Comments

  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    and by 'fact' I mean 'a statement which corresponds to reality such that what it refers to about reality is there'Bob Ross

    So it is not a fact that Santa doesn't exist? I don't think it makes sense to say that Santa's non-existence is "there".
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    Yes. In order to know that there is a difference between two things, one must have access to both in order to compare them.creativesoul

    It's not that simplistic. I have no "access" to your parents and yet I know that they're different. Some things we understand rationally. The distinction between "analytic", "synthetic a priori", and "empirical" knowledge is central to Kant's philosophy.

    It's been a while since I've read him, but I think his argument is that knowledge of noumena is synthetic a priori, whereas you seem to be arguing that because it's not empirical then it's fallacious?

    Although I think modern science has discovered to an extent Kant's noumena; the fundamental particles of the Standard Model. They're the mind-independent things causally responsible for the subjective phenomena that we are familiar with.
  • Web development in 2023


    That's the entire purpose of things like public, protected, private, readonly, final, typing, interfaces, abstract, etc; to ensure that developers do things properly.

    If they choose to break the code, even unintentionally, perhaps they shouldn't even be coding in the first place.Outlander

    In reality things aren't this simple. People are fallible, we forget things and get tired. And especially with open source software, not every contributor is going to immediately know everything about every function and class and whatever. Being able to see at a glance 'protected "name"' immediately tells them that they're not supposed to do '$class->name = 'foo'''.

    Think of it as inline documentation with automatic error checking.
  • Web development in 2023


    That allows for public reassignment.

    $person->name = 'Mike';
    

    Often times you don't want that which is why such properties are usually protected or private.

    Perhaps a better example would be:

    class Person
    {
      public readonly string $initials;
      public function __construct(
        public readonly string $first_name,
        public readonly string $surname,
      )
      {
        $this->initials = substr($first_name, 0, 1) . substr($surname, 0, 1);
      }
    }
    
    $person = new Person('John Smith');
    
    echo $person->initials;
    
  • Web development in 2023
    I had to Google the "readonly" stipulation. What realistic (or even atypical) case scenarios can you provide that warrants its explicit use?Outlander

    You might want to get the name after creating the object.

    New way:
    class Person
    {
      public function __construct(public readonly string $name) {}
    }
    
    $person = new Person('Michael');
    
    echo $person->name;
    

    Old way:
    class Person
    {
      protected $name;
      public function __construct($name)
      {
        $this-name = $name;
      }
      public function getName()
      {
        return $this->name;
      }
    }
    
    $person = new Person('Michael');
    
    echo $person->getName();
    

    I'd much rather a default function-level based "error handling" (ie. not integer detected therefore, perform this) than a top level PHP error that breaks whatever the user is doing (and often the site or at least the specific action page in the process).

    They're optional. But it's to enforce good coding. If you're expecting an integer then you should write your code such that you only ever give it an integer. If at some point a string is being passed then you've coded it wrong. Strict typing ensures that these mistakes are picked up in development.
  • Web development in 2023
    Hopefully things haven't changed too much...Outlander

    How about

    class Person
    {
      public function __construct(
        public readonly string $name,
        public readonly int $age
      ) {}
    }
    
  • Web development in 2023
    the SQL stuff is a bit yikes to me.Jamal

    You might also say "what the fuck?" ;)

    Hence the name.
  • Web development in 2023
    I see you're using Typescript.Jamal

    My first time trying it. It takes some getting used to. I'm finding it more complicated that PHP's static typing.

    By the way, amongst the front-end frameworks, I've found Svelte to be the most enjoyable to work with.Jamal

    I've been using Preact at work. I like how small and fast it is. Briefly tried Vue and had a glance at Svelte, but my colleague is suggesting htmx for future projects so that's what I've been doing recently and what inspired me to make this.

    There's just so much to learn. :shade:

    I'm also in the process of building a PHP framework, inspired by Laravel but much smaller and faster. I just keep getting distracted by other things. :lol:

    It's a work in progress so not yet open source but parts of it are public anyway so check it out if you're interested: https://github.com/wtframework

    I'm particularly proud of the SQL statement builder (https://github.com/wtframework/sql). My intention is to allow for the full spec. Just need to finish off some CREATE and ALTER stuff (mostly to do with partitions).
  • Web development in 2023
    htmx and hyperscript are what inspired it
  • Web development in 2023
    @Jamal

    I was bored so spent the last day and a half building an experimental JSON-powered JavaScript framework. The idea came to me whilst getting my hair cut.

    https://github.com/on-js/on-js
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    "One cannot move pawns backwards."

    Is "objectively" true, but only in the context of playing a game of chess. Once that context is removed, it is objectively false: after all, I can move the piece backwards just as easily as any other direction. But note that the form of the sentence is no different than:

    "One cannot transmute lead into gold."

    Which is not dependent in its truth on any particular context.

