How can we know, therefore, that we "really" have eyes and brain? How can we know that we cannot know? How can we know that the telephone "really" works the way you claim it works? How does an indirect realist escape from global epistemological scepticism? — unenlightened

If we assume that we do have eyes and brains, and that the mechanics of perception is as we currently understand it to be, then the explanation above shows indirect realism to be the case. If we assume that we don’t have eyes and brains, and that the mechanics of perception isn’t as we currently understand it to be, then we’ve assumed indirect realism to be the case.

Either way, it just isn’t possible to maintain direct realism.

In the case of indirect realism, the DA converter is your central nervous system. You have no way to assess how the construction of your own CNS compares to the source of the stimulus. That's a long standing problem with indirect realism — frank

That's not a problem with indirect realism. That's the very point that indirect realism is making. The argument between direct and indirect realism is regarding the epistemological problem of perception; how can we know that the external world "really is" as we see and hear and feel it to be? The indirect realist argues that we can't know this, because the quality of our experiences is determined not just by the external stimulus but also by our eyes and brain.

Seeing an apple is, in principle, just like talking to you on the phone. It's indirect. There's a lot of stuff going on in between that manipulates what is seen and heard. I can't know that it's really you I'm talking to, or that what you sound like on the phone is what you would sound like were we to meet in real life, and I can't know that the thing outside my head really is an apple, or that the colour I see it to be (red) is the colour it has even when I'm not looking. And in fact on this latter point, I think the very idea of external things "having" colours even when not being looked at (i.e. colour realism) is nonsense, and so indirect realism is certainly correct on that account.

Another oddity with indirect realism is that it implies that communication is always between me and someone I've constructed. — frank

How so? Do you think of a phone call as direct communication with someone? Or as communication with a person constructed by the phone's speakers?

I would say that if I talk to someone on the phone then it is both indirect and the case that I am talking to them, not to the phone or whatever. And this shows the very flaw with the direct realist's "semantic" argument against indirect realism. Simply arguing that we "see a tree, not a mental representation of a tree" doesn't actually address indirect realism at all.

Here's my incredible photoshopping skills at work.



The sphere with blue and green patterns is a mental "representation" of the external wave-particles that stimulate the receptors in left man's eyes. The sphere with orange and brown patterns is a mental "representation" of the external wave-particles that stimulate the receptors in the right man's eyes. That is indirect realism.

Once again, arguing over the semantics of whether we should say "I see the external thing(s) that stimulate the receptors in my eye" or "I see a mental 'representation' of the external thing(s) that stimulate the receptors in my eye" is a red herring.

The question is: does indirect realism undermine itself? If you note in the image above, the indirect scenario has a guy seeing a faulty representation of the object. If this is his only access to the world, can he be an indirect realist without contradiction? In other words, if his view of the world is faulty (or at least possibly unreliable), why should he believe the impressions that led him to consider indirectness in the first place? — frank

Your picture promotes the very misleading premise that the indirect realist argues against. The thing between the two men shouldn't look like anything. The thing in the middle should, at best, be a mass of wave-particles, which both men then see as whatever they see it to be, e.g. a sphere with blue and green patterns.

If the castle is as free as the small flat, how do we distribute housing? Maybe ownership only gets handed down from the previous system, meaning the castles are in possession of the ones who previously owned it, but nothing would prevent the poor to move in when the rich die. — Christoffer

Well, single people get flats, families get houses, castles get knocked down and replaced with something more reasonable, and those who continue to work in whatever jobs can't be done by AI get extra money and so can buy the nicer stuff.

I find the potential futures we face due to AI changing the nature of work in relation to people's concept of purpose through work, to be fascinating as it is a very possible future we face. — Christoffer

Yes, a lot of people seem to think of work as being something other than an economic necessity. Not something I've ever understood. I do it because I have to do it to earn money. I don't do because it's "fulfilling" or an indictor of good character or whatever.

Anyway, apologies @Pierre-Normand for going off topic.

I'm not saying we won't improve. I'm saying it has the capacity to outcompete us. For example, someone who has traditionally hired a blogger to create content can probably already achieve a similar or even superior result in many cases using this tool. And we're just beginning. E.g. Movies scripted by AI and acted by photo-realistic avatars are probably not far around the corner. It's a socially transformative technology and it appears to be moving very quickly. — Baden

Hopefully we're heading towards a world where most of the work is done by AI and the rest of us get a decent universal basic income.

He knows some of the idiots who support him are unhinged and will riot if he's arrested.

