I have been arguing that we have direct perception of the mind-independent world, of which apples and light are constituents. — NOS4A2

Your argument rested on the premise that we have direct perception of X if and only if our sense organs are in direct physical contact with X, but if this is true then we only have direct visual perception of light, and so either a) we do not have visual perception of apples or b) we only have indirect visual perception of apples.

You're contradicting yourself in denying the consequences of your premise, and so your argument fails.

The indirect realist makes the ridiculous claim that even when you are at the Rod Laver Arena, you do not see the tennis, but an image of the tennis. — Banno

No, the claim is that we do not directly see the tennis. We still indirectly see the tennis, much like when watching it on TV.

And it's not ridiculous.

We have direct visual perception of much of our periphery, which sometimes includes apples. — NOS4A2

Except you have been arguing that the following proposition is true:

1. I have direct perception of X if and only if my sense organs are in direct physical contact with X

Given that my visual sense organs (i.e. my eyes) are not in direct physical contact with apples it therefore follows that I do not have direct visual perception of apples.

So now you're contradicting yourself. If we have direct visual perception of apples then (1) is false and you need to provide a better explanation of what it means to have direct visual perception of apples.

1. You seem to leave open the question whether the experience during the first ten seonds is an indirect perception of an apple. — Ludwig V

I don't leave it open? C3 literally says "I do not have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds".

2. If P4 is false, and the apple continues to exist for the entire 30 seconds of the experiment, does the experiment not become a case of direct perception? — Ludwig V

No, because as per C3 I do not have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds, even though the apple exists during the first 10 seconds.

Don't you need to say that we have direct visual perception of one's own mental phenomena? — Ludwig V

For the purpose of this argument I'm only interested in proving that (1) is true. It's entirely possible that (2) is false, e.g. if we only have direct visual perception of light.

Sure, but it isn’t indirect perception of the mind-independent world. — NOS4A2

It's indirect visual perception of apples and trees and everything other than light, which is a very significant asterisk to your "direct visual perception of a mind-independent world".

But I haven’t used the concept of sense-datum at all, so nothing is straddled. — NOS4A2

It straddles the line because traditional direct realism rejects (1) and (2), you accept (1) and reject (2), and the sense datum theory accepts (1) and (2). I would even say that if you accept (1) then you are an indirect realist with respect to seeing apples even if you're not a sense datum theorist with respect to seeing apples.

1. We do not have direct visual perception of apples, only indirect visual perception of apples
2. We have direct visual perception of mental phenomena

So you agree with direct perception of the mind-independent world, which is contrary to indirect realism. — NOS4A2

I didn't say I agree with you.

So the experience of an apple in the first ten seconds was not an experience of an apple. H'm. — Ludwig V

That's not what I said. I'll start again from the top.

On [the naive realist] conception of experience, when one is veridically perceiving the objects of perception are constituents of the experiential episode. The given event could not have occurred without these entities existing and being constituents of it in turn, one could not have had such a kind of event without there being relevant candidate objects of perception to be apprehended. So, even if those objects are implicated in the causes of the experience, they also figure non-causally as essential constituents of it... Mere presence of a candidate object will not be sufficient for the perceiving of it, that is true, but its absence is sufficient for the non-occurrence of such an event. The connection here is [one] of a constitutive or essential condition of a kind of event. — Martin 2004

The important points to take from this are:

P1. If I have direct perception of an object then that object is a constituent of the experience
P2. If an object is a constituent of the experience then that object exists

I then continue this with the following:

Let's assume that I live in a world in which the air is thick and light has mass and travels at a slow 1m/s. An apple is placed 10m in front of me at 10:00:00. It is disintegrated at 10:00:20. Given the speed of the light and the distance of the apple I see an apple for 20 seconds between 10:00:10 and 10:00:30.

P3. If the apple is a constituent of the experience during the first 10 seconds then it is a constituent of the experience during the second 10 seconds
P4. The apple does not exist during the second 10 seconds
C1. Therefore, the apple is not a constituent of the experience during the second 10 seconds
C2. Therefore, the apple is not a constituent of the experience during the first 10 seconds
C3. Therefore, I do not have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds
P5. If I do not have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds when the light travels at 1m/s then I do not have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds when the light travels at 299,792,458m/s
C4. Therefore, I do not have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds when the light travels at 299,792,458m/s

The experience during the first 10 seconds (and the second 10 seconds) is still the experience of an apple; it just isn't the direct perception of an apple.

