The president can declassify what he wants. — NOS4A2

No he can't.

Not Even the President Can Declassify Nuclear Secrets

The 1988 Supreme Court case Navy v. Egan confirmed that classification authority flows from the president except in specific instances separated from his powers by law.

...

[T]here are certain materials that presidents cannot classify and declassify at will. One such category of material is the identity of spies.

Another is nuclear secrets. The Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954 produced an even stranger category of classified knowledge. Anything related to the production or use of nuclear weapons and nuclear power is inherently classified.

The TS/SCI documents that were taken might involve the identity of spies or information about nuclear power (as some outlets have reported).

Also, anything that one President declassifies a future President can reclassify. So if Trump wants to play the game that he "had a standing order" that declassifies anything he took home, Biden can play the game that he ordered that anything taken to Mar-a-Lago is reclassified.

It's irrelevant if Trump declassified the documents. — Relativist

Good point.

Laws and Lists in Search Warrant Offer Clues to Trump Document Investigation

Even if it is true that Mr. Trump deemed the files declassified before the end of his presidency, however, none of the three crimes depends on whether the documents are classified.

The first law, Section 793 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, is better known as the Espionage Act. It criminalizes the unauthorized retention or disclosure of information related to national defense that could be used to harm the United States or aid a foreign adversary. Each offense can carry a penalty of up to 10 years in prison.

...

As a result, while these classifications — especially top secret ones — can be good indicators that a document probably meets the standard of being “national defense information” covered by the Espionage Act, charges under that law can be brought against someone who hoarded national security secrets even if they were not deemed classified.

..

The second, Section 1519, is an obstruction law that is part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a broad set of reforms enacted by Congress in 2002 after financial scandals at firms like Enron, Arthur Andersen and WorldCom.

Section 1519 sets a penalty of up to 20 years in prison per offense for the act of destroying or concealing documents or records “with the intent to impede, obstruct or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter” within the jurisdiction of federal departments or agencies.

...

The third law that investigators cite in the warrant, Section 2071, criminalizes the theft or destruction of government documents. It makes it a crime, punishable in part by up to three years in prison per offense, for anyone with custody of any record or document from federal court or public office to willfully and unlawfully conceal, remove, mutilate, falsify or destroy it.

I think Moore's paradox might be a useful thing to consider here.

That I believe that p is true doesn't entail that p is true, and so "I believe that p is true and p is not true" is, in a sense, consistent and possibly true, but in another sense an absurd thing to say.

This is where I think the meaning-as-use approach isn't the full story. Although in the everyday sense we might agree that the assertions "p" and "I believe p" are doing the same thing, in a more strict sense they can have different truth-values, and if two propositions can have different truth-values then they mean different things.

So I don't think it right (or rather insufficient) to just look to our ordinary, everyday speech to understand the difference between "snow is white" is true and snow is white.

The FBI suspiciously waited until before the midterms to retrieve those documents — NOS4A2

Why is it suspicious? They didn't have enough evidence to obtain a warrant earlier, and even issued a subpoena to have him return them which he defied. And after obtaining a warrant it doesn't make sense to then wait months until after the midterms as the very point is that them being there is a national security threat.

Although I'm not sure what the midterms have to do with anything. Are you suggesting that the FBI did this just so that the midterm elections will be influenced to favour the Democrats? Given that you've previously argued that the very notion of influence is "magical thinking", you refute your own rhetoric.

According to his defense he had a standing order to declassify documents so he could take them for work at Mar-a-Lago. — NOS4A2

He doesn't have the authority to declassify documents that are TS/SCI.

What else can it be? — NOS4A2

A fact that he illegally possessed classified documents and defied a subpoena by not returning them all.

Best to explain as clearly and fully as you can. — universeness

That's the point of symbolic logic. Ordinary language is often vague and ambiguous and open to misunderstanding. Symbolic logic allows us to clarify our terms and better make sense of inferences.

A good teacher... — universeness

I'm not here to teach. In fact I specifically posted this to get answers from people more knowledgeable than me because, as I said, the conclusion seems counterintuitive.

the symbology in your OP is cryptic to say the least. — universeness

It really isn't. It's very basic modal logic.

I don't want to turn this discussion into a lesson on symbolic logic so I'll just refer you to these:

List of logic symbols
Modal logic

As I mentioned in the previous post (as an edit, so you may need to refresh to see it), Kp means "x knows p" and Bp means "x believes p" ("x" being some hypothetical person and "p" being some state of affairs).