    So the question is, are the truths of moral statements context dependent or context independent? To satisfy a moral arealist such as Bob Ross I think they must be context independent. But either way, the form in which the statements are posed cannot tell you that.
    hypericin

    Yes, this is a very good point, and shows that the nuances of objective truth isn't quite captured by the "realism" in moral realism.

    I've brought up mathematics before. Mathematical antirealists are not non-cognitivists, error theorists, or subjectivists; they believe in objective-like mathematical truths, albeit truths that do not depend on the mind-independent existence of abstract objects.

    I'm not sure if there's a popular "ism" that is comparable to this in metaethics. Moral realism seems like it could include the moral equivalents of both mathematical realism and mathematical antirealism.
  • An example where we can derive an "ought" from an "is"
    4 is required to get from the facts of hte matter, to the judgement about htose facts.AmadeusD

    (5) isn't a judgement; it's a fact.
  • An example where we can derive an "ought" from an "is"
    If nothing existed, that would be a state of affairs that included Santa not existing.AmadeusD

    Exactly. There are states of affairs even if there is no physical world. Something can be a state of affairs even if it does not "correspond" to something that physically exists. Therefore, your claim that if obligations do not "correspond" to something that physically exists then we have no obligations is a non sequitur.
  • An example where we can derive an "ought" from an "is"
    The brute facts remain:

    1. We exist
    2. We can be harmed
    3. We can harm others.
    4?????? (this is where i'm not seeing any work being done)
    5. One ought not harm.
    AmadeusD

    We don't need (4). (5) isn't derived from (1) - (3); it's brute (much like you have taken (1) to be brute).
  • An example where we can derive an "ought" from an "is"
    Which is extant in the state of the physical world - Santa isn't in it.AmadeusD

    Santa doesn't exist even if nothing exists. There are states of affairs even if there is no physical world; indeed, if a physical world doesn't exist then that a physical world doesn't exist is a state of affairs.

    And I had other examples too: that 1 + 1 = 2, that certain arguments are valid, that it is irrational to believe in something if the evidence suggests otherwise, etc.
  • An example where we can derive an "ought" from an "is"
    That is a physical state of affairs.AmadeusD

    Santa's non-existence isn't a physical thing. By definition it's the lack of a physical thing.
  • An example where we can derive an "ought" from an "is"
    "One ought not x" is only referential if you have a state of affairs to refer to. In this case, you haven't established it. You end up on 'brute fact' but i don't accept that position, so, as i actually began this part of the exchange - we have no further to go on this journey together.AmadeusD

    As I said above, it doesn't refer to anything that exists external to the mind, but as I have been at pains to explain, something doesn't need to exist for it to be a state of affairs. That Santa doesn't exist is a state of affairs.

    You seem to be suggesting that something is a state of affairs if it is (or was? or will be?) a physical thing. Realists reject this assumption. There are non-physical states of affairs; that Santa doesn't exist, that 1 + 1 = 2, that certain arguments are valid, that it is irrational to believe in something if the evidence suggests otherwise, etc. Moral realists argue that that one ought not harm another is another such non-physical state of affairs.
  • An example where we can derive an "ought" from an "is"
    It's the linguistic representation of a thought, not a state of affairs. If your position is that a sentence is necessarily representative of a state of affairs, i find that bizarre and hard to grasp.

    No, i understand the distinction you're making.
    AmadeusD

    You clearly don't understand the distinction.

    "The cat is on the mat" is the linguistic representation of a thought, but that the cat is on the mat is not the linguistic representation of a thought; it's a state of affairs. Note the difference that removing the quotation marks makes.
  • An example where we can derive an "ought" from an "is"


    You said:

    "One ought not x" ... is a thought, not a state of affairs.

    Firstly, "one ought not x" is a sentence, not a thought. Specifically, in this case, it is a written sentence.

    Secondly, I'm not saying that "one ought not x" is a state of affairs; I'm saying that that one ought not x is a state of affairs. Note the lack of quotation marks; it's important. Again, see the use-mention distinction.

    it certainly doesn't refer to anything external to the mind.AmadeusD

    It doesn't refer to anything that exists external to the mind, but as I have been at pains to explain, something doesn't need to exist for it to be a state of affairs. That Santa doesn't exist is a state of affairs.
  • An example where we can derive an "ought" from an "is"


    You should look up the use-mention distinction.

    "The cat is on the mat" is a sentence. That the cat is on the mat is a state-of-affairs.
    "One ought not harm another" is a sentence. That one ought not harm another is a state-of-affairs.
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism


    You misunderstand what that is saying.

    Moral realism claims that there are facts of the matter about which actions are right and which are wrong.

    Moral realism doesn't claim that these actions are right and that these actions are wrong.

    One can be a moral realist and claim that moral sentences are truth-apt and describe objective features of the world without commenting on whether or not abortion is wrong.

