Sorry, I don't understand how pointing out a fatal flaw in a claim isn't a rebuttal? Deny facts that exist is surely a fatal flaw in a posiiton? — AmadeusD

John says that God exists.
Jane says that John's claim is fatally flawed because God doesn't exist.

Jane says that God doesn't exist.
John says that Jane's claim is fatally flawed because God does exist.

Michael says that moral facts cannot be explained in non-moral terms.
AmadeusD says that Michael's claim is fatally flawed because moral facts can be explained in non-moral terms.

AmadeusD says that moral facts can be explained in non-moral terms.
Michael says that AmadeusD's claim is fatally flawed because moral facts cannot be explained in non-moral terms.

None of these are rebuttals. They're just two people stating their conflicting beliefs.

I'm aware that is the naturalist position - but my position is that: that is factually wrong. There are further explanations available and to just ignore them doesn't constitute it being impossible. Unsure if i can clarify that further. — AmadeusD

Then you're simply stating your disagreement with ethical non-naturalism (and moral realism). That's fine, but it doesn't constitute a rebuttal of their position.

And as I said, that's ethical naturalism. Those kinds of explanations are impossible for ethical non-naturalism.

According to ethical non-naturalism, moral facts cannot be explained in non-moral terms, so arguing that ethical non-naturalism is false because it cannot explain moral facts in non-moral terms is begging the question.

What "deep facts"?

Because that position is ignorant of the deeper facts related to any moral claim. — AmadeusD

All you seem to be saying here is that moral realism is incorrect.

Obviously this is begging the question.

Yes. I am pointing out the flaw in that notion. — AmadeusD

Why is it a flaw? If infinitism is incorrect then there are, necessarily, brute physical facts. If there are brute physical facts then why can't there be brute moral facts?

You've not at all understood what i actually said - which is that there are further explanations that they choose not to engage.

"One ought not kick puppies for fun"

Why?

"Because it hurts the puppy"

And then there's a further conversation. — AmadeusD

That's ethical naturalism. Ethical non-naturalism, by definition, cannot offer this kind of explanation.

If ethical non-naturalism is correct then either:

1) "one ought not X" is a brute fact, or
2) "one ought not X" is true because "one ought not Y" is true, and "one ought not Y" is a brute fact.

It seemed to me to be asking why we ought to do what we ought to do. — Banno

The question is one about motivation. Knowing that I ought to do something isn't always enough to convince me to do it. Sometimes I do things I know I ought not do.

If it could be proved that I ought eat babies I still wouldn't.

is that it may not be the case that there is no explanation — AmadeusD

There are three possible options:

1. There are no moral facts (error theory)
2. There are moral facts that can be explained by non-moral facts (ethical naturalism)
3. There are moral facts that cannot be explained by non-moral facts (ethical non-naturalism)

If ethical non-naturalism is correct then moral facts cannot be explained by physics or mathematics or anything non-moral. So what sort of explanation do you expect from then?

The thing is, there are areas of research pointing to there being explanations beyond mere brute fact. See Jon Haidt's The Rightous Mind. There is value in understanding one's tendencies to moral judgement in order to deal with those tendencies skillfully. — wonderer1

You seem to be confusing metaethics with descriptive ethics. Moral facts, as per moral realism, are independent from our moral judgements.

How do you know they are brute facts? By your inability to explain them? — hypericin

If moral facts are not reducible to non-moral facts (whether physical or mathematical or magical) then they must be brute.

Whereas here, the moral realists seem to use the notion of brute facts to excuse them from offering any explanations whatsoever. — hypericin

If moral facts are brute facts then there is no explanation.

Has your position on this remained the same over the intervening years? — Leontiskos

Yes.

Its you realists that struggle, that are throw up your hands and say "whelp, its a brute fact, what else can I say! Explanation's gotta stop somewhere!" — hypericin

It's either that or infinitism.

Brute facts seem more reasonable to me than an infinite regress.

How are moral facts discovered? — bert1

Kant said through pure practical reason. Others say via ethical intuition.

Also, of they contradict ones own values, how does one choose what to do? — bert1

I asked this question myself several years ago.

In a universe consisting of nothing, would 1 + 1 = 2? — hypericin

Yes.

