The part following "that" is a proposition. — Tate

I'm not sure about that. There is the fact that snow is white and there is the proposition that snow is white. Are these the same thing? I'm inclined to say that the proposition is the truth-bearer and the fact the truth-maker.

Why do you treat these differently?

1. Joe Biden
2. The kettle is boiling

(1) is a name and (2) is a sentence. (1) isn't Joe Biden and (2) isn't the fact that the kettle is boiling.

1. The kettle is boiling
2. "The kettle is boiling"

(1) is a sentence, (2) is a quote.

And similarly:

1. The kettle is boiling

(1) is a sentence and that the kettle is boiling is a fact.

What is so hard to understand about this?

1. Joe Biden

(1) is a name and Joe Biden is a man.

Use-mention. It's really simple.

We can explain Tarski's view as follows: There are two modes of speech, an objectual mode and a linguistic mode ('material' mode, in Medieval terminology). The correspondence idea can be expressed in both modes. It is expressed by:

'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white

as well as by:

' "Snow is white" is true' is equivalent to 'Snow is white.' — Andrew M

I don't know if Blackwell got this right. In Truth and Proof (1969) Tarski said this:

A radical solution of the problem which may readily occur to us would be simply to remove the word “true” from the English vocabulary or at least to abstain from using it in any serious discussion.

Those people to whom such an amputation of English seems highly unsatisfactory and illegitimate may be inclined to accept a somewhat more compromising solution, which consists in adopting what could be called (following the contemporary Polish philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbinski) ´ “the nihilistic approach to the theory of truth”. According to this approach, the word “true” has no independent meaning but can be used as a component of the two meaningful expressions “it is true that” and “it is not true that”. These expressions are thus treated as if they were single words with no organic parts. The meaning ascribed to them is such that they can be immediately eliminated from any sentence in which they occur. For instance, instead of saying
it is true that all cats are black
we can simply say
all cats are black,
and instead of
it is not true that all cats are black
we can say
not all cats are black.

In other contexts the word “true” is meaningless. In particular, it cannot be used as a real predicate qualifying names of sentences. Employing the terminology of medieval logic, we can say that the word “true” can be used syncategorematically in some special situations, but it cannot ever be used categorematically.

To realize the implications of this approach, consider the sentence which was the starting point for the antinomy of the liar; that is, the sentence printed in red on page 65 in this magazine. From the “nihilistic” point of view it is not a meaningful sentence, and the antinomy simply vanishes. Unfortunately, many uses of the word “true”, which otherwise seem quite legitimate and reasonable, are similarly affected by this approach. Imagine, for instance, that a certain term occurring repeatedly in the works [[67]] of an ancient mathematician admits of several interpretations. A historian of science who studies the works arrives at the conclusion that under one of these interpretations all the theorems stated by the mathematician prove to be true; this leads him naturally to the conjecture that the same will apply to any work of this mathematician that is not known at present but may be discovered in the future. If, however, the historian of science shares the “nihilistic” approach to the notion of truth, he lacks the possibility of expressing his conjecture in words. One could say that truth-theoretical “nihilism” pays lip service to some popular forms of human speech, while actually removing the notion of truth from the conceptual stock of the human mind.

So he seems quite opposed to the redundancy view.

1. Joe Biden

(1) isn't the President. (1) is a name. Joe Biden is the President.

Again, this is the use-mention distinction.

Remember this?

1. The kettle is boiling
2. (1) is true

The correct translation of (2) is "the kettle is boiling" is true.

So:

1. The kettle is boiling
2. (1) is the fact that the kettle is boiling

The correct translation of (2) is "the kettle is boiling" is the fact that the kettle is boiling. This is false. Just as "Joe Biden" is the President is false.

That the kettle is boiling is the fact that the kettle is boiling.

So, what is the fact to which your sentence "The kettle is boiling" points? In your own words. Take your time. — Banno

The fact that the kettle is boiling.

On the contrary, that is exactly what I am pointing to. — Banno

And yet you are conflating them when you say that (1) is the fact that the kettle is boiling. It isn't. (1) is a sentence.

