Why can the lowest base-12 number (12) be split evenly into halves/thirds/quarters, while the lowest base-10 cannot be split into 1/2 and 1/4? — Mp202020

Because 3 and 4 are divisors of 12 but not divisors of 10.

Even in deciding not to run, Joe Biden did something Trump could never do - which was to put the interests of the Party and the nation above his own. — Wayfarer

I don't even see why being President would be in Biden's interests. It's a lot of work and responsibility. Retirement is the much better option.

At least in Trump's case it benefits him because he can then try to pardon himself of his crimes, or at least shut down all his prosecutions.

You have it backwards.

$1 - 0.999… = x$

With the standard reals this equation can only be:

$1 - 0.999… = 0.000… = 0$

There is no standard real number greater than 0 that can satisfy the equation.

But with the hyperreals this can be:

$1 - 0.\underbrace{999…}_H = {1\over{10^H}}$

Where H is an infinite hyperinteger.

What is worth discussing is why the layman’s mathematical intuitions favour nonstandard analysis, and why standard analysis is standard.

There are different kinds of idealisms. Subjective, objective, epistemological, and so on. You'll need to clarify exactly what kind of idealism you're talking about before you can argue its merits.

I am saying that something like "you ought brush your teeth" just means "brush your teeth" (or possibly "it is in your best interests to brush your teeth", but I don't think this meaning is relevant to this discussion).

I don't know what other thing it could mean. It is this other meaning that others claim is there that I want explained.

Can you give an account of "do this" which is much more coherent than obligation and its synonyms though? — Apustimelogist

It's a command; a phrase we use when we want or need someone to do something.

I've seen several comments that our members wish death on Trump and liken him to Hitler — AmadeusD

What's hilarious is that JD Vance, Trump's choice for Vice President, once likened Trump to Hitler.

... you intend to place yourself under an obligation to do that thing ... — Janus

Which means what?

We have all these different phrases:

1. You ought do this
2. You should do this
3. You must do this
4. You are obliged to do this
5. You have an obligation to do this
6. You have a duty to do this
etc.

They all seem to express the same concept, but nobody is giving a coherent account of what this concept is.

All I ever understand by these phrases is "do this". It's just been phrased as if it were a truth-apt proposition, leading to the misplaced belief that it means something more.

CFR means federal regulations. Regulations are not statutes. — NOS4A2

Thanks for the correction. Reading through the order it was actually 509, 510, 515, and 533 that were cited by Garland when appointing Smith. 510 and 515 are the basis for establishing 28 CFR 600.

Relevant to this is United States v. Short, 1956 by the 9th Circuit:

An administrative regulation promulgated within the authority granted by statute has the force of law and will be given full effect by the courts.

Since 1999 when the Independent Counsel Act expired, all of the above is likely what has been used to defend the constitutionality of special councils, e.g. here where the DC Circuit unanimously affirmed the constitutionality of Mueller's appointment.

So again, I expect the 11th Circuit to overturn Cannon's anomalous order.

Being obliged is different from being commanded, because a command is uttered by whim of the commanding entity while an obligation is incurred by following specific procedures, such as promising or contracting etc. — Tobias

And this is the fiction.

We take the command “do this”, we phrase it as the truth-apt proposition “you ought do this”, and then we believe in the existence of some abstract entity - the “obligation” - but when asked to make sense of it we can’t; we just insist that it’s more than a command.

Anscombe understood this.

What I do not understand is why you would hold on to a theory that does not explain a certain distinction we all feel that is relevant in favour of a theory that cannot make heads or tails of it. — Tobias

The distinction you feel is a delusion, perhaps a bewitchment by language.

If I tell you, you ought to pay the fine it means you are obliged to pay the fine. — Tobias

It’s this “obliged” meaning that I’m asking about.

What you want is an explanation why we ought to do things. — Tobias

No, it's not. I want to know what "you ought do this" means. I don't know why I need to keep repeating this?

You just respond with "you ought do what a legitimate authority tells you to do" or "you are bound by what a legitimate authority tells you to do" without ever explaining what the "you ought" or "you are bound" parts of these sentences mean.

All I understand by these phrases is "do what a legitimate authority tells you to do".

And that's fine by me, but you and others seem to want it to mean something more, but seem incapable of making sense of what that something more is.

