You’re just playing word games. Dreamlng isn’t just something that is reported after waking. It’s something experienced. It’s the occurrence of visual, auditory, tactile sense data. It’s seeing, hearing, feeling.

Be that as it may, isn’t the prerogative of intelligence, insofar as it deems truth to be a valid idea, to determine what it does depends on, from whence does truth receive its justification? — Mww

I gave examples: "the square root of 4 is 2" being true depends on the square root of 4 being 2; "a yellow ball does not exist" being true depends on a yellow ball not existing.

Just as for truth, there must be something by which the comprehending the appearance of natural relations, becomes possible. — Mww

You seem to be suggesting that all facts are reducible to something which exists? The square root of 4 is 2 only if something exists which makes it so? A yellow ball does not exist only if something exists which makes it so? I don't see why. And in the case of the latter example, it seems even nonsensical. And why end the questioning there? Why not ask what the existence of something depends on? What does the existence of gravity depend on? What does the existence of an external material world depend on? Or does (material?) existence count as a brute fact, and the only possible brute fact?

I don't see any reason to accept that. Perhaps the existence of an external material world is a brute fact. But perhaps the non-existence of a yellow ball is also a brute fact, and doesn't in turn depend on the existence of something else. And perhaps the square root of 4 being 2 is a brute fact, and doesn't in turn depend on the existence of either physical matter or immaterial minds (or on the existence of mind- and matter-independent abstract entities).

What we humans do is report that we have dreams. — Richard B

Because we see and hear and feel things when asleep. That's what dreaming is.

However, the problem here is that both the direct and indirect realist misuse they terms and create great deal of confusion when moved from its ordinary use — Richard B

I agree, which is why it is more productive to ask if things like colour, shape, sound, taste, etc. are properties inherent in external world objects or are properties of experience. That gets to the crux of the real disagreement between direct and indirect realists.

But it does seem as though truth must depend on something — Mww

The truth of “the square root of 4 is 2” depends on the square root of 4 being 2. But the square root of 4 being true doesn’t depend on the existence of gravity or electricity or other material object, and nor does it depend on the existence of some immaterial consciousness.

That the truth depends on something isn’t that it depends on the existence of something. Again as an example, the truth of “a yellow ball doesn’t exist” quite obviously depends on the non-existence of something.

Truth, here, just indicates there is no inherent self-contradiction in the proposition, which, again, requires a mind, does it not? — Mww

I don’t think so. There are plenty of unsolved problems in mathematics. The Reimann hypothesis is either true or false, even though it hasn’t been (dis)proven. Its truth doesn’t depend on what we believe. It doesn’t depend on what inanimate matter believes either. I suppose you could argue for mathematical realism and claim that mathematical entities exist as abstract objects, but that seems both unnecessary and fantastical.

What else is there? — Mww

Probably nothing. The mistake is in thinking that a statement's truth depends on the existence of something.

Imagine that just two things exist; a red ball and a blue ball. The statement "a red ball exists" is made true by the existence of a red ball, and the statement "a blue ball exists" is made true by the existence of a blue ball. But there are many other true statements, e.g. "a yellow ball does not exist". This statement isn't made true by the existence of the red ball or by the existence of the blue ball; rather it's made true by the non-existence of a yellow ball.

Similar situations occur with predictions (if we reject eternalism) and counterfactuals. Statements like "it will rain tomorrow" and "I would have been a father by now had I married at 18" are not made true by anything that exists. The future doesn't exist, but statements about the future can be true. Counterfactual scenarios don't exist, but counterfactual statements can be true.

And, again, the same should be evident with mathematics. The square root of 2 does not depend on the existence of space or gravity or atoms, and nor does it depend on the existence of living, thinking people. But there is a square root of 2. Its truth just has nothing to do with anything that exists.

This also explains why the claim that solipsism entails omniscience is also mistaken. Imagine that just two things exist: John's mind and Jane's mind. These minds do not interact. John is not aware of Jane and Jane is not aware of John. John and Jane each consider two statements: "only my mind exists" and "something or someone other than my mind exists". Neither John nor Jane know which of these two statements is true. Some time later, John dies. Now, only Jane's mind exists. Jane doesn't suddenly find herself knowing that only her mind exists. She still considers it possible that something or someone other than her mind exists. In fact, she might be a non-solipsist and believes that something or someone other her mind does exist. But she's wrong. Even though her mind is the only thing that exists, the truth of "only my mind exists" is independent of her beliefs.

