For others it is incoherent because in being a response to moral issues it pretends to tell us what we ought to do, and yet it only tells us what most people do. — Banno

See my second paragraph above.

My problem with this is that morality is a normative affair. If someone is making purely descriptive claims, then they are not engaged in, or committing themselves to, any kind of morality. — Leontiskos

1. X is wrong
2. One ought not X

Do these mean the same thing?

If someone claims that morality is reducible to descriptive facts, then they are explaining away morality. — Leontiskos

I don't think that this is necessarily the case. There is a normative component to the rules of chess and to laws even though these are manufactured. I don't see a problem with claiming that society has manufactured (organically over time) a set of rules that each member must abide by, and that these are the rules we talk about when we talk about morality.

Are you committed to the proposition that, on the version of moral subjectivism you are examining, the consensus has moral weight but the votes have none? — Leontiskos

What I am saying is that there are certain behaviours that society has deemed acceptable and certain behaviours that society has deemed unacceptable. According to some moral subjectivists when we talk about morality we are talking about these socially acceptable and unacceptable behaviours. The sentence "murder is immoral" is true iff society deems murder unacceptable because "murder is immoral" just means "murder is deemed socially unacceptable."

This may be factually incorrect (e.g. if Moore's open argument is sound), but that doesn't make it incoherent. It's an internally consistent theory even if it mistakes the meaning of moral sentences.

And on a similar vein, the same is true for the subjectivists who claim that "murder is immoral" is true (for me) if I disapprove of murder because "murder is immoral" just means "I disapprove of murder". It's internally consistent even if factually incorrect.

You are assuming that (3a) is coherent, but when presented with the incoherencies of (3a) — Leontiskos

I don't think you have presented any incoherencies.

I think I might have already mentioned once or twice that my interest here was no more than to show that there are moral truths. — Banno

And as I have already mentioned, the rest of us are interested in further considerations. We want to know if moral truths are expressions of individual attitudes, or if they describe conventions of social behaviour, or if they report on facts about the world that obtain even if everyone were to believe otherwise. We want to know whether or not moral truths are reducible to natural phenomena.

If you're not interested in these further considerations then you don't need to engage with the rest of us who are.

Of course. Are you expecting mere philosophical considerations will decide what you ought to do? They might help you phrase the issues, but they will no more solve all your moral quandaries than they will tell you the value of the gravitational constant. — Banno

I'm expecting philosophical considerations to help me determine what "one ought not" means and whether or not moral truths are determined to any extent by human attitudes and decisions.

You seem to be confusing metaethics and normative ethics. I have no questions for normative ethics. I already know what I ought to (not) do. Don't eat babies, for example.

Banno's point is that the common element in moral realism is that there are true moral statements. It turns out to be important that the SEP article on moral realism stops there, noting that "...some accounts of moral realism see it as involving additional commitments", while the SEP article on Moral Antirealism - the one you repeatedly refer to - needs these "additional commitments' in order to implement a critique of "moral realism".

Could it be that without these "additional commitments" moral realism stands firm? I think so. — Banno

You seem to view the distinction as:

1. Moral non-cognitivism
2. Error theory
3. Moral realism

Others view the distinction as:

1. Moral non-cognitivism
2. Error theory
3a. Moral subjectivism
3b. Moral realism

When others argue against moral realism they are arguing against their (3b), not your (3). Your (3) also allows for their (3a).

So you're just talking past each other.

So what.

Agreement is not a criteria here. The open question argument shows that.

I am not following whatever it is you are doing. — Banno

You said that "if the consequence of an argument is unacceptable, it is open to us to reject the argument."

So you offer an argument for some morality with a consequence that I find unacceptable, so I reject it.

I offer an argument for some morality with a consequence that you find unacceptable, so you reject it.

We've gotten nowhere. How do we determine which of us is, if either, is right? Is moral philosophy simply a futile endeavour?

On this account, our moral beliefs and intuitions are an expression of this cooperative system. To ask, "but what if they are *wrong*?", independently of the system, is to reintroduce moral realism, which this account leaves no room for. — hypericin

If moral realism is correct then it is perfectly appropriate to ask "what if they're wrong?"