You need to read more than just the opening sentence.

It points out that by the very wording of the Appointments Clause, "Congress may by law invest the appointment of 'inferior' officers to the President alone, or to courts of law or heads of departments."

It then explains that a special counsel is an "inferior" officer.

So it finds that the Appointments Clause allows for Congress to "invest the appointment of [a special counsel] to the President alone, or to courts of law or heads of departments".

[removed mistaken reference to CFR 600]

I suspect Cannon’s decision will be overturned in the court of appeals, but instead of the Mueller case, will reach the Supremes where the final decision will come through. No more unlawful appointments. — NOS4A2

The Supreme Court already ruled on this in Morrison v. Olson.

Held:

It does not violate the Appointments Clause for Congress to vest the appointment of independent counsel in the Special Division.

Although admittedly the current court doesn't seem to give a damn about precedent. But as no justices concurred with Thomas's opinion on the matter in the recent immunity case, I doubt enough of them would even agree to hear it.

Special prosecutors were appointed under Trump as well, by both Rosenstein (Mueller) and Barr (Durham). One has even been appointed by Garland (Weiss) to investigate and prosecute Hunter Biden.

They've been used for a long time, with their constitutionality confirmed in Morrison v. Olson.

Here's a list.

Cannon is just an idiot. Or corrupt. Or a corrupt idiot.

But it's a useful decision. Now it can be appealed, overturned, and the case assigned to a competent judge who doesn't act as Trump's lawyer.

How is entering directly into full-scale war preferable over striking a deal with the Russians which they have been signaling is their intention since the March/April 2022? — Tzeentch

Good question, Chamberlain.

Duties are indeed something like the "imperative demands" of society as a whole, or of institutions, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And I'm fine with that. We understand that a phrase such as "you ought do this" just means "do this", with the additional understanding that it is the will of society as a whole (or some other authority) and not just the individual speaker.

And also the phrase "you ought do what society tells you to do" just means "do what society tells you to do", with the additional understanding that it is the will of society as a whole and not just the individual speaker.

It's not divine command theory, but it is a command theory. Ought-claims are commands phrased as if they were truth-apt propositions.

They are not just like imperative demands though because they define normative goods like "being a good citizen" or "being a good basketball player." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't quite understand what is being said here. To be a good basketball player is just to be a successful/talented basketball player, i.e. being able to dribble, pass, block, and shoot, scoring points, helping teammates score points, preventing opponents from scoring points, and so on.

Being a "good" citizen is a little more vague. Does this just mean that the citizen obeys society's commands?

Anyhow, you didn't answer the questions above. If duties are just imperative statements, who is making these statements? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I answered it before. Parents, teachers, government, society, FIFA, FIDE, etc.

I didn't say that. Consequences and obligations are related. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, I understand that. But I don't care about consequences. I only care about obligations. Please just tell me what "you ought" means. Everything else is a red herring.

So who can go up to a lifeguard and say, "see that drowning kid? You don't have to save them," such that no one will hold them responsible for not saving the child? — Count Timothy von Icarus

You're bringing up consequences again. Why do you keep doing this when you say that consequences have nothing to do with the meaning of "you ought"?

But to make it simple, are you actually claiming that "Orestes had an obligation to avenge his father's death because that was a norm in ancient Greek culture," is a false statement? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I am saying that I don't know what "Orestes had an obligation" means. I am asking you what it means and you appear to be doing everything in your power to avoid answering.

I could perhaps interpret it as "the Greeks demand that people avenge their father's murder, and Orestes' father was murdered", which is true. Beyond that I don't know what else it is saying.

You are bound means that there is an outside authority to which you have submitted by following its procedures — Tobias

Which just means that I agree to do what some outside authority says.

that exert some sort of legitimate power over you that compels you to do x — Tobias

I don't understand what this means. Is this a physical compulsion? A psychological compulsion?

I keep telling you and you keep running around in circles. — Tobias

Because you engage in the circular claim "you ought do what this authority tells you to do". I want to know what the "you ought" part of this sentence means. A reference back to this authority is no explanation at all.

All I understand by the phrase "you ought do what this authority tells you to do" is "do what this authority tells you to do".

