Do I see distal objects? Do I feel distal objects when I touch them? Are distal objects a mental phenomena? — Luke

Yes, we experience distal objects like cows. And we experience mental phenomena like colours and smells and tastes and pain.

This is why arguing over the grammar of "I see X" is a confusion and a red herring. Both direct and indirect realist grammar is correct.

The claim "we see representations" is the substance of the dispute between direct and indirect realists. Indirect realists claim that we see representations, whereas direct realists claim that we do not see representations. — Luke

What do you think "see" means? What do you think "feel" means?

Do I see colours? Are colours a mental phenomenon? Do I feel pain? Is pain a mental phenomenon?

Michael appears to claim that can only ever refer to the sensation-of-cow — Banno

No I don't. We can refer to things that we don't directly experience, e.g. Hitler and dark matter.

But this dispute has nothing to do with language. Consider that we are all deaf, illiterate mutes. Naive realists claim that distal objects and their properties are constituents of our experience and indirect realists claim that they're not.

Naive realists claim that “visual experience” includes distal objects among its constituents. Indirect realists claim that “visual experience” does not include distal objects among its constituents. Therefore, both groups mean something different by “visual experience”. — Luke

They mean the same thing by "visual experience" but disagree on what constitutes it.

Taken from What’s so naïve about naïve realism?

The second formulation is the constitutive claim, which says that it introspectively seems to one that the perceived mind-independent objects (and their features) are constituents of the experiential state. Nudds, for instance, argues that ‘visual experiences seem to have the NR [Naïve Realist] property’ (2009, p. 335), which he defines as ‘the property of having some mind-independent object or feature as a constituent’ (2009, p. 334), and, more explicitly, that ‘our experience […] seems to have mind-independent objects and features as constituents’ (2013, p. 271). Martin claims that ‘when one introspects one’s veridical perception one recognises that this is a situation in which some mind-independent object is present and is a constituent of the experiential episode’ (2004, p. 65).

...

... Intentionalism typically characterizes the connection between perception (taken as a representative state) and the perceived mind-independent objects as a merely causal one. But if the connection is merely causal, then it seems natural to take the suitable mind-independent objects to be distinct from the experience itself and, therefore, not literally constituents of it.

It is important to note the distinction between naive realism and intentionalism. The former argues that distal objects are constituents of experience and the latter that distal objects cause experience, where each group means the same thing by "experience".

Given that you have said such things as "perceptual experience is a representation" and "we cannot directly perceive distal objects as they are in themselves" you reject naive realism. This rejection of naive realism is the substance of indirect realism, even if you disagree with the grammar of "we see representations".

But as has been said before, arguing over the grammar of "we see mental phenomena" is a confusion and a red herring. It's not the case that either we experience mental phenomena or we experience distal objects. There are just different meanings of the word "experience" such that both are correct depending on the meaning being used, e.g. "I feel pain" and "I feel the fire".

Agreed, but false analogy with regard to what I'm arguing. That fits with what you're arguing about all perception, and what I'm arguing only regarding hallucinations/dreams. Replace the painter with distal objects. — creativesoul

A [veridical experience] depends on a [distal object] but the [distal object] is not a constituent of the [veridical experience]. The constituents of the [veridical experience] are just [mental phenomena].

And the constituents of hallucinations and dreams are just mental phenomena. They're just not caused by some distal object.

While this latter dispute could boil down to a disagreement over the meaning of the word "perceive", the dispute between naive and indirect realists could equally be viewed as a disagreement over the meaning of the phrase "visual experience". So, if the dispute between direct realists and indirect realists is merely grammatical, then so too is the dispute between naive realists and indirect realists. They are therefore equally substantive disputes. — Luke

The dispute between naive realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not experience provides us with direct knowledge of the mind-independent nature of distal objects. That's not a grammatical dispute. Whatever each group means by "visual experience" it must be such that if, as naive realists claim, distal objects are constituents of visual experience then we have direct knowledge of the mind-independent nature of distal objects.

Our perception is directed, intentional. — Banno

The epistemological problem of perception concerns whether or not distal objects and their properties are given to us in experience; it doesn't concern the direction of our attention. You appear to be looking at things in reverse.