You're just telling me how scientists say we see things. That's not in dispute. — Hanover

And the way scientists say we see things is the way indirect realists say we see things, in contrast to naive realists who say that distal objects and their properties are literal constituents of first-person phenomenal experience.

The metaphysical question deals with the fundamental ontological composition of the entity. — Hanover

That metaphysical question is a question for materialists, idealists, and dualists — not for indirect realists. Indirect realism is concerned with the nature of perception, not with the nature of apples.

As I have explained previously, qualia do not meet the criteria required to play the role of the object of perception. This doesn’t mean they don’t exist; it means they are features of perceptual acts rather than entities that can ground correctness, error, or public objecthood. Treating them as objects simply relocates the problem rather than solving it. — Esse Quam Videri

I'll rephrase the two claims:

1. The constituents of first-person phenomenal experience are distal objects and their properties
2. The constituents of first-person phenomenal experience are qualia/sense data

Naive realism claims that (1) is true, minimal indirect realism claims that (1) is false, and the sense datum theory claims that (2) is true.

My concern is not to deny that there are multiple senses in play, but to argue that any adequate theory of perception ought to explain normativity, error, and objecthood, and that refusal to address those issues looks less like a theory of perception and more like quietism or eliminativism. — Esse Quam Videri

I don't think it's necessarily quietism or eliminativism; rather it's only trying to answer a simpler question, and that is: what are the constituents of first-person phenomenal experience?

It is through the direct connection of the light reflecting off other objects that we can see the object. — NOS4A2

Yes, and this is indirect perception of the object reflecting the light even according to your account of direct perception.

None of this implies sense-data or other mental objects either. — NOS4A2

I'm not saying it does. Again, these are two distinct claims:

1. We do not have direct visual perception of apples, only indirect visual perception of apples
2. We have direct visual perception of mental phenomena

Your brand of "direct" realism agrees with (1) even if it doesn't agree with (2). I am simply pointing out that direct realism as almost everyone else understands it doesn't agree with (1).

I must have drafted something very badly. My position is that I only see objects that reflect or emit light. I don't know what it would be to see light as such - in transit, so to speak. — Ludwig V

That comment of mine was directed at NOS4A2, not you. He does say that we only have direct visual perception of light.

If that's a good argument, then what's wrong with this?

P1a. If the apple is a constituent of the experience during the first ten seconds, then it is a constituent of the experience during the second ten seconds.
P2a. The apple is a constituent of the experience during the first ten seconds.
C1a. Therefore, the apple is a constituent of the experience during the second ten seconds. — Ludwig V

The apple doesn't exist during the second ten seconds and so cannot be a constituent of the experience, and so the conclusion is false. Therefore, one of the premises is false. Given that I agree with P1a, my conclusion is that P2a is false.

The indirect realist is the one insisting that you never saw the tennis, only every pixels on a screen. — Banno

No, indirect realism says that we do not have direct perception of the tennis when watching it on the screen; that we only have indirect perception of it. Most direct realists accept this too, claiming that in this scenario we only have direct perception of the screen.

You need to stop pretending that the words "direct" and "indirect" don't play an essential role in this discussion. This argument that "we see tennis, even if on TV; therefore direct realism is true" is ridiculous.

This and your quote appear to be a constipated way of saying that one only sees the apple if there is an apple. Sure. At issue is whether one sees the apple or a "representation" of the apple. In your now well-beaten dead horse, one sees the apple as it was ten seconds ago. But somehow you conclude that one is therefore not seeing the apple. How that works escapes me. — Banno

This is getting quite tiresome. I have said so many times that I am seeing an apple, even after it has been disintegrated. The relevant philosophical issue is that this does not quality as direct perception of an apple because no apple is a constituent of the experience, given that it has been disintegrated.

Can you please just take your time to read the actual words I'm writing.