SO how can it be that: "(1) isn't the fact that the kettle is boiling". — Banno

Because (1) is a sentence and the fact that the kettle is boiling isn't a sentence. Therefore, (1) isn't the fact that the kettle is boiling.

You seem to be unable to separate use from mention. Here's another example that should make it clearer:

1. The kettle is boiling
2. (1) is true

The correct translation of (2) is "the kettle is boiling" is true. The incorrect translation of (2) is the kettle is boiling is true.

1. The kettle is boiling

(1) is an English sentence. You appear to have accepted this above. But the fact that the kettle is boiling isn't an English sentence. Therefore, (1) isn't the fact that the kettle is boiling. (1) refers to the fact that the kettle is boiling. (1) is about the fact that the kettle is boiling. (1) mentions the fact that the kettle is boiling. etc.

(1) says "The kettle is boiling" and (2) says "La bouilloire est en ébullition".

I don't understand the difficulty:

1. The kettle is boiling
2. La bouilloire est en ébullition

(1) is an English sentence and (2) is a French sentence.

1. Boiling the kettle is

Is (1) a grammatically incorrect fact or a grammatically incorrect sentence?

What sentence is it?

Why, it's (2)... — Banno

1. The kettle is boiling
2. "The kettle is boiling"

These are two different sentences.

Skip to 1:25.

And when you ask them what item 0 is, the answer is something like that it is the kettle boiling.

But that's item 1. — Banno

Is it?

1. The kettle is boiling

(1) is a sentence but a boiling kettle isn't a sentence.

For Jan. 6 rioters who believed Trump, storming the Capitol made sense

But the rioters themselves haven't been circumspect about what made them travel — in some cases hundreds of miles — to Washington for a rally that day and then march on the Capitol, which hundreds of them entered.

In interviews and court proceedings they've been clear: They believed Donald Trump when he told them the election had been stolen, and they believed it was their duty to try to help keep him in office, which in their eyes was essentially an effort to save the democracy.

...

Kenneth Rader, who pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge this month, admitted in court documents that he shared an image with 40 Facebook friends that read “Operation Occupy the Capitol, January 6, 2021” and wrote that Trump supporters were “going to remove the corrupt politions and take our country back... I will not stand by and let this go unanswered.”

...

Another woman was incredulous when asked by a reporter on Jan. 6 why she tried to storm the Capitol building, crying about being sprayed in the face with mace.

“We’re storming the Capitol!” she said in a video that was posted on Twitter, explaining why she tried to go inside. “It’s a revolution!”

...

Ryan Nichols, who was visible in the footage shown by the Jan. 6 committee on Thursday, pleaded not guilty and is being held in detention before his trial. A judge ruled Nichols was a threat based on evidence that included a “plethora” of videos, including some in which he appears to confess to fighting at the Capitol, filmed himself threatening violence on his way to the Capitol and then explained the reason he committed violence.

“So yes, today, Ryan Nichols, Ryan Nichols,” he says in the video, speaking in third person, adding that he grabbed his weapon “and he stormed the Capitol and he fought.” He goes on to say he fought for “freedom” and “election integrity.”

“I fought!”

In Harvard study of Jan. 6 rioters, top motivation is clear: Trump

A plurality of rioters cited either their support for Trump (20.6%) or Trump’s false belief that the election had been stolen (also 20.6%) as their primary motivation for their actions that led to charges on Jan. 6.

The third most frequently listed reason defendants gave to law enforcement for entering the Capitol was their belief that they were participating in “revolution, civil war, or secession.”

About the same number of defendants in the study claimed they were at the Capitol to “peacefully protest” (7%) as those who claimed they were there because of a “general interest in violence” (6.2%).

Anyone who isn't an idiot understands why they stormed the Capitol. They were trying to stop the Electoral College vote.

Trump compliments 'fierce' and 'smart' Putin and applauds Xi Jinping for ruling China with an 'iron fist'

He sure loves his dictators. Definitely wishes he had their power.

Classified folder on display at Trump Tower

What's the bet that Trump Tower gets searched next?

Judge unseals the list of items FBI seized from Trump in Mar-a-Lago search

Lots of empty folders with classified banners. What's he done with the contents?

