A more interesting question would be whether atheists generally are intent on refuting belief in any and all forms of deity or transcendence. And if so, what motivates them to concern themselves with the beliefs of others. — Janus

I can only speak for myself, but no. I'm not intent on refuting anything. In everyday life I don't give a second thought to God or religion.

It's only when confronted with the religious that I even consider it. And I only care about it if religious beliefs are the driving factor behind some injustice, e.g. mistreating others because of something that their religion (falsely, I believe) claims to be wrong. If someone is homophobic or pro-life because of their religion, and if their religion is wrong (which as an atheist I believe it is), then what they believe matters, and it's important that the victims of their misbeliefs (homosexuals, pregnant women wanting an abortion, etc.) are protected from them.

People might be entitled to their beliefs, but a false belief isn't a justification for doing wrong to others.

As for military secrets, I’m not sure violating one’s obligations to one’s employer, stealing their information, and giving it to their enemies constitutes an act of speech. — NOS4A2

I was specifically considering verbally sharing information, so no documents.

That’s why I added, and you removed, “ because violating his rights just in case is morally wrong”. — NOS4A2

Then you’re begging the question as you’re trying to argue that we do have an absolute right to free speech. You can’t just assert that we have such a right and that censorship violates it.

It was morally wrong to murder Socrates and morally right to leave him alive because murdering someone just in case is morally wrong — NOS4A2

OK, so how is this a defence of free speech absolutism? Not all cases of censorship are killing someone just in case. Some censorship is imprisonment after divulging military secrets which resulted in the death of spies.

You cannot say whether the act saved us or not from what you promised it would. Without this knowledge how can you say it was morally good? — NOS4A2

By saying it? I might not know it to be true, but something being true doesn’t depend on me knowing it.

I don’t know that aliens exist, but I can say that they do and I might be right.

I said it because I’m confident that the loss of Socrates and his art is greater than whatever had been gained by his silencing. We have the act itself, the murder of Socrates, and thus the loss of his creativity and production, so no chance of him conversing about virtue any longer. — NOS4A2

So? If you follow this up with “therefore it was wrong” then you’re a utilitarian. If you don’t follow it up with “therefore it was wrong” then it isn’t an argument in favour of free speech absolutism.

We can never know if an act of censorship protected us from the ill effects we were told would befall us should no act of censorship occur. In the case of Socrates, we can never know if his censorship saved the youth from corruption after all. So we are unable to judge whether the act of censorship was morally good. — NOS4A2

This seems like an appeal to ignorance. Perhaps something can be morally good even if we do not, or cannot, know that it is morally good.

I’m not a utilitarian. — NOS4A2

Then why, in a defence of free speech, did you say “one can be confident that the loss of Socrates and his art is greater than whatever trappings had been gained by his silencing.” That seems a quite obvious utilitarian defence. If you’re not a utilitarian then this cost-benefit analysis is a non sequitur.

What we do know is the act of censorship itself, in this case killing a man and violating his most basic rights, so we can judge that it was morally bad. — NOS4A2

As I said before, it doesn’t follow from the fact that it was wrong to kill Socrates for the things he said that therefore any and all censorship is wrong.

So I am a truth and honesty absolutist — unenlightened

So government employees ought be allowed to share military intelligence with foreign nations?

One can be confident that the loss of Socrates and his art is greater than whatever trappings had been gained by his silencing.

So it is with all acts of censorship — NOS4A2

That doesn't follow.

What’s wrong with free speech absolutism?

Given that your reasoning appears based on a utilitarian principle, a simple argument against free speech absolutism is that there is at least once case where more is gained than lost by censorship. Perhaps the sharing of military intelligence with a foreign nation is one such example.

Also, Biden used private counsel and not the FBI or security officers to search for and handle more documents, so now we can only trust their word, which no doubt serves to protect Biden’s interests instead of the public’s. — NOS4A2

Trump was offered the same courtesy but refused the initial subpoena and then lied about having returned them all, whereas Biden voluntarily disclosed that documents had been found and returned them. That’s the material difference that distinguishes the two cases.

Whether or not he had authority to declassify is mostly irrelevant. What matters is whether or not they were declassified. Given that the documents had classification markings on them, evidently they were still classified.

