Yeah... doesn't really roll of the tongue and it sounds kind of boring. — Tom Storm

Is that relevant to whether it is the best way to understand what enlightenment is? Should philosophers only be interested in, only take seriously, ideas that "roll of the tongue" and don't sound boring?

In my OP, I was wondering if enlightenment means the same thing in different cultures. I guess I was asking if it is the case that enlightenment (if and when it takes place) transcends culture and religion.

I am somewhat surprised that no one yet has said something like 'enlightenment is a myth'. — Tom Storm

My take is that enlightenment in its non-deflationary sense is a culturally mediated phenomenon. but since there are many cross-cultural commonalities of human nature there will be commonalities in the ways in which the experiential attributes of enlightenment are and have been described or evoked.

In it's deflationary sense, I think (in case you haven't noticed :wink: ) that it is simply the most radical state of non-attachment or non-reactivity possible for an embodied human being..

Or a little stupid.

The annoying thing about a "lecturing" tone is the adopted posture of superior knowledge on the part of the "lecturer". Those who really do have superior knowledge usually don't adopt a superior tone in my experience.

The other possible mode of 'lecturing tone' action of is that someone presents a whole lot of fairly basic information, either because they unjustifiably presume the other to be ignorant of what they are presenting, or because they want to appear learned themselves.

Your posts don't usually come off as "lecturing" in either of these senses; not to me at least. The only thing you do sometimes that annoys me is failing to state your case while claiming that if your interlocutor was familiar enough with certain texts they would see that what you are saying is true.

Right, so it's only a matter of degree.

Except that pretty much everyone is, to use your word, such a fuckwit about one thing or another.
Some people refuse to abandon their broken cars that are on collision course with a train. Some stay in dysfunctional, destructive relationships. Some maintain a religious affiliation even though they don't believe the tenets anymore and only pretend to do so, which is making them miserable. — baker

Right, but only those who are really fuckwits won't let go once they see that the alternative is unacceptable, or else cannot see the alternative is unacceptable when its unacceptability is staring them right in the face.

One can only give up a lesser happiness when one has sight of a bigger one. — baker

But one can give up a greater unhappiness when one sees that will deliver them to a lesser unhappiness.

With such prospects, what can possibly motivate a person to give up their attachments, when they've got nothing higher to live for? — baker

Being run over by a bus is not a prospect but merely an unlikely possibility. People of course will not be motivated to give up their attachments until they see that their attachments are causing them to suffer, and that if they were less attached they would suffer less.

Clearly, not everyone knows that they can let go of attachment to things when we need to. — baker

You're being pedantic; the fact (if it is a fact) that a few fuckwits cannot let go of their attachments even when the alternative is dire is not relevant. It could be said that the alternative to being non-reactive is always dire; and that it is coming to see that that constitutes the greatest difficulty we face.

Since when does letting go of attachments mean non-attachment? — praxis

So not being attached is not non-attachment? Perhaps you are joking, being ironic; if not you're beginning to look like a troll. :roll:

I don't see how you can say that it's odd, you're not even sure that non-attachment is possible, or so you've said in this topic. — praxis

You should read more closely and try not to think in black and white. I said I don't know if complete non-attachment is possible. We all know that we can let go of attachment to things when we need to.

:ok:

Clear as mud, as I suppose it must be. — praxis

That's odd; it seems crystal clear to me. Try this: attachment in this context we are discussing means reactivity; or better, it means being invested in your reactions, being attached to them.

What do you mean by a belief being justified? Because I understand it as meaning that, given the information available, a rational person can cogently infer the subject of belief. As such, a fake ID can be justification.

This, incidentally, is how the law would consider it. — Michael

Depending on how you want to think about it, you could claim that any belief is not justified, since it is not absolutely certain. The acceptance of fake ids as proof of age is legally justified, since it is acknowledged that the average bartender does not possess the means to enable her to distinguish between a fake id and a valid id. But if you don't have the means to distinguish fake from valid then you have no justification in claiming knowledge.