The fear of you acting on them influences me, the voter. — NOS4A2

Then your fear is the election interference, not my words.

It certainly does influence voters. — NOS4A2

So my words can influence you, the voter.

I never brought up the influence angle, but should you remain consistent, maybe you can alter my mind with your words enough so as to influence me to believe that threatening civil unrest should an election not go your way is not election interference. — NOS4A2

What is election interference if not the unjust influence of an election? In what way do threats of civil unrest interfere with an election if not by influencing the result? And in what way do threats of civil unrest influence the result if not by influencing voters?

Perhaps given your propensity for sorcery you can move me with your words to believe the same as you do. — NOS4A2

Well that's a transparent deflection.

Again, your words are not influencing anything. My belief that you may act on your words do. Is this going completely over your head? — NOS4A2

You believing what you do isn't me engaging in election interference.

and threat of this future activity is more than enough to get people to do what you want. — NOS4A2

Sorry, but my words are still not influencing anything.

You can't even maintain a consistent argument across two posts.

Yeah, sorry, your words are still not influencing anything. They do not have the causal effects you pretend they do. Your words only reveal what you think. What influences me are my own fears of what might happen should you get violent and burn my business down. — NOS4A2

Then threats of protests aren't election interference. They don't prevent people from voting. They don't make it harder for people to vote. They don't dissuade people from voting. They don't persuade them to vote for someone else.

If Trump supporters didn't vote for Trump because they were afraid then they only have themselves to blame for his loss.

Given the mass violence and rioting of that year, you don’t think threatening the country with more civil unrest is any kind of threat to voters? — NOS4A2

What does it matter if it's a threat to voters? It's not election interference because according to you we can't influence other people, and so can't influence their decision to vote (or not):

Linguistic activity does not have the causal effects you claim they do. At best such activity makes concrete what the speaker thinks. Here they reveal what Isaac thinks, nothing more. The effects on me never manifest, however. I’ll be sure to let you know if they do, though. — NOS4A2

According to you, any Trump supporter who chose not to vote out of fear of what would happen were Trump to win only has himself to blame. You can't blame them not voting on Democrat protestations.

Are you finally going to abandon this position? And perhaps also argue that people shouldn't be allowed to threaten protests? That would also require abandoning your free speech absolutism.

what is threatening mass protest should their opponent win and advocating for the censorship of opposing views? — NOS4A2

A First Amendment right?

Certainly not election interference as according to you it’s impossible to influence another’s decision to vote.

Election interference is now “preventing or making it harder for people to vote”, according to Michael. — NOS4A2

Election interference is letting people vote, according to NOS4A2.

What was once a form of voter fraud became legal in many states right before an election, and it worked in the current president’s favor. “Democracy”, right? — NOS4A2

It made it easier for voters to vote, and the fact is that the majority of voters preferred Biden. So yes, that’s democracy.

Whereas the opposing view, that making it easier for voters to vote is a bad thing because it favours one’s opponent, is textbook anti-democratic authoritarianism.

They altered laws because it would have otherwise been illegal to do what they did. — NOS4A2

Yes, that’s what it means to change a law. This is such absurd rhetoric.

Sorry, repeating “democracy” isn’t going to work. — NOS4A2

Sorry, but denying the fact that making it easier for voters to vote is a good thing isn’t going to work.

There is really no way to defend censoring information that makes your favourite candidate look bad, so don’t bother. — NOS4A2

I’m not defending it. I’m saying that it isn’t election interference. It doesn’t prevent or make it harder for people to vote, and according to your logic it doesn’t influence voting decisions.

No matter the explanation they’ve told you and therefor what you’ve come to believe, and no matter how many times you try to invoke “democracy”, altering state election laws, fundamentally changing how voting itself occurs in the run up to the biggest election in US history is interfering in an election in my opinion. — NOS4A2

Your opinion is wrong. Making it easier for voters to vote is to the betterment of democracy.

But denying people access to information prohibits them from making an informed decision. — NOS4A2

You can’t make an informed decision if you’re being fed misinformation. That would make for a misinformed decision.

Oh, it’s all “making it easier for voters to vote”. — NOS4A2

Changing the laws to allow for early mail in ballots and the like is making it easier for voters to vote. It’s not election interference.

The … social media censorship all makes sense now. — NOS4A2

According to your own logic this can’t be election interference because it’s impossible to influence another’s decisions, and so censoring a Facebook post isn’t going to dissuade a Trump supporter from voting for Trump.

