The difference being that we can say what kettles, tables or teacups are, but not so Jabberwockies, it would seem. — Janus

Maybe. But I can say that Jabberwokies are tall hairy creatures with purple noses. I can instil in your mind the notion that one might reach for the word 'jabberwocky' on seeing such a thing. I can do all this without jabberwockies having to actually exist.

Your trigger and your response can both exist without the causal object existing.

I have to have criteria I rely on to reach a decision regarding an entity about whether it's a jabberwocky or not. Those criteria might be characteristics of the thing, but might be as simple as me believing that you possess such criteria even though I don't, and just asking you and trusting your judgment. — Srap Tasmaner

You seem happy to let factors other than properties of the putative object act as membership criteria - so why not "the thing I treat this way". If I feel inclined to treat it thus, then it's a jabberwocky. Does that not serve as sufficient criteria?

for a long time I've been uncomfortable with the way classical logic is constructed... — Srap Tasmaner

Well, at least I'm only taking a pop at some form of naive realism, I think the target on your back is bigger than that on mine if you want to take down classical logic...

I think we handle sortals quite differently from predicates. An entity that is barking might not be. Some entities that are mine might not be. An entity that is a dog is always a dog, and couldn't be, for instance, a lamp of mine that is now on or off. — Srap Tasmaner

Classic John Hegley monologue seems fitting here, I'll paraphrase for brevity...

John came home one day to find a large white sliced loaf on his kitchen table. he hadn't bought it and didn't even eat white bread. It had one of the crusts missing. While John was puzzling over this there was a knock at the door.
"Have you seen my dog?" asked the man at the door, "He's gone missing".
"What does he look like?" asked John.
"Like a large white sliced loaf" said the man.
"Ahh!" said John, "With one of the crusts missing?".
"Yes" said the man "He lost it in a fight".
John went into the kitchen and brought the white sliced loaf from the table. "Is this your dog?" he asked...

... "No" said the man. "that must be somebody else's dog".

you're also erasing all the different ways we might reach for to describe entities and calling them all behaviours, and then even identifying the entity itself as a bundle of behaviours. It's behaviours all the way down, with no agents anywhere.

Which means all we ever do now is describe behaviours, and bundles of behaviours, and that makes them the new entities of unrestricted quantification. Which, you know, fine, but I'm going to be uncomfortable. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm not sure what you mean by 'unrestricted quantification'? All I'm saying is that it's difficult not to see us as a cluster of behaviours. It's simply that without behaving we'd decay, we resist the entropic gradient, that's we are a distinguishable something and not a sea of homogeneous soup.

You could have kettles and teapots as objects apart form our behaviour toward them, but what would that mean for them to be so? what would it mean for the boundary between teapot and ~teapot to be thus and not thus other than our treating it so? Even for you to declare it to be is some behaviour, no?

you're starting with a lot of conceptual apparatus about entropy and the laws of thermodynamics and all that, and then using that to explain the being of entities. Even apokrisis (who has a related big story) doesn't try to do that, but starts from a more fundamental metaphysics and then gets the physics out of that — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah. I think that's fair. But I don't see any grounds for a kind of 'order of events' with regards to lining up one's presuppositions. Is there a reason why metaphysics must proceed physics when ensuring one's presuppositions cohere?

you want to explain being in terms of physics, but that's backwards — Srap Tasmaner

I don't see why. In order to think we have to have brains, but that doesn't mean we can't then revise our understanding of how we think with our empirical data about how brains work. Likewise, just because we must exist prior to learning about physics, I don't see why our knowledge of that physics shouldn't then form part of our narratives regarding what that existence is all about.

Point being, you come along, a methodological behaviourist, and tell me, in essence, that it turns out your methodology is literal fact, that it's not just a matter of modeling entities in terms of their behaviour, but that entities just literally are their behavior. Now maybe you're right, and you were terribly lucky to have chosen a methodology that turns out not to be a research strategy but a factual description of the universe -- or maybe, just maybe, you're projecting the structure of your thought onto reality. — Srap Tasmaner

But that's exactly what I'm doing. Exactly what everyone is doing. How are they not? How is anyone not constructing their reality from the priors their 'methodology' hands them? With what would one construct reality otherwise?