Not that religious talk needs to make sense, and in fact it's better if it doesn't, but it sounded like you just said that attachment is part of non-attachment. — praxis

Not being attached to the fact that, when thought about in a certain way, some attachment seems inevitable, is a substantial part of non-attachment. Does that make it any clearer?

That could be it, or it could be a "software glitch" as Wayfarer suggested.

The nature of attachment is connection or binding, and there’s no escaping the fact that we’re all connected and bound, so reason demands that we accept this enslavement. — praxis

:up: Yes accepting the inevitable is a substantial part of non-attachment.

The issue is obviously with what constitutes justification. But JTB is not concerned with establishing criteria for that; it is just a definition based on analyzing what is usually meant by knowledge. We don't have to know what constitutes justification (every case will be different) in order to understand the definition.

In the 'bartender' case; his belief the person is 18 is not justified because it is based on a fake id. So it is not knowledge (specifically "knowledge that", not "know-how" or the knowledge of familiarity or acquaintance). The fact that the person is 18 is irrelevant,

This brings up an interesting point about this case; we might want to say that if the id had been valid his belief would have been justified; but if there is no way to tell whether an id is false or not, then there can be no knowledge in the JTB sense in either case, and a rational person would suspend judgement and make no claim to believe the person is 18, as opposed to accepting that the person is 18 in the sense that a box has been ticked. If you asked a rational bartender whether they ever know anyone is 18 they would say 'no'.

If it turns out that we never have justification to believe anything, then we never have knowledge, but just belief. The definition of knowledge as JTB remains untouched in any case.

Why is this so hard for some of you to grasp? Did I miss something? — I like sushi

The idea of JTB really is not concerned with whether we know anything or don't know anything; it's just a definition of knowledge. We may have true beliefs, but they don't count as knowledge unless we have good reason to hold those beliefs.

Can't think of any offhand: I've never been that interested in Gettier problems.

:up: Taking life seriously...good ideas!

Sure, but the idea is to free oneself from forms of attachment which enslave, not from those which liberate. Can't you tell the difference?

If the cowishly shaped cloth is a cow then there is a cow in my field, therefore if I can infer that the cowishly shaped cloth is a cow given the evidence then I can infer that there is a cow in my field given the evidence. — Michael

I'm with TMF; in this example there is no problem for JTB. The belief that there is a cow on his field is not specific enough. It's a fudge; what the farmer actually believes is that there is a cow in his field at the location of the cow-shaped cloth, so his belief, adequately specified, is false.

:up: That is a better translation. I have the Penguin Classics edition on my shelves translated by Hollingsdale (I think), but I kind of remembered the passage and searched and posted the first one I found.

and stoicism taught me to hang on, — praxis

You know they were talking about patience, not attachment, right?

:up: The thing you are asking about: not being notified of responses happens to me sometimes too.

I suspect this is part of the reason why psychology as a science, has not made as much progress as other fields, the phenomena get too complex eventually. — Manuel

I agree, and the further problem is that people do things for reasons, which is a whole different ball game than what is involved in studying events, processes and the behavior of things in terms of causes.

So take a scientists who believes in only what the evidence shows. The world is made of quantum fields. That's what the evidence says exists at bottom. It's a fluctuating space that vibrates. It's a physical thing that we'll never see, can only get at thorough (physical) mathematical equations and offers no hints that a rock, much less an organism would ever arise. — Manuel

But quantum theory and particle physics is consistent with chemical theory, and chemical theory is consistent with geology, cosmology and biology. I see them as just being different domains or levels of description and explanation.

Yes, but Popper's point was that no matter what came up, you could accomodate it or explain it, so Freudian psychoanalysis wasn't a predictive theory at all. — Wayfarer

But it is a predictive theory, The theory is that is you remember and confront past emotional traumas that have been repressed because they were too difficult to cope with, then you will overcome the psychological blocks and complexes that those repressions are sustaining. As I said it is not definitely testable, but there is no other way to decide if that theory is on the mark or not. It cannot be decided by thinking about it.