You've also got the weirdness that comes from convention T working for factual, declarative language and using it to, generically, set out the meaning of non-factual, non-declarative language through how the sentence somehow 'pictures' the relevant state of affairs. EG, like you can elucidate the speech act of flipping someone off through ""fdrake flipped someone off" is true if and only if fdrake flipped someone off". — fdrake

Just a side note, but Convention T and the T schema are different things.

Convention T. A formally correct definition of the symbol 'Tr', formulated in the metalanguage, will be called an adequate definition of truth if it has the following consequences:

1. all sentences which are obtained from the expression 'x E Tr if and only if p' by substituting for the symbol 'x' a structural-descriptive name of any sentence of the language in question and for the symbol 'p' the expression which forms the translation of this sentence into the metalanguage;
2. the sentence 'for any x, if x E Tr then x E S'.

So Convention T is the claim that an adequate definition of "true" will entail the T-schema for all sentences.

And, as I've mention before, this highlights the fact that Tarski didn't offer the T-schema as a definition of truth, but as a consequence of a correct definition. As I mentioned here, we still need an actual definition of "true".

In On the Concept of Truth in Formal Languages he says:

In § 1 colloquial Ianguage is the object of our investigations. The results are entirely negative. With respect to this language not only does the definition of truth seem to be impossible, but even the consistent use of this concept in conformity with the laws of logic.

...

If these observations are correct, then the very possibility of a consistent use of the expression 'true sentence' which is in harmony with the laws of logic and the spirit of everyday language seems to be very questionable, and consequently the same doubt attaches to the possibility of constructing a correct definition of this expression.

...

For the reasons given in the preceding section I now abandon the attempt to solve our problem for the language of everyday life and restrict myself henceforth entirely to formalized languages.

The object language is a formalized language, specifically the calculus of classes in his example.

1. "p" is X iff p

Does (1) tell us the meaning of "X"? If not then the T-schema doesn't tell us the meaning of "true". It sets out the condition under which "p" is true, but nothing more.

This, perhaps, is the point @Sam26 makes when he says that the T-schema is irrelevant?

Trump team's filing

Movant also agrees that it would be appropriate for the special master to possess a Top Secret/SCI security clearance.

So they accept that these documents haven't been declassified.

I think sometimes we expect more from certain concepts than they give us, or we over analyze certain concepts in search of a some phantom that will answer our intellectual itch. Philosophers have a tendency to take concepts out of their natural habitat, and place them in an unnatural one. — Sam26

I think this is one of the things that Wittgenstein got right in the Philosophical Investigations. I'm not entirely convinced that meaning is as simple as use, but at the very least I think it's a good approach to dissolve some of the problems that philosophers effectively invent by injecting undue significance into a word (like "truth").

Sure, although I don't understand the relevance of this?

And yet, "It's fuzzy" isn't really truth apt until you know the context. At that point, you have an abstract object on your hands. — Tate

What abstract object? All I see there is a sentence with no explicit referent.

Sentences are not favored as truthbearers outside artificial systems. Propositions work better for that purpose, although they're abstract objects. There's no 'aboutness' to a proposition. It's the content of an uttered sentence, which can take many forms: usually speech or writing.

How would you say a proposition corresponds to a truthmaker? Where do we look to see this relation? — Tate

I think you're making things far too complicated. We use speech and writing to talk about/describe the world. If there's nothing mysterious about this then there's nothing mysterious about correspondence.

I just meant we don't have to get our boxers in a bunch over the status of truthbearers, the content of truthmakers, and the mysterious correspondence relation that's supposed to hold between them. — Tate

Is there something mysterious about correspondence?

We have a sentence "the cat is on the mat", we have the cat on the mat, and we say that the former is about or describes the latter. Is that mysterious? I don't really think so. So why would it be mysterious to say that the former corresponds to the latter?

In addition to my reply to Tate above, counterfactuals also imply, right up front, something that is the case, and try to show how that matters, in this world, by imagining that it's not. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm a bit confused. I just don't quite see the connection between "if Hitler had not committed suicide then he would have been executed by the Allies" being true (assuming for the sake of argument that it is) and the truth being "about our world, about where we live, and is thereby also about us, every time", as you say.

It seems to me that the counterfactual says something about some other possible world.

