Sure, suggestion, advice, command, remonstrance, etc. These are all interpersonal 'oughts' — Leontiskos

Doesn’t seem like a moral obligation though so I think you need to revise your definition.

I already told you: "interpersonal 'oughts'." — Leontiskos

Like “you ought to listen to my music, it’s really good”?

Well, if we define morality according to justice, as the realm of interpersonal 'oughts', then A3 is a moral truth. — Leontiskos

So to say that something is moral is to say that it is just? That just shifts the question to a new mystery. What is the ontological status of justice? Is it a natural or non-natural property? Is it a fact we discover, like physics, or is it a fact we construct through social convention? How do we verify or falsify a claim that something is just?

That's odd, given that you have consistently objected that my claims are non-moral. How do you object on the basis of a concept you do not know? — Leontiskos

I don't think I've said this. I've only said that "one ought not X" can be understood in pragmatic terms, and that if Moore's open question argument is correct then "moral" doesn't mean "pragmatic".

It might also be understood in moral terms, but that's on you to explain, not me.

You spoke of ordinary language. Is, "Do not needlessly cause others to suffer," moral according to your understanding of ordinary language? — Leontiskos

Again, I don't know what "moral" means. I only interpret that statement as a command. Someone is telling me what to do. "Don't cause others to suffer", "don't forget to brush your teeth", "don't go outside today because it's raining", etc.

I think you're just being contentious at this point. You consistently refuse the burden of proof, refuse to give substantive answers, and nitpick everything that is said.

You say A1 is not 'moral' by the mysterious definition you consistently refuse to provide. What about A3? Is that 'moral'? — Leontiskos

I don't know what "moral" means so I can't answer. It's pragmatic, sure. So what else is there? You're the one positing the existence of some other quality. The burden is on you to explain it and justify it.

The idea here is that the act involves a moral omission. — Leontiskos

And that needs to be explained, not simply asserted. I don't know what this word "moral" means. Does it refer to some natural property in the world? If so, what? If not then I need someone to actually make sense of it and justify its existence. It seems superfluous. What mystery about the world does it answer?

Meanwhile, I'm going to watch some TV and not worry about whether or not watching TV is "moral". I do it simply because it interests me, and that's enough.

In choosing to play a game you are choosing not to volunteer to fight in Ukraine. Ethics pervades everything you do. — Banno

What does choosing not to volunteer to fight in Ukraine have to do with ethics?

And it must be exhausting for you to have to consider "should I go fight in Ukraine instead?" every time you choose to do something.

I don't think there are non-moral 'oughts'. — Leontiskos

Seems inconsistent with ordinary language.

I ought to brush my teeth. I ought to buy my groceries whilst the sale is on. I ought not go out in the rain without an umbrella. I ought not move my pawn backwards.

This is a perfectly acceptable use of language. Why introduce a new ontological category of "moral" facts? What purpose do they serve?

This conversation is well off the rails. — Banno

Because you won't address what I'm saying.

Not every action is ethical. Not every choice requires ethical deliberation. My decision to play, or not play, baseball has nothing to do with ethics at all.

So you need something other than vague references to "actions" and "choices" if you want to make any sense of, and justify, all this seemingly unnecessary talk about morality. We don't need it. We can get by perfectly well just considering what we want and what's pragmatic.

But you're the one who objected that something cannot be pragmatic and moral in the first place — Leontiskos

I'm not saying that they can't be. I'm only saying that "pragmatic" and "moral" don't mean the same thing (see Moore's open question argument). When I asked you if it was pragmatic or moral, interpret it as an inclusive or.

What's up with all of this mumble-mouth crap? — GRWelsh

He's mentally challenged.

You're the one who said that not causing suffering is both pragmatic and moral, so I'm asking you what you mean by "moral" when you say this.

If that were so, your presence in this forum seems inexplicable. — Banno

Why?

You don't see the incongruity here? — Banno

No. Unless you want to argue for some form of naturalism where "moral" just means "pragmatic"? In which case see Moore's open question argument.

Do you agree with me that, ceteris paribus, one ought not cause suffering for themselves? — Leontiskos

As a pragmatic matter, yes. But I'm asking about morality.