It would not be empirically verifiable. — hypericin

Does that matter? Does something need to be empirically verifiable for it to be true? Are you an antirealist about truth in general?

I don't understand how metaethics can be so neatly separated from normative ethics.
All ethics are, by their nature, normative, that's the point of ethics. How can there be any talk about ethics that is not normative? — baker

There's a simple description of the distinction on the Wikipedia page for normative ethics:

Normative ethics is distinct from meta-ethics in that the former examines standards for the rightness and wrongness of actions, whereas the latter studies the meaning of moral language and the metaphysics of moral facts.

Metaethics:
1. Moral propositions are not truth-apt (non-cognitivism)
2. Moral propositions are truth-apt (cognitivism)
3. All moral propositions are false (error theory)
4. Some moral propositions are objectively true (moral realism)
5. Some moral propositions are subjectively true (moral subjectivism)

Normative ethics:
1. Pleasure is good (hedonism)
2. Maximising happiness and well-being is good (utilitarianism)
3. Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law (categorical imperative)

Can you name any other such brute fact about something that doesn't exist? — hypericin

1 + 1 = 2.

I have to say, I feel that the NY civil case against Trump Corp's valuation practises is on very shaky ground and will get tossed on appeal. As Trump keeps saying, valuation is a subjective process, and furthermore none of the banks who accepted his inflated valuations brought a complaint about them or apparently lost any money. Neither did the IRS with respect to valuations quoted for tax purposes. (And boy do I hate it when Trump is right about something.) — Wayfarer

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1344

Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice—
(1)to defraud a financial institution; or
(2)to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises ...

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1014

Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or report, or willfully overvalues any land, property or security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the action ...

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/6662

(a)Imposition of penalty
If this section applies to any portion of an underpayment of tax required to be shown on a return, there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 20 percent of the portion of the underpayment to which this section applies.

(b)Portion of underpayment to which section applies

This section shall apply to the portion of any underpayment which is attributable to 1 or more of the following:

...

(3) Any substantial valuation misstatement under chapter 1.

The law is pretty clear. You can't just decide for yourself that your property is worth $10,000,000 when asking for a loan but worth $1,000 when paying your taxes. One or both are clearly, criminally, fraudulent.

So in a world without minds, would a complete taxonomy of this world included oughts and values? — hypericin

In the counterfactual sense that "if there were minds then those minds ought not..." would be true.

Much like the counterfactual sentence "if the Tyrannosaurus rex still lived then it would be the largest living land animal on Earth" is true.

There can be objective truths about things that don't exist.

"Ham objectively and absolutely tastes better than chicken": taste is subjective and provisional by nature, the statement is internally contradictory and therefore not truth-apt. Or, self-falsifying. — hypericin

I wouldn’t say that it’s internally contradictory, just that it’s factually incorrect.

A good example is that of colour. It’s not internally contradictory to claim that grass is objectively and absolutely green, but given that I’m not a colour realist I would argue that this is factually incorrect. Colour is “in the head” (like taste). Obviously colour realists argue otherwise.

The same disagreement applies in meta ethics. Moral realism may be factually incorrect, but I don’t think it’s internally contradictory.

Every "should", "ought", and value proposition, may be perfectly truth-apt, but it must explicitly or implicitly include an "according to" clause, just to be structurally correct. — hypericin

Well that’s just where moral realists disagree.

And indeed any such "brute moral fact" might necessarily be false, or not truth apt. — hypericin

If it’s false then it’s not a brute fact. If it’s a brute fact then it’s true.

Yes. Moral sentences are truth-apt but all false.

Or there could be no such true brute facts such as the categorical imperative. Or, such ultimate moral propositions may not be truth-apt, while everyday moral claims, being claims about such ultimate propositions, are perfectly truth apt. — hypericin

That would be moral subjectivism?

Although I would argue against moral subjectivism on the grounds that when we make moral claims we don't usually think of ourselves to be just expressing a subjective opinion. This is why there is such a strong disagreement. When I say that X is good and you say that X is bad, you don't tell me that it might be good for me; you tell me that I'm wrong.

Rightly or wrongly we mean to assert an objective moral fact, and as such it must be that either moral realism or error theory is correct.

Or even moral nihilism. — frank

That is error theory?

Or are you saying the categorical imperative itself is the brute fact, for Kant. — hypericin

Yes.