Re. the comparison to Trump's case, the three statutes cited in the search warrant were:

18 U.S. Code § 793 - Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information

18 U.S. Code § 2071 - Concealment, removal, or mutilation generally

18 U.S. Code § 1519 - Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy

Specifically in his case I believe the relevant parts of each statute were that of concealing classified documents. He was asked to return them and he didn't, resisting subpoenas and lying about having returned them all. That's why he was raided and is facing criminal investigation.

Given that Biden's team, after discovering them, notified the Government and returned them willingly, there's not much of a comparison. Like with the case of Hillary's email server, all he's really guilty of is carelessness.

I never posted in the Shoutbox on old PF — Jamal

I think I may have had the highest shout-count on old PF.

Nah

It also doesn't follow from the fact that we talk about physical objects that they exist in the realist sense. — frank

Correct.

That is also an unfounded notion. There is no evidence for it and no need for it.

Uncertain. The realist would argue that the realist existence of physical objects is a parsimonious explanation for the occurrence and regularity of observable phenomena. Of course, subjective idealists would disagree, but then that's a separate discussion.

I don't think you can make the same argument in favour of the realist existence of universals and abstract objects. Why do we need something like "things with heads" to exist as an abstract object for a concrete, physical thing with a head to exist? I don't think we do. Rather, a number of concrete, physical things with heads exist, and then we conceptually abstract from this the notion of "a thing with a head". But this abstract "thing with a head" is just a facet of our thought and language, not some object with a mind-independent existence.

It does, since you haven't escaped talking about abstract objects yet. I propose that you can't do that. Universals and properties are too embedded in the way you think to escape them. For instance, try imagining an object that has no properties. — frank

It doesn't follow from the fact that we talk about abstract objects that abstract objects exist in the realist sense. The latter notion is unfounded projection. There's no evidence for it and there's no need for it. It is sufficient that just the physical and the mental (which might be reducible to the physical) exist.

Wouldn't it be "therefore decapitations exist" if we're keeping the same form? I don't find that ridiculous, for "decaptiations" to exist in the abstract in the same way as boiling point. — khaled

Perhaps, depending on your interpretation. And what does "decapitations exist in the abstract" even mean? I can understand it in the sense of "it is possible for things with heads to be decapitated", but that has nothing to do with the realist existence of abstract objects.

Imagine saying "John would die were he to be decapitated, therefore his death exists." It's obviously ridiculous if interpreted in a realist sense. So too with "this water would boil were it to be heated to 100 degrees celsius, therefore its boiling point exists."

I think the boiling point can exist even if things don't really boil. If we lived in a world where the maximum temperature ever detected or achievable by us was 60 degrees celcius, the boiling point of water would still be 100 degrees celcius. — khaled

That water would boil were it to reach 100 degrees celsius isn't that some universal/abstract object exists. Such a view is a realist misinterpretation of counterfactuals; a fallacious projection of grammar.

What problems arise if we consider values to be real in the same way that boiling point is real? — khaled

To repeat the kind of question I asked frank before, is there a difference between saying that the boiling point is real and saying that things really do boil? I don't think there is.

And that things really do boil does not entail that some universal or abstract object exists.

That we have a language with a grammar that includes universals and abstract objects isn't that realism about universals and abstract objects is true. Such a view is simply an unfounded projection.

I wasn't really interested in pushing any particular account of abstract objects and universals. I was pointing out the problem with denying that they exist, which Hume's bundle theory explains pretty succinctly. — frank

But Hume was a nominalist?

Could you clarify your point? — frank

I'm trying to point out the ambiguity in your question.

The Platonist might say that height is real iff height is a mind-independent abstract object. The nominalist rejects the claim that height is a mind-independent abstract object. The Platonist might then respond by claiming that the nominalist rejects the claim that height is real. But then the nominalist will respond by claiming that height being real just is that physical objects really have a height, and that physical objects really having a height does not depend on height being a mind-independent abstract object.

So simply asking something like "is height real?" doesn't address the issue at all.

Your question for @NOS4A2 should be "is an electron's spin a mind-independent abstract object?" rather than the ambiguous "is an electron's spin real?"

Yes, there's a difference. Saying that tops have the property of being able to spin is not the same as saying that tops sometimes spin. You could have a top that spends its whole existence in a drawer. It still has the property of being able to spin. — frank

OK, then is there a difference between spin being real and a top really being able to spin?