Very well, then how do we falsify indirect realism as you've defined it? — Hanover

I don't know, and it's not how I've defined it.

This is the scientific account of perception:

The process of perception begins with an object in the real world, known as the distal stimulus or distal object. By means of light, sound, or another physical process, the object stimulates the body's sensory organs. These sensory organs transform the input energy into neural activity—a process called transduction. This raw pattern of neural activity is called the proximal stimulus. These neural signals are then transmitted to the brain and processed. The resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus is the percept.

To explain the process of perception, an example could be an ordinary shoe. The shoe itself is the distal stimulus. When light from the shoe enters a person's eye and stimulates the retina, that stimulation is the proximal stimulus. The image of the shoe reconstructed by the brain of the person is the percept. Another example could be a ringing telephone. The ringing of the phone is the distal stimulus. The sound stimulating a person's auditory receptors is the proximal stimulus. The brain's interpretation of this as the "ringing of a telephone" is the percept.

This is clearly what indirect realism argues, as contrasted with their naive realist opponents, hence why it says here that "indirect perceptual realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception".

Moreover, this move overlooks the fact that there are other ways of cashing out what “direct” means that are neither dependent on the reification of consciousness nor reducible to deflationary semantics. — Esse Quam Videri

Yes, as I have tried to explain several times, e.g. with the distinction between phenomenological direct realism and semantic direct realism. It is possible that perception is direct₁ but not direct₂, where "direct₁" and "direct₂" mean different things.

You are free to stipulate indirect realism in this purely negative way if you wish, but it’s unreasonable to expect others to adopt this stipulation given that indirect realism was traditionally a substantive, positive thesis about perception, rather than merely the rejection of one particular type of direct realism. — Esse Quam Videri

Then forget the terms "direct realism" and "indirect realism". We have two theses, one negative and one positive:

1. We do not have direct perception of distal objects
2. We have direct perception of mental phenomena

I am primarily interesting in arguing that (1) is true, where "direct perception of distal objects" is to be understood in the traditional way, i.e. mind-independent objects and their mind-independent properties are "constituents" of first-person phenomenal experience, such that things "really are" as they appear to us (e.g. coloured in the sui generis sense) even when not being perceived.

As for (2), I'd like to refer back to something you said here:

Strictly speaking, insofar as the apple has disintegrated, there is no direct object of perception during the second interval. — Esse Quam Videri

Clearly something is happening during the second interval; I am having a visual experience with phenomenal character, described as "seeing a red apple 10m in front of me". If you don't want to say that qualia or sense data or mental phenomena are the "constituents" of this visual experience then I don't really understand what you think this visual experience is (are you an eliminative materialist?). It's clearly not nothing, else I'd be saying "I don't see anything". I suspect that, once again, you just mean something else by "direct object of perception", and so are misinterpreting what is meant by (2).

Are you saying that the apple is a constituent of the episode during the first 10 seconds? — Ludwig V

No, I'm saying that:

P1. If the apple is not a constituent of the experience during the second 10 seconds then it is not a constituent of the experience during the first 10 seconds
P2. The apple is not a constituent of the experience during the second 10 seconds
C1. Therefore, the apple is not a constituent of the experience during the first 10 seconds

What we should not say is that we never saw Alcaraz defeat Djokovic, only ever images of Alcaraz defeating Djokovic. — Banno

The relevant issue is that when I see the tennis match on television I do not have direct perception of the tennis match. In the context of the dispute between direct and indirect realism, "direct perception" means something substantive, and the dispute cannot be "deflated" simply by saying "I saw the tennis match" or "I see the apple".

In your example, the apple causes the pattern of light that is seen ten seconds later. Hence the apple is a constituent of the experience. — Banno

That the apple causes the experience isn't that it's a constituent of the experience. I'll repeat the quote from Martin, with emphasis:

So, even if those objects are implicated in the causes of the experience, they also figure non-causally as essential constituents of it... Mere presence of a candidate object will not be sufficient for the perceiving of it, that is true, but its absence is sufficient for the non-occurrence of such an event. — Martin 2004

Given that the apple does not exist at 10:00:25 it is not a constituent of the experience at 10:00:25.