Although if you want to say that counterfactuals like the above are about our world (somehow) then I'm not entirely sure what significance there is in saying that the truth is "about our world". What would it mean for the truth to not be about our world? Are you just saying that "is true" means "is about our world"?

If legal action against ex-presidents becomes a "thing", we are entering a new age of tyranny. — Merkwurdichliebe

Prosecuting people for their crimes is tyranny?

I was thinking about how truth has to be about our world, about where we live, and is thereby also about us, every time, whether it seems to be or not, because every truth says something about what kind of world we live in and that says something about us as its residents, as part of it. — Srap Tasmaner

What about counterfactuals? Are they false (or not truth-apt)?

Proper names behave differently to common nouns.

As another example, assume that you believe that Trump is the President. If you were to claim that the President lives in Mar-a-Lago then you would be wrong because Joe Biden doesn't live in Mar-a-Lago. Regardless of who you believe is the President, the term "the President" refers to Joe Biden.

Yes.

What is a proper name if not a word that means a particular thing? — hypericin

It refers to a particular thing, but whether or not it means something is a contested subject. See the SEP article on names:

As well as having a range of entities to which it applies, the common noun “bachelor” has a meaning; it means man who has never been married. What about names? “Socrates” certainly applies to things. It applies, most obviously, to the founder of Western philosophy. Understood as a generic name (see Section 1), “Socrates” applies to several individuals: to a first approximation, all those who are called “Socrates”. But does “Socrates” also possess a meaning?

Some names have meanings in a sense. I have heard “Merlot” used to summon a child, and once knew of a married couple whose respective names were “Sunshine” and “Moonlight”. These names, we would say, have meanings. “Moonlight”, for instance, means light from the Moon. Something similar goes on when we say that “Theodore” means gift of god, or interpret a Mohawk name as a verb phrase. But this sense of meaning turns out not to be the one we are after.

Consider that for “bachelor” the meaning—man who has never been married—is also what determines the noun’s range of application. When the noun “bachelor” applies to someone, it’s because they are a man who has never been married. And when it fails to apply to someone, it’s because they are not. By contrast, the kind of meaning just canvassed for the names “Merlot” or “Moonlight” places no direct constraint on what they apply to. One may be named “Merlot”, and so fall within the name’s range of application, no matter what relationship one bears to the wine grape variety, Merlot (Mill 1843: 34). Moreover, one’s particular relationship to the grape is not the reason the name applies.

In this long tail of the article on semantics, we will confine ourselves to the question of whether names have a meaning in the sense in which “bachelor” does. Do they have a meaning that determines, or at least restricts, their extension (i.e., either range of application or reference)?

---

The same example can be made without using a proper name. Suppose all the world's water was suddenly replaced with twin water. Until I learned of this replacement, I would still mean water when I said "water". Only when I learned would I mean twin water. While still acknowledging that the people who were naïve to the change still mean water. — hypericin

And in such a scenario if you were to say "this is a glass of water" you would be wrong because it isn't a glass of water, it's a glass of twin-water. The extension of the word "water" isn't just whatever you claim to be water; it's whatever satisfies the intension of the word.

Imagine you were killed and replaced by an evil doppelganger. Your friend George, unaware of this, says "Hi Michael". George doesn't mean the doppelganger, he means to greet Good Michael. Only for those who learned of substitution would "Michael" mean the doppelganger. — hypericin

That's a proper name. "Michael" doesn't really mean anything¹.

¹ Unless you want to address the Hebrew etymology, in which case it means "who is like God?"

Nonetheless, when earthlings and twin earthlings say "water", they mean the exact same thing, for them. — hypericin

By this you mean that the subjects have the same psychological state? The point of Putnam's argument is to show that:

a) the subjects have the same psychological state, and
b) the word "water" means different things (both in the sense of intension and extension, as explained above) in each world

So therefore the subjects' psychological states have nothing to do with the meaning of the word "water", hence his conclusion "meanings just ain't in the head".

In other words, there's no such thing as what I mean by the word "water", there is only what the word "water" means.

Fine, but that has nothing to do with what I was saying so I don't understand why you're bringing it up as a response to my comment.