So was it irrational to write the check for $975 rather than for $1000? — Leontiskos
And though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind... — David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, § xii, 128
No. I was told to only pay $975 by my landlord, so that's what I did. — Michael
Aka: everybody is a realist when they walk out of the door. — Lionino
Here is a kind of puzzle or paradox that several philosophers have stressed. On the one hand, existence questions seem hard. The philosophical question of whether there are abstract entities does not seem to admit of an easy or trivial answer. At the same time, there seem to be trivial arguments settling questions like this in the affirmative. Consider for instance the arguments, “2+2=4. So there is a number which, when added to 2, yields 4. This something is a number. So there are numbers”, and “Fido is a dog. So Fido has the property of being a dog. So there are properties.” How should one resolve this paradox? One response is: adopt fictionalism. The idea would be that in the philosophy room we do not speak fictionally, but ordinarily we do. So in the philosophy room, the question of the existence of abstract entities is hard; outside it, the question is easy. When, ordinarily, a speaker utters a sentence that semantically expresses a proposition that entails that there are numbers, what she says is accurate so long as according to the relevant fiction, there are numbers. But when she utters the same sentence in the philosophy room, she speaks literally and then what she asserts is something highly non-trivial
Right, but how would it be rational to depend on his promise if obligations don't exist? — Leontiskos
He told me to only pay him $975. So I believed that he is only expecting me to pay him $975. So I only pay him $975. — Michael
That's right, and so I ask again: would it be rational for you to invoke his promise when he tells you that you underpaid? — Leontiskos
If there's reason to believe that it will work then yes. Much like it would be rational for me to appeal to the Bible if he were a Christian. But the Bible is still bullshit. — Michael
b. Field's fictionalism is that mathematical statements are false, and mathematical statements are given with a fictional operator: "According to arithmetics, there are infinitely many prime numbers". Whereas without the operator, the statement would be false, as numbers don't exist (standard semantics). — Lionino
If you think the obligation is bullshit then how can you tell me that it was rational to pay him $975? — Leontiskos
Because he told me to, and it's rational to pay less if the person asking you for money asks for less. — Michael
...but are refusing to make sense of them... — Michael
So the proper comparison would be:
1. You were given an order
2. Do this
I have no problem with (1). Is this all "you ought do this" means? — Michael
Much like it would be rational for me to appeal to the Bible if he were a Christian. But the Bible is still bullshit. — Michael
So shall my word be that goes forth from my mouth;
it shall not return to me empty,
but it shall accomplish that which I purpose,
and prosper in the thing for which I sent it. — Isaiah 55:11 RSV
Why is it bad to go back on promises, not only for others but also for oneself? It is bad because it is to be a shitty man, in the same way that to continually try to do something and fail at it is to be a shitty man. "By promising he directs what he himself is to do for another," and someone who continually reneges or simply fails in his promises is a failure. He is unable to direct himself. He is unable to do what he promises—and yes, also intends—to do. To fail to understand why promises involve obligations is a bit like failing to understand why reaching out to turn on the light involves turning on the light. "If it turns on, it turns on. If not, not. It has nothing to do with my reaching out." :scream: — Leontiskos
Well, Kant said "ought implies can". If this is correct then one cannot be obligated to do what one cannot do. But one can promise to do what one believes one can do, even if in fact one cannot do it. Therefore, one can promise to do what one cannot do. Therefore, promises do not entail obligations
An obligation is simply something you ought to do. — Banno
Your inability to make sense of obligation is not our problem. — Banno
Again, if you think a young man saying "I don't intend to get married," and a monk vowing to never marry are functionally equivalent I don't know what to tell you. — Count Timothy von Icarus
This all seems to reduce to the claim that some authority has told me to do something. I understand and accept that. What I cannot make sense of is the conclusion "therefore I ought do as I'm told". What does this conclusion add that hasn't already been covered by the fact that some authority has told me to do something?