All we have, absent our methodological assumptions, is an unfiltered sea of raw data and noise.

We just are never going to get the kind of precision out of language that some philosophers want. It's like an itch that won't go away. — Sam26

I may or may not be one of those philosophers, but I do think common language is capable of being precise enough. Language can be honed.

For example, the terms/adjectives "linguistic" "non-linguistic" and "pre-linguistic" have been employed in this discussion by a variety of different individuals. Those uses were mainly talking about kinds of facts or something like that. For different reasons in the past, I used them myself, because they seemed like a commonsense easily understood distinction. I wanted to draw and maintain a meaningful distinction between language less creatures' belief and language users' belief. Naturally, I saw the difference to be language. So, I began by saying that language less animals have non-linguistic(or pre-linguistic) belief and language users have linguistic belief. Seems fairly straight forward. Makes perfect sense. I later found that that particular simplicity, which I always strive for, was deceptively so.

Turns out that that was a very useful distinction for me, but not for the reasons I initially began using it. I wanted to clearly demarcate two categories of belief as mentioned heretofore. I called them "linguistic belief", which was meant to pick out all belief that is existentially dependent upon language, and "pre-linguistic" or "non-linguistic" belief, which was meant to pick out all belief that was not existentially dependent upon language. Seems all well and good right up to the point when we want to set out cat's belief about bowls in terms of the content of the belief.

A non-linguistic belief cannot be existentially dependent upon language. If a bowl is existentially dependent upon language(and they are) and the content of the cat's belief includes the bowl(and it does) then that particular belief is existentially dependent upon language, and there's no way around it. All belief about bowls is existentially dependent upon bowls. Even illusions of bowls are not possible without bowls. So, I had arrived at incoherence and/or self-contradiction without being guilty of equivocating terms. This forced me to re-evaluate my position and what I was aiming to take proper account of. I want to offer a notion of belief that is philosophically and scientifically respectable. Such a notion ought be able to sensibly bridge the gap between language less belief and the belief of language users in a way that belief as propositional content has been found sorely lacking.

I had - and remain to have - no doubt whatsoever that some language less creatures have belief, but realized that we could not make sense of those sorts of belief by using the terms "linguistic" and "pre-linguistic" if I wanted to also hold that non-linguistic belief cannot be existentially dependent upon language. Some language less creatures' belief includes content that is itself existentially dependent upon language. Believing that a mouse is under the stove for example includes the stove. This makes perfect sense given that the overlap between their world and ours includes things that we created via language use; some of which are perfectly capable of being directly perceived by language less creatures and thus could be sensibly said to be part of the content of their belief.

So, I had no choice but to abandon the idea that a language less creature's belief could not be existentially dependent upon language, because some of them clearly are. This line of thought led me to realization that the difference between language less belief and the belief of language users could not be properly set out by using such terms. While language use is the difference, it was not whether or not the content of the belief was existentially dependent upon language use that determined the difference between language less creatures' belief and language users'. Rather, it was whether or not the content included language use.

Thus, we can make sense of the cat's belief that a mouse is behind the tree, or that a mouse is under the sofa, or that the food bowl is empty, or that a duck is under the car because none of those beliefs have language use as content. The correlations being drawn do not include language use. However, my cat also has some belief that includes language use as content, not because she asks, "you want some treats?" each and every time in the same tone prior to giving her treats, but because I do, and she has come to believe that she is about to get treats when I say that as a result of drawing correlations between my language use and what happens afterwards. She has attributed meaning to the language use by virtue of drawing correlations between it and eating treats. This points towards language acquisition and what it takes to go from language less creature to language user.