Some of you are reading too much into the word "omniscience". This isn't a discussion about God or anything like it. This is just a discussion about the below argument and how to interpret the conclusion.

Kp ≔ x knows p
Bp ≔ x believes p

1. Kp ⊨ Bp (premise)
2. ∀p: Kp (premise)
3. ∃p: ¬□p (premise)
4. ∃p: Bp ∧ ◇¬p (from 1, 2, and 3)

I am not saying that there is anything that satisfies the second premise, I'm just looking at what would follow were there to be something that knows everything.

I would appreciate it if you could keep on topic and not discuss unrelated issues.

Trump Claims He Had A 'Standing Order' That Made It OK To Take Classified Docs

Former President Donald Trump’s response to the federal raid on his Mar-a-Lago home this week ricocheted from conspiracy to whataboutism: First, he suggested the FBI could have planted the top-secret material it found at his South Florida residence. Then he shifted focus to his predecessor, Barack Obama, whom he said had done the same thing, only worse ― a claim the National Archives was moved to debunk on Friday.

Trump now appears to have landed on an old standby, claiming victimhood because he supposedly didn’t do anything wrong to begin with. He had already declassified everything that had been taken to Mar-a-Lago, Trump argued on Truth Social, the platform he founded after being kicked off Twitter.

On Friday evening, Trump’s camp sent a statement to Fox News elaborating on that defense.

“As we can all relate to, everyone ends up having to bring home their work from time to time. American presidents are no different,” the statement read.

It continued: “President Trump, in order to prepare for work the next day, often took documents, including classified documents, to the residence. He had a standing order that documents removed from the Oval Office and taken to the residence were deemed to be declassified the moment he removed them.”

They really are just trying everything to try to get him off the hook.

Well, as it was Iran that issued the Fatwa, maybe look to Iran?

Praise, worry in Iran after Rushdie attack; government quiet

As recently as February 2017, Khamenei tersely answered this question posed to him: “Is the fatwa on the apostasy of the cursed liar Salman Rushdie still in effect? What is a Muslim’s duty in this regard?”

Khamenei responded: “The decree is as Imam Khomeini issued.”

Exactly my thoughts. This seems to be an epistemic version of a modal scope fallacy where the possibility that not-p entails some possibility of not-p as a conjunction with knowing-that-p. But this is impossible: while p is possibly false, there are simply no worlds where p is both known and false (these worlds are contradictory, i.e. impossible). — Kuro

Again, from the OP:

1. Kp (premise)
2. ¬□p (premise)
3. Kp ∧ ◇¬p (from 1 and 2)

This is a valid argument. To deny the conclusion you must deny one of the premises.

Note that I'm not saying:

◇(Kp ∧ ¬p)

From here:

1. It is possible that I know everything and am wrong about something
2. I know everything and it is possible that I am wrong about something

The former is false but the latter seems possible as the argument above shows.

Is that the right parsing? If you know that p then p is true, after all, and you could not be wrong about p being true, even if p, in some other possible world, might have not been true...

That is, that p might have been false does not imply that you are wrong that p is, as things turned out, true.

The cat is indeed on the mat, you know the cat is on the mat, it is true that the cat is on the mat, you believe that the cat is on the mat, but the cat might have been elsewhere. — Banno

Well, there's a difference between these two:

1. I believe p but I am wrong
2. I believe p but I could be wrong

How do we formulate these in symbolic logic? This is my attempt:

1. Bp ∧ ¬p
2. Bp ∧ ◇¬p

It makes sense to me. "I believe p but I could be wrong" means "I believe p and it's possible that not p".

If not these then what?

Trump Lawyer Told Justice Dept. That Classified Material Had Been Returned

The lawyer signed a statement in June that all documents marked as classified and held in boxes in storage at Mar-a-Lago had been given back. The search at the former president’s home on Monday turned up more.

I wonder why they lied. :chin:

1. I think. — Isaac

Then you accept what I said here as part of this exchange:

2. If John claims "Only X, Y, and Z exist" - John cannot possibly be wrong — Isaac

He can possibly be wrong. I provided the argument several times:

Bp
¬□p
Bp ∧ ◇¬p

What you should say is:

2. If John claims "Only X, Y, and Z exist" - John is not wrong

All you have argued is that if ontological solipsism is correct then the ontological solipsist isn't wrong. — Michael

You haven't specified your terms. I can look up the notation, but I can't look up what you mean by Bp or p. — Isaac

p ≔ ontological solipsism is true
Bp ≔ I believe that p

Nonsense. You writing only two premises doesn't confer some kind of magical power. You've not listed all the premises which are being assumed by the argument. — Isaac

One of these is true:

1. Bp ∧ ◇¬p
2. Bp ∧ □p
3. ¬Bp ∧ ◇¬p
4. ¬Bp ∧ □p

Which of these is true if ontological solipsism is true?