(And as a related point, the above example shows why idealism doesn't entail solipsism. It is entirely possible that everything that exists is fundamentally mental in substance and that there are multiple minds, e.g. John and Jane. The existence of space and gravity and atoms and other material objects is not prima facie necessary for more than one thinking thing to exist.)

I am not arguing the scientific description/explanation of perception but only the metaphysical explanation. — Richard B

What's the difference? We know that the external world is constituted of things like atoms and electromagnetic radiation. We know that electromagnetic radiation is reflected by bundles of atoms into our eyes (which are themselves bundles of atoms). This stimulates brain activity (which is itself bundles of atoms). This triggers the occurrence of visual or auditory or tactical experience. What else is there to add to this?

Many times in human experience, two people can disagree on what they see for many reasons without appeal to "sense data".

And many times in human experience two people disagree on what they see for reasons that do appeal to sense data, e.g. a dress that one person sees as white and gold and another as black and blue.

Another example of sense data having explanatory power is that of dreaming or hallucinations. I see and hear and feel things when I dream. I'm not seeing or hearing or feeling some external world stimulus. I'm not seeing or hearing or feeling my brain. So what am I seeing and hearing and feeling? I think there are two different, equally acceptable, ways to answer this. The ordinary answer is that I see people and hear music and feel warmth. Of course, these people and this music and this warmth are all "in my head", but I see and hear and feel them all the same. The philosophical answer is that I see and hear and feel sense data.

But, the indirect realist says, "this is not the same because we do not know what the tree "really" looks like to compare, we only have our "sense data". This makes no sense because the indirect realist suggests that if only we could "directly perceive" something where we are not involved in the perceiving. It is like saying, "what is the color of the tree when there is no light?" — Richard B

That is the very question that gave rise to the distinction between direct and indirect realism. We wanted to know if the world "really is, objectively" as it appears to be. The direct realists argued that the world "really is, objectively" as it appears to be, because we see it "directly" (whatever that means). It therefore follows that if the world isn't "really, objectively" as it appears to be, then we don't see it "directly" (whatever that means).

The irony here is that you (and many others) appear to be using direct realist terminology but accept the indirect realist's conclusion regarding the disconnect between how things appear and how they "really, objectively" are. And this is why I said before that direct and indirect realists are talking past each other and that the question of whether or not we see things "directly" is a red herring. To repeat my previous comment: the pertinent question is whether or not colour, shape, sound, taste, etc. are properties inherent in external world objects or are properties of experience. That's the issue that has philosophical significance, and I think our best understanding of the world and perception firmly supports the latter view – which is the essence of indirect realism, even if you disagree with the way in which it's often described ("seeing sense data/internal representations").

Roughly, realism holds that some things are as they are, without regard to their relation to us, while idealism holds that things are otherwise; that they are as they are only in relation to us, or some mind of some sort - the details are sketchy.

I don't see that phrasing this in terms of "internal" and "external" helps much. It's got something to do with the world being internal to the mind, I suppose, but what and how... — Banno

I think of idealism as simply being a substance monism, contrasted primarily with materialism and substance/property dualism. I don't think that "things being as they are", or truth-bivalence, depends on either materialism or substance/property dualism being true, and so isn't excluded by idealism being true.

As an example, consider the square root of 2. I don't think the answer is mind-dependent. The square root of 2 does not depend on what I think or you think or anyone else thinks. But it also isn't matter-dependent. The square root of 2 does not depend on the existence of stars or planets or electrons or gravity or even space itself. Mathematical truths are bivalent, but do not depend on materialism or substance/property dualism, and so are not excluded by idealism. Even if everything that exists is fundamentally mental in nature, there is a truth to the square root of 2 and this truth is independent of all the minds that exist. Just as if everything that exists is fundamentally physical in nature, there is a truth to the square root of 2 and this truth is independent of all the matter that exists.

As I mentioned before, there's a distinction between truth and ontology. Counterfactuals and predictions can be true even though their truth has nothing to do with anything that actually exists.