Intentionalism is consistent with indirect realism. See Semantic Direct Realism:

The most common form of direct realism is Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR). PDR is the theory that direct realism consists in unmediated awareness of the external object in the form of unmediated awareness of its relevant properties. I contrast this with Semantic Direct Realism (SDR), the theory that perceptual experience puts you in direct cognitive contact with external objects but does so without the unmediated awareness of the objects’ intrinsic properties invoked by PDR. PDR is what most understand by direct realism. My argument is that, under pressure from the arguments from illusion and hallucination, defenders of intentionalist theories, and even of relational theories, in fact retreat to SDR. I also argue briefly that the sense-datum theory is compatible with SDR and so nothing is gained by adopting either of the more fashionable theories.

There is however the distal object, which is the proximal cause of the table related aspects of all our proximal stimuli in veridical perception - and that is what we perceive. — fdrake

Given what you mean by "proximal cause" the indirect realist agrees with the first part. But then the second part needs further explanation/justification.

But as per this comment I think that second part is a red herring.

Veridical perception, hallucination, and illusions. You claim they share the same constituents, and the difference is in their causes.

Can you set out the different causes? — creativesoul

Veridical experiences are caused by some appropriate proximal stimulus, e.g. seeing the colour red when light with a wavelength of 700nm interacts with the eyes, or feeling pain when putting one’s hand in a fire.

Illusions are like veridical experiences but where the features of the experience provide a misleading representation of the proximal stimulus or distal object, e.g. if the shape in the percept is a bent line but the shape of the distal object is a straight line. This usually occurs when something manipulates the proximal stimulus (e.g. light) before it reaches the sense organ (e.g. eyes).

Hallucinations occur without some appropriate proximal stimulus, e.g. seeing coloured shapes when one’s eyes are closed because one has eaten psychedelics.

They are what's being perceived in every veridical and illusory case — creativesoul

Which means what?

I have been trying to explain that when naive realists claim that some distal object is (directly) perceived they mean that the object is a literal constituent of the experience and that when indirect realists claim that some distal object is not (directly) perceived they mean that the object is not a literal constituent of the experience.

Since all three kinds are existentially dependent upon distal objects, but hallucinations do not include distal objects, there are differences in their constitution — creativesoul

That doesn’t follow. That X depends on Y is not that Y is a constituent of X. A painting depends on a painter but the painter is not a constituent of the painting. The constituents of the painting are just paint and a canvas.

You seem to be confusing constituent with cause. See here for why that’s wrong. Intentionalism is not naive realism.

Why is it, then, that you can't focus your attention on the proximal mental image and reinterpret it? Isn't it because this "mental image" already is an act of interpreting what is out there rather than it being an act of "seeing" what's in the brain? — Pierre-Normand

I think you're reading something into the meaning of the word "seeing" that just isn't there.

When we have a visual experience we describe it using the English phrase "I see X". You seem to want to separate this phrase into three distinct parts such that "I", "see", and "X" are distinct entities. I think that this is sometimes a mistake, much like doing the same to the phrase "I feel pain" would be a mistake.

The indirect realist claims that we do not have direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are not constituents of experience. The constituents of experience – smells, tastes, colours – are (interpreted) mental phenomena, and I smell smells, taste tastes, and see colours. So the indirect realist, perhaps cumbersomely, says that we smell and taste and see mental phenomena.

The direct (naive) realist claims that we do have direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are constituents of experience. The constituents of experience – smells, tastes, colours – are mind-independent properties of distal objects, and I smell smells, taste tastes, and see colours. So the direct realist says that we smell and taste and see mind-independent properties of distal objects.

You (and others) seem to be getting unnecessarily lost in the grammar of "I see X", but this is a red herring. The relevant concern is the reasoning that precedes such a claim, i.e. are distal objects and their properties constituents of experience and so do we have direct knowledge of distal objects and their properties. If you accept that they're not and that we don't then you're an indirect realist, even if you don't like indirect realist grammar and would rather continue to say "I see distal objects".

I am asking, is this proximal object that they see something that is already interpreted or still ambiguous (as, say, a bundle of colors and shapes)? — Pierre-Normand

It's interpreted. When there's something ambiguous like the duck-rabbit I can switch between seeing the duck and seeing the rabbit without any change in the shapes or colours.

Why do you think that the proximate cause for touch and taste is the distal object but not for sight? How about hearing? — fdrake

The proximal cause is the entity that stimulates the sense receptors. With sight it's light, with hearing it's sound, with smell it's odour molecules in the air, and with touch and taste it's the distal object itself.