That's ignoring the implication of the entire world being in John's mind. — Isaac

The rules of inference don’t change. You can only avoid the conclusion by rejecting one of the two premises. Either I don’t believe that ontological solipsism is true or ontological solipsism is necessarily true.

I don't see how. What you say is true in our world because timekeeping is external and your memory is not always accessible to you. Two external features. I don't see how it would be the case in a world where all there was was your consciously aware mind. — Isaac

Let’s assume that only my mind and your mind exist. I have been in pain for 30 minutes. According to your reasoning, either it is impossible for me to not know that I have been in pain for 30 minutes or that I have been in pain for 30 minutes is a property of your mind.

Or let’s assume that only my mind and seven billion other minds and a material universe of superstrings exist. I have been in pain for 30 minutes. According to your reasoning, either it is impossible for me to not know that I have been in pain for 30 minutes or that I have been in pain for 30 minutes is a property of one or more of these seven billion other minds, or of the material universe of superstrings.

I don’t think either of these scenarios make sense. So the conclusion is that either that I have been in pain for 30 minutes, although true, isn’t a “property” of anything, or something can be a “property” of my mental phenomena but not known.

Then why did the vase fall off the table, if not because of some property of the world prior? — Isaac

Because of stuff that happens in the future. I don’t understand what’s difficult to understand about this. Stuff that will happen in the future isn’t a “property” of things that exist in the present.

If only a material universe of superstrings exist it doesn’t follow that the future state of that universe is a property of that universe in the present. If only your mind and my mind exist it doesn’t follow that the future state of your mind is a property of your mind in the present (or a property of my mind in the present).

'All things it will cause' is a property of an entity. — Isaac

You're really reaching with what you mean by "property". I wouldn’t say that that the vase will fall off the table tomorrow and break is a property of the vase, or of the table, or of the floor, or of whatever.

But if you want to use the word "property" to refer to this sort of thing then I reject the assertion that solipsism entails that all "properties" of mental phenomena are known. See below.

1. John knows that Joe Biden is President (and Joe Biden is a figment of John's mind)
2. Joe Biden is 79 years old (and being 79 years old is a figment of John's mind)
3. Therefore, John knows that Joe Biden is 79 years old (and 'knowing' anything is figment of John's mind, the 'truth' of anything means whatever john thinks is means because it's also a figment of John's mind) — Isaac

Even if it is impossible for me to not know that I am in pain it is possible for me to not know that I have been in pain for 30 minutes. And this is true even if only my mental phenomena exists. I don't need for something other than my mind (e.g. another mind or a material universe) to exist for me to have been in pain for 30 minutes, or for me to not know that I have been in pain for 30 minutes.

There are facts about mental phenomena that might not be known even if the mental phenomena themselves are known.

2. If John claims "Only X, Y, and Z exist" - John cannot possibly be wrong — Isaac

He can possibly be wrong. I provided the argument several times:

Bp
¬□p
Bp ∧ ◇¬p

What you should say is:

2. If John claims "Only X, Y, and Z exist" - John is not wrong

All you have argued is that if ontological solipsism is correct then the ontological solipsist isn't wrong.

John knows that only X, Y, and Z exist (incorrect) — Isaac

If John doesn't know that only X, Y, and Z exist then he doesn't know everything.

Jim knows such a world where John might exist is nonsense. — Isaac

But it's not nonsense. It is a perfectly coherent situation. Only X, Y, and Z exist and they are all features of John's mind. He knows that X, Y, and Z exist but he doesn't know that only X, Y, and Z exist. He doesn't know what will exist in the future, or how X, Y, or Z will change. He might not know what existed in the past, given the limitations of memory. He might not know whether or not the Reimann hypothesis is true. He doesn't know what could have happened had he chosen a different course of action.

Maybe the problem is with the interpretation of the English sentence. These two don’t mean the same thing:

It is possible that I know everything and am wrong about something

I know everything and it is possible that I am wrong about something

The former is false but the latter seems possible as the argument above shows.