In terms of "internal" and "external", there are a few ways of considering it. If substance/property dualism is true then the "external" world is the material stuff, and the "internal" world is the immaterial stuff. If idealism is true then everything is "internal" and nothing is "external". If materialism is true then the "internal" world is the matter that constitutes our minds and the "external" world is everything else.

I took you to be claiming that the cup was actually quantum in some way, from this:

...it seemed that you thought we had a choice between describing the cup in everyday terms and describing it in quantum terms, but that quantum terms were "proper". — Banno

No, I’m just making this argument:

Objects in the external world are correctly described by quantum fields.
Cups aren't correctly described by quantum fields.
Therefore, cups aren't objects in the external world.

As an analogy, countries are not reducible to landmass. A realist might argue that landmass would continue to exist even if all humans were to die, but they might accept that countries wouldn't continue to exist if all humans were to die. And this isn't simply the trivial fact that nothing would be called a country (as nothing would be called landmass either). It is the more meaningful understanding that being a country is something that only obtains within the context of human perspective and social practices. In the absence of such a context, countries do not exist.

I think that the same logic applies to being landmass, and being a cup, and being red. These predicates only obtain within the context of human perspective and social practices. In the absence of such a context, landmass, cups, and the colour red do not exist. But the things described by something like quantum field theory do continue to exist even if all humans were to die.

So I would say that I'm a (property) dualist who believes in an external material world, and perhaps also a scientific realist, but not a metaphysical realist.

Multiple ways of using language, to talk in different ways about the same thing. — Banno

That’s where I disagree. Quantum field theory doesn’t talk about cups or cupboards or King Charles III, but our everyday language does. Therefore it’s not a case of multiple languages being used to talk about the same thing but multiple languages being used to talk about different things.

Ok. I don't understand what it is "external" to, but let it pass. — Banno

Then how do you distinguish realism from idealism? Surely “external material world” means something to you for you to make sense of being one or the other?

Then I don't understand what your "external world" is. — Banno

It's the world that quantum field theory describes. Do you agree that there is such a world? If so then either a) cups can be described by quantum field theory, or b) cups aren't objects in that external world.

Notice that I dropped the word "external". What is achieved by using it? — Banno

Presumably something, hence why the question you (or rather PhilPapers) asked was "External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism?"

Again, this is why I answered "The question is too unclear to answer". You haven't defined "external world" or "realism" in your question.

Seems to me fairly plain that we have here two very different activities - making tea and building super colliders - with differing languages. It follows that nether way of talking has some innate superiority. — Banno

I'm not saying that either has some innate superiority. I'm saying that they each describe different things. Quantum field theory describes the external world, everyday languages describes a non-external world.

I say the cup in the cupboard is better thought of as having a handle than as being in some odd state similar to a quantum superposition. — Banno

So do I.

Objects in the external world are correctly described by quantum fields. Cups aren't correctly described by quantum fields. Therefore, cups aren't objects in the external world. Unobserved cups aren't objects in the external world either, and for the same reason.

I don't think that we can usefully claim things such as that the world is "properly described by something like quantum field theory and not by our everyday talk of cups and chairs". — Banno

Neither do I. But I do think that it is correct to claim that the external world is properly described by something like quantum field theory.

The familiar world of cups and cupboards is of course properly described by our everyday talk of cups and cupboards (and not by quantum field theory).

And so the familiar world of cups and cupboards isn't the external world.

Really? What is it we talk about , then? — Banno

Cups and cupboards and other everyday stuff, as opposed to quantum fields.

It seems we need to differentiate realism as opposed to anti-realism from realism as opposed to idealism, in order to proceed. — Banno

Yes, which is why I answered "The question is too unclear to answer".

I'll posit that an anti-realist might hold that certain statements are neither true nor false when they do not stand in a suitable relation to an observer. Presumably Schrödinger's cat is such an instance, and perhaps you would add the properties of the cup while it is unobserved in the cupboard.

So does the cup in the cupboard, unobserved, have a handle?

A realist would say it does, an anti-realist might say that there is no truth or falsity to the issue. — Banno

I think there's a distinction between truth bivalence and external world realism. There's no prima facie reason that the former requires the latter. If it is possible that "it will rain tomorrow" is true, and if eternalism is false, then a statement can be true even if it is about something that doesn't exist. So a statement like "it will rain tomorrow" can be true whether external world realism is the case or idealism is the case.