This is the terminology adopted from here:

The process of perception begins with an object in the real world, known as the distal stimulus or distal object. By means of light, sound, or another physical process, the object stimulates the body's sensory organs. These sensory organs transform the input energy into neural activity—a process called transduction. This raw pattern of neural activity is called the proximal stimulus. These neural signals are then transmitted to the brain and processed. The resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus is the percept.

To explain the process of perception, an example could be an ordinary shoe. The shoe itself is the distal stimulus. When light from the shoe enters a person's eye and stimulates the retina, that stimulation is the proximal stimulus. The image of the shoe reconstructed by the brain of the person is the percept. Another example could be a ringing telephone. The ringing of the phone is the distal stimulus. The sound stimulating a person's auditory receptors is the proximal stimulus. The brain's interpretation of this as the "ringing of a telephone" is the percept.

The different kinds of sensation (such as warmth, sound, and taste) are called sensory modalities or stimulus modalities.

Do you think that indirect realists can accept that distal objects are the proximate cause of experience? That is the sense I meant. — fdrake

Well, certainly not when it comes to sight where the proximal cause is light. In the case of touch and taste they'd agree.

When human beings experience features of the world by means of sense perception, the things that they experience cause them to experience them in some specific ways, but the understanding that they bring to bear also shapes the character and content of those experiences. — Pierre-Normand

I'm not sure how that's relevant to the dispute between direct and indirect realism?

Would you say that Sue and Lia are caused by the visual presentation of the figure to experience, or see, the same mental phenomenon and that that they give it different interpretations, or would you say that they experience different mental phenomena? — Pierre-Normand

I don't understand the distinction. Interpretation is a mental phenomenon. Either way, like above, I don't see how it's relevant to the dispute between direct and indirect realism.

I don't agree that experience is located in the brainbody, so where does that leave us? — Janus

Are you arguing for something like substance dualism then, with consciousness being some non-physical phenomenon that extends beyond the body?

If all you mean by saying that distal objects are not in the body or brain, well so what? — Janus

Then distal objects and their properties are not constituents of experience. The smells and tastes and colours that are constituents of experience are therefore not distal objects or their properties (even if you want to claim that there is a resemblance between them).

We do, after all, have the word "hallucination", "dream", "delusion' and so on precisely because we are aware of that difference. — Banno

The difference is in what causes the experience, not in what constitutes the experience.

You want to say that the experience is the same, but having a dream is qualitatively different to being awake; having an hallucination is different to having a cow.

There's a qualitative difference only in the sense that there's a qualitative difference between photorealism and cubism; it's still just paint on canvas. It's not as if in the veridical case distal objects and their properties are constituents of the experience.

If hallucination of an apple amounts to the biological machinery doing the same thing it has done in past, while looking at an apple, then it becomes clear which one is existentially dependent upon the other.

They are not the same. Indirect realism cannot seem to account for that. — creativesoul

I don't understand what you think indirect realism has to account for.

Experiences, whether veridical or hallucinations, are reducible to (or supervene on) brain activity. Therefore anything that exists outside the brain cannot be a constituent of experience. Do you not accept this reasoning?

Fungus huh?

Yep. Was a great night. For a while I even had a split mind which was weird.

Is hallucination of an apple possible if one has never ever seen one, if one is completely unaware that there are such things as apples? — creativesoul

I'm not sure, I only recall hallucinating once and that was patterns of colours and spatial distortions. I think a schizophrenic or regular user of psychedelics would have to answer that

Well, whether or not something follows from one's terms is established by one's meaning, not the others'. — creativesoul

Sure, but then you have to accept that you are not necessarily arguing against indirect realism. This is clear if you each replace the word "direct" with your intended meanings.

I cannot make sense of hallucination unless compared to non-hallucinatory experience. Non hallucinatory experience does not depend upon hallucinatory in the same sense of "depend". Existential dependency. On the indirect realist account, there is no difference between the constituents.

That's just plain wrong.

A hallucination or dream of an apple does not require a distal object(an apple) except sometime in past experience. For that is when the biological machinery does its perception work. In dreams and hallucinations, its (mis)firing as though it has once again perceived or is once again perceiving an apple, despite no apple being perceived.

There is no difference between the constituents of an hallucination and a veridical experience. Their difference is in their causes.

To me, I am directly perceiving the chicken in the other room, because small parts of it entered my nose. — creativesoul

The indirect realist accepts that odour molecules from the chicken enter his nose, but denies that his perception of it is direct. Therefore, at the very least, what he means by "direct" isn't what you mean by "direct".

So according to his meaning, your use of the word "because" above is a non sequitur.

