If you say, there is no "being" outside perspective, that is indeed Idealism and Schopenhauer would get on board with that. But, let's say you weren't an Idealist. Is there any other way to answer this? — schopenhauer1

There is no problem with saying there is being outside of any perspective, or that things exist independently of any perspective; but it's obvious, by definition, that anything we say about it, including the statement that there is being outside perspective, or things existing independently of any perspective is from a perspective.

Apology rejected because unneeded. :wink:

I would say our study of what we describe as reality (the empirical) is science, not metaphysics. Do we ever grasp the real? It depends on what you mean by "the real". Science does a good job of grasping empirical reality; in fact science would be impossible if we couldn't comprehend the field of our experience. Can we go beyond that? Traditional metaphysics says we can, and Kant was one of the first to say we can't (even though he thinks the tendency to try to do so is built into rational thought). Later thinkers (the logical positivists being the prime example) thought metaphysical claims are completely meaningless, or at least without sense (Wittgenstein).

I think physicalism is a metaphysical position (and is invalid as any other) if it holds that the nature of reality in itself is physical. Reality as we understand it is indeed physical, but that is an empirical or phenomenological claim, not a metaphysical one (unless you want to redefine metaphysics and ontology in terms of phenomenology).

I think many people want to reject physicalism holus bolus just because they think it threatens the spiritual side of human life. I don't agree with that concern.That's my small change on the matter, anyway.

It's much easier to dismiss the whole subject than to even begin to understand it. — Wayfarer

And it's much easier to make a sweeping claim that others don't understand the issues, or that they have dismissed the "whole subject" without sufficient investigation of it, than it is to actually explain and defend your position.

That is the basis of the various ancient formulations of dualism: the faculty of reason as the ability to discern the real. — Wayfarer

That is the very claim which Kant refuted. Kant's metaphysical project is confined to reflection and analysis of what possible human experience and judgement must consist in. He specifically rejects the idea that reason can, inductively or deductively, come to discern the nature of the real (the noumenal). He rejects rational psychology, rational cosmology and rational theology; in other words the reliability of metaphysical speculations about the nature of the soul, the world and God. Did you read the SEP article I linked earlier?

Right, so I was hoping Wayfarer would offer an explanation of what he thinks could constitute a valid or true metaphysics, as opposed to merely the usual necessarily invalid and questionable,because subjective, speculations.

I can't speak for Wayfarer but surely any metaphysics is always based on a human point of view. If we have described it, we co-created it. As an idealist, I imagine Wayfarer would hold to a view that there is a reality beyond human perception. — Tom Storm

If a metaphysics, to be considered valid or substantive, must reflect a "reality beyond human perception" and all our metaphysics are merely human creations or at best "co-creations" (whatever that could be thought to mean), then there are no valid metaphysics, or at least no metaphysics which we can demonstrate or know to be valid.

The conceit of a lot of modern thinking is to believe that science really does exclude the subject. In fact that is impossible. What scientists endeavour to do, is to arrive at an understanding which is as general as possible, devoid of personal, subjective or cultural influences. That's what 'the view from nowhere' is trying to achieve, and it can do that. But it's not a metaphysic. To mistake it for a metaphysic is to lapse into scientism. — Wayfarer

What then could constitute a metaphysic? Surely no merely human perspective could qualify, since metaphysics, to be considered substantive in your book, must be absolute. no?

But what is a perspective free universe. One without sentience? Planets planeting? Particles particling? What is being without perspective? — schopenhauer1

It's obviously either a meaningless question, or else at least a question that cannot be answered.

How can there be matter without form? — Fooloso4

Yes, that's what I said?

There is no meaning without beings for whom things have meaning. Meaning is not inherent in form. Things can mean different things to different people. It is a matter of what we ascribe meaning to.

Doesn't matter taking the form of the various elements mean the opening up of all the possibilities which we see manifest today?

Wouldn't the lawful behavior of matter already make it meaningful, though?

I do have it, have read it, and found it very interesting as I recall (it was about ten years ago I read it, I think).

My response was not a critique of Nishijima, but to the incoherence of the idea of meaningless matter; I mean people often imagine matter that way, but really meaningless matter, formless matter, is impossible.

Language, to put it in a familiar way, never "touches" the world, for reference is impossible in the familiar way this is thought of. — Constance

How can you deny that words can refer to things perceived? We don't perceive the world; it is the idea of the unconditioned totality of possibly perceived things. So it is not merely words which don't "touch" the world.

Some people explain the Universe as a universe based on matter. But there also exists something which we call value or meaning. A Universe consisting only of matter leaves no room for value or meaning in civilizations and cultures. — Nishijima Roshi, Three Philosophies, One Reality

The universe is not merely matter; matter means nothing, can be nothing, unless it takes form. Meaning is inherent within form. How could there be form without meaning?