I'd have taken "the cup is in the cupboard" as pretty "normal", to cross my metaphors. — Banno

It is, but I don't think we normally talk about the external world.

Yet that the cup is in the cupboard is presumably the sort of thing that can be true or false. — Banno

That doesn't entail realism. Things are still true or false even if idealism or some other anti-realism is correct.

So, “sense datum” has no explanatory power in this case. — Richard B

I think it has explanatory power in the case of the dress that some see to be black and blue and others see to be white and gold. Each person can be looking at the same photo, in the same lighting conditions, and from the same perspective, but given their differences in eye and brain structure, the quality of their visual experiences differ.

One person sees white and gold, and so uses the phrase "white and gold" to refer to what they see. The other person sees black and blue, and so uses the phrase "black and blue" to refer to what they see. In a quite understandable sense, each person is seeing something different. So if each person is seeing something different, despite the shared external world stimulus, then they aren't seeing that shared external world stimulus.

At the very least this shows an ambiguity with the word "see", such that under one meaning they are seeing the same thing and under another meaning they are seeing a different thing. And this is why I think much of the time both direct and indirect realists are talking past each other, and why I think the very question "do we see the object directly or indirectly" is a red herring. The more pertinent question is whether or not colour, shape, sound, taste, etc. are properties inherent in external world objects or are properties that emerge in the act of seeing, hearing, tasting, etc.

Historically at least, direct (or naive) realists would argue that colour, shape, sound, taste, etc. are properties inherent in external world objects, and indirect realists would argue that they're not. And I think our current understanding of the world, at least with respect to colour, sound, and taste, agrees with the latter.

Then i don't understand why you did not vote for realism. — Banno

Because I don't believe that something like "the cup is in the cupboard" is a proper description of the external world.

Why, or how, would a quantum field theory qualify as idealism? — Banno

I don't think it would.

I voted "The question is too unclear to answer".

If I believe that there is an external world but that it is properly described by something like quantum field theory and not by our everyday talk of cups and chairs, am I a realist or an idealist? I would say that I'm neither. Not all anti-realisms are idealisms.

Similarly, the designer must have been the starting point, not designed by another entity. — gevgala

Why can't an undesigned universe be the starting point?

In fact, your argument can be used to refute the argument that the universe was designed. If the complexity of the universe suggests that it was created, then the complexity of its creator suggests that it too was created. This leads to an infinite regress which is untenable. Therefore, the complexity of the universe does not suggest that it was created.

It's special pleading to argue that this infinite regress proves that the creator wasn't created but not that the universe wasn't created.

Trump pleaded the 5th more than 400 times for the New York AG deposition a couple of days ago. A prudent move given that anything he said would likely confirm his guilt. — Fooloso4

If you’re innocent, why are you taking the Fifth Amendment?

As another example, some Christians believe that homosexuality is wrong because they believe that there is a God who has commanded so.

Can an atheist respond to this by arguing that there is no God, and so therefore these Christians don't believe that homosexuality is wrong? Of course not. Even if the Christians' reason for believing that homosexuality is wrong is false, it is true that they believe that homosexuality is wrong.

Max and Jessica both believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane, but for different reasons and therefore in different contexts. — Ludwig V

Yes, that's been my point. They both believe that John shouldn't marry Jane, and if it's true that John shouldn't marry Jane then their belief that John shouldn't marry Jane is true – even if Jane isn't a horrible person and marriage isn't a terrible practice.

An uncharged crime is not a crime. — Merkwurdichliebe

A crime is a crime without police, prosecutor or courts being involved. When someone steals your wallet, he's a thief and committed a crime. Miraculously, that's even true when he's not prosecuted. — Benkei

Classic example of people misunderstanding "innocent until proven guilty". You're innocent if you didn't do it and guilty if you did, regardless of proof, charges, or conviction. The presumption of innocence simply asserts that the courts shouldn't punish anyone for a crime unless it can be proven.

The only way to properly discriminate between the three individuals is to report their belief as Q because P — creativesoul

It’s not unusual to say “we both believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane, but for different reasons.”

Max believes that John shouldn’t marry Jane because he believes that Jane is a horrible person.