Altering state voting laws in the run-up to an election, getting social media to censor opponents, and threatening businesses with an army of astroturf protesters ready to protest the results should Trump win, is election interference. — NOS4A2

Making it easier for voters to vote isn’t election interference.

And according to you, it’s impossible to influence another’s choices, so unless you want to make the claim that Trump voters were physical prevented from voting, your claims make no sense.

It was election interference on a mass scale. — NOS4A2

Making it easier for voters to vote isn’t election interference.

There was a massive shadow campaign to alter how the very election was ran, and Big Labor teamed with Big Business and Big Tech to alter election laws, shill for mail in ballots, and of course it favored one candidate over the other. — NOS4A2

Yes, because more voters preferred Biden to Trump, and they made it easier for voters to vote. That's a win for democracy. Unless you're going to accuse them of allowing for wide-spread voter fraud that swung the election then this is a really bizarre comment to make.

Brave = dodging the draft because of bonespurs? — RogueAI

People shouldn’t be demonised for trying to avoid going to war.

There is a lot of speculation, but the fact of the matter is we do not know what he will be charged with. — Fooloso4

According to this,

The charges likely center on the way Mr. Trump and his company, the Trump Organization, handled reimbursing Mr. Cohen for the payment of $130,000 to the porn star Stormy Daniels. The company’s internal records falsely identified the reimbursements as legal expenses, which helped conceal the purpose of the payments, according to Mr. Cohen, who said Mr. Trump knew about the misleading records. (Mr. Trump’s lawyers deny that and have accused Mr. Bragg’s office of targeting the former president for political purposes.)

In New York, falsifying business records can be a crime, and Mr. Bragg’s office is likely to build the case around that charge, according to people with knowledge of the matter.

On a bigger note, Special counsel claims Trump deliberately misled his attorneys about classified documents, judge wrote.

Prosecutors in the special counsel's office have presented compelling preliminary evidence that former President Donald Trump knowingly and deliberately misled his own attorneys about his retention of classified materials after leaving office, a top federal judge wrote Friday in a sealed filing, according to sources who described its contents to ABC News.

U.S. Judge Beryl Howell, who on Friday stepped down as the D.C. district court's chief judge, wrote last week that prosecutors in special counsel Jack Smith's office had made a "prima facie showing that the former president had committed criminal violations," according to the sources, and that attorney-client privileges invoked by two of his lawyers could therefore be pierced.

All vastly more damaging than misappropriation of campaign funds. — Isaac

So because one crime is more damaging than another crime then we shouldn't care about the latter? I don't see why. People can care care about both crimes.

Are you suggesting that people shouldn't care if rich and powerful politicians get away with committing crimes?

Trump says he expects to be arrested on Tuesday

Former US President Donald Trump says he is expecting to be arrested on Tuesday in a case about alleged hush money paid to an ex-porn star.

Mr Trump called on his supporters to protest against such a move in a post on his Truth Social platform.

One of Mr Trump's lawyers said his claim was based on media reports that he could be indicted next week.

So this must be the joke everybody’s talking about….all positions are implausible but any of them might be true. And if one of them turns out to be true, it mustn’t have been implausible after all. — Mww

I'm not sure what you understand "implausible" to mean. It doesn't mean "false" or "impossible". It means something like "unconvincing" or "seemingly improbable".

Which just says substance monism is no better or worse than any other -ism. So what’s the point of it? — Mww

The point of it is that it might be true.

I’d hope a guy with his credentials would posit something useful. And if one of them must be true, does he make any headway in showing his position is? — Mww

Not in that specific paper. That paper is just an explanation of idealism.

So if no position on the mind-body problem is plausible, and substance monism is a position that addresses that problem, what advantage does it hold? — Mww

He's saying that no solution to the mind-body problem is plausible, but one of them must be true.

Yes, or more clearly from the conclusion:

I do not claim that idealism is plausible. No position on the mind–body problem is plausible. Materialism is implausible. Dualism is implausible. Idealism is implausible. Neutral monism is implausible. None-of-the-above is implausible. But the probabilities of all of these views get a boost from the fact that one of them must be true. Idealism is not greatly less plausible than its main competitors. So even though idealism is implausible, there is a non-negligible probability that it is true.

He contrasts idealism with materialism, dualism, and neutral monism. These terms are commonly understood to refer to the views of substance monism/dualism.