    This is the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics. Moral realism – like non-cognitivism, subjectivism, and error theory – is a theory in metaethics. Utilitarianism and deontology are theories in normative ethics.
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    all “alien” refers to is non-human, non-Earthbound life forms. All of those elements have direct referents which we almalgamate.AmadeusD

    The sentence "angels do not live in Heaven" is true even though the words "angel" and "heaven" do not refer to anything.

    But noting the issue you’re outlining my question is - what moral facts could exist a priori? That is, without human knowledge of them?AmadeusD

    That we ought not eat babies. It's true even if we all believe otherwise (and even if we never consider it at all).

    What are we discovering when we come across moral facts?AmadeusD

    We are discovering moral facts. You seem to be asking me to reduce moral facts to non-moral facts. Moral facts can't be reduced to non-moral facts. See Hume.
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    As I understand it, "moral realism" --I don't like and never use this term-- is basically about making a list of what things are right and what are wrong.Alkis Piskas

    No, that's normative ethics.
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    Moral truths are necessarily attendant to the world in which we live. They must refer.AmadeusD

    If there is no intelligent alien life in the universe then the sentence "there is no intelligent alien life in the universe" is true, even though the phrase "intelligent alien life" wouldn't refer to anything that exists.

    If one ought not eat babies then the sentence "one ought not eat babies" is true, even though the phrase "ought not" wouldn't refer to anything that exists.

    I see no reason to believe your assertion that if obligation isn't a physical then then there are no obligations. You have yet to justify this assertion.
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    mathematical facts are not moral facts.AmadeusD

    I'm not saying that mathematical facts are moral facts.

    I'm saying that mathematical truths do not depend on the existence of anything (whether material or abstract).

    Therefore, it is fallacious to say that truths depend on the existence of something (whether material or abstract).

    Therefore, it is prima facie fallacious to say that moral truths depend on the existence of something (whether material or abstract).

    You need positive evidence or reasoning to assert that moral truths depend on the existence of something (whether material or abtract).
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism


    Carrying on from this, one of these must be true:

    1. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of spacetime
    2. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of material objects
    3. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of abstract objects
    4. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of magic
    5. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of God
    6. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of [some other thing]
    7. Mathematical truths do not depend on the existence of anything
    8. There are no mathematical truths

    I know that mathematical realists will say that (3) is true. Mathematical antirealists like myself will disagree. I can't even make sense of the existence of abstract objects. I certainly will say that (1), (2), (4), and (5) are false.

    That leaves me with (6), (7), and (8). I'm unwilling to accept (8) and I can't comment on (6) because it doesn't really say anything.

    So I must accept that (7) is true.

    And if mathematical truths do not depend on the existence of anything then I see no reason to dismiss the claim that moral truths do not depend on the existence of anything.

    Finally, as a passing consideration, "Santa does not exist" being true does not depend on the existence of anything. Rather, by definition, it depends on the non-existence of something (namely, Santa), and I don't think it makes sense to say that Santa's non-existence is itself the existence of something (such as an abstract object).

    Now replace “Santa” with “objective moral fact.” Error theory being correct depends on an objective truth that does not depend on the existence of anything, and so an error theorist dismissing realism on the grounds that it depends on an objective truth that does not depend on the existence of anything is self-refuting.
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    Just because it seems as though there are moral facts because we colloquially express our norms in a moral realist kind of manner does not entail they exist whatsoever: it's a non-sequitur.Bob Ross

    I’m not saying that there are moral facts.

    I'll set out my argument as clear as I can:

    1. All moral sentences assert that there is some objective moral fact
    2. Either there is at least one objective moral fact or there are no objective moral facts
    3. If there is at least one objective moral fact then at least one moral sentence is true
    4. If there are no objective moral facts then all moral sentences are false
    5. If at least one moral sentence is true then realism is correct
    6. If all moral sentences are false then error theory is correct
    7. Therefore, either realism is correct or error theory is correct
    8. The sentence "one ought not eat babies" is a moral sentence
    9. If error theory is correct then the sentence "one ought not eat babies" is false
    10. If the sentence "one ought not eat babies" is false then it is not the case that one ought not eat babies
    11. Therefore, if error theory is correct then it is not the case that one ought not eat babies
    12. Therefore, either realism is correct or it is not the case that one ought not eat babies
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    I can't figure out how a moral fact could escape needing to be tied to space and timeAmadeusD

    Do mathematical facts need to be "tied" to space and time? Or are there no mathematical facts?
  • Reason for believing in the existence of the world
    I don't think this is right: the statement is valid, but in that abstract generic form is not truth apt.Janus

    1. All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs
    2. "All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs" is a valid argument

    I'm not saying that (1) is objectively true; I'm saying that (2) is objectively true.