I agree with you about the Logical Positivists misconstrual of Wittgenstein's philosophy. He undoubtedly allowed for the mystical, but only as something about which absolutely nothing could be (propositionally) said.

The mystical, the religious, spirit is shown, for example, in the great cathedrals and buildings of other cultures, as well as in poetry, painting and music. Think of Bach as a paradigm example. But when you say

And finally how that accounts for his conviction that ‘ethics are transcendent’ along with those other aphorisms which indicate the transcendent source of ethics. — Wayfarer

when you talk about a "transcendent source" or "hierarchies of being" I think you are departing from Wittgenstein's ideas; and you are skating dangerously close to the kind of reification which he condemned as being "without sense".

That's my view, anyway, which you should be pretty familiar with by now.

I read the article; nothing unfamiliar there nor anything which disagrees with anything I've said, as far as I can tell. If you think differently then please enlighten me.

You're not disagreeing with anything I said other than that Kant is traditional metaphysics; which is just plain wrong. Kant critiques the idea that any rationalist conception or empirical observation could tell us anything about anything real beyond human experience; that is about the nature of things per se; which is what traditional metaphysics and ontology purport to be able to reveal.


Perhaps give this a read: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-metaphysics/

I don’t think either of them did that though. More that they were scrupulous about the use of conceptual language for what is beyond its scope. — Wayfarer

Kant rejected the possibility of doing traditional metaphysics.

Wittgenstein definitely thought that traditional metaphysics is "language on holiday". His "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" shows his attitude to metaphysics.

From the article on Wittgenstein in SEP:

"Having developed this analysis of world-thought-language, and relying on the one general form of the proposition, Wittgenstein can now assert that all meaningful propositions are of equal value. Subsequently, he ends the journey with the admonition concerning what can (or cannot) and what should (or should not) be said (7), leaving outside the realm of the sayable propositions of ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics."

Neither, in my view, would have said that metaphysical concerns have any meaning, in the sense of being of no significance to humans; rather I think both would agree that metaphysical claims can have no propositional sense. I've been saying this to you for years now, and you never seem to be willing to accept it.

Every test of a theory, whether resulting in its collaboration or falsification, must stop at some basic statement or other which we decide to accept. If we do not come to any decision, and do not accept some basic statement or other, then the test will have led nowhere…
...
Basic statements are not justifiable by our immediate experiences, but are … accepted by an act, a free decision.
...
Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being. — Popper


Is anyone else reminded of Wittgenstein's later work here? Popper does not take the route of treating sense-data at the absolute which can falsify theories. Instead he talks of decisions. In his Logic, he uses the metaphor of a jury. I think he's trying to jump over the quicksand between language and the world apart from language. This 'swampy' element is something like 'common sense.' I imagine, for instance, everything that goes into a making a legitimate measurement, including one that falsifies a theory. Wittgenstein's discussion of the standard meter comes to mind. Popper admits or tolerates a dimness at the base of critical rationalism. — jas0n

It'd be great to hear your thoughts on Popper's swamp, which has hardly been touched. Observation statements are tricky! 'Experience' is pre-logical, one might say, since logic is about relationships between statements. Which statements count as basic (not needing justification by still other statements) is maybe unformalizable. Reminds me of On Certainty. — jas0n

My initial thought is that statements which count as basic are statements which have come to be accepted because they reflect what is common, most universal, to all of human experience. Is this "ecosystem" of 'self-evident' experience rightly captured in the metaphor of "swamp"? A swamp has no firm bedrock (which was Wittgenstein's metaphor for the set of hinge propositions which form the terrain over which the river of human life flows) to be found. We can touch the stream bed as it is more or less firm.

So, the question seems to be as to what is the difference between the two metaphors. Wittgenstein (if memory serves) allows that hinge propositions might change (as the river of human experience and judgement erodes here and silts up there). A swamp is an ecosystem thriving on a bed of fathomless ooze. Unlike Kant's sharp distinction between phenomena and noumena. the observability of the life of the swamp fades into the mud.

It has been pointed out by Sellars, McDowell and Brandom (following Hegel?) that, if sense experience is to be counted as justification for any propositional claims, it must be "conceptually shaped" all the way down. But what could this mean?

We know, on account of our very ignorance, that we are affected by the world at a pre-cognitive level; this means that, despite our ability to analyze the function of the various sensory structures via which we gain access to experience of a world, we cannot become conscious of this very most basic affectivity. It is ineluctably vague and subject only to our most recondite speculations.