Now, if we go back to my granddaughter, we can also sensibly say that she believed stuff was in the fridge, and her belief was true because stuff was in the fridge. So, when she heard someone say otherwise, she knew that the claim was false on it's face, because she knew what was being claimed(she knew what it meant) and she had true belief to the contrary. The claim made no sense to her! Her belief included correlations between language use(which is directly perceptible, but includes things that are not - meaning) and other directly perceptible things like the fridge and its contents.

I'm not convinced there is a coherent account of belief that doesn't rely on knowledge as a separate category... — Srap Tasmaner

Are there beliefs that do not rely upon accounts(language use)?

(And again, that is what creativesoul misses in his account.) — Banno

I do not completely agree with Davidson or Witt. There are important differences at a fundamental level between their views and my own. My and your view differ in much the same respect, I think. Yours is more in line with theirs, whereas I disagree with all three of you on some basic tenets. It could be summed up with "truth and meaning are both prior to language".

:wink:

It's like an itch that won't go away — Sam26

Like the shingles virus that I'm currently suffering from...

:yikes:

@Srap Tasmaner

If there's confusion about what I meant with "exterior" in the scare quotes, what I meant was the usual 'things are they are in themselves' in contrast to 'things as they are for us'. This was intended to resonate with the non-linguistic ('things as they are in themselves') vs linguistic ('things as they are for us') distinction in context.

That's painful :gasp:

Indeed. Gives me time to do this though! lol. Cannot move around as usual, otherwise I would not be doing this. There are more real life results based things I would be doing if I could.

@fdrake, @Sam26, @creativesoul, @Srap Tasmaner

1. The kettle is boiling
2. "The kettle is boiling"
3. "The kettle is boiling" is true
4. '"The kettle is boiling" is true'
5. '"The kettle is boiling is true' is true

Previously I've felt obliged to explain that 1, 3 and 5 in this list are facts.

Arguably, since they are directly about sentences and not about kettles, 3 and 5 might be called linguistic facts. But on that criteria, 1 is directly about kettles, not sentences.

There are, it seems, folk who think that we need an item 0 in this list, a state of affairs or an exterior thing in itself, outside of language or perception or belief or some other; and that it is this item 0 that is the fact, which is represented (or some such...) in item 1.

And when you ask them what item 0 is, the answer is something like that it is the kettle boiling.

But that's item 1.

As if there were a boiling kettle that were not yet a boiling kettle without our intervention.

I do not completely agree with Davidson or Witt. — creativesoul

Nor am I, nor are they with each other, and often nor are any of us even in agreement with ourselves...

Understood. I do strive for agreement with myself though.

:wink:

I may or may not be one of those philosophers, but I do think common language is capable of being precise enough. Language can be honed. — creativesoul

Ya, I'm not saying language can't be precise, only that some concepts resist precision. So, we agree.

A non-linguistic belief cannot be existentially dependent upon language. If a bowl is existentially dependent upon language(and they are) and the content of the cat's belief includes the bowl(and it does) then that particular belief is existentially dependent upon language, and there's no way around it. — creativesoul

I agree, that a non-linguistic belief is not dependent on language. However, I would probably word the next statement a bit different. The concept bowl is dependent on language, but the fact that there is a bowl (the object referred to as bowl), this fact can be part of the of the cat's belief. In fact, many states-of-affairs can be part of the cat's belief. So, I'm separating the concept from the facts involved in the cat's belief.

Some language less creatures' belief includes content that is itself existentially dependent upon language. Believing that a mouse is under the stove for example includes the stove. This makes perfect sense given that the overlap between their world and ours includes things that we created via language use; some of which are perfectly capable of being directly perceived by language less creatures and thus could be sensibly said to be part of the content of their belief. — creativesoul

Again, here, including the stove is just including a fact about reality, their belief doesn't include the concept stove. The object that the concept refers to is not dependent on language, just as many facts aren't dependent on language. So, the cat's belief, it seems to me, is not dependent on language, at least our language, but maybe dependent upon some fact that has obtained as a result of our interaction with the world. So, I don't see an overlap, i.e., if I'm interpreting you correctly.