It looks as if you have decided that you cannot act unless you are certain of what to do, and yet you must act and without certainty. So you are stuck. — Banno

I don't need to posit something like "moral obligations" to decide how to act. Wants and pragmatic concerns are more than sufficient.

In all the theorising in this thread we may lose track of the purpose of ethical thinking: to decide what to do. Ethics has to be about the relation between belief and action. — Banno

Lots of things we do have nothing to do with ethics. Lots of things we do are amoral. I don't sleep with men, play baseball, or cut my wrists.

So when do we get to the part where you actually explain morality?

In your other thread you ask if something like A1 is a moral claim or a pragmatic claim.

...

Why can't it be both? — Leontiskos

I accept that I have a pragmatic reason to not cause myself suffering. But what do you mean by saying that we also have a moral reason to not cause myself suffering? What does the term "moral" add? And what evidence or reasoning suggests that, in addition to being pragmatic, avoiding suffering is also moral?

Yep.

You choose for yourself what to believe. You choose whether to laugh with them or to stop them. — Banno

What does any of this have to do with morality and moral obligation?

But outside of this debate, you would not kick the puppy. That's not who you are. That's the point. — Banno

Others do. It's who they are.

One demonstrates the reality of the world by interacting with it, hence the reality of ethical statements by enacting them. — Banno

You don't kick a puppy. I kick a puppy. We've both interacted with the world.

Your comments don't really say anything relevant at all.

The mystery of the missing binder: How a collection of raw Russian intelligence disappeared under Trump

A binder containing highly classified information related to Russian election interference went missing at the end of Donald Trump’s presidency, raising alarms among intelligence officials that some of the most closely guarded national security secrets from the US and its allies could be exposed, sources familiar with the matter told CNN.

Its disappearance, which has not been previously reported, was so concerning that intelligence officials briefed Senate Intelligence Committee leaders last year about the missing materials and the government’s efforts to retrieve them, the sources said.

In the two-plus years since Trump left office, the missing intelligence does not appear to have been found.

The binder contained raw intelligence the US and its NATO allies collected on Russians and Russian agents, including sources and methods that informed the US government’s assessment that Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to help Trump win the 2016 election, sources tell CNN.

The intelligence was so sensitive that lawmakers and congressional aides with top secret security clearances were able to review the material only at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, where their work scrutinizing it was itself kept in a locked safe.

The binder was last seen at the White House during Trump’s final days in office. The former president had ordered it brought there so he could declassify a host of documents related to the FBI’s Russia investigation. Under the care of then-White House chief of staff Mark Meadows, the binder was scoured by Republican aides working to redact the most sensitive information so it could be declassified and released publicly.

...

But an unredacted version of the binder containing the classified raw intelligence went missing amid the chaotic final hours of the Trump White House. The circumstances surrounding its disappearance remain shrouded in mystery.

I take it that since you cannot make the possibility of any kind of moral obligation believable, you do not believe it is immoral to kill babies. Therefore there are no possible worlds in which we can discuss these worlds you propose as your presence makes them impossible. — unenlightened

That doesn't make sense. There's a possible world where I believe in moral obligation. There's a possible world where I'm a bartender. There's a possible where I dye my hair.

I'm not sure what you think possible worlds are.

But why must it end there? This seems like fleeing from battle while declaring your victory. Admitting that your belief is just an arbitrary dogma gets you points for honesty but not much else. — goremand

Some here seem overly fond of appeals to the stone.

I think that "queerness" is not easy to establish -- or, at least, is as hard to establish as "not-queer". I don't know how we get to a place where we know, or are even able to judge, what queerness is. — Moliere

Rather than "queer", how about "non-physical" and "non-mathematical"?

We can learn of and test physical and mathematical claims; empirically in the case of the physical and rationally by applying rules of inferences to some set of axioms in the case of mathematics (and other formal logical systems).

What about for moral claims? As that article continues to say, "in order to track such weird properties we would need 'some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else'."

What evidence or reasoning is there for such a thing? As @hypericin says, it introduces a new ontological category, apparently a propos of nothing. If you cannot justify the existence of such things, why posit them in the first place?

I suspect many just have something like a base need to "validate" their disgust of certain behaviours.