You will be imprisoned because you violating a certain obligation (not all) which is laid down in law, under which you are bound by participating in society and in a democratic society at least, is legitimized by democratic procedures, hence is not arbitrary. — Tobias

I addressed this here. All this talk of "violating obligations" and "being bound" is vacuous and superfluous. It is just the case that the law says "anyone who is found guilty of murder is to be imprisoned". We then choose to murder or not with this knowledge in mind, and will inevitably face whatever consequences follow if we choose to murder. There's nothing more to it.

No. Are people widely accepted to have a duty to give a mugger their money when they demand it? Nope. Might they face harm if they refuse to do what the mugger demands? Yes.

If obligations and duties are the same thing as "someone saying do this or else," who exactly is doing the saying? Who tells Orestes "avenge your father's murder or else?" What explicit threat does he face?

The fact that Orestes had this duty, that it was socially recognized in his culture, is a historical fact. His obligation emerges from his culture and his social role, not from any particular person saying "do this or else." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Then why did you bring up undesirable consequences when I asked you to make sense of obligations?

I just want to know what "you ought" means. You keep asserting "you ought do this" and "you ought do that", and now you're asserting that "you ought" doesn't just mean "do this or else".

I need an actual explanation.

If obligations and duties are the same thing as "someone saying do this or else," who exactly is doing the saying? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Your parents, your teachers, your employer, your government, FIFA, FIDE, etc.

I've never suggested that there won't be undesirable consequences to not doing what one promised to do. In fact I've explicitly accepted such things.

Are you now saying that "you ought do this" just means "do this or you will face undesirable consequences"? Because I have no problem with this latter claim.

... you ought to do what you are told ...

... I am bound by the terms of it ... — Tobias

What does "you ought" mean? What does "I am bound" mean?

Whenever someone uses such phrases, all I understand is "do this" (or at best "so-and-so says to do this"). I might even understand it with an additional "or else".

If they mean more than this then I need it explained. I keep asking for someone to make sense of these phrases and nobody ever does. They just reassert the claims "you ought do this" and "you are bound by this". You might as well just replace the terms "ought" and "bound" with "floogle".

If it was pragmatism, 'efficient breach of contract', would be a legal thing to do. It is not.

...

The "I do" actually has large scale legal consequences. — Tobias

What does the law have to do with obligation? Does "you ought do this" just mean "do this or you will be fined/imprisoned"? I have no problem with this latter claim.

That this authority is recognized as legitimate. That you yourself has submitted to this procedure, or in any case, that by participating in the social fabric of society you accept the rules of the game. — Tobias

So I agree to do what I'm told. That's fine. But what does it mean to say that I ought do what I'm told?

We all tacitly assume and subscribe to the principle that promises need to be kept and that therefore a: "but you promised!" is a reasonable reproach. — Tobias

Do you just mean that it is pragmatic for us to do what we promise to do? That's fine. But what does it mean to say that we ought do what we promise to do?

And what special relevance is the verb "promise"? If instead of saying "I promise to do this" and "but you promised", what if we said "I will do this" and "but you said you would"? This certainly seems like the ordinary thing we do. Does this then entail that we enter into an obligation every time we assert our intention to do something, irrespective of whether or not it's a promise?

An obligation is simply something you ought to do. — Banno

The "something you ought to do" is what needs to be explained. I understand what I've been told to do and what I've been advised to do, but beyond that nothing.

Your inability to make sense of obligation is not our problem. — Banno

But your inability to explain or justify obligations is – especially when you don't even try. It's telling. It suggests that Anscombe was right.

Again, if you think a young man saying "I don't intend to get married," and a monk vowing to never marry are functionally equivalent I don't know what to tell you. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You could tell me what the difference is.

But I should point out that you are misrepresenting my position. Here are two propositions:

1. I intend to find your cat
2. I will find your cat

There is something of a difference between these two. The first just expresses my intentions whereas the second (also) predicts the future. But in both cases the propositions are sincere if I intend to find your cat. No further conditions are involved. And then the same principle with these two propositions:

2. I will find your cat
3. I promise to find your cat

Such statements are sincere if I intend to find your cat. No further conditions are involved. The second no more requires or entails an obligation (whatever such a thing is) than the first. Especially as, as previously mentioned, whether or not I will find your cat is beyond my control alone. I may in fact be incapable of finding your cat because it has already been killed and incinerated.