I agree with your assessment of your granddaughter's belief. I think your other thoughts may need more refinement. That's my take, for what its worth.

And when you ask them what item 0 is, the answer is something like that it is the kettle boiling.

But that's item 1. — Banno

Is it?

1. The kettle is boiling

(1) is a sentence but a boiling kettle isn't a sentence.

(1) is a sentence — Michael

What sentence is it?

Why, it's (2)...

Hence (2) is the sentence...

You seem to be brewing some sort of circularity.

What sentence is it?

Why, it's (2)... — Banno

1. The kettle is boiling
2. "The kettle is boiling"

These are two different sentences.

Then what's the LHS? — Tate

Have you encountered the 'use/ mention' distinction? The LHS is the mention of the linguistic expression itself. Remember the RHS is not to be thought of in this context as a linguistic expression, but as the state of affairs it posits. So "snow is white" says that snow is white; it is not talking about itself but about the fact that snow is white.But ""snow is white"" is talking about "snow is white" the linguistic expression.

Thanks. I don't find anything to disagree with what you say there. What I meant by "self-evident", though, is something like "immediately apparent"; when I think about my experience taken as a whole it seems immediately apparent that it is not the world. perhaps I can say it is of the world, but then the world is not an object of any perception.

Even the empirical objects of the everyday are not (taken as wholes) objects of perception, because all I perceive are images or impressions (of them). I put "of them" in brackets because the idea that our images and impressions are of empirical objects is an inferentially derived collective representation, an inference to what certainly seems to be the best explanation, or so it seems to me, anyway.

Not necessarily use against what you said so much as attempting to makes sense of how the 'actual world' posited earlier fit into the carving. You've also said that we don't see the world, but rather our perceptions, conceptions, impressions, and things of a nature which sound like a denial of direct perception. — creativesoul

Just to be clear, I haven't posited an "actual world"; I've talked about the distinction between experienced actuality, meaning actual experience, which I'm saying is of images, sensations, impressions, and the world, which I'm saying is the idea of the totality of things, facts and relations that we think gives rise to actual experience.

Of course actual experience also involves recognition of invariances or repetitions and patterns of image, sensation and impression, and I'm saying that it is both from these, and communication via language with others, that the idea of a world is constructed. So, I'm agreeing with Davidson, Wittgenstein and Kant that there is no substantive distinction between world and schema.

Maybe. But I can say that Jabberwokies are tall hairy creatures with purple noses. I can instil in your mind the notion that one might reach for the word 'jabberwocky' on seeing such a thing. I can do all this without jabberwockies having to actually exist.

Your trigger and your response can both exist without the causal object existing. — Isaac

Sure, but this is purely arbitrary confabulation as opposed to what we say about tables, kettles and cups, which is a conventional store of practical wisdom derived from actual invention and use.

. It could be summed up with "truth and meaning are both prior to language". — creativesoul

I would put that differently: actuality and non-linguistic meaning are both prior to language. For me truth is linguistic correspondence with our ideas of the actual (ideas which are themselves not necessarily or wholly linguistic).

Here we are entering territory that is very tricky to speak about; in fact I would say impossible to speak about unambiguously, but we can and do get a sense of it. We understand it even if we cannot definitively enframe it. Discourse is by no means the "be all and end all".

So, I had no choice but to abandon the idea that a language less creature's belief could not be existentially dependent upon language, because some of them clearly are. — creativesoul

There is, however, a clear distinction between the sense in which a belief might be thought to be existentially dependent on language because the believer is a language user, and the sense in which the believing or expectations of a non-language user might be thought to be existentially dependent on language because the object the belief is about would not exist had language not existed.

1. Boiling the kettle is

Is (1) a grammatically incorrect fact or a grammatically incorrect sentence?