I don't understand what you're trying to say.

Most direct realists say that we have direct visual perception of apples and trees and everything else that emits or reflects light into our eyes, whereas your account is that we only have direct visual perception of light. Yours is a strange kind of direct realism.

So "I see X" is true if we directly see X or if we indirectly see X and yet they do not collapse into one? Not following that at all. — Banno

Given that "I see X" is true if "I indirectly see X" is true, it is a non sequitur to argue that if "I see X" is true then "I directly see X" is true.

So you say "I see the apple" is true, and so is "I see the mental representation of the apple", and you want to claim these are the same? But it is clear that an apple is different to a mental representation of an apple. You can't make a pie with a mental representation. — Banno

I could say "I saw Alcaraz defeat Djokovic in tennis" or I could say "I saw images on my computer screen".

Going over the already dispelled though experiment doesn't help you here. — Banno

It's an example of seeing an apple without an apple being a constituent of the experience. You asked how it was possible, I provided. I don't understand who you're trying to gaslight here.

Good. then the two collapse into one. — Banno

No they don't.

And you have now agreed that "I see the apple" is true — Banno

I always did. Why is it so difficult for you to just read what I write?

So indirect realists say that apples are not "constituents" of our seeing apples? How's that? — Banno

As per the thought experiment, both of these are true:

1. At 10:00:25 I see an intact red apple 10m in front of me
2. At 10:00:25 there is not an intact red apple 10m in front of me because it was disintegrated at 10:00:20

So, given that no apple exists at 10:00:25 no apple is a "constituent" of my experience at 10:00:25.

You conflate "I see an apple" and "I indirectly see an apple". — Banno

No I don't. "I see X" is true if we directly see X or if we indirectly see X.

Again, that "naive realist" is no more than a foil against which to draw the supposed "indirect" account. — Banno

It's not a "foil". It's a very real philosophical position, and is the intended target of indirect realism. Naive realists say that apples are "constituents" of first-person phenomenal experience, and indirect realist say that they're not; that the "constituents" of first-person phenomenal experience are only sense-data/qualia/mental representations.

If direct realism (as it is absurdly defined here) requires a part of the apple perceived actually be in your head — Hanover

That's not how it's defined.

This is the naive realist view that indirect realism disputes:

On [the naive realist] conception of experience, when one is veridically perceiving the objects of perception are constituents of the experiential episode. The given event could not have occurred without these entities existing and being constituents of it in turn, one could not have had such a kind of event without there being relevant candidate objects of perception to be apprehended. So, even if those objects are implicated in the causes of the experience, they also figure non-causally as essential constituents of it... Mere presence of a candidate object will not be sufficient for the perceiving of it, that is true, but its absence is sufficient for the non-occurrence of such an event. The connection here is [one] of a constitutive or essential condition of a kind of event. — Martin 2004

Represented as a picture, it would be this:



Naive realists aren't saying that apples are "in the head"; they say that experience isn't "in the head" but an "openness to the world", i.e. there are no "mental representations" or anything of the sort; there's just the strawberry being presented to me.

Indirect realism says that what we see is not the apple. — Banno

No, it says that seeing an apple is not the "direct presentation" of an apple, where "direct presentation" is understood in the naive realist sense:

On [the naive realist] conception of experience, when one is veridically perceiving the objects of perception are constituents of the experiential episode. The given event could not have occurred without these entities existing and being constituents of it in turn, one could not have had such a kind of event without there being relevant candidate objects of perception to be apprehended. So, even if those objects are implicated in the causes of the experience, they also figure non-causally as essential constituents of it... Mere presence of a candidate object will not be sufficient for the perceiving of it, that is true, but its absence is sufficient for the non-occurrence of such an event. The connection here is [one] of a constitutive or essential condition of a kind of event. — Martin 2004

We do see apples; just not directly. You always conflate "I see an apple" and "I directly see an apple". The addition of the adjective "directly" involves additional conditions that the naive realist (wrongly) claims are satisfied and the indirect realist (rightly) claims aren't satisfied.

Seeing an apple is constructing a model of that apple. — Banno

That's indirect realism.