So to simply use this example of socially advantageous behaviour as a refutation of realism is to beg the question.

If the consequence of an argument is unacceptable, it is open to us to reject the argument. That's how reductio works. — Banno

Unacceptable to who? You and I might disagree over whether or not abortion, eating meat, and the death penalty are unacceptable.

If the nature of chess is dictated by an authority, then it is not the result of a consensus. A vote and an appeal to an authority are two different things. Thus your chess case, as presented, is not a matter of consensus. — Leontiskos

I think you're being overly pedantic here. In the case of chess there was a majority consensus amongst the group authorized to decide the laws. In the case of laws there is a majority consensus amongst the legislature. In the case of morality it may be that there is a majority consensus amongst the general population.

There's nothing inherently contradictory about these positions.

Again, if a moral theory were to advocate some horror, it is open for us to reject that moral theory on that basis. — Banno

On what grounds do you justify this assertion? It seems to beg the question.

And what happens when two people disagree over whether or not something is a "horror" (e.g. with abortion or the death penalty for murderers)?

This is about the ontology of chess, and ontological questions are not settled by authorities. — Leontiskos

They are if the ontology of chess is such that the rules are dictated by some relevant authority, which they are. Cavemen didn't just discover the rules of chess one day.

How can it be simultaneously true that, "It is morally wrong because we agreed on it," and, "We agreed on it because it is morally wrong"? You have to pick one or the other. — Leontiskos

I did. Moral subjectivists say it's the former.

Only if the rules of a game do not constitute the game would this argument succeed. That seems highly implausible. — Leontiskos

Are you saying that the rules didn't change? Because they did. That's simply indisputable.

If morality is nothing more than consensus, then the origins of the consensus (the votes) are non-moral (or pre-moral). I don't have a problem with the idea that consensus carries moral weight, but I believe the circularity argument proves that morality cannot be simply reduced to consensus. If a consensus of 10 votes carries moral weight, then so does a single vote. The moral weight can't just materialize out of nowhere upon the reaching of a consensus. — Leontiskos

I don't understand what's circular about it? The people who invented chess dictated the original rules. FIDE recently dictated some new changes. Governments across the world enact new laws every day. Why can't it be that moral rules work the same way?

If we change the rules of chess then we are playing a different game. Calling it "chess" is misleading. — Leontiskos

Well this isn't true. The FIDE rules of chess last changed in January of this year to add a seventy-five move rule.

If we speak about consensus, then we are not speaking about morality. — Leontiskos

Some moral subjectivists disagree. They argue that that is exactly what morality is. See contractualism.

You conclude that their moral conventions are a socially advantageous strategy designed to foster cooperation. This account in no way requires that the apes themselves take this view. — hypericin

This is ambiguous. It may be that our moral beliefs are consistent with socially advantageous strategies designed to foster cooperation, but it doesn't then follow that socially advantageous strategies designed to foster cooperation are moral. Our beliefs may be wrong.

The summary of these facts is that one ought to be honest, because otherwise communication ceases, language is useless, and society collapses. This a physical reality. — unenlightened

But what does this have to do with morality? There can be non-moral obligations. I ought to brush my teeth otherwise they will fall out, but it's not immoral to not brush my teeth (although it may be immoral to subject others to my foul breath).

There's something missing in your argument to connect socially advantageous behaviour with morality.

If we all agree that X is morally wrong, does that agreement make X morally wrong? — Leontiskos

According to moral subjectivism, yes, hence what I said before:

1. It would not be wrong to eat babies if everyone were to say so (subjectivism), or
2. It would be wrong to eat babies even if everyone were to say otherwise (realism)

So are moral rules like physical laws (realism) or like the rules of chess (subjectivism)?

Despite @Banno's comments there is more to the issue than simply whether or not some moral sentences are true. There are further considerations to be had.

I don't think we can change moral rules by collective decision. I don't know if anyone believes that...? I am not following you here. — Leontiskos

Moral subjectivists might. They might argue that moral rules are the collectively decided rules of social behaviour (if not simply an individual's own chosen rules).

