in this case:

p. "the box is empty" is true and we don't know that it's true — Michael

OK, assuming the knowability principle is itself true, the case doesn't contradict it anyway, because it says that ""the box is empty" is true and we don't know that it's true" not ""the box is empty" is true and we can't know that it's true".

It does according to the knowability principle: if a proposition is true then it is possible to know that the proposition is true.

1. "the box is empty" is true and we don't know that it's true

The above is a proposition which, if true, entails that it is possible to know that it's true. — Michael

I'm sorry, but I don't see why "1.", if it is true, entails that it is possible to know that it is true. In other words, we don't know whether the knowability principle is itself true, but we do know that we don't know everything. The stumbling block in the argument, for me, remains the fact that time is apparently being ignored, and it is that ignore-ance that creates the apparent paradox, as far as I can tell. I am very open to being corrected, but no one seems able to explain what it is that I'm purportedly missing.

All that makes sense to me. I think there is a sense in which we can say we see the cup and another sense in which we can say that we see a model of the cup. Of course if I pick up the cup in the presence of others they will not see me picking up my model of the cup, but will see me picking up the cup.

That said, we can also say that they see a model of me picking up the cup. Just two different ways of talking as I see it, neither of which get to the heart of the question as to what the cup is "in itself".

Of course, that question can also be rejected as being incoherent given that there is no possible answer to it, other than that it is "something" which along with the "somethings" that we are,gives rise to our seeing, and being able to feel, tap to hear the sound it emits, pick up and so on, a cup.

I saw this, but I don't see a cogent argument in this:
"The problem is that according to the knowability principle, if "the box is empty" is true and we don't know that it's true then it's possible to know that "the box is empty" is true and that we don't know that it's true, which is a contradiction, and that if "the box is not empty" is true and we don't know that it's true then it's possible to know that the "the box is not empty" is true and that we don't know that it's true, which is a contradiction."

If "the box is empty is true" and we don't know that it is true it does not follow that it's possible to know that "the box is empty is true" and that we don't know that it's true, at the same time. We don't know that it's true, but we may come to know that it's true, and if we come to know that it's true, it will no longer be the case that we don't know that it's true; and hence there is no contradiction. Am I missing something? I'm finding it impossible to see why anyone would think there is a paradox here. If I am missing something it should be explainable, no?

Suppose there is some statement t that is true AND no-one knows that t is true (say, Goldbach's conjecture or its negation). That conjunctive statement is itself true but unknowable. — Andrew M

We don't know if that statement is true, though; someone might know but isn't telling, so it's truth is merely being stipulated. It is unknown whether anyone knows the truth of Golbach's conjecture, but not unknowable, because someone may demonstrate that they know that it is true or false.

Wouldn't it then just be "it might be known that there are truths that are not known" rather than " It might be known that there is a truth that is not known" ? Is there a salient difference?

It needs to be singular to substitute in to (2), so as to get (3) right. — Banno

If the singular substitutes into (2) as you laid it out, why doesn't the plural substitute into (2) as I laid it out?

It isn't that we do know there are unknown truths, it is that it is possible to know there is an unknown truth. If it is possible to know, then it is knowable. These terms are simply synonymous. — Luke

OK, that seems fine: so it is possible to know there is an unknown truth; that does not mean it is possible to know an unknown truth (which would be a contradiction) but that it is possible to know that there is an unknown truth (which is not a contradiction).

the fact that there are unknown truths (if there are) is not itself an unknown truth (if it is known). — Janus


No, but why do you think it should be? — Luke

I don't think it should be.

That's not an instantiation. — Banno

Right, not an instantiation, but many instantiations? Why should non-omniscience not entail that there be more than one unknown truth?

If one of all of the knowable truths (KP) is that we are non-omniscient or that there is an unknown truth (NonO) - in other words, if it is possible to know that there is an unknown truth - then it follows that an unknown truth is knowable.

However, it can be independently shown that an unknown truth is unknowable. — Luke

I don't see how it follows from the fact that we know (if we do know) there are unknown truths that an unknown truth is knowable; the fact that there are unknown truths (if there are) is not itself an unknown truth (if it is known).