Jessica believes that John shouldn’t marry Jane because she believes that marriage is a terrible practice.

They both believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane.

It’s perfectly appropriate to distinguish beliefs from the reasons for having them. It’s absurd to respond to the above by saying that neither Max nor Jessica believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane.

Suppose Smith persuades Brown to accept a bet, that the man who gets the job will have ten coins in his pocket. Smith gets the job and coincidentally has ten coins in his pocket. Smith will argue that he got it right, on the ground that he has been appointed and has ten coins in his pocket but will accept that his prediction was not entirely accurate. Jones will argue that he did not, on the ground that he is right only by coincidence and that he lost. — Ludwig V

This being a coincidence is why I don't particularly like this example. A different example would be: I believe that my car isn't in my driveway, because I parked it in a garage. However, someone has stolen my car from the garage and is currently driving it on the motorway.

My belief that my car isn't in my driveway is both true and justified, but unlike your (and Gettier's) example, it isn't just coincidentally true.

A more interesting question would be whether atheists generally are intent on refuting belief in any and all forms of deity or transcendence. And if so, what motivates them to concern themselves with the beliefs of others. — Janus

I can only speak for myself, but no. I'm not intent on refuting anything. In everyday life I don't give a second thought to God or religion.

It's only when confronted with the religious that I even consider it. And I only care about it if religious beliefs are the driving factor behind some injustice, e.g. mistreating others because of something that their religion (falsely, I believe) claims to be wrong. If someone is homophobic or pro-life because of their religion, and if their religion is wrong (which as an atheist I believe it is), then what they believe matters, and it's important that the victims of their misbeliefs (homosexuals, pregnant women wanting an abortion, etc.) are protected from them.

People might be entitled to their beliefs, but a false belief isn't a justification for doing wrong to others.

As for military secrets, I’m not sure violating one’s obligations to one’s employer, stealing their information, and giving it to their enemies constitutes an act of speech. — NOS4A2

I was specifically considering verbally sharing information, so no documents.

That’s why I added, and you removed, “ because violating his rights just in case is morally wrong”. — NOS4A2

Then you’re begging the question as you’re trying to argue that we do have an absolute right to free speech. You can’t just assert that we have such a right and that censorship violates it.

It was morally wrong to murder Socrates and morally right to leave him alive because murdering someone just in case is morally wrong — NOS4A2

OK, so how is this a defence of free speech absolutism? Not all cases of censorship are killing someone just in case. Some censorship is imprisonment after divulging military secrets which resulted in the death of spies.

You cannot say whether the act saved us or not from what you promised it would. Without this knowledge how can you say it was morally good? — NOS4A2

By saying it? I might not know it to be true, but something being true doesn’t depend on me knowing it.

I don’t know that aliens exist, but I can say that they do and I might be right.

I said it because I’m confident that the loss of Socrates and his art is greater than whatever had been gained by his silencing. We have the act itself, the murder of Socrates, and thus the loss of his creativity and production, so no chance of him conversing about virtue any longer. — NOS4A2

So? If you follow this up with “therefore it was wrong” then you’re a utilitarian. If you don’t follow it up with “therefore it was wrong” then it isn’t an argument in favour of free speech absolutism.

We can never know if an act of censorship protected us from the ill effects we were told would befall us should no act of censorship occur. In the case of Socrates, we can never know if his censorship saved the youth from corruption after all. So we are unable to judge whether the act of censorship was morally good. — NOS4A2

This seems like an appeal to ignorance. Perhaps something can be morally good even if we do not, or cannot, know that it is morally good.

I’m not a utilitarian. — NOS4A2

Then why, in a defence of free speech, did you say “one can be confident that the loss of Socrates and his art is greater than whatever trappings had been gained by his silencing.” That seems a quite obvious utilitarian defence. If you’re not a utilitarian then this cost-benefit analysis is a non sequitur.

What we do know is the act of censorship itself, in this case killing a man and violating his most basic rights, so we can judge that it was morally bad. — NOS4A2

As I said before, it doesn’t follow from the fact that it was wrong to kill Socrates for the things he said that therefore any and all censorship is wrong.

So I am a truth and honesty absolutist — unenlightened

So government employees ought be allowed to share military intelligence with foreign nations?