    It is objectively true that (1) is valid, and this does not depend on the existence of an external world; it certainly does not depend on the existence of spacetime or any material object, and I would even say that it does not depend on the existence of any abstract object (à la Platonism).

    Objective truths do not depend on the existence of anything (except in the obvious case of something like "X exists").
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    You seem to be talking about normative ethics, applied ethics, and/or descriptive ethics. I'm talking about metaethics.

    Metaethics:

    One of the central debates within analytic metaethics concerns the semantics of what is actually going on when people make moral statements such as “Abortion is morally wrong” or “Going to war is never morally justified.” The metaethical question is not necessarily whether such statements themselves are true or false, but whether they are even the sort of sentences that are capable of being true or false in the first place (that is, whether such sentences are “truth-apt”) and, if they are, what it is that makes them “true.” On the surface, such sentences would appear to possess descriptive content—that is, they seem to have the syntactical structure of describing facts in the world—in the same form that the sentence “The cat is on the mat” seems to be making a descriptive claim about a cat on a mat; which, in turn, is true or false depending on whether or not there really is a cat on the mat. To put it differently, the sentence “The cat is on the mat” seems to be expressing a belief about the way the world actually is. The metaethical view that moral statements similarly express truth-apt beliefs about the world is known as cognitivism. Cognitivism would seem to be the default view of our moral discourse given the apparent structure that such discourse appears to have.

    I have extended this line of reasoning to argue that moral sentences seem to be expressing a belief about the way the world objectively is. The sentence "it is wrong to eat babies" is closer in kind to the sentence "the cat is on the mat" than it is to the sentence "chocolate is tasty."

    When we claim that chocolate is tasty we are expressing an opinion but when we claim that it is wrong to eat babies we are doing more than just expressing an opinion. We disagree about morality in a way very unlike how we disagree about the tastiness of certain foods.

    As such, it seems clear that subjectivism (like non-cognitivism) misunderstands the meaning of moral sentences.

    Therefore, either moral realism is correct or error theory is correct, and if error theory is correct then it is not the case that it is wrong to eat babies.
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    I am not quite sure what you mean by "theory of meaning"Bob Ross

    Theories of Meaning

    nor why I would need it for this discussion.Bob Ross

    The starting point of any metaethics is the question "what do moral statements mean?".

    When I say "you ought not murder" am I saying something like "don't murder" (non-cognitivism), am I saying something like "I disapprove of murder" (subjectivism), or am I trying to describe an objective feature of the world (realism and error theory).

    My example argument is that non-cognitivists and subjectivists misunderstand the meaning of moral statements: "you ought not murder" just doesn't mean either "don't murder" or "I disapprove of murder". When we claim something like "one ought not murder" we are trying to describe an objective feature of the world. As such, if there are such features then realism is true and if there aren't such features then error theory is true.
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    what's the source of the state of affairsAmadeusD

    I'm not sure what you're asking.

    I can only imagine (as previously mentioned) a supernatural origin for such a brute claim.AmadeusD

    What do you mean by "supernatural"? If you mean "non-physical" then yes, the moral realist will accept that moral facts are not physical facts; a moral statement being true has nothing to do with the existence of matter, energy, space, or time. Some moral realists may believe in the existence of abstract moral entities (much like mathematical realists believe in the existence of abstract mathematical entities), but I don't think this is required.
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    "One ought not harm others". Its a judgment, not a state of affairs. But i've just realised we've been over thisAmadeusD

    Yes, we have. The moral realist will say that that one ought not harm another is a state of affairs.
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    But the statement is an opinion, not universally held.AmadeusD

    What statement?
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    Are you suggesting that what is necessarily an opinion, not universally held, is a brute fact, with this statement?AmadeusD

    No.
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    or how to get from an is to an ought.GRWelsh

    There need not be an ought from an is. There need only be an ought.
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    I'd rather not divert this discussion into one on the merits of ordinary language philosophy.

    If one accepts ordinary language philosophy then the argument I presented might be used to support moral realism. A moral realist who doesn't accept ordinary language philosophy will offer a different argument.
  • Reason for believing in the existence of the world
    If there are any examples of (b) then this proves that the world exists
    even if the world is mere a projection from one's own mind.
    PL Olcott

    That's not the kind of world that the OP is asking about. It's clearly talking about something like a world of mind-independent material objects. The very first sentence of the OP reads: "I have been asked ... if I believed in the existence of the world, when I am not perceiving it" and later mentioned being asked "if I believed in the existence of the cup, when I was not seeing it."

    Pain isn't proof that fists exist when not being perceived.
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    Indeed, our aggrieved “ordinary language” response to such a situation, if it's revealed, is, “You didn’t mean it!” So what’s going on here?J

    You're equivocating. When we say "you didn't mean it" we're not saying something like "the words you used didn't mean what they (ordinarily) mean". Instead we're saying something like "you weren't being honest."