No theory, not even relativity (which along with quantum theory is one of the most predictively successful theories ever) can be known to be true, in any case. All we can know is whether it works in the sense that what is predicted is observed.

The fact that metaphysical ideas are not testable does nothing to negate them, as ideas on that level can only be judged according to their philosophical merits. — Wayfarer

If even scientific theories cannot be known to be true, how much less can metaphysical speculations be known to be true? There is no agreement among philosophers, much less than there is among scientists, so how could a metaphysical idea be judged according to its "philosophical merits"? Who decides what constitutes philosophical merit, and by what criteria?

It can't be tested in the third person. — Wayfarer

It can't be tested at all. If you believed you knew an ultimate truth how could you know it is true, and how could you know it is ultimate?

As if the scientific criteria are the only criteria by which anything can be judged to be real. Which is as I've often said, pretty well an exact definition of positivism: — Wayfarer

Where have I said anything about anything being real? We are discussing truth and its relation to testability.

I think it's actually a very ordinary problem with a very ordinary solution; but there are so many distractions. The trick is that you have to want a solution; if you don't then you won't. That's not a problem either; unless it is.

But Popper's point was that all kinds of results could be accomodated by both theories, which is why he used them as examples of the kinds of theories that purport to be scientific or empirical, but actually are not, because they can't be falsified by observation. — Wayfarer

I was thinking along the lines that psychoanalysis is believed to help people work through their mental problems. So you could do case studies to see if that is the case. I believe such studies have been carried out on the various psychotherapies, and I recall reading that CBT has generally appeared to be the most effective kind of therapy.

To test whether communism would work to make for more harmonious communities and general improvement of happiness you would first need to establish a community that works according to communistic principles freely chosen by the people, not imposed by force.

As I said before, I think there is a continuum of definiteness of testability across the various domains of inquiry. Take the idea of enlightenment as knowing-the-ultimate-truth; that cannot be tested at all; how could you ever know by observation whether someone knows the ultimate truth (whatever that might even be thought to mean). But enlightenment as non-attachment and non-reactivity can be tested by observing the purportedly enlightened one's behavior.

There is a "demarcation problem" that philosophers of science are still grappling with. The boundary between science and pseudoscience or non-science cannot definitively be established, so I think it is best thought of as a continuum. Any speculation which in principle cannot be even with minimal definiteness tested by observation would count as non-science. Where something would seem to be able to be tested, for example astrology, but the testing cannot coherently, consistently, plausibly and unequivocally link the predicted results with the purported causes would count as pseudoscience.

Persistence is a valuable trait.

I can't make much sense of the idea that information is ontologcally basic. at least not exclusively. Information informs; what is it informing and what is it informing about?

All true, but the point about falsifiability is to be able to differentiate scientific or empirical hypotheses from those that are not. Examples that he gave were psychoanalysis and communism which can't be falsified as they're so loosely defined they can accomodate all kinds of counter-factuals (ergo not really 'scientific' although that is hardly news by now.) But the fact that an idea is not 'falsifiable' doesn't mean it's automatically invalid, that anything that can't be empirically falsified is empty. That's very close to positivism or verificationism. — Wayfarer

I think the examples you give: psychoanalysis and communism are tested by observing their results. Such testing is empirical but it cannot be as definitive as testing in physics or chemistry. Testing of theories in geology and biology are somewhere in between; not as definitively testable as physical and chemical theories, but more definitively testable than psychoanalytic theories or the predictions of communism.

I wouldn't say that untestable ideas are invalid. Logical validity is to do with form, not content, so even nonsense syllogisms can be valid. In any case, considerations of validity aside, untestable ideas may be highly creative, and poetic and inspiring, so they are not necessarily without value.

Premises need not be descriptions of physical things, whose truth and falsity is judged according to empirical evidence. We can make premises which are descriptions of how logic works, and also premises concerning moral issues. The judgement of truth or falsity of these premises is not based in empirical evidence, so it isn't really correct to say that the truth of a premise can only be tested by empirical evidence. That itself would be a premise which cannot be tested, so the truth or falsity of it could not be judged. — Metaphysician Undercover

Only premises that are descriptions of physical things or the behavior of observable things can be tested, though. Descriptions of how logic works are observations of how we think and are tested for veracity against observations of how we think. Moral premises are judged against standards of compassion, social harmony and against how we feel about things. All of this requires observation. The premise that the truth of premises can be tested only by observation is itself based on observation of how we test premises. It is supported by the fact that we cannot come up with any other way to test premises.