(1) There is a truth that is not known (instantiation from NonO)
(2) If there is a truth that is not known, then it might be known that there is a truth that is not known
....(sub (2) into KP)
(3) It might be known that there is a truth that is not known — Banno

What about

(1) There are truths that are not known (instantiation from NonO)
(2) If there are truths that are not known, then it might be known that there
are truths that are not known
....(sub (2) into KP)
(3) It might be known that there are truths that are not known

It seems obvious that there are truths that are not known; for example someone cited the example that the Earth is (roughly) spherical, which at one time was not known. There must be many truths about other planets or yet to be discovered flora and fauna which are not known.

I'm not seeing how the (apparent) fact that there are unknown truths proves either that there are or are not unknowable truths. And I'm also not seeing how there being knowable (in the sense of becoming, obviously not presently, known) unknown truths proves that all truths are known. There must be some (formal) sleight of hand going on, it seems to me.

I took a unit in predicate calculus at Sydney Uni, and I didn't find it difficult. I didn't find it that interesting either. My point is that, however difficult it might be to do, if the argument cannot be expressed informally then it has nothing interesting to say; any interest it might have could only be found within the hermetically sealed formal game.

But the conclusion of Fitch's argument can be "translated back" into plain english - and has been, multiple times, in both articles and in this thread. :roll: — Banno

:roll: So what if the conclusion, but apparently not the argument itself can be translated back into plain English? So what if it is "clearer and easier to follow the detail" in the formal language; the detail should nonetheless be able to be translated into plain language and seen to be valid. If it can't be then it's useless.

Idealism can consist in thinking that so-called external objects are real, but are constituted by virtue of being thought, not merely by your mind or mine, but either by some absolutely other Big Mind, or by an absolutely unconscious collective of small minds.

In the first scenario the objects are independent of your or my mind and indeed all human minds; that is the objects could exist for Big Mind regardless of the existence of any small minds. In the second case the objects can only exist insofar as there is a collective of small minds or perhaps even one small mind would be enough; that would have to be unpacked further.

Formal logic is nothing more than a formalization of the logical validity that operates, or doesn't, in plain language usage. If a conclusion is reached via formal logic which cannot be translated back into plain language and shown to be valid, then something has gone wrong somewhere, and the problem cannot lie with our everyday language, since that is where the formal language is derived from in the first place.

If formal logic is merely a self-enclosed game with its own rules and practices differing from the rules and practices of plain language, that's fine, but then it cannot be plausibly claimed that it has any entailments outside of its own boundaries.

You can't have it both ways.

It's not a trap; if it can't be expressed in plain language then it has no bearing on epistemology (or anything else) since it is in plain language that philosophy is practiced and our thinking in general is done.

Fitch's paradox shows that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known. Some truths aren't known, therefore some truths aren't knowable. — Michael

Can you lay out the argument clearly in plain English?

And yet we don't know which of "the Riemann hypothesis is correct" and "the Riemann hypothesis is not correct" is true, but one of them must be. Therefore not all truths are known. — Michael

The criterion is 'knowable' not 'known'.

Hence you know an unknown sentence. — Banno

Is it the sentence or it's truth value that is unknown?

The thought that the relation between mind and the world is something fundamental makes many people in this day and age nervous. I believe this is one manifestation of a fear of religion which has large and often pernicious consequences for modern intellectual life. — Thomas Nagel

I don't see why the idea that the relation between mind and world is something fundamental would presuppose religion. I have no idea what the connection might be.

It seems obvious that the ways that things uniquely appear to humans is a function of both the things themselves and human physiology, which means that the relation between (body/)mind and world is fundamental.

Things don't appear the same to other animals, but it is the same things that don't appear the same to different species, and this would not change whether the things were ideas in the mind of God or mind-independent existents, as far as I can see.

On the other hand, is there any logical contradiction in the idea that God might have created a world of mind independent existents and many species of percipients with the faculties to perceive those existents? Perhaps He would do that so He doesn't have to keep everything in mind all the time. the lazy prick! :wink:

Suppose p is a sentence that is an unknown truth; that is, the sentence p is true, but it is not known that p is true. In such a case, the sentence "the sentence p is an unknown truth" is true; and, if all truths are knowable, it should be possible to know that "p is an unknown truth". — Fitch's paradox of knowability

Right, we are supposing, stipulating that the sentence p is an unknown truth, not knowing it, obviously, so what's the problem, where's the paradox? If we come to know that the sentence p is true. then it would no longer be an unknown truth. We would then know that the sentence p was an unknown truth, but is no longer. It seems that changes through time have not been accounted for in this purported paradox of knowability.