As for a lack of need for it: If things are either mental or physical, then when we refer to "gravity" we must be referring to a mental thing, a physical thing, or having no referent at all. So which is it? — khaled

Physical. It's one of the 4 fundamental forces.

The obvious question would then be why you are so sure those two categories are all there is. — khaled

There's no evidence or prima facie need for anything more, and so as per Occam's razor I can dismiss anything else.

But other than that, your only problem for it is that it seems unnecessary? Not some sort of internal inconsistency or issues that arise from assuming it? — khaled

Well, there's the question you asked of me; what does it even mean for an abstract object to exist (as some mind-independent thing)? It seems like an empty claim. And how do these abstract objects "attach" themselves to physical objects, or whatever it is that happens?

What does existence for abstract stuff mean to you? — khaled

I'm not entirely sure what it means to exist, but according to Platonism the existence of abstract objects is independent of the physical and the mental. This is what I deny. Whatever it means to exist, things exist either as a physical or as a mental thing (with the latter possibly reducible to the former).

There is no evidence or need for this third "realm" of abstract objects.

There is just the physical distance between two points in space and our concept of distance. There is no abstract distance as some additional mind-independent thing.

That just seems...weird. Would you deny the existence of distance between two points as well? When a mathematician speaks of "distance between two points a and b" but doesn't specify a or b, what is he speaking about? — khaled

We can talk about the distance between two points without having to accept that the distance exists, just as we can talk about Mordor and unicorns without having to accept that Mordor and unicorns exist.

To repeat my earlier exchange with Frank:

The argument comes down to insisting that you can't think or communicate without using universals and abstract objects. — frank

Even if that were true it doesn’t follow that universals and abstract objects exist in the realist sense. They might play a useful role in language, but that’s all they are. — Michael

The idea that we can only talk about things that have some mind-independent existence, à la realism, is mistaken.

Yes, the boiling point of water is not a property. In the same way that the height of the empire state building is not a property. But height is a property.

The boiling point is a property. The boiling point of water is not. — khaled

Then your argument above either equivocates or begs the question.

A is B
B exists
Therefore A exists

If so, replace A with "boiling point" and B with "the temperature at which something boils" and you get "the boiling point (a property) exists"

You're saying that the temperature at which something boils exists. But this is meant in some abstract sense, not in some concrete sense, e.g. the temperature at which water boils exist. And so I will simply deny that the temperature at which something boils exists.

I will accept that the temperature at which water boils exists, but then if so we are only left with my argument above:

The boiling point of water is the temperature at which water boils
The temperature at which water boils is 100 degrees celsius
100 degrees celsius is not a property
Therefore, the boiling point of water is not a property

And then we apply that same argument for all things which (concretely) exist. There's no need or evidence for some abstract property in addition to this.

Is 100 degrees celsius a property? — Michael

No. — khaled

The boiling point of water is the temperature at which water boils
The temperature at which water boils is 100 degrees celsius
100 degrees celsius is not a property
Therefore, the boiling point of water is not a property

A is B
B is C
C is not D
Therefore, A is not D

I would think it is a property of the thing yes. — khaled

The temperature at which water boils is 100 degrees celsius. Is 100 degrees celsius a property?

I think you're saying that you're satisfied that things sometimes spin. That tops have the property of being able to spin is a different proposition, though.

Are you ok with that proposition? — frank

That's the question I asked of you. Is there a difference between asking if spin is real and asking if things really spin?

If there isn't a difference, and if things really spinning is concrete, not abstract, then spin being real is concrete, not abstract.

If there is a difference then prima facie one can deny that spin is real but accept that things really spin. What issues would arise from this? We have evidence of things really spinning. What evidence is there of spin being real (as something else)? What need is there for spin being real (as something else)?

If so, replace A with "boiling point" and B with "the temperature at which something boils" and you get "the boiling point (a property) exists" — khaled

Is the temperature at which something boils a property?

I don't know how they exist, although I have speculations. I just know there's a logical problem with denying that they exist, which is the nominalist claim. — frank

What logical problems? I don’t need to accept the mind-independent existence of some abstract property of spin to accept that tops (and other things) sometimes spin. The concrete behaviour of physical objects is a sufficient account of spin.