I'm guessing that you'll deny that the chicken is a constituent of my perception or my experience. I'm guessing that you'll deny that the molecules are a constituent of my perception or experience.

Yes. Experience exists within brain. Chickens and odour molecules exist outside the brain. Therefore, chickens and odour molecules are not constituents of experience. Experiences are caused by chickens and odour molecules, but that's the extent of their involvement.

So idealists believe our perceptions are the objects? What brand of idealists does that? — Mww

Subjective idealism or phenomenalism perhaps?

If both hearing and hallucinating are the activities of the auditory cortex, and the voice is merely the product of this activity, there seems to me no way to distinguish between veridical experience and hallucination, whether it arrives from an appropriate proximal stimulus or not. — NOS4A2

How do you distinguish between veridical experience and hallucination? It certainly wouldn't make sense to say that you can distinguish them because the English word "see" should only be used for veridical experience.

If one only has direct knowledge of the voice as the cortex has constructed it, how does one infer whether there is a proximal stimulus of the cortex or not? It seems to me there must first be some direct knowledge of a proximal stimulus that is not merely the product of the cortex. — NOS4A2

By definition, if I have to infer some X then I do not have direct knowledge of X, so I don't understand your argument here. Are you asking how inferences are even possible? Are you calling into question the very scientific method?

You can tell me what you mean by “hearing” and “voices” and I’m willing to adopt your definitions. If you think hearing doesn’t involves the use of ears and that a voice isn’t the sounds from the larynx, then what are they? — NOS4A2

We see things when the visual cortex is active and we hear things when the auditory cortex is active. The cortical blind have functioning eyes but don’t see because of damage in the occipital lobe.

When these cortexes are active in response to some appropriate proximal stimulus we describe it as a veridical experience and when they’re active without some appropriate proximal stimulus we describe it as an hallucination (if awake) or a dream (if asleep).

The claim “I hear voices” in the case of hallucination is not true, though. — NOS4A2

According to what you mean by “hear”, but what you mean isn’t always what others mean, and certainly isn’t what they mean when they say that the schizophrenic hears voices.

it just boggles my mind why they’d appropriate the language used to describe those things and interactions to describe mind-dependant things and interactions — NOS4A2

Words often mean more than one thing. It boggles my mind that you don’t understand this.

I’m fine with them saying it. But I’m not fine with the indirect realist saying it, especially if accuracy is any concern.

What would be your motivation for wishing to retain the language used to describe the interactions of distal objects and the sense organs to describe mental objects and the mental organs? — NOS4A2

Because that's how the language is ordinarily used. I see colours, I feel pain, the schizophrenic hears voices.

Why must the indirect realist restrict the meaning to some specific subset of its ordinary uses?

Not that this really matters. What matters is what they mean by the words they use, not what you think is the "proper" use of the words.

And this is where my earlier comment to Banno above is relevant. Naive realists claim that we have direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are constituents of experience. Indirect realists claim that we do not have direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are not constituents of experience; they only play a causal role in producing mental percepts of which we have direct knowledge.

This is the philosophical dispute, not some irrelevant argument about the grammar of "I see X".

A voice, though, is the sound released from the larynx. To hear a voice is to have that sound affect the ears. Since neither of these things and events are present in a hallucination, to say “I hear voices” is to mischaracterize the experience.

One can distinguish between between two different hallucinations by simply describing how they are different. One might be audible or visual, for example. — NOS4A2

Saying that the schizophrenic hears voices is a perfectly ordinary and appropriate use of the English language.

If you don't want to phrase it that way then you're welcome not to, but to misinterpret someone who does phrase it that way as suggesting the involvement of the sense organs in the schizophrenic's ears is your problem, not theirs. And this kind of misinterpretation is the root of your disagreement with indirect realism.

“Hallucinate” would be a better verb than “see” when comes to such events. “I am hallucinating voices”, for instance, doesn’t imply that the sound of a voice is hitting the ear, and recognizes that some bodily activity is producing the phenomena. — NOS4A2

There is a difference between visual and auditory hallucinations and using words like "see" and "hear" to describe that difference is perfectly appropriate.

The difference concerns which of the visual and auditory cortexes are involved. The words don't imply anything about sense organs, and assuming that they do is why you are misunderstanding indirect realism.

You have to interpret another's claims according to what they mean by the words, not what you mean by them, else you're arguing against a strawman.

Indirect realism has you sitting inside your head, seeing and touching what is constructed by your nerves. — Banno

This shows the crux of the misunderstanding.