Exactly how? What sentence is (1)? Is (1) the sentence "the kettle is boiling" and (2) the sentence ""The kettle is boiling""? And these are different... how?

1. The kettle is boiling
2. "The kettle is boiling"
3. "'The kettle is boiling'"
4. ...

One of these things is not like the others...

I don't understand the difficulty:

1. The kettle is boiling
2. La bouilloire est en ébullition

(1) is an English sentence and (2) is a French sentence.

Yep.

So, what do they say?

(1) says "The kettle is boiling" and (2) says "La bouilloire est en ébullition".

(1) says "The kettle is boiling" and (2) says "La bouilloire est en ébullition". — Michael

No, (1) is "The kettle is boiling" and (2) is "La bouilloire est en ébullition".

What do they say?

I'll answer for you. They both say that the kettle is boiling.

But that's (1), not (0)...

1. The kettle is boiling

(1) is an English sentence. You appear to have accepted this above. But the fact that the kettle is boiling isn't an English sentence. Therefore, (1) isn't the fact that the kettle is boiling. (1) refers to the fact that the kettle is boiling. (1) is about the fact that the kettle is boiling. (1) mentions the fact that the kettle is boiling. etc.

The object that the concept refers to is not dependent on language... — Sam26

When and where there has never been language there could have never been stoves.

That sums up the difference between our views it seems. The object that "stove" refers to is existentially dependent upon language on my view, but not yours.

It's as if someone were to argue like this...

5. ......
4. "'"The kettle is boiling"'"
3. '"The kettle is boiling"'
2. "The kettle is boiling"

...and in each step the bit in bold just is the next item in the list; it's what each sentence points to. So what do we bold in:

1. The kettle is boiling

What does it point to?

And here some conclude that there must be a non-linguistic, unquoted, thing-in-itself to which (1) is pointing.

Or it points to a fact, which is a thing in the world, and when asked what that thing is, they say it is a boiling kettle - which is (1)

But (1) is pointing to the boiling kettle, if anything. If it points to anything, it points to itself. Here the sequence ends. Here you show your understanding not by pointing but by making tea.

Edit: does exactly this. I'd written this post before I read his.

Michael, what fact does (1) state? It states that the kettle is boiling - which is (1).

Just to be clear, I haven't posited an "actual world"; I've talked about the distinction between experienced actuality, meaning actual experience, which I'm saying is of images, sensations, impressions, and the world, which I'm saying is the idea of the totality of things, facts and relations that we think gives rise to actual experience. — Janus

There is, as a kind of ground to all our propositions, truths and facts, a pre-linguistic actuality to which they must submit. Analysis and conceptualization cannot gain purchase on that actuality, — Janus

That's the bit directly above that seems to be untenable in the same way that Kant's Noumena is.

Obviously linguistics played a part in the stove's creation, but the fact that stove exists, is just like any other fact of existence for the cat, and the cat's belief. What if we removed all humans from existence, but there still existed stoves, would there still be an overlap between the cat's belief and language? What if someone created a stove, ceased to exist, then cats came into existence later, would you still say that the cat's belief overlapped language? I don't see any reason to think that the cat's belief has a linguistic component simply because some language user created the stove. The stove is just another fact of reality, like a tree or the moon.

Therefore, (1) isn't the fact that the kettle is boiling. (1) refers to the fact that the kettle is boiling. (1) is about the fact that the kettle is boiling. (1) mentions the fact that the kettle is boiling. etc. — Michael

(1) refers to the fact that the kettle is boiling.
The kettle is boiling. (1) refers to that.

(1) is about the fact that the kettle is boiling.
The kettle is boiling. (1) is about that fact.

(1) mentions the fact that the kettle is boiling.
The kettle is boiling. (1) mentions that fact.

In each, (1) is that.

Somewhat circular, no? Is that OK? SO how can it be that: "(1) isn't the fact that the kettle is boiling".

that the kettle is boiling. — Banno

The part following "that" is a proposition.

Is it? So what is a proposition? Fill out your point.