I'm not saying any of that. In fact I explicitly said several times that at 10:00:25 I see an intact red apple 10m in front of me.

The issue is that you seem to think that this suffices as direct realism and as a refutation of indirect realism. It is neither.

I think we agree that indirect realism means that (a) is false and that (b) and (c) are true. — Esse Quam Videri

Indirect realism means that (a) is false and (b) is true. The sense datum and representational theories say that (c) is true.

As before, there are two distinct claims:

1. We do not have direct perception of distal objects
2. We have direct perception of mental phenomena

It is entirely possible that (1) is true and (2) is false.

If (1) is true — i.e. (a) is false and (b) is true — then either our perception of distal objects is indirect or we do not have perception of distal objects.

Your argument is merely rhetorical, a play on the word "direct". What one sees is the apple with a ten-second delay. What one does not see is some mental representation of the apple as it was ten seconds ago. — Banno

Yours is the rhetorical argument. You are misrepresenting the grammar of "seeing a mental representation". Once again, the grammar is to be understood in the same way as "the schizophrenic hears voices" and "synesthetes see colours when listening to music".

At 10:00:25 there is no apple, only first-person phenomenal experience with subjective character — described as "seeing a red apple" — and this first-person phenomenal experience with subjective character is a mental representation of an apple that no longer exists.

We see the apple as it was — Banno

What does it mean to see the apple as it was?

Given the scenario as described, both of these are true:

1. At 10:00:25 I see an intact red apple 10m in front of me
2. At 10:00:25 there is not an intact red apple 10m in front of me

Given that (2) is true, an intact red apple is not the direct object of perception at 10:00:25. At 10:00:25 there is just first-person phenomenal experience, with "I see an intact red apple 10m in front of me" describing the subjective character of this first-person phenomenal experience. This is all there is to the positive thesis of indirect realism (e.g. the sense datum theory).

But you can’t know any of this because you can only directly perceive yourself. — NOS4A2

That doesn't follow. You claim that we only have direct visual perception of light, and yet presumably you think that this allows us to know about the distal object that reflected the light, even though it is not directly seen. So you accept that we can know about things even if we do not have direct perception of them. This doesn't change under indirect realism.

Objects don’t turn from one thing to another according to its proximity of the body. It’s a distinction without a difference. — NOS4A2

What are you talking about? I am simply using the proper terminology, e.g. from here:

The process of perception begins with an object in the real world, known as the distal stimulus or distal object. By means of light, sound, or another physical process, the object stimulates the body's sensory organs. These sensory organs transform the input energy into neural activity—a process called transduction. This raw pattern of neural activity is called the proximal stimulus. These neural signals are then transmitted to the brain and processed. The resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus is the percept.

To explain the process of perception, an example could be an ordinary shoe. The shoe itself is the distal stimulus. When light from the shoe enters a person's eye and stimulates the retina, that stimulation is the proximal stimulus. The image of the shoe reconstructed by the brain of the person is the percept. Another example could be a ringing telephone. The ringing of the phone is the distal stimulus. The sound stimulating a person's auditory receptors is the proximal stimulus. The brain's interpretation of this as the "ringing of a telephone" is the percept.

Obviously you disagree with all the talk about "mental re-creations" and "images" and "percepts", but there's nothing objectionable about the use of "distal object" to refer to the object that reflects the light and "proximal stimulus" to refer to the light absorbed by the photoreceptors in the eye.

But, once again, you are deflecting. You accept that we don't have direct visual perception of apples, and so you must accept either that a) we only have indirect visual perception of apples (mediated by light) or that b) we do not have visual perception of apples. Even if you disagree with the positive thesis of something like the sense datum theory you agree with the negative thesis of minimal indirect realism, and your so-called "direct realism" is nothing like what is ordinarily meant by the term.

Light is not a “distal object”. So beyond the “proximal stimulus” there is no light? — NOS4A2

Of course there's light beyond the proximal stimulus, but according to your theory it isn't directly perceived because it isn't in physical contact with our sense organs. According to your theory something is directly perceived only when it's in physical contact with our sense organs, in which case it is no longer a distal object but a proximal stimulus.