Moral statements being truth apt doesn't entail moral realism. — frank

I agree with that. It could be that error theory or moral subjectivism are correct.

I'm a little confused. Are you saying that moral sentences aren't truth-apt or are you saying that moral sentences being truth-apt does not entail moral realism?

I'm not sure who would argue for the latter. Moral sentences being truth-apt also allows for error theory and moral subjectivism.

I'm also unsure of the relevance of being a deflationist. Even if one is a correspondence theorist or a coherence theorist it is still the case that moral sentences being truth-apt also allows for error theory and moral subjectivism.

The problem is that's doesn't lead to the moral realism as a conclusion if you're a deflationist. — frank

My understanding of moral realism is that it is the theory that some moral propositions are true in such a way that if everyone believes that they are false then everyone is wrong.

Why can't a moral realist believe this and also be a deflationist?

But I do have a problem equating something which can be necessarily inferred from a state of affairs, to something which truly is malleable to opinion (that one ought not x). There is nothing that makes this true if no one believes it. I think that’s probably a fairly comprehensible difference. I know that may not be your position - just giving my position on that, given we appear to have come to terms. — AmadeusD

All you seem to be saying here is that you're not a moral realist. Obviously moral realists disagree with you; that one ought not X isn't malleable to opinion and there is something that makes "one ought not X" true if no one believes it: that one ought not X.

In the moral realist case (and this seems plainly evident with a fellow such as Banno) the claim is made…. And that’s it. It’s not inferred or exemplified or entailed by or understood in relation to anything which does exist. — AmadeusD

The same is true of mathematics. It is true that 1 + 1 = 2 even though this has nothing to do with the physical existence of anything. There are some, i.e. mathematical realists, who explain this by positing the existence of abstract mathematical objects, but I don't think that this is required. Mathematical anti-realists can believe that 1 + 1 = 2 even if everyone believes otherwise.

And perhaps some moral realists explain moral realism by positing the existence of abstract moral objects.

As much as it can be stated that its “the way things are” so to speak, that is incoherent as there’s zero evidence for it let alone good evidence.

You can verify the equation. You can’t verify a moral claim. — AmadeusD

Some think you can verify a moral claim. Kant attempted to prove the categorical imperative using what he called pure practical reason.

But even if you can't, it doesn't then follow that moral realism is false. It is possible that a) there is some sentence "one ought not X" that is non-subjectively true and that b) it is impossible to verify or falsify this sentence.

There are plenty of truth-apt sentences that cannot be proven or disproven, e.g. "the universe was created by a transcendent intelligent designer" and "if Hitler hadn't killed himself then he would have been arrested."

As I said before, if your only objection is that moral realists haven't proven that there are brute moral facts then I won't object. My only argument here is to refute the suggestion that all brute facts must have something to do with physical (or abstract) existence.

If that's what you mean by "objective" then I will use the term "non-subjective" instead.

Some truths are non-subjective, i.e. are true even if everyone believes otherwise.

The sentence "Santa does not exist" is true, and is so even if everyone believes that Santa does exist. If everyone believes that Santa does exist then everyone is wrong. "Santa does not exist" is non-subjectively true.

Moral realists claim that some sentence "one ought not X" is true, and is so even if everyone believes that one ought X. If everyone believes that one ought X then everyone is wrong. "One ought not X" is non-subjectively true.

The non-subjective truth of "one ought not X" does not depend on the existence of some particular physical or abstract object. The non-subjective truth of "one ought not X" does not depend on the existence of anything. The non-subjective truth of "one ought not X" has nothing to do with existence at all.

Exactly like the non-subjective truth of "1 + 1 = 2".

It just is the case that 1 + 1 = 2 and just is the case that one ought not X, and if everyone believes otherwise then everyone is wrong.

'Santa does not exist' can't be objectively true because it refers to no object. — AmadeusD

Why does something need to refer to an object to be objectively true? To be objectively true just means that it's true irrespective of subjective opinion.

If everyone believes that Santa exists then everyone is wrong because Santa doesn't exist.

How does one discover and verify such brute facts? — hypericin

That is the key question that moral realists need to answer. Kant, for example, believed that this could be done using what he called pure practical reason, leading him to the categorical imperative.