You seem to think that there is the command and then also the obligation. I don't know what this second thing is, or how/why it follows from the command. — Michael
I think we're just going to disagree here. I said earlier that what exists is people saying and doing things. The rest is feelings and ad hoc explanations. I was hoping you'd agree that obligation comes down to personal sentiment because we could finally explore the way the private language argument blasts away the veracity of the stories we tell about obligation. But instead, you're saying the binding is out there for all to see. I'm not sure what you're talking about. — frank
That this authority is recognized as legitimate. That you yourself has submitted to this procedure, or in any case, that by participating in the social fabric of society you accept the rules of the game. — Tobias
We all tacitly assume and subscribe to the principle that promises need to be kept and that therefore a: "but you promised!" is a reasonable reproach. — Tobias
So I agree to do what I'm told. That's fine. But what does it mean to say that I ought do what I'm told? — Michael
Do you just mean that it is pragmatic for us to do what we promise to do? That's fine. But what does it mean to say that we ought do what we say we will do? — Michael
And what special relevance is the verb "promise"? If instead of saying "I promise to do this" and instead of saying "but you promised", what if we said "I will do this" and "but you said you would"? — Michael
Like I said, words are always context dependent. Sometimes an "I will" is construed as a promise. Certainly during a wedding ceremony. The "I do" actually has large scale legal consequences. In general though, no, that is the difference between expressing an intention and a promise.This certainly seems like the ordinary thing we do. Does this then also entail that we enter into an obligation every time we assert our intention to do something, irrespective of whether or not it's a promise? — Michael
... you ought to do what you are told ...
... I am bound by the terms of it ... — Tobias
If it was pragmatism, 'efficient breach of contract', would be a legal thing to do. It is not.
...
The "I do" actually has large scale legal consequences. — Tobias
You could tell me what the difference is.
Are you now saying that "you ought do this" just means "do this or you will face undesirable consequences"? Because I have no problem with this latter claim.
No. Are people widely accepted to have a duty to give a mugger their money when they demand it? Nope. Might they face harm if they refuse to do what the mugger demands? Yes.
If obligations and duties are the same thing as "someone saying do this or else," who exactly is doing the saying? Who tells Orestes "avenge your father's murder or else?" What explicit threat does he face?
The fact that Orestes had this duty, that it was socially recognized in his culture, is a historical fact. His obligation emerges from his culture and his social role, not from any particular person saying "do this or else." — Count Timothy von Icarus
If obligations and duties are the same thing as "someone saying do this or else," who exactly is doing the saying? — Count Timothy von Icarus
What does "you ought" mean? What does "I am bound" mean? — Michael
Whenever someone uses such phrases, all I understand is "do this" (or at best "so-and-so says to do this"). I might even understand it with an additional "or else". — Michael
If they mean more than this then I need it explained. I keep asking for someone to make sense of these phrases and nobody ever does. — Michael
What does the law have to do with obligation? Does "you ought do this" just mean "do this or you will be fined/imprisoned"? I have no problem with this latter claim. — Michael
Then why did you bring up undesirable consequences when I asked you to make sense of obligations?
You are bound means that there is an outside authority to which you have submitted by following its procedures — Tobias
that exert some sort of legitimate power over you that compels you to do x — Tobias
I keep telling you and you keep running around in circles. — Tobias
You will be imprisoned because you violating a certain obligation (not all) which is laid down in law, under which you are bound by participating in society and in a democratic society at least, is legitimized by democratic procedures, hence is not arbitrary. — Tobias
So who can go up to a lifeguard and say, "see that drowning kid? You don't have to save them," such that no one will hold them responsible for not saving the child? — Count Timothy von Icarus
But to make it simple, are you actually claiming that "Orestes had an obligation to avenge his father's death because that was a norm in ancient Greek culture," is a false statement? — Count Timothy von Icarus
You're bringing up consequences again. Why do you keep doing this when you say that consequences have nothing to do with the meaning of "you ought"?
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