But you seem to be deflecting. According to your theory you do not have direct visual perception of apples or trees or people. Therefore, according your theory either a) you only have indirect visual perception of apples and trees and people or b) you do not have visual perception of apples or trees or people. It's a bizarre brand of direct realism, very different to what is ordinarily meant, with (a) being consistent with the negative thesis of indirect realism.

Is light not a “distal object”? — NOS4A2

No, it's a proximal stimulus. Distal objects are things like apples that reflect the light.

We directly perceive light. Light is a member/instance/object of the mind-independent world. Therefore, we directly perceive the mind-independent world. — NOS4A2

When the traditional direct realist says "we directly see the mind-independent world" they mean more than just "we directly see mind-independent light"; they also mean "we directly see mind-independent apples and trees and people, etc.".

If you accept that we don't directly see mind-independent apples and trees then you accept either that a) we only indirectly see mind-independent apples and trees or b) we do not see mind-independent apples and trees.

So I understand the problem similar to “most authors”, according to AD Smith. If I take a different approach to solving that problem that shouldn’t be an issue, at least for someone who doesn’t require other people’s arguments to pad their own. — NOS4A2

You don't solve the problem because "most authors" (who are direct realists) also say that we have direct visual perception of apples. You appear to accept that we don't have direct visual perception of apples, and so you must accept either that a) we only have indirect visual perception of apples (mediated by light) or that b) we do not have visual perception of apples.

So even if you disagree with the positive thesis that we have direct visual perception of mental phenomena (sense datum theory or representational theory) you appear to agree with the negative thesis that we do not have direct visual perception of distal objects (minimal indirect realism).

We can phrase the dispute without using the words "direct" or "indirect".

Group A believes that a) mind-independent objects and their properties are "phenomenally present" constituents of first-person experience.

Group B believes that b) mind-independent objects and their properties are not "phenomenally present" constituents of first-person experience and that c) the "phenomenally present" constituents of first-person experience that Group A believes to be mind-independent objects and their properties are in fact sense-data (sense datum theory) or mental representations (representational theory) or qualia or other mental phenomena.

Your position seems to be that "perception is direct" and "perception is indirect" mean something else, above-and-beyond (a), (b), and (c), such that perception can be direct even if (a) is false and (b) is true. This is where I disagree. I think that in the context of the dispute between traditional direct and indirect realism, "perception is direct" just means that (a) is true and that (b) and (c) are false, and that "perception is indirect" just means that (a) is false and that (b) is true, and that "we directly perceive sense-data/mental representations/qualia/other mental phenomena" just means that (c) is true.

What experiment would prove the validity of direct realism as you define direct realism? — Hanover

I have no idea. Science primarily relies on falsification, not verification. If direct realism claims that ordinary objects are "constituents" of experience (see here), and if science has falsified this claim — as I believe it has — then science has refuted direct realism.

I don't think there's any such thing as direct perception. The only perception there is is indirect. — frank

I'd say I directly perceive pain, colours, smells, tastes, etc.

Not with our eyes. — NOS4A2

Either way, what you mean by "direct perception" isn't what most other direct realists mean by it. They will say that we do have direct visual perception of apples even though our sense organs are not in direct physical contact with the apples.

So we have the following proposition:

1. "I directly perceive X" means "my sense organs are in direct physical contact with X"

You seem to be saying that (1) is true, whereas both traditional direct realists and indirect realists will say that (1) is false.

In other words, you are talking past everyone by meaning something very different by "direct perception" and so your arguments are red herrings and your interpretations of indirect realism are strawmen.

Given what both traditional direct realists and indirect realists mean by "direct perception", both of these are non sequiturs:

2. My sense organs are in direct physical contact with X, therefore I have direct perception of X
3. My sense organs are not in direct physical contact with X, therefore I do not have direct perception of X

Michael has used a bit of rhetoric to put those opposed to indirect perception on the back foot. They feel obliged to defend "direct" realism.

What one sees is the apple with a ten-second delay. What one does not see is some mental representation of the apple as it was ten seconds ago. — Banno

As I said to NOS4A2 there are (at least) three distinct claims:

1. We have direct visual perception of apples
2. We have direct visual perception of light
3. We have direct visual perception of mental phenomena/qualia/sense data

Even if (3) is false it does not follow that (1) is true.