"Feel" does not mean "touch". I feel pain, I don't touch pain (rather, I touch the fire).

Unfortunately, when it comes to words like "see" and "hear" and "smell" and "taste" we don't have terms that can be separated out in this way, and so Banno conflates the meaning of "see" in "I see colours when I hallucinate" and the meaning of "see" in "I see a cow". Indirect realists are using the former meaning when they say that we see mental images, and Banno's homunculus is a strawman.

When you have an hallucination of a cow, you do not see a cow, because there is no cow to see. — Banno

I still see something when I dream and hallucinate, and that thing I see is a mental phenomenon. When I feel pain I feel something, and that thing I feel is a mental phenomenon. So there's clearly nothing wrong with the phrase "I experience mental phenomena".

This sense of seeing and feeling and experiencing is also satisfied in veridical experience – even if there's some other sense of seeing and feeling and experiencing that allows us to truthfully say "I see a cow" – and so there's clearly nothing wrong with the indirect realist saying "I experience mental phenomena" about veridical experience.

What indirect realists dispute is that seeing a cow counts as direct perception, because by "direct perception" they mean something very specific. The phrase "direct perception" is related to the epistemological problem of perception.

To make sense of this, I'll refer to What’s so naïve about naïve realism?:

The second formulation is the constitutive claim, which says that it introspectively seems to one that the perceived mind-independent objects (and their features) are constituents of the experiential state. Nudds, for instance, argues that ‘visual experiences seem to have the NR [Naïve Realist] property’ (2009, p. 335), which he defines as ‘the property of having some mind-independent object or feature as a constituent’ (2009, p. 334), and, more explicitly, that ‘our experience […] seems to have mind-independent objects and features as constituents’ (2013, p. 271). Martin claims that ‘when one introspects one’s veridical perception one recognises that this is a situation in which some mind-independent object is present and is a constituent of the experiential episode’ (2004, p. 65).

...

... Intentionalism typically characterizes the connection between perception (taken as a representative state) and the perceived mind-independent objects as a merely causal one. But if the connection is merely causal, then it seems natural to take the suitable mind-independent objects to be distinct from the experience itself and, therefore, not literally constituents of it.

The epistemological problem of perception concerns whether or not experience provides us with direct knowledge of distal objects. Naive realists claimed that experience does provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are constituents of experience. Indirect realists claimed that experience does not provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are not constituents of experience; they are simply the cause of the mental representations of which we have direct knowledge.

"Direct perception" meant that distal objects are constituents of experience and "indirect perception" meant that distal objects are not constituents of experience.

You're welcome to redefine "direct perception" if you like, but in doing so you're no longer addressing the indirect realist's claim. Your arguments against indirect realism are against a strawman.

I feel pain and see and hear things when I dream and hallucinate. You're reading something into the sentence "I experience mental representations" that just isn't there.

The trouble here is how indirect realism can produce reliable information about the number of handles on the cup. — Banno

If we agree on the physics and physiology and only disagree on the grammar then why would the indirect realist have any more trouble than the direct realist?

Your very question here seems to accept that the dispute between direct and indirect realists is about more than grammar.

If both direct and indirect realists accept the existence of mental representations as caused by distal objects then what do you think the (non-grammatical) substance of the dispute between the two is?

I don't claim not to have reliable knowledge of distal objects. I claim that mental representations are distinct from distal objects, that I have direct knowledge of mental representations, and that I have indirect knowledge of distal objects.

If it is not a performative contradiction for a direct realist to be scientific realist (i.e. believing in the existence of objects that he cannot directly see) then it is not a performative contradiction for an indirect realist to be a scientific realist.

Even direct realists can trust a Geiger counter. You're being a hypocrite.

Balls. If that were so there would not be a philosophical issue. There is no difference in the physics or physiology between direct and indirect descriptions. The difference is that the direct realist sees a cow, the indirect realist sees... something mental. You keep setting out a scientific account as if it settles the issue, but there is no disagreement here. — Banno

If you don't understand what naive realists are claiming then that's on you. They are saying much more than just "I see a cow" is true.

I think it is exactly the problem. We do not disagree on anything to do with the physiology or physics hereabouts. Where we disagree is as to the language of perception.

I say we see the cow. You say we see only the mental cow.

I don't see our approaches as meshing. — Banno

This is precisely the point I have been making since the start. The philosophical dispute between direct (naive) and indirect (non-naive) realists concerns the physics and physiology of perception. Indirect realists are right and direct realists are wrong.