Presumably you meant "...why there is something..." — hypericin

No, my point is that if moral facts are brute facts then there is no answer to the "why". But it is reasonable to ask the realist to prove "that" there are brute moral facts.

Physicists can empirically verify is (with reference to definition, sure). Moral facts are not amendable to the same verification. I think this is the trouble, though i agree that's how realists see their position. — AmadeusD

Proving that something is the case isn't the same as proving why something is the case.

I'm saying that there is no explanation for why electrons are negatively charged, and that there is no explanation for why one ought not do something.

If all you want to say is that moral realists haven't proven that there is something that one ought not do then I won't object.

I just can't conceive of a moral statement being self-evident — AmadeusD

I said that they're brute facts, not that they're self-evident. It is a brute fact that electrons are negatively charged particles, but it isn't self-evident.

So when we look at the "One ought not keep slaves" statement, there HAS to be a 'why' or 'in what condition' that obtains. — AmadeusD

Why are electrons negatively charge particles?

No. This is merely another inference from the actual state of affairs, which is only able to capture that which is, not that which isn't. Re: teh second quote there, they don't come into contact with what actually is and so have no truth-value.

If you don't accept that, fair enough - but it seems pretty clear we're not misunderstanding each other anymore which i think is good. — AmadeusD

These statements are true:

1) there is no ball in the room
2) there is no elephant in the room

This statement is false:

3) there is no ball in the room iff there is no elephant in the room

Therefore, whatever it is that makes (1) true isn't what makes (2) true. This is the case even if the room is the only thing that exists.

Therefore, something other than everything that exists (the room) is a necessary truth-condition.

Therefore, not all truth conditions are things that exist.

If I have an inner monologue it’s definitely not auditory. I think for me it’s just micro tongue movements as if I was talking. When I focus on my tongue and try to keep it perfectly still I find that I can’t really think any words.

You don't have an internal monologue/voice? — RogueAI

https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/blog/intersections/202304/inner-monologues-what-are-they-and-whos-having-them

30-50% of people have inner monologues.

So, I just disagree with this. Those are referencing the same state-of-affairs, but noting different things that are not in that state-of-affairs.

The room in both cases is the exact same: the same couch, same chair, etc.; so why would noting there isn't A vs. B, assuming they both are not in the room, refer to a different state-of-affairs?

For any given state-of-affairs, there is an infinite amount of things of which their existence cannot be found therein and, thusly, can be predicated as "not there". — Bob Ross

Then you're just using the term "state of affairs" differently to me.

Are you familiar with the distinction between truth makers and truth bearers? A truth bearer is a truth-apt sentence such as "the cat is on the mat." A truth maker is the condition that must be satisfied for a truth bearer to be true.

I use the terms "state of affairs" and "truth maker" interchangeably, but if you don't then I'll rephrase what I said above:

That there is no ball in your room is a truth maker.
That there is no elephant in your room is a different truth maker.

This must be the case otherwise it would be the case that "there is no ball in your room" is true iff there is no elephant in your room, which is of course false.

If your room is the only thing that exists then it is the case that a) just one thing exists and b) there are (at least) two different truth makers.

Therefore, a truth maker cannot be reduced to the thing(s) that exist(s).

Moral realists claim that some truth bearer "one ought not X" is true because a particular truth maker – that one ought not X – objectively obtains.

Their position has nothing to do with what does or doesn't physically (or abstractly) exist.

But the fact that different people have different values means that there is no point-of-view invariant value, as value depends on the point of view. — bert1

I'm not sure what you mean here by "value". I am simply saying that moral realists believe that there is some X such that "one ought not X" is a brute fact.

Asking them to explain why it's the case that one ought not X is like asking the physicist why electrons are negatively charged particles. There's just no answer to this question.

Correct. The proposition "there is no ball in my room" is true iff the state-of-affairs in my room is such that it excludes the existence of the ball. Michael appears to think, if I am understanding them correctly, that it being true is in virtue of a state-of-affairs which does not exist but makes it true. — Bob Ross

That there is no ball in your room is a state of affairs.
That there is no elephant in your room is a different state of affairs.

There is one room but there are (at least) two different states of affairs.

If your room is the only thing that exists then it is the case that a) just one thing exists and b) there are (at least) two different states of affairs.

Therefore, a state of affairs cannot be reduced to the the thing(s) that exist(s).