One can be confident that the loss of Socrates and his art is greater than whatever trappings had been gained by his silencing.

So it is with all acts of censorship — NOS4A2

That doesn't follow.

What’s wrong with free speech absolutism?

Given that your reasoning appears based on a utilitarian principle, a simple argument against free speech absolutism is that there is at least once case where more is gained than lost by censorship. Perhaps the sharing of military intelligence with a foreign nation is one such example.

Also, Biden used private counsel and not the FBI or security officers to search for and handle more documents, so now we can only trust their word, which no doubt serves to protect Biden’s interests instead of the public’s. — NOS4A2

Trump was offered the same courtesy but refused the initial subpoena and then lied about having returned them all, whereas Biden voluntarily disclosed that documents had been found and returned them. That’s the material difference that distinguishes the two cases.

Whether or not he had authority to declassify is mostly irrelevant. What matters is whether or not they were declassified. Given that the documents had classification markings on them, evidently they were still classified.

Re. the comparison to Trump's case, the three statutes cited in the search warrant were:

18 U.S. Code § 793 - Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information

18 U.S. Code § 2071 - Concealment, removal, or mutilation generally

18 U.S. Code § 1519 - Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy

Specifically in his case I believe the relevant parts of each statute were that of concealing classified documents. He was asked to return them and he didn't, resisting subpoenas and lying about having returned them all. That's why he was raided and is facing criminal investigation.

Given that Biden's team, after discovering them, notified the Government and returned them willingly, there's not much of a comparison. Like with the case of Hillary's email server, all he's really guilty of is carelessness.

I never posted in the Shoutbox on old PF — Jamal

I think I may have had the highest shout-count on old PF.

Nah

It also doesn't follow from the fact that we talk about physical objects that they exist in the realist sense. — frank

Correct.

That is also an unfounded notion. There is no evidence for it and no need for it.

Uncertain. The realist would argue that the realist existence of physical objects is a parsimonious explanation for the occurrence and regularity of observable phenomena. Of course, subjective idealists would disagree, but then that's a separate discussion.

I don't think you can make the same argument in favour of the realist existence of universals and abstract objects. Why do we need something like "things with heads" to exist as an abstract object for a concrete, physical thing with a head to exist? I don't think we do. Rather, a number of concrete, physical things with heads exist, and then we conceptually abstract from this the notion of "a thing with a head". But this abstract "thing with a head" is just a facet of our thought and language, not some object with a mind-independent existence.

It does, since you haven't escaped talking about abstract objects yet. I propose that you can't do that. Universals and properties are too embedded in the way you think to escape them. For instance, try imagining an object that has no properties. — frank

It doesn't follow from the fact that we talk about abstract objects that abstract objects exist in the realist sense. The latter notion is unfounded projection. There's no evidence for it and there's no need for it. It is sufficient that just the physical and the mental (which might be reducible to the physical) exist.

Wouldn't it be "therefore decapitations exist" if we're keeping the same form? I don't find that ridiculous, for "decaptiations" to exist in the abstract in the same way as boiling point. — khaled

Perhaps, depending on your interpretation. And what does "decapitations exist in the abstract" even mean? I can understand it in the sense of "it is possible for things with heads to be decapitated", but that has nothing to do with the realist existence of abstract objects.

Imagine saying "John would die were he to be decapitated, therefore his death exists." It's obviously ridiculous if interpreted in a realist sense. So too with "this water would boil were it to be heated to 100 degrees celsius, therefore its boiling point exists."

I think the boiling point can exist even if things don't really boil. If we lived in a world where the maximum temperature ever detected or achievable by us was 60 degrees celcius, the boiling point of water would still be 100 degrees celcius. — khaled

That water would boil were it to reach 100 degrees celsius isn't that some universal/abstract object exists. Such a view is a realist misinterpretation of counterfactuals; a fallacious projection of grammar.

What problems arise if we consider values to be real in the same way that boiling point is real? — khaled

To repeat the kind of question I asked frank before, is there a difference between saying that the boiling point is real and saying that things really do boil? I don't think there is.

And that things really do boil does not entail that some universal or abstract object exists.

That we have a language with a grammar that includes universals and abstract objects isn't that realism about universals and abstract objects is true. Such a view is simply an unfounded projection.