The argument with the slow light is merely to show that (1) is false; not to show that (3) is true. It is true that the sense-datum theorist must also defend (3), but it's also true that the direct realist must still defend (1). The more minimal indirect realist (with respect to sight) need only defend the rejection of (1).

But the only reason to impose that requirement is if one already assumes that direct objects must be internal, continuously present, and phenomenally given—which is precisely the indirect realist conclusion the argument is meant to establish. — Esse Quam Videri

It's not the indirect realist conclusion. It's the meaning of the term "direct perception" as used by both indirect realists and their direct (naive) realist opponents. As I said before, when they say that "we (don't) have direct perception of ordinary objects" they are saying that "ordinary objects are (not) phenomenally present".

From Martin (2004):

On [the naive realist] conception of experience, when one is veridically perceiving the objects of perception are constituents of the experiential episode. The given event could not have occurred without these entities existing and being constituents of it in turn, one could not have had such a kind of event without there being relevant candidate objects of perception to be apprehended. So, even if those objects are implicated in the causes of the experience, they also figure non-causally as essential constituents of it... Mere presence of a candidate object will not be sufficient for the perceiving of it, that is true, but its absence is sufficient for the non-occurrence of such an event. The connection here is [one] of a constitutive or essential condition of a kind of event.

Using this account, the naive realist must accept that the apple is not a "constituent" of the experiential episode during the second 10 seconds — because no such apple exists — and so is not the direct object of perception. My claim is that if it's not a "constituent" of the experiential episode during the second 10 seconds then it's not a "constituent" of the experiential episode during the first 10 seconds. It existed and was causally responsible for the experiential episode, but even the naive realist acknowledges above that this alone is insufficient.

Again, you clearly just mean something else by "direct perception" and "direct object of perception", and other than the use of the label "direct" it's not clear how the substance of your position is incompatible with the substance of indirect realism.

H'm. Perhaps we agree, then. What is perceived is the same object in both time periods. I see the apple during the first time period, so I also see the apple in the second time period. — Ludwig V

Yes, but in the second time period the apple is not the direct object of perception because there is no apple.

OK. So you are really watching the TV, not the event shown on the TV? — Ludwig V

I don't know what you mean by "really watching".

I am saying that a) I am watching someone rob the store and b) the direct object of perception is not someone robbing the store.

Even the direct realist will likely admit that (b) is true; he will likely say that the images on the screen are the direct object of perception.

It's still the case that (a) is true, showing that "object of perception" and "direct object of perception" do not mean the same thing, and that something can be the former even if it's not the latter.

So would I, except that I would specify that you see the apple placed in front of you. The delay in transmission does not affect this. I don't see what all the fuss is about. — Ludwig V

The "fuss" is that between 10:00:20 and 10:00:30 I see an intact red apple 10m in front of me even though there isn't an intact red apple 10m in front of me — because it was disintegrated at 10:00:20.

So what is the direct object of perception between 10:00:20 and 10:00:30? I say that whatever is the direct object of perception between 10:00:20 and 10:00:30 is also the direct object of perception between 10:00:10 and 10:00:20, and that the direct object of perception between 10:00:20 and 10:00:30 isn't the apple because it no longer exists.

This begs the question. One can only distinguish two objects of perception of the same thing if one has already accepted indirect realism. — Ludwig V

It doesn't beg the question because it doesn't assume that the apple is not the direct object of perception; it only asserts that something can be the object of perception but not the direct object of perception, e.g. if I'm watching something on CCTV then the thing I'm watching is the object (or "event" if you prefer) of perception but not the direct object of perception. It's important that we don't conflate "object of perception" and "direct object of perception" so as not to equivocate.

That leaves you with the answer that we directly perceive the light that directly reflects off the apple. — NOS4A2

But do we directly perceive the apple? Is (1) true or false?

We’ve already gone through this weeks ago. — NOS4A2

And evidently you refuse to provide a consistent answer, and seemingly conflate (1) and (2). It's a simple question: is (1) true or false? I can't address your questions until I understand what you think "direct perception" means, and to do that I need an answer to this question.