So it is not consciousness which is most basic to our experience of a world, but unconsciousness, a primordial unfathomable affectivity.

No worries man. I remember we did touch on this before; although I don't recall the unpleasantness so much.

Anyway aplologies for any misunderstanding.

As early Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein (among others) would have it an implicit background understanding and interpretation is always involved.

The rule would be to reflect, or be aware, I suppose.

I'm waiting to see the anti- or bizarro- you, apo, and his respective philosophy. If you present it I ought not to be able to tell it is really you behind the mask.

I don't agree, not at first blush. Knowing is doing; That one knows how to ride a bike is demonstrated in the act of riding. Just being aware (conscious) of the bike is wholly insufficient. — Banno

That one knows how things seem to one is demonstrated in the act of being conscious of how things seem. It is also an act, a doing. I wasn't suggesting that one could know how to do complex tasks merely by being aware of them or whatever apparatus they involve.

Knowing how things seem means becoming conscious of how they seem. Seeming can very well remain unconscious.

The private nature of introspection rules it out of contention for a foundation for knowledge. — Banno

Not introspection, reflection. By remembering we can know how things seem to us. Even in relation to mere introspection, if we report whatever we find and others report the same, then we can have an inter-subjective basis for knowledge, which in the final analysis, is the only basis there is. Of course none of it demonstrates anything about anything beyond our experience.

But you have trouble following a single thread, so maybe don't concern yourself with the idea... — jas0n

How do you know I have trouble following a single thread?

I wasn't meaning to offend you; I thought that was what you were referring to; your multiple personas on this site. I have had only one, but it's true I did change the name of that one from John to Janus.

Why so upset, such as even to refer to me as "bitch"?

I think Schopenhuaer's statement is an apologetic for his idea that the noumenon is Will. Not so profound, in my view, and all the less so because he nicked the idea from Spinoza (conatus).

The idea that pure intellectual intuition can yield real knowledge was demolished by Kant, and Hegel attempted to resurrect it. The idea is common to religions in the forms of "revelation" or "enlightenment". .

I think such intuitionistic ideas are incapable of demonstration; even if intuition or introspection can give us true direct knowledge of the nature of things, that it could do so can never be demonstrated. So we might know, but can never know that we know. Same goes for science, of course. The whole idea of certain knowledge is bogus, in my view.

I think the most certain knowledge we can have is the phenomenological knowledge of reflection on our experience. But even that assumes the reliability of memory. I think we live better if we live comfortable with uncertainty.

Who did you think I was referring to? Exempting myself? Not I. Really merely a play on words...with no one in particular in mind...

It'd maybe be better to have at least two, and to methodically exercise differing approaches with each. — jas0n

Only two? I thought you had many more than that. And yet the approaches do not differ enough such as to be unrecognizable as one. Keep trying I guess.

You make it sound like shit when you put it like that. — baker


If the shoe fits... — Banno

If the fool shits...

Hermeneutics, not hermetics.

Killing in war situations is not defined as murder. Your husband and wife example is laughable and not deserving of a response.

You cannot figure out what a cup is by observing cups. Without having any idea what a cup is to begin with, you won't know what to focus on to begin with. — baker

You've not familiar with hermeneutics?

Murder is disruptive of the social order; it is irrelevant what the murder's intentions regarding the social order might be imagined to be. And it is arguable that in almost all cases we would have no reason to think that the murderer had any purpose at all regarding the wider social order.

Cannibalism is not murder, but killing for food. Infanticide in animals is an instinctive, well-regulated behavior, not a random act of passion.When these acts occur in animals they are part of the social order, not disruptive of it.

every claim — Nickolasgaspar

Not trying to prove anything means not making a claim. In which case asking for justification of what is presented is inapt. But by all means continue in your inaptitude...it's amusing.

The burden of proof is irrelevant if the person presenting the ideas is not trying to prove anything. It's not difficult to see.

Oh, you were referring to the beliefs of others? I had thought

you tap dances in an effort to avoid challenging his faith based beliefs.... — Nickolasgaspar

referred to some beliefs of my own that you knew of. The combination of "you" and "his" there is somewhat ambiguous I suppose.

What beliefs are you referring to?

If the question was whether knowledge always has to be useful, then you would want to deconstruct the perfectly clear sense of the question by either disputing the definition of knowledge, and/or of use? — apokrisis

Not exactly. Since saying that knowledge, to be of any use, must be useful, is not really saying anything, but seems to indicate that you think knowledge must, or should, be useful, I sought an answer as to whether you considered personal transformation or pleasure to be uses or, if you like, to be useful.

Good for you! You sound very similar to a recently disappeared poster: @Garrett Travers; I think you would get on very well with him.