From https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/monism

To illustrate these various doctrines for various targets and units, let the target t₁ = concrete objects, and let the unit u₁ = highest type. To be a monist for t₁ counted by u₁ is to hold that concrete objects fall under one highest type. The materialist, idealist, and neutral monist are all monists of this sort (substance monism). They all agree that concrete objects fall under one highest type, disagreeing only over whether the one highest type is material, mental, or something deeper.

To be a pluralist for t₁ counted by u₁ is to hold that concrete objects fall under more than one highest type. The Cartesian dualist is a pluralist of this sort (substance dualism). She holds that concrete objects fall under two highest types: the material (with the primary attribute of extension), and the mental (with the primary attribute of thought).

What version of idealism in a metaphysical sense is Chalmers concerned with? — Mww

Substance monism.

↪Michael's schema does not quite capture the full depth and breadth of idealist thinking... — Banno

I've only had time to read the introduction, but in general it seems to agree with my characterisation:

I will understand idealism broadly, as the thesis that the universe is fundamentally mental, or perhaps that all concrete facts are grounded in mental facts. As such it is meant as a global metaphysical thesis analogous to physicalism, the thesis that the universe is fundamentally physical, or perhaps that all concrete facts are grounded in physical facts. The only difference is that “physical” is replaced by “mental”.

...

As for concreteness: this excludes truths about abstract domains, such as mathematics. In practice most physicalists and idealists are not committed to the strong claim that mathematical truths are grounded in physical or mental truths, and the restriction to concrete domains helps to avoid the issue.

His subsequent breakdown of idealism into "micro", "macro", and "cosmic" doesn't seem to conflict with anything said above.

I'll comment more later today if I have the time to read the rest of the paper.

Materialism takes many forms - as does idealism - but it must rely on there being some ultimately real object or thing, which comprises the basic constituent of all other things. — Wayfarer

That strikes me as atomism, not materialism. String theory is perhaps an example of atomistic materialism, but the Standard Model is perhaps an example of non-atomistic materialism.

Sure. The question remains, what is external doing in the phrase "external reality"? — Banno

"External reality" refers to the notion of a domain of objects existing independently ("outside") of any subjective mental phenomena.

Also not following how you got "idealism as simply being a substance monism" from "all that exists are ideas and the minds, less than divine or divine, that have them" or "there can be no physical objects existing apart from some experience, and this might perhaps be taken as the definition of idealism..", " the idealist denies the mind-independent reality of matter", or "Metaphysical arguments proceed by identifying some general constraints on existence and arguing that only minds of some sort or other satisfy such conditions"... even on bold.

Some Aristotelian notion of substance, I suppose. — Banno

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monism

Substance monism asserts that a variety of existing things can be explained in terms of a single reality or substance. Substance monism posits that only one kind of substance exists, although many things may be made up of this substance, e.g., matter or mind.

But then if nothing is external, the difference between internal and external dissipates. — Banno

Words and concepts can have a meaning even if nothing exists which satisfies the conditions of that meaning. Nothing is "supernatural", but the difference between the natural and the supernatural doesn't dissipate.

Well, that's not the common view. Where did you get this from, or is it just yours? — Banno

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/

Idealism in sense (1) has been called “metaphysical” or “ontological idealism”, while idealism in sense (2) has been called “formal” or “epistemological idealism”. The modern paradigm of idealism in sense (1) might be considered to be George Berkeley’s “immaterialism”, according to which all that exists are ideas and the minds, less than divine or divine, that have them.

...

We thus agree with A.C. Ewing, who wrote in 1934 that all forms of idealism

"have in common the view that there can be no physical objects existing apart from some experience, and this might perhaps be taken as the definition of idealism..."

...

We also agree with Jeremy Dunham, Iain Hamilton Grant, and Sean Watson when they write that

"the idealist, rather than being anti-realist, is in fact … a realist concerning elements more usually dismissed from reality. (Dunham, Grant, & Watson 2011: 4)"

namely mind of some kind or other: the idealist denies the mind-independent reality of matter, but hardly denies the reality of mind....

Metaphysical arguments proceed by identifying some general constraints on existence and arguing that only minds of some sort or other satisfy such conditions...

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/

Materialist views say that, despite appearances to the contrary, mental states are just physical states.

…

Idealist views say that physical states are really mental.

…

Dualist views (the subject of this entry) say that the mental and the physical are both real and neither can be assimilated to the other.

Idealism is concerned with what does and doesn't exist. This has no prima facie relevance to truth, except insofar as it then follows that "X exists" is only true if X is reducible to mental phenomena.