Anti-naturalists like Michael, @Banno, @Leontiskos have to demonstrate why accounts like this fail so utterly that, ontological parsimony be damned, it is preferable to introduce a whole new category of reality. — hypericin

"Socially advantageous behaviour is morally right" does not seem to be a tautology. If it's not a tautology then the meaning of "morally right" cannot be reduced to "socially advantageous behaviour".

See Moore's open question argument:

Consider a particular naturalist claim, such as that “x is good” is equivalent to “x is pleasant” or “x is pleasure.” If this claim were true, he argued, the judgement “Pleasure is good” would be equivalent to “Pleasure is pleasure,” yet surely someone who asserts the former means to express more than that uninformative tautology. Alternatively, if this naturalist claim were true, “x is pleasant but x is not good” would be self-contradictory. Once it was established that x is pleasant, the question whether it is good would then be closed, or not worth considering, whereas, he argued, it remains open.

It may be factually correct that socially advantageous behaviour is morally right, but realist metaethics may still be correct: that socially advantageous behaviour is morally right is objectively true, even if we were all to believe otherwise, and for the non-naturalist that moral rightness is a non-natural property of socially advantageous behaviour.

My point was that, "The diamond is worth $1,000," is not made true by everyone saying so. — Leontiskos

If you don't think the worth of a diamond is a good example then consider the rules of chess. We can change them by collective decision. Can we change moral rules by collective decision?

This feels like a narrow account of subjectivism that few would endorse.

In my view, people ultimately make moral judgements and decisions according to their own values and moral sense. These values and this sensibility are in turn informed by enculturation and group-think, but also by biologically based moral instincts (innate senses of fairness and justice, empathy), as well as individual experiences and preferences. This is "subjectivism" as none of these are objective features of the world (right?), but seems poorly captured by "if everyone were to say so". — hypericin

Note that I said if. I didn't say only if.

I'd say that the consequences of false moral belief will depend on the moral system in question. For example, if a consequentialist holds that killing babies is evil on account of inflicting pain, then the possible world in which the killing of babies is permissible would be a world where babies feel no pain (or where one can kill painlessly). For this consequentialist, the negative consequence of false belief is an increase in pain, or unnecessary pain, or the pain of innocents, or something like that. — Leontiskos

Perhaps a more suitable question for the consequentialist is to explain the difference between these worlds:

1. Causing pain has no moral value
2. Causing pain is morally good
3. Causing pain is morally bad

A possible response is that "causing pain is morally bad" is true by definition, and so (1) and (2) are not possible worlds, but the question stands for any consequentialist who doesn't think consequentialism true by definition.

Quote 1. If it is a fact that kicking a puppy hurts/harms the puppy, then that's just a fact of hte matter. So, that's not a further moral "fact" - it's an empirical fact subsequent to the act of kicking (which others are making a moral judgment on, rather than I). I ascribed no value to the harm/hurt (in fact, i think that might be what sets me on the anti-realist bent.. I do not see that it matters). Had I said that the harm is the wrong-maker, I could agree - but again, I don't see how the puppy being hurt imparts any truth to the initial statement.

Quote 2. Is him ascribing something to me which I don't think or feel but that may be explained by the above - I did not, and do not, believe the harm the puppy experiences is a fact that gives moral statements about kicking a puppy value or truth (morally speaking). It is just a fact (or, an effect).

Quote 3. Similar to above. I've never tried to prove that the fact of the puppy's harm would make it wrong or right. Though, it appears to me that's a result of my larger-scale misunderstanding being read as if i know what im talking about LOL. The only reason I was bringing up that underlying fact was because I was under the impression that i could apply the concept (that the statement is not brute) to the framework being used to allow 'One ought not kick puppies' being considered somehow 'true'. I don't think either that statement of itself, or the resulting harm/hurt impart 'truth' beyond it being empirically true that a puppy is hurt by being kicked. — AmadeusD

You said that one ought not kick the puppy because it hurts the puppy. How is this to be interpreted as anything other than you ascribing moral value to hurting the puppy?