If you think the obligation is bullshit then how can you tell me that it was rational to pay him $975? — Leontiskos

Because he told me to, and it's rational to pay less if the person asking you for money asks for less.

These questions are getting tiresome. If this is your desperate last attempt then it's an utter failure.

That's right, and so I ask again: would it be rational for you to invoke his promise when he tells you that you underpaid? — Leontiskos

If there's reason to believe that it will work then yes. Much like it would be rational for me to appeal to the Bible if he were a Christian. But the Bible is still bullshit.

Right, but how would it be rational to depend on his promise if obligations don't exist? — Leontiskos

He told me to only pay him $975. So I believed that he is only expecting me to pay him $975. So I only pay him $975.

This isn't rocket science.

Aka: everybody is a realist when they walk out of the door. — Lionino

Relevant:

Here is a kind of puzzle or paradox that several philosophers have stressed. On the one hand, existence questions seem hard. The philosophical question of whether there are abstract entities does not seem to admit of an easy or trivial answer. At the same time, there seem to be trivial arguments settling questions like this in the affirmative. Consider for instance the arguments, “2+2=4. So there is a number which, when added to 2, yields 4. This something is a number. So there are numbers”, and “Fido is a dog. So Fido has the property of being a dog. So there are properties.” How should one resolve this paradox? One response is: adopt fictionalism. The idea would be that in the philosophy room we do not speak fictionally, but ordinarily we do. So in the philosophy room, the question of the existence of abstract entities is hard; outside it, the question is easy. When, ordinarily, a speaker utters a sentence that semantically expresses a proposition that entails that there are numbers, what she says is accurate so long as according to the relevant fiction, there are numbers. But when she utters the same sentence in the philosophy room, she speaks literally and then what she asserts is something highly non-trivial

So was it irrational to write the check for $975 rather than for $1000? — Leontiskos

No. I was told to only pay $975 by my landlord, so that's what I did.

And why is it plausible that it might work? Why would this move plausibly convince him to do as you wish? — Leontiskos

Because, like you, he might believe in obligations.

I don't know why you are appealing to human psychology and the pragmatics of interpersonal relations. None of this proves your assertion that there is more to a promise than just the use of the phrase "I promise to do so-and-so" with the honest intention to do so-and-so. And none of this is you making sense of obligations.

It's all just red herrings.

You conclude that there are no such thing as obligations. — Banno

No, I conclude that obligations are commands fictitiously treated as if they were truth-apt propositions.

You and others are claiming that obligations are more than this, but are refusing to make sense of them or justify their inclusion despite repeated requests.

Compare:
1. You were asked to give an answer to what we get when we add six and five.
2. What is six and five?

...

Or this:
1. She greeted you
2. "Hello" — Banno

So the proper comparison would be:

1. You were given an order
2. Do this

I have no problem with (1). Is this all "you ought do this" means?

So you would invoke his promise in order to convince him that he should not require an additional $25? — Leontiskos

Yes, if I thought it would work. And if he's religious I might appeal to Christian charity, even though I'm an atheist.

I am wondering if I have recourse. What would you do in that situation? — Leontiskos

I just told you; I'd speak to a lawyer.

Would you invoke the promise he made? Why? — Leontiskos

Perhaps, and to convince him not to ask me for more money? I don't know why you think asking for the pragmatic course of action has any relevance to the philosophical dispute regarding the existence of abstract entities like obligations.

Whenever your position falls apart you bury your head in the sand. — Leontiskos

My position hasn't fallen apart and I'm not burying my head in the sand.

I don't understand what kind of answer you want to a question like that.

Do I have recourse? — Leontiskos

Speak to a lawyer.

Honest intentions to do what!? — Leontiskos

To do what was promised. In using the phrase "I promise to find your cat" with the honest intention to find your cat I have promised to find your cat. That's all there is to the matter. All this further talk of "obligation" and "being bound" is vacuous.

You seem to be clueless as to what a promise is. — Leontiskos

People use the phrase "I promise to do so-and-so". That's all a promise is; the use of those words with honest intentions.

I am not sure what the relevance of the question is. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, Kant said "ought implies can". If this is correct then one cannot be obligated to do what one cannot do. But one can promise to do what one believes one can do, even if in fact one cannot do it. Therefore, one can promise to do what one cannot do. Therefore, promises do not entail obligations.

Can I be obligated to do something that I am incapable of doing?