Then so-called "non-naive" direct realists enter the fray, read something into the sentence "I experience mental representations" that just isn't there, and so start an irrelevant and nonsense argument about grammar.

If there is a equivocation here, it is being forced on us. But in any case, it seems we now agree that colours are not just mental phenomena. — Banno

When I say "I see colours and colours are mental phenomena" I am referring to the mental phenomena, not whatever else the term "colour" might be used to refer to.

So to repeat:

I see colours and feel pain. Colours and pain are mental phenomena. I see things when I dream and hear things when I hallucinate.

You're reading something into the grammar of "I experience mental representations" that just isn't there.

There's also the colour red. Folk knew about it well before they knew about wavelengths and three channel colour vision. — Banno

What is the substance of this? If we're not talking about wavelengths and we're not talking about mental percepts then what do we mean by "is red"? All we seem to be agreeing on is that most English speakers use the predicate "is red" to describe the apple.

That linguistic issue has nothing to do with the epistemological problem of perception. You can't see the forest for the giant red herring you've fished out.

To help you out, lets's consider us all to be deaf, illiterate mutes. We still see colours, and the colours we see have nothing to do with language.

All assertion and no argument. I'll wait until you present an argument to address—responding to mere assertions being a waste of time. — Janus

The argument was in that comment:

Experience exists within the brain. Distal objects exist outside the body. Therefore distal objects (and their properties) do not exist within experience.

The first premise is supported by neuroscience. The second premise is true by definition. The conclusion follows.

If colours are no more than mental phenomena, how is it that we agree that clear skys are blue? How is it that we agree that an ache is not a sting?

They are also linguistic, and physical. — Banno

I'll repeat myself from an earlier comment:

This is equivocation. There is "colour" as an object's surface disposition to reflect a certain wavelength of light and there is "colour" as the mental phenomenon that differs between those with 3 channel colour vision and those with 12 channel colour vision (and that occurs when we dream and hallucinate).

Despite sharing the same label these are distinct things – albeit causally covariant given causal determinism.

Those with 3 channel colour vision and those with 12 channel colour vision will agree that some object reflects light with a wavelength of 700nm, but they will see it to have a different colour appearance.

You mean like direct realism = the apple is distal object is numerically identical to the apple percept? — fdrake

I'll copy from What’s so naïve about naïve realism?:

The second formulation is the constitutive claim, which says that it introspectively seems to one that the perceived mind-independent objects (and their features) are constituents of the experiential state. Nudds, for instance, argues that ‘visual experiences seem to have the NR [Naïve Realist] property’ (2009, p. 335), which he defines as ‘the property of having some mind-independent object or feature as a constituent’ (2009, p. 334), and, more explicitly, that ‘our experience […] seems to have mind-independent objects and features as constituents’ (2013, p. 271). Martin claims that ‘when one introspects one’s veridical perception one recognises that this is a situation in which some mind-independent object is present and is a constituent of the experiential episode’ (2004, p. 65).

...

... Intentionalism typically characterizes the connection between perception (taken as a representative state) and the perceived mind-independent objects as a merely causal one. But if the connection is merely causal, then it seems natural to take the suitable mind-independent objects to be distinct from the experience itself and, therefore, not literally constituents of it.

There's a distinction between a distal object being a constituent of experience and being a cause of experience. Indirect realists accept that distal objects are a cause of experience but deny that they are a constituent of experience.

Here's the point, again; one does not see the representation; seeing is constructing the representation. — Banno

I see colours and feel pain. Colours and pain are mental phenomena. I see things when I dream and hear things when I hallucinate.

You're reading something into the grammar of "I experience mental representations" that just isn't there.

Ordinary Objects Caveat: perceptual experiences are directly of ordinary mind-independent objects in the sense that mind-independent objects reliably cause percept properties to hold which intersubjectively count as each other.

Presentation: perceptual experiences are direct perceptual presentations of their objects in the sense that perceptual experiences are perceptions/percepts and that causes of percept properties are tightly constrained by distal object properties. Like reflectance spectra tightly constraining seen colour. — fdrake

But the indirect realist agrees that mental phenomena like smells and tastes and colours are causally determined by distal objects and their properties.

So clearly direct realism cannot be defined in this way.

As I see it indirect realism is nothing more than the rejection of naive realism, with naive realism claiming that distal objects are literal constituents of experience, entailing such things as the naive theory of colour.