The argument comes down to insisting that you can't think or communicate without using universals and abstract objects. — frank

Even if that were true it doesn’t follow that universals and abstract objects exist in the realist sense. They might play a useful role in language, but that’s all they are.

They would allow that some tops spin some of the time. — frank

Which surely is a sufficient account. Tops spinning is a real, concrete thing that can be seen and measured. Tops really do spin (sometimes).

What need and evidence is there for some additional abstract property, above-and-beyond the physical act?

The nominalist denies that it's appropriate to say that tops have this property. — frank

Do they deny that it’s appropriate to say that tops spin?

Is the spin real or not? — frank

Is there a difference between asking if spin is real and asking if things really spin? Is an answer to one also an answer to the other?

Certainly will help junior developers.

Request:
Write a class in PHP to generate a strong salted hash of a user's password

Response:
Here is an example of a simple PHP class that can be used to generate a strong salted hash of a user's password:


To use this class, you would first create an instance of the PasswordHash class:


Then, you can generate a salted hash of a given password by calling the generateHash method and passing in the password as an argument:


The $hash variable will now contain the salted hash of the password. This salted hash can be stored in a database or other storage system, and can be used later to verify the user's password when they log in.

"Michael was not born in Germany" is not S's belief. — creativesoul

S believes many related things:

1. S believes that Michael was not born in Germany because he was born in France
2. S believes that Michael was born in France
3. S believes that Michael was not born in Germany
4. S believes that France is not in Germany
5. S believes that Michael cannot have been born in more than one place
etc.

Your claim is that if (1) is true then (3) is false. My claim is that if (1) is true then (3) is true. I think my claim is supported by common sense logic: (1) entails (2) and (3).

"I believe that Michael was not born in Germany because he was born in France but I do not believe that Michael was not born in Germany" is an absurd claim.

"Michael was not born in Germany."
"Michael was not born in Germany, because he was born in France."

According to the argument you offered earlier, which of the above is an accurate report of S's belief regarding your birthplace? — creativesoul

Both. Someone who believes the latter also believes the former. They are not mutually exclusive. As I have said, you need to show that someone who believes the latter doesn't also believe the former. You haven't done that.

S does not just believe that you were not born in Germany. — creativesoul

I do not just believe that Joe Biden is President. I believe that Joe Biden is President and is a man and is white and is married and is American and is 80 years old, and so on. The fact that I believe multiple things about Joe Biden doesn't mean that if any one of these things is false that I don't truthfully believe other things about him.

And so for the same reason, the fact that S believes that I was not born in Germany because I was born in France doesn't entail that if I wasn't born in France then S doesn't truthfully believe that I was not born in Germany.

Well, no. In order for my argument to work, I need to show that what you're claiming is S's belief is not equivalent to S's belief and that the difference between S's belief and your report is clearly shown by virtue of looking at the differences in what it takes for each to be true.

I can and have done that. — creativesoul

You haven't shown that someone who believes “Michael wasn’t born in Germany because he was born in France” doesn't also believe “Michael wasn’t born in Germany”.

I think it self-evident that someone who believes the former also believes the latter. And the latter is true.

"Michael was not born in Germany" is an utterly inadequate report of S's belief. — creativesoul

The fact that “Michael wasn’t born in Germany because he was born in France” isn’t equivalent to “Michael wasn’t born in Germany” doesn’t mean that someone who believes the former doesn’t also believe the latter. People can believe multiple things.

For your argument to work you must show that everyone who believes the former to be true doesn’t believe the latter to be true. You haven’t done that, and I don’t think you can.

People believe more than one thing. Beliefs about one thing entail beliefs about another. I believe that Joe Biden is President. I believe that only one person is President. I believe that Donald Trump isn't President. I believe that Barack Obama isn't President. I believe that @creativesoul isn't President. I believe that an emu isn't President. And so on.

You want to rephrase all these beliefs as being "I believe that an emu isn't President because I believe that Joe Biden is President and that only one person can be President and that non-human animals cannot be President and... [whatever else there is]".

Whereas I can simply say "I believe than an emu isn't President."

And for the exact same reason, I don't need to phrase my belief as "I believe that so-and-so was not born in Germany because I believe that she was born in France and I believe that France isn't in Germany and I believe that people cannot be born in more than one place and... [whatever else there is]". I can just say "I believe that so-and-so was not born in Germany", and this belief is true if they were born in England.