Wittgenstein is talking about meaning and reference.
For example, an argument against private language. — Jackson

My understanding of the PLA is that a private language is impossible because in order to determine the meaning of the words it would be composed of (except perhaps for purely ostensive words, i.e.. some nouns) one would need to translate them into a public language one was already conversant in, and this would mean it would not really be a private language. How do we arrive at this understanding? By reflecting on the way things are for us; i.e. phenomenologically.

Who are those scholars? I never heard of that. — Jackson

Perhaps "many scholars" is an exaggeration but off the top of my head I can think of Charles Taylor, Hubert Dreyfus and Lee Braver. There are others who have sought to bridge the analytic/ continental divide. You should find something here:

https://www.google.com.au/search?q=wittgenstein+and+phenomenology&source=hp&ei=z_O4YtOlFpzU4-EPtumBQA&iflsig=AJiK0e8AAAAAYrkB36gI7WnZ0076kibJBLm8HNIbolBC&gs_ssp=eJzj4tVP1zc0TKkoTLMoKc42YPSSK88sKUlPzSsuSc3MU0jMS1EoyEjNy88F4pz89EoAhIwRMQ&oq=wittgenstin+and+phenomenology&gs_lcp=Cgdnd3Mtd2l6EAEYADIHCC4Q1AIQDTIHCC4Q1AIQDToLCAAQgAQQsQMQgwE6DgguEIAEELEDEIMBENQCOhEILhCABBCxAxCDARDHARCjAjoICAAQgAQQsQM6EQguEIAEELEDEIMBEMcBENEDOggILhCxAxCDAToFCAAQgAQ6CAgAELEDEIMBOgsILhCABBCxAxCDAToLCC4QsQMQgwEQ1AI6CwguEIAEEMcBEK8BOggILhCABBCxAzoOCC4QgAQQsQMQxwEQowI6DgguEIAEELEDEMcBENEDOggILhCABBDUAjoFCC4QgAQ6BggAEB4QFlAAWIsyYK6IAWgAcAB4AIABgAmIAclWkgEGNi0xMC4ymAEAoAEB&sclient=gws-wiz

The point was that investigating human practices, human phenomena, is by definition a kind of phenomenology.

What is?

The equation of philosophy with phenomenology here would be an error. It is clear from the context that he is talking about rules, meaning and logic, and not just about perceptions. — Banno

Rules, meanings and logic are practices and as therefore investigating them is a kind of phenomenology. The TLP would probably not be considered as such, but I know that many scholars regard the PI as a phenomenological investigation of human life. I haven't read much of it myself, though it's on the list.

Also, I haven't equated philosophy with phenomenology; there are obviously other branches.

I have looked into OLP much, but from my limited familiarity with it, it seems to be an investigation into what we mean when we say this or that, and the ways in which language can lead to (metaphysical) reification when it "goes on holiday".

A bit paradoxical, but I think Wittgenstein is on to something. I don't think this means we understand things simply by looking at them. I think he is alluding to what was called ordinary language philosophy. — Jackson

I was thinking more along the lines of, via philosophical (phenomenological) investigation of and reflection on experience, finding things which were previously not seen. I think this is quite a different kind of investigation than ordinary language philosophy, although the latter is arguably a kind of phenomenology, just much more limited in scope.

I think this is a good question. For me philosophy is descriptive, not explanatory, but explicatory, so I'm more drawn to phenomenology than to metaphysics. On the other hand, the idea that everything lies open to view doesn't seem right;philosophy can elucidate, disclose what had been concealed from view, but this is more a matter of investigating what is there than of attempting to explain it

:up:

Note I said "seriously believe"; belief serious enough to count preparing for the life to come as the most important matter in life. It's pretty rare, at least as far as my experience goes. Anyway I agree with you; all one needs is compassion and a conscience to be an ethical person.