By analogy, consider if someone were to say that one ought not kick the puppy because the puppy has brown fur. It is certainly true that the puppy has brown fur, but this has nothing to do with whether or not one ought not kick the puppy, and so the use of the term "because" here is fallacious.

If you only meant to say that one ought not kick the puppy and kicking the puppy would hurt the puppy then I wouldn't object. But of course this doesn't even address the issue of whether or not moral facts are brute facts, so it certainly doesn't rebut the claim that there are brute moral facts.

That's an example of non-cognitivism.

I provide a different explanation of the difference between objectivity and subjectivity here.

It's a complex issue. It cannot simply be addressed with aphorisms.

World 3 would would pretty quickly stop being a world. With no morality there is more of a chance people would kill babies but maybe not to the extent that the species would cease to exist. — I like sushi

I don't think that this is accurate. Consider the possible worlds again:

1. No morality but everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies
2. It is immoral to kill babies and everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies
3. It is moral to kill babies but everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies

What is the practical difference between these worlds?

It seems to me that only moral beliefs matter. Whether or not the beliefs are true has no practical relevance.

All very good questions. Have you any answers? — Banno

I don't, but I can set out an argument to properly lay out the options:

If moral sentences are truth-apt then either some moral sentence is true or it is not wrong to eat babies.

If it is wrong to eat babies then either it would not be wrong to eat babies if everyone were to say so or it would be wrong to eat babies even if everyone were to say otherwise.

So we have:

1. Moral sentences are not truth-apt (non-cognitivism), or
2. It is not wrong to eat babies (error theory), or
3. It would not be wrong to eat babies if everyone were to say so (subjectivism), or
4. It would be wrong to eat babies even if everyone were to say otherwise (realism)

There seems to be the presumption that if evidence or reasoning cannot be provided in support of (4) then either (2) or (3) should be accepted by default. I think that this presumption should itself be questioned.

All moral truths are true. — Banno

Yes, but this can be examined in more detail:

1. “One ought not X” is true if everyone says so
2. “One ought not Y” is true even if everyone says otherwise

Is (2) the case for some Y, and if so how do we know? Can it be proved with empirical evidence and/or reasoned argument? Is it an intuition? Is it unknowable?

Or is (2) never the case? Is every moral truth a case of (1)?

So some moral truths are true even if everyone says otherwise?

I’ll phrase it another way:

Some things are true if everyone says so and some things are true even if everyone says otherwise.

Which of these is the case for moral truths?

We can do away with the term and still address the substance of the disagreement. The article I referenced offered an example:

1. The diamond is made of carbon
2. The diamond is worth $1,000

We can all be wrong about (1) but can't all be wrong about (2). (2) is true because of social conventions/intersubjective agreement, etc. whereas (1) is true even if we all believe otherwise.

Are moral truths like (1) or like (2)?

I've said before I don't really care what you call it. the interesting bit is that moral statements have a truth value. — Banno

Many in this discussion believe that moral statements have a truth value. The main disagreement seems to be precisely on its objectivity.

Are they true because of social convention, or are they true even if everyone believed and behaved otherwise?

My objection would be that "objectively" does nothing here. Hence moral realism is that there are true moral statements. — Banno

It's not as simple as that.

Moral Anti-Realism

Traditionally, to hold a realist position with respect to X is to hold that X exists objectively. On this view, moral anti-realism is the denial of the thesis that moral properties—or facts, objects, relations, events, etc. (whatever categories one is willing to countenance)—exist objectively. This could involve either (1) the denial that moral properties exist at all, or (2) the acceptance that they do exist but this existence is (in the relevant sense) non-objective. There are broadly two ways of endorsing (1): moral noncognitivism and moral error theory. Proponents of (2) may be variously thought of as moral non-objectivists, or idealists, or constructivists. So understood, moral anti-realism is the disjunction of three theses:

a) moral noncognitivism
b) moral error theory
c) moral non-objectivism

...