I suppose the latter is the implication of fallibilism. If knowledge does not require certainty then I can know everything even if I am not certain about anything. In this case I have fallible omniscience.

And I think certainty is only possible if the truth is necessary, so infallible omniscience requires that all truths are necessary.

Couldn't we be "wrong" about this conclusion? — 180 Proof

That's what I'm suggesting. The conclusion is counterintuitive, so something is probably wrong somewhere but I can't see where.

1. ∀p: Kp (premise)
2. ∃p: ¬□p (premise)
3. ∃p: Bp ∧ ◇¬p (from 1 and 2)

It could be that this is a reductio ad absurdum against 1: it is logically impossible to know everything. Or it could be that all truths are necessary. Or it could be that "Bp ∧ ◇¬p" is not the definition of "I could be wrong".

Or maybe it really is the case that it’s possible to be wrong even if you know everything.

Of course it is. X is such that it causes Y. Some collection of states in the world are such that Z will happen in ten minutes. Those are properties of X and {those states} respectively. — Isaac

Even if X is a property of something that exists in my mind it doesn't follow that I know that it will cause Y. You're just asserting that the solipsist will have knowledge of the future without explaining how you came to that conclusion.

And it isn't a given that ontological solipsism entails hard determinism. It could be that probabilities/randomness is involved in mental phenomena.

X is such that it cannot lead to Y. Z, X, and C are such that if C were removed they would no longer lead to Y. — Isaac

Same with this. It doesn't follow from X being a property of something that exists in my mind that I know that it cannot lead to Y.

Mathematics is such that pi is 3.14... — Isaac

Yes, but it's not a property of things that exist. You don't find the decimal notation of pi, or the truth of the Reimann hypothesis, written onto atoms or whatever, or on sense data, and mathematical realism is false.

And I'm not talking about the decimal notation of pi to some arbitrary number of decimal places.

A third party can say it of you under the assumption that all that exists is your mind. — Isaac

They'd be wrong.

1. John knows that Joe Biden is President
2. Joe Biden is 79 years old
3. Therefore, John knows that Joe Biden is 79 years old

Obviously the conclusion doesn't follow. The same with:

1. John knows that X, Y, and Z exist
2. Only X, Y, and Z exist
3. Therefore, John knows that only X, Y, and Z exist

The conclusion doesn't follow. And if John doesn't know that only X, Y, and Z exist then it doesn't follow that if he knows that none of X, Y, and Z are A then he knows that A doesn't exist.

I assume we are operating under Justified True Belief rules. Given that, I don't think your statement is true. A true statement would be "p is true, even though it could have been otherwise." — T Clark

How is the symbolic different to what I used?

Kp ∧ ◇¬p

If so, then there is not contradiction between "it is true" and "it is not necessarily true." — T Clark

I'm not saying that it's a contradiction? I'm just explaining that p → □p is not a valid inference.

Interesting quote from here:

The former president does not have authority to declassify such documents, intelligence sources say, because they are classified under statute rather than by executive order.

FBI seized classified records from Mar-a-Lago during search of Trump residence

According to the property receipt, reviewed by Fox News, FBI agents took approximately 20 boxes of items from the premises, including one set of documents marked as "Various classified/TS/SCI documents," which refers to top secret/ sensitive information.

The property receipt also shows that FBI agents collected four sets of top secret documents, three sets of secret documents, and three sets of confidential documents.

No, I specifically included the properties of what exists. And I've been through all this. You even asked me what it would mean and I replied that I consider God's nonexistence to be a property of the world (which exists). It is such that there's no thing in it matching the description of god. You ignored my reply completely and are now acting as if I hadn't said anything on the matter. — Isaac

The future is not a property of things that exist in the present. Neither are counterfactuals. Neither is the decimal notation of pi.

It is such that there's no thing in it matching the description of god.

You can't go from "nothing I know of is God" to "I know that God doesn't exist".

You're saying that if ontological solipsism is true then I know that God doesn't exist. — Michael

No. — Isaac

If I don't know that God doesn't exist then I don't know everything.

As I said before, you equivocate on the meaning of "what is the case". Given 1 and 2 it just refers to what exists, and so your conclusion is only that X is not wrong that Y exists. But that he is not wrong that Y exists isn't that he cannot be wrong. As I have repeatedly said, there is more to knowledge than just knowledge of what exists. There is knowledge of what doesn't exist, there is knowledge of what will happen in the future, there is knowledge of what could have happened, there is knowledge of maths. None of this knowledge is accounted for in your argument.