Oh god. Showing your true colors. — baker

Oh god, yes, may they shine a light like the darkest night!

Non-physical explanations are tested logically. That's what logic gives us, non-physical explanations — Metaphysician Undercover

Logic, though, doesn't tell us anything about an inference other than whether it is consistent with its premises (validity); it cannot tell us whether the premises are true.

The only way to test the truth of any premise is by empirical evidence.

you do know why Karl Popper introduced the criterion of testability? And that he himself was not a materialist? — Wayfarer

Yes, I've read a fair bit of Popper's work many years ago. He introduced the criterion of falsifiability, as a corrective to the Logical Positivists idea of verifiability. He clearly identified metaphysical ideas, in distinction from scientific ideas, as being untestable. He rejected Kant's noumena. It's true he wasn't a strict materialsit, as he posited "three worlds" if I remember right. Since my memory of this is a bit vague I just searched that and found this on Wikipedia. Note that Popper thinks world 2 and 3 are emergent, not primordial; they are exclusively human phenomena for Popper.

This issue has been substantially dealt with in Eastern (and some Western) spiritual practices. The "effort of non-effort" and all that. It only seems to be a problem to the dualistic Western mind set.

This is not to suggest it is easy, far from it. I don't know for sure that it is possible to completely eliminate attachment and become permanently non-attached (enlightened). But I am humble enough to realize that I don't know that it is not possible either.

I think the idea that it is about making an effort to "harness" anything is a common mistake. It is more about an effort to keep "coming back" to and allow something more primordial.

So, I shouldn't have spoken about harnessing the ego; I think it's more about moving away from it.

I agree that some metaphysical ideas certainly seem more plausible than others; but then what one finds plausible will depend on one's culturally inculcated presuppositions. We may be able to alter those, to an extent, but I think scientifically educated people will find it very difficult to honestly believe in things for which there can be no definitive evidence.

So, it is more a matter of being true to your intellect, and trying to avoid being swayed by wishful thinking (which would be a form of intellectual dishonesty for us educated moderns). This allows that those who have been inculcated with more traditional beliefs can be true to their intellects without demanding empirical evidence for their beliefs..

Maybe the eastern effort to harness it, through some kind of practice, is the equivalent of domesticating something wild: the result becomes us and we like it, but it's a watered-down version what we wanted when we saw it. It is not enough. — James Riley

I think this is a mistake. The idea is not to harness "It", but to harness the ego that occludes "it".

"Enlightenment means a conscious annihilation of yourself. For most people, it will take a certain amount of time and maturing to understand that whatever you make yourself to be, in the end, it is frustrating and not enough. However wonderful you make yourself, still it is not enough. Only when you disappear, everything becomes wonderful."

Awkward language notwithstanding - Sadhuru is getting at something people haven't raised so far on this thread. The merits of enlightenment and the concomitant experience of everything becoming 'wonderful'. I wonder (sorry) what this means. It seems antithetical to self-annihilation however. Who exactly is the self experiencing the extinguished wonderfulness? Or is this what happens when mere words are used to describe the numinous? — Tom Storm

I see that as entirely consistent with the idea of non-attachment. Attachment to things is slavery; non-attachment is freedom. Is freedom not more wonderful than slavery?

Obviously Sadhguru would not be claiming that we literally disappear, but the idea of ourselves as separate self-contained egos who consequently suffer a terrible anxiety and loneliness which can only be compensated for by "grasping" for objects of desire and distraction, might "disappear" when we become non-attached, because that is just what non-attachment means.

Why should enlightenment be the same for each of us? — Banno

It wouldn't be. It wasn't even for the Zen masters according to the canonical texts.