Moral noncognitivism holds that our moral judgments are not in the business of aiming at truth. So, for example, A.J. Ayer declared that when we say “Stealing money is wrong” we do not express a proposition that can be true or false, but rather it is as if we say “Stealing money!!” with the tone of voice indicating that a special feeling of disapproval is being expressed (Ayer [1936] 1971: 110). Note how the predicate “… is wrong” has disappeared in Ayer’s translation schema; thus the issues of whether the property of wrongness exists, and whether that existence is objective, also disappear.

The moral error theorist thinks that although our moral judgments aim at the truth, they systematically fail to secure it: the world simply doesn’t contain the relevant “stuff” to render our moral judgments true. For a more familiar analogy, compare what an atheist usually claims about religious judgments. On the face of it, religious discourse is cognitivist in nature: it would seem that when someone says “God exists” or “God loves you” they are usually asserting something that purports to be true. However, according to the atheist, the world isn’t furnished with the right kind of stuff (gods, afterlife, miracles, etc.) necessary to render these assertions true. The moral error theorist claims that when we say “Stealing is morally wrong” we are asserting that the act of stealing instantiates the property of moral wrongness, but in fact there is no such property, or at least nothing in the world instantiates it, and thus the utterance is untrue.

Non-objectivism (as it will be called here) allows that moral facts exist but holds that they are non-objective. The slogan version comes from Hamlet: “there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.” For a quick example of a non-objective fact, consider the different properties that a particular diamond might have. It is true that the diamond is made of carbon, and also true that the diamond is worth $1000, say. But the status of these facts seems different. That the diamond is carbon seems an objective fact: it doesn’t depend on what we think of the matter. (We could all be under the impression that it is not carbon, and all be wrong.) That the diamond is worth $1000, by contrast, seems to depend on us. If we all thought that it was worth more (or less), then it would be worth more (or less).

Even your quote from a different article continued with "... (although some accounts of moral realism see it as involving additional commitments, say to the independence of the moral facts from human thought and practice, or to those facts being objective in some specified way)."

Who thinks this is realism? What anti-realist would say that?

@Michael @Leontiskos
Are you agreeing with this?? — hypericin

1. Moral propositions are not truth-apt (non-cognitivism)
2. Moral propositions are truth-apt (cognitivism)
2a. All moral propositions are false (error theory)
2b. Some moral propositions are true and these are subjectively true (moral subjectivism)
2c. Some moral propositions are true and these are objectively true (moral realism)

Moral anti-realism encompasses 1, 2a, and 2b.

1. You've got the positions backwards, but i imagine that was just haste. No guff. Naturalism is what I take issue with. — AmadeusD

And I have been explaining non-naturalism so now I don’t understand the relevance of your comments.

If it were proved to you, then you would eat babies. If you refuse to eat babies, then the argument simply hasn't convinced you — Leontiskos

How so? I don’t see a problem with knowing that I ought to do one thing but choosing to do another because, say, it’s in my self interest.

Davidson offered an account that tried to account for weakness of the will in an otherwise rational mind, with I think some success. Have you read ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible?’ — Banno

I’m not sure what it has to do with weakness? I’m questioning the extent to which moral obligations are a sufficient motivator.

Merely, that the claim of a ethical naturalist isn't tenable. — AmadeusD

You’re arguing that ethical non-naturalism isn’t tenable because it disagrees with your ethical naturalism. That’s not a rebuttal, it’s begging the question.

Again, whether i'm correct or not, this is a rebuttal to ethical naturalism. — AmadeusD

For it to be a rebuttal you must prove that moral facts can be explained in non-moral terms. You must prove that "one ought not kick puppies for fun because it hurts the puppy" is true.

As you haven't proven it, only asserted it, it begs the question.

But those deeper facts remain in existence, and do, in fact, support the claim.

This is quite different from your version of the hypothetical exchange. In yours, I offer no explanation of my claim. In my version, I offer a precise and specifically relevant rebuttal to the claim that there are no deeper facts.

So yeah, it's a rebuttal. — AmadeusD

You have claimed that one ought not kick the puppy because it hurts the puppy. The ethical non-naturalist, being a non-naturalist, rejects this connection. You are begging the question and assuming ethical naturalism.

The ethical non-naturalist might refer to Hume: one cannot derive an ought from an is.