We're going round in circles. Nowhere in my argument do I claim, imply, or require deriving 2 from 1. — Isaac

You're saying that if ontological solipsism is true then I know that God doesn't exist.

Just saying it over and over is pointless. You're not my teacher. We're equals here, having a discussion (or supposed to be). I've tried to explain why I think they are valid inferences. I've even referenced that explanation twice now. You've not even acknowledged it, let alone addressed it. If you're just here to lecture me I'm not interested. — Isaac

We have to use free logic for this (classical logic doesn't allow for "p does not exist"):

1. ∀p: ∃x(x=p) → K(∃x(x=p))
2. ∀p: ¬∃x(x=p) → K(¬∃x(x=p))

There is no rule of inference that lets you derive 2 from 1.

Seeing as I haven't, I'm not sure why you're mentioning this. — Isaac

Ontological solipsism claims:

1. If Y exists then Y is a facet of my mind
2. If Y is a facet of my mind then I know that Y exists
3. Therefore, if Y exists then I know that Y exists

That's it. You, somehow, want to say that this entails:

4. If Y (e.g. God) does not exist then I know that Y does not exist

And even:

5. I know what will happen tomorrow
6. I know what would have happened had I done things differently
7. I know whether or not the Reimann hypothesis is true

But these are all invalid inferences. Ontological solipsism just doesn't entail that I know everything. It only entails that if Y exists then I know that Y exists. There is more to knowledge than just knowledge of what exists.

You can't go from:

1. If Y exists then X knows that Y exists

to:

2. If Y does not exist then X knows that Y does not exist

Ontological solipsism only entails 1. Your reasoning to 2 is fallacious.

5. Z then has to admit that in that possible world X cannot be wrong about what is the case (whether X knows this or not is irrelevant) — Isaac

You're equivocating. As per 1 and 2, "what is the case" is restricted to "Y exists". Hence you are only concluding:

If Y exists then X knows that Y exists

God's non-existence, the Reimann hypothesis, and being happy tomorrow aren't one of the Ys defined in 1 and assumed to exist in 2 (what would it even mean to say that God's non-existence exists?).

No, because the epistemic solipsists can further analyse what it would mean for X (that even if X didn't know they know, they would, in fact, know) and thereby need to reject the option. Having found they need to reject the option, they cannot coherently claim to also not know if it's true. — Isaac

Your reasoning is faulty.

1. If Y exists then X knows that Y exists
2. X knows that if Y exists then X knows that Y exists

1 does not entail 2. And nor does it entail any of these:

3. X knows that he will be happy tomorrow
4. X knows that the Riemann hypothesis is true
5. X knows that the Riemann hypothesis is false
6. X knows that had he chosen some other course of action then he would have been sad
7. X knows that God doesn't exist

I don't know how much simpler to explain this to you so if you can't understand this then we're never going to progress.

There can be no source of uncertainty other than from some state external to the system carrying out the inference. — Isaac

The square root of two is mind-independent even if only my mind exists. You conflate mind-independence with mind-independent existence. The solipsist rejects (knowledge of) mind-independent existence.

And there's uncertainty because of the logical argument I gave above:

1. Bp (premise)
2. ¬□p (premise)
3. Bp ∧ ◇¬p (from 1 and 2)

The soundness of this argument doesn't depend on something other than my mind existing.

My argument is about the version of us doing the assessment about the feasibility of those possible worlds. — Isaac

And yet you admitted that if only X's mind exists then X doesn't know that only his mind exists. I don't know what else I can tell you; you just admitted to epistemological solipsism.

Well. I'm sold. Super convincing argument. Well done. Have you considered a career in politics? — Isaac

I could say the same about your bare assertion that the square root of 2 and my future feelings would be directly available to my mind.

You, in that world, might not know, in that world, that all that exists is your mind — Isaac

And again, you refuted your own argument here. I don't know that all that exists is my mind. This, in fact, is epistemological solipsism.

You know exactly what the square root of two is, because it's available directly to your conscious mind. — Isaac

No it isn't.

Same with what you'll feel tomorrow.

And again, no.

Tarski doesn't deal in propositions. It's just sentences from two different languages, one that has a truth predicate and one that doesn't. It's not a definition of truth. — Tate

He does provide a definition of truth in The Semantic Conception of Truth:

Hence we arrive at a definition of truth and falsehood simply by saying that a sentence is true if it is satisfied by all objects, and false otherwise.