But I will just point out that you have undermined all of your thread which is based on various scenarios of "everyone believes..." — unenlightened

What do you mean by this?

There what is again?

In the first case, there is harm; in the second, no harm — Banno

There is harm in the second case. We're just not morally obligated to not harm.

This post explains it more clearly.

Value systems are not true or false. — Joshs

My questioning is direct at moral cognitivists, i.e. those who believe that moral propositions are truth-apt. In particular it's directed at ethical non-naturalists, i.e. those who believe that moral facts are non-natural, and robust moral realists, i.e. those who believe that moral facts are mind-independent.

I really don't understand what you are saying.

Here are two possible worlds:

1. We have a moral obligation to save the human race from extinction
2. We do not have a moral obligation to save the human race from extinction

If we believe that we have a moral obligation to save the human race from extinction then what is the practical difference between us being in world 1 (where our belief is true) and us being in world 2 (where our belief is false)?

In neither case do we know which world we're in, but in both cases we believe that we are in world 1.

If there is no practical difference then which world we're in is inconsequential. All that matters is that we believe that we have a moral obligation to save the human race from extinction and so act accordingly.

At least the house members you cited are acting in good faith — NOS4A2

Well that's delusional thinking.

But you cannot make the possibility believable? — unenlightened

I can't make the possibility of any kind of moral obligation believable. That's really what I'm trying to show here.

If it's logically possible for there to be a moral obligation to harm and if it's logically possible for there to be a moral obligation to not harm, and if there's no practical difference between being morally obligated to harm and being morally obligated to not harm, then moral obligations are a vacuous concept.

That’s why an inquiry is in order, to find the answers. — NOS4A2

So because some member of Biden's family (Hunter?) received money from some foreign company an impeachment inquiry into Presidential corruption is warranted? That's one hell of a stretch.

It's far more tenuous than any of the allegations against Trump, and yet you railed against them as being politically motivated. Do you recognize the hypocrisy and bias in your approach to this allegation against Biden?

What's written there is so vague that I can't say. e.g.:

"After the Chinese company wired the Biden associate account the $3 million, the Biden family received approximately $1,065,692 over a three-month period in different bank accounts."

Who is the "Biden associate"? What work was he doing for the Chinese company? Which members of the "Biden family" received money from him, and what work were they doing?

I suspect that the Republicans are being intentionally vague so as to give the false appearance of impropriety as part of their political stunt. Which is why they refused Hunter Biden's offer of a public testimony. They can't falsely accuse him of saying things he didn't actually say if everyone can hear it for themselves.

You would have to make that believable to me. — unenlightened

It simply follows from the fact that "we have a moral obligation to prevent environmental catastrophe and population crash" is not true by definition.

If it's not true by definition then it's not necessarily true, and if it's not necessarily true then it's possibly false. I believe that's straightforward modal logic?

I would not like to be around folk who do that shit. — Banno

What relevance is that? Is liking or not liking to be around folk the measure of obligation?

One ought keep one's promises.

And this because a promise just it the sort of thing one ought to keep. — Banno

Well that's just begging the question.

Such a world would at least have to be a world without humans — unenlightened

Why?

Unless "we have a moral obligation to prevent environmental catastrophe and population crash" is true by definition there is a possible world (with humans) in which we do not have a moral obligation to prevent environmental catastrophe and population crash.

And if it is true by definition then it's a case of ethical naturalism, in which case it's vulnerable to Moore's open question argument.

Well, looking at the first thing in the list, all it says is that "the Biden family" received a lot of money from foreign nationals whilst Joe Biden was Vice President.

What's the issue there? How much money did "the Trump family" receive from foreign nationals whilst Trump was President?

I don't understand what you're saying.

I cannot help you beyond pointing out that moral beliefs are efficacious, and some are life affirming and others life denying. — unenlightened

I agree. Moral beliefs are efficacious. But I'm asking about the efficacy of moral facts.

Given your comments, I have a more tailored question: what is the practical difference between a world in which we have a moral obligation to prevent environmental catastrophe and population crash and a world in which we don't have a moral obligation to prevent environmental catastrophe and population crash, assuming that in both worlds we believe that we have such a moral obligation and so act accordingly.